* ingela/inets/clean-white-space/OTP-13663:
  inets: Prepare for release
  inets: Handle multiple \t in mime types file

* ingela/maint/ssl/max-session-table/OTP-13490:
  ssl: Mitigate load increase when the whole session table is invalidated

* joedevivo/maint/ssl/PR-1063/OTP-13635:
  ssl:recv timeout() can be 0

* ingela/maint/ssl/tls-1.2-available-hashsigns/OTP-13670:
  ssl: ordsets:intersection/2 did not give the expected result

* kennethlakin/maint/tls-use-negotiated-prf/PR-1042/OTP-13546:
  ssl: Use cipher suite's PRF in prf/5

Use the negotiated cipher suite's PRF algorithm in calls to
ssl:prf/5, rather than a hard-coded one.

For TLS 1.0 the PRF algorithm was hard-coded to MD5/SHA1. This
was correct 100% of the time.

For TLS 1.1 and 1.2 the PRF algorithm was hard-coded to SHA256.
This was correct only some of the time for TLS 1.2 and none of the
time for TLS 1.1. Because the TLS handshake code calls tls_v1:prf/5
through another path, the handshaking process used the negotiated
PRF and did not encounter this bug.

A new test (prf) has been added to ssl_basic_SUITE to guard against future
breakage.