Merge branch 'ia/ssl/dtls-refactor/OTP-11292' into maint

* ia/ssl/dtls-refactor/OTP-11292:
  ssl: Refactor TLS/DTLS record handling
  ssl: Dialyzer fixes
  ssl: Solve rebase issues
  ssl: DTLS record handling
  ssl: Add DTLS record primitives
  ssl:  Refactor to provide common handshake functions for TLS/DTLS
  ssl: Add DTLS handshake primitivs.

22 files changed, 3671 insertions, 2357 deletions

diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/Makefile b/lib/ssl/src/Makefile
index cf9f7d5001..6744e2f256 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/Makefile
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/Makefile
@@ -58,15 +58,18 @@ MODULES= \
 	ssl_connection_sup \
 	tls_handshake \
 	dtls_handshake\
+	ssl_handshake\
 	ssl_manager \
 	ssl_session \
 	ssl_session_cache \
 	ssl_socket \
 	tls_record \
 	dtls_record \
-	ssl_ssl2 \
-	ssl_ssl3 \
-	ssl_tls1 \
+	ssl_record \
+	ssl_v2 \
+	ssl_v3 \
+	tls_v1 \
+	dtls_v1 \
 	ssl_tls_dist_proxy
 
 INTERNAL_HRL_FILES = \
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
index ac2ee0d09f..fda488501c 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
@@ -17,3 +17,325 @@
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
 -module(dtls_connection).
+
+%%-behaviour(gen_fsm).
+
+%% -include("dtls_handshake.hrl").
+%% -include("ssl_alert.hrl").
+%% -include("dtls_record.hrl").
+%% -include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+%% -include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+%% -include("ssl_srp.hrl").
+%% -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
+
+
+%% %% Called by dtls_connection_sup
+%% %%-export([start_link/7]).
+
+%% %% gen_fsm callbacks
+%% -export([init/1, hello/2, certify/2, cipher/2,
+%% 	 abbreviated/2, connection/2, handle_event/3,
+%%          handle_sync_event/4, handle_info/3, terminate/3, code_change/4]).
+
+%% -record(message_sequences, {
+%% 	  read = 0,
+%% 	  write = 0
+%% 	 }).
+
+%% -record(state, {
+%%           role,               % client | server
+%%           user_application,   % {MonitorRef, pid()}
+%%           transport_cb,       % atom() - callback module
+%%           data_tag,           % atom()  - ex tcp.
+%% 	  close_tag,          % atom()  - ex tcp_closed
+%% 	  error_tag,          % atom() - ex  tcp_error
+%%           host,               % string() | ipadress()
+%%           port,               % integer()
+%%           socket,             % socket()
+%%           ssl_options,        % #ssl_options{}
+%%           socket_options,     % #socket_options{}
+%%           connection_states,  % #connection_states{} from ssl_record.hrl
+%% 	  message_sequences = #message_sequences{},
+%% 	  dtls_packets = [],        % Not yet handled decode ssl/tls packets.
+%%           dtls_record_buffer,  % binary() buffer of incomplete records
+%%           dtls_handshake_buffer, % binary() buffer of incomplete handshakes
+%%           dtls_handshake_history, % tls_handshake_history()
+%%           dtls_cipher_texts,     % list() received but not deciphered yet
+%% 	  cert_db,              %
+%%           session,              % #session{} from tls_handshake.hrl
+%% 	  session_cache,        %
+%% 	  session_cache_cb,     %
+%%           negotiated_version,   % tls_version()
+%%           client_certificate_requested = false,
+%% 	  key_algorithm,       % atom as defined by cipher_suite
+%% 	  hashsign_algorithm,  % atom as defined by cipher_suite
+%%           public_key_info,     % PKIX: {Algorithm, PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}
+%%           private_key,         % PKIX: #'RSAPrivateKey'{}
+%% 	  diffie_hellman_params, % PKIX: #'DHParameter'{} relevant for server side
+%% 	  diffie_hellman_keys, % {PublicKey, PrivateKey}
+%% 	  psk_identity,        % binary() - server psk identity hint
+%% 	  srp_params,          % #srp_user{}
+%% 	  srp_keys,            % {PublicKey, PrivateKey}
+%%           premaster_secret,    %
+%% 	  file_ref_db,         % ets()
+%%           cert_db_ref,         % ref()
+%%           bytes_to_read,       % integer(), # bytes to read in passive mode
+%%           user_data_buffer,    % binary()
+%% 	  log_alert,           % boolean()
+%% 	  renegotiation,       % {boolean(), From | internal | peer}
+%% 	  start_or_recv_from,  % "gen_fsm From"
+%% 	  timer,               % start_or_recv_timer
+%% 	  send_queue,          % queue()
+%% 	  terminated = false,  %
+%% 	  allow_renegotiate = true,
+%%           expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false :: boolean(),
+%%           next_protocol = undefined :: undefined | binary(),
+%% 	  client_ecc,          % {Curves, PointFmt}
+%% 	  client_cookie = <<>>
+%% 	 }).
+
+
+
+%% %%====================================================================
+%% %% Internal application API
+%% %%====================================================================
+
+
+%% %%====================================================================
+%% %% State functions
+%% %%====================================================================
+
+%% -spec hello(start | #hello_request{} | #client_hello{} | #server_hello{} | term(),
+%% 	    #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% hello(start, #state{host = Host, port = Port, role = client,
+%% 			      ssl_options = SslOpts,
+%% 			      session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
+%% 			      session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
+%% 			      connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+%% 			      renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
+%% 			      client_cookie = Cookie} = State0) ->
+%%     Hello = dtls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, Cookie, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts,
+%% 				       Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert),
+
+%%     Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version,
+%%     State1 = State0#state{negotiated_version = Version, %% Requested version
+%% 			  session =
+%% 			      Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id},
+%% 			  dtls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history()},
+
+%%     State2 = send_flight(Hello, waiting, State1),
+
+%%     {Record, State} = next_record(State2),
+%%     next_state(hello, hello, Record, State);
+
+%% hello(start, #state{role = server} = State0) ->
+%%     {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
+%%     next_state(hello, hello, Record, State);
+
+%% hello(#hello_request{}, #state{role = client} = State0) ->
+%%     {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
+%%     next_state(hello, hello, Record, State);
+
+%% hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+%% 		    compression_method = Compression} = Hello,
+%%       #state{session = #session{session_id = OldId},
+%% 	     connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+%% 	     role = client,
+%% 	     negotiated_version = ReqVersion,
+%% 	     renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
+%% 	     ssl_options = SslOptions} = State1) ->
+%%     State0 = flight_done(State1),
+%%     case ssl_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOptions, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
+%% 	#alert{} = Alert ->
+%% 	    handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, hello, State0);
+%% 	{Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, NextProtocol} ->
+%% 	    {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} =
+%% 		ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
+
+%% 	    PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion, KeyAlgorithm),
+
+%% 	    NewNextProtocol = case NextProtocol of
+%% 				  undefined ->
+%% 				      State0#state.next_protocol;
+%% 				  _ ->
+%% 				      NextProtocol
+%% 			      end,
+
+%% 	    State = State0#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm,
+%% 				 hashsign_algorithm = default_hashsign(Version, KeyAlgorithm),
+%% 				 negotiated_version = Version,
+%% 				 connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+%% 				 premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
+%% 				 expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocol =/= undefined,
+%% 				 next_protocol = NewNextProtocol},
+
+%% 	    case ssl_session:is_new(OldId, NewId) of
+%% 		true ->
+%% 		    handle_new_session(NewId, CipherSuite, Compression,
+%% 				       State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates});
+%% 		false ->
+%% 		    handle_resumed_session(NewId, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates})
+%% 	    end
+%%     end;
+
+%% hello(#hello_verify_request{cookie = Cookie},
+%%       #state{host = Host, port = Port,
+%% 	     session = #session{own_certificate = Cert},
+%% 	     session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
+%% 	     ssl_options = SslOpts,
+%% 	     connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+%% 	     renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = State0) ->
+%%     Hello = ssl_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, Cookie, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts,
+%% 				       Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert),
+%%     State1 = State0#state{
+%% 	       tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
+%% 	       client_cookie = Cookie},
+%%     State2 = send_flight(Hello, waiting, State1),
+
+%%     {Record, State} = next_record(State2),
+%%     next_state(hello, hello, Record, State);
+
+%% hello(Hello = #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion},
+%%       State = #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+%% 		     port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
+%% 		     renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
+%% 		     session_cache = Cache,
+%% 		     session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
+%% 		     ssl_options = SslOpts}) ->
+%%     case ssl_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb,
+%% 				     ConnectionStates0, Cert}, Renegotiation) of
+%%         {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, ProtocolsToAdvertise,
+%% 	 EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} ->
+%%             do_server_hello(Type, ProtocolsToAdvertise,
+%% 			    EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves,
+%% 			    State#state{connection_states  = ConnectionStates,
+%% 					negotiated_version = Version,
+%% 					session = Session,
+%% 					client_ecc = {EllipticCurves, EcPointFormats}});
+%%         #alert{} = Alert ->
+%%             handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State)
+%%     end;
+
+%% hello(timeout, State) ->
+%%     { next_state, hello, State, hibernate };
+
+%% hello(Msg, State) ->
+%%     handle_unexpected_message(Msg, hello, State).
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% -spec abbreviated(#hello_request{} | #finished{} | term(),
+%% 		  #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+%% abbreviated(timeout, State) ->
+%%     { next_state, abbreviated, State, hibernate };
+
+%% abbreviated(Msg, State) ->
+%%     handle_unexpected_message(Msg, abbreviated, State).
+
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% -spec certify(#hello_request{} | #certificate{} |  #server_key_exchange{} |
+%% 	      #certificate_request{} | #server_hello_done{} | #client_key_exchange{} | term(),
+%% 	      #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+%% certify(timeout, State) ->
+%%     { next_state, certify, State, hibernate };
+
+%% certify(Msg, State) ->
+%%     handle_unexpected_message(Msg, certify, State).
+
+
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% -spec cipher(#hello_request{} | #certificate_verify{} | #finished{} | term(),
+%% 	     #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+%% cipher(timeout, State) ->
+%%     { next_state, cipher, State, hibernate };
+
+%% cipher(Msg, State) ->
+%%     handle_unexpected_message(Msg, cipher, State).
+
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% -spec connection(#hello_request{} | #client_hello{} | term(),
+%% 		 #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+%% connection(timeout, State) ->
+%%     {next_state, connection, State, hibernate};
+
+%% connection(Msg, State) ->
+%%     handle_unexpected_message(Msg, connection, State).
+
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% %%% Internal functions
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% handle_unexpected_message(Msg, Info, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
+%%     Alert =  ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE),
+%%     handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, {Info, Msg}, State).
+
+%% send_flight(HandshakeRec, FlightState, State) ->
+%%     send_flight(FlightState, buffer_flight(HandshakeRec, State)).
+
+%% send_flight(FlightState, State = #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+%% 					flight_buffer = Buffer}) ->
+
+%%     State1 = do_send_flight(queue:to_list(Buffer), [], State),
+%%     finish_send_flight(Version, FlightState, State1).
+
+%% resend_flight(State = #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+%% 			     flight_state = FlightState,
+%% 			     flight_buffer = Buffer})
+%%   when FlightState == finished; FlightState == waiting ->
+%%     State1 = do_send_flight(queue:to_list(Buffer), [], State),
+%%     finish_send_flight(Version, FlightState, State1);
+
+%% resend_flight(State) ->
+%%     State.
+
+%% flight_done(State) ->
+%%     cancel_dtls_retransmit_timer(State#state{flight_state = done,
+%% 					     flight_buffer = undefined}).
+
+%% do_send_flight([], BinMsgs, State = #state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket}) ->
+%%     Transport:send(Socket, lists:reverse(BinMsgs)),
+%%     State;
+%% do_send_flight([{Epoch, MsgSeq, HandshakeRec}|T], BinMsgs0,
+%% 	       State = #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+%% 			      connection_states = ConnectionStates0}) ->
+%%     CS0 = ssl_record:connection_state_by_epoch(ConnectionStates0, Epoch, write),
+%%     {BinMsgs, CS1} = encode_handshake_rec(HandshakeRec, Version, MsgSeq, BinMsgs0, CS0),
+%%     ConnectionStates1 = ssl_record:set_connection_state_by_epoch(ConnectionStates0, CS1, write),
+%%     do_send_flight(T, BinMsgs, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}).
+
+%% cancel_dtls_retransmit_timer(State = #state{dtls_retransmit_timer = TimerRef}) ->
+%%     cancel_timer(TimerRef),
+%%     State#state{dtls_retransmit_timer = undefined}.
+
+%% rearm_dtls_retransmit_timer(State = #state{dtls_retransmit_timer = undefined}) ->
+%%     TimerRef = erlang:start_timer(1000, self(), dtls_retransmit),
+%%     State#state{dtls_retransmit_timer = TimerRef};
+%% rearm_dtls_retransmit_timer(State) ->
+%%     State.
+
+%% finish_send_flight({254, _}, waiting, State) ->
+%%     TimerRef = erlang:start_timer(1000, self(), dtls_retransmit),
+%%     State#state{
+%%       dtls_retransmit_timer = TimerRef,
+%%       last_retransmit = timestamp(),
+%%       flight_state = waiting};
+
+%% finish_send_flight(_, FlightState, State) ->
+%%     State#state{flight_state = FlightState}.
+
+%% timestamp() ->
+%%     {Mega, Sec, Micro} = erlang:now(),
+%%     Mega * 1000000 * 1000 + Sec * 1000 + (Micro div 1000).
+
+%% encode_handshake_rec(HandshakeRec, Version, MsgSeq, BinMsgs0, CS0) ->
+%%     {_, Fragments} = ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version, MsgSeq, 1400),
+%%     lists:foldl(fun(F, {Bin, C0}) ->
+%% 			{B, C1} = ssl_record:encode_handshake(F, Version, C0),
+%% 		{[B|Bin], C1} end, {BinMsgs0, CS0}, Fragments).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl
index b25daa59d9..26e8ce7503 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl
@@ -16,3 +16,413 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 -module(dtls_handshake).
+
+-include("dtls_handshake.hrl").
+-include("dtls_record.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+
+-export([client_hello/9, hello/3, get_dtls_handshake/2,
+	 dtls_handshake_new_flight/1, dtls_handshake_new_epoch/1,
+	 encode_handshake/4]).
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Internal application API
+%%====================================================================
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec client_hello(host(), inet:port_number(), term(), #connection_states{},
+		   #ssl_options{}, integer(), atom(), boolean(), der_cert()) ->
+			  #client_hello{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a client hello message.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+client_hello(Host, Port, Cookie, ConnectionStates,
+	     #ssl_options{versions = Versions,
+			  ciphers = UserSuites
+			 } = SslOpts,
+	     Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert) ->
+    Version = dtls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions),
+    Pending = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    CipherSuites = ssl_handshake:available_suites(UserSuites, Version),
+
+    Extensions = ssl_handshake:client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites,
+						SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
+
+    Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert),
+
+    #client_hello{session_id = Id,
+		  client_version = Version,
+		  cipher_suites = ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(CipherSuites, Renegotiation),
+		  compression_methods = ssl_record:compressions(),
+		  random = SecParams#security_parameters.client_random,
+		  cookie = Cookie,
+		  extensions = Extensions
+		 }.
+
+hello(Address, Port,
+      #ssl_tls{epoch = _Epoch, record_seq = _Seq,
+	       version = Version} = Record) ->
+    {[{Hello, _}], _, _} =
+	get_dtls_handshake(Record,
+			   dtls_handshake_new_flight(undefined)),
+    #client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor},
+		  random = Random,
+		  session_id = SessionId,
+		  cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
+		  compression_methods = CompressionMethods} = Hello,
+    CookieData = [address_to_bin(Address, Port),
+		  <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor)>>,
+		  Random, SessionId, CipherSuites, CompressionMethods],
+    Cookie = crypto:hmac(sha, <<"secret">>, CookieData),
+
+    case Hello of
+	#client_hello{cookie = Cookie} ->
+	    accept;
+	_ ->
+	    %% generate HelloVerifyRequest
+	    HelloVerifyRequest = encode_handshake(#hello_verify_request{protocol_version = Version,
+									  cookie = Cookie},
+						    Version, 0, 1400),
+	    {reply, HelloVerifyRequest}
+    end.
+
+address_to_bin({A,B,C,D}, Port) ->
+    <<0:80,16#ffff:16,A,B,C,D,Port:16>>;
+address_to_bin({A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H}, Port) ->
+    <<A:16,B:16,C:16,D:16,E:16,F:16,G:16,H:16,Port:16>>.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_handshake(Package, Version, MsgSeq, Mss) ->
+    {MsgType, Bin} = enc_hs(Package, Version),
+    Len = byte_size(Bin),
+    HsHistory = [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), ?uint16(MsgSeq), ?uint24(0), ?uint24(Len), Bin],
+    BinMsg = dtls_split_handshake(Mss, MsgType, Len, MsgSeq, Bin, 0, []),
+    {HsHistory, BinMsg}.
+
+%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec get_dtls_handshake(#ssl_tls{}, #dtls_hs_state{} | binary()) ->
+     {[dtls_handshake()], #ssl_tls{}}.
+%
+% Description: Given a DTLS state and new data from ssl_record, collects
+% and returns it as a list of handshake messages, also returns a new
+% DTLS state
+%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+% get_dtls_handshake(Record, <<>>) ->
+%     get_dtls_handshake_aux(Record, dtls_hs_state_init());
+get_dtls_handshake(Record, HsState) ->
+    get_dtls_handshake_aux(Record, HsState).
+
+%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec dtls_handshake_new_epoch(#dtls_hs_state{}) -> #dtls_hs_state{}.
+%
+% Description: Reset the DTLS decoder state for a new Epoch
+%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+% dtls_handshake_new_epoch(<<>>) ->
+%     dtls_hs_state_init();
+dtls_handshake_new_epoch(HsState) ->
+    HsState#dtls_hs_state{highest_record_seq = 0,
+			  starting_read_seq = HsState#dtls_hs_state.current_read_seq,
+			  fragments = gb_trees:empty(), completed = []}.
+
+%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec dtls_handshake_new_flight(integer() | undefined) -> #dtls_hs_state{}.
+%
+% Description: Init the DTLS decoder state for a new Flight
+dtls_handshake_new_flight(ExpectedReadReq) ->
+    #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = ExpectedReadReq,
+		   highest_record_seq = 0,
+		   starting_read_seq = 0,
+		   fragments = gb_trees:empty(), completed = []}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+dtls_split_handshake(Mss, MsgType, Len, MsgSeq, Bin, Offset, Acc)
+  when byte_size(Bin) + 12 < Mss ->
+    FragmentLen = byte_size(Bin),
+    BinMsg = [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), ?uint16(MsgSeq), ?uint24(Offset), ?uint24(FragmentLen), Bin],
+    lists:reverse([BinMsg|Acc]);
+dtls_split_handshake(Mss, MsgType, Len, MsgSeq, Bin, Offset, Acc) ->
+    FragmentLen = Mss - 12,
+    <<Fragment:FragmentLen/bytes, Rest/binary>> = Bin,
+    BinMsg = [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), ?uint16(MsgSeq), ?uint24(Offset), ?uint24(FragmentLen), Fragment],
+    dtls_split_handshake(Mss, MsgType, Len, MsgSeq, Rest, Offset + FragmentLen, [BinMsg|Acc]).
+
+get_dtls_handshake_aux(#ssl_tls{version = Version,
+				record_seq = SeqNo,
+				fragment = Data}, HsState) ->
+    get_dtls_handshake_aux(Version, SeqNo, Data, HsState).
+
+get_dtls_handshake_aux(Version, SeqNo,
+		       <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length),
+			 ?UINT16(MessageSeq),
+			 ?UINT24(FragmentOffset), ?UINT24(FragmentLength),
+			 Body:FragmentLength/binary, Rest/binary>>,
+		       HsState0) ->
+    case reassemble_dtls_fragment(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+				 FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+				 Body, HsState0) of
+	{retransmit, HsState1} ->
+	    case Rest of
+		<<>> ->
+		    {retransmit, HsState1};
+		_ ->
+		    get_dtls_handshake_aux(Version, SeqNo, Rest, HsState1)
+	    end;
+	{HsState1, HighestSeqNo, MsgBody} ->
+	    HsState2 = dec_dtls_fragment(Version, HighestSeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq, MsgBody, HsState1),
+	    HsState3 = process_dtls_fragments(Version, HsState2),
+	    get_dtls_handshake_aux(Version, SeqNo, Rest, HsState3);
+	HsState2 ->
+	    HsState3 = process_dtls_fragments(Version, HsState2),
+	    get_dtls_handshake_aux(Version, SeqNo, Rest, HsState3)
+    end;
+
+get_dtls_handshake_aux(_Version, _SeqNo, <<>>, HsState) ->
+    {lists:reverse(HsState#dtls_hs_state.completed),
+     HsState#dtls_hs_state.highest_record_seq,
+     HsState#dtls_hs_state{completed = []}}.
+
+dec_dtls_fragment(Version, SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq, MsgBody,
+		  HsState = #dtls_hs_state{highest_record_seq = HighestSeqNo, completed = Acc}) ->
+    Raw = <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), ?UINT16(MessageSeq), ?UINT24(0), ?UINT24(Length), MsgBody/binary>>,
+    H = decode_handshake(Version, Type, MsgBody),
+    HsState#dtls_hs_state{completed = [{H,Raw}|Acc], highest_record_seq = erlang:max(HighestSeqNo, SeqNo)}.
+
+process_dtls_fragments(Version,
+		       HsState0 = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq,
+						 fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    case gb_trees:is_empty(Fragments0) of
+	true ->
+	    HsState0;
+	_ ->
+	    case gb_trees:smallest(Fragments0) of
+		{CurrentReadSeq, {SeqNo, Type, Length, CurrentReadSeq, {Length, [{0, Length}], MsgBody}}} ->
+		    HsState1 = dtls_hs_state_process_seq(HsState0),
+		    HsState2 = dec_dtls_fragment(Version, SeqNo, Type, Length, CurrentReadSeq, MsgBody, HsState1),
+		    process_dtls_fragments(Version, HsState2);
+		_ ->
+		    HsState0
+	    end
+    end.
+
+dtls_hs_state_process_seq(HsState0 = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq,
+						    fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    Fragments1 = gb_trees:delete_any(CurrentReadSeq, Fragments0),
+    HsState0#dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq + 1,
+			   fragments = Fragments1}.
+
+dtls_hs_state_add_fragment(MessageSeq, Fragment, HsState0 = #dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    Fragments1 = gb_trees:enter(MessageSeq, Fragment, Fragments0),
+    HsState0#dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments1}.
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq, 0, Length,
+			 Body, HsState0 = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = undefined})
+  when Type == ?CLIENT_HELLO;
+       Type == ?SERVER_HELLO;
+       Type == ?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST ->
+    %% First message, should be client hello
+    %% return the current message and set the next expected Sequence
+    %%
+    %% Note: this could (should?) be restricted further, ClientHello and
+    %%       HelloVerifyRequest have to have message_seq = 0, ServerHello
+    %%       can have a message_seq of 0 or 1
+    %%
+    {HsState0#dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = MessageSeq + 1}, SeqNo, Body};
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(_SeqNo, _Type, Length, _MessageSeq, _, Length,
+			 _Body, HsState = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = undefined}) ->
+    %% not what we expected, drop it
+    HsState;
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(SeqNo, _Type, Length, MessageSeq, 0, Length,
+			 Body, HsState0 =
+			     #dtls_hs_state{starting_read_seq = StartingReadSeq})
+  when MessageSeq < StartingReadSeq ->
+    %% this has to be the start of a new flight, let it through
+    %%
+    %% Note: this could (should?) be restricted further, the first message of a
+    %%       new flight has to have message_seq = 0
+    %%
+    HsState = dtls_hs_state_process_seq(HsState0),
+    {HsState, SeqNo, Body};
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(_SeqNo, _Type, Length, MessageSeq, 0, Length,
+			 _Body, HsState =
+			     #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq})
+  when MessageSeq < CurrentReadSeq ->
+    {retransmit, HsState};
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(_SeqNo, _Type, Length, MessageSeq, 0, Length,
+			 _Body, HsState = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq})
+  when MessageSeq < CurrentReadSeq ->
+    HsState;
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(SeqNo, _Type, Length, MessageSeq, 0, Length,
+			 Body, HsState0 = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = MessageSeq}) ->
+    %% Message fully contained and it's the current seq
+    HsState1 = dtls_hs_state_process_seq(HsState0),
+    {HsState1, SeqNo, Body};
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq, 0, Length,
+			 Body, HsState) ->
+    %% Message fully contained and it's the NOT the current seq -> buffer
+    Fragment = {SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+		dtls_fragment_init(Length, 0, Length, Body)},
+    dtls_hs_state_add_fragment(MessageSeq, Fragment, HsState);
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(_SeqNo, _Type, Length, MessageSeq, FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+			 _Body,
+			 HsState = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq})
+  when FragmentOffset + FragmentLength == Length andalso MessageSeq == (CurrentReadSeq - 1) ->
+    {retransmit, HsState};
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(_SeqNo, _Type, _Length, MessageSeq, _FragmentOffset, _FragmentLength,
+			 _Body,
+			 HsState = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq})
+  when MessageSeq < CurrentReadSeq ->
+    HsState;
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+			 FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+			 Body,
+			 HsState = #dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    case gb_trees:lookup(MessageSeq, Fragments0) of
+	{value, Fragment} ->
+	    dtls_fragment_reassemble(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+				     FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+				     Body, Fragment, HsState);
+	none ->
+	    dtls_fragment_start(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+				FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+				Body, HsState)
+    end.
+
+dtls_fragment_start(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+				FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+				Body, HsState = #dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    Fragment = {SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+		dtls_fragment_init(Length, FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Body)},
+    Fragments1 = gb_trees:insert(MessageSeq, Fragment, Fragments0),
+    HsState#dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments1}.
+
+dtls_fragment_reassemble(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+			 FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+			 Body,
+			 {LastSeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq, FragBuffer0},
+			 HsState = #dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    FragBuffer1 = dtls_fragment_add(FragBuffer0, FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Body),
+    Fragment = {erlang:max(SeqNo, LastSeqNo), Type, Length, MessageSeq, FragBuffer1},
+    Fragments1 = gb_trees:enter(MessageSeq, Fragment, Fragments0),
+    HsState#dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments1};
+
+%% Type, Length or Seq mismatch, drop everything...
+%% Note: the RFC is not clear on how to handle this...
+dtls_fragment_reassemble(_SeqNo, _Type, _Length, MessageSeq,
+			 _FragmentOffset, _FragmentLength, _Body, _Fragment,
+			 HsState = #dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    Fragments1 = gb_trees:delete_any(MessageSeq, Fragments0),
+    HsState#dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments1}.
+
+dtls_fragment_add({Length, FragmentList0, Bin0}, FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Body) ->
+    Bin1 = dtls_fragment_bin_add(FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Body, Bin0),
+    FragmentList1 = add_fragment(FragmentList0, {FragmentOffset, FragmentLength}),
+    {Length, FragmentList1, Bin1}.
+
+dtls_fragment_init(Length, 0, Length, Body) ->
+    {Length, [{0, Length}], Body};
+dtls_fragment_init(Length, FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Body) ->
+    Bin = dtls_fragment_bin_add(FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Body, <<0:(Length*8)>>),
+    {Length, [{FragmentOffset, FragmentLength}], Bin}.
+
+dtls_fragment_bin_add(FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Add, Buffer) ->
+    <<First:FragmentOffset/bytes, _:FragmentLength/bytes, Rest/binary>> = Buffer,
+    <<First/binary, Add/binary, Rest/binary>>.
+
+merge_fragment_list([], Fragment, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse([Fragment|Acc]);
+
+merge_fragment_list([H = {_, HEnd}|Rest], Frag = {FStart, _}, Acc)
+  when FStart > HEnd ->
+    merge_fragment_list(Rest, Frag, [H|Acc]);
+
+merge_fragment_list(Rest = [{HStart, _HEnd}|_], Frag = {_FStart, FEnd}, Acc)
+  when FEnd < HStart ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc) ++ [Frag|Rest];
+
+merge_fragment_list([{HStart, HEnd}|Rest], _Frag = {FStart, FEnd}, Acc)
+  when
+      FStart =< HEnd orelse FEnd >= HStart ->
+    Start = erlang:min(HStart, FStart),
+    End = erlang:max(HEnd, FEnd),
+    NewFrag = {Start, End},
+    merge_fragment_list(Rest, NewFrag, Acc).
+
+add_fragment(List, {FragmentOffset, FragmentLength}) ->
+    merge_fragment_list(List, {FragmentOffset, FragmentOffset + FragmentLength}, []).
+
+enc_hs(#hello_verify_request{protocol_version = {Major, Minor},
+			     cookie = Cookie}, _Version) ->
+    CookieLength = byte_size(Cookie),
+    {?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
+			      ?BYTE(CookieLength),
+			      Cookie/binary>>};
+
+enc_hs(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor},
+		     random = Random,
+		     session_id = SessionID,
+		     cookie = Cookie,
+		     cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
+		     compression_methods = CompMethods,
+		     extensions = HelloExtensions}, Version) ->
+    SIDLength = byte_size(SessionID),
+    BinCookie = enc_client_hello_cookie(Version, Cookie),
+    BinCompMethods = list_to_binary(CompMethods),
+    CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods),
+    BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites),
+    CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites),
+    ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions),
+
+    {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+		      ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary,
+		      BinCookie/binary,
+				?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary,
+		      ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>};
+enc_hs(HandshakeMsg, Version) ->
+    ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version).
+
+enc_client_hello_cookie(_, <<>>) ->
+    <<>>;
+enc_client_hello_cookie(_, Cookie) ->
+    CookieLength = byte_size(Cookie),
+    <<?BYTE(CookieLength), Cookie/binary>>.
+
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+		       ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
+		       ?BYTE(Cookie_length), Cookie:Cookie_length/binary,
+		       ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary,
+		       ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary,
+		       Extensions/binary>>) ->
+
+    DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(Extensions),
+
+    #client_hello{
+       client_version = {Major,Minor},
+       random = Random,
+       session_id = Session_ID,
+       cookie = Cookie,
+       cipher_suites = ssl_handshake:decode_suites('2_bytes', CipherSuites),
+       compression_methods = Comp_methods,
+       extensions = DecodedExtensions
+      };
+
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
+					  ?BYTE(CookieLength), Cookie:CookieLength/binary>>) ->
+
+    #hello_verify_request{
+       protocol_version = {Major,Minor},
+       cookie = Cookie};
+decode_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg) ->
+    ssl_handshake:decode_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl
index db7b8596ae..5bdf45f627 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
 
 -include("ssl_handshake.hrl"). %% Common TLS and DTLS records and Constantes
 
+-define(HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, 3).
+
 -record(client_hello, {
 	  client_version,
 	  random,             
@@ -35,16 +37,22 @@
 	  cipher_suites,       % cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>
 	  compression_methods, % compression_methods<1..2^8-1>,
 	  %% Extensions
-	  renegotiation_info,
-	  hash_signs,          % supported combinations of hashes/signature algos
-	  next_protocol_negotiation = undefined % [binary()]
+	  extensions
 	 }).
 
--record(hello_verify_request  {
+-record(hello_verify_request, {
 	  protocol_version,
 	  cookie
 	 }).
 
--define(HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, 3).
+-record(dtls_hs_state,
+	{current_read_seq,
+	 starting_read_seq,
+	 highest_record_seq,
+	 fragments,
+	 completed
+	}).
+
+-type dtls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | #hello_verify_request{} | ssl_handshake().
 
 -endif. % -ifdef(dtls_handshake).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
index 2469a7d26c..f667458a10 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
@@ -15,4 +15,370 @@
 %% under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
+
+%%
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: Handle DTLS record protocol. (Parts that are not shared with SSL/TLS)
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 -module(dtls_record).
+
+-include("dtls_record.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
+-include("dtls_handshake.hrl").
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+
+%% Handling of incoming data
+-export([get_dtls_records/2]).
+
+%% Decoding
+-export([decode_cipher_text/2]).
+
+%% Encoding
+-export([encode_plain_text/4]).
+
+%% Protocol version handling
+-export([protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/2,
+	 highest_protocol_version/1, supported_protocol_versions/0,
+	 is_acceptable_version/2, cipher/4, decipher/2]).
+
+-export([init_connection_state_seq/2, current_connection_state_epoch/2,
+	 set_connection_state_by_epoch/3, connection_state_by_epoch/3]).
+
+-compile(inline).
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Internal application API
+%%====================================================================
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec get_dtls_records(binary(), binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Given old buffer and new data from UDP/SCTP, packs up a records
+%% and returns it as a list of tls_compressed binaries also returns leftover
+%% data
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+get_dtls_records(Data, <<>>) ->
+    get_dtls_records_aux(Data, []);
+get_dtls_records(Data, Buffer) ->
+    get_dtls_records_aux(list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), []).
+
+get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?APPLICATION_DATA),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer),
+		       ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber),
+		       ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>,
+		     Acc) ->
+    get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA,
+					 version = {MajVer, MinVer},
+					 epoch = Epoch, record_seq = SequenceNumber,
+					 fragment = Data} | Acc]);
+get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?HANDSHAKE),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer),
+		       ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber),
+		       ?UINT16(Length),
+		       Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) when MajVer >= 128 ->
+    get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE,
+					 version = {MajVer, MinVer},
+					 epoch = Epoch, record_seq = SequenceNumber,
+					 fragment = Data} | Acc]);
+get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?ALERT),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer),
+		       ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber),
+		       ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary,
+		       Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT,
+					 version = {MajVer, MinVer},
+					 epoch = Epoch, record_seq = SequenceNumber,
+					 fragment = Data} | Acc]);
+get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer),
+		       ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber),
+		       ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>,
+		     Acc) ->
+    get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+					 version = {MajVer, MinVer},
+					 epoch = Epoch, record_seq = SequenceNumber,
+					 fragment = Data} | Acc]);
+
+get_dtls_records_aux(<<0:1, _CT:7, ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer),
+		       ?UINT16(Length), _/binary>>,
+		     _Acc) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW);
+
+get_dtls_records_aux(<<1:1, Length0:15, _/binary>>,_Acc)
+  when Length0 > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW);
+
+get_dtls_records_aux(Data, Acc) ->
+    case size(Data) =< ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH + ?INITIAL_BYTES of
+	true ->
+	    {lists:reverse(Acc), Data};
+	false ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE)
+    end.
+
+encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data,
+		  #connection_state{
+		     compression_state = CompS0,
+		     epoch = Epoch,
+		     sequence_number = Seq,
+		     security_parameters=
+			 #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg}
+		    }= CS0) ->
+    {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0),
+    CS1 = CS0#connection_state{compression_state = CompS1},
+    {CipherText, CS2} = cipher(Type, Version, Comp, CS1),
+    CTBin = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, Epoch, Seq, CipherText),
+    {CTBin, CS2}.
+
+decode_cipher_text(CipherText, ConnnectionStates0) ->
+    ReadState0 = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states.current_read,
+    #connection_state{compression_state = CompressionS0,
+		      security_parameters = SecParams} = ReadState0,
+    CompressAlg = SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm,
+   case decipher(CipherText, ReadState0) of
+       {Compressed, ReadState1} ->
+	   {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompressAlg,
+					       Compressed, CompressionS0),
+	   ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states{
+				 current_read = ReadState1#connection_state{
+						  compression_state = CompressionS1}},
+	   {Plain, ConnnectionStates};
+       #alert{} = Alert ->
+	   Alert
+   end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec protocol_version(tls_atom_version() | tls_version()) ->
+			      tls_version() | tls_atom_version().
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a protocol version record from a version atom
+%% or vice versa.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+protocol_version('dtlsv1.2') ->
+    {254, 253};
+protocol_version(dtlsv1) ->
+    {254, 255};
+protocol_version({254, 253}) ->
+    'dtlsv1.2';
+protocol_version({254, 255}) ->
+    dtlsv1.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec lowest_protocol_version(tls_version(), tls_version()) -> tls_version().
+%%
+%% Description: Lowes protocol version of two given versions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+lowest_protocol_version(Version = {M, N}, {M, O}) when N > O ->
+    Version;
+lowest_protocol_version({M, _}, Version = {M, _}) ->
+    Version;
+lowest_protocol_version(Version = {M,_}, {N, _}) when M > N ->
+    Version;
+lowest_protocol_version(_,Version) ->
+    Version.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec highest_protocol_version([tls_version()]) -> tls_version().
+%%
+%% Description: Highest protocol version present in a list
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+highest_protocol_version([Ver | Vers]) ->
+    highest_protocol_version(Ver, Vers).
+
+highest_protocol_version(Version, []) ->
+    Version;
+highest_protocol_version(Version = {N, M}, [{N, O} | Rest])   when M < O ->
+    highest_protocol_version(Version, Rest);
+highest_protocol_version({M, _}, [Version = {M, _} | Rest]) ->
+    highest_protocol_version(Version, Rest);
+highest_protocol_version(Version = {M,_}, [{N,_} | Rest])  when M < N ->
+    highest_protocol_version(Version, Rest);
+highest_protocol_version(_, [Version | Rest]) ->
+    highest_protocol_version(Version, Rest).
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec supported_protocol_versions() -> [tls_version()].
+%%
+%% Description: Protocol versions supported
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+supported_protocol_versions() ->
+    Fun = fun(Version) ->
+		  protocol_version(Version)
+	  end,
+    case application:get_env(ssl, dtls_protocol_version) of
+	undefined ->
+	    lists:map(Fun, supported_protocol_versions([]));
+	{ok, []} ->
+	    lists:map(Fun, supported_protocol_versions([]));
+	{ok, Vsns} when is_list(Vsns) ->
+	    supported_protocol_versions(Vsns);
+	{ok, Vsn} ->
+	    supported_protocol_versions([Vsn])
+     end.
+
+supported_protocol_versions([]) ->
+    Vsns = supported_connection_protocol_versions([]),
+    application:set_env(ssl, dtls_protocol_version, Vsns),
+    Vsns;
+
+supported_protocol_versions([_|_] = Vsns) ->
+    Vsns.
+
+supported_connection_protocol_versions([]) ->
+    ?ALL_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec is_acceptable_version(tls_version(), Supported :: [tls_version()]) -> boolean().
+%%
+%% Description: ssl version 2 is not acceptable security risks are too big.
+%%
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) ->
+    lists:member(Version, Versions).
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec init_connection_state_seq(tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+				       #connection_state{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Copy the read sequence number to the write sequence number
+%% This is only valid for DTLS in the first client_hello
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+init_connection_state_seq({254, _},
+			  #connection_states{
+			     current_read = Read = #connection_state{epoch = 0},
+			     current_write = Write = #connection_state{epoch = 0}} = CS0) ->
+    CS0#connection_states{current_write =
+			      Write#connection_state{
+				sequence_number = Read#connection_state.sequence_number}};
+init_connection_state_seq(_, CS) ->
+    CS.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------
+-spec current_connection_state_epoch(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
+					    integer().
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the epoch the connection_state record
+%% that is currently defined as the current conection state.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+current_connection_state_epoch(#connection_states{current_read = Current},
+			       read) ->
+    Current#connection_state.epoch;
+current_connection_state_epoch(#connection_states{current_write = Current},
+			       write) ->
+    Current#connection_state.epoch.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-spec connection_state_by_epoch(#connection_states{}, integer(), read | write) ->
+				      #connection_state{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the instance of the connection_state record
+%% that is defined by the Epoch.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+connection_state_by_epoch(#connection_states{current_read = CS}, Epoch, read)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    CS;
+connection_state_by_epoch(#connection_states{pending_read = CS}, Epoch, read)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    CS;
+connection_state_by_epoch(#connection_states{current_write = CS}, Epoch, write)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    CS;
+connection_state_by_epoch(#connection_states{pending_write = CS}, Epoch, write)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    CS.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_connection_state_by_epoch(#connection_states{},
+				    #connection_state{}, read | write) -> ok.
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the instance of the connection_state record
+%% that is defined by the Epoch.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_connection_state_by_epoch(ConnectionStates0 =
+				  #connection_states{current_read = CS},
+			      NewCS = #connection_state{epoch = Epoch}, read)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    ConnectionStates0#connection_states{current_read = NewCS};
+
+set_connection_state_by_epoch(ConnectionStates0 =
+				  #connection_states{pending_read = CS},
+			      NewCS = #connection_state{epoch = Epoch}, read)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    ConnectionStates0#connection_states{pending_read = NewCS};
+
+set_connection_state_by_epoch(ConnectionStates0 =
+				  #connection_states{current_write = CS},
+			      NewCS = #connection_state{epoch = Epoch}, write)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    ConnectionStates0#connection_states{current_write = NewCS};
+
+set_connection_state_by_epoch(ConnectionStates0 =
+				  #connection_states{pending_write = CS},
+			      NewCS = #connection_state{epoch = Epoch}, write)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    ConnectionStates0#connection_states{pending_write = NewCS}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Epoch, Seq, Fragment) ->
+    Length = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
+    [<<?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Epoch),
+       ?UINT48(Seq), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Fragment].
+
+cipher(Type, Version, Fragment, CS0) ->
+    Length = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
+    {MacHash, CS1=#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS0,
+				    security_parameters=
+					#security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm =
+								 BCA}
+				   }} =
+	hash_and_bump_seqno(CS0, Type, Version, Length, Fragment),
+    {Ciphered, CipherS1} = ssl_cipher:cipher(BCA, CipherS0, MacHash, Fragment, Version),
+    CS2 = CS1#connection_state{cipher_state=CipherS1},
+    {Ciphered, CS2}.
+
+decipher(TLS=#ssl_tls{type=Type, version=Version={254, _},
+		      epoch = Epoch, record_seq = SeqNo,
+		      fragment=Fragment}, CS0) ->
+    SP = CS0#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    BCA = SP#security_parameters.bulk_cipher_algorithm,
+    HashSz = SP#security_parameters.hash_size,
+    CipherS0 = CS0#connection_state.cipher_state,
+    case ssl_cipher:decipher(BCA, HashSz, CipherS0, Fragment, Version) of
+	{T, Mac, CipherS1} ->
+	    CS1 = CS0#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1},
+	    TLength = size(T),
+	    MacHash = hash_with_seqno(CS1, Type, Version, Epoch, SeqNo, TLength, T),
+	    case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of
+		true ->
+		    {TLS#ssl_tls{fragment = T}, CS1};
+		false ->
+		    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+	    end;
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert
+    end.
+
+hash_with_seqno(#connection_state{mac_secret = MacSecret,
+				 security_parameters =
+				     SecPars},
+	       Type, Version = {254, _},
+	       Epoch, SeqNo, Length, Fragment) ->
+    mac_hash(Version,
+	     SecPars#security_parameters.mac_algorithm,
+	     MacSecret, (Epoch bsl 48) + SeqNo, Type,
+	     Length, Fragment).
+
+hash_and_bump_seqno(#connection_state{epoch = Epoch,
+				      sequence_number = SeqNo,
+				      mac_secret = MacSecret,
+				      security_parameters =
+				      SecPars} = CS0,
+		    Type, Version = {254, _}, Length, Fragment) ->
+    Hash = mac_hash(Version,
+		    SecPars#security_parameters.mac_algorithm,
+		    MacSecret, (Epoch bsl 48) + SeqNo, Type,
+		    Length, Fragment),
+    {Hash, CS0#connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo+1}}.
+
+mac_hash(Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) ->
+    dtls_v1:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Version,
+		     Length, Fragment).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c12e12e424
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
+%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
+%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
+%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
+%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%%
+%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
+%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
+%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
+%% under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+-module(dtls_v1).
+
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+
+-export([suites/1, mac_hash/7, ecc_curves/1, corresponding_tls_version/1]).
+
+-spec suites(Minor:: 253|255) -> [cipher_suite()].
+
+suites(Minor) ->
+   tls_v1:suites(corresponding_minor_tls_version(Minor)).
+
+mac_hash(Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) ->
+    tls_v1:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Version,
+		    Length, Fragment).
+
+ecc_curves({_Major, Minor}) ->
+    tls_v1:ecc_curves(corresponding_minor_tls_version(Minor)).
+
+corresponding_tls_version({254, Minor}) ->
+    {3, corresponding_minor_tls_version(Minor)}.
+
+corresponding_minor_tls_version(255) ->
+    2;
+corresponding_minor_tls_version(253) ->
+    3.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src
index 582a60635f..44798f8c12 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src
@@ -3,40 +3,44 @@
     {vsn, "%VSN%"},
     {modules, [
 	       %% TLS/SSL 
-	       tls,
 	       tls_connection,
 	       tls_handshake,
 	       tls_record,
+	       tls_v1,
+	       ssl_v3,
+	       ssl_v2,
 	       %% DTLS
-	       dtls_record,
-	       dtls_handshake,
 	       dtls_connection,
-	       dtls,	
-	       %% Backwards compatibility
+	       dtls_handshake,
+	       dtls_record,
+	       dtls_v1,
+	       %% API
+	       tls, %% Future API module
+	       dtls, %% Future API module
                ssl,
+	       ssl_session_cache_api,
 	       %% Both TLS/SSL and DTLS
-	       ssl_app,
-	       ssl_sup,
+	       ssl_handshake,
+	       ssl_record,
+	       ssl_cipher,
+	       ssl_srp_primes,
+	       ssl_alert,
+	       ssl_socket,
+	       %%ssl_connection,
+	       %% Erlang Distribution over SSL/TLS
 	       inet_tls_dist,
 	       ssl_tls_dist_proxy,
 	       ssl_dist_sup,
-	       ssl_tls1,
-	       ssl_ssl3,
-	       ssl_ssl2,
+	       %% SSL/TLS session handling
 	       ssl_session,
-	       ssl_session_cache_api,
 	       ssl_session_cache,
-	       ssl_socket,	
-	       %%ssl_record,
 	       ssl_manager,
-	       %%ssl_handshake,
-	       ssl_connection_sup,
-	       %%ssl_connection,
-	       ssl_cipher,
-	       ssl_srp_primes,
 	       ssl_pkix_db,
 	       ssl_certificate,
-	       ssl_alert
+	       %% App structure
+	       ssl_app,
+	       ssl_sup,
+	       ssl_connection_sup
 	       ]},
     {registered, [ssl_sup, ssl_manager]},
     {applications, [crypto, public_key, kernel, stdlib]},
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
index 09aad8e414..6513042e98 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 -include("ssl_alert.hrl").
 -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
 
--export([security_parameters/3, suite_definition/1,
+-export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, suite_definition/1,
 	 decipher/5, cipher/5,
 	 suite/1, suites/1, anonymous_suites/0, psk_suites/1, srp_suites/0,
 	 openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1, filter/2, filter_suites/1,
@@ -41,7 +41,17 @@
 -compile(inline).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec security_parameters(tls_version(), cipher_suite(), #security_parameters{}) ->
+-spec security_parameters(cipher_suite(), #security_parameters{}) ->
+				 #security_parameters{}.
+%% Only security_parameters/2 should call security_parameters/3 with undefined as
+%% first argument.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+security_parameters(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL = CipherSuite, SecParams) ->
+    security_parameters(undefined, CipherSuite, SecParams).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec security_parameters(tls_version() | undefined, cipher_suite(), #security_parameters{}) ->
 				 #security_parameters{}.
 %%
 %% Description: Returns a security parameters record where the
@@ -195,9 +205,9 @@ block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0,
 %% Description: Returns a list of supported cipher suites.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 suites({3, 0}) ->
-    ssl_ssl3:suites();
+    ssl_v3:suites();
 suites({3, N}) ->
-    ssl_tls1:suites(N).
+    tls_v1:suites(N).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec anonymous_suites() -> [cipher_suite()].
@@ -1192,15 +1202,15 @@ hash_size(md5) ->
 hash_size(sha) ->
     20;
 %% Uncomment when adding cipher suite that needs it
-hash_size(sha224) ->
-    28;
+%hash_size(sha224) ->
+%    28;
 hash_size(sha256) ->
     32;
 hash_size(sha384) ->
-    48;
+    48.
 %% Uncomment when adding cipher suite that needs it
-hash_size(sha512) ->
-    64.
+%hash_size(sha512) ->
+%    64.
 
 %% RFC 5246: 6.2.3.2.  CBC Block Cipher
 %%
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl
index c7c71ee1a7..62a5269def 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@
 
 -type cipher()            :: null |rc4_128 | idea_cbc | des40_cbc | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' 
 			   | aes_128_cbc |  aes_256_cbc.
--type hash()              :: null | sha | md5 | ssh224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512.
+-type hash()              :: null | sha | md5 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512.
+-type key_algo()          :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon.
 -type erl_cipher_suite()  :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()}.
 -type int_cipher_suite()  :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash(), hash() | default_prf}.
 -type cipher_suite()      :: binary().
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..29a8996bd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,1650 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
+%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
+%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
+%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
+%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%%
+%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
+%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
+%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
+%% under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+
+%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: Help funtions for handling the SSL-handshake protocol (common
+%% to SSL/TLS and DTLS
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-module(ssl_handshake).
+
+-include("ssl_handshake.hrl").
+-include("ssl_record.hrl").
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_srp.hrl").
+-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
+
+%% Handshake messages
+-export([hello_request/0, server_hello_done/0,
+	 certificate/4, certificate_request/4, key_exchange/3,
+	 finished/5,  next_protocol/1]).
+
+%% Handle handshake messages
+-export([certify/7, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5,
+	 master_secret/5, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6]).
+
+%% Encode/Decode
+-export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/1,
+	 encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1,
+	 decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1,
+	 decode_server_key/3, decode_client_key/3,
+	 decode_suites/2
+	]).
+
+%% Cipher suites handling
+-export([available_suites/2, available_suites/3, cipher_suites/2,
+	 select_session/10]).
+
+%% Extensions handling
+-export([client_hello_extensions/5,
+	 handle_client_hello_extensions/8, %% Returns server hello extensions
+	 handle_server_hello_extensions/9
+	]).
+
+%% MISC
+-export([select_version/3, prf/5, select_hashsign/2, select_cert_hashsign/3,
+	 decrypt_premaster_secret/2]).
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Internal application API
+%%====================================================================
+
+%% ---------- Create handshake messages  ----------
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec hello_request() -> #hello_request{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a hello request message sent by server to
+%% trigger renegotiation.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+hello_request() ->
+    #hello_request{}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec server_hello_done() ->  #server_hello_done{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a server hello done message.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+server_hello_done() ->
+    #server_hello_done{}.
+
+client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) ->
+    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} =
+	case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of
+	    true ->
+		ecc_extensions(tls_v1, Version);
+	    false ->
+		{undefined, undefined}
+	end,
+    SRP = srp_user(SslOpts),
+
+    #hello_extensions{
+       renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client,
+					       ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
+       srp = SRP,
+       hash_signs = advertised_hash_signs(Version),
+       ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
+       elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
+       next_protocol_negotiation =
+	   encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector,
+					      Renegotiation)}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec certificate(der_cert(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), client | server) -> #certificate{} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a certificate message.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client) ->
+    Chain =
+	case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of
+	    {ok, CertChain} ->
+		CertChain;
+	    {error, _} ->
+		%% If no suitable certificate is available, the client
+		%% SHOULD send a certificate message containing no
+		%% certificates. (chapter 7.4.6. RFC 4346)
+		[]
+	end,
+    #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain};
+
+certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) ->
+    case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of
+	{ok, Chain} ->
+	    #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain};
+	{error, _} ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR)
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a next protocol message
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) ->
+  #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec client_certificate_verify(undefined | der_cert(), binary(),
+				tls_version(), term(), private_key(),
+				tls_handshake_history()) ->
+    #certificate_verify{} | ignore | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a certificate_verify message, called by the client.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+client_certificate_verify(undefined, _, _, _, _, _) ->
+    ignore;
+client_certificate_verify(_, _, _, _, undefined, _) ->
+    ignore;
+client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version,
+			  {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
+			  PrivateKey, {Handshake, _}) ->
+    case public_key:pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(OwnCert) of
+	true ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+	false ->
+	    Hashes =
+		calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake),
+	    Signed = digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey),
+	    #certificate_verify{signature = Signed, hashsign_algorithm = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}}
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec certificate_request(erl_cipher_suite(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), tls_version()) ->
+    #certificate_request{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a certificate_request message, called by the server.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+certificate_request(CipherSuite, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Version) ->
+    Types = certificate_types(CipherSuite),
+    HashSigns = advertised_hash_signs(Version),
+    Authorities = certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
+    #certificate_request{
+		    certificate_types = Types,
+		    hashsign_algorithms = HashSigns,
+		    certificate_authorities = Authorities
+		   }.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec key_exchange(client | server, tls_version(),
+		   {premaster_secret, binary(), public_key_info()} |
+		   {dh, binary()} |
+		   {dh, {binary(), binary()}, #'DHParameter'{}, {HashAlgo::atom(), SignAlgo::atom()},
+		   binary(), binary(), private_key()} |
+		   {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{}} |
+		   {psk, binary()} |
+		   {dhe_psk, binary(), binary()} |
+		   {srp, {binary(), binary()}, #srp_user{}, {HashAlgo::atom(), SignAlgo::atom()},
+		   binary(), binary(), private_key()}) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{} | #server_key_exchange{}.
+
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a keyexchange message.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {premaster_secret, Secret, {_, PublicKey, _}}) ->
+    EncPremasterSecret =
+	encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, PublicKey),
+    #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = EncPremasterSecret};
+
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {dh, PublicKey}) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{
+	      exchange_keys = #client_diffie_hellman_public{
+		dh_public = PublicKey}
+	       };
+
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = {0, ECPublicKey}}}) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{
+	      exchange_keys = #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{
+		dh_public = ECPublicKey}
+	       };
+
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {psk, Identity}) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{
+       exchange_keys = #client_psk_identity{
+			  identity = Identity}
+      };
+
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {dhe_psk, Identity, PublicKey}) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{
+	      exchange_keys = #client_dhe_psk_identity{
+		identity = Identity,
+		dh_public = PublicKey}
+	       };
+
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, Secret, {_, PublicKey, _}}) ->
+    EncPremasterSecret =
+	encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, PublicKey),
+    #client_key_exchange{
+       exchange_keys = #client_rsa_psk_identity{
+			  identity = PskIdentity,
+			  exchange_keys = EncPremasterSecret}};
+
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {srp, PublicKey}) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{
+       exchange_keys = #client_srp_public{
+			  srp_a = PublicKey}
+      };
+
+key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, {PublicKey, _},
+			       #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G},
+			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
+    ServerDHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = int_to_bin(P),
+				       dh_g = int_to_bin(G), dh_y = PublicKey},
+    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerDHParams, HashSign,
+			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
+
+key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdh,  #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey =  {0, ECPublicKey},
+						      parameters = ECCurve}, HashSign,
+			       ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
+    ServerECParams = #server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve, public = ECPublicKey},
+    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerECParams, HashSign,
+			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
+
+key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
+			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
+    ServerPSKParams = #server_psk_params{hint = PskIdentityHint},
+    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerPSKParams, HashSign,
+			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
+
+key_exchange(server, Version, {dhe_psk, PskIdentityHint, {PublicKey, _},
+			       #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G},
+			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
+    ServerEDHPSKParams = #server_dhe_psk_params{
+      hint = PskIdentityHint,
+      dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = int_to_bin(P),
+				    dh_g = int_to_bin(G), dh_y = PublicKey}
+     },
+    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerEDHPSKParams,
+			    HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
+
+key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, {PublicKey, _},
+			       #srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime,
+					 salt = Salt},
+			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
+    ServerSRPParams = #server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator,
+					 srp_s = Salt, srp_b = PublicKey},
+    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerSRPParams, HashSign,
+			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec finished(tls_version(), client | server, integer(), binary(), tls_handshake_history()) ->
+    #finished{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a handshake finished message
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {Handshake, _}) -> % use the current handshake
+    #finished{verify_data =
+	      calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake)}.
+
+%% ---------- Handle handshake messages  ----------
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), tls_version(), term(),
+			 binary(), tls_handshake_history()) -> valid | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo, Version,
+		   HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) ->
+    Hash = calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake),
+    case verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PublicKeyInfo) of
+	true ->
+	    valid;
+	_ ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE)
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec verify_signature(tls_version(), binary(), {term(), term()}, binary(),
+				   public_key_info()) -> true | false.
+%%
+%% Description: Checks that a public_key signature is valid.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+verify_signature(_Version, _Hash, {_HashAlgo, anon}, _Signature, _) ->
+    true;
+verify_signature({3, Minor}, Hash, {HashAlgo, rsa}, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams})
+  when Minor >= 3 ->
+    public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, PubKey);
+verify_signature(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams}) ->
+    case public_key:decrypt_public(Signature, PubKey,
+				   [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) of
+	Hash -> true;
+	_    -> false
+    end;
+verify_signature(_Version, Hash, {HashAlgo, dsa}, Signature, {?'id-dsa', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) ->
+    public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams});
+verify_signature(_Version, Hash, {HashAlgo, ecdsa}, Signature,
+		 {?'id-ecPublicKey', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) ->
+    public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), integer() | nolimit,
+	      verify_peer | verify_none, {fun(), term},
+	      client | server) ->  {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
+	MaxPathLen, _Verify, VerifyFunAndState, Role) ->
+    [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs,
+
+    ValidationFunAndState =
+	case VerifyFunAndState of
+	    undefined ->
+		{fun(OtpCert, ExtensionOrVerifyResult, SslState) ->
+			 ssl_certificate:validate_extension(OtpCert,
+							    ExtensionOrVerifyResult, SslState)
+		 end, Role};
+	    {Fun, UserState0} ->
+		{fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) ->
+			 case ssl_certificate:validate_extension(OtpCert,
+								 Extension,
+								 SslState) of
+			     {valid, NewSslState} ->
+				 {valid, {NewSslState, UserState}};
+			     {fail, Reason} ->
+				 apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Reason, UserState,
+						SslState);
+			     {unknown, _} ->
+				 apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert,
+						Extension, UserState, SslState)
+			 end;
+		    (OtpCert, VerifyResult, {SslState, UserState}) ->
+			 apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState,
+					SslState)
+		 end, {Role, UserState0}}
+	end,
+
+    try
+	{TrustedErlCert, CertPath}  =
+	    ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
+	case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedErlCert,
+					      CertPath,
+					     [{max_path_length,
+					       MaxPathLen},
+					      {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of
+	    {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} ->
+		{PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo};
+	    {error, Reason} ->
+		path_validation_alert(Reason)
+	end
+    catch
+	error:_ ->
+	    %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN)
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec verify_connection(tls_version(), #finished{}, client | server, integer(), binary(),
+			tls_handshake_history()) -> verified | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Checks the ssl handshake finished message to verify
+%%              the connection.
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+verify_connection(Version, #finished{verify_data = Data},
+		  Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) ->
+    %% use the previous hashes
+    case calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) of
+	Data ->
+	    verified;
+	_ ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decrypt_premaster_secret(binary(), #'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> binary().
+
+%%
+%% Description: Public key decryption using the private key.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) ->
+    try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey,
+				   [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
+    catch
+	_:_ ->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR))
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary().
+%%
+%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) ->
+    MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value),
+    SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value),
+    <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
+
+server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) ->
+    crypto:hash(Hash, Value).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec prf(tls_version(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) ->
+		 {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}.
+%%
+%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _) ->
+    {error, undefined};
+prf({3,1}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
+    {ok, tls_v1:prf(?MD5SHA, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)};
+prf({3,_N}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
+    {ok, tls_v1:prf(?SHA256, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{}| undefined,  undefined | binary()) ->
+			      [{atom(), atom()}] | undefined.
+
+%%
+%% Description:
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+select_hashsign(_, undefined) ->
+    {null, anon};
+select_hashsign(undefined,  Cert) ->
+    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+    #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+    select_cert_hashsign(undefined, Algo, {undefined, undefined});
+select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert) ->
+    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} =public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+    #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+    DefaultHashSign = {_, Sign} = select_cert_hashsign(undefined, Algo, {undefined, undefined}),
+    case lists:filter(fun({sha, dsa}) ->
+			      true;
+			 ({_, dsa}) ->
+			      false;
+			 ({Hash, S}) when  S == Sign ->
+			      ssl_cipher:is_acceptable_hash(Hash,  proplists:get_value(hashs, crypto:supports()));
+			 (_)  ->
+			      false
+		      end, HashSigns) of
+	[] ->
+	    DefaultHashSign;
+	[HashSign| _] ->
+	    HashSign
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec select_cert_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{}| undefined, oid(), tls_version() | {undefined, undefined}) ->
+				  {atom(), atom()}.
+
+%%
+%% Description: For TLS 1.2 selected cert_hash_sign will be recived
+%% in the handshake message, for previous versions use appropriate defaults.
+%% This function is also used by select_hashsign to extract
+%% the alogrithm of the server cert key.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+select_cert_hashsign(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
+    HashSign;
+select_cert_hashsign(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) ->
+    {sha, ecdsa};
+select_cert_hashsign(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) ->
+    {md5sha, rsa};
+select_cert_hashsign(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) ->
+    {sha, dsa}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec master_secret(atom(), tls_version(), #session{} | binary(), #connection_states{},
+		   client | server) -> {binary(), #connection_states{}} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys,
+%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update
+%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails.
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+master_secret(RecordCB, Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret},
+	      ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+    ConnectionState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    try master_secret(RecordCB, Version, Mastersecret, SecParams,
+		      ConnectionStates, Role)
+    catch
+	exit:Reason ->
+	    Report = io_lib:format("Key calculation failed due to ~p",
+				   [Reason]),
+	    error_logger:error_report(Report),
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+    end;
+
+master_secret(RecordCB, Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+    ConnectionState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
+			 client_random = ClientRandom,
+			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+    try master_secret(RecordCB, Version,
+		      calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret,
+					 ClientRandom, ServerRandom),
+		      SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role)
+    catch
+	exit:Reason ->
+	    Report = io_lib:format("Master secret calculation failed"
+				   " due to ~p", [Reason]),
+	    error_logger:error_report(Report),
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+    end.
+
+%%-------------Encode/Decode --------------------------------
+encode_handshake(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, _Version) ->
+    PaddingLength = 32 - ((byte_size(SelectedProtocol) + 2) rem 32),
+    {?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE((byte_size(SelectedProtocol))), SelectedProtocol/binary,
+                         ?BYTE(PaddingLength), 0:(PaddingLength * 8)>>};
+
+encode_handshake(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor},
+			       random = Random,
+			       session_id = Session_ID,
+			       cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+			       compression_method = Comp_method,
+			       extensions = #hello_extensions{} = Extensions}, _Version) ->
+			SID_length = byte_size(Session_ID),
+    ExtensionsBin = encode_hello_extensions(Extensions),
+    {?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+		     ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID/binary,
+                     CipherSuite/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method), ExtensionsBin/binary>>};
+encode_handshake(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1CertList}, _Version) ->
+    ASN1Certs = certs_from_list(ASN1CertList),
+    ACLen = erlang:iolist_size(ASN1Certs),
+    {?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>};
+encode_handshake(#server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, _Version) ->
+    {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys};
+encode_handshake(#server_key_params{params_bin = Keys, hashsign = HashSign,
+			  signature = Signature}, Version) ->
+    EncSign = enc_sign(HashSign, Signature, Version),
+    {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<Keys/binary, EncSign/binary>>};
+encode_handshake(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
+			    hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos},
+			    certificate_authorities = CertAuths},
+       {Major, Minor})
+  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
+    HashSigns= << <<(ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash)):8, (ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)):8>> ||
+		   {Hash, Sign} <- HashSignAlgos >>,
+    CertTypesLen = byte_size(CertTypes),
+    HashSignsLen = byte_size(HashSigns),
+    CertAuthsLen = byte_size(CertAuths),
+    {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes/binary,
+	?UINT16(HashSignsLen), HashSigns/binary,
+	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths/binary>>
+    };
+encode_handshake(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
+			    certificate_authorities = CertAuths},
+       _Version) ->
+    CertTypesLen = byte_size(CertTypes),
+    CertAuthsLen = byte_size(CertAuths),
+    {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes/binary,
+	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths/binary>>
+    };
+encode_handshake(#server_hello_done{}, _Version) ->
+    {?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>};
+encode_handshake(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version) ->
+    {?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, encode_client_key(ExchangeKeys, Version)};
+encode_handshake(#certificate_verify{signature = BinSig, hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}, Version) ->
+    EncSig = enc_sign(HashSign, BinSig, Version),
+    {?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, EncSig};
+encode_handshake(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, _Version) ->
+    {?FINISHED, VerifyData}.
+
+encode_hello_extensions(#hello_extensions{} = Extensions) ->
+    encode_hello_extensions(hello_extensions_list(Extensions), <<>>).
+encode_hello_extensions([], <<>>) ->
+    <<>>;
+encode_hello_extensions([], Acc) ->
+    Size = byte_size(Acc),
+    <<?UINT16(Size), Acc/binary>>;
+
+encode_hello_extensions([#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    Len = byte_size(ExtensionData),
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
+				    ExtensionData/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+encode_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc);
+encode_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0) = Info} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    Len = byte_size(Info),
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+
+encode_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Info} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    InfoLen = byte_size(Info),
+    Len = InfoLen +1,
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(InfoLen),
+				    Info/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+encode_hello_extensions([#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = EllipticCurves} | Rest], Acc) ->
+
+    EllipticCurveList = << <<(tls_v1:oid_to_enum(X)):16>> || X <- EllipticCurves>>,
+    ListLen = byte_size(EllipticCurveList),
+    Len = ListLen + 2,
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT),
+				 ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), EllipticCurveList/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+encode_hello_extensions([#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = ECPointFormats} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    ECPointFormatList = list_to_binary(ECPointFormats),
+    ListLen = byte_size(ECPointFormatList),
+    Len = ListLen + 1,
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT),
+				 ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(ListLen), ECPointFormatList/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+encode_hello_extensions([#srp{username = UserName} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    SRPLen = byte_size(UserName),
+    Len = SRPLen + 2,
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen),
+				    UserName/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+encode_hello_extensions([#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    SignAlgoList = << <<(ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash)):8, (ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)):8>> ||
+		       {Hash, Sign} <- HashSignAlgos >>,
+    ListLen = byte_size(SignAlgoList),
+    Len = ListLen + 2,
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT),
+				 ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), SignAlgoList/binary, Acc/binary>>).
+
+enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
+			ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) ->
+    EncParams = encode_server_key(Params),
+    case HashAlgo of
+	null ->
+	    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+			       params_bin = EncParams,
+			       hashsign = {null, anon},
+			       signature = <<>>};
+	_ ->
+	    Hash =
+		server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary,
+						     ServerRandom/binary,
+						     EncParams/binary>>),
+	    Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey),
+	    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+			       params_bin = EncParams,
+			       hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
+			       signature = Signature}
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_client_key(binary(), key_algo(), tls_version()) ->
+			    #encrypted_premaster_secret{}
+			    | #client_diffie_hellman_public{}
+			    | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{}
+			    | #client_psk_identity{}
+			    | #client_dhe_psk_identity{}
+			    | #client_rsa_psk_identity{}
+			    | #client_srp_public{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) ->
+    dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_server_key(binary(), key_algo(), tls_version()) ->
+			       #server_key_params{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) ->
+    dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
+
+encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) ->
+    undefined;
+encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, false) ->
+	#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<>>};
+encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, _) ->
+	undefined.
+
+encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(undefined) ->
+	undefined;
+
+encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(Protocols) ->
+	#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}.
+
+decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) ->
+    #hello_request{};
+decode_handshake(_, ?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE(SelectedProtocolLength),
+				      SelectedProtocol:SelectedProtocolLength/binary,
+				      ?BYTE(PaddingLength), _Padding:PaddingLength/binary>>) ->
+    #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol};
+
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+					    ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
+					    Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method)>>) ->
+    #server_hello{
+       server_version = {Major,Minor},
+       random = Random,
+       session_id = Session_ID,
+       cipher_suite = Cipher_suite,
+       compression_method = Comp_method,
+       extensions = #hello_extensions{}};
+
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+		       ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
+		       Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method),
+		       ?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>) ->
+
+    HelloExtensions = decode_hello_extensions(Extensions),
+
+    #server_hello{
+       server_version = {Major,Minor},
+       random = Random,
+       session_id = Session_ID,
+       cipher_suite = Cipher_suite,
+       compression_method = Comp_method,
+       extensions = HelloExtensions};
+
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>) ->
+    #certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)};
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys) ->
+    #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys};
+decode_handshake({Major, Minor}, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes:CertTypesLen/binary,
+	?UINT16(HashSignsLen), HashSigns:HashSignsLen/binary,
+	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths:CertAuthsLen/binary>>)
+  when Major >= 3, Minor >= 3 ->
+    HashSignAlgos = [{ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)} ||
+			<<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>> <= HashSigns],
+    #certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
+			 hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos},
+			 certificate_authorities = CertAuths};
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes:CertTypesLen/binary,
+	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths:CertAuthsLen/binary>>) ->
+    #certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
+			 certificate_authorities = CertAuths};
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>) ->
+    #server_hello_done{};
+decode_handshake({Major, Minor}, ?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,<<HashSign:2/binary, ?UINT16(SignLen),
+						       Signature:SignLen/binary>>)
+  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
+    #certificate_verify{hashsign_algorithm = dec_hashsign(HashSign), signature = Signature};
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,<<?UINT16(SignLen), Signature:SignLen/binary>>)->
+    #certificate_verify{signature = Signature};
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, PKEPMS) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = PKEPMS};
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?FINISHED, VerifyData) ->
+    #finished{verify_data = VerifyData};
+decode_handshake(_, _, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_hello_extensions({client, binary()} | binary()) -> #hello_extensions{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decodes TLS hello extensions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_hello_extensions({client, <<>>}) ->
+    #hello_extensions{};
+decode_hello_extensions({client, <<?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>}) ->
+    decode_hello_extensions(Extensions);
+decode_hello_extensions(Extensions) ->
+    dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, #hello_extensions{}).
+
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
+    Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+%% ECParameters with named_curve
+%% TODO: explicit curve
+dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID),
+		 ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary,
+		 _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
+    Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)},
+				 public = ECPoint},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       KeyExchange, Version)
+  when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ->
+    Params = #server_psk_params{
+		hint = PskIdentityHint},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) ->
+    DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
+    Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{
+      hint = IdentityHint,
+      dh_params = DHParams},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+		 ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) ->
+    Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(_, _, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_suites('2_bytes'|'3_bytes', binary()) -> list().
+%%
+%% Description:
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_suites('2_bytes', Dec) ->
+    from_2bytes(Dec);
+decode_suites('3_bytes', Dec) ->
+    from_3bytes(Dec).
+
+%%-------------Cipeher suite handling --------------------------------
+
+available_suites(UserSuites, Version) ->
+    case UserSuites of
+	[] ->
+	    ssl_cipher:suites(Version);
+	_ ->
+	    UserSuites
+    end.
+
+available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version) ->
+    ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version)).
+
+cipher_suites(Suites, false) ->
+    [?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV | Suites];
+cipher_suites(Suites, true) ->
+    Suites.
+
+select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, Compressions, Port, Session, Version,
+	       #ssl_options{ciphers = UserSuites} = SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert) ->
+    {SessionId, Resumed} = ssl_session:server_id(Port, SuggestedSessionId,
+						 SslOpts, Cert,
+						 Cache, CacheCb),
+    Suites = ssl_handshake:available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version),
+    case Resumed of
+        undefined ->
+	    CipherSuite = select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites),
+	    Compression = select_compression(Compressions),
+	    {new, Session#session{session_id = SessionId,
+				  cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+				  compression_method = Compression}};
+	_ ->
+	    {resumed, Resumed}
+    end.
+
+%%-------------certificate handling --------------------------------
+
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _})
+  when KeyExchange == rsa;
+       KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
+       KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
+       KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa ->
+    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
+
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _})
+  when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
+       KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa ->
+    <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>;
+
+certificate_types(_) ->
+    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>.
+
+certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
+    Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
+    Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) ->
+		  OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject,
+		  DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp),
+		  DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin),
+		  <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>>
+	  end,
+    list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]).
+
+certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
+    ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref  == CertDbRef ->
+			      [Cert | Acc];
+			 (_, Acc) ->
+			      Acc
+		      end,
+    ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle).
+
+%%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
+
+handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random,
+			#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info,
+					  srp = SRP,
+					  next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation,
+					  ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats0,
+					  elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves0}, Version,
+			#ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation} = Opts,
+			#session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression} = Session0,
+			ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
+    Session = handle_srp_extension(SRP, Session0),
+    ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(server, RecordCB, Version, Info,
+						      Random, CipherSuite, Compression,
+						      ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation),
+    ProtocolsToAdvertise = handle_next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, Opts),
+    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = handle_ecc_extensions(Version, EcPointFormats0, EllipticCurves0),
+    ServerHelloExtensions =  #hello_extensions{
+				renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server,
+									ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
+				ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
+				elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
+				next_protocol_negotiation =
+				    encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(ProtocolsToAdvertise)
+			       },
+    {Session, ConnectionStates, ServerHelloExtensions}.
+
+handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression,
+			       #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info,
+						 next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, Version,
+			       #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation,
+					    next_protocol_selector = NextProtoSelector},
+			       ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
+    ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(client, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, CipherSuite,
+						      Compression, ConnectionStates0,
+						      Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation),
+    case handle_next_protocol(NextProtocolNegotiation, NextProtoSelector, Renegotiation) of
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert;
+	Protocol ->
+	    {ConnectionStates, Protocol}
+    end.
+
+select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) ->
+    ServerVersion = RecordCB:highest_protocol_version(Versions),
+    RecordCB:lowest_protocol_version(ClientVersion, ServerVersion).
+
+renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) ->
+    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined};
+renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) ->
+    CS  = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
+	true ->
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)};
+	false ->
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+    end;
+renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) ->
+    CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
+	true ->
+	    Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data};
+	false ->
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+    end;
+
+renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) ->
+    CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
+	true ->
+	    CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
+	    SData  =CS#connection_state.server_verify_data,
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>};
+	false ->
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+    end.
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)},
+			  ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
+    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) ->
+    case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
+	true ->
+	    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
+	false ->
+	    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}
+    end;
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
+    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)};
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify},
+			  ConnectionStates, true, _, _) ->
+    CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
+    SData = CS#connection_state.server_verify_data,
+    case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of
+	true ->
+	    {ok, ConnectionStates};
+	false ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+    end;
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify},
+			  ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) ->
+
+      case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
+	  true ->
+	      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+	  false ->
+	      CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+	      Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
+	      case Data == ClientVerify of
+		  true ->
+		      {ok, ConnectionStates};
+		  false ->
+		      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+	      end
+      end;
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) ->
+    handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation);
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) ->
+     case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
+	  true ->
+	     ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+	 false ->
+	     handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation)
+     end.
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
+    CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    case {SecureRenegotation, CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation} of
+	{_, true} ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+	{true, false} ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+	{false, false} ->
+	    {ok, ConnectionStates}
+    end.
+
+hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
+					srp = SRP,
+					hash_signs = HashSigns,
+					ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
+					elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
+					next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}) ->
+    [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns,
+		    EcPointFormats,EllipticCurves, NextProtocolNegotiation], Ext =/= undefined].
+
+srp_user(#ssl_options{srp_identity = {UserName, _}}) ->
+    #srp{username = UserName};
+srp_user(_) ->
+    undefined.
+
+ecc_extensions(Module, Version) ->
+    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
+    case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
+	true ->
+	    EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]},
+	    EllipticCurves = #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = Module:ecc_curves(Version)},
+	    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves};
+	_ ->
+	    {undefined, undefined}
+    end.
+
+handle_ecc_extensions(Version, EcPointFormats0, EllipticCurves0) ->
+    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
+    case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
+	true ->
+	    EcPointFormats1 = handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats0),
+	    EllipticCurves1 = handle_ecc_curves_extension(Version, EllipticCurves0),
+	    {EcPointFormats1, EllipticCurves1};
+	_ ->
+	    {undefined, undefined}
+    end.
+
+handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) ->
+    #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}.
+
+handle_ecc_curves_extension(_Version, undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+handle_ecc_curves_extension(Version, _) ->
+    #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = tls_v1:ecc_curves(Version)}.
+
+advertises_ec_ciphers([]) ->
+    false;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) ->
+    advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0, SslState) ->
+    case Fun(OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0) of
+	{valid, UserState} ->
+	    {valid, {SslState, UserState}};
+	{fail, _} = Fail ->
+	    Fail;
+	{unknown, UserState} ->
+	    {unknown, {SslState, UserState}}
+    end.
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_expired}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_issuer}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_signature}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, name_not_permitted}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_critical_extension}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_revoked}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, selfsigned_peer}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) ->
+     ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNKNOWN_CA);
+path_validation_alert(_) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE).
+
+encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) ->
+    try
+	PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey,
+						    [{rsa_pad,
+						      rsa_pkcs1_padding}]),
+	#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret}
+    catch
+	_:_->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE))
+    end.
+
+digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) when Minor >= 3 ->
+    public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key);
+digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
+    public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key);
+digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
+    public_key:encrypt_private(Hash, Key,
+			       [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]);
+digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) ->
+    public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key).
+
+calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
+    ssl_v3:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake));
+calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, HashAlgo, _MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
+    tls_v1:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, N, lists:reverse(Handshake)).
+
+calc_finished({3, 0}, Role, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
+    ssl_v3:finished(Role, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake));
+calc_finished({3, N}, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
+    tls_v1:finished(Role, N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)).
+
+master_secret(_RecordCB, Version, MasterSecret,
+	      #security_parameters{
+		 client_random = ClientRandom,
+		 server_random = ServerRandom,
+		 hash_size = HashSize,
+		 prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
+		 key_material_length = KML,
+		 expanded_key_material_length = EKML,
+		 iv_size = IVS},
+	      ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+    {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey,
+     ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV} =
+	setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom,
+		   ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS),
+
+    ConnStates1 = ssl_record:set_master_secret(MasterSecret, ConnectionStates),
+    ConnStates2 =
+	ssl_record:set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret,
+				  Role, ConnStates1),
+
+    ClientCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ClientIV, key = ClientWriteKey},
+    ServerCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ServerIV, key = ServerWriteKey},
+    {MasterSecret,
+     ssl_record:set_pending_cipher_state(ConnStates2, ClientCipherState,
+					 ServerCipherState, Role)}.
+
+setup_keys({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret,
+	   ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS) ->
+    ssl_v3:setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom,
+			ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS);
+
+setup_keys({3,N}, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret,
+	   ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, _EKML, IVS) ->
+    tls_v1:setup_keys(N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize,
+			KML, IVS).
+
+calc_master_secret({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) ->
+    ssl_v3:master_secret(PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom);
+
+calc_master_secret({3,_}, PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) ->
+    tls_v1:master_secret(PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom).
+
+handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, CipherSuite, Compression,
+			       ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) ->
+    case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0,
+				   Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation,
+				   [CipherSuite]) of
+	{ok, ConnectionStates} ->
+	    hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role,
+					    Version,
+					    CipherSuite,
+					    Random,
+					    Compression,
+					    ConnectionStates);
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    throw(Alert)
+    end.
+
+%% Update pending connection states with parameters exchanged via
+%% hello messages
+%% NOTE : Role is the role of the receiver of the hello message
+%%        currently being processed.
+hello_pending_connection_states(_RecordCB, Role, Version, CipherSuite, Random, Compression,
+				 ConnectionStates) ->
+    ReadState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    WriteState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write),
+
+    NewReadSecParams =
+	hello_security_parameters(Role, Version, ReadState, CipherSuite,
+			    Random, Compression),
+
+    NewWriteSecParams =
+	hello_security_parameters(Role, Version, WriteState, CipherSuite,
+			    Random, Compression),
+
+    ssl_record:set_security_params(NewReadSecParams,
+				    NewWriteSecParams,
+				    ConnectionStates).
+
+hello_security_parameters(client, Version, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random,
+			  Compression) ->
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams),
+    NewSecParams#security_parameters{
+      server_random = Random,
+      compression_algorithm = Compression
+     };
+
+hello_security_parameters(server, Version, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random,
+			  Compression) ->
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams),
+    NewSecParams#security_parameters{
+      client_random = Random,
+      compression_algorithm = Compression
+     }.
+
+%%-------------Encode/Decode --------------------------------
+
+encode_server_key(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}) ->
+    PLen = byte_size(P),
+    GLen = byte_size(G),
+    YLen = byte_size(Y),
+    <<?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary>>;
+encode_server_key(#server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, ECCurve}, public = ECPubKey}) ->
+    %%TODO: support arbitrary keys
+    KLen = size(ECPubKey),
+    <<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16((tls_v1:oid_to_enum(ECCurve))),
+      ?BYTE(KLen), ECPubKey/binary>>;
+encode_server_key(#server_psk_params{hint = PskIdentityHint}) ->
+    Len = byte_size(PskIdentityHint),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint/binary>>;
+encode_server_key(Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{hint = undefined}) ->
+    encode_server_key(Params#server_dhe_psk_params{hint = <<>>});
+encode_server_key(#server_dhe_psk_params{
+		  hint = PskIdentityHint,
+		  dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}}) ->
+    Len = byte_size(PskIdentityHint),
+    PLen = byte_size(P),
+    GLen = byte_size(G),
+    YLen = byte_size(Y),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint/binary,
+      ?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary>>;
+encode_server_key(#server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G,	srp_s = S, srp_b = B}) ->
+    NLen = byte_size(N),
+    GLen = byte_size(G),
+    SLen = byte_size(S),
+    BLen = byte_size(B),
+    <<?UINT16(NLen), N/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary,
+      ?BYTE(SLen), S/binary, ?UINT16(BLen), B/binary>>.
+
+encode_client_key(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS},{3, 0}) ->
+    PKEPMS;
+encode_client_key(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}, _) ->
+    PKEPMSLen = byte_size(PKEPMS),
+    <<?UINT16(PKEPMSLen), PKEPMS/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
+    Len = byte_size(DHPublic),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), DHPublic/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
+    Len = byte_size(DHPublic),
+    <<?BYTE(Len), DHPublic/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(#client_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, _) ->
+    Id = <<"psk_identity">>,
+    Len = byte_size(Id),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(#client_psk_identity{identity = Id}, _) ->
+    Len = byte_size(Id),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(Identity = #client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, Version) ->
+    encode_client_key(Identity#client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = <<"psk_identity">>}, Version);
+encode_client_key(#client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
+    Len = byte_size(Id),
+    DHLen = byte_size(DHPublic),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary, ?UINT16(DHLen), DHPublic/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(Identity = #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, Version) ->
+    encode_client_key(Identity#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = <<"psk_identity">>}, Version);
+encode_client_key(#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id, exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version) ->
+    EncPMS = encode_client_key(ExchangeKeys, Version),
+    Len = byte_size(Id),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary, EncPMS/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(#client_srp_public{srp_a = A}, _) ->
+    Len = byte_size(A),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), A/binary>>.
+
+enc_sign({_, anon}, _Sign, _Version) ->
+    <<>>;
+enc_sign({HashAlg, SignAlg}, Signature, _Version = {Major, Minor})
+  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3->
+	SignLen = byte_size(Signature),
+	HashSign = enc_hashsign(HashAlg, SignAlg),
+	<<HashSign/binary, ?UINT16(SignLen), Signature/binary>>;
+enc_sign(_HashSign, Sign, _Version) ->
+	SignLen = byte_size(Sign),
+	<<?UINT16(SignLen), Sign/binary>>.
+
+enc_hashsign(HashAlgo, SignAlgo) ->
+    Hash = ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo),
+    Sign = ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo),
+    <<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>>.
+
+encode_protocol(Protocol, Acc) ->
+	Len = byte_size(Protocol),
+	<<Acc/binary, ?BYTE(Len), Protocol/binary>>.
+
+dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) ->
+    #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) ->
+    #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS};
+dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE));
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
+    #client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y};
+dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE));
+dec_client_key(<<?BYTE(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
+    #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, _) ->
+    #client_psk_identity{identity = Id};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, _) ->
+    #client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DH_Y};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary, PKEPMS/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, {3, 0}) ->
+    #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id,
+			     exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary, ?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, _) ->
+    #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id,
+			     exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(ALen), A:ALen/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, _) ->
+    #client_srp_public{srp_a = A}.
+
+dec_server_key_params(Len, Keys, Version) ->
+    <<Params:Len/bytes, Signature/binary>> = Keys,
+    dec_server_key_signature(Params, Signature, Version).
+
+dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo),
+			    ?UINT16(0)>>, {Major, Minor})
+  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
+    HashSign = {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)},
+    {Params, HashSign, <<>>};
+dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo),
+			    ?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, {Major, Minor})
+  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
+    HashSign = {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)},
+    {Params, HashSign, Signature};
+dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<>>, _) ->
+    {Params, {null, anon}, <<>>};
+dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(0)>>, _) ->
+    {Params, {null, anon}, <<>>};
+dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, _) ->
+    {Params, undefined, Signature};
+dec_server_key_signature(_, _, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+
+dec_hello_extensions(<<>>, Acc) ->
+    Acc;
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    NextP = #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData},
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextP});
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    RenegotiateInfo = case Len of
+			  1 ->  % Initial handshake
+			      Info; % should be <<0>> will be matched in handle_renegotiation_info
+			  _ ->
+			      VerifyLen = Len - 1,
+			      <<?BYTE(VerifyLen), VerifyInfo/binary>> = Info,
+			      VerifyInfo
+		      end,
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info =
+							#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection =
+										RenegotiateInfo}});
+
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), SRP:SRPLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc)
+  when Len == SRPLen + 2 ->
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest,  Acc#hello_extensions{srp = #srp{username = SRP}});
+
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
+		       ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    SignAlgoListLen = Len - 2,
+    <<?UINT16(SignAlgoListLen), SignAlgoList/binary>> = ExtData,
+    HashSignAlgos = [{ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)} ||
+			<<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>> <= SignAlgoList],
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{hash_signs =
+						    #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos}});
+
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
+		       ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    <<?UINT16(_), EllipticCurveList/binary>> = ExtData,
+    EllipticCurves = [tls_v1:enum_to_oid(X) || <<X:16>> <= EllipticCurveList],
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{elliptic_curves =
+							#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list =
+									     EllipticCurves}});
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
+		       ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    <<?BYTE(_), ECPointFormatList/binary>> = ExtData,
+    ECPointFormats = binary_to_list(ECPointFormatList),
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{ec_point_formats =
+							#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list =
+									      ECPointFormats}});
+%% Ignore data following the ClientHello (i.e.,
+%% extensions) if not understood.
+
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(_), ?UINT16(Len), _Unknown:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc);
+%% This theoretically should not happen if the protocol is followed, but if it does it is ignored.
+dec_hello_extensions(_, Acc) ->
+    Acc.
+
+dec_hashsign(<<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo)>>) ->
+    {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)}.
+
+decode_next_protocols({next_protocol_negotiation, Protocols}) ->
+    decode_next_protocols(Protocols, []).
+decode_next_protocols(<<>>, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+decode_next_protocols(<<?BYTE(Len), Protocol:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    case Len of
+        0 ->
+            {error, invalid_next_protocols};
+        _ ->
+            decode_next_protocols(Rest, [Protocol|Acc])
+    end;
+decode_next_protocols(_Bytes, _Acc) ->
+    {error, invalid_next_protocols}.
+
+%% encode/decode stream of certificate data to/from list of certificate data
+certs_to_list(ASN1Certs) ->
+    certs_to_list(ASN1Certs, []).
+
+certs_to_list(<<?UINT24(CertLen), Cert:CertLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    certs_to_list(Rest, [Cert | Acc]);
+certs_to_list(<<>>, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc, []).
+
+certs_from_list(ACList) ->
+    list_to_binary([begin
+			CertLen = byte_size(Cert),
+                        <<?UINT24(CertLen), Cert/binary>>
+		    end || Cert <- ACList]).
+from_3bytes(Bin3) ->
+    from_3bytes(Bin3, []).
+
+from_3bytes(<<>>, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+from_3bytes(<<?UINT24(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    from_3bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]).
+
+from_2bytes(Bin2) ->
+    from_2bytes(Bin2, []).
+
+from_2bytes(<<>>, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+from_2bytes(<<?UINT16(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    from_2bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]).
+key_exchange_alg(rsa) ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA;
+key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss;
+			    Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa; Alg == dh_anon ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN;
+key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == ecdhe_rsa; Alg == ecdh_rsa;
+			   Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa; Alg == ecdh_ecdsa;
+			   Alg == ecdh_anon ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN;
+key_exchange_alg(psk) ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK;
+key_exchange_alg(dhe_psk) ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK;
+key_exchange_alg(rsa_psk) ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK;
+key_exchange_alg(Alg)
+  when Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_anon ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP;
+key_exchange_alg(_) ->
+    ?NULL.
+
+%%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
+
+handle_next_protocol(undefined,
+		     _NextProtocolSelector, _Renegotiating) ->
+    undefined;
+
+handle_next_protocol(#next_protocol_negotiation{} = NextProtocols,
+    NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) ->
+
+    case next_protocol_extension_allowed(NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) of
+        true ->
+            select_next_protocol(decode_next_protocols(NextProtocols), NextProtocolSelector);
+        false ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) % unexpected next protocol extension
+    end.
+
+
+handle_next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, SslOpts)->
+    case handle_next_protocol_on_server(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, SslOpts) of
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert;
+	ProtocolsToAdvertise ->
+	    ProtocolsToAdvertise
+    end.
+
+handle_next_protocol_on_server(undefined, _Renegotiation, _SslOpts) ->
+    undefined;
+
+handle_next_protocol_on_server(#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<>>},
+			       false, #ssl_options{next_protocols_advertised = Protocols}) ->
+    Protocols;
+
+handle_next_protocol_on_server(_Hello, _Renegotiation, _SSLOpts) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE). % unexpected next protocol extension
+
+next_protocol_extension_allowed(NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) ->
+    NextProtocolSelector =/= undefined andalso not Renegotiating.
+
+select_next_protocol({error, _Reason}, _NextProtocolSelector) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+select_next_protocol(Protocols, NextProtocolSelector) ->
+    case NextProtocolSelector(Protocols) of
+	?NO_PROTOCOL ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+	Protocol when is_binary(Protocol)  ->
+	    Protocol
+    end.
+
+handle_srp_extension(undefined, Session) ->
+    Session;
+handle_srp_extension(#srp{username = Username}, Session) ->
+    Session#session{srp_username = Username}.
+
+%%-------------Misc --------------------------------
+
+select_cipher_suite([], _) ->
+   no_suite;
+select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) ->
+    case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of
+	true ->
+	    Suite;
+        false ->
+	    select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites)
+    end.
+
+int_to_bin(I) ->
+    L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2,
+    <<I:(L*8)>>.
+
+is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) ->
+    lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites).
+
+select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) ->
+    ?NULL.
+
+-define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(MD), {MD, rsa}).
+-define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_DSA(MD), {MD, dsa}).
+-define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_ECDSA(MD), {MD, ecdsa}).
+
+-define(TLSEXT_SIGALG(MD), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_ECDSA(MD), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(MD)).
+
+advertised_hash_signs({Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
+    HashSigns = [?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha512),
+		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha384),
+		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha256),
+		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha224),
+		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha),
+		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_DSA(sha),
+		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(md5)],
+    CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(),
+    HasECC = proplists:get_bool(ecdsa,  proplists:get_value(public_keys, CryptoSupport)),
+    Hashs = proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport),
+    #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos =
+			 lists:filter(fun({Hash, ecdsa}) -> HasECC andalso proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashs);
+					 ({Hash, _}) -> proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashs) end, HashSigns)};
+advertised_hash_signs(_) ->
+    undefined.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl
index eb1a1dbf62..3a3ad8cf35 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl
@@ -28,11 +28,6 @@
 
 -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
 
--type oid()               :: tuple().
--type public_key_params() :: #'Dss-Parms'{} |  {namedCurve, oid()} | #'ECParameters'{} | term().
--type public_key_info()   :: {oid(), #'RSAPublicKey'{} | integer() | #'ECPoint'{}, public_key_params()}.
--type tls_handshake_history() :: {[binary()], [binary()]}.
-
 -define(NO_PROTOCOL, <<>>).
 
 %% Signature algorithms
@@ -96,17 +91,22 @@
 
 %% client_hello defined in tls_handshake.hrl and dtls_handshake.hrl
 
+-record(hello_extensions, {
+	  renegotiation_info,
+	  hash_signs,          % supported combinations of hashes/signature algos
+	  next_protocol_negotiation = undefined, % [binary()]
+	  srp,
+	  ec_point_formats,
+	  elliptic_curves
+	 }).
+
 -record(server_hello, {
 	  server_version,
 	  random,             
 	  session_id,         % opaque SessionID<0..32>
 	  cipher_suite,       % cipher_suites
 	  compression_method, % compression_method
-	  renegotiation_info,
-	  hash_signs,          % supported combinations of hashes/signature algos
-	  ec_point_formats,    % supported ec point formats
-	  elliptic_curves,     % supported elliptic curver
-	  next_protocol_negotiation = undefined % [binary()]
+	  extensions
 	 }).
 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
@@ -337,6 +337,20 @@
 -define(EXPLICIT_CHAR2, 2).
 -define(NAMED_CURVE, 3).
 
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+%% Dialyzer types
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+
+-type oid()               :: tuple().
+-type public_key_params() :: #'Dss-Parms'{} |  {namedCurve, oid()} | #'ECParameters'{} | term().
+-type public_key_info()   :: {oid(), #'RSAPublicKey'{} | integer() | #'ECPoint'{}, public_key_params()}.
+-type tls_handshake_history() :: {[binary()], [binary()]}.
+
+-type ssl_handshake() :: #server_hello{} | #server_hello_done{} | #certificate{} | #certificate_request{} |
+			 #client_key_exchange{} | #finished{} | #certificate_verify{} |
+			 #hello_request{} | #next_protocol{}.
+
+
 -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_handshake).
 
 
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
index de8d20d399..96e3280fb5 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@
 -type tls_atom_version()  :: sslv3 | tlsv1 | 'tlsv1.1' | 'tlsv1.2'.
 -type certdb_ref()        :: reference().
 -type db_handle()         :: term().
--type key_algo()          :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon.
 -type der_cert()          :: binary().
 -type private_key()       :: #'RSAPrivateKey'{} | #'DSAPrivateKey'{} | #'ECPrivateKey'{}.
 -type issuer()            :: tuple().
@@ -50,6 +49,7 @@
 -define(UINT16(X),   X:16/unsigned-big-integer).
 -define(UINT24(X),   X:24/unsigned-big-integer).
 -define(UINT32(X),   X:32/unsigned-big-integer).
+-define(UINT48(X),   X:48/unsigned-big-integer).
 -define(UINT64(X),   X:64/unsigned-big-integer).
 -define(STRING(X),   ?UINT32((size(X))), (X)/binary).
 
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 -define(uint16(X), << ?UINT16(X) >> ).
 -define(uint24(X), << ?UINT24(X) >> ).
 -define(uint32(X), << ?UINT32(X) >> ).
+-define(uint48(X), << ?UINT48(X) >> ).
 -define(uint64(X), << ?UINT64(X) >> ).
 
 -define(CDR_MAGIC, "GIOP").
@@ -71,6 +72,8 @@
 
 -define(ALL_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1, sslv3]).
 -define(MIN_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.1', tlsv1, sslv3]).
+-define(ALL_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['dtlsv1.2', dtlsv1]).
+-define(MIN_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['dtlsv1.2', dtlsv1]).
 
 -record(ssl_options, {
 	  versions,   % 'tlsv1.2' | 'tlsv1.1' | tlsv1 | sslv3
@@ -124,6 +127,10 @@
 	  active = true
 	 }).
 
+-type state_name()           :: hello | abbreviated | certify | cipher | connection.
+-type gen_fsm_state_return() :: {next_state, state_name(), term()} |
+				{next_state, state_name(), term(), timeout()} |
+				{stop, term(), term()}.
 -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_internal).
 
 
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50a45dc16b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,439 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
+%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
+%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
+%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
+%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%%
+%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
+%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
+%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
+%% under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose:  Handle TLS/SSL/DTLS record protocol. Note epoch is only
+%% used by DTLS but handled here so we can avoid code duplication.
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-module(ssl_record).
+
+-include("ssl_record.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
+
+%% Connection state handling
+-export([init_connection_states/1,
+	 current_connection_state/2, pending_connection_state/2,
+	 activate_pending_connection_state/2,
+	 set_security_params/3,
+         set_mac_secret/4,
+	 set_master_secret/2,
+         set_pending_cipher_state/4,
+	 set_renegotiation_flag/2,
+	 set_client_verify_data/3,
+	 set_server_verify_data/3]).
+
+%% Encoding records
+-export([encode_handshake/3, encode_alert_record/3,
+	 encode_change_cipher_spec/2, encode_data/3]).
+
+%% Compression
+-export([compress/3, uncompress/3, compressions/0]).
+
+-export([is_correct_mac/2]).
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Internal application API
+%%====================================================================
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec init_connection_states(client | server) -> #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a connection_states record with appropriate
+%% values for the initial SSL connection setup.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+init_connection_states(Role) ->
+    ConnectionEnd = record_protocol_role(Role),
+    Current = initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
+    Pending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
+    #connection_states{current_read = Current,
+		       pending_read = Pending,
+		       current_write = Current,
+		       pending_write = Pending
+                      }.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec current_connection_state(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
+				      #connection_state{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the instance of the connection_state record
+%% that is currently defined as the current conection state.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+current_connection_state(#connection_states{current_read = Current},
+			 read) ->
+    Current;
+current_connection_state(#connection_states{current_write = Current},
+			 write) ->
+    Current.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec pending_connection_state(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
+				      term().
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the instance of the connection_state record
+%% that is currently defined as the pending conection state.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+pending_connection_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Pending},
+			 read) ->
+    Pending;
+pending_connection_state(#connection_states{pending_write = Pending},
+			 write) ->
+    Pending.
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec activate_pending_connection_state(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
+					       #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a new instance of the connection_states record
+%% where the pending state of <Type> has been activated.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+activate_pending_connection_state(States =
+                                  #connection_states{current_read = Current,
+						     pending_read = Pending},
+                                  read) ->
+    NewCurrent = Pending#connection_state{epoch = dtls_next_epoch(Current),
+					  sequence_number = 0},
+    SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    ConnectionEnd = SecParams#security_parameters.connection_end,
+    EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
+    SecureRenegotation = NewCurrent#connection_state.secure_renegotiation,
+    NewPending = EmptyPending#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = SecureRenegotation},
+    States#connection_states{current_read = NewCurrent,
+                             pending_read = NewPending
+                            };
+
+activate_pending_connection_state(States =
+                                  #connection_states{current_write = Current,
+						     pending_write = Pending},
+                                  write) ->
+    NewCurrent = Pending#connection_state{epoch = dtls_next_epoch(Current),
+					  sequence_number = 0},
+    SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    ConnectionEnd = SecParams#security_parameters.connection_end,
+    EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
+    SecureRenegotation = NewCurrent#connection_state.secure_renegotiation,
+    NewPending = EmptyPending#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = SecureRenegotation},
+    States#connection_states{current_write = NewCurrent,
+                             pending_write = NewPending
+                            }.
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_security_params(#security_parameters{}, #security_parameters{},
+			     #connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a new instance of the connection_states record
+%% where the pending states gets its security parameters updated.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_security_params(ReadParams, WriteParams, States =
+		       #connection_states{pending_read = Read,
+					  pending_write = Write}) ->
+    States#connection_states{pending_read =
+                             Read#connection_state{security_parameters =
+                                                   ReadParams},
+                             pending_write =
+                             Write#connection_state{security_parameters =
+                                                    WriteParams}
+                            }.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_mac_secret(binary(), binary(), client | server,
+			#connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: update the mac_secret field in pending connection states
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, client, States) ->
+    set_mac_secret(ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteMacSecret, States);
+set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, server, States) ->
+    set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, States).
+
+set_mac_secret(ReadMacSecret, WriteMacSecret,
+	       States = #connection_states{pending_read = Read,
+					   pending_write = Write}) ->
+    States#connection_states{
+      pending_read = Read#connection_state{mac_secret = ReadMacSecret},
+      pending_write = Write#connection_state{mac_secret = WriteMacSecret}
+     }.
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_master_secret(binary(), #connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Set master_secret in pending connection states
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_master_secret(MasterSecret,
+                  States = #connection_states{pending_read = Read,
+                                              pending_write = Write}) ->
+    ReadSecPar = Read#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    Read1 = Read#connection_state{
+              security_parameters = ReadSecPar#security_parameters{
+                                      master_secret = MasterSecret}},
+    WriteSecPar = Write#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    Write1 = Write#connection_state{
+               security_parameters = WriteSecPar#security_parameters{
+                                       master_secret = MasterSecret}},
+    States#connection_states{pending_read = Read1, pending_write = Write1}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_renegotiation_flag(boolean(), #connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Set secure_renegotiation in pending connection states
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_renegotiation_flag(Flag, #connection_states{
+			 current_read = CurrentRead0,
+			 current_write = CurrentWrite0,
+			 pending_read = PendingRead0,
+			 pending_write = PendingWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
+    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
+    PendingRead = PendingRead0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
+    PendingWrite = PendingWrite0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
+				       current_write = CurrentWrite,
+				       pending_read = PendingRead,
+				       pending_write = PendingWrite}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_client_verify_data(current_read | current_write | current_both,
+			     binary(), #connection_states{})->
+				    #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Set verify data in connection states.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_client_verify_data(current_read, Data,
+		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
+					  pending_write = PendingWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
+    PendingWrite = PendingWrite0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
+				       pending_write = PendingWrite};
+set_client_verify_data(current_write, Data,
+		       #connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead0,
+					  current_write = CurrentWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    PendingRead = PendingRead0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
+    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead,
+				       current_write = CurrentWrite};
+set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data,
+		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
+					  current_write = CurrentWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
+    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
+				       current_write = CurrentWrite}.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_server_verify_data(current_read | current_write | current_both,
+			     binary(), #connection_states{})->
+				    #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Set verify data in pending connection states.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_server_verify_data(current_write, Data,
+		       #connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead0,
+					  current_write = CurrentWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    PendingRead = PendingRead0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
+    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead,
+				       current_write = CurrentWrite};
+
+set_server_verify_data(current_read, Data,
+		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
+					  pending_write = PendingWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
+    PendingWrite = PendingWrite0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
+				       pending_write = PendingWrite};
+
+set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data,
+		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
+					  current_write = CurrentWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
+    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
+				       current_write = CurrentWrite}.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{}, #cipher_state{},
+			       #cipher_state{}, client | server) ->
+				      #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Set the cipher state in the specified pending connection state.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Read,
+                                            pending_write = Write} = States,
+                         ClientState, ServerState, server) ->
+    States#connection_states{
+        pending_read = Read#connection_state{cipher_state = ClientState},
+        pending_write = Write#connection_state{cipher_state = ServerState}};
+
+set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Read,
+                                            pending_write = Write} = States,
+                         ClientState, ServerState, client) ->
+    States#connection_states{
+        pending_read = Read#connection_state{cipher_state = ServerState},
+        pending_write = Write#connection_state{cipher_state = ClientState}}.
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_handshake(iolist(), tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+			      {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes a handshake message to send on the ssl-socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+    encode_plain_text(?HANDSHAKE, Version, Frag, ConnectionStates).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_alert_record(#alert{}, tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+				 {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes an alert message to send on the ssl-socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_alert_record(#alert{level = Level, description = Description},
+                    Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+    encode_plain_text(?ALERT, Version, <<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description)>>,
+		      ConnectionStates).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_change_cipher_spec(tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+				       {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes a change_cipher_spec-message to send on the ssl socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+    encode_plain_text(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, Version, <<1:8>>, ConnectionStates).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_data(binary(), tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+			 {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes data to send on the ssl-socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_data(Frag, Version,
+	    #connection_states{current_write = #connection_state{
+				 security_parameters =
+				     #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCA}}} =
+		ConnectionStates) ->
+    Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA),
+    encode_iolist(?APPLICATION_DATA, Data, Version, ConnectionStates).
+
+uncompress(?NULL, Data, CS) ->
+    {Data, CS}.
+
+compress(?NULL, Data, CS) ->
+    {Data, CS}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec compressions() -> [binary()].
+%%
+%% Description: return a list of compressions supported (currently none)
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+compressions() ->
+    [?byte(?NULL)].
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd) ->
+    SecParams = empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd),
+    #connection_state{security_parameters = SecParams}.
+
+empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd = ?CLIENT) ->
+    #security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
+                         client_random = random()};
+empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd = ?SERVER) ->
+    #security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
+                         server_random = random()}.
+random() ->
+    Secs_since_1970 = calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds(
+			calendar:universal_time()) - 62167219200,
+    Random_28_bytes = crypto:rand_bytes(28),
+    <<?UINT32(Secs_since_1970), Random_28_bytes/binary>>.
+
+dtls_next_epoch(#connection_state{epoch = undefined}) -> %% SSL/TLS
+    undefined;
+dtls_next_epoch(#connection_state{epoch = Epoch}) -> %% DTLS
+    Epoch + 1.
+
+is_correct_mac(Mac, Mac) ->
+    true;
+is_correct_mac(_M,_H) ->
+    false.
+
+record_protocol_role(client) ->
+    ?CLIENT;
+record_protocol_role(server) ->
+    ?SERVER.
+
+initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd) ->
+    #connection_state{security_parameters =
+			  initial_security_params(ConnectionEnd),
+                      sequence_number = 0
+                     }.
+
+initial_security_params(ConnectionEnd) ->
+    SecParams = #security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
+				     compression_algorithm = ?NULL},
+    ssl_cipher:security_parameters(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, SecParams).
+
+
+encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates) ->
+    RecordCB = protocol_module(Version),
+    RecordCB:encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates).
+
+encode_iolist(Type, Data, Version, ConnectionStates0) ->
+    RecordCB = protocol_module(Version),
+    {ConnectionStates, EncodedMsg} =
+        lists:foldl(fun(Text, {CS0, Encoded}) ->
+			    {Enc, CS1} =
+				RecordCB:encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Text, CS0),
+			    {CS1, [Enc | Encoded]}
+		    end, {ConnectionStates0, []}, Data),
+    {lists:reverse(EncodedMsg), ConnectionStates}.
+
+%% 1/n-1 splitting countermeasure Rizzo/Duong-Beast, RC4 chiphers are
+%% not vulnerable to this attack.
+split_bin(<<FirstByte:8, Rest/binary>>, ChunkSize, Version, BCA) when
+      BCA =/= ?RC4 andalso ({3, 1} == Version orelse
+			    {3, 0} == Version) ->
+    do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [[FirstByte]]);
+split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, _, _) ->
+    do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, []).
+
+do_split_bin(<<>>, _, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Acc) ->
+    case Bin of
+        <<Chunk:ChunkSize/binary, Rest/binary>> ->
+            do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [Chunk | Acc]);
+        _ ->
+            lists:reverse(Acc, [Bin])
+    end.
+
+protocol_module({3, _}) ->
+    tls_record;
+protocol_module({254, _}) ->
+    dtls_record.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
index 2fd17f9c35..c17fa53a62 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
@@ -29,6 +29,18 @@
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%% Connection states - RFC 4346 section 6.1
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+-record(connection_state, {
+	  security_parameters,
+	  compression_state,
+	  cipher_state,
+	  mac_secret,
+	  epoch, %% Only used by DTLS
+	  sequence_number,
+	  %% RFC 5746
+	  secure_renegotiation,
+	  client_verify_data,
+	  server_verify_data
+	 }).
 
 -record(connection_states, {
 	  current_read,
@@ -56,17 +68,7 @@
           exportable				% boolean
        }). 
 
--record(connection_state, {
-	  security_parameters,
-	  compression_state,
-	  cipher_state,
-	  mac_secret,
-	  sequence_number,
-	  %% RFC 5746
-	  secure_renegotiation,
-	  client_verify_data,
-	  server_verify_data
-	 }).
+-define(INITIAL_BYTES, 5).
 
 -define(MAX_SEQENCE_NUMBER, 18446744073709552000). %% math:pow(2, 64) - 1 = 1.8446744073709552e19
 %% Sequence numbers can not wrap so when max is about to be reached we should renegotiate.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl2.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v2.erl
index a9ab6a2678..07876366f1 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl2.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v2.erl
@@ -1,30 +1,30 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
-%% 
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2011. All Rights Reserved.
-%% 
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
 %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
 %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
 %% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
 %% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
 %% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%% 
+%%
 %% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
 %% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
 %% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
 %% under the License.
-%% 
+%%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
 
 %%
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Purpose: Handles sslv2 hello as clients supporting sslv2 and higher 
+%% Purpose: Handles sslv2 hello as clients supporting sslv2 and higher
 %% will send an sslv2 hello.
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--module(ssl_ssl2).
-             
+-module(ssl_v2).
+
 -export([client_random/2]).
 
 client_random(ChallengeData, 32) ->
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v3.erl
index 013c27ebb5..d477b3df81 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v3.erl
@@ -22,14 +22,14 @@
 %% Purpose: Handles sslv3 encryption.
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--module(ssl_ssl3).
+-module(ssl_v3).
 
 -include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
 -include("ssl_internal.hrl").
 -include("ssl_record.hrl"). 			% MD5 and SHA
 
 -export([master_secret/3, finished/3, certificate_verify/3,
-	 mac_hash/6, setup_keys/7, 
+	 mac_hash/6, setup_keys/7,
 	 suites/0]).
 -compile(inline).
 
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 -spec master_secret(binary(), binary(), binary()) -> binary().
 
 master_secret(PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) ->
-    %%  draft-ietf-tls-ssl-version3-00 - 6.2.2 
+    %%  draft-ietf-tls-ssl-version3-00 - 6.2.2
     %% key_block =
     %%   MD5(master_secret + SHA(`A' + master_secret +
     %%                           ServerHello.random +
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ finished(Role, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
    %%      opaque md5_hash[16];
    %%      opaque sha_hash[20];
    %%  } Finished;
-   %% 
+   %%
    %%   md5_hash       MD5(master_secret + pad2 +
    %%                     MD5(handshake_messages + Sender +
    %%                         master_secret + pad1));
@@ -95,23 +95,23 @@ certificate_verify(sha, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
 
     handshake_hash(?SHA, MasterSecret, undefined, Handshake).
 
--spec mac_hash(integer(), binary(), integer(), integer(), integer(), binary()) -> binary(). 
+-spec mac_hash(integer(), binary(), integer(), integer(), integer(), binary()) -> binary().
 
 mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, Length, Fragment) ->
-    %% draft-ietf-tls-ssl-version3-00 - 5.2.3.1 
+    %% draft-ietf-tls-ssl-version3-00 - 5.2.3.1
     %% hash(MAC_write_secret + pad_2 +
     %%      hash(MAC_write_secret + pad_1 + seq_num +
     %%           SSLCompressed.type + SSLCompressed.length +
     %%           SSLCompressed.fragment));
-    Mac = mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, 
-		   [<<?UINT64(Seq_num), ?BYTE(Type), 
+    Mac = mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret,
+		   [<<?UINT64(Seq_num), ?BYTE(Type),
 		     ?UINT16(Length)>>, Fragment]),
     Mac.
 
--spec setup_keys(binary(), binary(), binary(),  
-		 integer(), integer(), term(), integer()) -> 
-			{binary(), binary(), binary(), 
-			 binary(), binary(), binary()}.  
+-spec setup_keys(binary(), binary(), binary(),
+		 integer(), integer(), term(), integer()) ->
+			{binary(), binary(), binary(),
+			 binary(), binary(), binary()}.
 
 setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HS, KML, _EKML, IVS) ->
     KeyBlock = generate_keyblock(MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom,
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HS, KML, _EKML, IVS) ->
 -spec suites() -> [cipher_suite()].
 
 suites() ->
-    [ 
+    [
       ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ suites() ->
       ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-      %%?TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA, 
+      %%?TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
       ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
       ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
index 0415ea6ecc..5618837506 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
@@ -106,10 +106,6 @@
 		       base = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR}).
 -define(WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, 12000).
 
--type state_name()           :: hello | abbreviated | certify | cipher | connection.
--type gen_fsm_state_return() :: {next_state, state_name(), #state{}} |
-				{next_state, state_name(), #state{}, timeout()} |
-				{stop, term(), #state{}}.
 
 %%====================================================================
 %% Internal application API
@@ -367,7 +363,6 @@ hello(#hello_request{}, #state{role = client} = State0) ->
     next_state(hello, hello, Record, State);
 
 hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
-		    hash_signs = HashSign,
 		    compression_method = Compression} = Hello,
       #state{session = #session{session_id = OldId},
 	     connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
@@ -392,8 +387,6 @@ hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
 			      end,
 
 	    State = State0#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm,
-				 hashsign_algorithm =
-				     negotiated_hashsign(HashSign, KeyAlgorithm, Version),
 				 negotiated_version = Version,
 				 connection_states = ConnectionStates,
 				 premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
@@ -410,27 +403,27 @@ hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
     end;
 
 hello(Hello = #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion,
-			    hash_signs = HashSigns},
+			    extensions = #hello_extensions{hash_signs = HashSigns}},
       State = #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
 		     port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
 		     renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
-		     session_cache = Cache,		  
+		     session_cache = Cache,
 		     session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
 		     ssl_options = SslOpts}) ->
-
-    HashSign = tls_handshake:select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert),
+    HashSign = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert),
     case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb,
 				     ConnectionStates0, Cert}, Renegotiation) of
-        {Version, {Type,  #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session}, ConnectionStates, ProtocolsToAdvertise,
-	 EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} ->
-	    {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
-	    NH = negotiated_hashsign(HashSign, KeyAlgorithm, Version),
-            do_server_hello(Type, ProtocolsToAdvertise,
-			    EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves,
+        {Version, {Type,  #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session},
+	 ConnectionStates,
+	 #hello_extensions{ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
+			   elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves} = ServerHelloExt} ->
+	    {KeyAlg, _, _, _} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
+	    NegotiatedHashSign = negotiated_hashsign(HashSign, KeyAlg, Version),
+            do_server_hello(Type, ServerHelloExt,
 			    State#state{connection_states  = ConnectionStates,
 					negotiated_version = Version,
 					session = Session,
-					hashsign_algorithm = NH,
+					hashsign_algorithm = NegotiatedHashSign,
 					client_ecc = {EllipticCurves, EcPointFormats}});
         #alert{} = Alert ->
             handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State)
@@ -456,11 +449,11 @@ abbreviated(#finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished,
 		   session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
 		  connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = 
 	    State) ->
-    case tls_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, client,
+    case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, client,
 					 get_current_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, write),
 					 MasterSecret, Handshake) of
         verified ->  
-	    ConnectionStates = tls_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0),
+	    ConnectionStates = ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0),
 	    next_state_connection(abbreviated, 
 				  ack_connection(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}));
 	#alert{} = Alert ->
@@ -472,11 +465,11 @@ abbreviated(#finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished,
 		   session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
 		   negotiated_version = Version,
 		   connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
-    case tls_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, server,
+    case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, server,
 					 get_pending_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, write),
 					 MasterSecret, Handshake0) of
         verified ->
-	    ConnectionStates1 = tls_record:set_server_verify_data(current_read, Data, ConnectionStates0),
+	    ConnectionStates1 = ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_read, Data, ConnectionStates0),
 	    {ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
 		finalize_handshake(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}, abbreviated),
 	    next_state_connection(abbreviated, 
@@ -531,7 +524,7 @@ certify(#certificate{} = Cert,
 	       cert_db = CertDbHandle,
 	       cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
 	       ssl_options = Opts} = State) ->
-    case tls_handshake:certify(Cert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Opts#ssl_options.depth,
+    case ssl_handshake:certify(Cert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Opts#ssl_options.depth,
 			       Opts#ssl_options.verify,
 			       Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role) of
         {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo} ->
@@ -563,7 +556,7 @@ certify(#server_key_exchange{} = Msg,
 
 certify(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = HashSigns},
 	#state{session = #session{own_certificate = Cert}} = State0) ->
-    HashSign = tls_handshake:select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert),
+    HashSign = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert),
     {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = true}),
     next_state(certify, certify, Record, State#state{cert_hashsign_algorithm = HashSign});
 
@@ -613,7 +606,7 @@ certify(#server_hello_done{},
 	       negotiated_version = Version,
 	       premaster_secret = undefined,
 	       role = client} = State0) ->
-    case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session, 
+    case ssl_handshake:master_secret(tls_record, Version, Session,
 				     ConnectionStates0, client) of
 	{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
 	    State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates},
@@ -629,7 +622,7 @@ certify(#server_hello_done{},
 	       negotiated_version = Version,
 	       premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
 	       role = client} = State0) ->    
-    case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, 
+    case ssl_handshake:master_secret(tls_record, Version, PremasterSecret,
 				     ConnectionStates0, client) of
 	{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
 	    Session = Session0#session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
@@ -650,7 +643,7 @@ certify(#client_key_exchange{} = Msg,
 certify(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys},
 	State = #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg, negotiated_version = Version}) ->
     try
-	certify_client_key_exchange(tls_handshake:decode_client_key(Keys, KeyAlg, Version), State)
+	certify_client_key_exchange(ssl_handshake:decode_client_key(Keys, KeyAlg, Version), State)
     catch 
 	#alert{} = Alert ->
 	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State)
@@ -668,8 +661,8 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS
 				   connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
 				   session = Session0,
 				   private_key = Key} = State0) ->
-    PremasterSecret = tls_handshake:decrypt_premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
-    case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret,
+    PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:decrypt_premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
+    case ssl_handshake:master_secret(tls_record, Version, PremasterSecret,
 				     ConnectionStates0, server) of
 	{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
 	    Session = Session0#session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
@@ -735,7 +728,7 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_rsa_psk_identity{
 				   #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS}},
 			    #state{negotiated_version = Version,
 				   private_key = Key} = State0) ->
-    PremasterSecret = tls_handshake:decrypt_premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
+    PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:decrypt_premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
     case server_rsa_psk_master_secret(PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, State0) of
 	#state{} = State1 ->
 	    {Record, State} = next_record(State1),
@@ -774,8 +767,8 @@ cipher(#certificate_verify{signature = Signature, hashsign_algorithm = CertHashS
 	      tls_handshake_history = Handshake
 	     } = State0) -> 
 
-    HashSign = tls_handshake:select_cert_hashsign(CertHashSign, Algo, Version),
-    case tls_handshake:certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo,
+    HashSign = ssl_handshake:select_cert_hashsign(CertHashSign, Algo, Version),
+    case ssl_handshake:certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo,
 					  Version, HashSign, MasterSecret, Handshake) of
 	valid ->
 	    {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
@@ -798,7 +791,7 @@ cipher(#finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished,
 	      = Session0,
 		  connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
 	      tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    case tls_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, 
+    case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished,
 					 opposite_role(Role), 
 					 get_current_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, read),
 					 MasterSecret, Handshake0) of
@@ -1033,7 +1026,7 @@ handle_sync_event({prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}, _, StateName,
 		  #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
 			 negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
     ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+	ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
     SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
     #security_parameters{master_secret = MasterSecret,
 			 client_random = ClientRandom,
@@ -1048,7 +1041,7 @@ handle_sync_event({prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}, _, StateName,
 					     (client_random, Acc) -> [ClientRandom|Acc];
 					     (server_random, Acc) -> [ServerRandom|Acc]
 					  end, [], Seed)),
-		tls_handshake:prf(Version, SecretToUse, Label, SeedToUse, WantedLength)
+		ssl_handshake:prf(Version, SecretToUse, Label, SeedToUse, WantedLength)
 	    catch
 		exit:_ -> {error, badarg};
 		error:Reason -> {error, Reason}
@@ -1414,7 +1407,7 @@ certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client,
 		      session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert},
                       socket = Socket,
                       tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    Certificate = tls_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client),
+    Certificate = ssl_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client),
     {BinCert, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
         encode_handshake(Certificate, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
     Transport:send(Socket, BinCert),
@@ -1434,7 +1427,7 @@ verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client,
 			  cert_hashsign_algorithm = HashSign,
 			  tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
 
-    case tls_handshake:client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, 
+    case ssl_handshake:client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret,
 						 Version, HashSign, PrivateKey, Handshake0) of
         #certificate_verify{} = Verified ->
             {BinVerified, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
@@ -1451,21 +1444,17 @@ verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client,
 verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State) ->
     State.
 
-do_server_hello(Type, NextProtocolsToSend,
-		EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves,
+do_server_hello(Type, #hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocols} = ServerHelloExt,
 		#state{negotiated_version = Version,
 		       session = #session{session_id = SessId},
-		       connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		       renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}}
+		       connection_states = ConnectionStates0}
 		= State0) when is_atom(Type) ->
 
     ServerHello = 
-	tls_handshake:server_hello(SessId, Version, 
-                                   ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation,
-				   NextProtocolsToSend, EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves),
+	tls_handshake:server_hello(SessId, Version, ConnectionStates0, ServerHelloExt),
     State = server_hello(ServerHello,
 			 State0#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation =
-					  NextProtocolsToSend =/= undefined}),
+					  NextProtocols =/= undefined}),
     case Type of	
 	new ->
 	    new_server_hello(ServerHello, State);
@@ -1496,7 +1485,7 @@ resumed_server_hello(#state{session = Session,
 			    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
 			    negotiated_version = Version} = State0) ->
 
-    case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session,
+    case ssl_handshake:master_secret(tls_record, Version, Session,
 				     ConnectionStates0, server) of
 	{_, ConnectionStates1} ->
 	    State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
@@ -1525,7 +1514,7 @@ handle_resumed_session(SessId, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
 				      session_cache = Cache,
 				      session_cache_cb = CacheCb} = State0) ->
     Session = CacheCb:lookup(Cache, {{Host, Port}, SessId}),
-    case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session, 
+    case ssl_handshake:master_secret(tls_record, Version, Session,
 				     ConnectionStates0, client) of
 	{_, ConnectionStates} ->
 	    {Record, State} = 
@@ -1584,7 +1573,7 @@ server_hello_done(#state{transport_cb = Transport,
                          connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
                          tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
     
-    HelloDone = tls_handshake:server_hello_done(),
+    HelloDone = ssl_handshake:server_hello_done(),
     
     {BinHelloDone, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
         encode_handshake(HelloDone, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
@@ -1604,7 +1593,7 @@ certify_server(#state{transport_cb = Transport,
 		      cert_db = CertDbHandle,
 		      cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
 		      session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert}} = State) ->
-    case tls_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) of
+    case ssl_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) of
 	CertMsg = #certificate{} ->
 	    {BinCertMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
 		encode_handshake(CertMsg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
@@ -1633,11 +1622,11 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
        Algo == dh_anon ->
     DHKeys = public_key:generate_key(Params),
     ConnectionState = 
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
     SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
     #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
 			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, 
-    Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, DHKeys, Params,
+    Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, DHKeys, Params,
 					       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
 					       ServerRandom,
 					       PrivateKey}),
@@ -1665,11 +1654,11 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
 
     ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(select_curve(State)),
     ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
     SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
     #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
 			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdh, ECDHKeys,
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdh, ECDHKeys,
 							HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
 							ServerRandom,
 							PrivateKey}),
@@ -1694,11 +1683,11 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk,
 		    transport_cb = Transport
 		   } = State) ->
     ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
     SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
     #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
 			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
+    Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
 						       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
 						       ServerRandom,
 						       PrivateKey}),
@@ -1721,11 +1710,11 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk,
 		   } = State) ->
     DHKeys = public_key:generate_key(Params),
     ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
     SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
     #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
 			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {dhe_psk, PskIdentityHint, DHKeys, Params,
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {dhe_psk, PskIdentityHint, DHKeys, Params,
 					       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
 					       ServerRandom,
 					       PrivateKey}),
@@ -1750,11 +1739,11 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk,
 		    transport_cb = Transport
 		   } = State) ->
     ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
     SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
     #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
 			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
 					       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
 					       ServerRandom,
 					       PrivateKey}),
@@ -1786,11 +1775,11 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
 		   Keys0
 	   end,
     ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
     SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
     #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
 			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, Keys, SrpParams,
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, Keys, SrpParams,
 					       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
 					       ServerRandom,
 					       PrivateKey}),
@@ -1826,7 +1815,7 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client,
   when Algorithm == dhe_dss;
        Algorithm == dhe_rsa;
        Algorithm == dh_anon ->
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {dh, DhPubKey}),
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {dh, DhPubKey}),
     {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
         encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
     Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
@@ -1843,7 +1832,7 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client,
   when Algorithm == ecdhe_ecdsa; Algorithm == ecdhe_rsa;
        Algorithm == ecdh_ecdsa; Algorithm == ecdh_rsa;
        Algorithm == ecdh_anon ->
-    Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {ecdh, Keys}),
+    Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {ecdh, Keys}),
     {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
         encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
     Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
@@ -1857,7 +1846,7 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client,
 		    negotiated_version = Version,
 		    socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
 		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity}),
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity}),
     {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
         encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
     Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
@@ -1872,7 +1861,7 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client,
 		    diffie_hellman_keys = {DhPubKey, _},
 		    socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
 		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {dhe_psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, DhPubKey}),
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {dhe_psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, DhPubKey}),
     {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
         encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
     Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
@@ -1905,7 +1894,7 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client,
   when Algorithm == srp_dss;
        Algorithm == srp_rsa;
        Algorithm == srp_anon ->
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {srp, ClientPubKey}),
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {srp, ClientPubKey}),
     {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
         encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
     Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
@@ -1922,7 +1911,7 @@ rsa_key_exchange(Version, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _})
        Algorithm == ?sha384WithRSAEncryption;
        Algorithm == ?sha512WithRSAEncryption
        ->
-    tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version,
+    ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version,
 			       {premaster_secret, PremasterSecret,
 				PublicKeyInfo});
 rsa_key_exchange(_, _, _) ->
@@ -1938,7 +1927,7 @@ rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo = {Alg
        Algorithm == ?sha384WithRSAEncryption;
        Algorithm == ?sha512WithRSAEncryption
        ->
-    tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version,
+    ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version,
 			       {psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret,
 				PublicKeyInfo});
 rsa_psk_key_exchange(_, _, _, _) ->
@@ -1952,7 +1941,11 @@ request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer},
 			   negotiated_version = Version,
 			   socket = Socket,
 			   transport_cb = Transport} = State) ->
-    Msg = tls_handshake:certificate_request(ConnectionStates0, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Version),
+    #connection_state{security_parameters =
+			  #security_parameters{cipher_suite = CipherSuite}} =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+    Msg = ssl_handshake:certificate_request(CipherSuite, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Version),
+
     {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
         encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
     Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
@@ -1967,7 +1960,7 @@ finalize_handshake(State, StateName) ->
     ConnectionStates0 = cipher_protocol(State),
 
     ConnectionStates =
-        tls_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0,
+        ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0,
                                                      write),
 
     State1 = State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates},
@@ -1985,7 +1978,7 @@ next_protocol(#state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket,
 		     next_protocol = NextProtocol,
 		     connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
 		     tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    NextProtocolMessage = tls_handshake:next_protocol(NextProtocol),
+    NextProtocolMessage = ssl_handshake:next_protocol(NextProtocol),
     {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(NextProtocolMessage, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
     Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
     State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
@@ -2007,7 +2000,7 @@ finished(#state{role = Role, socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version,
                 connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
                 tls_handshake_history = Handshake0}, StateName) ->
     MasterSecret = Session#session.master_secret,
-    Finished = tls_handshake:finished(Version, Role,
+    Finished = ssl_handshake:finished(Version, Role,
 				       get_current_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, write),
 				       MasterSecret, Handshake0),
     ConnectionStates1 = save_verify_data(Role, Finished, ConnectionStates0, StateName),
@@ -2017,18 +2010,19 @@ finished(#state{role = Role, socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version,
     {ConnectionStates, Handshake}.
 
 save_verify_data(client, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, certify) ->
-    tls_record:set_client_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates);
+    ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates);
 save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, cipher) ->
-    tls_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates);
+    ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates);
 save_verify_data(client, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbreviated) ->
-    tls_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates);
+    ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates);
 save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbreviated) ->
-    tls_record:set_server_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates).
+    ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates).
 
 handle_server_key(#server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys},
 		  #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg,
 			 negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
-    Params = tls_handshake:decode_server_key(Keys, KeyAlg, Version),
+
+    Params = ssl_handshake:decode_server_key(Keys, KeyAlg, Version),
     HashSign = negotiated_hashsign(Params#server_key_params.hashsign, KeyAlg, Version),
     case is_anonymous(KeyAlg) of
 	true ->
@@ -2046,15 +2040,15 @@ verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params = Params,
 			 public_key_info = PubKeyInfo,
 			 connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) ->
     ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
     SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
     #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
 			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, 
-    Hash = tls_handshake:server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo,
+    Hash = ssl_handshake:server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo,
 						  <<ClientRandom/binary,
 						    ServerRandom/binary,
 						    EncParams/binary>>),
-    case tls_handshake:verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo) of
+    case ssl_handshake:verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo) of
 	true ->
 	    server_master_secret(Params, State);
 	false ->
@@ -2090,7 +2084,7 @@ master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret,
 			     #state{session = Session,
 				    negotiated_version = Version, role = Role,
 				    connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
-    case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret,
+    case ssl_handshake:master_secret(tls_record, Version, PremasterSecret,
 				     ConnectionStates0, Role) of
 	{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
 	    State#state{
@@ -2243,12 +2237,12 @@ client_srp_master_secret(Generator, Prime, Salt, ServerPub, ClientKeys,
     end.
 
 cipher_role(client, Data, Session, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> 
-    ConnectionStates = tls_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0),
+    ConnectionStates = ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0),
     next_state_connection(cipher, ack_connection(State#state{session = Session,
 							     connection_states = ConnectionStates}));
      
 cipher_role(server, Data, Session,  #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> 
-    ConnectionStates1 = tls_record:set_client_verify_data(current_read, Data, ConnectionStates0),
+    ConnectionStates1 = ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_read, Data, ConnectionStates0),
     {ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
 	finalize_handshake(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
 				       session = Session}, cipher),
@@ -2258,16 +2252,16 @@ cipher_role(server, Data, Session,  #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0
 							     tls_handshake_history =
 								 Handshake})).
 encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
-    tls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates).
+    ssl_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates).
 
 encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
-    tls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates).
+    ssl_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates).
 
 encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0) ->
     Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version),
     Handshake1 = tls_handshake:update_handshake_history(Handshake0, Frag),
     {E, ConnectionStates1} =
-        tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+        ssl_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
     {E, ConnectionStates1, Handshake1}.
 
 encode_packet(Data, #socket_options{packet=Packet}) ->
@@ -2362,7 +2356,7 @@ write_application_data(Data0, From, #state{socket = Socket,
 	    renegotiate(State#state{send_queue = queue:in_r({From, Data}, SendQueue),
 				    renegotiation = {true, internal}});
 	false ->
-	    {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+	    {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = ssl_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0),
 	    Result = Transport:send(Socket, Msgs),
 	    {reply, Result,
 	     connection, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, get_timeout(State)}
@@ -2567,7 +2561,7 @@ next_state(Current, Next, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = <<1>>}
  	   _ChangeCipher, 
  	   #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
     ConnectionStates1 =
- 	tls_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+	ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
     {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}),
     next_state(Current, Next, Record, State);
 next_state(Current, Next, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, State0) ->
@@ -2619,7 +2613,7 @@ next_state_connection(StateName, #state{send_queue = Queue0,
     case queue:out(Queue0) of
 	{{value, {From, Data}}, Queue} ->
 	    {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = 
-		tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+		ssl_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0),
 	    Result = Transport:send(Socket, Msgs),
 	    gen_fsm:reply(From, Result),
 	    next_state_connection(StateName,
@@ -2664,7 +2658,7 @@ invalidate_session(server, _, Port, Session) ->
 
 initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions}, User,
 	      {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) ->
-    ConnectionStates = tls_record:init_connection_states(Role),
+    ConnectionStates = ssl_record:init_connection_states(Role),
     
     SessionCacheCb = case application:get_env(ssl, session_cb) of
 			 {ok, Cb} when is_atom(Cb) ->
@@ -2926,11 +2920,11 @@ renegotiate(#state{role = server,
 		   transport_cb = Transport,
 		   negotiated_version = Version,
 		   connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
-    HelloRequest = tls_handshake:hello_request(),
+    HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(),
     Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version),
     Hs0 = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
     {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = 
-	tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+	ssl_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
     Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
     {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{connection_states = 
 					       ConnectionStates,
@@ -3005,12 +2999,45 @@ handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref,
     end.
 
 get_current_connection_state_prf(CStates, Direction) ->
-	CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(CStates, Direction),
+	CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(CStates, Direction),
 	CS#connection_state.security_parameters#security_parameters.prf_algorithm.
 get_pending_connection_state_prf(CStates, Direction) ->
-	CS = tls_record:pending_connection_state(CStates, Direction),
+	CS = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(CStates, Direction),
 	CS#connection_state.security_parameters#security_parameters.prf_algorithm.
 
+start_or_recv_cancel_timer(infinity, _RecvFrom) ->
+    undefined;
+start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom) ->
+    erlang:send_after(Timeout, self(), {cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}).
+
+cancel_timer(undefined) ->
+    ok;
+cancel_timer(Timer) ->
+    erlang:cancel_timer(Timer),
+    ok.
+
+handle_unrecv_data(StateName, #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport} = State) ->
+    ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]),
+    case Transport:recv(Socket, 0, 0) of
+	{error, closed} ->
+	    ok;
+	{ok, Data} ->
+	    handle_close_alert(Data, StateName, State)
+    end.
+
+handle_close_alert(Data, StateName, State0) ->
+    case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of
+	{#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, State} ->
+	    [Alert|_] = decode_alerts(EncAlerts),
+	    handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State);
+	_ ->
+	    ok
+    end.
+negotiated_hashsign(undefined, Algo, Version) ->
+    default_hashsign(Version, Algo);
+negotiated_hashsign(HashSign = {_, _}, _, _) ->
+    HashSign.
+
 %% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1.  Signature Algorithms
 %% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
 %% server MUST do the following:
@@ -3025,11 +3052,6 @@ get_pending_connection_state_prf(CStates, Direction) ->
 %% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
 %%    ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}.
 
-negotiated_hashsign(undefined, Algo, Version) ->
-    default_hashsign(Version, Algo);
-negotiated_hashsign(HashSign = {_, _}, _, _) ->
-    HashSign.
-
 default_hashsign(_Version = {Major, Minor}, KeyExchange)
   when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 andalso
        (KeyExchange == rsa orelse
@@ -3065,35 +3087,6 @@ default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange)
        KeyExchange == srp_anon ->
     {null, anon}.
 
-start_or_recv_cancel_timer(infinity, _RecvFrom) ->
-    undefined;
-start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom) ->
-    erlang:send_after(Timeout, self(), {cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}).
-
-cancel_timer(undefined) ->
-    ok;
-cancel_timer(Timer) ->
-    erlang:cancel_timer(Timer),
-    ok.
-
-handle_unrecv_data(StateName, #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport} = State) ->
-    ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]),
-    case Transport:recv(Socket, 0, 0) of
-	{error, closed} ->
-	    ok;
-	{ok, Data} ->
-	    handle_close_alert(Data, StateName, State)
-    end.
-
-handle_close_alert(Data, StateName, State0) ->
-    case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of
-	{#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, State} ->
-	    [Alert|_] = decode_alerts(EncAlerts),
-	    handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State);
-	_ ->
-	    ok
-    end.
-
 select_curve(#state{client_ecc = {[Curve|_], _}}) ->
     {namedCurve, Curve};
 select_curve(_) ->
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
index 6cc6e9e885..02bfa69fc5 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@
 %%
 
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Purpose: Help funtions for handling the SSL-handshake protocol
+%% Purpose: Help funtions for handling the TLS (specific parts of)
+%%% SSL/TLS/DTLS handshake protocol
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 -module(tls_handshake).
@@ -31,24 +32,9 @@
 -include("ssl_srp.hrl").
 -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
 
--export([master_secret/4, client_hello/8, server_hello/7, hello/4,
-	 hello_request/0, certify/7, certificate/4,
-	 client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5,
-	 certificate_request/4, key_exchange/3, server_key_exchange_hash/2,
-	 finished/5, verify_connection/6, get_tls_handshake/3,
-	 decode_client_key/3, decode_server_key/3, server_hello_done/0,
-	 encode_handshake/2, init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/2,
-	 decrypt_premaster_secret/2, prf/5, next_protocol/1, select_hashsign/2,
-	 select_cert_hashsign/3]).
-
--export([dec_hello_extensions/2]).
-
--type tls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | #server_hello{} |
-			 #server_hello_done{} | #certificate{} | #certificate_request{} |
-			 #client_key_exchange{} | #finished{} | #certificate_verify{} |
-			 #hello_request{} | #next_protocol{}.
-
--define(NAMED_CURVE_TYPE, 3).
+-export([client_hello/8, server_hello/4, hello/4,
+	 get_tls_handshake/3, encode_handshake/2, decode_handshake/3,
+	 init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/2]).
 
 %%====================================================================
 %% Internal application API
@@ -66,515 +52,105 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates,
 			 } = SslOpts,
 	     Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert) ->
     Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions),
-    Pending = tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    Pending = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
     SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    Ciphers = available_suites(UserSuites, Version),
-    SRP = srp_user(SslOpts),
-    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = default_ecc_extensions(Version),
+    CipherSuites = ssl_handshake:available_suites(UserSuites, Version),
+
+    Extensions = ssl_handshake:client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites,
+						SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
 
     Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert),
 
     #client_hello{session_id = Id,
 		  client_version = Version,
-		  cipher_suites = cipher_suites(Ciphers, Renegotiation),
-		  compression_methods = tls_record:compressions(),
+		  cipher_suites = ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(CipherSuites, Renegotiation),
+		  compression_methods = ssl_record:compressions(),
 		  random = SecParams#security_parameters.client_random,
-
-		  renegotiation_info =
-		      renegotiation_info(client, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
-		  srp = SRP,
-		  hash_signs = advertised_hash_signs(Version),
-		  ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
-		  elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-		  next_protocol_negotiation =
-		      encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, Renegotiation)
+		  extensions = Extensions
 		 }.
 
-encode_protocol(Protocol, Acc) ->
-	Len = byte_size(Protocol),
-	<<Acc/binary, ?BYTE(Len), Protocol/binary>>.
-
-encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(undefined) ->
-	undefined;
-
-encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(Protocols) ->
-	#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}.
-
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec server_hello(session_id(), tls_version(), #connection_states{}, 
-		   boolean(), [binary()] | undefined,
-		   #ec_point_formats{} | undefined,
-		   #elliptic_curves{} | undefined) -> #server_hello{}.
+-spec server_hello(#session{}, tls_version(), #connection_states{},
+		   #hello_extensions{}) -> #server_hello{}.
 %%
 %% Description: Creates a server hello message.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation,
-	     ProtocolsAdvertisedOnServer, EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves) ->
-    Pending = tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Extensions) ->
+    Pending = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
     SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
+
     #server_hello{server_version = Version,
 		  cipher_suite = SecParams#security_parameters.cipher_suite,
                   compression_method = 
 		  SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm,
 		  random = SecParams#security_parameters.server_random,
 		  session_id = SessionId,
-		  renegotiation_info = 
-		  renegotiation_info(server, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
-		  ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
-		  elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-		  next_protocol_negotiation = encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(ProtocolsAdvertisedOnServer)
+		  extensions = Extensions
 		 }.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec hello_request() -> #hello_request{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a hello request message sent by server to 
-%% trigger renegotiation.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-hello_request() ->
-    #hello_request{}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec hello(#server_hello{} | #client_hello{}, #ssl_options{},
 	    #connection_states{} | {inet:port_number(), #session{}, db_handle(),
-				    atom(), #connection_states{}, binary()},
+				    atom(), #connection_states{}, binary() | undefined},
 	    boolean()) ->
 			  {tls_version(), session_id(), #connection_states{}, binary() | undefined}|
-			  {tls_version(), {resumed | new, #session{}}, #connection_states{}, [binary()] | undefined,
+			  {tls_version(), {resumed | new, #session{}}, #connection_states{},
+			   [binary()] | undefined,
 			  [oid()] | undefined, [oid()] | undefined} |
 			  #alert{}.
 %%
 %% Description: Handles a recieved hello message
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, server_version = Version,
-		    compression_method = Compression, random = Random,
-		    session_id = SessionId, renegotiation_info = Info,
-		    hash_signs = _HashSigns} = Hello,
-      #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation, next_protocol_selector = NextProtocolSelector,
-		   versions = SupportedVersions},
+hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, random = Random,
+		    cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+		    compression_method = Compression,
+		    session_id = SessionId, extensions = HelloExt},
+      #ssl_options{versions = SupportedVersions} = SslOpt,
       ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
     case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, SupportedVersions) of
 	true ->
-	    case handle_renegotiation_info(client, Info, ConnectionStates0, 
-					   Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, []) of
-		{ok, ConnectionStates1} ->
-		    ConnectionStates =
-			hello_pending_connection_states(client, Version, CipherSuite, Random,
-							Compression, ConnectionStates1),
-		    case handle_next_protocol(Hello, NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiation) of
-			#alert{} = Alert ->
-			    Alert;
-			    Protocol ->
-			    {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates, Protocol}
-		    end;
-		#alert{} = Alert ->
-		    Alert
-	    end;
+	    handle_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite,
+				    Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation);
 	false ->
 	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION)
     end;
 			       
-hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello,
+hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion,
+		    session_id = SugesstedId,
+		    cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
+		    compression_methods = Compressions,
+		    random = Random,
+		    extensions = HelloExt},
       #ssl_options{versions = Versions} = SslOpts,
       {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert}, Renegotiation) ->
-    Version = select_version(ClientVersion, Versions),
+    Version = ssl_handshake:select_version(tls_record, ClientVersion, Versions),
     case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of
 	true ->
 	    %% TODO: need to take supported Curves into Account when selecting the CipherSuite....
 	    %%       if whe have an ECDSA cert with an unsupported curve, we need to drop ECDSA ciphers
 	    {Type, #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session1}
-		= select_session(Hello, Port, Session0, Version, 
-				 SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert),
+		= ssl_handshake:select_session(SugesstedId, CipherSuites, Compressions,
+					       Port, Session0, Version,
+					       SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert),
 	    case CipherSuite of 
 		no_suite ->
 		    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
 		_ ->
-		    try handle_hello_extensions(Hello, Version, SslOpts, Session1, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
-			{Session, ConnectionStates, ProtocolsToAdvertise, ECPointFormats, EllipticCurves} ->
-			    {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates,
-			     ProtocolsToAdvertise, ECPointFormats, EllipticCurves}
-		    catch throw:Alert ->
-			    Alert
-		    end
+		    handle_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, HelloExt,
+					    SslOpts, Session1, ConnectionStates0,
+					    Renegotiation)
 	    end;
 	false ->
 	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION)
     end.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), integer() | nolimit,
-	      verify_peer | verify_none, {fun(), term},
-	      client | server) ->  {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
-	MaxPathLen, _Verify, VerifyFunAndState, Role) ->
-    [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs,
-      
-    ValidationFunAndState =
-	case VerifyFunAndState of
-	    undefined ->
-		{fun(OtpCert, ExtensionOrVerifyResult, SslState) ->
-			 ssl_certificate:validate_extension(OtpCert,
-							    ExtensionOrVerifyResult, SslState)
-		 end, Role};
-	    {Fun, UserState0} ->
-		{fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) ->
-			 case ssl_certificate:validate_extension(OtpCert,
-								 Extension,
-								 SslState) of
-			     {valid, NewSslState} ->
-				 {valid, {NewSslState, UserState}};
-			     {fail, Reason} ->
-				 apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Reason, UserState,
-						SslState);
-			     {unknown, _} ->
-				 apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert,
-						Extension, UserState, SslState)
-			 end;
-		    (OtpCert, VerifyResult, {SslState, UserState}) ->
-			 apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState,
-					SslState)
-		 end, {Role, UserState0}}
-	end,
-
-    try
-	{TrustedErlCert, CertPath}  =
-	    ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
-	case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedErlCert,
-					      CertPath,
-					     [{max_path_length,
-					       MaxPathLen},
-					      {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of
-	    {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} ->
-		{PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo};
-	    {error, Reason} ->
-		path_validation_alert(Reason)
-	end
-    catch
-	error:_ ->
-	    %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN)
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec certificate(der_cert(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), client | server) -> #certificate{} | #alert{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a certificate message.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client) ->
-    Chain =
-	case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of
-	    {ok, CertChain} ->
-		CertChain;
-	    {error, _} -> 
-		%% If no suitable certificate is available, the client
-		%% SHOULD send a certificate message containing no
-		%% certificates. (chapter 7.4.6. RFC 4346)
-		[]	 
-	end,
-    #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain};
-
-certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) ->
-    case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of
-	{ok, Chain} ->
-	    #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain};
-	{error, _} ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR)
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec client_certificate_verify(undefined | der_cert(), binary(),
-				tls_version(), term(), private_key(),
-				tls_handshake_history()) ->
-    #certificate_verify{} | ignore | #alert{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a certificate_verify message, called by the client.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-client_certificate_verify(undefined, _, _, _, _, _) ->
-    ignore;
-client_certificate_verify(_, _, _, _, undefined, _) ->
-    ignore;
-client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version,
-			  {HashAlgo, _} = HashSign,
-			  PrivateKey, {Handshake, _}) ->
-    case public_key:pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(OwnCert) of
-	true ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
-	false ->
-	    Hashes =
-		calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake),
-	    Signed = digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey),
-	    #certificate_verify{signature = Signed, hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), tls_version(), term(),
-			 binary(), tls_handshake_history()) -> valid | #alert{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo, Version,
-		   HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) ->
-    Hash = calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake),
-    case verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PublicKeyInfo) of
-	true ->
-	    valid;
-	_ ->
-    	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE)
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec verify_signature(tls_version(), binary(), {term(), term()}, binary(),
-				   public_key_info()) -> true | false.
-%%
-%% Description: Checks that a public_key signature is valid.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-verify_signature(_Version, _Hash, {_HashAlgo, anon}, _Signature, _) ->
-    true;
-verify_signature({3, Minor}, Hash, {HashAlgo, rsa}, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams})
-  when Minor >= 3 ->
-    public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, PubKey);
-verify_signature(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams}) ->
-    case public_key:decrypt_public(Signature, PubKey,
-				   [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) of
-	Hash -> true;
-	_    -> false
-    end;
-verify_signature(_Version, Hash, {HashAlgo, dsa}, Signature, {?'id-dsa', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) ->
-    public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams});
-verify_signature(_Version, Hash, {HashAlgo, ecdsa}, Signature, {?'id-ecPublicKey', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) ->
-    public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec certificate_request(#connection_states{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), tls_version()) ->
-    #certificate_request{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a certificate_request message, called by the server.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certificate_request(ConnectionStates, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Version) ->
-    #connection_state{security_parameters = 
-		      #security_parameters{cipher_suite = CipherSuite}} =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    Types = certificate_types(CipherSuite),
-    HashSigns = advertised_hash_signs(Version),
-    Authorities = certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
-    #certificate_request{
-		    certificate_types = Types,
-		    hashsign_algorithms = HashSigns,
-		    certificate_authorities = Authorities
-		   }.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec key_exchange(client | server, tls_version(),
-		   {premaster_secret, binary(), public_key_info()} |
-		   {dh, binary()} |
-		   {dh, {binary(), binary()}, #'DHParameter'{}, {HashAlgo::atom(), SignAlgo::atom()},
-		   binary(), binary(), private_key()} |
-		   {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{}} |
-		   {psk, binary()} |
-		   {dhe_psk, binary(), binary()} |
-		   {srp, {binary(), binary()}, #srp_user{}, {HashAlgo::atom(), SignAlgo::atom()},
-		   binary(), binary(), private_key()}) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{} | #server_key_exchange{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a keyexchange message.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {premaster_secret, Secret, {_, PublicKey, _}}) ->
-    EncPremasterSecret =
-	encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, PublicKey),
-    #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = EncPremasterSecret};
-
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {dh, PublicKey}) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{
-	      exchange_keys = #client_diffie_hellman_public{
-		dh_public = PublicKey}
-	       };
-
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = {0, ECPublicKey}}}) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{
-	      exchange_keys = #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{
-		dh_public = ECPublicKey}
-	       };
-
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {psk, Identity}) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{
-	      exchange_keys = #client_psk_identity{
-		identity = Identity}
-	       };
-
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {dhe_psk, Identity, PublicKey}) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{
-	      exchange_keys = #client_dhe_psk_identity{
-		identity = Identity,
-		dh_public = PublicKey}
-	       };
-
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, Secret, {_, PublicKey, _}}) ->
-    EncPremasterSecret =
-	encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, PublicKey),
-    #client_key_exchange{
-		exchange_keys = #client_rsa_psk_identity{
-				   identity = PskIdentity,
-		  exchange_keys = EncPremasterSecret}};
-
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {srp, PublicKey}) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{
-	      exchange_keys = #client_srp_public{
-		srp_a = PublicKey}
-	       };
-
-key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, {PublicKey, _},
-			       #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G},
-			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
-    ServerDHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = int_to_bin(P),
-				       dh_g = int_to_bin(G), dh_y = PublicKey},
-    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerDHParams, HashSign,
-			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
-
-key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdh,  #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey =  {0, ECPublicKey},
-						      parameters = ECCurve}, HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom,
-	     PrivateKey}) ->
-    ServerECParams = #server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve, public = ECPublicKey},
-    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerECParams, HashSign,
-			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
-
-key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
-			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
-    ServerPSKParams = #server_psk_params{hint = PskIdentityHint},
-    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerPSKParams, HashSign,
-			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
-
-key_exchange(server, Version, {dhe_psk, PskIdentityHint, {PublicKey, _},
-			       #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G},
-			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
-    ServerEDHPSKParams = #server_dhe_psk_params{
-      hint = PskIdentityHint,
-      dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = int_to_bin(P),
-				    dh_g = int_to_bin(G), dh_y = PublicKey}
-     },
-    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerEDHPSKParams,
-			    HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
-
-key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, {PublicKey, _},
-			       #srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime,
-					 salt = Salt},
-			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
-    ServerSRPParams = #server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator,
-					 srp_s = Salt, srp_b = PublicKey},
-    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerSRPParams, HashSign,
-			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey).
-
-enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
-			ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) ->
-    EncParams = enc_server_key(Params),
-    case HashAlgo of
-	null ->
-	    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-			       params_bin = EncParams,
-			       hashsign = {null, anon},
-			       signature = <<>>};
-	_ ->
-	    Hash =
-		server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary,
-						     ServerRandom/binary,
-						     EncParams/binary>>),
-	    Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey),
-	    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-			       params_bin = EncParams,
-			       hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
-			       signature = Signature}
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec master_secret(tls_version(), #session{} | binary(), #connection_states{},
-		   client | server) -> {binary(), #connection_states{}} | #alert{}.
-%%    
-%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys,
-%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update
-%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails.
-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret}, 
-	      ConnectionStates, Role) ->
-    ConnectionState = 
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams, 
-		      ConnectionStates, Role)
-    catch
-	exit:Reason ->
-	    Report = io_lib:format("Key calculation failed due to ~p",
-				   [Reason]),
-	    error_logger:error_report(Report),
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
-    end;
-
-master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
-    ConnectionState = 
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
-			 client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, 
-    try master_secret(Version, 
-		      calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret,
-				       ClientRandom, ServerRandom),
-		      SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role) 
-    catch
-	exit:Reason ->
-	    Report = io_lib:format("Master secret calculation failed"
-				   " due to ~p", [Reason]),
-	    error_logger:error_report(Report),
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
-    end.
-
--spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}.
-
-next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) ->
-  #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec finished(tls_version(), client | server, integer(), binary(), tls_handshake_history()) ->
-    #finished{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a handshake finished message
-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {Handshake, _}) -> % use the current handshake
-    #finished{verify_data = 
-	      calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake)}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec verify_connection(tls_version(), #finished{}, client | server, integer(), binary(),
-			tls_handshake_history()) -> verified | #alert{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Checks the ssl handshake finished message to verify
-%%              the connection.
-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-verify_connection(Version, #finished{verify_data = Data}, 
-		  Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) ->
-    %% use the previous hashes
-    case calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) of
-	Data ->
-	    verified;
-	_ ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)
-    end.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec server_hello_done() ->  #server_hello_done{}.
-%%     
-%% Description: Creates a server hello done message.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------	    
-server_hello_done() ->
-    #server_hello_done{}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec encode_handshake(tls_handshake(), tls_version()) -> iolist().
 %%     
-%% Description: Encode a handshake packet to binary
+%% Description: Encode a handshake packet
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------x
 encode_handshake(Package, Version) ->
-    {MsgType, Bin} = enc_hs(Package, Version),
+    {MsgType, Bin} = enc_handshake(Package, Version),
     Len = byte_size(Bin),
     [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), Bin].
 
@@ -592,30 +168,6 @@ get_tls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffer) ->
     get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), []).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decode_client_key(binary(), key_algo(), tls_version()) ->
-			    #encrypted_premaster_secret{}
-			    | #client_diffie_hellman_public{}
-			    | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{}
-			    | #client_psk_identity{}
-			    | #client_dhe_psk_identity{}
-			    | #client_rsa_psk_identity{}
-			    | #client_srp_public{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) ->
-    dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decode_server_key(binary(), key_algo(), tls_version()) ->
-			       #server_key_params{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) ->
-    dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec init_handshake_history() -> tls_handshake_history().
 
 %%
@@ -645,1231 +197,99 @@ update_handshake_history(Handshake, % special-case SSL2 client hello
 update_handshake_history({Handshake0, _Prev}, Data) ->
     {[Data|Handshake0], Handshake0}.
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decrypt_premaster_secret(binary(), #'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> binary().
-
-%%
-%% Description: Public key decryption using the private key.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) ->
-    try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey,
-				   [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
-    catch
-	_:_ ->
-			io:format("decrypt_premaster_secret error"),
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR))
-    end.
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary().
-%%
-%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) ->
-    MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value),
-    SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value),
-    <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
-
-server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) ->
-    crypto:hash(Hash, Value).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec prf(tls_version(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) ->
-		 {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}.
-%%
-%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _) ->
-    {error, undefined};
-prf({3,1}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
-    {ok, ssl_tls1:prf(?MD5SHA, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)};
-prf({3,_N}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
-    {ok, ssl_tls1:prf(?SHA256, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}.
-
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{}| undefined,  undefined | term()) ->
-			      [{atom(), atom()}] | undefined.
-
-%%
-%% Description:
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-select_hashsign(_, undefined) ->
-    {null, anon};
-select_hashsign(undefined,  Cert) ->
-    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
-    #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
-    select_cert_hashsign(undefined, Algo, {undefined, undefined});
-select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert) ->
-    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} =public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
-    #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
-    DefaultHashSign = {_, Sign} = select_cert_hashsign(undefined, Algo, {undefined, undefined}),
-    case lists:filter(fun({sha, dsa}) ->
-			      true;
-			 ({_, dsa}) ->
-			      false;
-			 ({Hash, S}) when  S == Sign ->
-			      ssl_cipher:is_acceptable_hash(Hash,  proplists:get_value(hashs, crypto:supports()));
-			 (_)  ->
-			      false
-		      end, HashSigns) of
-	[] ->
-	    DefaultHashSign;
-	[HashSign| _] ->
-	    HashSign
-    end.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec select_cert_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{}| undefined, oid(), tls_version()) ->
-				  [{atom(), atom()}].
-
-%%
-%% Description:
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-select_cert_hashsign(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
-    HashSign;
-select_cert_hashsign(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) ->
-    {sha, ecdsa};
-select_cert_hashsign(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) ->
-    {md5sha, rsa};
-select_cert_hashsign(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) ->
-    {sha, dsa}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%%% Internal functions
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length),
 			Body:Length/binary,Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
     Raw = <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), Body/binary>>,
-    H = dec_hs(Version, Type, Body),
-    get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, Rest, [{H,Raw} | Acc]);
+    Handshake = decode_handshake(Version, Type, Body),
+    get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, Rest, [{Handshake,Raw} | Acc]);
 get_tls_handshake_aux(_Version, Data, Acc) ->
     {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}.
 
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_expired}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_issuer}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_signature}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, name_not_permitted}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_critical_extension}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_revoked}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, selfsigned_peer}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) ->
-     ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNKNOWN_CA);
-path_validation_alert(_) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE).
-
-select_session(Hello, Port, Session, Version,
-	       #ssl_options{ciphers = UserSuites} = SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert) ->
-    SuggestedSessionId = Hello#client_hello.session_id,
-    {SessionId, Resumed} = ssl_session:server_id(Port, SuggestedSessionId,
-						 SslOpts, Cert,
-						 Cache, CacheCb),
-    Suites = available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version),
-    case Resumed of
-        undefined ->
-	    CipherSuite = select_cipher_suite(Hello#client_hello.cipher_suites, Suites),
-	    Compressions = Hello#client_hello.compression_methods,
-	    Compression = select_compression(Compressions),
-	    {new, Session#session{session_id = SessionId,
-				  cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
-				  compression_method = Compression}};
-	_ ->
-	    {resumed, Resumed}
-    end.
-
-available_suites(UserSuites, Version) ->
-    case UserSuites of
-	[] ->
-	    ssl_cipher:suites(Version);
-	_ ->
-	    UserSuites
-    end.
-
-available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version) ->
-    ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version)).
- 
-cipher_suites(Suites, false) ->
-    [?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV | Suites];
-cipher_suites(Suites, true) ->
-    Suites.
-
-srp_user(#ssl_options{srp_identity = {UserName, _}}) ->
-    #srp{username = UserName};
-srp_user(_) ->
-    undefined.
-
-renegotiation_info(client, _, false) ->
-    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined};
-renegotiation_info(server, ConnectionStates, false) ->
-    CS  = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
-	true ->
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)};
-	false ->
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
-    end;
-renegotiation_info(client, ConnectionStates, true) ->
-    CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
-	true ->
-	    Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data};
-	false ->
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
-    end;
-
-renegotiation_info(server, ConnectionStates, true) ->
-    CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
-	true ->
-	    CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
-	    SData  =CS#connection_state.server_verify_data,
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>};
-	false ->
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
-    end. 
-
-decode_next_protocols({next_protocol_negotiation, Protocols}) ->
-    decode_next_protocols(Protocols, []).
-decode_next_protocols(<<>>, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc);
-decode_next_protocols(<<?BYTE(Len), Protocol:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    case Len of
-        0 ->
-            {error, invalid_next_protocols};
-        _ ->
-            decode_next_protocols(Rest, [Protocol|Acc])
-    end;
-decode_next_protocols(_Bytes, _Acc) ->
-    {error, invalid_next_protocols}.
-
-next_protocol_extension_allowed(NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) ->
-    NextProtocolSelector =/= undefined andalso not Renegotiating.
-
-handle_next_protocol_on_server(#client_hello{next_protocol_negotiation = undefined}, _Renegotiation, _SslOpts) ->
-    undefined;
-
-handle_next_protocol_on_server(#client_hello{next_protocol_negotiation = {next_protocol_negotiation, <<>>}},
-			       false, #ssl_options{next_protocols_advertised = Protocols}) ->
-    Protocols;
-
-handle_next_protocol_on_server(_Hello, _Renegotiation, _SSLOpts) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE). % unexpected next protocol extension
-
-handle_next_protocol(#server_hello{next_protocol_negotiation = undefined},
-    _NextProtocolSelector, _Renegotiating) ->
-    undefined;
-
-handle_next_protocol(#server_hello{next_protocol_negotiation = Protocols},
-    NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) ->
-
-    case next_protocol_extension_allowed(NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) of
-        true ->
-            select_next_protocol(decode_next_protocols(Protocols), NextProtocolSelector);
-        false ->
-            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) % unexpected next protocol extension
-    end.
-
-select_next_protocol({error, _Reason}, _NextProtocolSelector) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-select_next_protocol(Protocols, NextProtocolSelector) ->
-    case NextProtocolSelector(Protocols) of
-	?NO_PROTOCOL ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	Protocol when is_binary(Protocol)  ->
-	    Protocol
-    end.
-
-default_ecc_extensions(Version) ->
-    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
-    case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
-	true ->
-	    EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]},
-	    EllipticCurves = #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ssl_tls1:ecc_curves(Version)},
-	    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves};
-	_ ->
-	    {undefined, undefined}
-    end.
-
-handle_ecc_extensions(Version, EcPointFormats0, EllipticCurves0) ->
-    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
-    case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
-	true ->
-	    EcPointFormats1 = handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats0),
-	    EllipticCurves1 = handle_ecc_curves_extension(Version, EllipticCurves0),
-	    {EcPointFormats1, EllipticCurves1};
-	_ ->
-	    {undefined, undefined}
-    end.
-
-handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) ->
-    #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}.
-
-handle_ecc_curves_extension(_Version, undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-handle_ecc_curves_extension(Version, _) ->
-    #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ssl_tls1:ecc_curves(Version)}.
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(_, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, 
-			  ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
-    {ok, tls_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> 
-    case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
-	true ->
-	    {ok, tls_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
-	false ->
-	    {ok, tls_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}
-    end;
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(_, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
-    {ok, tls_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)};
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, 
-			  ConnectionStates, true, _, _) ->
-    CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
-    SData = CS#connection_state.server_verify_data,    
-    case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of
-	true ->
-	    {ok, ConnectionStates};
-	false ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
-    end;
-handle_renegotiation_info(server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, 
-			  ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) ->
-    
-      case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
-	  true ->
-	      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	  false ->	
-	      CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-	      Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
-	      case Data == ClientVerify of
-		  true ->
-		      {ok, ConnectionStates};
-		  false ->
-		      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
-	      end
-      end;
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) ->
-    handle_renegotiation_info(ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation);
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) ->
-     case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
-	  true ->
-	     ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	 false ->
-	     handle_renegotiation_info(ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation)
-     end.
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
-    CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    case {SecureRenegotation, CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation} of
-	{_, true} ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	{true, false} ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION);
-	{false, false} ->
-	    {ok, ConnectionStates}
-    end.
-
-%% Update pending connection states with parameters exchanged via 
-%% hello messages
-%% NOTE : Role is the role of the receiver of the hello message
-%%        currently being processed.
-hello_pending_connection_states(Role, Version, CipherSuite, Random, Compression,
-				 ConnectionStates) ->    
-    ReadState =  
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    WriteState = 
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write),
-    
-    NewReadSecParams = 
-	hello_security_parameters(Role, Version, ReadState, CipherSuite,
-			    Random, Compression),
-    
-    NewWriteSecParams =
-	hello_security_parameters(Role, Version, WriteState, CipherSuite,
-			    Random, Compression),
- 
-    tls_record:update_security_params(NewReadSecParams,
-				    NewWriteSecParams,
-				    ConnectionStates).
-
-hello_security_parameters(client, Version, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random,
-			  Compression) ->   
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams),
-    NewSecParams#security_parameters{
-      server_random = Random,
-      compression_algorithm = Compression
-     };
-
-hello_security_parameters(server, Version, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random,
-			  Compression) ->
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams),
-    NewSecParams#security_parameters{
-      client_random = Random,
-      compression_algorithm = Compression
-     }.
-
-select_version(ClientVersion, Versions) ->   
-    ServerVersion = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions),
-    tls_record:lowest_protocol_version(ClientVersion, ServerVersion).
-
-select_cipher_suite([], _) ->
-   no_suite;
-select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) ->
-    case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of
-	true ->
-	    Suite;
-        false ->
-	    select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites)
-    end.
-
-is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) ->
-    lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites).
-
-select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) ->
-    ?NULL.
-
-master_secret(Version, MasterSecret, #security_parameters{
-			 client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom,
-			 hash_size = HashSize,
-			 prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
-			 key_material_length = KML,
-			 expanded_key_material_length = EKML,
-			 iv_size = IVS},
-	      ConnectionStates, Role) ->
-    {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey,
-     ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV} =
-	setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom,
-		   ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS),
-
-    ConnStates1 = tls_record:set_master_secret(MasterSecret, ConnectionStates),
-    ConnStates2 =
-	tls_record:set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret,
-				  Role, ConnStates1),
-
-    ClientCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ClientIV, key = ClientWriteKey},
-    ServerCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ServerIV, key = ServerWriteKey}, 
-    {MasterSecret, 
-     tls_record:set_pending_cipher_state(ConnStates2, ClientCipherState, 
-					 ServerCipherState, Role)}.
-
-
-dec_hs(_, ?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE(SelectedProtocolLength), SelectedProtocol:SelectedProtocolLength/binary,
-                         ?BYTE(PaddingLength), _Padding:PaddingLength/binary>>) ->
-	#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol};
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-dec_hs(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) ->
+decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) ->
     #hello_request{};
 
 %% Client hello v2.
 %% The server must be able to receive such messages, from clients that
 %% are willing to use ssl v3 or higher, but have ssl v2 compatibility.
-dec_hs(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
 				  ?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
 				  ?UINT16(CDLength),
 				  CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
 				  ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>) ->
     #client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor},
-		  random = ssl_ssl2:client_random(ChallengeData, CDLength),
+		  random = ssl_v2:client_random(ChallengeData, CDLength),
 		  session_id = 0,
-		  cipher_suites = from_3bytes(CipherSuites),
+		  cipher_suites =  ssl_handshake:decode_suites('3_bytes', CipherSuites),
 		  compression_methods = [?NULL],
-		  renegotiation_info = undefined
+		  extensions = #hello_extensions{}
 		 };
-dec_hs(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
 		       ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
 		       ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary,
 		       ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary,
 		       Extensions/binary>>) ->
 
-    DecodedExtensions = dec_hello_extensions(Extensions),
-    RenegotiationInfo = proplists:get_value(renegotiation_info, DecodedExtensions, undefined),
-    SRP = proplists:get_value(srp, DecodedExtensions, undefined),
-    HashSigns = proplists:get_value(hash_signs, DecodedExtensions, undefined),
-    EllipticCurves = proplists:get_value(elliptic_curves, DecodedExtensions,
-					 undefined),
-    NextProtocolNegotiation = proplists:get_value(next_protocol_negotiation, DecodedExtensions, undefined),
+    DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions({client, Extensions}),
 
     #client_hello{
        client_version = {Major,Minor},
        random = Random,
        session_id = Session_ID,
-       cipher_suites = from_2bytes(CipherSuites),
+       cipher_suites = ssl_handshake:decode_suites('2_bytes', CipherSuites),
        compression_methods = Comp_methods,
-       renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
-       srp = SRP,
-       hash_signs = HashSigns,
-       elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-       next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation
+       extensions = DecodedExtensions
       };
 
-dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
-		       ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
-		       Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method)>>) ->
-    #server_hello{
-	server_version = {Major,Minor},
-	random = Random,
-	session_id = Session_ID,
-	cipher_suite = Cipher_suite,
-	compression_method = Comp_method,
-	renegotiation_info = undefined,
-	hash_signs = undefined,
-	elliptic_curves = undefined};
-
-dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
-		       ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
-		       Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method),
-		       ?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>) ->
-    
-    HelloExtensions = dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, []),
-    RenegotiationInfo = proplists:get_value(renegotiation_info, HelloExtensions,
-					   undefined),
-    HashSigns = proplists:get_value(hash_signs, HelloExtensions,
-					   undefined),
-    EllipticCurves = proplists:get_value(elliptic_curves, HelloExtensions,
-					   undefined),
-    NextProtocolNegotiation = proplists:get_value(next_protocol_negotiation, HelloExtensions, undefined),
-
-    #server_hello{
-	server_version = {Major,Minor},
-	random = Random,
-	session_id = Session_ID,
-	cipher_suite = Cipher_suite,
-	compression_method = Comp_method,
-	renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
-	hash_signs = HashSigns,
-	elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-       next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>) ->
-    #certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys) ->
-    #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys};
-dec_hs({Major, Minor}, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
-       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes:CertTypesLen/binary,
-	?UINT16(HashSignsLen), HashSigns:HashSignsLen/binary,
-	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths:CertAuthsLen/binary>>)
-  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
-    HashSignAlgos = [{ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)} ||
-			<<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>> <= HashSigns],
-    #certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
-			 hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos},
-			 certificate_authorities = CertAuths};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
-       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes:CertTypesLen/binary,
-	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths:CertAuthsLen/binary>>) ->
-    #certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
-			 certificate_authorities = CertAuths};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>) ->
-    #server_hello_done{};
-dec_hs({Major, Minor}, ?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,<<HashSign:2/binary, ?UINT16(SignLen), Signature:SignLen/binary>>)
-  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
-    #certificate_verify{hashsign_algorithm = hashsign_dec(HashSign), signature = Signature};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,<<?UINT16(SignLen), Signature:SignLen/binary>>)->
-    #certificate_verify{signature = Signature};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, PKEPMS) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = PKEPMS};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?FINISHED, VerifyData) ->
-    #finished{verify_data = VerifyData};
-dec_hs(_, _, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
-
-dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) ->
-    #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS};
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) ->
-    #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS};
-dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE));
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
-    #client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y};
-dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE));
-dec_client_key(<<?BYTE(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
-    #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y};
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, _) ->
-    #client_psk_identity{identity = Id};
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, _) ->
-    #client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DH_Y};
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary, PKEPMS/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, {3, 0}) ->
-    #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id, exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}};
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary, ?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, _) ->
-    #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id, exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}};
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(ALen), A:ALen/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, _) ->
-    #client_srp_public{srp_a = A}.
-
-dec_ske_params(Len, Keys, Version) ->
-    <<Params:Len/bytes, Signature/binary>> = Keys,
-    dec_ske_signature(Params, Signature, Version).
-
-dec_ske_signature(Params, <<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo),
-			    ?UINT16(0)>>, {Major, Minor})
-  when Major >= 3, Minor >= 3 ->
-    HashSign = {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)},
-    {Params, HashSign, <<>>};
-dec_ske_signature(Params, <<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo),
-			    ?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, {Major, Minor})
-  when Major >= 3, Minor >= 3 ->
-    HashSign = {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)},
-    {Params, HashSign, Signature};
-dec_ske_signature(Params, <<>>, _) ->
-    {Params, {null, anon}, <<>>};
-dec_ske_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(0)>>, _) ->
-    {Params, {null, anon}, <<>>};
-dec_ske_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, _) ->
-    {Params, undefined, Signature};
-dec_ske_signature(_, _, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+decode_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg) ->
+    ssl_handshake:decode_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg).
 
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
-    Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_ske_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-%% ECParameters with named_curve
-%% TODO: explicit curve
-dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID),
-		 ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary,
-		 _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
-    Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, ssl_tls1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)},
-				 public = ECPoint},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_ske_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       KeyExchange, Version)
-  when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ->
-    Params = #server_psk_params{
-		hint = PskIdentityHint},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_ske_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) ->
-    DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
-    Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{
-		hint = IdentityHint,
-		dh_params = DHParams},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_ske_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
-		 ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) ->
-    Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_ske_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(_, _, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<>>) ->
-    [];
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>) ->
-    dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, []);
-dec_hello_extensions(_) ->
-    [].
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<>>, Acc) ->
-    Acc;
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    Prop = {next_protocol_negotiation, #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData}},
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [Prop | Acc]);
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    RenegotiateInfo = case Len of
-			  1 ->  % Initial handshake
-			      Info; % should be <<0>> will be matched in handle_renegotiation_info
-			  _ ->
-			      VerifyLen = Len - 1,
-			      <<?BYTE(VerifyLen), VerifyInfo/binary>> = Info,
-			      VerifyInfo
-		      end,	    
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{renegotiation_info, 
-			   #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = RenegotiateInfo}} | Acc]);
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), SRP:SRPLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc)
-  when Len == SRPLen + 2 ->
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{srp,
-			   #srp{username = SRP}} | Acc]);
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
-		       ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    SignAlgoListLen = Len - 2,
-    <<?UINT16(SignAlgoListLen), SignAlgoList/binary>> = ExtData,
-    HashSignAlgos = [{ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)} ||
-			<<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>> <= SignAlgoList],
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{hash_signs,
-				 #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos}} | Acc]);
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
-		       ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    <<?UINT16(_), EllipticCurveList/binary>> = ExtData,
-    EllipticCurves = [ssl_tls1:enum_to_oid(X) || <<X:16>> <= EllipticCurveList],
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{elliptic_curves,
-				 #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = EllipticCurves}} | Acc]);
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
-		       ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    <<?BYTE(_), ECPointFormatList/binary>> = ExtData,
-    ECPointFormats = binary_to_list(ECPointFormatList),
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{ec_point_formats,
-				 #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = ECPointFormats}} | Acc]);
-
-%% Ignore data following the ClientHello (i.e.,
-%% extensions) if not understood.
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(_), ?UINT16(Len), _Unknown:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc);
-%% This theoretically should not happen if the protocol is followed, but if it does it is ignored.
-dec_hello_extensions(_, Acc) ->
-    Acc.
-
-encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) -> 
-    try 
-	PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey, 
-						    [{rsa_pad, 
-						      rsa_pkcs1_padding}]),
-	#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret}
-    catch
-	_:_->
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE))
-    end.
-
-%% encode/decode stream of certificate data to/from list of certificate data 
-certs_to_list(ASN1Certs) ->
-    certs_to_list(ASN1Certs, []).
-
-certs_to_list(<<?UINT24(CertLen), Cert:CertLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    certs_to_list(Rest, [Cert | Acc]);
-certs_to_list(<<>>, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc, []).
-
-certs_from_list(ACList) ->
-    list_to_binary([begin
-			CertLen = byte_size(Cert),
-                        <<?UINT24(CertLen), Cert/binary>>
-		    end || Cert <- ACList]).
-
-enc_hs(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, _Version) ->
-    PaddingLength = 32 - ((byte_size(SelectedProtocol) + 2) rem 32),
-
-    {?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE((byte_size(SelectedProtocol))), SelectedProtocol/binary,
-                         ?BYTE(PaddingLength), 0:(PaddingLength * 8)>>};
-enc_hs(#hello_request{}, _Version) ->
+enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, _Version) ->
     {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>};
-enc_hs(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor},
+enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor},
 		     random = Random,
 		     session_id = SessionID,
 		     cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
 		     compression_methods = CompMethods, 
-		     renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
-		     srp = SRP,
-		     hash_signs = HashSigns,
-		     ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
-		     elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-		     next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, _Version) ->
+		     extensions = HelloExtensions}, _Version) ->
     SIDLength = byte_size(SessionID),
     BinCompMethods = list_to_binary(CompMethods),
     CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods),
     BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites),
     CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites),
-    Extensions0 = hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo, SRP, NextProtocolNegotiation)
-	++ ec_hello_extensions(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites), EcPointFormats)
-	++ ec_hello_extensions(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites), EllipticCurves),
-    Extensions1 = if
-		      Major == 3, Minor >=3 -> Extensions0 ++ hello_extensions(HashSigns);
-		      true -> Extensions0
-		  end,
-    ExtensionsBin = enc_hello_extensions(Extensions1),
-
- {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
-		     ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary,
-		     ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary,
-		     ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>};
-
-enc_hs(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor},
-		     random = Random,
-		     session_id = Session_ID,
-		     cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
-		     compression_method = Comp_method,
-		     renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
-		     ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
-		     elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-		     next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, _Version) ->
-    SID_length = byte_size(Session_ID),
-    CipherSuites = [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite)],
-    Extensions  = hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo, NextProtocolNegotiation)
-	++ ec_hello_extensions(CipherSuites, EcPointFormats)
-	++ ec_hello_extensions(CipherSuites, EllipticCurves),
-    ExtensionsBin = enc_hello_extensions(Extensions),
-    {?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
-		     ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID/binary,
-                     CipherSuite/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method), ExtensionsBin/binary>>};
-enc_hs(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1CertList}, _Version) ->
-    ASN1Certs = certs_from_list(ASN1CertList),
-    ACLen = erlang:iolist_size(ASN1Certs),
-    {?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>};
-enc_hs(#server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, _Version) ->
-    {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys};
-enc_hs(#server_key_params{params_bin = Keys, hashsign = HashSign,
-			  signature = Signature}, Version) ->
-    EncSign = enc_sign(HashSign, Signature, Version),
-    {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<Keys/binary, EncSign/binary>>};
-enc_hs(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
-			    hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos},
-			    certificate_authorities = CertAuths},
-       {Major, Minor})
-  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
-    HashSigns= << <<(ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash)):8, (ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)):8>> ||
-		   {Hash, Sign} <- HashSignAlgos >>,
-    CertTypesLen = byte_size(CertTypes),
-    HashSignsLen = byte_size(HashSigns),
-    CertAuthsLen = byte_size(CertAuths),
-    {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
-       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes/binary,
-	?UINT16(HashSignsLen), HashSigns/binary,
-	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths/binary>>
-    };
-enc_hs(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
-			    certificate_authorities = CertAuths}, 
-       _Version) ->
-    CertTypesLen = byte_size(CertTypes),
-    CertAuthsLen = byte_size(CertAuths),
-    {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
-       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes/binary,
-	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths/binary>>
-    };
-enc_hs(#server_hello_done{}, _Version) ->
-    {?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>};
-enc_hs(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version) ->
-    {?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, enc_cke(ExchangeKeys, Version)};
-enc_hs(#certificate_verify{signature = BinSig, hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}, Version) ->
-    EncSig = enc_sign(HashSign, BinSig, Version),
-    {?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, EncSig};
-enc_hs(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, _Version) ->
-    {?FINISHED, VerifyData}.
-
-enc_cke(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS},{3, 0}) ->
-    PKEPMS;
-enc_cke(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}, _) ->
-    PKEPMSLen = byte_size(PKEPMS),
-    <<?UINT16(PKEPMSLen), PKEPMS/binary>>;
-enc_cke(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
-    Len = byte_size(DHPublic),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), DHPublic/binary>>;
-enc_cke(#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
-    Len = byte_size(DHPublic),
-    <<?BYTE(Len), DHPublic/binary>>;
-enc_cke(#client_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, _) ->
-    Id = <<"psk_identity">>,
-    Len = byte_size(Id),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary>>;
-enc_cke(#client_psk_identity{identity = Id}, _) ->
-    Len = byte_size(Id),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary>>;
-enc_cke(Identity = #client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, Version) ->
-    enc_cke(Identity#client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = <<"psk_identity">>}, Version);
-enc_cke(#client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
-    Len = byte_size(Id),
-    DHLen = byte_size(DHPublic),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary, ?UINT16(DHLen), DHPublic/binary>>;
-enc_cke(Identity = #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, Version) ->
-    enc_cke(Identity#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = <<"psk_identity">>}, Version);
-enc_cke(#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id, exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version) ->
-    EncPMS = enc_cke(ExchangeKeys, Version),
-    Len = byte_size(Id),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary, EncPMS/binary>>;
-enc_cke(#client_srp_public{srp_a = A}, _) ->
-    Len = byte_size(A),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), A/binary>>.
-
-enc_server_key(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}) ->
-    PLen = byte_size(P),
-    GLen = byte_size(G),
-    YLen = byte_size(Y),
-    <<?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary>>;
-enc_server_key(#server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, ECCurve}, public = ECPubKey}) ->
-    %%TODO: support arbitrary keys
-    KLen = size(ECPubKey),
-    <<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE_TYPE), ?UINT16((ssl_tls1:oid_to_enum(ECCurve))),
-      ?BYTE(KLen), ECPubKey/binary>>;
-enc_server_key(#server_psk_params{hint = PskIdentityHint}) ->
-    Len = byte_size(PskIdentityHint),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint/binary>>;
-enc_server_key(Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{hint = undefined}) ->
-    enc_server_key(Params#server_dhe_psk_params{hint = <<>>});
-enc_server_key(#server_dhe_psk_params{
-		  hint = PskIdentityHint,
-		  dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}}) ->
-    Len = byte_size(PskIdentityHint),
-    PLen = byte_size(P),
-    GLen = byte_size(G),
-    YLen = byte_size(Y),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint/binary,
-      ?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary>>;
-enc_server_key(#server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G,	srp_s = S, srp_b = B}) ->
-    NLen = byte_size(N),
-    GLen = byte_size(G),
-    SLen = byte_size(S),
-    BLen = byte_size(B),
-    <<?UINT16(NLen), N/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary,
-      ?BYTE(SLen), S/binary, ?UINT16(BLen), B/binary>>.
-
-enc_sign({_, anon}, _Sign, _Version) ->
-    <<>>;
-enc_sign({HashAlg, SignAlg}, Signature, _Version = {Major, Minor})
-  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3->
-	SignLen = byte_size(Signature),
-	HashSign = hashsign_enc(HashAlg, SignAlg),
-	<<HashSign/binary, ?UINT16(SignLen), Signature/binary>>;
-enc_sign(_HashSign, Sign, _Version) ->
-	SignLen = byte_size(Sign),
-	<<?UINT16(SignLen), Sign/binary>>.
-
-
-ec_hello_extensions(CipherSuites, #elliptic_curves{} = Info) ->
-    case advertises_ec_ciphers(CipherSuites) of
-	true ->
-	    [Info];
-	false ->
-	    []
-    end;
-ec_hello_extensions(CipherSuites, #ec_point_formats{} = Info) ->
-    case advertises_ec_ciphers(CipherSuites) of
-	true ->
-	    [Info];
-	false ->
-	    []
-    end;
-ec_hello_extensions(_, undefined) ->
-    [].
-
-hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo, NextProtocolNegotiation) ->
-    hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo) ++ next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation).
-
-hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo, SRP, NextProtocolNegotiation) ->
-    hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo)
-	++ hello_extensions(SRP)
-	++ next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation).
-
-advertises_ec_ciphers([]) ->
-    false;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) ->
-    advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest).
+    ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions),
 
-%% Renegotiation info
-hello_extensions(#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}) ->
-    [];
-hello_extensions(#renegotiation_info{} = Info) ->
-    [Info];
-hello_extensions(#srp{} = Info) ->
-    [Info];
-hello_extensions(#hash_sign_algos{} = Info) ->
-    [Info];
-hello_extensions(undefined) ->
-    [].
+    {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+		      ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary,
+		      ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary,
+		      ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>};
 
-next_protocol_extension(undefined) ->
-    [];
-next_protocol_extension(#next_protocol_negotiation{} = Info) ->
-    [Info].
+enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version) ->
+    ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version).
 
-enc_hello_extensions(Extensions) ->
-    enc_hello_extensions(Extensions, <<>>).
-enc_hello_extensions([], <<>>) ->
-    <<>>;
-enc_hello_extensions([], Acc) ->
-    Size = byte_size(Acc),
-    <<?UINT16(Size), Acc/binary>>;
 
-enc_hello_extensions([#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    Len = byte_size(ExtensionData),
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData/binary, Acc/binary>>);
-enc_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0) = Info} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    Len = byte_size(Info),
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>);
-
-enc_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Info} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    InfoLen = byte_size(Info),
-    Len = InfoLen +1,
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(InfoLen), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>);
-enc_hello_extensions([#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = EllipticCurves} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    EllipticCurveList = << <<(ssl_tls1:oid_to_enum(X)):16>> || X <- EllipticCurves>>,
-    ListLen = byte_size(EllipticCurveList),
-    Len = ListLen + 2,
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT),
-				 ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), EllipticCurveList/binary, Acc/binary>>);
-enc_hello_extensions([#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = ECPointFormats} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    ECPointFormatList = list_to_binary(ECPointFormats),
-    ListLen = byte_size(ECPointFormatList),
-    Len = ListLen + 1,
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT),
-				 ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(ListLen), ECPointFormatList/binary, Acc/binary>>);
-enc_hello_extensions([#srp{username = UserName} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    SRPLen = byte_size(UserName),
-    Len = SRPLen + 2,
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), UserName/binary, Acc/binary>>);
-enc_hello_extensions([#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    SignAlgoList = << <<(ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash)):8, (ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)):8>> ||
-		       {Hash, Sign} <- HashSignAlgos >>,
-    ListLen = byte_size(SignAlgoList),
-    Len = ListLen + 2,
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), 
-				 ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), SignAlgoList/binary, Acc/binary>>).
-
-encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) ->
-    undefined;
-encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, false) ->
-	#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<>>};
-encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, _) ->
-	undefined.
-
-from_3bytes(Bin3) ->
-    from_3bytes(Bin3, []).
-
-from_3bytes(<<>>, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc);
-from_3bytes(<<?UINT24(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    from_3bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]).
-
-from_2bytes(Bin2) ->
-    from_2bytes(Bin2, []).
-
-from_2bytes(<<>>, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc);
-from_2bytes(<<?UINT16(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    from_2bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]).
-
-certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _})  
-  when KeyExchange == rsa;
-       KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
-       KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
-       KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa ->
-    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
-
-certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _})
-  when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
-       KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa ->
-    <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>;
-
-certificate_types(_) ->
-    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>.
-
-hashsign_dec(<<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo)>>) ->
-    {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)}.
-
-hashsign_enc(HashAlgo, SignAlgo) ->
-    Hash = ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo),
-    Sign = ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo),
-    <<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>>.
-
-certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
-    Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
-    Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) ->
-		  OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject,
-		  DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp),
-		  DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin),
-		  <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>>
-	  end,
-    list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]).
-
-certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
-    ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref  == CertDbRef ->
-			      [Cert | Acc];
-			 (_, Acc) ->
-			      Acc
-		      end,
-    ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle).
-
-
-digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) when Minor >= 3 ->
-    public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key);
-digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
-    public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key);
-digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
-    public_key:encrypt_private(Hash, Key,
-			       [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]);
-digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) ->
-    public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key).
-
-calc_master_secret({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) ->
-    ssl_ssl3:master_secret(PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom);
-
-calc_master_secret({3,_}, PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) ->
-    ssl_tls1:master_secret(PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom).
-
-setup_keys({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret,
-	   ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS) ->
-    ssl_ssl3:setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom,
-			ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS);
-
-setup_keys({3,N}, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret,
-	   ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, _EKML, IVS) ->
-    ssl_tls1:setup_keys(N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize,
-			KML, IVS).
-
-calc_finished({3, 0}, Role, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
-    ssl_ssl3:finished(Role, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake));
-calc_finished({3, N}, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
-    ssl_tls1:finished(Role, N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)).
-
-calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
-    ssl_ssl3:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake));
-calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, HashAlgo, _MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
-    ssl_tls1:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, N, lists:reverse(Handshake)).
-
-key_exchange_alg(rsa) ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA;
-key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss;
-			    Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa; Alg == dh_anon ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN;
-key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == ecdhe_rsa; Alg == ecdh_rsa;
-			   Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa; Alg == ecdh_ecdsa;
-			   Alg == ecdh_anon ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN;
-key_exchange_alg(psk) ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK;
-key_exchange_alg(dhe_psk) ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK;
-key_exchange_alg(rsa_psk) ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK;
-key_exchange_alg(Alg)
-  when Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_anon ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP;
-key_exchange_alg(_) ->
-    ?NULL.
-
-apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0, SslState) ->
-    case Fun(OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0) of
-	{valid, UserState} ->
-	    {valid, {SslState, UserState}};
-	{fail, _} = Fail ->
-	    Fail;
-	{unknown, UserState} ->
-	    {unknown, {SslState, UserState}}
+handle_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, HelloExt, SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
+    try ssl_handshake:handle_client_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, HelloExt, Version, SslOpts,
+						     Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
+	{Session, ConnectionStates, ServerHelloExt} ->
+	    {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, ServerHelloExt}
+    catch throw:Alert ->
+	    Alert
     end.
 
-handle_hello_extensions(#client_hello{random = Random,
-				      cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
-				      renegotiation_info = Info,
-				      srp = SRP,
-				      ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats0,
-				      elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves0} = Hello, Version,
-			#ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation} = Opts,
-			Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
-    Session = handle_srp_extension(SRP, Session0),
-    ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(Version, Info, Random, Session, ConnectionStates0,
-						      Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites),
-    ProtocolsToAdvertise = handle_next_protocol_extension(Hello, Renegotiation, Opts),
-    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = handle_ecc_extensions(Version, EcPointFormats0, EllipticCurves0),
-    %%TODO make extensions compund data structure
-    {Session, ConnectionStates, ProtocolsToAdvertise, EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves}.
-
 
-handle_renegotiation_extension(Version, Info, Random, #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
-							       compression_method = Compression},
-			       ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) ->
-    case handle_renegotiation_info(server, Info, ConnectionStates0,
-				   Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation,
-				   CipherSuites) of
-	{ok, ConnectionStates1} ->
-	    hello_pending_connection_states(server,
-					    Version,
-					    CipherSuite,
-					    Random,
-					    Compression,
-					    ConnectionStates1);
+handle_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite,
+			Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
+    case ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuite,
+						      Compression, HelloExt, Version,
+						      SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
 	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    throw(Alert)
+	    Alert;
+	{ConnectionStates, Protocol} ->
+	    {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates, Protocol}
     end.
 
-handle_next_protocol_extension(Hello, Renegotiation, SslOpts)->
-    case handle_next_protocol_on_server(Hello, Renegotiation, SslOpts) of
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    throw(Alert);
-	ProtocolsToAdvertise ->
-	    ProtocolsToAdvertise
-    end.
-
-handle_srp_extension(undefined, Session) ->
-    Session;
-handle_srp_extension(#srp{username = Username}, Session) ->
-    Session#session{srp_username = Username}.
-
-int_to_bin(I) ->
-    L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2,
-    <<I:(L*8)>>.
-
--define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(MD), {MD, rsa}).
--define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_DSA(MD), {MD, dsa}).
--define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_ECDSA(MD), {MD, ecdsa}).
-
--define(TLSEXT_SIGALG(MD), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_ECDSA(MD), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(MD)).
-
-advertised_hash_signs({Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
-    HashSigns = [?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha512),
-		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha384),
-		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha256),
-		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha224),
-		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha),
-		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_DSA(sha),
-		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(md5)],
-    CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(),
-    HasECC = proplists:get_bool(ecdsa,  proplists:get_value(public_keys, CryptoSupport)),
-    Hashs = proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport),
-    #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos =		 
-			 lists:filter(fun({Hash, ecdsa}) -> HasECC andalso proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashs);
-					 ({Hash, _}) -> proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashs) end, HashSigns)};
-advertised_hash_signs(_) ->
-    undefined.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl
index abf1b5abb6..dbe930cb90 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl
@@ -34,12 +34,9 @@
 	  cipher_suites,       % cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>
 	  compression_methods, % compression_methods<1..2^8-1>,
 	  %% Extensions
-	  renegotiation_info,
-	  hash_signs,          % supported combinations of hashes/signature algos
-	  next_protocol_negotiation = undefined, % [binary()]
-	  srp,
-	  ec_point_formats,
-	  elliptic_curves
+	  extensions
 	 }).
 
+-type tls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | ssl_handshake().
+
 -endif. % -ifdef(tls_handshake).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
index 1409a04763..54cf8d0b80 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@
 
 %%
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Purpose: Help functions for handling the SSL-Record protocol 
-%% 
+%% Purpose: Handle TLS/SSL record protocol. (Parts that are not shared with DTLS)
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 -module(tls_record).
@@ -31,282 +30,27 @@
 -include("tls_handshake.hrl").
 -include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
 
-%% Connection state handling
--export([init_connection_states/1, 
-         current_connection_state/2, pending_connection_state/2,
-         update_security_params/3,
-         set_mac_secret/4,
-	 set_master_secret/2, 
-         activate_pending_connection_state/2,
-         set_pending_cipher_state/4,
-	 set_renegotiation_flag/2,
-	 set_client_verify_data/3,
-	 set_server_verify_data/3]).
-
 %% Handling of incoming data
 -export([get_tls_records/2]).
 
-%% Encoding records
--export([encode_handshake/3, encode_alert_record/3,
-	 encode_change_cipher_spec/2, encode_data/3]).
-
 %% Decoding
 -export([decode_cipher_text/2]).
 
-%% Misc.
+%% Encoding
+-export([encode_plain_text/4]).
+
+%% Protocol version handling
 -export([protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/2,
 	 highest_protocol_version/1, supported_protocol_versions/0,
 	 is_acceptable_version/1, is_acceptable_version/2]).
 
--export([compressions/0]).
-
 -compile(inline).
 
--define(INITIAL_BYTES, 5).
-
 %%====================================================================
 %% Internal application API
 %%====================================================================
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec init_connection_states(client | server) -> #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a connection_states record with appropriate
-%% values for the initial SSL connection setup. 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-init_connection_states(Role) ->
-    ConnectionEnd = record_protocol_role(Role),
-    Current = initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
-    Pending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
-    #connection_states{current_read = Current,
-		       pending_read = Pending,
-		       current_write = Current,
-		       pending_write = Pending
-                      }.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec current_connection_state(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
-				      #connection_state{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Returns the instance of the connection_state record
-%% that is currently defined as the current conection state.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------  
-current_connection_state(#connection_states{current_read = Current},
-			 read) ->
-    Current;
-current_connection_state(#connection_states{current_write = Current},
-			 write) ->
-    Current.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec pending_connection_state(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
-				      #connection_state{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Returns the instance of the connection_state record
-%% that is currently defined as the pending conection state.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------  
-pending_connection_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Pending},    
-			 read) ->
-    Pending;
-pending_connection_state(#connection_states{pending_write = Pending},
-			 write) ->
-    Pending.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec update_security_params(#security_parameters{}, #security_parameters{},
-			     #connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a new instance of the connection_states record
-%% where the pending states gets its security parameters updated.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------  
-update_security_params(ReadParams, WriteParams, States = 
-		       #connection_states{pending_read = Read,
-					  pending_write = Write}) -> 
-    States#connection_states{pending_read =
-                             Read#connection_state{security_parameters = 
-                                                   ReadParams},
-                             pending_write = 
-                             Write#connection_state{security_parameters = 
-                                                    WriteParams}
-                            }.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_mac_secret(binary(), binary(), client | server, 
-			#connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.			       
-%%
-%% Description: update the mac_secret field in pending connection states
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, client, States) ->
-    set_mac_secret(ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteMacSecret, States);
-set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, server, States) ->
-    set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, States).
-
-set_mac_secret(ReadMacSecret, WriteMacSecret,
-	       States = #connection_states{pending_read = Read,
-					   pending_write = Write}) ->
-    States#connection_states{
-      pending_read = Read#connection_state{mac_secret = ReadMacSecret},
-      pending_write = Write#connection_state{mac_secret = WriteMacSecret}
-     }.
-
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_master_secret(binary(), #connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Set master_secret in pending connection states
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_master_secret(MasterSecret,
-                  States = #connection_states{pending_read = Read,
-                                              pending_write = Write}) -> 
-    ReadSecPar = Read#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    Read1 = Read#connection_state{
-              security_parameters = ReadSecPar#security_parameters{
-                                      master_secret = MasterSecret}},
-    WriteSecPar = Write#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    Write1 = Write#connection_state{
-               security_parameters = WriteSecPar#security_parameters{
-                                       master_secret = MasterSecret}},
-    States#connection_states{pending_read = Read1, pending_write = Write1}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_renegotiation_flag(boolean(), #connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Set secure_renegotiation in pending connection states
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_renegotiation_flag(Flag, #connection_states{
-			 current_read = CurrentRead0,
-			 current_write = CurrentWrite0,
-			 pending_read = PendingRead0,
-			 pending_write = PendingWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
-    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
-    PendingRead = PendingRead0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
-    PendingWrite = PendingWrite0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead, 
-				       current_write = CurrentWrite, 
-				       pending_read = PendingRead, 
-				       pending_write = PendingWrite}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_client_verify_data(current_read | current_write | current_both,
-			     binary(), #connection_states{})->
-				    #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Set verify data in connection states.                 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_client_verify_data(current_read, Data, 
-		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
-					  pending_write = PendingWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
-    PendingWrite = PendingWrite0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
-				       pending_write = PendingWrite};
-set_client_verify_data(current_write, Data, 
-		       #connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead0,
-					  current_write = CurrentWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    PendingRead = PendingRead0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
-    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead,
-				       current_write = CurrentWrite};
-set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, 
-		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
-					  current_write = CurrentWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
-    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
-				       current_write = CurrentWrite}.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_server_verify_data(current_read | current_write | current_both,
-			     binary(), #connection_states{})->
-				    #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Set verify data in pending connection states.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_server_verify_data(current_write, Data, 
-		       #connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead0,
-					  current_write = CurrentWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    PendingRead = PendingRead0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
-    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead,
-				       current_write = CurrentWrite};
-
-set_server_verify_data(current_read, Data, 
-		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
-					  pending_write = PendingWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
-    PendingWrite = PendingWrite0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
-				       pending_write = PendingWrite};
-
-set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, 
-		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
-					  current_write = CurrentWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
-    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
-				       current_write = CurrentWrite}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec activate_pending_connection_state(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
-					       #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a new instance of the connection_states record
-%% where the pending state of <Type> has been activated. 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-activate_pending_connection_state(States = 
-                                  #connection_states{pending_read = Pending},
-                                  read) ->
-    NewCurrent = Pending#connection_state{sequence_number = 0},
-    SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    ConnectionEnd = SecParams#security_parameters.connection_end,
-    EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
-    SecureRenegotation = NewCurrent#connection_state.secure_renegotiation,
-    NewPending = EmptyPending#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = SecureRenegotation},
-    States#connection_states{current_read = NewCurrent,
-                             pending_read = NewPending
-                            };
-
-activate_pending_connection_state(States = 
-                                  #connection_states{pending_write = Pending},
-                                  write) ->
-    NewCurrent = Pending#connection_state{sequence_number = 0},
-    SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    ConnectionEnd = SecParams#security_parameters.connection_end,
-    EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
-    SecureRenegotation = NewCurrent#connection_state.secure_renegotiation,
-    NewPending = EmptyPending#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = SecureRenegotation},
-    States#connection_states{current_write = NewCurrent,
-                             pending_write = NewPending
-                            }.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{}, #cipher_state{},
-			       #cipher_state{}, client | server) ->
-				      #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Set the cipher state in the specified pending connection state.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Read,
-                                            pending_write = Write} = States,
-                         ClientState, ServerState, server) ->
-    States#connection_states{
-        pending_read = Read#connection_state{cipher_state = ClientState},
-        pending_write = Write#connection_state{cipher_state = ServerState}};
-
-set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Read,
-                                            pending_write = Write} = States,
-                         ClientState, ServerState, client) ->
-    States#connection_states{
-        pending_read = Read#connection_state{cipher_state = ServerState},
-        pending_write = Write#connection_state{cipher_state = ClientState}}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec get_tls_records(binary(), binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}.
 %%			     
 %% Description: Given old buffer and new data from TCP, packs up a records
@@ -376,6 +120,43 @@ get_tls_records_aux(Data, Acc) ->
 	false ->
 	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE)
 	end.
+
+encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates) ->
+    #connection_states{current_write=#connection_state{
+			 compression_state=CompS0,
+			 security_parameters=
+			 #security_parameters{compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+			}=CS0} = ConnectionStates,
+    {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0),
+    CS1 = CS0#connection_state{compression_state = CompS1},
+    {CipherFragment, CS2} = cipher(Type, Version, Comp, CS1),
+    CTBin = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, CipherFragment),
+    {CTBin, ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_write = CS2}}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}) ->
+				{#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}}| #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decode cipher text
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version,
+			    fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, ConnnectionStates0) ->
+    ReadState0 = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states.current_read,
+    #connection_state{compression_state = CompressionS0,
+		      security_parameters = SecParams} = ReadState0,
+    CompressAlg = SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm,
+   case decipher(Type, Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0) of
+       {PlainFragment, ReadState1} ->
+	   {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompressAlg,
+							  PlainFragment, CompressionS0),
+	   ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states{
+				 current_read = ReadState1#connection_state{
+						  compression_state = CompressionS1}},
+	   {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates};
+       #alert{} = Alert ->
+	   Alert
+   end.
+
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec protocol_version(tls_atom_version() | tls_version()) -> 
 			      tls_version() | tls_atom_version().		      
@@ -493,183 +274,39 @@ is_acceptable_version(_,_) ->
     false.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec compressions() -> [binary()].
-%%     
-%% Description: return a list of compressions supported (currently none)
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-compressions() ->
-    [?byte(?NULL)].
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}) ->
-				{#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}}| #alert{}.
-%%     
-%% Description: Decode cipher text
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-decode_cipher_text(CipherText, ConnnectionStates0) ->
-    ReadState0 = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states.current_read,
-    #connection_state{compression_state = CompressionS0,
-		      security_parameters = SecParams} = ReadState0,
-    CompressAlg = SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm,
-   case decipher(CipherText, ReadState0) of
-       {Compressed, ReadState1} ->
-	   {Plain, CompressionS1} = uncompress(CompressAlg, 
-					       Compressed, CompressionS0),
-	   ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states{
-				 current_read = ReadState1#connection_state{
-						  compression_state = CompressionS1}},
-	   {Plain, ConnnectionStates};
-       #alert{} = Alert ->
-	   Alert
-   end.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec encode_data(binary(), tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
-			 {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
-%%
-%% Description: Encodes data to send on the ssl-socket.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-encode_data(Frag, Version,
-	    #connection_states{current_write = #connection_state{
-				 security_parameters =
-				     #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCA}}} =
-		ConnectionStates) ->
-    Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA),
-    encode_iolist(?APPLICATION_DATA, Data, Version, ConnectionStates).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec encode_handshake(iolist(), tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
-			      {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
-%%
-%% Description: Encodes a handshake message to send on the ssl-socket.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
-    encode_plain_text(?HANDSHAKE, Version, Frag, ConnectionStates).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec encode_alert_record(#alert{}, tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
-				 {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
-%%
-%% Description: Encodes an alert message to send on the ssl-socket.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-encode_alert_record(#alert{level = Level, description = Description},
-                    Version, ConnectionStates) ->
-    encode_plain_text(?ALERT, Version, <<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description)>>,
-		      ConnectionStates).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec encode_change_cipher_spec(tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
-				       {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
-%%
-%% Description: Encodes a change_cipher_spec-message to send on the ssl socket.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates) ->
-    encode_plain_text(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, Version, <<1:8>>, ConnectionStates).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %%% Internal functions
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-encode_iolist(Type, Data, Version, ConnectionStates0) ->
-    {ConnectionStates, EncodedMsg} =
-        lists:foldl(fun(Text, {CS0, Encoded}) ->
-			    {Enc, CS1} = encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Text, CS0),
-			    {CS1, [Enc | Encoded]}
-		    end, {ConnectionStates0, []}, Data),
-    {lists:reverse(EncodedMsg), ConnectionStates}.
-
-highest_protocol_version() ->
-    highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()).
-
-initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd) ->
-    #connection_state{security_parameters =
-			  initial_security_params(ConnectionEnd),
-                      sequence_number = 0
-                     }.
-
-initial_security_params(ConnectionEnd) ->
-    SecParams = #security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
-				     compression_algorithm = ?NULL},
-    ssl_cipher:security_parameters(highest_protocol_version(), ?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL,
-				   SecParams).
-
-empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd) ->
-    SecParams = empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd),
-    #connection_state{security_parameters = SecParams}.
-
-empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd = ?CLIENT) ->
-    #security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
-                         client_random = random()};
-empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd = ?SERVER) ->
-    #security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
-                         server_random = random()}.
-random() ->
-    Secs_since_1970 = calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds(
-			calendar:universal_time()) - 62167219200,
-    Random_28_bytes = crypto:rand_bytes(28),
-    <<?UINT32(Secs_since_1970), Random_28_bytes/binary>>.
-
-record_protocol_role(client) ->
-    ?CLIENT;
-record_protocol_role(server) ->
-    ?SERVER.
-
-%% 1/n-1 splitting countermeasure Rizzo/Duong-Beast, RC4 chiphers are not vulnerable to this attack.
-split_bin(<<FirstByte:8, Rest/binary>>, ChunkSize, Version, BCA) when BCA =/= ?RC4 andalso ({3, 1} == Version orelse
-											    {3, 0} == Version) ->
-    do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [[FirstByte]]);
-split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, _, _) ->
-    do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, []).
-
-do_split_bin(<<>>, _, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc);
-do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Acc) ->
-    case Bin of
-        <<Chunk:ChunkSize/binary, Rest/binary>> ->
-            do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [Chunk | Acc]);
-        _ ->
-            lists:reverse(Acc, [Bin])
-    end.
-
-encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates) ->
-    #connection_states{current_write=#connection_state{
-			 compression_state=CompS0,
-			 security_parameters=
-			 #security_parameters{compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
-			}=CS0} = ConnectionStates,
-    {Comp, CompS1} = compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0),
-    CS1 = CS0#connection_state{compression_state = CompS1},
-    {CipherText, CS2} = cipher(Type, Version, Comp, CS1),
-    CTBin = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, CipherText),
-    {CTBin, ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_write = CS2}}.
-
 encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Fragment) ->
     Length = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
     [<<?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Fragment].
 
-cipher(Type, Version, Fragment, CS0) ->
-    Length = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
-    {MacHash, CS1=#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS0,
-				 security_parameters=
-				 #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = 
+cipher(Type, Version, Fragment,
+       #connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS0,
+			 sequence_number = SeqNo,
+			 security_parameters=
+			     #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm =
 						      BCA}
-				}} = 
-	hash_and_bump_seqno(CS0, Type, Version, Length, Fragment),
-    {Ciphered, CipherS1} = ssl_cipher:cipher(BCA, CipherS0, MacHash, Fragment, Version),
-    CS2 = CS1#connection_state{cipher_state=CipherS1},
-    {Ciphered, CS2}.
-
-decipher(TLS=#ssl_tls{type=Type, version=Version, fragment=Fragment}, CS0) ->
-    SP = CS0#connection_state.security_parameters,
+			} = WriteState0) ->
+    MacHash = calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, Fragment, WriteState0),
+    {CipherFragment, CipherS1} =
+	ssl_cipher:cipher(BCA, CipherS0, MacHash, Fragment, Version),
+    WriteState = WriteState0#connection_state{cipher_state=CipherS1},
+    {CipherFragment, WriteState#connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo+1}}.
+
+decipher(Type, Version, CipherFragment,
+	 #connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo} = ReadState) ->
+    SP = ReadState#connection_state.security_parameters,
     BCA = SP#security_parameters.bulk_cipher_algorithm, 
     HashSz = SP#security_parameters.hash_size,
-    CipherS0 = CS0#connection_state.cipher_state,
-    case ssl_cipher:decipher(BCA, HashSz, CipherS0, Fragment, Version) of
-	{T, Mac, CipherS1} ->
-	    CS1 = CS0#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1},
-	    TLength = size(T),
-	    {MacHash, CS2} = hash_and_bump_seqno(CS1, Type, Version, TLength, T),
-	    case is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of
-		true ->		  
-		    {TLS#ssl_tls{fragment = T}, CS2};
+    CipherS0 = ReadState#connection_state.cipher_state,
+    case ssl_cipher:decipher(BCA, HashSz, CipherS0, CipherFragment, Version) of
+	{PlainFragment, Mac, CipherS1} ->
+	    CS1 = ReadState#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1},
+	    MacHash = calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState),
+	    case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of
+		true ->
+		    {PlainFragment,
+		     CS1#connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo+1}};
 		false ->
 		    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
 	    end;
@@ -677,40 +314,29 @@ decipher(TLS=#ssl_tls{type=Type, version=Version, fragment=Fragment}, CS0) ->
 	    Alert
     end.
 
-uncompress(?NULL, Data = #ssl_tls{type = _Type,
-				  version = _Version,
-				  fragment = _Fragment}, CS) ->
-    {Data, CS}.
-
-compress(?NULL, Data, CS) ->
-    {Data, CS}.
-
-hash_and_bump_seqno(#connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo,
-				      mac_secret = MacSecret,
-				      security_parameters = 
-				      SecPars} = CS0,
-		    Type, Version, Length, Fragment) ->
-    Hash = mac_hash(Version, 
-		    SecPars#security_parameters.mac_algorithm,
-		    MacSecret, SeqNo, Type,
-		    Length, Fragment),
-    {Hash, CS0#connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo+1}}.
-
-is_correct_mac(Mac, Mac) ->
-    true;
-is_correct_mac(_M,_H) ->
-    false.
-
 mac_hash({_,_}, ?NULL, _MacSecret, _SeqNo, _Type,
 	 _Length, _Fragment) ->
     <<>>;
 mac_hash({3, 0}, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) ->
-    ssl_ssl3:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment);
+    ssl_v3:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment);
 mac_hash({3, N} = Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment)  
   when N =:= 1; N =:= 2; N =:= 3 ->
-    ssl_tls1:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Version, 
+    tls_v1:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Version,
 		      Length, Fragment).
 
+highest_protocol_version() ->
+    highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()).
+
 sufficient_tlsv1_2_crypto_support() ->
     CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(),
     proplists:get_bool(sha256, proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport)).
+
+calc_mac_hash(Type, Version,
+	      PlainFragment, #connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo,
+					       mac_secret = MacSecret,
+					       security_parameters =
+						   SecPars}) ->
+    Length = erlang:iolist_size(PlainFragment),
+    mac_hash(Version, SecPars#security_parameters.mac_algorithm,
+	     MacSecret, SeqNo, Type,
+	     Length, PlainFragment).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.hrl
index c9350fa137..30d7343074 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.hrl
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
 -include("ssl_record.hrl"). %% Common TLS and DTLS records and Constantes
 
 %% Used to handle tls_plain_text, tls_compressed and tls_cipher_text
-
 -record(ssl_tls, {   
 	  type,
 	  version, 
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl
index 8ab66d0627..2395e98642 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 %% Purpose: Handles tls1 encryption.
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--module(ssl_tls1).
+-module(tls_v1).
 
 -include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
 -include("ssl_internal.hrl").
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ certificate_verify(HashAlgo, _Version, Handshake) ->
 
 -spec setup_keys(integer(), integer(), binary(), binary(), binary(), integer(),
 		 integer(), integer()) -> {binary(), binary(), binary(),
-					  binary(), binary(), binary()}.  
+					  binary(), binary(), binary()}.
 
 setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize,
 	   KeyMatLen, IVSize)
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize
     WantedLength = 2 * (HashSize + KeyMatLen + IVSize),
     KeyBlock = prf(?MD5SHA, MasterSecret, "key expansion",
 		   [ServerRandom, ClientRandom], WantedLength),
-    <<ClientWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, 
+    <<ClientWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary,
      ServerWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary,
      ClientWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, ServerWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary,
      ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock,
@@ -167,22 +167,22 @@ setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize,
      ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}.
 
 -spec mac_hash(integer(), binary(), integer(), integer(), tls_version(),
-	       integer(), binary()) -> binary(). 
+	       integer(), binary()) -> binary().
 
-mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, {Major, Minor}, 
+mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, {Major, Minor},
 	 Length, Fragment) ->
     %% RFC 2246 & 4346 - 6.2.3.1.
     %% HMAC_hash(MAC_write_secret, seq_num + TLSCompressed.type +
     %%              TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length +
     %%              TLSCompressed.fragment));
-    Mac = hmac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, 
-		    [<<?UINT64(Seq_num), ?BYTE(Type), 
-		      ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), ?UINT16(Length)>>, 
+    Mac = hmac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret,
+		    [<<?UINT64(Seq_num), ?BYTE(Type),
+		      ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), ?UINT16(Length)>>,
 		     Fragment]),
     Mac.
 
 -spec suites(1|2|3) -> [cipher_suite()].
-    
+
 suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2->
     case sufficent_ec_support() of
 	true ->
@@ -199,8 +199,8 @@ suites(Minor) when Minor == 3 ->
 	    no_ec_suites(3) ++ no_ec_suites(2)
     end.
 
-all_suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2->		
-    [ 
+all_suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2->
+    [
       ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ all_suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2->
       ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-      
+
       ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
       ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
       ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
@@ -232,32 +232,32 @@ all_suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2->
       ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
       ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-      
+
       ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
     ];
-all_suites(3) ->	
+all_suites(3) ->
     [
      ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
      ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
      ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
      ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
-     
+
      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
-     
+
      ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
-     
+
      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
     ].
 
-no_ec_suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2->		
-    [ 
+no_ec_suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2->
+    [
       ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ no_ec_suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2->
       ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
     ];
-no_ec_suites(3) ->	
+no_ec_suites(3) ->
     [
      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ p_hash(Secret, Seed, WantedLength, Method, N, Acc) ->
 
 %% ... Where  A(0) = seed
 %%            A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1))
-%% a(0, _Secret, Seed, _Method) -> 
+%% a(0, _Secret, Seed, _Method) ->
 %%     Seed.
 %% a(N, Secret, Seed, Method) ->
 %%     hmac_hash(Method, Secret, a(N-1, Secret, Seed, Method)).