Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
|
|
|
|
Too much code was removed in commit 560f73141af
|
|
|
|
* anders/diameter/17.5.6.3/OTP-12927:
vsn -> 1.9.2.1
Update appup for 17.5.6.3
|
|
* anders/diameter/17/time/OTP-12926:
Simplify time manipulation
Remove use of monotonic time in pre-18 code
Remove unnecessary redefinition of erlang:max/2
|
|
* anders/diameter/grouped_errors/OTP-12930:
Fix decode of Grouped AVPs containing errors
Simplify logic
Simplify logic
|
|
* anders/diameter/transport/OTP-12929:
Fix start order of alternate transports
Log discarded answers
|
|
* anders/diameter/lcnt/OTP-12912:
Make ets diameter_stats a set
Remove unnecessary sorting in stats suite
Set ets {write_concurrency, true} on diameter_stats
Don't start watchdog timers unnecessarily
Remove unnecessary erlang:monitor/2 qualification
Add missing watchdog suite clause
|
|
* anders/diameter/caseless/OTP-12902:
Match allowable peer addresses case insensitively
Replace calls to module inet_parse to equivalents in inet
|
|
* anders/diameter/grouped_decode/OTP-12879:
Fix relay encode of decoded diameter_avp lists
|
|
* anders/diameter/decode/OTP-12891:
Don't compute AVP list length unnecessarily at AVP decode
|
|
* anders/diameter/decode/OTP-12871:
Don't traverse errors list unnecessarily when detecting missing AVPs
Don't flag AVP as missing as a consequence of decode error
Correct inaccurate doc
Truncate potentially large terms passed to diameter_lib:log/4
|
|
There's no need for it to be ordered, and the ordering has been seen to
have an unexpectedly negative impact on performance in some cases. Order
when retrieving statistics instead, so as not to change the
presentation in diameter:service_info/2.
|
|
The ordering of (ets) diameter_stats (also unnecessary) ensures the
sorting.
|
|
By doing away with more wrapping that the parent commit started to
remove.
|
|
This has been seen to be a bottleneck at high load: each undef results
in a loop out to the code server.
Originally implemented as suggested in the erts user's guide, in commits
e6d19a18 and d4386254.
|
|
|
|
OTP-12871: 5005 decode
OTP-12791: decode performance
OTP-12879: grouped decode
OTP-12902: caseless address match
OTP-12912: fewer timers
OTP-12926: pre-18 time
diameter_lib must be loaded after modules calling its time-related
functions (that have been removed).
|
|
A transport configured with diameter:add_transport/2 can be passed
multiple transport_module/transport_config tuples in order to specify
alternate configuration, modules being attempted in order until one
succeeds. This is primarily for the connecting case, to allow a
transport to be configured to first attempt connection over SCTP, and
then TCP in case SCTP fails, with configuration like that documented:
{transport_module, diameter_sctp},
{transport_config, [...], 5000},
{transport_module, diameter_tcp},
{transport_config, [...]}
If the options are the same in both cases, another possibility would be
configuration like this, which attaches the same transport_config to
both modules:
{transport_module, diameter_sctp},
{transport_module, diameter_tcp},
{transport_config, [...], 5000},
However, in this case the start order was reversed relative to the
documented order: first tcp, then sctp. This commit restores the
intended order.
|
|
To diameter_lib:log/4, which was last motivated in commit 39acfdb0.
|
|
The function already operates on arbitrary terms.
|
|
Commit c74b593a fixed the problem that a decoded deep diameter_avp list
couldn't be encoded, but did so in the wrong way: there's no need to
reencode component AVPs since the Grouped AVP itself already contains
the encoded binary. The blunder caused diameter_codec:pack_avp/1 to fail
if the first element of the AVP list to be encoded was itself a list.
Thanks to Andrzej TrawiĆski for reporting the problem.
|
|
Both diameter_tcp and diameter_sctp can be configured with one or more
IP addresses from which connections should be accepted (an 'accept'
tuple), specified either as a tuple-valued address or as a regular
expression. In the latter case, peer addresses are mapped to string
using inet:ntoa/1 and the result matched against the regexp. Since
(ipv6) addresses are case insensitive, this should also be the case with
the match, but was not.
|
|
Commits b563c796 (R16B) and 0fad6449 (R16B02) added parse_address/1 and
ntoa/1 to module inet, providing documented alternatives to address/1
and ntoa/1 in the undocumented (save comments in inet(3)) inet_parse.
|
|
This has had a hugely negative impact on performance when decoding
messages containing many AVP: each decode of an AVP having variable
arity computed the length of the list of previously decoded AVPs when
checking that the allowed arity was not exceeded, even if the allowed
arity was infinite, making for O(n^2) cost. Here are some execution
times, for diameter_codec:decode/2 on a representative message with n
integer AVPs in the Common application (on the host at hand):
Before After
------- ---------
n = 1K 5 ms 2 ms
n = 10K 500 ms 25 ms
n = 100K 75 sec 225 ms
n = 1M 2.6 sec
Note the nearly linear increase following the change.
Remove the dire documentation warning for incoming_maxlen as a
consequence. It can still be useful to set, but not doing so won't have
the same consequences as previously.
|
|
Since the list can potentially be long.
|
|
The decode of an incoming Diameter message uses the record
representation to determine whether or not an AVP has been received with
the expected arity, the number of AVPs in each field following decode
being compared with the arity specified in the message grammar. The
problem with this is that decode failure isn't reflected in the record
representation, so that an AVP can be appended to the errors field of a
diameter_packet record despite an entry for the same AVP already
existing. This isn't a fault as much as a misleading error indication,
but now only append AVPs that aren't already represented.
|
|
The warning report was removed in commit 00584303.
|
|
Last visited in commit 00584303.
|
|
lcnt:inspect/1 recently showed this:
lock id #tries collisions [%] time [us]
----- --- ------- --------------- ----------
db_tab diameter_stats 932920 92.9326 330332554
|
|
In particular, restart the timer with each incoming Diameter message,
only when the previous timer has expired. Doing so has been seen to
result in high lock contention at load, as in the example below:
(diameter@test)9> lcnt:conflicts([{print, [name, tries, ratio, time]}]).
lock #tries collisions [%] time [us]
----- ------- --------------- ----------
bif_timers 7844528 99.4729 1394434884
db_tab 17240988 1.7947 6286664
timeofday 7358692 5.6729 1399624
proc_link 4814938 2.2736 482985
drv_ev_state 2324012 0.5951 98920
run_queue 21768213 0.2091 63516
pollset 1190174 1.7170 42499
pix_lock 1956 2.5562 39770
make_ref 4697067 0.3669 20211
proc_msgq 9475944 0.0295 5200
timer_wheel 5325966 0.0568 2654
proc_main 10005332 2.8190 1079
pollset_rm_list 59768 1.7752 480
|
|
The function has been auto-exported since R14B.
|
|
The suite pretends to be gen_tcp-ish in configuring itself to
diameter_tcp. The function close/1 can be called as a result.
|
|
|
|
|
|
RFC 6733 says this of Failed-AVP in 7.5:
In the case where the offending AVP is embedded within a Grouped AVP,
the Failed-AVP MAY contain the grouped AVP, which in turn contains
the single offending AVP. The same method MAY be employed if the
grouped AVP itself is embedded in yet another grouped AVP and so on.
In this case, the Failed-AVP MAY contain the grouped AVP hierarchy up
to the single offending AVP. This enables the recipient to detect
the location of the offending AVP when embedded in a group.
It says this of DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_LENGTH in 7.1.5:
The request contained an AVP with an invalid length. A Diameter
message indicating this error MUST include the offending AVPs
within a Failed-AVP AVP. In cases where the erroneous AVP length
value exceeds the message length or is less than the minimum AVP
header length, it is sufficient to include the offending AVP
header and a zero filled payload of the minimum required length
for the payloads data type. If the AVP is a Grouped AVP, the
Grouped AVP header with an empty payload would be sufficient to
indicate the offending AVP. In the case where the offending AVP
header cannot be fully decoded when the AVP length is less than
the minimum AVP header length, it is sufficient to include an
offending AVP header that is formulated by padding the incomplete
AVP header with zero up to the minimum AVP header length.
The AVPs placed in the errors field of a diameter_packet record are
intended to be appropriate for inclusion in a Failed-AVP, but neither of
the above paragraphs has been followed in the Grouped case: the entire
faulty AVP (non-faulty components and all) has been included. This made
it impossible to identify the actual faulty AVP in all but simple case.
This commit adapts the decode to the RFC, and implements the suggested
single faulty AVP, nested in as many Grouped containers as required.
The best-effort decode of Failed-AVP in answer messages, initially
implemented in commit 0f9cdbaf, is also applied.
|
|
Testing is_failed() is unnecessary since put/2 a second time will
return a previously put 'true'.
|
|
Failed == undefined implies is_failed() == true. This was true even when
the code was written, in commit c2c00fdd.
|
|
|
|
* hans/ssh/codenomicon_degradation/OTP-12784:
ssh: update ssh version
ssh: Plain text message returned for invalid version exchange
ssh: Implement keyboard_interactive on server side
ssh: Check e and f parameters in kexdh
ssh: Set max num algoritms in msg_kexinit negotiation
|
|
* ia/ssl/crypto-bad-input/OTP-12783:
ssl: Prepare for release
ssl: Correct handling of bad input to premaster_secret calculation
|
|
* ia/ssh/recvbuf/OTP-12782:
ssh: handle that inet:getopts(Socket, [recbuf]) may return {ok, []}
|
|
|
|
alert records needs to be thrown from
ssl_handshake:premaster_secret/[2/3] so that operations will end up in
the catch clause of the invokation of certify_client_key_exchange/3 in
ssl_connection.erl, and hence terminate gracefully and not continue to try
and calculate the master secret with invalid inputs and crash.
|
|
|
|
This is how OpenSSH does. The bytes returned will be put on the
user's tty, so it is better with text than a ssh_msg_disconnect
|
|
|
|
rfc 4253 says in section 8 that:
"Values of 'e' or 'f' that are not in the range [1, p-1] MUST NOT be
sent or accepted by either side. If this condition is violated, the
key exchange fails."
This commit implements the reception check.
|
|
This is to prevent some dos-attac scenarios. The limit is hard-coded.
|