From b74ff4f6df28405222752fb2b1089f11e96e5406 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Travis Jensen Date: Fri, 6 May 2011 12:36:38 -0600 Subject: Add true streaming AES (CTR) encryption and streaming HMAC operations The current crypto module implementations require all of the data being encrypted or authenticated to be in memory at one time. When trying to encrypt or authenticate a large file (on order of GBs), this is problematic. The implementation of AES CTR uses the same underlying implementation as aes_ctr_[en|de]crypt, but hands the state back to the client after every operation. The HMAC implementation differs from the previous implementations of sha_mac and md5_mac. The old implementations did not utilize the OpenSSL HMAC implementation. In order to ensure that I didn't implement something incorrectly, I chose to use the OpenSSL HMAC implementation directly, since it handles streaming as well. This has the added side benefit of allowing other hash functions to be used as desired (for instances, I added support for ripemd160 hashing). While I haven't done this, it seems like the existing md5_mac and sha_mac functions could either be depricated or redefined in terms of the new hmac_ functions. Update AES CTR and HMAC streaming with code review input Ensure that memcpy operations in hmac operations are being size checked properly. Rename aes_ctr_XXX_with_state to aes_ctr_stream_XXX. Remove redundant hmac_init_[sha|md5|ripemd160] functions. Fix documentation for hmac_final_n. Fix possible error using negative value as a marker on an unsigned int Now, use a separate marker and add a unit test to test specifically for a case where HashLen is larger than the underlying resultant hash. Revert "Fix possible error using negative value as a marker on an unsigned int" This reverts commit 59cb177aa96444c0fd3ace6d01f7b8a70dd69cc9. Resolve buffer overflow posibility on an unsigned int. Change handling the marker for HashLen to use the fact that a second parameter that has to be the the HashLen was passed. Also, ensure that HashLen parameter is positive. --- lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/crypto/doc/src/crypto.xml | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl | 35 +++++++- lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl | 178 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 442 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/crypto') diff --git a/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c b/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c index 3ebf62d87c..c781ccb302 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c +++ b/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c @@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #ifdef VALGRIND # include @@ -128,11 +130,15 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM md4_update(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv static ERL_NIF_TERM md4_final(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM md5_mac_n(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM sha_mac_n(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); +static ERL_NIF_TERM hmac_init(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); +static ERL_NIF_TERM hmac_update(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); +static ERL_NIF_TERM hmac_final(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM des_cbc_crypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM des_ecb_crypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM des_ede3_cbc_crypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM aes_cfb_128_crypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM aes_ctr_encrypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); +static ERL_NIF_TERM aes_ctr_stream_encrypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM rand_bytes_1(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM strong_rand_bytes_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM rand_bytes_3(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); @@ -199,12 +205,18 @@ static ErlNifFunc nif_funcs[] = { {"md4_final", 1, md4_final}, {"md5_mac_n", 3, md5_mac_n}, {"sha_mac_n", 3, sha_mac_n}, + {"hmac_init", 2, hmac_init}, + {"hmac_update", 2, hmac_update}, + {"hmac_final", 1, hmac_final}, + {"hmac_final_n", 2, hmac_final}, {"des_cbc_crypt", 4, des_cbc_crypt}, {"des_ecb_crypt", 3, des_ecb_crypt}, {"des_ede3_cbc_crypt", 6, des_ede3_cbc_crypt}, {"aes_cfb_128_crypt", 4, aes_cfb_128_crypt}, {"aes_ctr_encrypt", 3, aes_ctr_encrypt}, {"aes_ctr_decrypt", 3, aes_ctr_encrypt}, + {"aes_ctr_stream_encrypt", 2, aes_ctr_stream_encrypt}, + {"aes_ctr_stream_decrypt", 2, aes_ctr_stream_encrypt}, {"rand_bytes", 1, rand_bytes_1}, {"strong_rand_bytes_nif", 1, strong_rand_bytes_nif}, {"rand_bytes", 3, rand_bytes_3}, @@ -255,6 +267,7 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_true; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_false; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_sha; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_md5; +static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_ripemd160; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_error; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_pkcs1_padding; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_pkcs1_oaep_padding; @@ -324,6 +337,7 @@ static int load(ErlNifEnv* env, void** priv_data, ERL_NIF_TERM load_info) atom_false = enif_make_atom(env,"false"); atom_sha = enif_make_atom(env,"sha"); atom_md5 = enif_make_atom(env,"md5"); + atom_ripemd160 = enif_make_atom(env,"ripemd160"); atom_error = enif_make_atom(env,"error"); atom_rsa_pkcs1_padding = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_pkcs1_padding"); atom_rsa_pkcs1_oaep_padding = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_pkcs1_oaep_padding"); @@ -581,6 +595,84 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM sha_mac_n(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[ return ret; } +static ERL_NIF_TERM hmac_init(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) +{/* (Type, Key) */ + ErlNifBinary key; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret; + unsigned char * ctx_buf; + const EVP_MD *md; + + if (argv[0] == atom_sha) md = EVP_sha1(); + else if (argv[0] == atom_md5) md = EVP_md5(); + else if (argv[0] == atom_ripemd160) md = EVP_ripemd160(); + else goto badarg; + + if (!enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, argv[1], &key)) { + badarg: + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + + ctx_buf = enif_make_new_binary(env, sizeof(HMAC_CTX), &ret); + HMAC_CTX_init((HMAC_CTX *) ctx_buf); + HMAC_Init((HMAC_CTX *) ctx_buf, key.data, key.size, md); + + return ret; +} + +static ERL_NIF_TERM hmac_update(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) +{/* (Context, Data) */ + ErlNifBinary context, data; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret; + unsigned char * ctx_buf; + + if (!enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[0], &context) + || !enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, argv[1], &data) + || context.size != sizeof(HMAC_CTX)) { + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + + ctx_buf = enif_make_new_binary(env, sizeof(HMAC_CTX), &ret); + memcpy(ctx_buf, context.data, context.size); + HMAC_Update((HMAC_CTX *)ctx_buf, data.data, data.size); + + return ret; +} + +static ERL_NIF_TERM hmac_final(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) +{/* (Context) or (Context, HashLen) */ + ErlNifBinary context; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret; + HMAC_CTX ctx; + unsigned char mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char * mac_bin; + unsigned int req_len = 0; + unsigned int mac_len; + + if (!enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[0], &context)) { + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + if (argc == 2 && !enif_get_uint(env, argv[1], &req_len)) { + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + + if (context.size != sizeof(ctx)) { + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + memcpy(&ctx, context.data, context.size); + + HMAC_Final(&ctx, mac_buf, &mac_len); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + + if (argc == 2 && req_len < mac_len) { + // Only truncate to req_len bytes if asked. + mac_len = req_len; + } + mac_bin = enif_make_new_binary(env, mac_len, &ret); + memcpy(mac_bin, mac_buf, mac_len); + + return ret; +} + static ERL_NIF_TERM des_cbc_crypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) {/* (Key, Ivec, Text, IsEncrypt) */ ErlNifBinary key, ivec, text; @@ -695,6 +787,46 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM aes_ctr_encrypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM return ret; } +/* Initializes state for ctr streaming (de)encryption +*/ +static ERL_NIF_TERM aes_ctr_stream_encrypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) +{/* ({Key, IVec, ECount, Num}, Data) */ + ErlNifBinary key_bin, ivec_bin, text_bin, ecount_bin; + AES_KEY aes_key; + unsigned int num; + ERL_NIF_TERM ret, num2_term, cipher_term, ivec2_term, ecount2_term, new_state_term; + int state_arity; + const ERL_NIF_TERM *state_term; + unsigned char * ivec2_buf; + unsigned char * ecount2_buf; + + if (!enif_get_tuple(env, argv[0], &state_arity, &state_term) + || state_arity != 4 + || !enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, state_term[0], &key_bin) + || AES_set_encrypt_key(key_bin.data, key_bin.size*8, &aes_key) != 0 + || !enif_inspect_binary(env, state_term[1], &ivec_bin) || ivec_bin.size != 16 + || !enif_inspect_binary(env, state_term[2], &ecount_bin) || ecount_bin.size != AES_BLOCK_SIZE + || !enif_get_uint(env, state_term[3], &num) + || !enif_inspect_iolist_as_binary(env, argv[1], &text_bin)) { + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + + ivec2_buf = enif_make_new_binary(env, ivec_bin.size, &ivec2_term); + ecount2_buf = enif_make_new_binary(env, ecount_bin.size, &ecount2_term); + + memcpy(ivec2_buf, ivec_bin.data, 16); + memcpy(ecount2_buf, ecount_bin.data, ecount_bin.size); + + AES_ctr128_encrypt((unsigned char *) text_bin.data, + enif_make_new_binary(env, text_bin.size, &cipher_term), + text_bin.size, &aes_key, ivec2_buf, ecount2_buf, &num); + + num2_term = enif_make_uint(env, num); + new_state_term = enif_make_tuple4(env, state_term[0], ivec2_term, ecount2_term, num2_term); + ret = enif_make_tuple2(env, new_state_term, cipher_term); + return ret; +} + static ERL_NIF_TERM rand_bytes_1(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) {/* (Bytes) */ unsigned bytes; diff --git a/lib/crypto/doc/src/crypto.xml b/lib/crypto/doc/src/crypto.xml index 1ccea6df79..179ba4498c 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/doc/src/crypto.xml +++ b/lib/crypto/doc/src/crypto.xml @@ -281,6 +281,57 @@ Mpint() = >]]> is 96 bits (12 bytes).

+ + hmac_init(Type, Key) -> Context + + + Type = sha | md5 | ripemd160 + Key = iolist() | binary() + Context = binary() + + +

Initializes the context for streaming HMAC operations. Type determines + which hash function to use in the HMAC operation. Key is the authentication + key. The key can be any length.

+ + + + hmac_update(Context, Data) -> NewContext + + + Context = NewContext = binary() + Data = iolist() | binary() + + +

Updates the HMAC represented by Context using the given Data. Context + must have been generated using an HMAC init function (such as + hmac_init). Data can be any length. NewContext + must be passed into the next call to hmac_update.

+ + + + hmac_final(Context) -> Mac + + + Context = Mac = binary() + + +

Finalizes the HMAC operation referenced by Context. The size of the resultant MAC is + determined by the type of hash function used to generate it.

+ + + + hmac_final_n(Context, HashLen) -> Mac + + + Context = Mac = binary() + HashLen = non_neg_integer() + + +

Finalizes the HMAC operation referenced by Context. HashLen must be greater than + zero. Mac will be a binary with at most HashLen bytes. Note that if HashLen is greater than the actual number of bytes returned from the underlying hash, the returned hash will have fewer than HashLen bytes.

+ + sha_mac(Key, Data) -> Mac Compute an MD5 MACmessage authentification code @@ -588,6 +639,55 @@ Mpint() = >]]> (16 bytes).

 + + aes_ctr_stream_init(Key, IVec) -> State + + + State = { K, I, E, C } + Key = K = iolist() + IVec = I = E = binary() + C = integer() + + +

Initializes the state for use in streaming AES encryption using Counter mode (CTR). + Key is the AES key and must be either 128, 192, or 256 bts long. IVec is + an arbitrary initializing vector of 128 bits (16 bytes). This state is for use with + aes_ctr_stream_encrypt and + aes_ctr_stream_decrypt.

+ + + + aes_ctr_stream_encrypt(State, Text) -> { NewState, Cipher} + + + Text = iolist() | binary() + Cipher = binary() + + +

Encrypts Text according to AES in Counter mode (CTR). This function can be + used to encrypt a stream of text using a series of calls instead of requiring all + text to be in memory. Text can be any number of bytes. State is initialized using + aes_ctr_stream_init. NewState is the new streaming + encryption state that must be passed to the next call to aes_ctr_stream_encrypt. + Cipher is the encrypted cipher text.

+ + + + aes_ctr_stream_decrypt(State, Cipher) -> { NewState, Text } + + + Cipher = iolist() | binary() + Text = binary() + + +

Decrypts Cipher according to AES in Counter mode (CTR). This function can be + used to decrypt a stream of ciphertext using a series of calls instead of requiring all + ciphertext to be in memory. Cipher can be any number of bytes. State is initialized using + aes_ctr_stream_init. NewState is the new streaming + encryption state that must be passed to the next call to aes_ctr_stream_encrypt. + Text is the decrypted data.

+ + erlint(Mpint) -> N mpint(N) -> Mpint diff --git a/lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl b/lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl index cc7b3acc9c..c35dfcebab 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl +++ b/lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ %-export([sha256/1, sha256_init/0, sha256_update/2, sha256_final/1]). %-export([sha512/1, sha512_init/0, sha512_update/2, sha512_final/1]). -export([md5_mac/2, md5_mac_96/2, sha_mac/2, sha_mac_96/2]). +-export([hmac_init/2, hmac_update/2, hmac_final/1, hmac_final_n/2]). -export([des_cbc_encrypt/3, des_cbc_decrypt/3, des_cbc_ivec/1]). -export([des_ecb_encrypt/2, des_ecb_decrypt/2]). -export([des3_cbc_encrypt/5, des3_cbc_decrypt/5]). @@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ -export([aes_cbc_256_encrypt/3, aes_cbc_256_decrypt/3]). -export([aes_cbc_ivec/1]). -export([aes_ctr_encrypt/3, aes_ctr_decrypt/3]). +-export([aes_ctr_stream_init/2, aes_ctr_stream_encrypt/2, aes_ctr_stream_decrypt/2]). -export([dh_generate_parameters/2, dh_check/1]). %% Testing see below @@ -64,6 +66,7 @@ %% sha512, sha512_init, sha512_update, sha512_final, md5_mac, md5_mac_96, sha_mac, sha_mac_96, + sha_mac_init, sha_mac_update, sha_mac_final, des_cbc_encrypt, des_cbc_decrypt, des_ecb_encrypt, des_ecb_decrypt, des_ede3_cbc_encrypt, des_ede3_cbc_decrypt, @@ -85,6 +88,7 @@ %% idea_cbc_encrypt, idea_cbc_decrypt, aes_cbc_256_encrypt, aes_cbc_256_decrypt, aes_ctr_encrypt, aes_ctr_decrypt, + aes_ctr_stream_init, aes_ctr_stream_encrypt, aes_ctr_stream_decrypt, info_lib]). -type rsa_digest_type() :: 'md5' | 'sha'. @@ -216,6 +220,19 @@ sha_final(_Context) -> ?nif_stub. %% MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES %% +%% +%% HMAC (multiple hash options) +%% +-spec hmac_init(atom(), iodata()) -> binary(). +-spec hmac_update(binary(), iodata()) -> binary(). +-spec hmac_final(binary()) -> binary(). +-spec hmac_final_n(binary(), integer()) -> binary(). + +hmac_init(_Type, _Key) -> ?nif_stub. +hmac_update(_Context, _Data) -> ? nif_stub. +hmac_final(_Context) -> ? nif_stub. +hmac_final_n(_Context, _HashLen) -> ? nif_stub. + %% %% MD5_MAC %% @@ -243,7 +260,7 @@ sha_mac_96(Key, Data) -> sha_mac_n(Key,Data,12). sha_mac_n(_Key,_Data,_MacSz) -> ?nif_stub. - + %% %% CRYPTO FUNCTIONS %% @@ -578,6 +595,22 @@ aes_cbc_ivec(Data) when is_list(Data) -> aes_ctr_encrypt(_Key, _IVec, _Data) -> ?nif_stub. aes_ctr_decrypt(_Key, _IVec, _Cipher) -> ?nif_stub. +%% +%% AES - in counter mode (CTR) with state maintained for multi-call streaming +%% +-type ctr_state() :: { iodata(), binary(), binary(), integer() }. + +-spec aes_ctr_stream_init(iodata(), binary()) -> ctr_state(). +-spec aes_ctr_stream_encrypt(ctr_state(), binary()) -> + { ctr_state(), binary() }. +-spec aes_ctr_stream_decrypt(ctr_state(), binary()) -> + { ctr_state(), binary() }. + +aes_ctr_stream_init(Key, IVec) -> + {Key, IVec, << 0:128 >>, 0}. +aes_ctr_stream_encrypt({_Key, _IVec, _ECount, _Num}=_State, _Data) -> ?nif_stub. +aes_ctr_stream_decrypt({_Key, _IVec, _ECount, _Num}=_State, _Cipher) -> ?nif_stub. + %% %% XOR - xor to iolists and return a binary %% NB doesn't check that they are the same size, just concatenates diff --git a/lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl b/lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl index 854a8b4485..283aadb6ea 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl @@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ md4_update/1, sha/1, sha_update/1, + hmac_update_sha/1, + hmac_update_sha_n/1, + hmac_update_md5/1, + hmac_update_md5_io/1, + hmac_update_md5_n/1, sha256/1, sha256_update/1, sha512/1, @@ -44,6 +49,7 @@ aes_cbc/1, aes_cbc_iter/1, aes_ctr/1, + aes_ctr_stream/1, mod_exp_test/1, rand_uniform_test/1, strong_rand_test/1, @@ -67,9 +73,10 @@ suite() -> [{ct_hooks,[ts_install_cth]}]. all() -> [link_test, md5, md5_update, md4, md4_update, md5_mac, md5_mac_io, sha, sha_update, + hmac_update_sha, hmac_update_sha_n, hmac_update_md5_n, hmac_update_md5_io, hmac_update_md5, %% sha256, sha256_update, sha512,sha512_update, des_cbc, aes_cfb, aes_cbc, - aes_cbc_iter, aes_ctr, des_cbc_iter, des_ecb, + aes_cbc_iter, aes_ctr, aes_ctr_stream, des_cbc_iter, des_ecb, rand_uniform_test, strong_rand_test, rsa_verify_test, dsa_verify_test, rsa_sign_test, dsa_sign_test, rsa_encrypt_decrypt, dh, exor_test, @@ -284,6 +291,101 @@ sha(Config) when is_list(Config) -> hexstr2bin("84983E441C3BD26EBAAE4AA1F95129E5E54670F1")). +%% +hmac_update_sha_n(doc) -> + ["Request a larger-than-allowed SHA1 HMAC using hmac_init, hmac_update, and hmac_final_n. " + "Expected values for examples are generated using crypto:sha_mac." ]; +hmac_update_sha_n(suite) -> + []; +hmac_update_sha_n(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + ?line Key = hexstr2bin("00010203101112132021222330313233" + "04050607141516172425262734353637" + "08090a0b18191a1b28292a2b38393a3b" + "0c0d0e0f1c1d1e1f2c2d2e2f3c3d3e3f"), + ?line Data = "Sampl", + ?line Data2 = "e #1", + ?line Ctx = crypto:hmac_init(sha, Key), + ?line Ctx2 = crypto:hmac_update(Ctx, Data), + ?line Ctx3 = crypto:hmac_update(Ctx2, Data2), + ?line Mac = crypto:hmac_final_n(Ctx3, 1024), + ?line Exp = crypto:sha_mac(Key, lists:flatten([Data, Data2])), + ?line m(Exp, Mac), + ?line m(size(Exp), size(Mac)). + + +hmac_update_sha(doc) -> + ["Generate an SHA1 HMAC using hmac_init, hmac_update, and hmac_final. " + "Expected values for examples are generated using crypto:sha_mac." ]; +hmac_update_sha(suite) -> + []; +hmac_update_sha(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + ?line Key = hexstr2bin("00010203101112132021222330313233" + "04050607141516172425262734353637" + "08090a0b18191a1b28292a2b38393a3b" + "0c0d0e0f1c1d1e1f2c2d2e2f3c3d3e3f"), + ?line Data = "Sampl", + ?line Data2 = "e #1", + ?line Ctx = crypto:hmac_init(sha, Key), + ?line Ctx2 = crypto:hmac_update(Ctx, Data), + ?line Ctx3 = crypto:hmac_update(Ctx2, Data2), + ?line Mac = crypto:hmac_final(Ctx3), + ?line Exp = crypto:sha_mac(Key, lists:flatten([Data, Data2])), + ?line m(Exp, Mac). + +hmac_update_md5(doc) -> + ["Generate an MD5 HMAC using hmac_init, hmac_update, and hmac_final. " + "Expected values for examples are generated using crypto:md5_mac." ]; +hmac_update_md5(suite) -> + []; +hmac_update_md5(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + % ?line Key2 = ["A fine speach", "by a fine man!"], + Key2 = "A fine speach by a fine man!", + ?line Long1 = "Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.", + ?line Long2 = "Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation, so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.", + ?line Long3 = "But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate, we can not consecrate, we can not hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us-that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain-that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom-and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.", + ?line CtxA = crypto:hmac_init(md5, Key2), + ?line CtxB = crypto:hmac_update(CtxA, Long1), + ?line CtxC = crypto:hmac_update(CtxB, Long2), + ?line CtxD = crypto:hmac_update(CtxC, Long3), + ?line Mac2 = crypto:hmac_final(CtxD), + ?line Exp2 = crypto:md5_mac(Key2, lists:flatten([Long1, Long2, Long3])), + ?line m(Exp2, Mac2). + + +hmac_update_md5_io(doc) -> + ["Generate an MD5 HMAC using hmac_init, hmac_update, and hmac_final. " + "Expected values for examples are generated using crypto:md5_mac." ]; +hmac_update_md5_io(suite) -> + []; +hmac_update_md5_io(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + ?line Key = ["A fine speach", "by a fine man!"], + ?line Data = "Sampl", + ?line Data2 = "e #1", + ?line Ctx = crypto:hmac_init(md5, Key), + ?line Ctx2 = crypto:hmac_update(Ctx, Data), + ?line Ctx3 = crypto:hmac_update(Ctx2, Data2), + ?line Mac = crypto:hmac_final(Ctx3), + ?line Exp = crypto:md5_mac(Key, lists:flatten([Data, Data2])), + ?line m(Exp, Mac). + + +hmac_update_md5_n(doc) -> + ["Generate a shortened MD5 HMAC using hmac_init, hmac_update, and hmac_final. " + "Expected values for examples are generated using crypto:md5_mac." ]; +hmac_update_md5_n(suite) -> + []; +hmac_update_md5_n(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + ?line Key = ["A fine speach", "by a fine man!"], + ?line Data = "Sampl", + ?line Data2 = "e #1", + ?line Ctx = crypto:hmac_init(md5, Key), + ?line Ctx2 = crypto:hmac_update(Ctx, Data), + ?line Ctx3 = crypto:hmac_update(Ctx2, Data2), + ?line Mac = crypto:hmac_final_n(Ctx3, 12), + ?line Exp = crypto:md5_mac_96(Key, lists:flatten([Data, Data2])), + ?line m(Exp, Mac). + + %% %% sha_update(doc) -> @@ -673,6 +775,77 @@ aes_ctr_do(Key,{IVec, Plain, Cipher}) -> ?line m(C, hexstr2bin(Cipher)), ?line m(P, crypto:aes_ctr_decrypt(Key, I, C)). +aes_ctr_stream(doc) -> "CTR Streaming"; +aes_ctr_stream(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + %% Sample data from NIST Spec.Publ. 800-38A + %% F.5.1 CTR-AES128.Encrypt + Key128 = hexstr2bin("2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c"), + Samples128 = [{"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff", % Input Block + ["6bc1bee22e409f", "96e93d7e117393172a"], % Plaintext + ["874d6191b620e3261bef6864990db6ce"]}, % Ciphertext + {"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff00", + ["ae2d8a57", "1e03ac9c", "9eb76fac", "45af8e51"], + ["9806f66b7970fdff","8617187bb9fffdff"]}, + {"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff01", + ["30c81c46a35c", "e411e5fbc119", "1a0a52ef"], + ["5ae4df3e","dbd5d3","5e5b4f0902","0db03eab"]}, + {"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff02", + ["f69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710"], + ["1e031dda2fbe","03d1792170a0","f3009cee"]}], + lists:foreach(fun(S) -> aes_ctr_stream_do(Key128,S) end, Samples128), + + %% F.5.3 CTR-AES192.Encrypt + Key192 = hexstr2bin("8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b"), + Samples192 = [{"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff", % Input Block + ["6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a"], % Plaintext + ["1abc9324","17521c","a24f2b04","59fe7e6e0b"]}, % Ciphertext + {"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff00", + ["ae2d8a57", "1e03ac9c9eb76fac", "45af8e51"], + ["090339ec0aa6faefd5ccc2c6f4ce8e94"]}, + {"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff01", + ["30c81c46a35ce411", "e5fbc1191a0a52ef"], + ["1e36b26bd1","ebc670d1bd1d","665620abf7"]}, + {"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff02", + ["f69f2445", "df4f9b17ad", "2b417be6", "6c3710"], + ["4f78a7f6d2980958","5a97daec58c6b050"]}], + lists:foreach(fun(S) -> aes_ctr_stream_do(Key192,S) end, Samples192), + + %% F.5.5 CTR-AES256.Encrypt + Key256 = hexstr2bin("603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d77811f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4"), + Samples256 = [{"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff", % Input Block + ["6bc1bee22e409f96", "e93d7e117393172a"], % Plaintext + ["601ec313775789", "a5b7a7f504bbf3d228"]}, % Ciphertext + {"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff00", + ["ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51"], + ["f443e3ca","4d62b59aca84","e990cacaf5c5"]}, + {"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff01", + ["30c81c46","a35ce411","e5fbc119","1a0a52ef"], + ["2b0930daa23de94ce87017ba2d84988d"]}, + {"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff02", + ["f69f2445df4f","9b17ad2b41","7be66c3710"], + ["dfc9c5","8db67aada6","13c2dd08","457941a6"]}], + lists:foreach(fun(S) -> aes_ctr_stream_do(Key256,S) end, Samples256). + + +aes_ctr_stream_do(Key,{IVec, PlainList, CipherList}) -> + ?line I = hexstr2bin(IVec), + ?line S = crypto:aes_ctr_stream_init(Key, I), + ?line C = aes_ctr_stream_do_iter( + S, PlainList, [], + fun(S2,P) -> crypto:aes_ctr_stream_encrypt(S2, P) end), + ?line m(C, hexstr2bin(lists:flatten(CipherList))), + ?line P = aes_ctr_stream_do_iter( + S, CipherList, [], + fun(S2,C2) -> crypto:aes_ctr_stream_decrypt(S2, C2) end), + ?line m(P, hexstr2bin(lists:flatten(PlainList))). + +aes_ctr_stream_do_iter(_State, [], Acc, _CipherFun) -> + iolist_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc)); +aes_ctr_stream_do_iter(State, [Plain|Rest], Acc, CipherFun) -> + ?line P = hexstr2bin(Plain), + ?line {S2, C} = CipherFun(State, P), + aes_ctr_stream_do_iter(S2, Rest, [C | Acc], CipherFun). + %% %% mod_exp_test(doc) -> @@ -1127,7 +1300,8 @@ worker_loop(0, _) -> worker_loop(N, Config) -> Funcs = { md5, md5_update, md5_mac, md5_mac_io, sha, sha_update, des_cbc, aes_cfb, aes_cbc, des_cbc_iter, rand_uniform_test, strong_rand_test, - rsa_verify_test, exor_test, rc4_test, rc4_stream_test, mod_exp_test }, + rsa_verify_test, exor_test, rc4_test, rc4_stream_test, mod_exp_test, + hmac_update_md5, hmac_update_sha, aes_ctr_stream }, F = element(random:uniform(size(Funcs)),Funcs), %%io:format("worker ~p calling ~p\n",[self(),F]), -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5815cc9355b26292ee066a01fb35668482973e06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sverker Eriksson Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 16:42:25 +0200 Subject: Stepping vsn for R14B03 --- lib/crypto/vsn.mk | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'lib/crypto') diff --git a/lib/crypto/vsn.mk b/lib/crypto/vsn.mk index 740c68d8fa..e754aabc44 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/crypto/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -CRYPTO_VSN = 2.0.2.2 +CRYPTO_VSN = 2.0.3 -- cgit v1.2.3