From 81c36ab87ac92c1f08b605b0fb0e29e51b6eb493 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anders Svensson Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 01:29:33 +0200 Subject: Simplify/complete Standards Compliance doc With a table. Probably no one wants to read a commented RFC, it's been unfinished for some time, and it's difficult to get an overview from it. --- lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc.xml | 1327 +++- lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc_rfc6733.xml | 8693 ------------------------- lib/diameter/doc/src/files.mk | 5 +- 3 files changed, 1280 insertions(+), 8745 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc_rfc6733.xml (limited to 'lib/diameter/doc') diff --git a/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc.xml b/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc.xml index ae404fcda4..28e01ff1be 100644 --- a/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc.xml +++ b/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc.xml @@ -1,15 +1,22 @@ gen_sctp(3)'> + gen_tcp(3)'> + service'> + capabilities'> + events'> + +  
'> %also; ]> - +
2011 -2016 +2017 Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved. @@ -41,63 +48,1285 @@ limitations under the License.

-Known points of questionable or non-compliance.

+The table below summarizes the diameter application's compliance with +&the_rfc;. +Since the diameter application isn't a Diameter node on its own, +compliance is strictly the responsibility of the user in many cases, +diameter providing the means for the user to be compliant +rather than being compliant on its own.

- - -
-&the_rfc; - - - - -

-There is no support for DTLS over SCTP.

- - -

-There is no explicit support for peer discovery (section 5.2). -It can possibly be implemented on top of diameter as is but this is -probably something that diameter should do.

- +The Compliance column notes C (Compliant) if the required +functionality is implemented, PC (Partially Compliant) if +there are limitations, NC (Not Compliant) if functionality is +not implemented, or a dash if text is informational or only places +requirements that must be met by the user's implementation.

-

-The peer state machine's election process (section 5.6.4) isn't -implemented as specified since it assumes knowledge of a -peer's Origin-Host before sending it a CER. (The identity becoming known -upon reception of CEA.) -The possibility of configuring -the peer's Origin-Host could be added, along with handling of the case -that it sends something else, but for many applications this will -just be unnecessary configuration of a value that it has no control over.

- - - - - - - -
+Capitalized Diameter refers to the protocol, lowercase +diameter to the Erlang application.

-RFC 3539 +&the_rfc; - Diameter Base Protocol -

-RFC 3539 is more difficult to comply to since it discusses -problems as much as it requires functionality but all the MUST's are -covered, the watchdog state machine being the primary one. -Of the optional functionality, load balancing is left to the -diameter user (since it's the one deciding who to send to) and -there is no Congestion Manager.

+ + + Section + Title + Compliance + Notes + + + 1 + Introduction + &NA; + + + + 1.1 + Diameter Protocol + &NA; + + + + 1.1.1 + Description of the Document Set + &NA; + + + + 1.1.2 + Conventions Used in This Document + &NA; + + + + 1.1.3 + Changes from RFC 3588 + &NA; + It is possible to configure a 3588 dictionary in + order to get 3588 semantics, where the differ from 6733. + + + 1.2 + Terminology + &NA; + + + + 1.3 + Approach to Extensibility + &NA; + The dictionary interface documented in &man_dict; provides + extensibility, allowing the user to defined new AVPs, commands, and + applications. + Ready dictionaries are provided for the &the_rfc; common message, base + accounting, and relay applications, as well as for RFC 7683, + Diameter Overload Indicator Conveyance. + + + 1.3.1 + Defining New AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 1.3.2 + Creating New AVPs + &NA; + New AVPs can be defined using the dictionary interface. + Both both RFC data formats and extensions are supported. + + + 1.3.3 + Creating New Commands + &NA; + New commands can be defined using the dictionary interface. + + + 1.3.4 + Creating New Diameter Applications + &NA; + New applications can be defined using the dictionary interface. + + + 2 + Protocol Overview + &NA; + Session state is the responsibility of the user.&BR; + The role of a Diameter node is determined by the user's + implementation. + + + 2.1 + Transport + PC + Ports are configured by the user: diameter places no + restrictions.&BR; + The transport interface documented in &man_transport; + allows the user to implement their own methods. + Ready support is provided for TCP, TCP/TLS, and SCTP, but not + DTLS/SCTP.&BR; + Multiple connections to the same peer is possible. + ICMP messages are not interpreted. + + + 2.1.1 + SCTP Guidelines + C + Unordered sending is configurable in &man_sctp;. + There is no special handling of DPR/DPA: since a user that cares + about pending answers should wait for them before initiating + DPR.&BR; + A PPID can be configured with a a gen_sctp sctp_default_send_param + option. + + + 2.2 + Securing Diameter Messages + PC + DTLS is not supported by &man_sctp;. See also + 2.1. + + + 2.3 + Diameter Application Compliance + &NA; + + + + 2.4 + Application Identifiers + C + The user configures diameter with the identifiers to send at + capabilities exchange, along with corresponding dictionaries + defining the messages of the applications. + + + 2.5 + Connections vs. Sessions + C + Connections are realized by configuring transport. Sessions + are the responsibility of the user. + + + 2.6 + Peer Table + PC + Routing is implemented by the user in callbacks documented in + &man_app;. + A peer table of the documented form is not exposed to the user. + + + 2.7 + Routing Table + PC + See 2.6. + A routing table of the documented form is not exposed to + the user. + + + 2.8 + Role of Diameter Agents + C + Most role-specific behaviour is implemented by the user. + How a node advertises itself at capabilities exchange is determined + by user configuration. + + + 2.8.1 + Relay Agents + C + + + + 2.8.2 + Proxy Agents + C + + + + 2.8.3 + Redirect Agents + C + + + + 2.8.4 + Translation Agents + C + + + + 2.9 + Diameter Path Authorization + &NA; + Authorization is the responsibility of the user. + + + 3 + Diameter Header + C + Hop-by-Hop and End-to-End Identifiers are set by diameter when + sending outgoing requests. + + + 3.1 + Command Codes + C + + + + 3.2 + Command Code Format Specification + C + Commands are defined as CCF specifications in dictionary + files. + + + 3.3 + Diameter Command Naming Conventions + &NA; + + + + 4 + Diameter AVPs + C + Any required padding is added by diameter when encoding + outgoing messages. + + + 4.1 + AVP Header + C + + + + 4.1.1 + Optional Header Elements + C + + + + 4.2 + Basic AVP Data Formats + C + + + + 4.3 + Derived AVP Data Formats + C + Arbitrary derived data formats are supported by the dictionary + interface. + + + 4.3.1 + Common Derived AVP Data Formats + C + Beware that RFC 6733 changed the DiameterURI transport/port + defaults specified in RFC3588. + Relying on the defaults can result in interoperability + problems. + + + 4.4 + Grouped AVP Values + C + The M-bit on a component AVP of a Grouped AVP that does not + set M is ignored: such AVPs are not regarded as erroneous at + decode.&BR; + Grouped AVPs are defined as CCF specifications in dictionary + files. + + + 4.4.1 + Example AVP with a Grouped Data Type + &NA; + + + + 4.5 + Diameter Base Protocol AVPs + C + The base AVPs are defined in the common dictionary provided by + diameter. + There are common dictionaries for both RFC 3588 and RFC 6733 since + the latter made changes to both syntax and semantics. + + + 5 + Diameter Peers + &NA; + + + + 5.1 + Peer Connections + PC + A peer's DiameterIdentity is not required when initiating a + connection: the identify is received at capabilities exchange, at + which time the connection can be rejected if the identity is + objectionable.&BR; + The number of connections established depends on the user's + configuration. Multiple connections per peer is possible. + + + 5.2 + Diameter Peer Discovery + NC + No form of peer discovery is implemented. + The user can implement this independently of diameter if + required. + + + 5.3 + Capabilities Exchange + C + All supported applications are sent in CEA. + The user can reject an incoming CER or CEA in a configured + callback.&BR; + Both transport security at connection establishment and + negotiated via an Inband-Security AVP are supported. + + + 5.3.1 + Capabilities-Exchange-Request + C + CER is sent and received by diameter. + + + 5.3.2 + Capabilities-Exchange-Answer + C + CEA is sent and received by diameter. + + + 5.3.3 + Vendor-Id AVP + C + + + + 5.3.4 + Firmware-Revision AVP + C + + + + 5.3.5 + Host-IP-Address AVP + C + + + + 5.3.6 + Supported-Vendor-Id AVP + C + + + + 5.3.7 + Product-Name AVP + C + + + + 5.4 + Disconnecting Peer Connections + C + DPA will not be answered with error: a peer that wants to a + avoid a race can wait for pending answers before sending + DPR. + + + 5.4.1 + Disconnect-Peer-Request + C + DPR is sent by diameter in response to configuration + changes requiring a connection to be broken. + The user can also send DPR. + + + 5.4.2 + Disconnect-Peer-Answer + C + DPR is answered by diameter. + + + 5.4.3 + Disconnect-Cause AVP + C + + + + 5.5 + Transport Failure Detection + &NA; + + + + 5.5.1 + Device-Watchdog-Request + C + DWR is sent and received by diameter. + Callbacks notify the user of transitions into and out of the OKAY + state. + + + 5.5.2 + Device-Watchdog-Answer + C + DWA is sent and received by diameter. + + + 5.5.3 + Transport Failure Algorithm + C + + + + 5.5.4 + Failover and Failback Procedures + C + + + + 5.6 + Peer State Machine + PC + The election process is modified as described in 5.6.4. + + + 5.6.1 + Incoming Connections + C + + + + 5.6.2 + Events + &NA; + + + + 5.6.3 + Actions + &NA; + + + + 5.6.4 + The Election Process + PC + As documented, the election assumes knowledge of a peer's + DiameterIdentity when initiating a connection, which diameter + doesn't require. Connections will be accepted if configuration + allows multiple connections per peer to be established or there is + no existing connection. Note that the election process is only + applicable when multiple connections per peer is + disallowed. + + + 6 + Diameter Message Processing + &NA; + + + + 6.1 + Diameter Request Routing Overview + &NA; + Routing is performed by the user. + A callback from diameter provides a list of available suitable peer + connections. + + + 6.1.1 + Originating a Request + C + Requests are constructed by the user; diameter sets header + fields as defined in the relevant dictionary. + + + 6.1.2 + Sending a Request + C + + + + 6.1.3 + Receiving Requests + C + Loops are detected by diameter when the return value of a + request callback asks that a request be forwarded. + Loop detection in other cases is the responsibility of the + user. + + + 6.1.4 + Processing Local Requests + C + The user decides whether or not to process a request locally + in the request callback from diameter. + + + 6.1.5 + Request Forwarding + PC + See 2.6. + + + 6.1.6 + Request Routing + PC + See 2.7. + + + 6.1.7 + Predictive Loop Avoidance + C + See 6.1.3. + + + 6.1.8 + Redirecting Requests + PC + See 2.6. + + + 6.1.9 + Relaying and Proxying Requests + C + A Route-Record AVP is appended by diameter when the return + value of a request callback asks that a request be forwarded. + Appending the AVP in other cases is the responsibility of the + user. + + + 6.2 + Diameter Answer Processing + C + Answer message are constructed by the user, except in the case + of some protocol errors, in which case the procedures are + followed. + + + 6.2.1 + Processing Received Answers + C + Answers with an unknown Hop-by-Hop Identifier are + discarded. + + + 6.2.2 + Relaying and Proxying Answers + &NA; + Modifying answers is the responsibility of the user in + callbacks from diameter. + + + 6.3 + Origin-Host AVP + C + The order of AVPs in an encoded message is determined by + the CCF of the message in question.&BR; + AVPs defined in the RFC are defined in dictionaries provided by + diameter. + Their proper use in application messages is the responsibility of + the user. + + + 6.4 + Origin-Realm AVP + C + + + + 6.5 + Destination-Host AVP + C + + + + 6.6 + Destination-Realm AVP + C + + + + 6.7 + Routing AVPs + &NA; + + + + 6.7.1 + Route-Record AVP + C + + + + 6.7.2 + Proxy-Info AVP + C + + + + 6.7.3 + Proxy-Host AVP + C + + + + 6.7.4 + Proxy-State AVP + C + + + + 6.8 + Auth-Application-Id AVP + C + + + + 6.9 + Acct-Application-Id AVP + C + + + + 6.10 + Inband-Security-Id AVP + C + See 2.1. + + + 6.11 + Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP + C + Note that the CCF of this AVP is not the same as in RFC + 3588. + + + 6.12 + Redirect-Host AVP + C + + + + 6.13 + Redirect-Host-Usage AVP + C + + + + 6.14 + Redirect-Max-Cache-Time AVP + C + + + + 7 + Error Handling + C + Answers are formulated by the user in most cases. + Answers setting the E-bit can be sent by diameter itself in response + to a request that cannot be handled by the user. + + + 7.1 + Result-Code AVP + C + + + + 7.1.1 + Informational + C + + + + 7.1.2 + Success + C + + + + 7.1.3 + Protocol Errors + C + Result codes 3001, 3002, 3005, and 3007 can be sent in answers + formulated by diameter, if configured to do so. + + + 7.1.4 + Transient Failures + C + Result code 4003 is sent in CEA if there is an existing + connection to the peer in question and configuration does not allow + more than one. + + + 7.1.5 + Permanent Failures + C + Message reception detects 5001, 5004, + 5005, 5008, 5009, 5010, 5011, 5014, 5015, and 5017 errors. + It ignores 5013 errors at the admonition of sections 3 and 4.1.&BR; + Note that RFC 3588 did not allow 5xxx result codes in + answers setting the E-bit, while RFC 6733 does. + This is a potential interoperability problem since the Diameter + protocol version has not changed. + + + 7.2 + Error Bit + C + + + + 7.3 + Error-Message AVP + C + The user can include this AVP as required. + + + 7.4 + Error-Reporting-Host AVP + C + The user can include this AVP as required. + + + 7.5 + Failed-AVP AVP + C + The user constructs application-specific messages, but + diameter provides failed AVPs in message callbacks. Failed component AVPs + are grouped within the relevant Grouped AVPs. + + + 7.6 + Experimental-Result AVP + C + + + + 7.7 + Experimental-Result-Code AVP + C + + + + 8 + Diameter User Sessions + &NA; + Authorization and accounting AVPs are defined in provided + dictionaries. Their proper use is the responsibility of the + user. + + + 8.1 + Authorization Session State Machine + &NA; + Authorization is the responsibility of the user: diameter does + not implement this state machine. + + + 8.2 + Accounting Session State Machine + &NA; + Accounting is the responsibility of the user: diameter does + not implement this state machine. + + + 8.3 + Server-Initiated Re-Auth + &NA; + + + + 8.3.1 + Re-Auth-Request + C + + + + 8.3.2 + Re-Auth-Answer + C + + + + 8.4 + Session Termination + &NA; + Session-related messages and AVPs are defined in provided + dictionaries. Their proper use is the user's responsibility. + + + 8.4.1 + Session-Termination-Request + C + + + + 8.4.2 + Session-Termination-Answer + C + + + + 8.5 + Aborting a Session + &NA; + Session-related messages and AVPs are defined in provided + dictionaries. Their proper use is the user's responsibility. + + + 8.5.1 + Abort-Session-Request + C + + + + 8.5.2 + Abort-Session-Answer + C + + + + 8.6 + Inferring Session Termination from Origin-State-Id + &NA; + Session-related messages and AVPs are defined in provided + dictionaries. Their proper use is the user's responsibility. + + + 8.7 + Auth-Request-Type AVP + C + + + + 8.8 + Session-Id AVP + C + + + + 8.9 + Authorization-Lifetime AVP + C + + + + 8.10 + Auth-Grace-Period AVP + C + + + + 8.11 + Auth-Session-State AVP + C + + + + 8.12 + Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP + C + + + + 8.13 + Session-Timeout AVP + C + + + + 8.14 + User-Name AVP + C + + + + 8.15 + Termination-Cause AVP + C + + + + 8.16 + Origin-State-Id AVP + C + + + + 8.17 + Session-Binding AVP + C + + + + 8.18 + Session-Server-Failover AVP + C + + + + 8.19 + Multi-Round-Time-Out AVP + C + + + + 8.20 + Class AVP + C + + + + 8.21 + Event-Timestamp AVP + C + + + + 9 + Accounting + &NA; + Accounting-related messages and AVPs are defined in provided + dictionaries. Their proper use is the user's responsibility. + + + 9.1 + Server Directed Model + &NA; + + + + 9.2 + Protocol Messages + &NA; + + + + 9.3 + Accounting Application Extension and Requirements + &NA; + + + + 9.4 + Fault Resilience + &NA; + + + + 9.5 + Accounting Records + &NA; + + + + 9.6 + Correlation of Accounting Records + &NA; + + + + 9.7 + Accounting Command Codes + &NA; + + + + 9.7.1 + Accounting-Request + C + + + + 9.7.2 + Accounting-Answer + C + + + + 9.8 + Accounting AVPs + &NA; + + + + 9.8.1 + Accounting-Record-Type AVP + C + + + + 9.8.2 + Acct-Interim-Interval AVP + C + + + + 9.8.3 + Accounting-Record-Number AVP + C + + + + 9.8.4 + Acct-Session-Id AVP + C + + + + 9.8.5 + Acct-Multi-Session-Id AVP + C + + + + 9.8.6 + Accounting-Sub-Session-Id AVP + C + + + + 9.8.7 + Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP + C + + + + 10 + AVP Occurrence Tables + &NA; + + + + 10.1 + Base Protocol Command AVP Table + &NA; + + + + 10.2 + Accounting AVP Table + &NA; + + + + 11 + IANA Considerations + &NA; + + + + 11.1 + AVP Header + &NA; + + + + 11.1.1 + AVP Codes + &NA; + + + + 11.1.2 + AVP Flags + &NA; + + + + 11.2 + Diameter Header + &NA; + + + + 11.2.1 + Command Codes + &NA; + + + + 11.2.2 + Command Flags + + + + + 11.3 + AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 11.3.1 + Experimental-Result-Code AVP + &NA; + + + + 11.3.2 + Result-Code AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 11.3.3 + Accounting-Record-Type AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 11.3.4 + Termination-Cause AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 11.3.5 + Redirect-Host-Usage AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 11.3.6 + Session-Server-Failover AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 11.3.7 + Session-Binding AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 11.3.8 + Disconnect-Cause AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 11.3.9 + Auth-Request-Type AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 11.3.10 + Auth-Session-State AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 11.3.11 + Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 11.3.12 + Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP Values + &NA; + + + + 11.3.13 + Inband-Security-Id AVP (code 299) + &NA; + + + + 11.4 + _diameters Service Name and Port Number Registration + &NA; + + + + 11.5 + SCTP Payload Protocol Identifiers + &NA; + + + + 11.6 + S-NAPTR Parameters + &NA; + + + + 12 + Diameter Protocol-Related Configurable Parameters + &NA; + + + + 13 + Security Considerations + PC + See 2.1.&BR; + IPsec is transparent to diameter. + + + 13.1 + TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP Usage + PC + See 2.1. + + + 13.2 + Peer-to-Peer Considerations + &NA; + + + + 13.3 + AVP Considerations + &NA; + + + + 14 + References + &NA; + + + + 14.1 + Normative References + &NA; + + + + 14.2 + Informative References + &NA; + + + +RFC 6733 Compliance +
 + + + + diff --git a/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc_rfc6733.xml b/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc_rfc6733.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 2098965706..0000000000 --- a/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc_rfc6733.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8693 +0,0 @@ - - - - -gen_sctp(3)'> - gen_tcp(3)'> - service'> - capabilities'> - events'> - No comment.

'> - - %also; -]> - -
-Commentary - -

-A more detailed commentary on &the_rfc; follows. -Its purpose is to (hopefully) clarify not only what is supported but -how, given that semantics and features discussed in the RFC are not -solely the responsibility of the diameter application: -in many cases much depends on the configuration a user passes to -diameter, the implementation of &man_app; callback modules in -particular.

- -

-Comments apply to all text following the preceding comment. -Be sure to distinguish between capitalized Diameter, the -protocol defined by the RFC, and lowercase diameter, the -Erlang application to which the commentary applies.

- - -

-The commentary is not yet complete. -Comments currently stop at chapter 4.

- - -
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                    [Page 6]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-1.  Introduction
-
-   Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) protocols such as
-   TACACS [RFC1492] and RADIUS [RFC2865] were initially deployed to
-   provide dial-up PPP [RFC1661] and terminal server access.  Over time,
-   AAA support was needed on many new access technologies, the scale and
-   complexity of AAA networks grew, and AAA was also used on new
-   applications (such as voice over IP).  This led to new demands on AAA
-   protocols.
-
- -

-Note that diameter implements the Diameter protocol as defined in -&the_rfc;. -It also supported the previous version of the protocol, as defined in -RFC 3588, when there are differences. -(Which will be noted below.) -It does not support RADIUS.

- -
-
-   Network access requirements for AAA protocols are summarized in
-   Aboba, et al. [RFC2989].  These include:
-
-   Failover
-
-      [RFC2865] does not define failover mechanisms and, as a result,
-      failover behavior differs between implementations.  In order to
-      provide well-defined failover behavior, Diameter supports
-      application-layer acknowledgements and defines failover algorithms
-      and the associated state machine.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-   Transmission-level security
-
-      RADIUS [RFC2865] defines an application-layer authentication and
-      integrity scheme that is required only for use with response
-      packets.  While [RFC2869] defines an additional authentication and
-      integrity mechanism, use is only required during Extensible
-      Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] sessions.  While attribute
-      hiding is supported, [RFC2865] does not provide support for per-
-      packet confidentiality.  In accounting, [RFC2866] assumes that
-      replay protection is provided by the backend billing server rather
-      than within the protocol itself.
-
-      While [RFC3162] defines the use of IPsec with RADIUS, support for
-      IPsec is not required.  In order to provide universal support for
-      transmission-level security, and enable both intra- and inter-
-      domain AAA deployments, Diameter provides support for TLS/TCP and
-      DTLS/SCTP.  Security is discussed in Section 13.
-
- -

-Whether or not IPsec is used is transparent to diameter.

- -

-The transport protocol used on a given peer connection is also -transparent to diameter in that transport to diameter is simply a -module that implements the transport protocol documented in -&man_transport;. -A diameter user configures this module as the &mod_transport_opt; -transport_module.

- -

-While a user can implement their own transport modules, diameter -includes implementations for TCP and SCTP: -&man_tcp; based on &gen_tcp; and &man_sctp; based on &gen_sctp;. -The former supports TLS but the latter does not currently support -DTLS.

- -
-
-   Reliable transport
-
-      RADIUS runs over UDP, and does not define retransmission behavior;
-      as a result, reliability varies between implementations.  As
-      described in [RFC2975], this is a major issue in accounting, where
-      packet loss may translate directly into revenue loss.  In order to
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                    [Page 7]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-      provide well-defined transport behavior, Diameter runs over
-      reliable transport mechanisms (TCP, Stream Control Transmission
-      Protocol (SCTP)) as defined in [RFC3539].
-
-   Agent support
-
-      RADIUS does not provide for explicit support for agents, including
-      proxies, redirects, and relays.  Since the expected behavior is
-      not defined, it varies between implementations.  Diameter defines
-      agent behavior explicitly; this is described in Section 2.8.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-   Server-initiated messages
-
-      While server-initiated messages are defined in RADIUS [RFC5176],
-      support is optional.  This makes it difficult to implement
-      features such as unsolicited disconnect or re-authentication/
-      re-authorization on demand across a heterogeneous deployment.  To
-      address this issue, support for server-initiated messages is
-      mandatory in Diameter.
-
- -

-A diameter user can both send and receive messages.

- -
-
-   Transition support
-
-      While Diameter does not share a common protocol data unit (PDU)
-      with RADIUS, considerable effort has been expended in enabling
-      backward compatibility with RADIUS so that the two protocols may
-      be deployed in the same network.  Initially, it is expected that
-      Diameter will be deployed within new network devices, as well as
-      within gateways enabling communication between legacy RADIUS
-      devices and Diameter agents.  This capability enables Diameter
-      support to be added to legacy networks, by addition of a gateway
-      or server speaking both RADIUS and Diameter.
-
- -

-RADIUS Attributes can be redefined as Diameter AVP's using diameter's -&man_dict; interface but diameter provides no such definitions.

- -
-
-   In addition to addressing the above requirements, Diameter also
-   provides support for the following:
-
-   Capability negotiation
-
-      RADIUS does not support error messages, capability negotiation, or
-      a mandatory/non-mandatory flag for attributes.  Since RADIUS
-      clients and servers are not aware of each other's capabilities,
-      they may not be able to successfully negotiate a mutually
-      acceptable service or, in some cases, even be aware of what
-      service has been implemented.  Diameter includes support for error
-      handling (Section 7), capability negotiation (Section 5.3), and
-      mandatory/non-mandatory Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs)
-      (Section 4.1).
-
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                    [Page 8]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   Peer discovery and configuration
-
-      RADIUS implementations typically require that the name or address
-      of servers or clients be manually configured, along with the
-      corresponding shared secrets.  This results in a large
-      administrative burden and creates the temptation to reuse the
-      RADIUS shared secret, which can result in major security
-      vulnerabilities if the Request Authenticator is not globally and
-      temporally unique as required in [RFC2865].  Through DNS, Diameter
-      enables dynamic discovery of peers (see Section 5.2).  Derivation
-      of dynamic session keys is enabled via transmission-level
-      security.
-
-   Over time, the capabilities of Network Access Server (NAS) devices
-   have increased substantially.  As a result, while Diameter is a
-   considerably more sophisticated protocol than RADIUS, it remains
-   feasible to implement it within embedded devices.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-1.1.  Diameter Protocol
-
-   The Diameter base protocol provides the following facilities:
-
-   o  Ability to exchange messages and deliver AVPs
-
- -

-There are two interfaces directly involved in message exchange when -using diameter: the function &mod_call; for sending outgoing requests, -and the application callback interface, documented in &man_app; for -receiving incoming request and answers.

- -
-
-   o  Capabilities negotiation
-
- -

-Capabilities negotiation is the responsibility of diameter: -a user configures a diameter service and/or transport with -&capabilities; to provide AVP values for CER and CEA messages but it -is diameter itself that sends these messages. -A user receives notification of a successful capabilities exchange by -way of &app_peer_up; callbacks.

- -
-
-   o  Error notification
-
- -

-A user can subscribe to &events;, using &mod_subscribe;, in order to -receive notification of various failures. -Errors in Diameter messaging are communicated via the application -callbacks &app_handle_request;, &app_handle_answer; and -&app_handle_error;.

- - -
-
-   o  Extensibility, required in [RFC2989], through addition of new
-      applications, commands, and AVPs
-
- -

-Support for applications, commands and AVP's is extensible using -diameter's dictionary interface, as documented in &man_dict;. -Dictionaries are compiled to Erlang encode/decode modules using -&man_compile; or &man_make;.

- -
-
-   o  Basic services necessary for applications, such as the handling of
-      user sessions or accounting
-
- -

-Compiled dictionaries are provided for the RFC 3588 and RFC 6733 -Diameter applications: common, base accounting and relay. -Dictionaries for a number of standardized -applications are provided in uncompiled form below the examples -subdirectory of the diameter application directory.

- -
-
-   All data delivered by the protocol is in the form of AVPs.  Some of
-   these AVP values are used by the Diameter protocol itself, while
-   others deliver data associated with particular applications that
-   employ Diameter.  AVPs may be arbitrarily added to Diameter messages,
-   the only restriction being that the Command Code Format (CCF)
-   specification (Section 3.2) be satisfied.  AVPs are used by the base
-   Diameter protocol to support the following required features:
-
-   o  Transporting of user authentication information, for the purposes
-      of enabling the Diameter server to authenticate the user
-
-   o  Transporting of service-specific authorization information,
-      between client and servers, allowing the peers to decide whether a
-      user's access request should be granted
-
-
-
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-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   o  Exchanging resource usage information, which may be used for
-      accounting purposes, capacity planning, etc.
-
-   o  Routing, relaying, proxying, and redirecting of Diameter messages
-      through a server hierarchy
-
-   The Diameter base protocol satisfies the minimum requirements for a
-   AAA protocol, as specified by [RFC2989].  The base protocol may be
-   used by itself for accounting purposes only, or it may be used with a
-   Diameter application, such as Mobile IPv4 [RFC4004], or network
-   access [RFC4005].  It is also possible for the base protocol to be
-   extended for use in new applications, via the addition of new
-   commands or AVPs.  The initial focus of Diameter was network access
-   and accounting applications.  A truly generic AAA protocol used by
-   many applications might provide functionality not provided by
-   Diameter.  Therefore, it is imperative that the designers of new
-   applications understand their requirements before using Diameter.
-   See Section 1.3.4 for more information on Diameter applications.
-
-   Any node can initiate a request.  In that sense, Diameter is a peer-
-   to-peer protocol.  In this document, a Diameter client is a device at
-   the edge of the network that performs access control, such as a
-   Network Access Server (NAS) or a Foreign Agent (FA).  A Diameter
-   client generates Diameter messages to request authentication,
-   authorization, and accounting services for the user.  A Diameter
-   agent is a node that does not provide local user authentication or
-   authorization services; agents include proxies, redirects, and relay
-   agents.  A Diameter server performs authentication and/or
-   authorization of the user.  A Diameter node may act as an agent for
-   certain requests while acting as a server for others.
-
-   The Diameter protocol also supports server-initiated messages, such
-   as a request to abort service to a particular user.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-1.1.1.  Description of the Document Set
-
-   The Diameter specification consists of an updated version of the base
-   protocol specification (this document) and the Transport Profile
-   [RFC3539].  This document obsoletes both RFC 3588 and RFC 5719.  A
-   summary of the base protocol updates included in this document can be
-   found in Section 1.1.3.
-
-   This document defines the base protocol specification for AAA, which
-   includes support for accounting.  There are also a myriad of
-   applications documents describing applications that use this base
-   specification for Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting.
-   These application documents specify how to use the Diameter protocol
-   within the context of their application.
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 10]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   The Transport Profile document [RFC3539] discusses transport layer
-   issues that arise with AAA protocols and recommendations on how to
-   overcome these issues.  This document also defines the Diameter
-   failover algorithm and state machine.
-
-   "Clarifications on the Routing of Diameter Request Based on the
-   Username and the Realm" [RFC5729] defines specific behavior on how to
-   route requests based on the content of the User-Name AVP (Attribute
-   Value Pair).
-
-1.1.2.  Conventions Used in This Document
-
-   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
-   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
-   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-1.1.3.  Changes from RFC 3588
-
-   This document obsoletes RFC 3588 but is fully backward compatible
-   with that document.  The changes introduced in this document focus on
-   fixing issues that have surfaced during the implementation of
-   Diameter (RFC 3588).  An overview of some the major changes are given
-   below.
-
- -

-RFC 6733 is not fully backwards compatible with RFC 3588. -(For example, in what values of Result-Code values are permissible with -the E-bit.) -The implications of incompatibilities for diameter are noted where -appropriate.

- -
-
-   o  Deprecated the use of the Inband-Security AVP for negotiating
-      Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246].  It has been generally
-      considered that bootstrapping of TLS via Inband-Security AVP
-      creates certain security risks because it does not completely
-      protect the information carried in the CER/CEA (Capabilities-
-      Exchange-Request/Capabilities-Exchange-Answer).  This version of
-      Diameter adopts the common approach of defining a well-known
-      secured port that peers should use when communicating via TLS/TCP
-      and DTLS/SCTP.  This new approach augments the existing in-band
-      security negotiation, but it does not completely replace it.  The
-      old method is kept for backward compatibility reasons.
-
- -

-&man_tcp; supports both methods of negotiating TLS: -bootstrapping via Inband-Security and directly following connection -establishment.

- -
-
-   o  Deprecated the exchange of CER/CEA messages in the open state.
-      This feature was implied in the peer state machine table of RFC
-      3588, but it was not clearly defined anywhere else in that
-      document.  As work on this document progressed, it became clear
-      that the multiplicity of meaning and use of Application-Id AVPs in
-      the CER/CEA messages (and the messages themselves) is seen as an
-      abuse of the Diameter extensibility rules and thus required
-      simplification.  Capabilities exchange in the open state has been
-      re-introduced in a separate specification [RFC6737], which clearly
-      defines new commands for this feature.
-
- -

-Capabilities exchange in the open state is not supported: an incoming -CER in the open state will cause diameter to ask the relevant -transport process to terminate, which implies the loss of the peer -connection in the case of &man_tcp; and &man_sctp;.

- -

-Capabilities update, as defined by RFC 6737, is not yet supported. -Support will require diameter to handle CUR/CUA in the same way that -it handles CER/CEA.

- -
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   o  Simplified security requirements.  The use of a secured transport
-      for exchanging Diameter messages remains mandatory.  However, TLS/
-      TCP and DTLS/SCTP have become the primary methods of securing
-      Diameter with IPsec as a secondary alternative.  See Section 13
-      for details.  The support for the End-to-End security framework
-      (E2E-Sequence AVP and 'P'-bit in the AVP header) has also been
-      deprecated.
-
- -

-The End-to-End security framework is not supported since it's use is -largely unspecified: diameter will set the P-bit in outgoing AVP's as -directed by the relevant dictionary and/or &app_prepare_request; or -&app_handle_request; callbacks, but whether or not the P-bit is set on -incoming AVP's has no consequence.

- -

-As noted above, DTLS is not currently supported and whether or not -IPsec is used is transparent to diameter.

- -
-
-   o  Changed Diameter extensibility.  This includes fixes to the
-      Diameter extensibility description (Section 1.3 and others) to
-      better aid Diameter application designers; in addition, the new
-      specification relaxes the policy with respect to the allocation of
-      Command Codes for vendor-specific uses.
-
-   o  Clarified Application Id usage.  Clarify the proper use of
-      Application Id information, which can be found in multiple places
-      within a Diameter message.  This includes correlating Application
-      Ids found in the message headers and AVPs.  These changes also
-      clearly specify the proper Application Id value to use for
-      specific base protocol messages (ASR/ASA, STR/STA) as well as
-      clarify the content and use of Vendor-Specific-Application-Id.
-
-   o  Clarified routing fixes.  This document more clearly specifies
-      what information (AVPs and Application Ids) can be used for making
-      general routing decisions.  A rule for the prioritization of
-      redirect routing criteria when multiple route entries are found
-      via redirects has also been added (see Section 6.13).
-
-   o  Simplified Diameter peer discovery.  The Diameter discovery
-      process now supports only widely used discovery schemes; the rest
-      have been deprecated (see Section 5.2 for details).
-
- -

-Peer discover is not currently supported: peers to which a node should -connect must be configured. -Connection requests are accepted from arbitrary peers but a -&mod_transport_opt; capabilities_cb can be used to reject a -peer based on an incoming CER or CEA.

- -
-
-   There are many other miscellaneous fixes that have been introduced in
-   this document that may not be considered significant, but they have
-   value nonetheless.  Examples are removal of obsolete types, fixes to
-   the state machine, clarification of the election process, message
-   validation, fixes to Failed-AVP and Result-Code AVP values, etc.  All
-   of the errata filed against RFC 3588 prior to the publication of this
-   document have been addressed.  A comprehensive list of changes is not
-   shown here for practical reasons.
-
-1.2.  Terminology
-
-   AAA
-
-      Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting.
-
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 12]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   ABNF
-
-      Augmented Backus-Naur Form [RFC5234].  A metalanguage with its own
-      formal syntax and rules.  It is based on the Backus-Naur Form and
-      is used to define message exchanges in a bi-directional
-      communications protocol.
-
-   Accounting
-
-      The act of collecting information on resource usage for the
-      purpose of capacity planning, auditing, billing, or cost
-      allocation.
-
-   Accounting Record
-
-      An accounting record represents a summary of the resource
-      consumption of a user over the entire session.  Accounting servers
-      creating the accounting record may do so by processing interim
-      accounting events or accounting events from several devices
-      serving the same user.
-
-   Authentication
-
-      The act of verifying the identity of an entity (subject).
-
-   Authorization
-
-      The act of determining whether a requesting entity (subject) will
-      be allowed access to a resource (object).
-
-   Attribute-Value Pair (AVP)
-
-      The Diameter protocol consists of a header followed by one or more
-      Attribute-Value-Pairs (AVPs).  An AVP includes a header and is
-      used to encapsulate protocol-specific data (e.g., routing
-      information) as well as authentication, authorization, or
-      accounting information.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-   Command Code Format (CCF)
-
-      A modified form of ABNF used to define Diameter commands (see
-      Section 3.2).
-
- -

-The @messages section of the &man_dict; format has the CCF as -content.

- -
-
-   Diameter Agent
-
-      A Diameter Agent is a Diameter node that provides relay, proxy,
-      redirect, or translation services.
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 13]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   Diameter Client
-
-      A Diameter client is a Diameter node that supports Diameter client
-      applications as well as the base protocol.  Diameter clients are
-      often implemented in devices situated at the edge of a network and
-      provide access control services for that network.  Typical
-      examples of Diameter clients include the Network Access Server
-      (NAS) and the Mobile IP Foreign Agent (FA).
-
-   Diameter Node
-
-      A Diameter node is a host process that implements the Diameter
-      protocol and acts as either a client, an agent, or a server.
-
-   Diameter Peer
-
-      Two Diameter nodes sharing a direct TCP or SCTP transport
-      connection are called Diameter peers.
-
-   Diameter Server
-
-      A Diameter server is a Diameter node that handles authentication,
-      authorization, and accounting requests for a particular realm.  By
-      its very nature, a Diameter server must support Diameter server
-      applications in addition to the base protocol.
-
- -

-A Diameter Node is implemented by configuring a service -using &mod_start_service; and one or more transports using -&mod_add_transport;. -The service typically represents a Diameter Node but since -capabilities can be configured on individual transports it's more -accurate to say that the node is a collection of transports -advertising the same Origin-Host.

- -

-The role of a node (agent, client or server) is not something that's -configured explicitly. -Transports are either connecting or listening, depending on whether -diameter should establish a peer connection and send CER or accept -connections and receive CER, but the role a node implements depends -largely on dictionary configuration and &man_app; callback -implementation.

- -
-
-   Downstream
-
-      Downstream is used to identify the direction of a particular
-      Diameter message from the home server towards the Diameter client.
-
-   Home Realm
-
-      A Home Realm is the administrative domain with which the user
-      maintains an account relationship.
-
-   Home Server
-
-      A Diameter server that serves the Home Realm.
-
-   Interim Accounting
-
-      An interim accounting message provides a snapshot of usage during
-      a user's session.  Typically, it is implemented in order to
-      provide for partial accounting of a user's session in case a
-      device reboot or other network problem prevents the delivery of a
-      session summary message or session record.
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 14]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   Local Realm
-
-      A local realm is the administrative domain providing services to a
-      user.  An administrative domain may act as a local realm for
-      certain users while being a home realm for others.
-
-   Multi-session
-
-      A multi-session represents a logical linking of several sessions.
-      Multi-sessions are tracked by using the Acct-Multi-Session-Id.  An
-      example of a multi-session would be a Multi-link PPP bundle.  Each
-      leg of the bundle would be a session while the entire bundle would
-      be a multi-session.
-
-   Network Access Identifier
-
-      The Network Access Identifier, or NAI [RFC4282], is used in the
-      Diameter protocol to extract a user's identity and realm.  The
-      identity is used to identify the user during authentication and/or
-      authorization while the realm is used for message routing
-      purposes.
-
-   Proxy Agent or Proxy
-
-      In addition to forwarding requests and responses, proxies make
-      policy decisions relating to resource usage and provisioning.
-      Typically, this is accomplished by tracking the state of NAS
-      devices.  While proxies usually do not respond to client requests
-      prior to receiving a response from the server, they may originate
-      Reject messages in cases where policies are violated.  As a
-      result, proxies need to understand the semantics of the messages
-      passing through them, and they may not support all Diameter
-      applications.
-
-   Realm
-
-      The string in the NAI that immediately follows the '@' character.
-      NAI realm names are required to be unique and are piggybacked on
-      the administration of the DNS namespace.  Diameter makes use of
-      the realm, also loosely referred to as domain, to determine
-      whether messages can be satisfied locally or whether they must be
-      routed or redirected.  In RADIUS, realm names are not necessarily
-      piggybacked on the DNS namespace but may be independent of it.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 15]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   Real-Time Accounting
-
-      Real-time accounting involves the processing of information on
-      resource usage within a defined time window.  Typically, time
-      constraints are imposed in order to limit financial risk.  The
-      Diameter Credit-Control Application [RFC4006] is an example of an
-      application that defines real-time accounting functionality.
-
-   Relay Agent or Relay
-
-      Relays forward requests and responses based on routing-related
-      AVPs and routing table entries.  Since relays do not make policy
-      decisions, they do not examine or alter non-routing AVPs.  As a
-      result, relays never originate messages, do not need to understand
-      the semantics of messages or non-routing AVPs, and are capable of
-      handling any Diameter application or message type.  Since relays
-      make decisions based on information in routing AVPs and realm
-      forwarding tables, they do not keep state on NAS resource usage or
-      sessions in progress.
-
-   Redirect Agent
-
-      Rather than forwarding requests and responses between clients and
-      servers, redirect agents refer clients to servers and allow them
-      to communicate directly.  Since redirect agents do not sit in the
-      forwarding path, they do not alter any AVPs transiting between
-      client and server.  Redirect agents do not originate messages and
-      are capable of handling any message type, although they may be
-      configured only to redirect messages of certain types, while
-      acting as relay or proxy agents for other types.  As with relay
-      agents, redirect agents do not keep state with respect to sessions
-      or NAS resources.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-   Session
-
-      A session is a related progression of events devoted to a
-      particular activity.  Diameter application documents provide
-      guidelines as to when a session begins and ends.  All Diameter
-      packets with the same Session-Id are considered to be part of the
-      same session.
-
- -

-Sessions are not something that diameter is aware of. -The function &mod_session_id; can be used to construct appropriate -values for Session-Id AVP's but logic connecting events in the same -session is the responsibility of the diameter user.

- -
-
-   Stateful Agent
-
-      A stateful agent is one that maintains session state information,
-      by keeping track of all authorized active sessions.  Each
-      authorized session is bound to a particular service, and its state
-      is considered active either until it is notified otherwise or
-      until expiration.
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 16]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   Sub-session
-
-      A sub-session represents a distinct service (e.g., QoS or data
-      characteristics) provided to a given session.  These services may
-      happen concurrently (e.g., simultaneous voice and data transfer
-      during the same session) or serially.  These changes in sessions
-      are tracked with the Accounting-Sub-Session-Id.
-
-   Transaction State
-
-      The Diameter protocol requires that agents maintain transaction
-      state, which is used for failover purposes.  Transaction state
-      implies that upon forwarding a request, the Hop-by-Hop Identifier
-      is saved; the field is replaced with a locally unique identifier,
-      which is restored to its original value when the corresponding
-      answer is received.  The request's state is released upon receipt
-      of the answer.  A stateless agent is one that only maintains
-      transaction state.
-
-   Translation Agent
-
-      A translation agent (TLA in Figure 4) is a stateful Diameter node
-      that performs protocol translation between Diameter and another
-      AAA protocol, such as RADIUS.
-
-   Upstream
-
-      Upstream is used to identify the direction of a particular
-      Diameter message from the Diameter client towards the home server.
-
-   User
-
-      The entity or device requesting or using some resource, in support
-      of which a Diameter client has generated a request.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-1.3.  Approach to Extensibility
-
-   The Diameter protocol is designed to be extensible, using several
-   mechanisms, including:
-
-   o  Defining new AVP values
-
-   o  Creating new AVPs
-
-   o  Creating new commands
-
-   o  Creating new applications
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 17]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   From the point of view of extensibility, Diameter authentication,
-   authorization, and accounting applications are treated in the same
-   way.
-
- -

-Extensibility in diameter is by way of the dictionary interface -documented in &man_dict;: a diameter user creates applications, -commands and AVP's by implementing a new dictionary, -compiling the dictionary to a codec module using &man_compile; or -&man_make;, and configuring the resulting dictionary module on a -service. -The dictionary modules provided with diameter are all implemented in -this manner.

- -
-   Note: Protocol designers should try to reuse existing functionality,
-   namely AVP values, AVPs, commands, and Diameter applications.  Reuse
-   simplifies standardization and implementation.  To avoid potential
-   interoperability issues, it is important to ensure that the semantics
-   of the reused features are well understood.  Given that Diameter can
-   also carry RADIUS attributes as Diameter AVPs, such reuse
-   considerations also apply to existing RADIUS attributes that may be
-   useful in a Diameter application.
-
- -

-Reuse in dictionary files is achieved by way of the @inherits -section. -AVP's are inherited, commands are not.

- -
-
-1.3.1.  Defining New AVP Values
-
-   In order to allocate a new AVP value for AVPs defined in the Diameter
-   base protocol, the IETF needs to approve a new RFC that describes the
-   AVP value.  IANA considerations for these AVP values are discussed in
-   Section 11.3.
-
-   The allocation of AVP values for other AVPs is guided by the IANA
-   considerations of the document that defines those AVPs.  Typically,
-   allocation of new values for an AVP defined in an RFC would require
-   IETF Review [RFC5226], whereas values for vendor-specific AVPs can be
-   allocated by the vendor.
-
-1.3.2.  Creating New AVPs
-
-   A new AVP being defined MUST use one of the data types listed in
-   Sections 4.2 or 4.3.  If an appropriate derived data type is already
-   defined, it SHOULD be used instead of a base data type to encourage
-   reusability and good design practice.
-
-   In the event that a logical grouping of AVPs is necessary, and
-   multiple "groups" are possible in a given command, it is recommended
-   that a Grouped AVP be used (see Section 4.4).
-
-   The creation of new AVPs can happen in various ways.  The recommended
-   approach is to define a new general-purpose AVP in a Standards Track
-   RFC approved by the IETF.  However, as described in Section 11.1.1,
-   there are other mechanisms.
-
- -

-Creating new AVP's is an issue for the dictionary designer, not -diameter.

- -
-
-1.3.3.  Creating New Commands
-
-   A new Command Code MUST be allocated when required AVPs (those
-   indicated as {AVP} in the CCF definition) are added to, deleted from,
-   or redefined in (for example, by changing a required AVP into an
-   optional one) an existing command.
-
-
-
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-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   Furthermore, if the transport characteristics of a command are
-   changed (for example, with respect to the number of round trips
-   required), a new Command Code MUST be registered.
-
-   A change to the CCF of a command, such as described above, MUST
-   result in the definition of a new Command Code.  This subsequently
-   leads to the need to define a new Diameter application for any
-   application that will use that new command.
-
-   The IANA considerations for Command Codes are discussed in
-   Section 3.1.
-
- -

-Creating new commands is an issue for the dictionary designer, not -diameter.

- -
-
-1.3.4.  Creating New Diameter Applications
-
-   Every Diameter application specification MUST have an IANA-assigned
-   Application Id (see Section 2.4).  The managed Application ID space
-   is flat, and there is no relationship between different Diameter
-   applications with respect to their Application Ids.  As such, there
-   is no versioning support provided by these Application Ids
-   themselves; every Diameter application is a standalone application.
-   If the application has a relationship with other Diameter
-   applications, such a relationship is not known to Diameter.
-
- -

-Creating new applications is an issue for the dictionary designer, -not diameter.

- -

-An application's Application Id is specified in the @id section -of a dictionary file.

- -
-
-   Before describing the rules for creating new Diameter applications,
-   it is important to discuss the semantics of the AVP occurrences as
-   stated in the CCF and the M-bit flag (Section 4.1) for an AVP.  There
-   is no relationship imposed between the two; they are set
-   independently.
-
-   o  The CCF indicates what AVPs are placed into a Diameter command by
-      the sender of that command.  Often, since there are multiple modes
-      of protocol interactions, many of the AVPs are indicated as
-      optional.
-
-   o  The M-bit allows the sender to indicate to the receiver whether or
-      not understanding the semantics of an AVP and its content is
-      mandatory.  If the M-bit is set by the sender and the receiver
-      does not understand the AVP or the values carried within that AVP,
-      then a failure is generated (see Section 7).
-
- -

-The M-bit is set on outgoing AVP's as directed by the relevant -dictionary. -For incoming AVP's, an M-bit set on an AVP that isn't -explicitly included in the definition of the command in question is -interpreted as a 5001 error, DIAMETER_AVP_UNSUPPORTED, the -consequences of which depend on the value of the &mod_application_opt; -answer_errors or request_errors.

- -
-
-   It is the decision of the protocol designer when to develop a new
-   Diameter application rather than extending Diameter in other ways.
-   However, a new Diameter application MUST be created when one or more
-   of the following criteria are met:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   M-bit Setting
-
-      An AVP with the M-bit in the MUST column of the AVP flag table is
-      added to an existing Command/Application.  An AVP with the M-bit
-      in the MAY column of the AVP flag table is added to an existing
-      Command/Application.
-
-      Note: The M-bit setting for a given AVP is relevant to an
-      Application and each command within that application that includes
-      the AVP.  That is, if an AVP appears in two commands for
-      application Foo and the M-bit settings are different in each
-      command, then there should be two AVP flag tables describing when
-      to set the M-bit.
-
-   Commands
-
-      A new command is used within the existing application because
-      either an additional command is added, an existing command has
-      been modified so that a new Command Code had to be registered, or
-      a command has been deleted.
-
-   AVP Flag bits
-
-      If an existing application changes the meaning/semantics of its
-      AVP Flags or adds new flag bits, then a new Diameter application
-      MUST be created.
-
-   If the CCF definition of a command allows it, an implementation may
-   add arbitrary optional AVPs with the M-bit cleared (including vendor-
-   specific AVPs) to that command without needing to define a new
-   application.  Please refer to Section 11.1.1 for details.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-2.  Protocol Overview
-
-   The base Diameter protocol concerns itself with establishing
-   connections to peers, capabilities negotiation, how messages are sent
-   and routed through peers, and how the connections are eventually torn
-   down.  The base protocol also defines certain rules that apply to all
-   message exchanges between Diameter nodes.
-
-   Communication between Diameter peers begins with one peer sending a
-   message to another Diameter peer.  The set of AVPs included in the
-   message is determined by a particular Diameter application.  One AVP
-   that is included to reference a user's session is the Session-Id.
-
-   The initial request for authentication and/or authorization of a user
-   would include the Session-Id AVP.  The Session-Id is then used in all
-   subsequent messages to identify the user's session (see Section 8 for
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   more information).  The communicating party may accept the request or
-   reject it by returning an answer message with the Result-Code AVP set
-   to indicate that an error occurred.  The specific behavior of the
-   Diameter server or client receiving a request depends on the Diameter
-   application employed.
-
-   Session state (associated with a Session-Id) MUST be freed upon
-   receipt of the Session-Termination-Request, Session-Termination-
-   Answer, expiration of authorized service time in the Session-Timeout
-   AVP, and according to rules established in a particular Diameter
-   application.
-
- -

-Like Session-Id, session state is maintained by the diameter user: -diameter has no session state of its own and does not interpret -STR/STA in any way.

- -
-
-   The base Diameter protocol may be used by itself for accounting
-   applications.  For authentication and authorization, it is always
-   extended for a particular application.
-
-   Diameter clients MUST support the base protocol, which includes
-   accounting.  In addition, they MUST fully support each Diameter
-   application that is needed to implement the client's service, e.g.,
-   Network Access Server Requirements (NASREQ) [RFC2881] and/or Mobile
-   IPv4.  A Diameter client MUST be referred to as "Diameter X Client"
-   where X is the application that it supports and not a "Diameter
-   Client".
-
-   Diameter servers MUST support the base protocol, which includes
-   accounting.  In addition, they MUST fully support each Diameter
-   application that is needed to implement the intended service, e.g.,
-   NASREQ and/or Mobile IPv4.  A Diameter server MUST be referred to as
-   "Diameter X Server" where X is the application that it supports, and
-   not a "Diameter Server".
-
-   Diameter relays and redirect agents are transparent to the Diameter
-   applications, but they MUST support the Diameter base protocol, which
-   includes accounting, and all Diameter applications.
-
-   Diameter proxies MUST support the base protocol, which includes
-   accounting.  In addition, they MUST fully support each Diameter
-   application that is needed to implement proxied services, e.g.,
-   NASREQ and/or Mobile IPv4.  A Diameter proxy MUST be referred to as
-   "Diameter X Proxy" where X is the application which it supports, and
-   not a "Diameter Proxy".
-
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-2.1.  Transport
-
-   The Diameter Transport profile is defined in [RFC3539].
-
-   The base Diameter protocol is run on port 3868 for both TCP [RFC0793]
-   and SCTP [RFC4960].  For TLS [RFC5246] and Datagram Transport Layer
-   Security (DTLS) [RFC6347], a Diameter node that initiates a
-   connection prior to any message exchanges MUST run on port 5658.  It
-   is assumed that TLS is run on top of TCP when it is used, and DTLS is
-   run on top of SCTP when it is used.
-
- -

-Which port a transport connects to or listens on is a matter of -configuration. -Both &man_tcp; and &man_sctp; will default to 3868 if no other value -is specified.

- -
-
-   If the Diameter peer does not support receiving TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP
-   connections on port 5658 (i.e., the peer complies only with RFC
-   3588), then the initiator MAY revert to using TCP or SCTP on port
-   3868.  Note that this scheme is kept only for the purpose of backward
-   compatibility and that there are inherent security vulnerabilities
-   when the initial CER/CEA messages are sent unprotected (see
-   Section 5.6).
-
-   Diameter clients MUST support either TCP or SCTP; agents and servers
-   SHOULD support both.
-
-   A Diameter node MAY initiate connections from a source port other
-   than the one that it declares it accepts incoming connections on, and
-   it MUST always be prepared to receive connections on port 3868 for
-   TCP or SCTP and port 5658 for TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP connections.
-   When DNS-based peer discovery (Section 5.2) is used, the port numbers
-   received from SRV records take precedence over the default ports
-   (3868 and 5658).
-
-   A given Diameter instance of the peer state machine MUST NOT use more
-   than one transport connection to communicate with a given peer,
-   unless multiple instances exist on the peer, in which, case a
-   separate connection per process is allowed.
-
- -

-The &mod_service_opt; restrict_connection controls to what -extent a diameter service allows multiple connections to the same -peer. -(As identified by the value of Origin-Host received from it -during capabilities exchange.)

- -
-
-   When no transport connection exists with a peer, an attempt to
-   connect SHOULD be made periodically.  This behavior is handled via
-   the Tc timer (see Section 12 for details), whose recommended value is
-   30 seconds.  There are certain exceptions to this rule, such as when
-   a peer has terminated the transport connection stating that it does
-   not wish to communicate.
-
-
- -

-The frequency of reconnection attempts is configured with the -&mod_transport_opt; connect_timer and -watchdog_timer.

- -
-
-   When connecting to a peer and either zero or more transports are
-   specified, TLS SHOULD be tried first, followed by DTLS, then by TCP,
-   and finally by SCTP.  See Section 5.2 for more information on peer
-   discovery.
-
- -

-The order in which different transports are attempted depends on the -order of &mod_transport_opt; transport_module and -transport_config tuples in transport configuration.

- -
-
-
-
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-
-
-   Diameter implementations SHOULD be able to interpret ICMP protocol
-   port unreachable messages as explicit indications that the server is
-   not reachable, subject to security policy on trusting such messages.
-   Further guidance regarding the treatment of ICMP errors can be found
-   in [RFC5927] and [RFC5461].  Diameter implementations SHOULD also be
-   able to interpret a reset from the transport and timed-out connection
-   attempts.  If Diameter receives data from the lower layer that cannot
-   be parsed or identified as a Diameter error made by the peer, the
-   stream is compromised and cannot be recovered.  The transport
-   connection MUST be closed using a RESET call (send a TCP RST bit) or
-   an SCTP ABORT message (graceful closure is compromised).
-
- -

-ICMP messages and other transport-level errors aren't directly -visible to diameter but transport implementations like &man_tcp; and -&man_sctp; propagate these as terminating transport processes.

- -
-
-2.1.1.  SCTP Guidelines
-
-   Diameter messages SHOULD be mapped into SCTP streams in a way that
-   avoids head-of-the-line (HOL) blocking.  Among different ways of
-   performing the mapping that fulfill this requirement it is
-   RECOMMENDED that a Diameter node send every Diameter message (request
-   or response) over stream zero with the unordered flag set.  However,
-   Diameter nodes MAY select and implement other design alternatives for
-   avoiding HOL blocking such as using multiple streams with the
-   unordered flag cleared (as originally instructed in RFC 3588).  On
-   the receiving side, a Diameter entity MUST be ready to receive
-   Diameter messages over any stream, and it is free to return responses
-   over a different stream.  This way, both sides manage the available
-   streams in the sending direction, independently of the streams chosen
-   by the other side to send a particular Diameter message.  These
-   messages can be out-of-order and belong to different Diameter
-   sessions.
-
- -

-&man_sctp; allows the sender to specify a stream number explicitly. -The stream on which an incoming message is received it passed to -&app_handle_request; and &app_handle_answer; callbacks as -transport_data in a #diameter_packet{}.

- -

-Ordered or unordered delivery can be configured per transport.

- -
-
-   Out-of-order delivery has special concerns during a connection
-   establishment and termination.  When a connection is established, the
-   responder side sends a CEA message and moves to R-Open state as
-   specified in Section 5.6.  If an application message is sent shortly
-   after the CEA and delivered out-of-order, the initiator side, still
-   in Wait-I-CEA state, will discard the application message and close
-   the connection.  In order to avoid this race condition, the receiver
-   side SHOULD NOT use out-of-order delivery methods until the first
-   message has been received from the initiator, proving that it has
-   moved to I-Open state.  To trigger such a message, the receiver side
-   could send a DWR immediately after sending a CEA.  Upon reception of
-   the corresponding DWA, the receiver side should start using out-of-
-   order delivery methods to counter the HOL blocking.
-
- -

-&man_sctp; does not currently allow the user to switch between ordered -and unordered delivery, or to specify the manner of sending per -message: one or the other must be configured, the defaults being -ordered.

- -
-
-   Another race condition may occur when DPR and DPA messages are used.
-   Both DPR and DPA are small in size; thus, they may be delivered to
-   the peer faster than application messages when an out-of-order
-   delivery mechanism is used.  Therefore, it is possible that a DPR/DPA
-
-
-
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-
-
-   exchange completes while application messages are still in transit,
-   resulting in a loss of these messages.  An implementation could
-   mitigate this race condition, for example, using timers, and wait for
-   a short period of time for pending application level messages to
-   arrive before proceeding to disconnect the transport connection.
-   Eventually, lost messages are handled by the retransmission mechanism
-   described in Section 5.5.4.
-
-   A Diameter agent SHOULD use dedicated payload protocol identifiers
-   (PPIDs) for clear text and encrypted SCTP DATA chunks instead of only
-   using the unspecified payload protocol identifier (value 0).  For
-   this purpose, two PPID values are allocated: the PPID value 46 is for
-   Diameter messages in clear text SCTP DATA chunks, and the PPID value
-   47 is for Diameter messages in protected DTLS/SCTP DATA chunks.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-2.2.  Securing Diameter Messages
-
-   Connections between Diameter peers SHOULD be protected by TLS/TCP and
-   DTLS/SCTP.  All Diameter base protocol implementations MUST support
-   the use of TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP.  If desired, alternative security
-   mechanisms that are independent of Diameter, such as IPsec [RFC4301],
-   can be deployed to secure connections between peers.  The Diameter
-   protocol MUST NOT be used without one of TLS, DTLS, or IPsec.
-
- -

-As noted above, DTLS is not currently supported and IPsec usage is -transparent to diameter. -Security is not enforced by diameter.

- -
-
-2.3.  Diameter Application Compliance
-
-   Application Ids are advertised during the capabilities exchange phase
-   (see Section 5.3).  Advertising support of an application implies
-   that the sender supports the functionality specified in the
-   respective Diameter application specification.
-
-   Implementations MAY add arbitrary optional AVPs with the M-bit
-   cleared (including vendor-specific AVPs) to a command defined in an
-   application, but only if the command's CCF syntax specification
-   allows for it.  Please refer to Section 11.1.1 for details.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-2.4.  Application Identifiers
-
-   Each Diameter application MUST have an IANA-assigned Application ID.
-   The base protocol does not require an Application Id since its
-   support is mandatory.  During the capabilities exchange, Diameter
-   nodes inform their peers of locally supported applications.
-   Furthermore, all Diameter messages contain an Application Id, which
-   is used in the message forwarding process.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   The following Application Id values are defined:
-
-         Diameter common message       0
-         Diameter base accounting      3
-         Relay                         0xffffffff
-
- -

-These applications are implemented in the dictionary modules -diameter_gen_base_rfc6733, diameter_gen_acct_rfc6733 and -diameter_relay respectively. -There are also RFC 3588 versions or the common and accounting -dictionaries: diameter_gen_base_rfc3588 and -diameter_base_accounting. -(The inconsistent naming is historical.) -Dictionary modules are configured using the &mod_application_opt; -dictionary.

- -
-   Relay and redirect agents MUST advertise the Relay Application ID,
-   while all other Diameter nodes MUST advertise locally supported
-   applications.  The receiver of a Capabilities Exchange message
-   advertising relay service MUST assume that the sender supports all
-   current and future applications.
-
-   Diameter relay and proxy agents are responsible for finding an
-   upstream server that supports the application of a particular
-   message.  If none can be found, an error message is returned with the
-   Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-2.5.  Connections vs. Sessions
-
-   This section attempts to provide the reader with an understanding of
-   the difference between "connection" and "session", which are terms
-   used extensively throughout this document.
-
-   A connection refers to a transport-level connection between two peers
-   that is used to send and receive Diameter messages.  A session is a
-   logical concept at the application layer that exists between the
-   Diameter client and the Diameter server; it is identified via the
-   Session-Id AVP.
-
-             +--------+          +-------+          +--------+
-             | Client |          | Relay |          | Server |
-             +--------+          +-------+          +--------+
-                      <---------->       <---------->
-                   peer connection A   peer connection B
-
-                      <----------------------------->
-                              User session x
-
-                Figure 1: Diameter Connections and Sessions
-
-   In the example provided in Figure 1, peer connection A is established
-   between the client and the relay.  Peer connection B is established
-   between the relay and the server.  User session X spans from the
-   client via the relay to the server.  Each "user" of a service causes
-   an auth request to be sent, with a unique session identifier.  Once
-   accepted by the server, both the client and the server are aware of
-   the session.
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   It is important to note that there is no relationship between a
-   connection and a session, and that Diameter messages for multiple
-   sessions are all multiplexed through a single connection.  Also, note
-   that Diameter messages pertaining to the session, both application-
-   specific and those that are defined in this document such as ASR/ASA,
-   RAR/RAA, and STR/STA, MUST carry the Application Id of the
-   application.  Diameter messages pertaining to peer connection
-   establishment and maintenance such as CER/CEA, DWR/DWA, and DPR/DPA
-   MUST carry an Application Id of zero (0).
-
- -

-As noted above, diameter is not involved in session management. -This is the responsibility of the diameter user.

- -
-
-2.6.  Peer Table
-
-   The Diameter peer table is used in message forwarding and is
-   referenced by the routing table.  A peer table entry contains the
-   following fields:
-
-   Host Identity
-
-      Following the conventions described for the DiameterIdentity-
-      derived AVP data format in Section 4.3.1, this field contains the
-      contents of the Origin-Host (Section 6.3) AVP found in the CER or
-      CEA message.
-
-   StatusT
-
-      This is the state of the peer entry, and it MUST match one of the
-      values listed in Section 5.6.
-
-   Static or Dynamic
-
-      Specifies whether a peer entry was statically configured or
-      dynamically discovered.
-
-   Expiration Time
-
-      Specifies the time at which dynamically discovered peer table
-      entries are to be either refreshed or expired.  If public key
-      certificates are used for Diameter security (e.g., with TLS), this
-      value MUST NOT be greater than the expiry times in the relevant
-      certificates.
-
-   TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP Enabled
-
-      Specifies whether TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP is to be used when
-      communicating with the peer.
-
-   Additional security information, when needed (e.g., keys,
-   certificates).
-
- -

-The Peer Table is not directly accessible to the diameter user. -Information about connected peers can be retrieved using -&mod_service_info;.

- -
-
-
-
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-
-
-2.7.  Routing Table
-
-   All Realm-Based routing lookups are performed against what is
-   commonly known as the routing table (see Section 12).  Each routing
-   table entry contains the following fields:
-
-   Realm Name
-
-      This is the field that MUST be used as a primary key in the
-      routing table lookups.  Note that some implementations perform
-      their lookups based on longest-match-from-the-right on the realm
-      rather than requiring an exact match.
-
-   Application Identifier
-
-      An application is identified by an Application Id.  A route entry
-      can have a different destination based on the Application Id in
-      the message header.  This field MUST be used as a secondary key
-      field in routing table lookups.
-
-   Local Action
-
-      The Local Action field is used to identify how a message should be
-      treated.  The following actions are supported:
-
-      1.  LOCAL - Diameter messages that can be satisfied locally and do
-          not need to be routed to another Diameter entity.
-
-      2.  RELAY - All Diameter messages that fall within this category
-          MUST be routed to a next-hop Diameter entity that is indicated
-          by the identifier described below.  Routing is done without
-          modifying any non-routing AVPs.  See Section 6.1.9 for
-          relaying guidelines.
-
-      3.  PROXY - All Diameter messages that fall within this category
-          MUST be routed to a next Diameter entity that is indicated by
-          the identifier described below.  The local server MAY apply
-          its local policies to the message by including new AVPs to the
-          message prior to routing.  See Section 6.1.9 for proxying
-          guidelines.
-
-      4.  REDIRECT - Diameter messages that fall within this category
-          MUST have the identity of the home Diameter server(s)
-          appended, and returned to the sender of the message.  See
-          Section 6.1.8 for redirection guidelines.
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   Server Identifier
-
-      The identity of one or more servers to which the message is to be
-      routed.  This identity MUST also be present in the Host Identity
-      field of the peer table (Section 2.6).  When the Local Action is
-      set to RELAY or PROXY, this field contains the identity of the
-      server(s) to which the message MUST be routed.  When the Local
-      Action field is set to REDIRECT, this field contains the identity
-      of one or more servers to which the message MUST be redirected.
-
-   Static or Dynamic
-
-      Specifies whether a route entry was statically configured or
-      dynamically discovered.
-
-   Expiration Time
-
-      Specifies the time at which a dynamically discovered route table
-      entry expires.  If public key certificates are used for Diameter
-      security (e.g., with TLS), this value MUST NOT be greater than the
-      expiry time in the relevant certificates.
-
-   It is important to note that Diameter agents MUST support at least
-   one of the LOCAL, RELAY, PROXY, or REDIRECT modes of operation.
-   Agents do not need to support all modes of operation in order to
-   conform with the protocol specification, but they MUST follow the
-   protocol compliance guidelines in Section 2.  Relay agents and
-   proxies MUST NOT reorder AVPs.
-
-   The routing table MAY include a default entry that MUST be used for
-   any requests not matching any of the other entries.  The routing
-   table MAY consist of only such an entry.
-
-   When a request is routed, the target server MUST have advertised the
-   Application Id (see Section 2.4) for the given message or have
-   advertised itself as a relay or proxy agent.  Otherwise, an error is
-   returned with the Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER.
-
- -

-Routing does not need specific support in diameter: a user can -maintain their own routing table if desired and implement any desired -routing in &man_app; callbacks. -However, it may be convenient to add more specific routing support to -diameter in the future.

- -
-
-2.8.  Role of Diameter Agents
-
-   In addition to clients and servers, the Diameter protocol introduces
-   relay, proxy, redirect, and translation agents, each of which is
-   defined in Section 1.2.  Diameter agents are useful for several
-   reasons:
-
- -

-An noted above, the role a node plays is largely a question of -configuration and &man_app; callback implementation.

- -
-
-   o  They can distribute administration of systems to a configurable
-      grouping, including the maintenance of security associations.
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   o  They can be used for concentration of requests from a number of
-      co-located or distributed NAS equipment sets to a set of like user
-      groups.
-
-   o  They can do value-added processing to the requests or responses.
-
-   o  They can be used for load balancing.
-
-   o  A complex network will have multiple authentication sources, they
-      can sort requests and forward towards the correct target.
-
-   The Diameter protocol requires that agents maintain transaction
-   state, which is used for failover purposes.  Transaction state
-   implies that upon forwarding a request, its Hop-by-Hop Identifier is
-   saved; the field is replaced with a locally unique identifier, which
-   is restored to its original value when the corresponding answer is
-   received.  The request's state is released upon receipt of the
-   answer.  A stateless agent is one that only maintains transaction
-   state.
-
-   The Proxy-Info AVP allows stateless agents to add local state to a
-   Diameter request, with the guarantee that the same state will be
-   present in the answer.  However, the protocol's failover procedures
-   require that agents maintain a copy of pending requests.
-
-   A stateful agent is one that maintains session state information by
-   keeping track of all authorized active sessions.  Each authorized
-   session is bound to a particular service, and its state is considered
-   active until either the agent is notified otherwise or the session
-   expires.  Each authorized session has an expiration, which is
-   communicated by Diameter servers via the Session-Timeout AVP.
-
-   Maintaining session state may be useful in certain applications, such
-   as:
-
-   o  Protocol translation (e.g., RADIUS <-> Diameter)
-
-   o  Limiting resources authorized to a particular user
-
-   o  Per-user or per-transaction auditing
-
-   A Diameter agent MAY act in a stateful manner for some requests and
-   be stateless for others.  A Diameter implementation MAY act as one
-   type of agent for some requests and as another type of agent for
-   others.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-2.8.1.  Relay Agents
-
-   Relay agents are Diameter agents that accept requests and route
-   messages to other Diameter nodes based on information found in the
-   messages (e.g., the value of the Destination-Realm AVP Section 6.6).
-   This routing decision is performed using a list of supported realms
-   and known peers.  This is known as the routing table, as is defined
-   further in Section 2.7.
-
-   Relays may, for example, be used to aggregate requests from multiple
-   Network Access Servers (NASes) within a common geographical area
-   (Point of Presence, POP).  The use of relays is advantageous since it
-   eliminates the need for NASes to be configured with the necessary
-   security information they would otherwise require to communicate with
-   Diameter servers in other realms.  Likewise, this reduces the
-   configuration load on Diameter servers that would otherwise be
-   necessary when NASes are added, changed, or deleted.
-
-   Relays modify Diameter messages by inserting and removing routing
-   information, but they do not modify any other portion of a message.
-   Relays SHOULD NOT maintain session state but MUST maintain
-   transaction state.
-
-       +------+    --------->     +------+     --------->    +------+
-       |      |    1. Request     |      |     2. Request    |      |
-       | NAS  |                   | DRL  |                   | HMS  |
-       |      |    4. Answer      |      |     3. Answer     |      |
-       +------+    <---------     +------+     <---------    +------+
-    example.net                example.net                example.com
-
-                  Figure 2: Relaying of Diameter messages
-
-   The example provided in Figure 2 depicts a request issued from a NAS,
-   which is an access device, for the user bob@example.com.  Prior to
-   issuing the request, the NAS performs a Diameter route lookup, using
-   "example.com" as the key, and determines that the message is to be
-   relayed to a DRL, which is a Diameter relay.  The DRL performs the
-   same route lookup as the NAS, and relays the message to the HMS,
-   which is example.com's home server.  The HMS identifies that the
-   request can be locally supported (via the realm), processes the
-   authentication and/or authorization request, and replies with an
-   answer, which is routed back to the NAS using saved transaction
-   state.
-
-   Since relays do not perform any application-level processing, they
-   provide relaying services for all Diameter applications; therefore,
-   they MUST advertise the Relay Application Id.
-
- -

-Requests are relayed by returning a relay tuple from a -&app_handle_request; callback.

- -
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-2.8.2.  Proxy Agents
-
-   Similar to relays, proxy agents route Diameter messages using the
-   Diameter routing table.  However, they differ since they modify
-   messages to implement policy enforcement.  This requires that proxies
-   maintain the state of their downstream peers (e.g., access devices)
-   to enforce resource usage, provide admission control, and provide
-   provisioning.
-
-   Proxies may, for example, be used in call control centers or access
-   ISPs that provide outsourced connections; they can monitor the number
-   and type of ports in use and make allocation and admission decisions
-   according to their configuration.
-
-   Since enforcing policies requires an understanding of the service
-   being provided, proxies MUST only advertise the Diameter applications
-   they support.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-2.8.3.  Redirect Agents
-
-   Redirect agents are useful in scenarios where the Diameter routing
-   configuration needs to be centralized.  An example is a redirect
-   agent that provides services to all members of a consortium, but does
-   not wish to be burdened with relaying all messages between realms.
-   This scenario is advantageous since it does not require that the
-   consortium provide routing updates to its members when changes are
-   made to a member's infrastructure.
-
-   Since redirect agents do not relay messages, and only return an
-   answer with the information necessary for Diameter agents to
-   communicate directly, they do not modify messages.  Since redirect
-   agents do not receive answer messages, they cannot maintain session
-   state.
-
-   The example provided in Figure 3 depicts a request issued from the
-   access device, NAS, for the user bob@example.com.  The message is
-   forwarded by the NAS to its relay, DRL, which does not have a routing
-   entry in its Diameter routing table for example.com.  The DRL has a
-   default route configured to DRD, which is a redirect agent that
-   returns a redirect notification to DRL, as well as the HMS' contact
-   information.  Upon receipt of the redirect notification, the DRL
-   establishes a transport connection with the HMS, if one doesn't
-   already exist, and forwards the request to it.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-                                  +------+
-                                  |      |
-                                  | DRD  |
-                                  |      |
-                                  +------+
-                                   ^    |
-                       2. Request  |    | 3. Redirection
-                                   |    |    Notification
-                                   |    v
-       +------+    --------->     +------+     --------->    +------+
-       |      |    1. Request     |      |     4. Request    |      |
-       | NAS  |                   | DRL  |                   | HMS  |
-       |      |    6. Answer      |      |     5. Answer     |      |
-       +------+    <---------     +------+     <---------    +------+
-      example.net                example.net               example.com
-
-                 Figure 3: Redirecting a Diameter Message
-
-   Since redirect agents do not perform any application-level
-   processing, they provide relaying services for all Diameter
-   applications; therefore, they MUST advertise the Relay Application
-   ID.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-2.8.4.  Translation Agents
-
-   A translation agent is a device that provides translation between two
-   protocols (e.g., RADIUS<->Diameter, TACACS+<->Diameter).  Translation
-   agents are likely to be used as aggregation servers to communicate
-   with a Diameter infrastructure, while allowing for the embedded
-   systems to be migrated at a slower pace.
-
-   Given that the Diameter protocol introduces the concept of long-lived
-   authorized sessions, translation agents MUST be session stateful and
-   MUST maintain transaction state.
-
-   Translation of messages can only occur if the agent recognizes the
-   application of a particular request; therefore, translation agents
-   MUST only advertise their locally supported applications.
-
-       +------+    --------->     +------+     --------->    +------+
-       |      |  RADIUS Request   |      |  Diameter Request |      |
-       | NAS  |                   | TLA  |                   | HMS  |
-       |      |  RADIUS Answer    |      |  Diameter Answer  |      |
-       +------+    <---------     +------+     <---------    +------+
-      example.net                example.net               example.com
-
-                Figure 4: Translation of RADIUS to Diameter
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-
-
-
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-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-2.9.  Diameter Path Authorization
-
-   As noted in Section 2.2, Diameter provides transmission-level
-   security for each connection using TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP.  Therefore,
-   each connection can be authenticated and can be replay and integrity
-   protected.
-
-   In addition to authenticating each connection, the entire session
-   MUST also be authorized.  Before initiating a connection, a Diameter
-   peer MUST check that its peers are authorized to act in their roles.
-   For example, a Diameter peer may be authentic, but that does not mean
-   that it is authorized to act as a Diameter server advertising a set
-   of Diameter applications.
-
-   Prior to bringing up a connection, authorization checks are performed
-   at each connection along the path.  Diameter capabilities negotiation
-   (CER/CEA) also MUST be carried out, in order to determine what
-   Diameter applications are supported by each peer.  Diameter sessions
-   MUST be routed only through authorized nodes that have advertised
-   support for the Diameter application required by the session.
-
-   As noted in Section 6.1.9, a relay or proxy agent MUST append a
-   Route-Record AVP to all requests forwarded.  The AVP contains the
-   identity of the peer from which the request was received.
-
-   The home Diameter server, prior to authorizing a session, MUST check
-   the Route-Record AVPs to make sure that the route traversed by the
-   request is acceptable.  For example, administrators within the home
-   realm may not wish to honor requests that have been routed through an
-   untrusted realm.  By authorizing a request, the home Diameter server
-   is implicitly indicating its willingness to engage in the business
-   transaction as specified by any contractual relationship between the
-   server and the previous hop.  A DIAMETER_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED error
-   message (see Section 7.1.5) is sent if the route traversed by the
-   request is unacceptable.
-
-   A home realm may also wish to check that each accounting request
-   message corresponds to a Diameter response authorizing the session.
-   Accounting requests without corresponding authorization responses
-   SHOULD be subjected to further scrutiny, as should accounting
-   requests indicating a difference between the requested and provided
-   service.
-
-   Forwarding of an authorization response is considered evidence of a
-   willingness to take on financial risk relative to the session.  A
-   local realm may wish to limit this exposure, for example, by
-   establishing credit limits for intermediate realms and refusing to
-   accept responses that would violate those limits.  By issuing an
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   accounting request corresponding to the authorization response, the
-   local realm implicitly indicates its agreement to provide the service
-   indicated in the authorization response.  If the service cannot be
-   provided by the local realm, then a DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY error
-   message MUST be sent within the accounting request; a Diameter client
-   receiving an authorization response for a service that it cannot
-   perform MUST NOT substitute an alternate service and then send
-   accounting requests for the alternate service instead.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-3.  Diameter Header
-
-   A summary of the Diameter header format is shown below.  The fields
-   are transmitted in network byte order.
-
-       0                   1                   2                   3
-       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
-      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-      |    Version    |                 Message Length                |
-      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-      | Command Flags |                  Command Code                 |
-      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-      |                         Application-ID                        |
-      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-      |                      Hop-by-Hop Identifier                    |
-      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-      |                      End-to-End Identifier                    |
-      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-      |  AVPs ...
-      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
-
- -

-The Diameter Header is represented by the diameter_header -record defined in diameter.hrl. -The diameter_packet record contains a header field whose -value will be a decoded #diameter_header{} for incoming -messages passed to &app_handle_request; and &app_handle_answer; -callbacks. -In the case of outgoing messages, diameter and the relevant -dictionary populate the Diameter Header appropriately, although -&app_prepare_request; and &app_handle_request; callbacks can modify -header values. -(Which can be useful in test.)

- -
-
-   Version
-
-      This Version field MUST be set to 1 to indicate Diameter Version
-      1.
-
-    Message Length
-
-      The Message Length field is three octets and indicates the length
-      of the Diameter message including the header fields and the padded
-      AVPs.  Thus, the Message Length field is always a multiple of 4.
-
-   Command Flags
-
-      The Command Flags field is eight bits.  The following bits are
-      assigned:
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-          0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-         +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-         |R P E T r r r r|
-         +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-
-      R(equest)
-
-         If set, the message is a request.  If cleared, the message is
-         an answer.
-
-      P(roxiable)
-
-         If set, the message MAY be proxied, relayed, or redirected.  If
-         cleared, the message MUST be locally processed.
-
-      E(rror)
-
-         If set, the message contains a protocol error, and the message
-         will not conform to the CCF described for this command.
-         Messages with the 'E' bit set are commonly referred to as error
-         messages.  This bit MUST NOT be set in request messages (see
-         Section 7.2).
-
-      T(Potentially retransmitted message)
-
-         This flag is set after a link failover procedure, to aid the
-         removal of duplicate requests.  It is set when resending
-         requests not yet acknowledged, as an indication of a possible
-         duplicate due to a link failure.  This bit MUST be cleared when
-         sending a request for the first time; otherwise, the sender
-         MUST set this flag.  Diameter agents only need to be concerned
-         about the number of requests they send based on a single
-         received request; retransmissions by other entities need not be
-         tracked.  Diameter agents that receive a request with the T
-         flag set, MUST keep the T flag set in the forwarded request.
-         This flag MUST NOT be set if an error answer message (e.g., a
-         protocol error) has been received for the earlier message.  It
-         can be set only in cases where no answer has been received from
-         the server for a request, and the request has been sent again.
-         This flag MUST NOT be set in answer messages.
-
-      r(eserved)
-
-         These flag bits are reserved for future use; they MUST be set
-         to zero and ignored by the receiver.
-
- -

-Reserved bits are set to 0 in outgoing messages.

- -
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   Command Code
-
-      The Command Code field is three octets and is used in order to
-      communicate the command associated with the message.  The 24-bit
-      address space is managed by IANA (see Section 3.1).  Command Code
-      values 16,777,214 and 16,777,215 (hexadecimal values FFFFFE-
-      FFFFFF) are reserved for experimental use (see Section 11.2).
-
-   Application-ID
-
-      Application-ID is four octets and is used to identify for which
-      application the message is applicable.  The application can be an
-      authentication application, an accounting application, or a
-      vendor-specific application.
-
-      The value of the Application-ID field in the header MUST be the
-      same as any relevant Application-Id AVPs contained in the message.
-
-   Hop-by-Hop Identifier
-
-      The Hop-by-Hop Identifier is an unsigned 32-bit integer field (in
-      network byte order) that aids in matching requests and replies.
-      The sender MUST ensure that the Hop-by-Hop Identifier in a request
-      is unique on a given connection at any given time, and it MAY
-      attempt to ensure that the number is unique across reboots.  The
-      sender of an answer message MUST ensure that the Hop-by-Hop
-      Identifier field contains the same value that was found in the
-      corresponding request.  The Hop-by-Hop Identifier is normally a
-      monotonically increasing number, whose start value was randomly
-      generated.  An answer message that is received with an unknown
-      Hop-by-Hop Identifier MUST be discarded.
-
-   End-to-End Identifier
-
-      The End-to-End Identifier is an unsigned 32-bit integer field (in
-      network byte order) that is used to detect duplicate messages.
-      Upon reboot, implementations MAY set the high order 12 bits to
-      contain the low order 12 bits of current time, and the low order
-      20 bits to a random value.  Senders of request messages MUST
-      insert a unique identifier on each message.  The identifier MUST
-      remain locally unique for a period of at least 4 minutes, even
-      across reboots.  The originator of an answer message MUST ensure
-      that the End-to-End Identifier field contains the same value that
-      was found in the corresponding request.  The End-to-End Identifier
-      MUST NOT be modified by Diameter agents of any kind.  The
-      combination of the Origin-Host AVP (Section 6.3) and this field is
-      used to detect duplicates.  Duplicate requests SHOULD cause the
-      same answer to be transmitted (modulo the Hop-by-Hop Identifier
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-      field and any routing AVPs that may be present), and they MUST NOT
-      affect any state that was set when the original request was
-      processed.  Duplicate answer messages that are to be locally
-      consumed (see Section 6.2) SHOULD be silently discarded.
-
-   AVPs
-
-      AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the
-      Diameter message.  See Section 4 for more information on AVPs.
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-3.1.  Command Codes
-
-   Each command Request/Answer pair is assigned a Command Code, and the
-   sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R' bit in
-   the Command Flags field of the Diameter header.
-
-   Every Diameter message MUST contain a Command Code in its header's
-   Command Code field, which is used to determine the action that is to
-   be taken for a particular message.  The following Command Codes are
-   defined in the Diameter base protocol:
-
-                                                   Section
-    Command Name             Abbrev.    Code       Reference
-      --------------------------------------------------------
-      Abort-Session-Request     ASR       274           8.5.1
-      Abort-Session-Answer      ASA       274           8.5.2
-      Accounting-Request        ACR       271           9.7.1
-      Accounting-Answer         ACA       271           9.7.2
-      Capabilities-Exchange-    CER       257           5.3.1
-         Request
-      Capabilities-Exchange-    CEA       257           5.3.2
-         Answer
-      Device-Watchdog-Request   DWR       280           5.5.1
-      Device-Watchdog-Answer    DWA       280           5.5.2
-      Disconnect-Peer-Request   DPR       282           5.4.1
-      Disconnect-Peer-Answer    DPA       282           5.4.2
-      Re-Auth-Request           RAR       258           8.3.1
-      Re-Auth-Answer            RAA       258           8.3.2
-      Session-Termination-      STR       275           8.4.1
-         Request
-      Session-Termination-      STA       275           8.4.2
-         Answer
-
- -

-These messages are all defined in diameter's implementation of the -common dictionary in modules diameter_gen_base_rfc6733 and -diameter_gen_base_rfc3588. -Corresponding record definitions are found in -diameter_gen_base_rfc6733.hrl and -diameter_gen_base_rfc3588.hrl.

- -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-3.2.  Command Code Format Specification
-
-   Every Command Code defined MUST include a corresponding Command Code
-   Format (CCF) specification, which is used to define the AVPs that
-   MUST or MAY be present when sending the message.  The following ABNF
-   specifies the CCF used in the definition:
-
- -

-The CCF is what is specified in the @messages section of the -&man_dict; format, except as noted below.

- -
-
-   command-def      = "<" command-name ">" "::=" diameter-message
-
- -

-Angle brackets are currently not allowed here. -This was a change between RFC 3588 and RFC 6733: the former disallowed -them in the grammar but included them in its own command definitions.

- -
-
-   command-name     = diameter-name
-
-   diameter-name    = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
-
-   diameter-message = header   *fixed  *required *optional
-
-   header           = "<Diameter-Header:" command-id
-                         [r-bit] [p-bit] [e-bit] [application-id]">"
-
-   application-id   = 1*DIGIT
-
-   command-id       = 1*DIGIT
-                      ; The Command Code assigned to the command.
-
-   r-bit            = ", REQ"
-                      ; If present, the 'R' bit in the Command
-                      ; Flags is set, indicating that the message
-                      ; is a request as opposed to an answer.
-
-   p-bit            = ", PXY"
-                      ; If present, the 'P' bit in the Command
-                      ; Flags is set, indicating that the message
-                      ; is proxiable.
-
-   e-bit            = ", ERR"
-                      ; If present, the 'E' bit in the Command
-                      ; Flags is set, indicating that the answer
-                      ; message contains a Result-Code AVP in
-                      ; the "protocol error" class.
-
-   fixed            = [qual] "<" avp-spec ">"
-                      ; Defines the fixed position of an AVP.
-
-   required         = [qual] "{" avp-spec "}"
-                      ; The AVP MUST be present and can appear
-                      ; anywhere in the message.
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   optional         = [qual] "[" avp-name "]"
-                      ; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot
-                      ; evaluate to any AVP Name that is included
-                      ; in a fixed or required rule.  The AVP can
-                      ; appear anywhere in the message.
-                      ;
-                      ; NOTE:  "[" and "]" have a slightly different
-                      ; meaning than in ABNF.  These braces
-                      ; cannot be used to express optional fixed rules
-                      ; (such as an optional ICV at the end).  To do
-                      ; this, the convention is '0*1fixed'.
-
-   qual             = [min] "*" [max]
-                      ; See ABNF conventions, RFC 5234, Section 4.
-                      ; The absence of any qualifier depends on
-                      ; whether it precedes a fixed, required, or
-                      ; optional rule.  If a fixed or required rule has
-                      ; no qualifier, then exactly one such AVP MUST
-                      ; be present.  If an optional rule has no
-                      ; qualifier, then 0 or 1 such AVP may be
-                      ; present.  If an optional rule has a qualifier,
-                      ; then the value of min MUST be 0 if present.
-
-   min              = 1*DIGIT
-                      ; The minimum number of times the element may
-                      ; be present.  If absent, the default value is 0
-                      ; for fixed and optional rules and 1 for
-                      ; required rules.  The value MUST be at least 1
-                      ; for required rules.
-
-   max              = 1*DIGIT
-                      ; The maximum number of times the element may
-                      ; be present.  If absent, the default value is
-                      ; infinity.  A value of 0 implies the AVP MUST
-                      ; NOT be present.
-
-   avp-spec         = diameter-name
-                      ; The avp-spec has to be an AVP Name, defined
-                      ; in the base or extended Diameter
-                      ; specifications.
-
-   avp-name         = avp-spec / "AVP"
-                      ; The string "AVP" stands for *any* arbitrary AVP
-                      ; Name, not otherwise listed in that Command Code
-                      ; definition.  The inclusion of this string
-                      ; is recommended for all CCFs to allow for
-                      ; extensibility.
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   The following is a definition of a fictitious Command Code:
-
-   Example-Request ::= < Diameter Header: 9999999, REQ, PXY >
-                       { User-Name }
-                    1* { Origin-Host }
-                     * [ AVP ]
-
- -&nada; - -
-
-3.3.  Diameter Command Naming Conventions
-
-   Diameter command names typically includes one or more English words
-   followed by the verb "Request" or "Answer".  Each English word is
-   delimited by a hyphen.  A three-letter acronym for both the request
-   and answer is also normally provided.
-
-   An example is a message set used to terminate a session.  The command
-   name is Session-Terminate-Request and Session-Terminate-Answer, while
-   the acronyms are STR and STA, respectively.
-
-   Both the request and the answer for a given command share the same
-   Command Code.  The request is identified by the R(equest) bit in the
-   Diameter header set to one (1), to ask that a particular action be
-   performed, such as authorizing a user or terminating a session.  Once
-   the receiver has completed the request, it issues the corresponding
-   answer, which includes a result code that communicates one of the
-   following:
-
-   o  The request was successful
-
-   o  The request failed
-
-   o  An additional request has to be sent to provide information the
-      peer requires prior to returning a successful or failed answer.
-
-   o  The receiver could not process the request, but provides
-      information about a Diameter peer that is able to satisfy the
-      request, known as redirect.
-
-   Additional information, encoded within AVPs, may also be included in
-   answer messages.
-
- -

-The &man_dict; format places no requirement on the naming of commands.

- -
-
-4.  Diameter AVPs
-
-   Diameter AVPs carry specific authentication, accounting,
-   authorization, and routing information as well as configuration
-   details for the request and reply.
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   Each AVP of type OctetString MUST be padded to align on a 32-bit
-   boundary, while other AVP types align naturally.  A number of zero-
-   valued bytes are added to the end of the AVP Data field until a word
-   boundary is reached.  The length of the padding is not reflected in
-   the AVP Length field.
-
-4.1.  AVP Header
-
-   The fields in the AVP header MUST be sent in network byte order.  The
-   format of the header is:
-
-       0                   1                   2                   3
-       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
-      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-      |                           AVP Code                            |
-      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-      |V M P r r r r r|                  AVP Length                   |
-      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-      |                        Vendor-ID (opt)                        |
-      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-      |    Data ...
-      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-
-   AVP Code
-
-      The AVP Code, combined with the Vendor-Id field, identifies the
-      attribute uniquely.  AVP numbers 1 through 255 are reserved for
-      reuse of RADIUS attributes, without setting the Vendor-Id field.
-      AVP numbers 256 and above are used for Diameter, which are
-      allocated by IANA (see Section 11.1.1).
-
-   AVP Flags
-
-      The AVP Flags field informs the receiver how each attribute must
-      be handled.  New Diameter applications SHOULD NOT define
-      additional AVP Flag bits.  However, note that new Diameter
-      applications MAY define additional bits within the AVP header, and
-      an unrecognized bit SHOULD be considered an error.  The sender of
-      the AVP MUST set 'R' (reserved) bits to 0 and the receiver SHOULD
-      ignore all 'R' (reserved) bits.  The 'P' bit has been reserved for
-      future usage of end-to-end security.  At the time of writing,
-      there are no end-to-end security mechanisms specified; therefore,
-      the 'P' bit SHOULD be set to 0.
-
-      The 'M' bit, known as the Mandatory bit, indicates whether the
-      receiver of the AVP MUST parse and understand the semantics of the
-      AVP including its content.  The receiving entity MUST return an
-      appropriate error message if it receives an AVP that has the M-bit
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-      set but does not understand it.  An exception applies when the AVP
-      is embedded within a Grouped AVP.  See Section 4.4 for details.
-      Diameter relay and redirect agents MUST NOT reject messages with
-      unrecognized AVPs.
-
-      The 'M' bit MUST be set according to the rules defined in the
-      application specification that introduces or reuses this AVP.
-      Within a given application, the M-bit setting for an AVP is
-      defined either for all command types or for each command type.
-
-      AVPs with the 'M' bit cleared are informational only; a receiver
-      that receives a message with such an AVP that is not supported, or
-      whose value is not supported, MAY simply ignore the AVP.
-
-      The 'V' bit, known as the Vendor-Specific bit, indicates whether
-      the optional Vendor-ID field is present in the AVP header.  When
-      set, the AVP Code belongs to the specific vendor code address
-      space.
-
-   AVP Length
-
-      The AVP Length field is three octets, and indicates the number of
-      octets in this AVP including the AVP Code field, AVP Length field,
-      AVP Flags field, Vendor-ID field (if present), and the AVP Data
-      field.  If a message is received with an invalid attribute length,
-      the message MUST be rejected.
-
-4.1.1.  Optional Header Elements
-
-   The AVP header contains one optional field.  This field is only
-   present if the respective bit-flag is enabled.
-
-   Vendor-ID
-
-      The Vendor-ID field is present if the 'V' bit is set in the AVP
-      Flags field.  The optional four-octet Vendor-ID field contains the
-      IANA-assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Codes"
-      [ENTERPRISE] value, encoded in network byte order.  Any vendors or
-      standardization organizations that are also treated like vendors
-      in the IANA-managed "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise
-      Codes" space wishing to implement a vendor-specific Diameter AVP
-      MUST use their own Vendor-ID along with their privately managed
-      AVP address space, guaranteeing that they will not collide with
-      any other vendor's vendor-specific AVP(s) or with future IETF
-      AVPs.
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-      A Vendor-ID value of zero (0) corresponds to the IETF-adopted AVP
-      values, as managed by IANA.  Since the absence of the Vendor-ID
-      field implies that the AVP in question is not vendor specific,
-      implementations MUST NOT use the value of zero (0) for the
-      Vendor-ID field.
-
-4.2.  Basic AVP Data Formats
-
-   The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information
-   specific to the Attribute.  The format and length of the Data field
-   is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields.  The format of
-   the Data field MUST be one of the following base data types or a data
-   type derived from the base data types.  In the event that a new Basic
-   AVP Data Format is needed, a new version of this RFC MUST be created.
-
-   OctetString
-
-      The data contains arbitrary data of variable length.  Unless
-      otherwise noted, the AVP Length field MUST be set to at least 8
-      (12 if the 'V' bit is enabled).  AVP values of this type that are
-      not a multiple of 4 octets in length are followed by the necessary
-      padding so that the next AVP (if any) will start on a 32-bit
-      boundary.
-
-   Integer32
-
-      32-bit signed value, in network byte order.  The AVP Length field
-      MUST be set to 12 (16 if the 'V' bit is enabled).
-
-   Integer64
-
-      64-bit signed value, in network byte order.  The AVP Length field
-      MUST be set to 16 (20 if the 'V' bit is enabled).
-
-   Unsigned32
-
-      32-bit unsigned value, in network byte order.  The AVP Length
-      field MUST be set to 12 (16 if the 'V' bit is enabled).
-
-   Unsigned64
-
-      64-bit unsigned value, in network byte order.  The AVP Length
-      field MUST be set to 16 (20 if the 'V' bit is enabled).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   Float32
-
-      This represents floating point values of single precision as
-      described by [FLOATPOINT].  The 32-bit value is transmitted in
-      network byte order.  The AVP Length field MUST be set to 12 (16 if
-      the 'V' bit is enabled).
-
-   Float64
-
-      This represents floating point values of double precision as
-      described by [FLOATPOINT].  The 64-bit value is transmitted in
-      network byte order.  The AVP Length field MUST be set to 16 (20 if
-      the 'V' bit is enabled).
-
-   Grouped
-
-      The Data field is specified as a sequence of AVPs.  These AVPs are
-      concatenated -- including their headers and padding -- in the
-      order in which they are specified and the result encapsulated in
-      the Data field.  The AVP Length field is set to 8 (12 if the 'V'
-      bit is enabled) plus the total length of all included AVPs,
-      including their headers and padding.  Thus, the AVP Length field
-      of an AVP of type Grouped is always a multiple of 4.
-
-4.3.  Derived AVP Data Formats
-
-   In addition to using the Basic AVP Data Formats, applications may
-   define data formats derived from the Basic AVP Data Formats.  An
-   application that defines new Derived AVP Data Formats MUST include
-   them in a section titled "Derived AVP Data Formats", using the same
-   format as the definitions below.  Each new definition MUST be either
-   defined or listed with a reference to the RFC that defines the
-   format.
-
-4.3.1.  Common Derived AVP Data Formats
-
-   The following are commonly used Derived AVP Data Formats.
-
-   Address
-
-      The Address format is derived from the OctetString Basic AVP
-      Format.  It is a discriminated union representing, for example, a
-      32-bit (IPv4) [RFC0791] or 128-bit (IPv6) [RFC4291] address, most
-      significant octet first.  The first two octets of the Address AVP
-      represent the AddressType, which contains an Address Family,
-      defined in [IANAADFAM].  The AddressType is used to discriminate
-      the content and format of the remaining octets.
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   Time
-
-      The Time format is derived from the OctetString Basic AVP Format.
-      The string MUST contain four octets, in the same format as the
-      first four bytes are in the NTP timestamp format.  The NTP
-      timestamp format is defined in Section 3 of [RFC5905].
-
-      This represents the number of seconds since 0h on 1 January 1900
-      with respect to the Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
-
-      On 6h 28m 16s UTC, 7 February 2036, the time value will overflow.
-      Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) [RFC5905] describes a
-      procedure to extend the time to 2104.  This procedure MUST be
-      supported by all Diameter nodes.
-
-   UTF8String
-
-      The UTF8String format is derived from the OctetString Basic AVP
-      Format.  This is a human-readable string represented using the
-      ISO/IEC IS 10646-1 character set, encoded as an OctetString using
-      the UTF-8 transformation format [RFC3629].
-
-      Since additional code points are added by amendments to the 10646
-      standard from time to time, implementations MUST be prepared to
-      encounter any code point from 0x00000001 to 0x7fffffff.  Byte
-      sequences that do not correspond to the valid encoding of a code
-      point into UTF-8 charset or are outside this range are prohibited.
-
-      The use of control codes SHOULD be avoided.  When it is necessary
-      to represent a new line, the control code sequence CR LF SHOULD be
-      used.
-
-      The use of leading or trailing white space SHOULD be avoided.
-
-      For code points not directly supported by user interface hardware
-      or software, an alternative means of entry and display, such as
-      hexadecimal, MAY be provided.
-
-      For information encoded in 7-bit US-ASCII, the UTF-8 charset is
-      identical to the US-ASCII charset.
-
-      UTF-8 may require multiple bytes to represent a single character /
-      code point; thus, the length of a UTF8String in octets may be
-      different from the number of characters encoded.
-
-      Note that the AVP Length field of an UTF8String is measured in
-      octets not characters.
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   DiameterIdentity
-
-      The DiameterIdentity format is derived from the OctetString Basic
-      AVP Format.
-
-                        DiameterIdentity  = FQDN/Realm
-
-   The DiameterIdentity value is used to uniquely identify either:
-
-      *  A Diameter node for purposes of duplicate connection and
-         routing loop detection.
-
-      *  A Realm to determine whether messages can be satisfied locally
-         or whether they must be routed or redirected.
-
-      When a DiameterIdentity value is used to identify a Diameter node,
-      the contents of the string MUST be the Fully Qualified Domain Name
-      (FQDN) of the Diameter node.  If multiple Diameter nodes run on
-      the same host, each Diameter node MUST be assigned a unique
-      DiameterIdentity.  If a Diameter node can be identified by several
-      FQDNs, a single FQDN should be picked at startup and used as the
-      only DiameterIdentity for that node, whatever the connection on
-      which it is sent.  In this document, note that DiameterIdentity is
-      in ASCII form in order to be compatible with existing DNS
-      infrastructure.  See Appendix D for interactions between the
-      Diameter protocol and Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs).
-
-   DiameterURI
-
-      The DiameterURI MUST follow the Uniform Resource Identifiers (RFC
-      3986) syntax [RFC3986] rules specified below:
-
-      "aaa://" FQDN [ port ] [ transport ] [ protocol ]
-
-                      ; No transport security
-
-      "aaas://" FQDN [ port ] [ transport ] [ protocol ]
-
-                      ; Transport security used
-
-      FQDN               = < Fully Qualified Domain Name >
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-      port               = ":" 1*DIGIT
-
-                      ; One of the ports used to listen for
-                      ; incoming connections.
-                      ; If absent, the default Diameter port
-                      ; (3868) is assumed if no transport
-                      ; security is used and port 5658 when
-                      ; transport security (TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP)
-                      ; is used.
-
-      transport          = ";transport=" transport-protocol
-
-                      ; One of the transports used to listen
-                      ; for incoming connections.  If absent,
-                      ; the default protocol is assumed to be TCP.
-                      ; UDP MUST NOT be used when the aaa-protocol
-                      ; field is set to diameter.
-
-      transport-protocol = ( "tcp" / "sctp" / "udp" )
-
-      protocol           = ";protocol=" aaa-protocol
-
-                      ; If absent, the default AAA protocol
-                      ; is Diameter.
-
-      aaa-protocol       = ( "diameter" / "radius" / "tacacs+" )
-
-      The following are examples of valid Diameter host identities:
-
-      aaa://host.example.com;transport=tcp
-      aaa://host.example.com:6666;transport=tcp
-      aaa://host.example.com;protocol=diameter
-      aaa://host.example.com:6666;protocol=diameter
-      aaa://host.example.com:6666;transport=tcp;protocol=diameter
-      aaa://host.example.com:1813;transport=udp;protocol=radius
-
-   Enumerated
-
-      The Enumerated format is derived from the Integer32 Basic AVP
-      Format.  The definition contains a list of valid values and their
-      interpretation and is described in the Diameter application
-      introducing the AVP.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   IPFilterRule
-
-      The IPFilterRule format is derived from the OctetString Basic AVP
-      Format and uses the ASCII charset.  The rule syntax is a modified
-      subset of ipfw(8) from FreeBSD.  Packets may be filtered based on
-      the following information that is associated with it:
-
-            Direction                          (in or out)
-            Source and destination IP address  (possibly masked)
-            Protocol
-            Source and destination port        (lists or ranges)
-            TCP flags
-            IP fragment flag
-            IP options
-            ICMP types
-
-   Rules for the appropriate direction are evaluated in order, with the
-   first matched rule terminating the evaluation.  Each packet is
-   evaluated once.  If no rule matches, the packet is dropped if the
-   last rule evaluated was a permit, and passed if the last rule was a
-   deny.
-
-   IPFilterRule filters MUST follow the format:
-
-         action dir proto from src to dst [options]
-
-         action       permit - Allow packets that match the rule.
-                      deny   - Drop packets that match the rule.
-
-         dir          "in" is from the terminal, "out" is to the
-                      terminal.
-
-         proto        An IP protocol specified by number.  The "ip"
-                      keyword means any protocol will match.
-
-         src and dst  <address/mask> [ports]
-
-                      The <address/mask> may be specified as:
-                      ipno       An IPv4 or IPv6 number in dotted-
-                                 quad or canonical IPv6 form.  Only
-                                 this exact IP number will match the
-                                 rule.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-                      ipno/bits  An IP number as above with a mask
-                                 width of the form 192.0.2.10/24.  In
-                                 this case, all IP numbers from
-                                 192.0.2.0 to 192.0.2.255 will match.
-                                 The bit width MUST be valid for the
-                                 IP version, and the IP number MUST
-                                 NOT have bits set beyond the mask.
-                                 For a match to occur, the same IP
-                                 version must be present in the
-                                 packet that was used in describing
-                                 the IP address.  To test for a
-                                 particular IP version, the bits part
-                                 can be set to zero.  The keyword
-                                 "any" is 0.0.0.0/0 or the IPv6
-                                 equivalent.  The keyword "assigned"
-                                 is the address or set of addresses
-                                 assigned to the terminal.  For IPv4,
-                                 a typical first rule is often "deny
-                                 in ip! assigned".
-
-                      The sense of the match can be inverted by
-                      preceding an address with the not modifier (!),
-                      causing all other addresses to be matched
-                      instead.  This does not affect the selection of
-                      port numbers.
-
-                      With the TCP, UDP, and SCTP protocols, optional
-                      ports may be specified as:
-
-                         {port/port-port}[,ports[,...]]
-
-                       The '-' notation specifies a range of ports
-                      (including boundaries).
-
-                      Fragmented packets that have a non-zero offset
-                      (i.e., not the first fragment) will never match
-                      a rule that has one or more port
-                      specifications.  See the frag option for
-                      details on matching fragmented packets.
-
-         options:
-            frag    Match if the packet is a fragment and this is not
-                    the first fragment of the datagram.  frag may not
-                    be used in conjunction with either tcpflags or
-                    TCP/UDP port specifications.
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-            ipoptions spec
-                    Match if the IP header contains the comma-separated
-                    list of options specified in spec.  The
-                    supported IP options are:
-
-                    ssrr (strict source route), lsrr (loose source
-                    route), rr (record packet route), and ts
-                    (timestamp).  The absence of a particular option
-                    may be denoted with a '!'.
-
-            tcpoptions spec
-                    Match if the TCP header contains the comma-separated
-                    list of options specified in spec.  The
-                    supported TCP options are:
-
-                    mss (maximum segment size), window (tcp window
-                    advertisement), sack (selective ack), ts (rfc1323
-                    timestamp), and cc (rfc1644 t/tcp connection
-                    count).  The absence of a particular option may
-                    be denoted with a '!'.
-
-            established
-                    TCP packets only.  Match packets that have the RST
-                    or ACK bits set.
-
-            setup   TCP packets only.  Match packets that have the SYN
-                    bit set but no ACK bit.
-
-
-            tcpflags spec
-                    TCP packets only.  Match if the TCP header
-                    contains the comma-separated list of flags
-                    specified in spec.  The supported TCP flags are:
-
-                    fin, syn, rst, psh, ack, and urg.  The absence of a
-                    particular flag may be denoted with a '!'.  A rule
-                    that contains a tcpflags specification can never
-                    match a fragmented packet that has a non-zero
-                    offset.  See the frag option for details on
-                    matching fragmented packets.
-
-            icmptypes types
-                    ICMP packets only.  Match if the ICMP type is in
-                    the list types.  The list may be specified as any
-                    combination of ranges or individual types
-                    separated by commas.  Both the numeric values and
-                    the symbolic values listed below can be used.  The
-                    supported ICMP types are:
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-                    echo reply (0), destination unreachable (3),
-                    source quench (4), redirect (5), echo request
-                    (8), router advertisement (9), router
-                    solicitation (10), time-to-live exceeded (11), IP
-                    header bad (12), timestamp request (13),
-                    timestamp reply (14), information request (15),
-                    information reply (16), address mask request (17),
-                    and address mask reply (18).
-
-   There is one kind of packet that the access device MUST always
-   discard, that is an IP fragment with a fragment offset of one.  This
-   is a valid packet, but it only has one use, to try to circumvent
-   firewalls.
-
-   An access device that is unable to interpret or apply a deny rule
-   MUST terminate the session.  An access device that is unable to
-   interpret or apply a permit rule MAY apply a more restrictive rule.
-   An access device MAY apply deny rules of its own before the supplied
-   rules, for example to protect the access device owner's
-   infrastructure.
-
-4.4.   Grouped AVP Values
-
-   The Diameter protocol allows AVP values of type 'Grouped'.  This
-   implies that the Data field is actually a sequence of AVPs.  It is
-   possible to include an AVP with a Grouped type within a Grouped type,
-   that is, to nest them.  AVPs within an AVP of type Grouped have the
-   same padding requirements as non-Grouped AVPs, as defined in
-   Section 4.4.
-
-   The AVP Code numbering space of all AVPs included in a Grouped AVP is
-   the same as for non-Grouped AVPs.  Receivers of a Grouped AVP that
-   does not have the 'M' (mandatory) bit set and one or more of the
-   encapsulated AVPs within the group has the 'M' (mandatory) bit set
-   MAY simply be ignored if the Grouped AVP itself is unrecognized.  The
-   rule applies even if the encapsulated AVP with its 'M' (mandatory)
-   bit set is further encapsulated within other sub-groups, i.e., other
-   Grouped AVPs embedded within the Grouped AVP.
-
-   Every Grouped AVP definition MUST include a corresponding grammar,
-   using ABNF [RFC5234] (with modifications), as defined below.
-
-         grouped-avp-def  = "<" name ">" "::=" avp
-
-         name-fmt         = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-         name             = name-fmt
-                            ; The name has to be the name of an AVP,
-                            ; defined in the base or extended Diameter
-                            ; specifications.
-
-         avp              = header *fixed *required *optional
-
-         header           = "<" "AVP-Header:" avpcode [vendor] ">"
-
-         avpcode          = 1*DIGIT
-                            ; The AVP Code assigned to the Grouped AVP.
-
-         vendor           = 1*DIGIT
-                            ; The Vendor-ID assigned to the Grouped AVP.
-                            ; If absent, the default value of zero is
-                            ; used.
-
-4.4.1.  Example AVP with a Grouped Data Type
-
-   The Example-AVP (AVP Code 999999) is of type Grouped and is used to
-   clarify how Grouped AVP values work.  The Grouped Data field has the
-   following CCF grammar:
-
-         Example-AVP  ::= < AVP Header: 999999 >
-                          { Origin-Host }
-                        1*{ Session-Id }
-                         *[ AVP ]
-
-      An Example-AVP with Grouped Data follows.
-
-      The Origin-Host AVP (Section 6.3) is required.  In this case:
-
-         Origin-Host = "example.com".
-
-      One or more Session-Ids must follow.  Here there are two:
-
-         Session-Id =
-           "grump.example.com:33041;23432;893;0AF3B81"
-
-         Session-Id =
-           "grump.example.com:33054;23561;2358;0AF3B82"
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-      optional AVPs included are
-
-         Recovery-Policy = <binary>
-            2163bc1d0ad82371f6bc09484133c3f09ad74a0dd5346d54195a7cf0b35
-            2cabc881839a4fdcfbc1769e2677a4c1fb499284c5f70b48f58503a45c5
-            c2d6943f82d5930f2b7c1da640f476f0e9c9572a50db8ea6e51e1c2c7bd
-            f8bb43dc995144b8dbe297ac739493946803e1cee3e15d9b765008a1b2a
-            cf4ac777c80041d72c01e691cf751dbf86e85f509f3988e5875dc905119
-            26841f00f0e29a6d1ddc1a842289d440268681e052b30fb638045f7779c
-            1d873c784f054f688f5001559ecff64865ef975f3e60d2fd7966b8c7f92
-
-         Futuristic-Acct-Record = <binary>
-            fe19da5802acd98b07a5b86cb4d5d03f0314ab9ef1ad0b67111ff3b90a0
-            57fe29620bf3585fd2dd9fcc38ce62f6cc208c6163c008f4258d1bc88b8
-            17694a74ccad3ec69269461b14b2e7a4c111fb239e33714da207983f58c
-            41d018d56fe938f3cbf089aac12a912a2f0d1923a9390e5f789cb2e5067
-            d3427475e49968f841
-
-   The data for the optional AVPs is represented in hexadecimal form
-   since the format of these AVPs is not known at the time of definition
-   of the Example-AVP group nor (likely) at the time when the example
-   instance of this AVP is interpreted -- except by Diameter
-   implementations that support the same set of AVPs.  The encoding
-   example illustrates how padding is used and how length fields are
-   calculated.  Also, note that AVPs may be present in the Grouped AVP
-   value that the receiver cannot interpret (here, the Recover-Policy
-   and Futuristic-Acct-Record AVPs).  The length of the Example-AVP is
-   the sum of all the length of the member AVPs, including their
-   padding, plus the Example-AVP header size.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   This AVP would be encoded as follows:
-
-         0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   0  |     Example AVP Header (AVP Code = 999999), Length = 496      |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   8  |     Origin-Host AVP Header (AVP Code = 264), Length = 19      |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   16 |  'e'  |  'x'  |  'a'  |  'm'  |  'p'  |  'l'  |  'e'  |  '.'  |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   24 |  'c'  |  'o'  |  'm'  |Padding|     Session-Id AVP Header     |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   32 | (AVP Code = 263), Length = 49 |  'g'  |  'r'  |  'u'  |  'm'  |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-                                    . . .
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   72 |  'F'  |  '3'  |  'B'  |  '8'  |  '1'  |Padding|Padding|Padding|
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   80 |     Session-Id AVP Header (AVP Code = 263), Length = 50       |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   88 |  'g'  |  'r'  |  'u'  |  'm'  |  'p'  |  '.'  |  'e'  |  'x'  |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-                                   . . .
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   120|  '5'  |  '8'  |  ';'  |  '0'  |  'A'  |  'F'  |  '3'  |  'B'  |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   128|  '8'  |  '2'  |Padding|Padding|  Recovery-Policy Header (AVP  |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   136|  Code = 8341), Length = 223   | 0x21  | 0x63  | 0xbc  | 0x1d  |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   144|  0x0a | 0xd8  | 0x23  | 0x71  | 0xf6  | 0xbc  | 0x09  | 0x48  |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-                                    . . .
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   352|  0x8c | 0x7f  | 0x92  |Padding| Futuristic-Acct-Record Header |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   328|(AVP Code = 15930),Length = 137| 0xfe  | 0x19  | 0xda  | 0x58  |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   336|  0x02 | 0xac  | 0xd9  | 0x8b  | 0x07  | 0xa5  | 0xb8  | 0xc6  |
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-                                    . . .
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-   488|  0xe4 | 0x99  | 0x68  | 0xf8  | 0x41  |Padding|Padding|Padding|
-      +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 54]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-4.5.  Diameter Base Protocol AVPs
-
-   The following table describes the Diameter AVPs defined in the base
-   protocol, their AVP Code values, types, and possible flag values.
-
-   Due to space constraints, the short form DiamIdent is used to
-   represent DiameterIdentity.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 55]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-                                            +----------+
-                                            | AVP Flag |
-                                            |  rules   |
-                                            |----+-----|
-                   AVP  Section             |    |MUST |
-   Attribute Name  Code Defined  Data Type  |MUST| NOT |
-   -----------------------------------------|----+-----|
-   Acct-             85  9.8.2   Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-     Interim-Interval                       |    |     |
-   Accounting-      483  9.8.7   Enumerated | M  |  V  |
-     Realtime-Required                      |    |     |
-   Acct-            50   9.8.5   UTF8String | M  |  V  |
-     Multi-Session-Id                       |    |     |
-   Accounting-      485  9.8.3   Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-     Record-Number                          |    |     |
-   Accounting-      480  9.8.1   Enumerated | M  |  V  |
-     Record-Type                            |    |     |
-   Acct-             44  9.8.4   OctetString| M  |  V  |
-    Session-Id                              |    |     |
-   Accounting-      287  9.8.6   Unsigned64 | M  |  V  |
-     Sub-Session-Id                         |    |     |
-   Acct-            259  6.9     Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-     Application-Id                         |    |     |
-   Auth-            258  6.8     Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-     Application-Id                         |    |     |
-   Auth-Request-    274  8.7     Enumerated | M  |  V  |
-      Type                                  |    |     |
-   Authorization-   291  8.9     Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-     Lifetime                               |    |     |
-   Auth-Grace-      276  8.10    Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-     Period                                 |    |     |
-   Auth-Session-    277  8.11    Enumerated | M  |  V  |
-     State                                  |    |     |
-   Re-Auth-Request- 285  8.12    Enumerated | M  |  V  |
-     Type                                   |    |     |
-   Class             25  8.20    OctetString| M  |  V  |
-   Destination-Host 293  6.5     DiamIdent  | M  |  V  |
-   Destination-     283  6.6     DiamIdent  | M  |  V  |
-     Realm                                  |    |     |
-   Disconnect-Cause 273  5.4.3   Enumerated | M  |  V  |
-   Error-Message    281  7.3     UTF8String |    | V,M |
-   Error-Reporting- 294  7.4     DiamIdent  |    | V,M |
-     Host                                   |    |     |
-   Event-Timestamp   55  8.21    Time       | M  |  V  |
-   Experimental-    297  7.6     Grouped    | M  |  V  |
-      Result                                |    |     |
-   -----------------------------------------|----+-----|
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 56]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-                                            +----------+
-                                            | AVP Flag |
-                                            |  rules   |
-                                            |----+-----|
-                   AVP  Section             |    |MUST |
-   Attribute Name  Code Defined  Data Type  |MUST| NOT |
-   -----------------------------------------|----+-----|
-   Experimental-    298  7.7     Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-      Result-Code                           |    |     |
-   Failed-AVP       279  7.5     Grouped    | M  |  V  |
-   Firmware-        267  5.3.4   Unsigned32 |    | V,M |
-     Revision                               |    |     |
-   Host-IP-Address  257  5.3.5   Address    | M  |  V  |
-   Inband-Security                          | M  |  V  |
-      -Id           299  6.10    Unsigned32 |    |     |
-   Multi-Round-     272  8.19    Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-     Time-Out                               |    |     |
-   Origin-Host      264  6.3     DiamIdent  | M  |  V  |
-   Origin-Realm     296  6.4     DiamIdent  | M  |  V  |
-   Origin-State-Id  278  8.16    Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-   Product-Name     269  5.3.7   UTF8String |    | V,M |
-   Proxy-Host       280  6.7.3   DiamIdent  | M  |  V  |
-   Proxy-Info       284  6.7.2   Grouped    | M  |  V  |
-   Proxy-State       33  6.7.4   OctetString| M  |  V  |
-   Redirect-Host    292  6.12    DiamURI    | M  |  V  |
-   Redirect-Host-   261  6.13    Enumerated | M  |  V  |
-      Usage                                 |    |     |
-   Redirect-Max-    262  6.14    Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-      Cache-Time                            |    |     |
-   Result-Code      268  7.1     Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-   Route-Record     282  6.7.1   DiamIdent  | M  |  V  |
-   Session-Id       263  8.8     UTF8String | M  |  V  |
-   Session-Timeout   27  8.13    Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-   Session-Binding  270  8.17    Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-   Session-Server-  271  8.18    Enumerated | M  |  V  |
-     Failover                               |    |     |
-   Supported-       265  5.3.6   Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-     Vendor-Id                              |    |     |
-   Termination-     295  8.15    Enumerated | M  |  V  |
-      Cause                                 |    |     |
-   User-Name          1  8.14    UTF8String | M  |  V  |
-   Vendor-Id        266  5.3.3   Unsigned32 | M  |  V  |
-   Vendor-Specific- 260  6.11    Grouped    | M  |  V  |
-      Application-Id                        |    |     |
-   -----------------------------------------|----+-----|
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 57]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-5.  Diameter Peers
-
-   This section describes how Diameter nodes establish connections and
-   communicate with peers.
-
-5.1.  Peer Connections
-
-   Connections between diameter peers are established using their valid
-   DiameterIdentity.  A Diameter node initiating a connection to a peer
-   MUST know the peer's DiameterIdentity.  Methods for discovering a
-   Diameter peer can be found in Section 5.2.
-
-   Although a Diameter node may have many possible peers with which it
-   is able to communicate, it may not be economical to have an
-   established connection to all of them.  At a minimum, a Diameter node
-   SHOULD have an established connection with two peers per realm, known
-   as the primary and secondary peers.  Of course, a node MAY have
-   additional connections, if it is deemed necessary.  Typically, all
-   messages for a realm are sent to the primary peer but, in the event
-   that failover procedures are invoked, any pending requests are sent
-   to the secondary peer.  However, implementations are free to load
-   balance requests between a set of peers.
-
-   Note that a given peer MAY act as a primary for a given realm while
-   acting as a secondary for another realm.
-
-   When a peer is deemed suspect, which could occur for various reasons,
-   including not receiving a DWA within an allotted time frame, no new
-   requests should be forwarded to the peer, but failover procedures are
-   invoked.  When an active peer is moved to this mode, additional
-   connections SHOULD be established to ensure that the necessary number
-   of active connections exists.
-
-   There are two ways that a peer is removed from the suspect peer list:
-
-   1.  The peer is no longer reachable, causing the transport connection
-       to be shut down.  The peer is moved to the closed state.
-
-   2.  Three watchdog messages are exchanged with accepted round-trip
-       times, and the connection to the peer is considered stabilized.
-
-   In the event the peer being removed is either the primary or
-   secondary, an alternate peer SHOULD replace the deleted peer and
-   assume the role of either primary or secondary.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 58]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-5.2.  Diameter Peer Discovery
-
-   Allowing for dynamic Diameter agent discovery makes possible simpler
-   and more robust deployment of Diameter services.  In order to promote
-   interoperable implementations of Diameter peer discovery, the
-   following mechanisms (manual configuration and DNS) are described.
-   These are based on existing IETF standards.  Both mechanisms MUST be
-   supported by all Diameter implementations; either MAY be used.
-
-   There are two cases where Diameter peer discovery may be performed.
-   The first is when a Diameter client needs to discover a first-hop
-   Diameter agent.  The second case is when a Diameter agent needs to
-   discover another agent for further handling of a Diameter operation.
-   In both cases, the following 'search order' is recommended:
-
-   1.  The Diameter implementation consults its list of statically
-       (manually) configured Diameter agent locations.  These will be
-       used if they exist and respond.
-
-   2.  The Diameter implementation performs a NAPTR query for a server
-       in a particular realm.  The Diameter implementation has to know,
-       in advance, in which realm to look for a Diameter agent.  This
-       could be deduced, for example, from the 'realm' in an NAI on
-       which a Diameter implementation needed to perform a Diameter
-       operation.
-
-       The NAPTR usage in Diameter follows the S-NAPTR DDDS application
-       [RFC3958] in which the SERVICE field includes tags for the
-       desired application and supported application protocol.  The
-       application service tag for a Diameter application is 'aaa' and
-       the supported application protocol tags are 'diameter.tcp',
-       'diameter.sctp', 'diameter.dtls', or 'diameter.tls.tcp'
-       [RFC6408].
-
-       The client can follow the resolution process defined by the
-       S-NAPTR DDDS [RFC3958] application to find a matching SRV, A, or
-       AAAA record of a suitable peer.  The domain suffixes in the NAPTR
-       replacement field SHOULD match the domain of the original query.
-       An example can be found in Appendix B.
-
-   3.  If no NAPTR records are found, the requester directly queries for
-       one of the following SRV records: for Diameter over TCP, use
-       "_diameter._tcp.realm"; for Diameter over TLS, use
-       "_diameters._tcp.realm"; for Diameter over SCTP, use
-       "_diameter._sctp.realm"; for Diameter over DTLS, use
-       "_diameters._sctp.realm".  If SRV records are found, then the
-       requester can perform address record query (A RR's and/or AAAA
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 59]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-       RR's) for the target hostname specified in the SRV records
-       following the rules given in [RFC2782].  If no SRV records are
-       found, the requester gives up.
-
-   If the server is using a site certificate, the domain name in the
-   NAPTR query and the domain name in the replacement field MUST both be
-   valid based on the site certificate handed out by the server in the
-   TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP or Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)
-   exchange.  Similarly, the domain name in the SRV query and the domain
-   name in the target in the SRV record MUST both be valid based on the
-   same site certificate.  Otherwise, an attacker could modify the DNS
-   records to contain replacement values in a different domain, and the
-   client could not validate whether this was the desired behavior or
-   the result of an attack.
-
-   Also, the Diameter peer MUST check to make sure that the discovered
-   peers are authorized to act in its role.  Authentication via IKE or
-   TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP, or validation of DNS RRs via DNSSEC is not
-   sufficient to conclude this.  For example, a web server may have
-   obtained a valid TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP certificate, and secured RRs
-   may be included in the DNS, but this does not imply that it is
-   authorized to act as a Diameter server.
-
-   Authorization can be achieved, for example, by the configuration of a
-   Diameter server Certification Authority (CA).  The server CA issues a
-   certificate to the Diameter server, which includes an Object
-   Identifier (OID) to indicate the subject is a Diameter server in the
-   Extended Key Usage extension [RFC5280].  This certificate is then
-   used during TLS/TCP, DTLS/SCTP, or IKE security negotiation.
-   However, note that, at the time of writing, no Diameter server
-   Certification Authorities exist.
-
-   A dynamically discovered peer causes an entry in the peer table (see
-   Section 2.6) to be created.  Note that entries created via DNS MUST
-   expire (or be refreshed) within the DNS Time to Live (TTL).  If a
-   peer is discovered outside of the local realm, a routing table entry
-   (see Section 2.7) for the peer's realm is created.  The routing table
-   entry's expiration MUST match the peer's expiration value.
-
-5.3.  Capabilities Exchange
-
-   When two Diameter peers establish a transport connection, they MUST
-   exchange the Capabilities Exchange messages, as specified in the peer
-   state machine (see Section 5.6).  This message allows the discovery
-   of a peer's identity and its capabilities (protocol version number,
-   the identifiers of supported Diameter applications, security
-   mechanisms, etc.).
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 60]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   The receiver only issues commands to its peers that have advertised
-   support for the Diameter application that defines the command.  A
-   Diameter node MUST cache the supported Application Ids in order to
-   ensure that unrecognized commands and/or AVPs are not unnecessarily
-   sent to a peer.
-
-   A receiver of a Capabilities-Exchange-Request (CER) message that does
-   not have any applications in common with the sender MUST return a
-   Capabilities-Exchange-Answer (CEA) with the Result-Code AVP set to
-   DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_APPLICATION and SHOULD disconnect the transport
-   layer connection.  Note that receiving a CER or CEA from a peer
-   advertising itself as a relay (see Section 2.4) MUST be interpreted
-   as having common applications with the peer.
-
-   The receiver of the Capabilities-Exchange-Request (CER) MUST
-   determine common applications by computing the intersection of its
-   own set of supported Application Ids against all of the
-   Application-Id AVPs (Auth-Application-Id, Acct-Application-Id, and
-   Vendor-Specific-Application-Id) present in the CER.  The value of the
-   Vendor-Id AVP in the Vendor-Specific-Application-Id MUST NOT be used
-   during computation.  The sender of the Capabilities-Exchange-Answer
-   (CEA) SHOULD include all of its supported applications as a hint to
-   the receiver regarding all of its application capabilities.
-
-   Diameter implementations SHOULD first attempt to establish a TLS/TCP
-   and DTLS/SCTP connection prior to the CER/CEA exchange.  This
-   protects the capabilities information of both peers.  To support
-   older Diameter implementations that do not fully conform to this
-   document, the transport security MAY still be negotiated via an
-   Inband-Security AVP.  In this case, the receiver of a Capabilities-
-   Exchange-Request (CER) message that does not have any security
-   mechanisms in common with the sender MUST return a Capabilities-
-   Exchange-Answer (CEA) with the Result-Code AVP set to
-   DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_SECURITY and SHOULD disconnect the transport layer
-   connection.
-
-   CERs received from unknown peers MAY be silently discarded, or a CEA
-   MAY be issued with the Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_UNKNOWN_PEER.
-   In both cases, the transport connection is closed.  If the local
-   policy permits receiving CERs from unknown hosts, a successful CEA
-   MAY be returned.  If a CER from an unknown peer is answered with a
-   successful CEA, the lifetime of the peer entry is equal to the
-   lifetime of the transport connection.  In case of a transport
-   failure, all the pending transactions destined to the unknown peer
-   can be discarded.
-
-   The CER and CEA messages MUST NOT be proxied, redirected, or relayed.
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 61]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-   Since the CER/CEA messages cannot be proxied, it is still possible
-   that an upstream agent will receive a message for which it has no
-   available peers to handle the application that corresponds to the
-   Command Code.  In such instances, the 'E' bit is set in the answer
-   message (Section 7) with the Result-Code AVP set to
-   DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER to inform the downstream agent to take
-   action (e.g., re-routing request to an alternate peer).
-
-   With the exception of the Capabilities-Exchange-Request message, a
-   message of type Request that includes the Auth-Application-Id or
-   Acct-Application-Id AVPs, or a message with an application-specific
-   Command Code MAY only be forwarded to a host that has explicitly
-   advertised support for the application (or has advertised the Relay
-   Application Id).
-
-5.3.1.  Capabilities-Exchange-Request
-
-   The Capabilities-Exchange-Request (CER), indicated by the Command
-   Code set to 257 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit set, is sent to
-   exchange local capabilities.  Upon detection of a transport failure,
-   this message MUST NOT be sent to an alternate peer.
-
-   When Diameter is run over SCTP [RFC4960] or DTLS/SCTP [RFC6083],
-   which allow for connections to span multiple interfaces and multiple
-   IP addresses, the Capabilities-Exchange-Request message MUST contain
-   one Host-IP-Address AVP for each potential IP address that MAY be
-   locally used when transmitting Diameter messages.
-
-      Message Format
-
-         <CER> ::= < Diameter Header: 257, REQ >
-                   { Origin-Host }
-                   { Origin-Realm }
-                1* { Host-IP-Address }
-                   { Vendor-Id }
-                   { Product-Name }
-                   [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                 * [ Supported-Vendor-Id ]
-                 * [ Auth-Application-Id ]
-                 * [ Inband-Security-Id ]
-                 * [ Acct-Application-Id ]
-                 * [ Vendor-Specific-Application-Id ]
-                   [ Firmware-Revision ]
-                 * [ AVP ]
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 62]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-5.3.2.  Capabilities-Exchange-Answer
-
-   The Capabilities-Exchange-Answer (CEA), indicated by the Command Code
-   set to 257 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit cleared, is sent in
-   response to a CER message.
-
-   When Diameter is run over SCTP [RFC4960] or DTLS/SCTP [RFC6083],
-   which allow connections to span multiple interfaces, hence, multiple
-   IP addresses, the Capabilities-Exchange-Answer message MUST contain
-   one Host-IP-Address AVP for each potential IP address that MAY be
-   locally used when transmitting Diameter messages.
-
-   Message Format
-
-         <CEA> ::= < Diameter Header: 257 >
-                   { Result-Code }
-                   { Origin-Host }
-                   { Origin-Realm }
-                1* { Host-IP-Address }
-                   { Vendor-Id }
-                   { Product-Name }
-                   [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                   [ Error-Message ]
-                   [ Failed-AVP ]
-                 * [ Supported-Vendor-Id ]
-                 * [ Auth-Application-Id ]
-                 * [ Inband-Security-Id ]
-                 * [ Acct-Application-Id ]
-                 * [ Vendor-Specific-Application-Id ]
-                   [ Firmware-Revision ]
-                 * [ AVP ]
-
-5.3.3.  Vendor-Id AVP
-
-   The Vendor-Id AVP (AVP Code 266) is of type Unsigned32 and contains
-   the IANA "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Codes"
-   [ENTERPRISE] value assigned to the Diameter Software vendor.  It is
-   envisioned that the combination of the Vendor-Id, Product-Name
-   (Section 5.3.7), and Firmware-Revision (Section 5.3.4) AVPs may
-   provide useful debugging information.
-
-   A Vendor-Id value of zero in the CER or CEA message is reserved and
-   indicates that this field is ignored.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 63]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-5.3.4.  Firmware-Revision AVP
-
-   The Firmware-Revision AVP (AVP Code 267) is of type Unsigned32 and is
-   used to inform a Diameter peer of the firmware revision of the
-   issuing device.
-
-   For devices that do not have a firmware revision (general-purpose
-   computers running Diameter software modules, for instance), the
-   revision of the Diameter software module may be reported instead.
-
-5.3.5.  Host-IP-Address AVP
-
-   The Host-IP-Address AVP (AVP Code 257) is of type Address and is used
-   to inform a Diameter peer of the sender's IP address.  All source
-   addresses that a Diameter node expects to use with SCTP [RFC4960] or
-   DTLS/SCTP [RFC6083] MUST be advertised in the CER and CEA messages by
-   including a Host-IP-Address AVP for each address.
-
-5.3.6.  Supported-Vendor-Id AVP
-
-   The Supported-Vendor-Id AVP (AVP Code 265) is of type Unsigned32 and
-   contains the IANA "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Codes"
-   [ENTERPRISE] value assigned to a vendor other than the device vendor
-   but including the application vendor.  This is used in the CER and
-   CEA messages in order to inform the peer that the sender supports (a
-   subset of) the Vendor-Specific AVPs defined by the vendor identified
-   in this AVP.  The value of this AVP MUST NOT be set to zero.
-   Multiple instances of this AVP containing the same value SHOULD NOT
-   be sent.
-
-5.3.7.  Product-Name AVP
-
-   The Product-Name AVP (AVP Code 269) is of type UTF8String and
-   contains the vendor-assigned name for the product.  The Product-Name
-   AVP SHOULD remain constant across firmware revisions for the same
-   product.
-
-5.4.  Disconnecting Peer Connections
-
-   When a Diameter node disconnects one of its transport connections,
-   its peer cannot know the reason for the disconnect and will most
-   likely assume that a connectivity problem occurred or that the peer
-   has rebooted.  In these cases, the peer may periodically attempt to
-   reconnect, as stated in Section 2.1.  In the event that the
-   disconnect was a result of either a shortage of internal resources or
-   simply that the node in question has no intentions of forwarding any
-   Diameter messages to the peer in the foreseeable future, a periodic
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   connection request would not be welcomed.  The Disconnection-Reason
-   AVP contains the reason the Diameter node issued the Disconnect-Peer-
-   Request message.
-
-   The Disconnect-Peer-Request message is used by a Diameter node to
-   inform its peer of its intent to disconnect the transport layer and
-   that the peer shouldn't reconnect unless it has a valid reason to do
-   so (e.g., message to be forwarded).  Upon receipt of the message, the
-   Disconnect-Peer-Answer message is returned, which SHOULD contain an
-   error if messages have recently been forwarded, and are likely in
-   flight, which would otherwise cause a race condition.
-
-   The receiver of the Disconnect-Peer-Answer message initiates the
-   transport disconnect.  The sender of the Disconnect-Peer-Answer
-   message should be able to detect the transport closure and clean up
-   the connection.
-
-5.4.1.  Disconnect-Peer-Request
-
-   The Disconnect-Peer-Request (DPR), indicated by the Command Code set
-   to 282 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit set, is sent to a peer to
-   inform it of its intentions to shut down the transport connection.
-   Upon detection of a transport failure, this message MUST NOT be sent
-   to an alternate peer.
-
-      Message Format
-
-         <DPR>  ::= < Diameter Header: 282, REQ >
-                    { Origin-Host }
-                    { Origin-Realm }
-                    { Disconnect-Cause }
-                  * [ AVP ]
-
-5.4.2.   Disconnect-Peer-Answer
-
-   The Disconnect-Peer-Answer (DPA), indicated by the Command Code set
-   to 282 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit cleared, is sent as a response
-   to the Disconnect-Peer-Request message.  Upon receipt of this
-   message, the transport connection is shut down.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-      Message Format
-
-         <DPA>  ::= < Diameter Header: 282 >
-                    { Result-Code }
-                    { Origin-Host }
-                    { Origin-Realm }
-                    [ Error-Message ]
-                    [ Failed-AVP ]
-                  * [ AVP ]
-
-
-5.4.3.   Disconnect-Cause AVP
-
-   The Disconnect-Cause AVP (AVP Code 273) is of type Enumerated.  A
-   Diameter node MUST include this AVP in the Disconnect-Peer-Request
-   message to inform the peer of the reason for its intention to shut
-   down the transport connection.  The following values are supported:
-
-      REBOOTING                         0
-         A scheduled reboot is imminent.  A receiver of a DPR with
-         above result code MAY attempt reconnection.
-
-      BUSY                              1
-         The peer's internal resources are constrained, and it has
-         determined that the transport connection needs to be closed.
-         A receiver of a DPR with above result code SHOULD NOT attempt
-         reconnection.
-
-      DO_NOT_WANT_TO_TALK_TO_YOU        2
-         The peer has determined that it does not see a need for the
-         transport connection to exist, since it does not expect any
-         messages to be exchanged in the near future.  A receiver of a
-         DPR with above result code SHOULD NOT attempt reconnection.
-
-5.5.  Transport Failure Detection
-
-   Given the nature of the Diameter protocol, it is recommended that
-   transport failures be detected as soon as possible.  Detecting such
-   failures will minimize the occurrence of messages sent to unavailable
-   agents, resulting in unnecessary delays, and will provide better
-   failover performance.  The Device-Watchdog-Request and Device-
-   Watchdog-Answer messages, defined in this section, are used to pro-
-   actively detect transport failures.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-5.5.1.  Device-Watchdog-Request
-
-   The Device-Watchdog-Request (DWR), indicated by the Command Code set
-   to 280 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit set, is sent to a peer when no
-   traffic has been exchanged between two peers (see Section 5.5.3).
-   Upon detection of a transport failure, this message MUST NOT be sent
-   to an alternate peer.
-
-      Message Format
-
-         <DWR>  ::= < Diameter Header: 280, REQ >
-                    { Origin-Host }
-                    { Origin-Realm }
-                    [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                  * [ AVP ]
-
-5.5.2.  Device-Watchdog-Answer
-
-   The Device-Watchdog-Answer (DWA), indicated by the Command Code set
-   to 280 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit cleared, is sent as a response
-   to the Device-Watchdog-Request message.
-
-      Message Format
-
-         <DWA>  ::= < Diameter Header: 280 >
-                    { Result-Code }
-                    { Origin-Host }
-                    { Origin-Realm }
-                    [ Error-Message ]
-                    [ Failed-AVP ]
-                    [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                  * [ AVP ]
-
-5.5.3.   Transport Failure Algorithm
-
-   The transport failure algorithm is defined in [RFC3539].  All
-   Diameter implementations MUST support the algorithm defined in that
-   specification in order to be compliant to the Diameter base protocol.
-
-5.5.4.  Failover and Failback Procedures
-
-   In the event that a transport failure is detected with a peer, it is
-   necessary for all pending request messages to be forwarded to an
-   alternate agent, if possible.  This is commonly referred to as
-   "failover".
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   In order for a Diameter node to perform failover procedures, it is
-   necessary for the node to maintain a pending message queue for a
-   given peer.  When an answer message is received, the corresponding
-   request is removed from the queue.  The Hop-by-Hop Identifier field
-   is used to match the answer with the queued request.
-
-   When a transport failure is detected, if possible, all messages in
-   the queue are sent to an alternate agent with the T flag set.  On
-   booting a Diameter client or agent, the T flag is also set on any
-   remaining records in non-volatile storage that are still waiting to
-   be transmitted.  An example of a case where it is not possible to
-   forward the message to an alternate server is when the message has a
-   fixed destination, and the unavailable peer is the message's final
-   destination (see Destination-Host AVP).  Such an error requires that
-   the agent return an answer message with the 'E' bit set and the
-   Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER.
-
-   It is important to note that multiple identical requests or answers
-   MAY be received as a result of a failover.  The End-to-End Identifier
-   field in the Diameter header along with the Origin-Host AVP MUST be
-   used to identify duplicate messages.
-
-   As described in Section 2.1, a connection request should be
-   periodically attempted with the failed peer in order to re-establish
-   the transport connection.  Once a connection has been successfully
-   established, messages can once again be forwarded to the peer.  This
-   is commonly referred to as "failback".
-
-5.6.  Peer State Machine
-
-   This section contains a finite state machine that MUST be observed by
-   all Diameter implementations.  Each Diameter node MUST follow the
-   state machine described below when communicating with each peer.
-   Multiple actions are separated by commas, and may continue on
-   succeeding lines, as space requires.  Similarly, state and next state
-   may also span multiple lines, as space requires.
-
-   This state machine is closely coupled with the state machine
-   described in [RFC3539], which is used to open, close, failover,
-   probe, and reopen transport connections.  In particular, note that
-   [RFC3539] requires the use of watchdog messages to probe connections.
-   For Diameter, DWR and DWA messages are to be used.
-
-   The I- prefix is used to represent the initiator (connecting)
-   connection, while the R- prefix is used to represent the responder
-   (listening) connection.  The lack of a prefix indicates that the
-   event or action is the same regardless of the connection on which the
-   event occurred.
-
-
-
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-
-
-   The stable states that a state machine may be in are Closed, I-Open,
-   and R-Open; all other states are intermediate.  Note that I-Open and
-   R-Open are equivalent except for whether the initiator or responder
-   transport connection is used for communication.
-
-   A CER message is always sent on the initiating connection immediately
-   after the connection request is successfully completed.  In the case
-   of an election, one of the two connections will shut down.  The
-   responder connection will survive if the Origin-Host of the local
-   Diameter entity is higher than that of the peer; the initiator
-   connection will survive if the peer's Origin-Host is higher.  All
-   subsequent messages are sent on the surviving connection.  Note that
-   the results of an election on one peer are guaranteed to be the
-   inverse of the results on the other.
-
-   For TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP usage, a TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP handshake
-   SHOULD begin when both ends are in the closed state prior to any
-   Diameter message exchanges.  The TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP connection
-   SHOULD be established before sending any CER or CEA message to secure
-   and protect the capabilities information of both peers.  The TLS/TCP
-   and DTLS/SCTP connection SHOULD be disconnected when the state
-   machine moves to the closed state.  When connecting to responders
-   that do not conform to this document (i.e., older Diameter
-   implementations that are not prepared to received TLS/TCP and DTLS/
-   SCTP connections in the closed state), the initial TLS/TCP and DTLS/
-   SCTP connection attempt will fail.  The initiator MAY then attempt to
-   connect via TCP or SCTP and initiate the TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP
-   handshake when both ends are in the open state.  If the handshake is
-   successful, all further messages will be sent via TLS/TCP and DTLS/
-   SCTP.  If the handshake fails, both ends move to the closed state.
-
-   The state machine constrains only the behavior of a Diameter
-   implementation as seen by Diameter peers through events on the wire.
-
-   Any implementation that produces equivalent results is considered
-   compliant.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-      state            event              action         next state
-      -----------------------------------------------------------------
-      Closed           Start            I-Snd-Conn-Req   Wait-Conn-Ack
-                       R-Conn-CER       R-Accept,        R-Open
-                                        Process-CER,
-                                        R-Snd-CEA
-
-      Wait-Conn-Ack    I-Rcv-Conn-Ack   I-Snd-CER        Wait-I-CEA
-                       I-Rcv-Conn-Nack  Cleanup          Closed
-                       R-Conn-CER       R-Accept,        Wait-Conn-Ack/
-                                        Process-CER      Elect
-                       Timeout          Error            Closed
-
-      Wait-I-CEA       I-Rcv-CEA        Process-CEA      I-Open
-                       R-Conn-CER       R-Accept,        Wait-Returns
-                                        Process-CER,
-                                        Elect
-                       I-Peer-Disc      I-Disc           Closed
-                       I-Rcv-Non-CEA    Error            Closed
-                       Timeout          Error            Closed
-
-      Wait-Conn-Ack/   I-Rcv-Conn-Ack   I-Snd-CER,Elect  Wait-Returns
-      Elect            I-Rcv-Conn-Nack  R-Snd-CEA        R-Open
-                       R-Peer-Disc      R-Disc           Wait-Conn-Ack
-                       R-Conn-CER       R-Reject         Wait-Conn-Ack/
-                                                         Elect
-                       Timeout          Error            Closed
-
-      Wait-Returns     Win-Election     I-Disc,R-Snd-CEA R-Open
-                       I-Peer-Disc      I-Disc,          R-Open
-                                        R-Snd-CEA
-                       I-Rcv-CEA        R-Disc           I-Open
-                       R-Peer-Disc      R-Disc           Wait-I-CEA
-                       R-Conn-CER       R-Reject         Wait-Returns
-                       Timeout          Error            Closed
-
-      R-Open           Send-Message     R-Snd-Message    R-Open
-                       R-Rcv-Message    Process          R-Open
-                       R-Rcv-DWR        Process-DWR,     R-Open
-                                        R-Snd-DWA
-                       R-Rcv-DWA        Process-DWA      R-Open
-                       R-Conn-CER       R-Reject         R-Open
-                       Stop             R-Snd-DPR        Closing
-                       R-Rcv-DPR        R-Snd-DPA        Closing
-                       R-Peer-Disc      R-Disc           Closed
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-      I-Open           Send-Message     I-Snd-Message    I-Open
-                       I-Rcv-Message    Process          I-Open
-                       I-Rcv-DWR        Process-DWR,     I-Open
-                                        I-Snd-DWA
-                       I-Rcv-DWA        Process-DWA      I-Open
-                       R-Conn-CER       R-Reject         I-Open
-                       Stop             I-Snd-DPR        Closing
-                       I-Rcv-DPR        I-Snd-DPA        Closing
-                       I-Peer-Disc      I-Disc           Closed
-
-      Closing          I-Rcv-DPA        I-Disc           Closed
-                       R-Rcv-DPA        R-Disc           Closed
-                       Timeout          Error            Closed
-                       I-Peer-Disc      I-Disc           Closed
-                       R-Peer-Disc      R-Disc           Closed
-
-5.6.1.  Incoming Connections
-
-   When a connection request is received from a Diameter peer, it is
-   not, in the general case, possible to know the identity of that peer
-   until a CER is received from it.  This is because host and port
-   determine the identity of a Diameter peer; the source port of an
-   incoming connection is arbitrary.  Upon receipt of a CER, the
-   identity of the connecting peer can be uniquely determined from the
-   Origin-Host.
-
-   For this reason, a Diameter peer must employ logic separate from the
-   state machine to receive connection requests, accept them, and await
-   the CER.  Once the CER arrives on a new connection, the Origin-Host
-   that identifies the peer is used to locate the state machine
-   associated with that peer, and the new connection and CER are passed
-   to the state machine as an R-Conn-CER event.
-
-   The logic that handles incoming connections SHOULD close and discard
-   the connection if any message other than a CER arrives or if an
-   implementation-defined timeout occurs prior to receipt of CER.
-
-   Because handling of incoming connections up to and including receipt
-   of a CER requires logic, separate from that of any individual state
-   machine associated with a particular peer, it is described separately
-   in this section rather than in the state machine above.
-
-5.6.2.  Events
-
-   Transitions and actions in the automaton are caused by events.  In
-   this section, we will ignore the I- and R- prefixes, since the actual
-   event would be identical, but it would occur on one of two possible
-   connections.
-
-
-
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-
-
-   Start          The Diameter application has signaled that a
-                  connection should be initiated with the peer.
-
-   R-Conn-CER     An acknowledgement is received stating that the
-                  transport connection has been established, and the
-                  associated CER has arrived.
-
-   Rcv-Conn-Ack   A positive acknowledgement is received confirming that
-                  the transport connection is established.
-
-   Rcv-Conn-Nack  A negative acknowledgement was received stating that
-                  the transport connection was not established.
-
-   Timeout        An application-defined timer has expired while waiting
-                  for some event.
-
-   Rcv-CER        A CER message from the peer was received.
-
-   Rcv-CEA        A CEA message from the peer was received.
-
-   Rcv-Non-CEA    A message, other than a CEA, from the peer was
-                  received.
-
-   Peer-Disc      A disconnection indication from the peer was received.
-
-   Rcv-DPR        A DPR message from the peer was received.
-
-   Rcv-DPA        A DPA message from the peer was received.
-
-   Win-Election   An election was held, and the local node was the
-                  winner.
-
-   Send-Message   A message is to be sent.
-
-   Rcv-Message    A message other than CER, CEA, DPR, DPA, DWR, or DWA
-                  was received.
-
-   Stop           The Diameter application has signaled that a
-                  connection should be terminated (e.g., on system
-                  shutdown).
-
-5.6.3.  Actions
-
-   Actions in the automaton are caused by events and typically indicate
-   the transmission of packets and/or an action to be taken on the
-   connection.  In this section, we will ignore the I- and R- prefixes,
-   since the actual action would be identical, but it would occur on one
-   of two possible connections.
-
-
-
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-
-
-   Snd-Conn-Req   A transport connection is initiated with the peer.
-
-   Accept         The incoming connection associated with the R-Conn-CER
-                  is accepted as the responder connection.
-
-   Reject         The incoming connection associated with the R-Conn-CER
-                  is disconnected.
-
-   Process-CER    The CER associated with the R-Conn-CER is processed.
-
-   Snd-CER        A CER message is sent to the peer.
-
-   Snd-CEA        A CEA message is sent to the peer.
-
-   Cleanup        If necessary, the connection is shut down, and any
-                  local resources are freed.
-
-   Error          The transport layer connection is disconnected,
-                  either politely or abortively, in response to
-                  an error condition.  Local resources are freed.
-
-   Process-CEA    A received CEA is processed.
-
-   Snd-DPR        A DPR message is sent to the peer.
-
-   Snd-DPA        A DPA message is sent to the peer.
-
-   Disc           The transport layer connection is disconnected,
-                  and local resources are freed.
-
-   Elect          An election occurs (see Section 5.6.4 for more
-                  information).
-
-   Snd-Message    A message is sent.
-
-   Snd-DWR        A DWR message is sent.
-
-   Snd-DWA        A DWA message is sent.
-
-   Process-DWR    The DWR message is serviced.
-
-   Process-DWA    The DWA message is serviced.
-
-   Process        A message is serviced.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-5.6.4.  The Election Process
-
-   The election is performed on the responder.  The responder compares
-   the Origin-Host received in the CER with its own Origin-Host as two
-   streams of octets.  If the local Origin-Host lexicographically
-   succeeds the received Origin-Host, a Win-Election event is issued
-   locally.  Diameter identities are in ASCII form; therefore, the
-   lexical comparison is consistent with DNS case insensitivity, where
-   octets that fall in the ASCII range 'a' through 'z' MUST compare
-   equally to their uppercase counterparts between 'A' and 'Z'.  See
-   Appendix D for interactions between the Diameter protocol and
-   Internationalized Domain Name (IDNs).
-
-   The winner of the election MUST close the connection it initiated.
-   Historically, maintaining the responder side of a connection was more
-   efficient than maintaining the initiator side.  However, current
-   practices makes this distinction irrelevant.
-
-6.  Diameter Message Processing
-
-   This section describes how Diameter requests and answers are created
-   and processed.
-
-6.1.  Diameter Request Routing Overview
-
-   A request is sent towards its final destination using one of the
-   following three combinations of the Destination-Realm and
-   Destination-Host AVPs:
-
-   o  A request that is not able to be proxied (such as a CER) MUST NOT
-      contain either Destination-Realm or Destination-Host AVPs.
-
-   o  A request that needs to be sent to a home server serving a
-      specific realm, but not to a specific server (such as the first
-      request of a series of round trips), MUST contain a Destination-
-      Realm AVP but MUST NOT contain a Destination-Host AVP.  For
-      Diameter clients, the value of the Destination-Realm AVP MAY be
-      extracted from the User-Name AVP, or other methods.
-
-   o  Otherwise, a request that needs to be sent to a specific home
-      server among those serving a given realm MUST contain both the
-      Destination-Realm and Destination-Host AVPs.
-
-   The Destination-Host AVP is used as described above when the
-   destination of the request is fixed, which includes:
-
-   o  Authentication requests that span multiple round trips.
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   o  A Diameter message that uses a security mechanism that makes use
-      of a pre-established session key shared between the source and the
-      final destination of the message.
-
-   o  Server-initiated messages that MUST be received by a specific
-      Diameter client (e.g., access device), such as the Abort-Session-
-      Request message, which is used to request that a particular user's
-      session be terminated.
-
-   Note that an agent can only forward a request to a host described in
-   the Destination-Host AVP if the host in question is included in its
-   peer table (see Section 2.6).  Otherwise, the request is routed based
-   on the Destination-Realm only (see Section 6.1.6).
-
-   When a message is received, the message is processed in the following
-   order:
-
-   o  If the message is destined for the local host, the procedures
-      listed in Section 6.1.4 are followed.
-
-   o  If the message is intended for a Diameter peer with whom the local
-      host is able to directly communicate, the procedures listed in
-      Section 6.1.5 are followed.  This is known as "Request
-      Forwarding".
-
-   o  The procedure listed in Section 6.1.6 is followed, which is known
-      as "Request Routing".
-
-   o  If none of the above are successful, an answer is returned with
-      the Result-Code set to DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER, with the 'E'
-      bit set.
-
-   For routing of Diameter messages to work within an administrative
-   domain, all Diameter nodes within the realm MUST be peers.
-
-   The overview contained in this section (6.1) is intended to provide
-   general guidelines to Diameter developers.  Implementations are free
-   to use different methods than the ones described here as long as they
-   conform to the requirements specified in Sections 6.1.1 through
-   6.1.9.  See Section 7 for more details on error handling.
-
-6.1.1.  Originating a Request
-
-   When creating a request, in addition to any other procedures
-   described in the application definition for that specific request,
-   the following procedures MUST be followed:
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   o  the Command Code is set to the appropriate value;
-
-   o  the 'R' bit is set;
-
-   o  the End-to-End Identifier is set to a locally unique value;
-
-   o  the Origin-Host and Origin-Realm AVPs MUST be set to the
-      appropriate values, used to identify the source of the message;
-      and
-
-   o  the Destination-Host and Destination-Realm AVPs MUST be set to the
-      appropriate values, as described in Section 6.1.
-
-6.1.2.  Sending a Request
-
-   When sending a request, originated either locally or as the result of
-   a forwarding or routing operation, the following procedures SHOULD be
-   followed:
-
-   o  The Hop-by-Hop Identifier SHOULD be set to a locally unique value.
-
-   o  The message SHOULD be saved in the list of pending requests.
-
-   Other actions to perform on the message based on the particular role
-   the agent is playing are described in the following sections.
-
-6.1.3.  Receiving Requests
-
-   A relay or proxy agent MUST check for forwarding loops when receiving
-   requests.  A loop is detected if the server finds its own identity in
-   a Route-Record AVP.  When such an event occurs, the agent MUST answer
-   with the Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_LOOP_DETECTED.
-
-6.1.4.  Processing Local Requests
-
-   A request is known to be for local consumption when one of the
-   following conditions occurs:
-
-   o  The Destination-Host AVP contains the local host's identity;
-
-   o  The Destination-Host AVP is not present, the Destination-Realm AVP
-      contains a realm the server is configured to process locally, and
-      the Diameter application is locally supported; or
-
-   o  Both the Destination-Host and the Destination-Realm are not
-      present.
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   When a request is locally processed, the rules in Section 6.2 should
-   be used to generate the corresponding answer.
-
-6.1.5.  Request Forwarding
-
-   Request forwarding is done using the Diameter peer table.  The
-   Diameter peer table contains all of the peers with which the local
-   node is able to directly communicate.
-
-   When a request is received, and the host encoded in the Destination-
-   Host AVP is one that is present in the peer table, the message SHOULD
-   be forwarded to the peer.
-
-6.1.6.  Request Routing
-
-   Diameter request message routing is done via realms and Application
-   Ids. A Diameter message that may be forwarded by Diameter agents
-   (proxies, redirect agents, or relay agents) MUST include the target
-   realm in the Destination-Realm AVP.  Request routing SHOULD rely on
-   the Destination-Realm AVP and the Application Id present in the
-   request message header to aid in the routing decision.  The realm MAY
-   be retrieved from the User-Name AVP, which is in the form of a
-   Network Access Identifier (NAI).  The realm portion of the NAI is
-   inserted in the Destination-Realm AVP.
-
-   Diameter agents MAY have a list of locally supported realms and
-   applications, and they MAY have a list of externally supported realms
-   and applications.  When a request is received that includes a realm
-   and/or application that is not locally supported, the message is
-   routed to the peer configured in the routing table (see Section 2.7).
-
-   Realm names and Application Ids are the minimum supported routing
-   criteria, additional information may be needed to support redirect
-   semantics.
-
-6.1.7.  Predictive Loop Avoidance
-
-   Before forwarding or routing a request, Diameter agents, in addition
-   to performing the processing described in Section 6.1.3, SHOULD check
-   for the presence of a candidate route's peer identity in any of the
-   Route-Record AVPs.  In the event of the agent detecting the presence
-   of a candidate route's peer identity in a Route-Record AVP, the agent
-   MUST ignore such a route for the Diameter request message and attempt
-   alternate routes if any exist.  In case all the candidate routes are
-   eliminated by the above criteria, the agent SHOULD return a
-   DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER message.
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-6.1.8.  Redirecting Requests
-
-   When a redirect agent receives a request whose routing entry is set
-   to REDIRECT, it MUST reply with an answer message with the 'E' bit
-   set, while maintaining the Hop-by-Hop Identifier in the header, and
-   include the Result-Code AVP to DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION.  Each of
-   the servers associated with the routing entry are added in a separate
-   Redirect-Host AVP.
-
-                     +------------------+
-                     |     Diameter     |
-                     |  Redirect Agent  |
-                     +------------------+
-                      ^    |    2. command + 'E' bit
-       1. Request     |    |    Result-Code =
-      joe@example.com |    |    DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION +
-                      |    |    Redirect-Host AVP(s)
-                      |    v
-                  +-------------+  3. Request  +-------------+
-                  | example.com |------------->| example.net |
-                  |    Relay    |              |   Diameter  |
-                  |    Agent    |<-------------|    Server   |
-                  +-------------+  4. Answer   +-------------+
-
-                     Figure 5: Diameter Redirect Agent
-
-   The receiver of an answer message with the 'E' bit set and the
-   Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION uses the Hop-by-
-   Hop Identifier in the Diameter header to identify the request in the
-   pending message queue (see Section 5.5.4) that is to be redirected.
-   If no transport connection exists with the new peer, one is created,
-   and the request is sent directly to it.
-
-   Multiple Redirect-Host AVPs are allowed.  The receiver of the answer
-   message with the 'E' bit set selects exactly one of these hosts as
-   the destination of the redirected message.
-
-   When the Redirect-Host-Usage AVP included in the answer message has a
-   non-zero value, a route entry for the redirect indications is created
-   and cached by the receiver.  The redirect usage for such a route
-   entry is set by the value of Redirect-Host-Usage AVP and the lifetime
-   of the cached route entry is set by Redirect-Max-Cache-Time AVP
-   value.
-
-   It is possible that multiple redirect indications can create multiple
-   cached route entries differing only in their redirect usage and the
-   peer to forward messages to.  As an example, two(2) route entries
-   that are created by two(2) redirect indications results in two(2)
-
-
-
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-
-
-   cached routes for the same realm and Application Id.  However, one
-   has a redirect usage of ALL_SESSION, where matching requests will be
-   forwarded to one peer; the other has a redirect usage of ALL_REALM,
-   where request are forwarded to another peer.  Therefore, an incoming
-   request that matches the realm and Application Id of both routes will
-   need additional resolution.  In such a case, a routing precedence
-   rule MUST be used against the redirect usage value to resolve the
-   contention.  The precedence rule can be found in Section 6.13.
-
-6.1.9.  Relaying and Proxying Requests
-
-   A relay or proxy agent MUST append a Route-Record AVP to all requests
-   forwarded.  The AVP contains the identity of the peer from which the
-   request was received.
-
-   The Hop-by-Hop Identifier in the request is saved and replaced with a
-   locally unique value.  The source of the request is also saved, which
-   includes the IP address, port, and protocol.
-
-   A relay or proxy agent MAY include the Proxy-Info AVP in requests if
-   it requires access to any local state information when the
-   corresponding response is received.  The Proxy-Info AVP has security
-   implications as state information is distributed to other entities.
-   As such, it is RECOMMENDED that the content of the Proxy-Info AVP be
-   protected with cryptographic mechanisms, for example, by using a
-   keyed message digest such as HMAC-SHA1 [RFC2104].  Such a mechanism,
-   however, requires the management of keys, although only locally at
-   the Diameter server.  Still, a full description of the management of
-   the keys used to protect the Proxy-Info AVP is beyond the scope of
-   this document.  Below is a list of common recommendations:
-
-   o  The keys should be generated securely following the randomness
-      recommendations in [RFC4086].
-
-   o  The keys and cryptographic protection algorithms should be at
-      least 128 bits in strength.
-
-   o  The keys should not be used for any other purpose than generating
-      and verifying instances of the Proxy-Info AVP.
-
-   o  The keys should be changed regularly.
-
-   o  The keys should be changed if the AVP format or cryptographic
-      protection algorithms change.
-
-   The message is then forwarded to the next hop, as identified in the
-   routing table.
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   Figure 6 provides an example of message routing using the procedures
-   listed in these sections.
-
-       (Origin-Host=nas.example.net)    (Origin-Host=nas.example.net)
-       (Origin-Realm=example.net)       (Origin-Realm=example.net)
-       (Destination-Realm=example.com)  (Destination-Realm=example.com)
-                                        (Route-Record=nas.example.net)
-      +------+      ------>      +------+      ------>      +------+
-      |      |     (Request)     |      |      (Request)    |      |
-      | NAS  +-------------------+ DRL  +-------------------+ HMS  |
-      |      |                   |      |                   |      |
-      +------+     <------       +------+     <------       +------+
-     example.net    (Answer)   example.net     (Answer)   example.com
-          (Origin-Host=hms.example.com)   (Origin-Host=hms.example.com)
-          (Origin-Realm=example.com)      (Origin-Realm=example.com)
-
-                  Figure 6: Routing of Diameter messages
-
-   Relay and proxy agents are not required to perform full inspection of
-   incoming messages.  At a minimum, validation of the message header
-   and relevant routing AVPs has to be done when relaying messages.
-   Proxy agents may optionally perform more in-depth message validation
-   for applications in which it is interested.
-
-6.2.  Diameter Answer Processing
-
-   When a request is locally processed, the following procedures MUST be
-   applied to create the associated answer, in addition to any
-   additional procedures that MAY be discussed in the Diameter
-   application defining the command:
-
-   o  The same Hop-by-Hop Identifier in the request is used in the
-      answer.
-
-   o  The local host's identity is encoded in the Origin-Host AVP.
-
-   o  The Destination-Host and Destination-Realm AVPs MUST NOT be
-      present in the answer message.
-
-   o  The Result-Code AVP is added with its value indicating success or
-      failure.
-
-   o  If the Session-Id is present in the request, it MUST be included
-      in the answer.
-
-   o  Any Proxy-Info AVPs in the request MUST be added to the answer
-      message, in the same order they were present in the request.
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   o  The 'P' bit is set to the same value as the one in the request.
-
-   o  The same End-to-End identifier in the request is used in the
-      answer.
-
-   Note that the error messages (see Section 7) are also subjected to
-   the above processing rules.
-
-6.2.1.   Processing Received Answers
-
-   A Diameter client or proxy MUST match the Hop-by-Hop Identifier in an
-   answer received against the list of pending requests.  The
-   corresponding message should be removed from the list of pending
-   requests.  It SHOULD ignore answers received that do not match a
-   known Hop-by-Hop Identifier.
-
-6.2.2.  Relaying and Proxying Answers
-
-   If the answer is for a request that was proxied or relayed, the agent
-   MUST restore the original value of the Diameter header's Hop-by-Hop
-   Identifier field.
-
-   If the last Proxy-Info AVP in the message is targeted to the local
-   Diameter server, the AVP MUST be removed before the answer is
-   forwarded.
-
-   If a relay or proxy agent receives an answer with a Result-Code AVP
-   indicating a failure, it MUST NOT modify the contents of the AVP.
-   Any additional local errors detected SHOULD be logged but not
-   reflected in the Result-Code AVP.  If the agent receives an answer
-   message with a Result-Code AVP indicating success, and it wishes to
-   modify the AVP to indicate an error, it MUST modify the Result-Code
-   AVP to contain the appropriate error in the message destined towards
-   the access device as well as include the Error-Reporting-Host AVP; it
-   MUST also issue an STR on behalf of the access device towards the
-   Diameter server.
-
-   The agent MUST then send the answer to the host that it received the
-   original request from.
-
-6.3.  Origin-Host AVP
-
-   The Origin-Host AVP (AVP Code 264) is of type DiameterIdentity, and
-   it MUST be present in all Diameter messages.  This AVP identifies the
-   endpoint that originated the Diameter message.  Relay agents MUST NOT
-   modify this AVP.
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   The value of the Origin-Host AVP is guaranteed to be unique within a
-   single host.
-
-   Note that the Origin-Host AVP may resolve to more than one address as
-   the Diameter peer may support more than one address.
-
-   This AVP SHOULD be placed as close to the Diameter header as
-   possible.
-
-6.4.  Origin-Realm AVP
-
-   The Origin-Realm AVP (AVP Code 296) is of type DiameterIdentity.
-   This AVP contains the Realm of the originator of any Diameter message
-   and MUST be present in all messages.
-
-   This AVP SHOULD be placed as close to the Diameter header as
-   possible.
-
-6.5.  Destination-Host AVP
-
-   The Destination-Host AVP (AVP Code 293) is of type DiameterIdentity.
-   This AVP MUST be present in all unsolicited agent initiated messages,
-   MAY be present in request messages, and MUST NOT be present in answer
-   messages.
-
-   The absence of the Destination-Host AVP will cause a message to be
-   sent to any Diameter server supporting the application within the
-   realm specified in Destination-Realm AVP.
-
-   This AVP SHOULD be placed as close to the Diameter header as
-   possible.
-
-6.6.  Destination-Realm AVP
-
-   The Destination-Realm AVP (AVP Code 283) is of type DiameterIdentity
-   and contains the realm to which the message is to be routed.  The
-   Destination-Realm AVP MUST NOT be present in answer messages.
-   Diameter clients insert the realm portion of the User-Name AVP.
-   Diameter servers initiating a request message use the value of the
-   Origin-Realm AVP from a previous message received from the intended
-   target host (unless it is known a priori).  When present, the
-   Destination-Realm AVP is used to perform message routing decisions.
-
-   The CCF for a request message that includes the Destination-Realm AVP
-   SHOULD list the Destination-Realm AVP as a required AVP (an AVP
-   indicated as {AVP}); otherwise, the message is inherently a non-
-   routable message.
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   This AVP SHOULD be placed as close to the Diameter header as
-   possible.
-
-6.7.  Routing AVPs
-
-   The AVPs defined in this section are Diameter AVPs used for routing
-   purposes.  These AVPs change as Diameter messages are processed by
-   agents.
-
-6.7.1.  Route-Record AVP
-
-   The Route-Record AVP (AVP Code 282) is of type DiameterIdentity.  The
-   identity added in this AVP MUST be the same as the one received in
-   the Origin-Host of the Capabilities Exchange message.
-
-6.7.2.  Proxy-Info AVP
-
-   The Proxy-Info AVP (AVP Code 284) is of type Grouped.  This AVP
-   contains the identity and local state information of the Diameter
-   node that creates and adds it to a message.  The Grouped Data field
-   has the following CCF grammar:
-
-         Proxy-Info ::= < AVP Header: 284 >
-                        { Proxy-Host }
-                        { Proxy-State }
-                      * [ AVP ]
-
-6.7.3.  Proxy-Host AVP
-
-   The Proxy-Host AVP (AVP Code 280) is of type DiameterIdentity.  This
-   AVP contains the identity of the host that added the Proxy-Info AVP.
-
-6.7.4.  Proxy-State AVP
-
-   The Proxy-State AVP (AVP Code 33) is of type OctetString.  It
-   contains state information that would otherwise be stored at the
-   Diameter entity that created it.  As such, this AVP MUST be treated
-   as opaque data by other Diameter entities.
-
-6.8.  Auth-Application-Id AVP
-
-   The Auth-Application-Id AVP (AVP Code 258) is of type Unsigned32 and
-   is used in order to advertise support of the Authentication and
-   Authorization portion of an application (see Section 2.4).  If
-   present in a message other than CER and CEA, the value of the Auth-
-   Application-Id AVP MUST match the Application Id present in the
-   Diameter message header.
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-6.9.  Acct-Application-Id AVP
-
-   The Acct-Application-Id AVP (AVP Code 259) is of type Unsigned32 and
-   is used in order to advertise support of the accounting portion of an
-   application (see Section 2.4).  If present in a message other than
-   CER and CEA, the value of the Acct-Application-Id AVP MUST match the
-   Application Id present in the Diameter message header.
-
-6.10.  Inband-Security-Id AVP
-
-   The Inband-Security-Id AVP (AVP Code 299) is of type Unsigned32 and
-   is used in order to advertise support of the security portion of the
-   application.  The use of this AVP in CER and CEA messages is NOT
-   RECOMMENDED.  Instead, discovery of a Diameter entity's security
-   capabilities can be done either through static configuration or via
-   Diameter Peer Discovery as described in Section 5.2.
-
-   The following values are supported:
-
-
-   NO_INBAND_SECURITY 0
-
-      This peer does not support TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP.  This is the
-      default value, if the AVP is omitted.
-
-   TLS 1
-
-      This node supports TLS/TCP [RFC5246] and DTLS/SCTP [RFC6083]
-      security.
-
-6.11.  Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP
-
-   The Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP (AVP Code 260) is of type
-   Grouped and is used to advertise support of a vendor-specific
-   Diameter application.  Exactly one instance of either Auth-
-   Application-Id or Acct-Application-Id AVP MUST be present.  The
-   Application Id carried by either Auth-Application-Id or Acct-
-   Application-Id AVP MUST comply with vendor-specific Application Id
-   assignment described in Section 11.3.  It MUST also match the
-   Application Id present in the Diameter header except when used in a
-   CER or CEA message.
-
-   The Vendor-Id AVP is an informational AVP pertaining to the vendor
-   who may have authorship of the vendor-specific Diameter application.
-   It MUST NOT be used as a means of defining a completely separate
-   vendor-specific Application Id space.
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   The Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP SHOULD be placed as close to
-   the Diameter header as possible.
-
-      AVP Format
-
-      <Vendor-Specific-Application-Id> ::= < AVP Header: 260 >
-                                           { Vendor-Id }
-                                           [ Auth-Application-Id ]
-                                           [ Acct-Application-Id ]
-
-   A Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP MUST contain exactly one of
-   either Auth-Application-Id or Acct-Application-Id.  If a Vendor-
-   Specific-Application-Id is received without one of these two AVPs,
-   then the recipient SHOULD issue an answer with a Result-Code set to
-   DIAMETER_MISSING_AVP.  The answer SHOULD also include a Failed-AVP,
-   which MUST contain an example of an Auth-Application-Id AVP and an
-   Acct-Application-Id AVP.
-
-   If a Vendor-Specific-Application-Id is received that contains both
-   Auth-Application-Id and Acct-Application-Id, then the recipient MUST
-   issue an answer with Result-Code set to
-   DIAMETER_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES.  The answer MUST also include a
-   Failed-AVP, which MUST contain the received Auth-Application-Id AVP
-   and Acct-Application-Id AVP.
-
-6.12.  Redirect-Host AVP
-
-   The Redirect-Host AVP (AVP Code 292) is of type DiameterURI.  One or
-   more instances of this AVP MUST be present if the answer message's
-   'E' bit is set and the Result-Code AVP is set to
-   DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION.
-
-   Upon receiving the above, the receiving Diameter node SHOULD forward
-   the request directly to one of the hosts identified in these AVPs.
-   The server contained in the selected Redirect-Host AVP SHOULD be used
-   for all messages matching the criteria set by the Redirect-Host-Usage
-   AVP.
-
-6.13.  Redirect-Host-Usage AVP
-
-   The Redirect-Host-Usage AVP (AVP Code 261) is of type Enumerated.
-   This AVP MAY be present in answer messages whose 'E' bit is set and
-   the Result-Code AVP is set to DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION.
-
-   When present, this AVP provides hints about how the routing entry
-   resulting from the Redirect-Host is to be used.  The following values
-   are supported:
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   DONT_CACHE 0
-
-      The host specified in the Redirect-Host AVP SHOULD NOT be cached.
-      This is the default value.
-
-   ALL_SESSION 1
-
-      All messages within the same session, as defined by the same value
-      of the Session-ID AVP SHOULD be sent to the host specified in the
-      Redirect-Host AVP.
-
-   ALL_REALM 2
-
-      All messages destined for the realm requested SHOULD be sent to
-      the host specified in the Redirect-Host AVP.
-
-   REALM_AND_APPLICATION 3
-
-      All messages for the application requested to the realm specified
-      SHOULD be sent to the host specified in the Redirect-Host AVP.
-
-   ALL_APPLICATION 4
-
-      All messages for the application requested SHOULD be sent to the
-      host specified in the Redirect-Host AVP.
-
-   ALL_HOST 5
-
-      All messages that would be sent to the host that generated the
-      Redirect-Host SHOULD be sent to the host specified in the
-      Redirect-Host AVP.
-
-   ALL_USER 6
-
-      All messages for the user requested SHOULD be sent to the host
-      specified in the Redirect-Host AVP.
-
-   When multiple cached routes are created by redirect indications and
-   they differ only in redirect usage and peers to forward requests to
-   (see Section 6.1.8), a precedence rule MUST be applied to the
-   redirect usage values of the cached routes during normal routing to
-   resolve contentions that may occur.  The precedence rule is the order
-   that dictate which redirect usage should be considered before any
-   other as they appear.  The order is as follows:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   1.  ALL_SESSION
-
-   2.  ALL_USER
-
-   3.  REALM_AND_APPLICATION
-
-   4.  ALL_REALM
-
-   5.  ALL_APPLICATION
-
-   6.  ALL_HOST
-
-6.14.  Redirect-Max-Cache-Time AVP
-
-   The Redirect-Max-Cache-Time AVP (AVP Code 262) is of type Unsigned32.
-   This AVP MUST be present in answer messages whose 'E' bit is set,
-   whose Result-Code AVP is set to DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION, and
-   whose Redirect-Host-Usage AVP set to a non-zero value.
-
-   This AVP contains the maximum number of seconds the peer and route
-   table entries, created as a result of the Redirect-Host, SHOULD be
-   cached.  Note that once a host is no longer reachable, any associated
-   cache, peer, and routing table entries MUST be deleted.
-
-7.  Error Handling
-
-   There are two different types of errors in Diameter; protocol errors
-   and application errors.  A protocol error is one that occurs at the
-   base protocol level and MAY require per-hop attention (e.g., a
-   message routing error).  Application errors, on the other hand,
-   generally occur due to a problem with a function specified in a
-   Diameter application (e.g., user authentication, missing AVP).
-
-   Result-Code AVP values that are used to report protocol errors MUST
-   only be present in answer messages whose 'E' bit is set.  When a
-   request message is received that causes a protocol error, an answer
-   message is returned with the 'E' bit set, and the Result-Code AVP is
-   set to the appropriate protocol error value.  As the answer is sent
-   back towards the originator of the request, each proxy or relay agent
-   MAY take action on the message.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-                          1. Request        +---------+ Link Broken
-                +-------------------------->|Diameter |----///----+
-                |     +---------------------|         |           v
-         +------+--+  | 2. answer + 'E' set | Relay 2 |     +--------+
-         |Diameter |<-+ (Unable to Forward) +---------+     |Diameter|
-         |         |                                        |  Home  |
-         | Relay 1 |--+                     +---------+     | Server |
-         +---------+  |   3. Request        |Diameter |     +--------+
-                      +-------------------->|         |           ^
-                                            | Relay 3 |-----------+
-                                            +---------+
-
-        Figure 7: Example of Protocol Error Causing Answer Message
-
-   Figure 7 provides an example of a message forwarded upstream by a
-   Diameter relay.  When the message is received by Relay 2, and it
-   detects that it cannot forward the request to the home server, an
-   answer message is returned with the 'E' bit set and the Result-Code
-   AVP set to DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER.  Given that this error falls
-   within the protocol error category, Relay 1 would take special
-   action, and given the error, attempt to route the message through its
-   alternate Relay 3.
-
-            +---------+ 1. Request  +---------+ 2. Request  +---------+
-            | Access  |------------>|Diameter |------------>|Diameter |
-            |         |             |         |             |  Home   |
-            | Device  |<------------|  Relay  |<------------| Server  |
-            +---------+  4. Answer  +---------+  3. Answer  +---------+
-                       (Missing AVP)           (Missing AVP)
-
-           Figure 8: Example of Application Error Answer Message
-
-   Figure 8 provides an example of a Diameter message that caused an
-   application error.  When application errors occur, the Diameter
-   entity reporting the error clears the 'R' bit in the Command Flags
-   and adds the Result-Code AVP with the proper value.  Application
-   errors do not require any proxy or relay agent involvement;
-   therefore, the message would be forwarded back to the originator of
-   the request.
-
-   In the case where the answer message itself contains errors, any
-   related session SHOULD be terminated by sending an STR or ASR
-   message.  The Termination-Cause AVP in the STR MAY be filled with the
-   appropriate value to indicate the cause of the error.  An application
-   MAY also send an application-specific request instead of an STR or
-   ASR message to signal the error in the case where no state is
-   maintained or to allow for some form of error recovery with the
-   corresponding Diameter entity.
-
-
-
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-
-
-   There are certain Result-Code AVP application errors that require
-   additional AVPs to be present in the answer.  In these cases, the
-   Diameter node that sets the Result-Code AVP to indicate the error
-   MUST add the AVPs.  Examples are as follows:
-
-   o  A request with an unrecognized AVP is received with the 'M' bit
-      (Mandatory bit) set causes an answer to be sent with the Result-
-      Code AVP set to DIAMETER_AVP_UNSUPPORTED and the Failed-AVP AVP
-      containing the offending AVP.
-
-   o  A request with an AVP that is received with an unrecognized value
-      causes an answer to be returned with the Result-Code AVP set to
-      DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_VALUE, with the Failed-AVP AVP containing the
-      AVP causing the error.
-
-   o  A received command that is missing AVPs that are defined as
-      required in the commands CCF; examples are AVPs indicated as
-      {AVP}.  The receiver issues an answer with the Result-Code set to
-      DIAMETER_MISSING_AVP and creates an AVP with the AVP Code and
-      other fields set as expected in the missing AVP.  The created AVP
-      is then added to the Failed-AVP AVP.
-
-   The Result-Code AVP describes the error that the Diameter node
-   encountered in its processing.  In case there are multiple errors,
-   the Diameter node MUST report only the first error it encountered
-   (detected possibly in some implementation-dependent order).  The
-   specific errors that can be described by this AVP are described in
-   the following section.
-
-7.1.  Result-Code AVP
-
-   The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 268) is of type Unsigned32 and
-   indicates whether a particular request was completed successfully or
-   an error occurred.  All Diameter answer messages in IETF-defined
-   Diameter application specifications MUST include one Result-Code AVP.
-   A non-successful Result-Code AVP (one containing a non-2xxx value
-   other than DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION) MUST include the Error-
-   Reporting-Host AVP if the host setting the Result-Code AVP is
-   different from the identity encoded in the Origin-Host AVP.
-
-   The Result-Code data field contains an IANA-managed 32-bit address
-   space representing errors (see Section 11.3.2).  Diameter provides
-   the following classes of errors, all identified by the thousands
-   digit in the decimal notation:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   o  1xxx (Informational)
-
-   o  2xxx (Success)
-
-   o  3xxx (Protocol Errors)
-
-   o  4xxx (Transient Failures)
-
-   o  5xxx (Permanent Failure)
-
-   An unrecognized class (one whose first digit is not defined in this
-   section) MUST be handled as a permanent failure.
-
-7.1.1.  Informational
-
-   Errors that fall within this category are used to inform the
-   requester that a request could not be satisfied, and additional
-   action is required on its part before access is granted.
-
-   DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH 1001
-
-      This informational error is returned by a Diameter server to
-      inform the access device that the authentication mechanism being
-      used requires multiple round trips, and a subsequent request needs
-      to be issued in order for access to be granted.
-
-7.1.2.  Success
-
-   Errors that fall within the Success category are used to inform a
-   peer that a request has been successfully completed.
-
-   DIAMETER_SUCCESS 2001
-
-      The request was successfully completed.
-
-   DIAMETER_LIMITED_SUCCESS 2002
-
-      When returned, the request was successfully completed, but
-      additional processing is required by the application in order to
-      provide service to the user.
-
-7.1.3.  Protocol Errors
-
-   Errors that fall within the Protocol Error category SHOULD be treated
-   on a per-hop basis, and Diameter proxies MAY attempt to correct the
-   error, if it is possible.  Note that these errors MUST only be used
-   in answer messages whose 'E' bit is set.
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   DIAMETER_COMMAND_UNSUPPORTED 3001
-
-      This error code is used when a Diameter entity receives a message
-      with a Command Code that it does not support.
-
-   DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 3002
-
-      This error is given when Diameter cannot deliver the message to
-      the destination, either because no host within the realm
-      supporting the required application was available to process the
-      request or because the Destination-Host AVP was given without the
-      associated Destination-Realm AVP.
-
-   DIAMETER_REALM_NOT_SERVED 3003
-
-      The intended realm of the request is not recognized.
-
-   DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY 3004
-
-      When returned, a Diameter node SHOULD attempt to send the message
-      to an alternate peer.  This error MUST only be used when a
-      specific server is requested, and it cannot provide the requested
-      service.
-
-   DIAMETER_LOOP_DETECTED 3005
-
-      An agent detected a loop while trying to get the message to the
-      intended recipient.  The message MAY be sent to an alternate peer,
-      if one is available, but the peer reporting the error has
-      identified a configuration problem.
-
-   DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION 3006
-
-      A redirect agent has determined that the request could not be
-      satisfied locally, and the initiator of the request SHOULD direct
-      the request directly to the server, whose contact information has
-      been added to the response.  When set, the Redirect-Host AVP MUST
-      be present.
-
-   DIAMETER_APPLICATION_UNSUPPORTED 3007
-
-      A request was sent for an application that is not supported.
-
-   DIAMETER_INVALID_HDR_BITS 3008
-
-      A request was received whose bits in the Diameter header were set
-      either to an invalid combination or to a value that is
-      inconsistent with the Command Code's definition.
-
-
-
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-
-
-   DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_BITS 3009
-
-      A request was received that included an AVP whose flag bits are
-      set to an unrecognized value or that is inconsistent with the
-      AVP's definition.
-
-   DIAMETER_UNKNOWN_PEER 3010
-
-      A CER was received from an unknown peer.
-
-7.1.4.  Transient Failures
-
-   Errors that fall within the transient failures category are used to
-   inform a peer that the request could not be satisfied at the time it
-   was received but MAY be able to satisfy the request in the future.
-   Note that these errors MUST be used in answer messages whose 'E' bit
-   is not set.
-
-   DIAMETER_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 4001
-
-      The authentication process for the user failed, most likely due to
-      an invalid password used by the user.  Further attempts MUST only
-      be tried after prompting the user for a new password.
-
-   DIAMETER_OUT_OF_SPACE 4002
-
-      A Diameter node received the accounting request but was unable to
-      commit it to stable storage due to a temporary lack of space.
-
-   ELECTION_LOST 4003
-
-      The peer has determined that it has lost the election process and
-      has therefore disconnected the transport connection.
-
-7.1.5.  Permanent Failures
-
-   Errors that fall within the permanent failures category are used to
-   inform the peer that the request failed and should not be attempted
-   again.  Note that these errors SHOULD be used in answer messages
-   whose 'E' bit is not set.  In error conditions where it is not
-   possible or efficient to compose application-specific answer grammar,
-   answer messages with the 'E' bit set and which comply to the grammar
-   described in Section 7.2 MAY also be used for permanent errors.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   DIAMETER_AVP_UNSUPPORTED 5001
-
-      The peer received a message that contained an AVP that is not
-      recognized or supported and was marked with the 'M' (Mandatory)
-      bit.  A Diameter message with this error MUST contain one or more
-      Failed-AVP AVPs containing the AVPs that caused the failure.
-
-   DIAMETER_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID 5002
-
-      The request contained an unknown Session-Id.
-
-   DIAMETER_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 5003
-
-      A request was received for which the user could not be authorized.
-      This error could occur if the service requested is not permitted
-      to the user.
-
-   DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_VALUE 5004
-
-      The request contained an AVP with an invalid value in its data
-      portion.  A Diameter message indicating this error MUST include
-      the offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP.
-
-   DIAMETER_MISSING_AVP 5005
-
-      The request did not contain an AVP that is required by the Command
-      Code definition.  If this value is sent in the Result-Code AVP, a
-      Failed-AVP AVP SHOULD be included in the message.  The Failed-AVP
-      AVP MUST contain an example of the missing AVP complete with the
-      Vendor-Id if applicable.  The value field of the missing AVP
-      should be of correct minimum length and contain zeroes.
-
-   DIAMETER_RESOURCES_EXCEEDED 5006
-
-      A request was received that cannot be authorized because the user
-      has already expended allowed resources.  An example of this error
-      condition is when a user that is restricted to one dial-up PPP
-      port attempts to establish a second PPP connection.
-
-   DIAMETER_CONTRADICTING_AVPS 5007
-
-      The Home Diameter server has detected AVPs in the request that
-      contradicted each other, and it is not willing to provide service
-      to the user.  The Failed-AVP AVP MUST be present, which contain
-      the AVPs that contradicted each other.
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   DIAMETER_AVP_NOT_ALLOWED 5008
-
-      A message was received with an AVP that MUST NOT be present.  The
-      Failed-AVP AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the
-      offending AVP.
-
-   DIAMETER_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES 5009
-
-      A message was received that included an AVP that appeared more
-      often than permitted in the message definition.  The Failed-AVP
-      AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the first instance of
-      the offending AVP that exceeded the maximum number of occurrences.
-
-   DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_APPLICATION 5010
-
-      This error is returned by a Diameter node that receives a CER
-      whereby no applications are common between the CER sending peer
-      and the CER receiving peer.
-
-   DIAMETER_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 5011
-
-      This error is returned when a request was received, whose version
-      number is unsupported.
-
-   DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY 5012
-
-      This error is returned when a request is rejected for unspecified
-      reasons.
-
-   DIAMETER_INVALID_BIT_IN_HEADER 5013
-
-      This error is returned when a reserved bit in the Diameter header
-      is set to one (1) or the bits in the Diameter header are set
-      incorrectly.
-
-   DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_LENGTH 5014
-
-      The request contained an AVP with an invalid length.  A Diameter
-      message indicating this error MUST include the offending AVPs
-      within a Failed-AVP AVP.  In cases where the erroneous AVP length
-      value exceeds the message length or is less than the minimum AVP
-      header length, it is sufficient to include the offending AVP
-      header and a zero filled payload of the minimum required length
-      for the payloads data type.  If the AVP is a Grouped AVP, the
-      Grouped AVP header with an empty payload would be sufficient to
-      indicate the offending AVP.  In the case where the offending AVP
-      header cannot be fully decoded when the AVP length is less than
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-      the minimum AVP header length, it is sufficient to include an
-      offending AVP header that is formulated by padding the incomplete
-      AVP header with zero up to the minimum AVP header length.
-
-   DIAMETER_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 5015
-
-      This error is returned when a request is received with an invalid
-      message length.
-
-   DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_BIT_COMBO 5016
-
-      The request contained an AVP with which is not allowed to have the
-      given value in the AVP Flags field.  A Diameter message indicating
-      this error MUST include the offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP
-      AVP.
-
-   DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_SECURITY 5017
-
-      This error is returned when a CER message is received, and there
-      are no common security mechanisms supported between the peers.  A
-      Capabilities-Exchange-Answer (CEA) message MUST be returned with
-      the Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_SECURITY.
-
-7.2.  Error Bit
-
-   The 'E' (Error Bit) in the Diameter header is set when the request
-   caused a protocol-related error (see Section 7.1.3).  A message with
-   the 'E' bit MUST NOT be sent as a response to an answer message.
-   Note that a message with the 'E' bit set is still subjected to the
-   processing rules defined in Section 6.2.  When set, the answer
-   message will not conform to the CCF specification for the command;
-   instead, it and will conform to the following CCF:
-
-      Message Format
-
-      <answer-message> ::= < Diameter Header: code, ERR [, PXY] >
-                        0*1< Session-Id >
-                           { Origin-Host }
-                           { Origin-Realm }
-                           { Result-Code }
-                           [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                           [ Error-Message ]
-                           [ Error-Reporting-Host ]
-                           [ Failed-AVP ]
-                           [ Experimental-Result ]
-                         * [ Proxy-Info ]
-                         * [ AVP ]
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   Note that the code used in the header is the same than the one found
-   in the request message, but with the 'R' bit cleared and the 'E' bit
-   set.  The 'P' bit in the header is set to the same value as the one
-   found in the request message.
-
-7.3.  Error-Message AVP
-
-   The Error-Message AVP (AVP Code 281) is of type UTF8String.  It MAY
-   accompany a Result-Code AVP as a human-readable error message.  The
-   Error-Message AVP is not intended to be useful in an environment
-   where error messages are processed automatically.  It SHOULD NOT be
-   expected that the content of this AVP be parsed by network entities.
-
-7.4.  Error-Reporting-Host AVP
-
-   The Error-Reporting-Host AVP (AVP Code 294) is of type
-   DiameterIdentity.  This AVP contains the identity of the Diameter
-   host that sent the Result-Code AVP to a value other than 2001
-   (Success), only if the host setting the Result-Code is different from
-   the one encoded in the Origin-Host AVP.  This AVP is intended to be
-   used for troubleshooting purposes, and it MUST be set when the
-   Result-Code AVP indicates a failure.
-
-7.5.  Failed-AVP AVP
-
-   The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 279) is of type Grouped and provides
-   debugging information in cases where a request is rejected or not
-   fully processed due to erroneous information in a specific AVP.  The
-   value of the Result-Code AVP will provide information on the reason
-   for the Failed-AVP AVP.  A Diameter answer message SHOULD contain an
-   instance of the Failed-AVP AVP that corresponds to the error
-   indicated by the Result-Code AVP.  For practical purposes, this
-   Failed-AVP would typically refer to the first AVP processing error
-   that a Diameter node encounters.
-
-   The possible reasons for this AVP are the presence of an improperly
-   constructed AVP, an unsupported or unrecognized AVP, an invalid AVP
-   value, the omission of a required AVP, the presence of an explicitly
-   excluded AVP (see tables in Section 10) or the presence of two or
-   more occurrences of an AVP that is restricted to 0, 1, or 0-1
-   occurrences.
-
-   A Diameter message SHOULD contain one Failed-AVP AVP, containing the
-   entire AVP that could not be processed successfully.  If the failure
-   reason is omission of a required AVP, an AVP with the missing AVP
-   code, the missing Vendor-Id, and a zero-filled payload of the minimum
-   required length for the omitted AVP will be added.  If the failure
-   reason is an invalid AVP length where the reported length is less
-
-
-
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-
-
-   than the minimum AVP header length or greater than the reported
-   message length, a copy of the offending AVP header and a zero-filled
-   payload of the minimum required length SHOULD be added.
-
-   In the case where the offending AVP is embedded within a Grouped AVP,
-   the Failed-AVP MAY contain the grouped AVP, which in turn contains
-   the single offending AVP.  The same method MAY be employed if the
-   grouped AVP itself is embedded in yet another grouped AVP and so on.
-   In this case, the Failed-AVP MAY contain the grouped AVP hierarchy up
-   to the single offending AVP.  This enables the recipient to detect
-   the location of the offending AVP when embedded in a group.
-
-   AVP Format
-
-         <Failed-AVP> ::= < AVP Header: 279 >
-                       1* {AVP}
-
-7.6.  Experimental-Result AVP
-
-   The Experimental-Result AVP (AVP Code 297) is of type Grouped, and
-   indicates whether a particular vendor-specific request was completed
-   successfully or whether an error occurred.  This AVP has the
-   following structure:
-
-   AVP Format
-
-         Experimental-Result ::= < AVP Header: 297 >
-                                 { Vendor-Id }
-                                 { Experimental-Result-Code }
-
-   The Vendor-Id AVP (see Section 5.3.3) in this grouped AVP identifies
-   the vendor responsible for the assignment of the result code that
-   follows.  All Diameter answer messages defined in vendor-specific
-   applications MUST include either one Result-Code AVP or one
-   Experimental-Result AVP.
-
-7.7.  Experimental-Result-Code AVP
-
-   The Experimental-Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 298) is of type Unsigned32
-   and contains a vendor-assigned value representing the result of
-   processing the request.
-
-   It is recommended that vendor-specific result codes follow the same
-   conventions given for the Result-Code AVP regarding the different
-   types of result codes and the handling of errors (for non-2xxx
-   values).
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-8.  Diameter User Sessions
-
-   In general, Diameter can provide two different types of services to
-   applications.  The first involves authentication and authorization,
-   and it can optionally make use of accounting.  The second only makes
-   use of accounting.
-
-   When a service makes use of the authentication and/or authorization
-   portion of an application, and a user requests access to the network,
-   the Diameter client issues an auth request to its local server.  The
-   auth request is defined in a service-specific Diameter application
-   (e.g., NASREQ).  The request contains a Session-Id AVP, which is used
-   in subsequent messages (e.g., subsequent authorization, accounting,
-   etc.) relating to the user's session.  The Session-Id AVP is a means
-   for the client and servers to correlate a Diameter message with a
-   user session.
-
-   When a Diameter server authorizes a user to implement network
-   resources for a finite amount of time, and it is willing to extend
-   the authorization via a future request, it MUST add the
-   Authorization- Lifetime AVP to the answer message.  The
-   Authorization-Lifetime AVP defines the maximum number of seconds a
-   user MAY make use of the resources before another authorization
-   request is expected by the server.  The Auth-Grace-Period AVP
-   contains the number of seconds following the expiration of the
-   Authorization-Lifetime, after which the server will release all state
-   information related to the user's session.  Note that if payment for
-   services is expected by the serving realm from the user's home realm,
-   the Authorization-Lifetime AVP, combined with the Auth-Grace-Period
-   AVP, implies the maximum length of the session for which the home
-   realm is willing to be fiscally responsible.  Services provided past
-   the expiration of the Authorization-Lifetime and Auth-Grace-Period
-   AVPs are the responsibility of the access device.  Of course, the
-   actual cost of services rendered is clearly outside the scope of the
-   protocol.
-
-   An access device that does not expect to send a re-authorization or a
-   session termination request to the server MAY include the Auth-
-   Session-State AVP with the value set to NO_STATE_MAINTAINED as a hint
-   to the server.  If the server accepts the hint, it agrees that since
-   no session termination message will be received once service to the
-   user is terminated, it cannot maintain state for the session.  If the
-   answer message from the server contains a different value in the
-   Auth-Session-State AVP (or the default value if the AVP is absent),
-   the access device MUST follow the server's directives.  Note that the
-   value NO_STATE_MAINTAINED MUST NOT be set in subsequent re-
-   authorization requests and answers.
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   The base protocol does not include any authorization request
-   messages, since these are largely application-specific and are
-   defined in a Diameter application document.  However, the base
-   protocol does define a set of messages that are used to terminate
-   user sessions.  These are used to allow servers that maintain state
-   information to free resources.
-
-   When a service only makes use of the accounting portion of the
-   Diameter protocol, even in combination with an application, the
-   Session-Id is still used to identify user sessions.  However, the
-   session termination messages are not used, since a session is
-   signaled as being terminated by issuing an accounting stop message.
-
-   Diameter may also be used for services that cannot be easily
-   categorized as authentication, authorization, or accounting (e.g.,
-   certain Third Generation Partnership Project Internet Multimedia
-   System (3GPP IMS) interfaces).  In such cases, the finite state
-   machine defined in subsequent sections may not be applicable.
-   Therefore, the application itself MAY need to define its own finite
-   state machine.  However, such application-specific state machines
-   SHOULD follow the general state machine framework outlined in this
-   document such as the use of Session-Id AVPs and the use of STR/STA,
-   ASR/ASA messages for stateful sessions.
-
-8.1.  Authorization Session State Machine
-
-   This section contains a set of finite state machines, which represent
-   the life cycle of Diameter sessions and which MUST be observed by all
-   Diameter implementations that make use of the authentication and/or
-   authorization portion of a Diameter application.  The term "Service-
-   Specific" below refers to a message defined in a Diameter application
-   (e.g., Mobile IPv4, NASREQ).
-
-   There are four different authorization session state machines
-   supported in the Diameter base protocol.  The first two describe a
-   session in which the server is maintaining session state, indicated
-   by the value of the Auth-Session-State AVP (or its absence).  One
-   describes the session from a client perspective, the other from a
-   server perspective.  The second two state machines are used when the
-   server does not maintain session state.  Here again, one describes
-   the session from a client perspective, the other from a server
-   perspective.
-
-   When a session is moved to the Idle state, any resources that were
-   allocated for the particular session must be released.  Any event not
-   listed in the state machines MUST be considered an error condition,
-   and an answer, if applicable, MUST be returned to the originator of
-   the message.
-
-
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-
-
-   In the case that an application does not support re-auth, the state
-   transitions related to server-initiated re-auth, when both client and
-   server sessions maintain state (e.g., Send RAR, Pending, Receive
-   RAA), MAY be ignored.
-
-   In the state table, the event "Failure to send X" means that the
-   Diameter agent is unable to send command X to the desired
-   destination.  This could be due to the peer being down or due to the
-   peer sending back a transient failure or temporary protocol error
-   notification DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY or DIAMETER_LOOP_DETECTED in the
-   Result-Code AVP of the corresponding Answer command.  The event 'X
-   successfully sent' is the complement of 'Failure to send X'.
-
-   The following state machine is observed by a client when state is
-   maintained on the server:
-
-                              CLIENT, STATEFUL
-      State     Event                          Action       New State
-      ---------------------------------------------------------------
-      Idle      Client or device requests      Send         Pending
-                access                         service-
-                                               specific
-                                               auth req
-
-      Idle      ASR Received                   Send ASA     Idle
-                for unknown session            with
-                                               Result-Code =
-                                               UNKNOWN_
-                                               SESSION_ID
-
-      Idle      RAR Received                   Send RAA     Idle
-                for unknown session            with
-                                               Result-Code =
-                                               UNKNOWN_
-                                               SESSION_ID
-
-      Pending   Successful service-specific    Grant        Open
-                authorization answer           Access
-                received with default
-                Auth-Session-State value
-
-      Pending   Successful service-specific    Sent STR     Discon
-                authorization answer received,
-                but service not provided
-
-      Pending   Error processing successful    Sent STR     Discon
-                service-specific authorization
-                answer
-
-
-
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-
-
-      Pending   Failed service-specific        Clean up     Idle
-                authorization answer received
-
-      Open      User or client device          Send         Open
-                requests access to service     service-
-                                               specific
-                                               auth req
-
-      Open      Successful service-specific    Provide      Open
-                authorization answer received  service
-
-      Open      Failed service-specific        Discon.      Idle
-                authorization answer           user/device
-                received.
-
-      Open      RAR received and client will   Send RAA     Open
-                perform subsequent re-auth     with
-                                               Result-Code =
-                                               SUCCESS
-
-      Open      RAR received and client will   Send RAA     Idle
-                not perform subsequent         with
-                re-auth                        Result-Code !=
-                                               SUCCESS,
-                                               Discon.
-                                               user/device
-
-      Open      Session-Timeout expires on     Send STR     Discon
-                access device
-
-      Open      ASR received,                  Send ASA     Discon
-                client will comply             with
-                with request to end the        Result-Code =
-                session                        = SUCCESS,
-                                               Send STR.
-
-      Open      ASR Received,                  Send ASA     Open
-                client will not comply         with
-                with request to end the        Result-Code !=
-                session                        != SUCCESS
-
-      Open      Authorization-Lifetime +       Send STR     Discon
-                Auth-Grace-Period expires on
-                access device
-
-      Discon    ASR received                   Send ASA     Discon
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-      Discon    STA received                   Discon.      Idle
-                                               user/device
-
-   The following state machine is observed by a server when it is
-   maintaining state for the session:
-
-                             SERVER, STATEFUL
-      State     Event                          Action       New State
-      ---------------------------------------------------------------
-      Idle      Service-specific authorization Send         Open
-                request received, and          successful
-                user is authorized             service-
-                                               specific
-                                               answer
-
-      Idle      Service-specific authorization Send         Idle
-                request received, and          failed
-                user is not authorized         service-
-                                               specific
-                                               answer
-
-      Open      Service-specific authorization Send         Open
-                request received, and user     successful
-                is authorized                  service-
-                                               specific
-                                               answer
-
-      Open      Service-specific authorization Send         Idle
-                request received, and user     failed
-                is not authorized              service-
-                                               specific
-                                               answer,
-                                               Clean up
-
-      Open      Home server wants to confirm   Send RAR     Pending
-                authentication and/or
-                authorization of the user
-
-      Pending   Received RAA with a failed     Clean up     Idle
-                Result-Code
-
-      Pending   Received RAA with Result-Code  Update       Open
-                = SUCCESS                      session
-
-      Open      Home server wants to           Send ASR     Discon
-                terminate the service
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-      Open      Authorization-Lifetime (and    Clean up     Idle
-                Auth-Grace-Period) expires
-                on home server
-
-      Open      Session-Timeout expires on     Clean up     Idle
-                home server
-
-      Discon    Failure to send ASR            Wait,        Discon
-                                               resend ASR
-
-      Discon    ASR successfully sent and      Clean up     Idle
-                ASA Received with Result-Code
-
-      Not       ASA Received                   None         No Change
-      Discon
-
-      Any       STR Received                   Send STA,    Idle
-                                               Clean up
-
-   The following state machine is observed by a client when state is not
-   maintained on the server:
-
-                              CLIENT, STATELESS
-      State     Event                          Action       New State
-      ---------------------------------------------------------------
-      Idle      Client or device requests      Send         Pending
-                access                         service-
-                                               specific
-                                               auth req
-
-      Pending   Successful service-specific    Grant        Open
-                authorization answer           access
-                received with Auth-Session-
-                State set to
-                NO_STATE_MAINTAINED
-
-      Pending   Failed service-specific        Clean up     Idle
-                authorization answer
-                received
-
-      Open      Session-Timeout expires on     Discon.      Idle
-                access device                  user/device
-
-      Open      Service to user is terminated  Discon.      Idle
-                                               user/device
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   The following state machine is observed by a server when it is not
-   maintaining state for the session:
-
-                              SERVER, STATELESS
-      State     Event                          Action       New State
-      ---------------------------------------------------------------
-      Idle      Service-specific authorization Send         Idle
-                request received, and          service-
-                successfully processed         specific
-                                               answer
-
-8.2.  Accounting Session State Machine
-
-   The following state machines MUST be supported for applications that
-   have an accounting portion or that require only accounting services.
-   The first state machine is to be observed by clients.
-
-   See Section 9.7 for Accounting Command Codes and Section 9.8 for
-   Accounting AVPs.
-
-   The server side in the accounting state machine depends in some cases
-   on the particular application.  The Diameter base protocol defines a
-   default state machine that MUST be followed by all applications that
-   have not specified other state machines.  This is the second state
-   machine in this section described below.
-
-   The default server side state machine requires the reception of
-   accounting records in any order and at any time, and it does not
-   place any standards requirement on the processing of these records.
-   Implementations of Diameter may perform checking, ordering,
-   correlation, fraud detection, and other tasks based on these records.
-   AVPs may need to be inspected as a part of these tasks.  The tasks
-   can happen either immediately after record reception or in a post-
-   processing phase.  However, as these tasks are typically application
-   or even policy dependent, they are not standardized by the Diameter
-   specifications.  Applications MAY define requirements on when to
-   accept accounting records based on the used value of Accounting-
-   Realtime-Required AVP, credit-limit checks, and so on.
-
-   However, the Diameter base protocol defines one optional server side
-   state machine that MAY be followed by applications that require
-   keeping track of the session state at the accounting server.  Note
-   that such tracking is incompatible with the ability to sustain long
-   duration connectivity problems.  Therefore, the use of this state
-   machine is recommended only in applications where the value of the
-   Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP is DELIVER_AND_GRANT; hence,
-   accounting connectivity problems are required to cause the serviced
-   user to be disconnected.  Otherwise, records produced by the client
-
-
-
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-
-
-   may be lost by the server, which no longer accepts them after the
-   connectivity is re-established.  This state machine is the third
-   state machine in this section.  The state machine is supervised by a
-   supervision session timer Ts, whose value should be reasonably higher
-   than the Acct_Interim_Interval value.  Ts MAY be set to two times the
-   value of the Acct_Interim_Interval so as to avoid the accounting
-   session in the Diameter server to change to Idle state in case of
-   short transient network failure.
-
-   Any event not listed in the state machines MUST be considered as an
-   error condition, and a corresponding answer, if applicable, MUST be
-   returned to the originator of the message.
-
-   In the state table, the event "Failure to send" means that the
-   Diameter client is unable to communicate with the desired
-   destination.  This could be due to the peer being down, or due to the
-   peer sending back a transient failure or temporary protocol error
-   notification DIAMETER_OUT_OF_SPACE, DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY, or
-   DIAMETER_LOOP_DETECTED in the Result-Code AVP of the Accounting
-   Answer command.
-
-   The event "Failed answer" means that the Diameter client received a
-   non-transient failure notification in the Accounting Answer command.
-
-   Note that the action "Disconnect user/dev" MUST also have an effect
-   on the authorization session state table, e.g., cause the STR message
-   to be sent, if the given application has both authentication/
-   authorization and accounting portions.
-
-   The states PendingS, PendingI, PendingL, PendingE, and PendingB stand
-   for pending states to wait for an answer to an accounting request
-   related to a Start, Interim, Stop, Event, or buffered record,
-   respectively.
-
-                            CLIENT, ACCOUNTING
-      State     Event                          Action       New State
-      ---------------------------------------------------------------
-      Idle      Client or device requests      Send         PendingS
-                access                         accounting
-                                               start req.
-
-      Idle      Client or device requests      Send         PendingE
-                a one-time service             accounting
-                                               event req
-
-      Idle      Records in storage             Send         PendingB
-                                               record
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-      PendingS  Successful accounting                       Open
-                start answer received
-
-      PendingS  Failure to send and buffer     Store        Open
-                space available and real time  Start
-                not equal to DELIVER_AND_GRANT Record
-
-      PendingS  Failure to send and no buffer               Open
-                space available and real time
-                equal to GRANT_AND_LOSE
-
-      PendingS  Failure to send and no         Disconnect   Idle
-                buffer space available and     user/dev
-                real time not equal to
-                GRANT_AND_LOSE
-
-      PendingS  Failed accounting start answer              Open
-                received and real time equal
-                to GRANT_AND_LOSE
-
-      PendingS  Failed accounting start answer Disconnect   Idle
-                received and real time not     user/dev
-                equal to GRANT_AND_LOSE
-
-      PendingS  User service terminated        Store        PendingS
-                                               stop
-                                               record
-
-      Open      Interim interval elapses       Send         PendingI
-                                               accounting
-                                               interim
-                                               record
-
-      Open      User service terminated        Send         PendingL
-                                               accounting
-                                               stop req.
-
-      PendingI  Successful accounting interim               Open
-                answer received
-
-      PendingI  Failure to send and (buffer    Store        Open
-                space available or old         interim
-                record can be overwritten)     record
-                and real time not equal to
-                DELIVER_AND_GRANT
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-      PendingI  Failure to send and no buffer               Open
-                space available and real time
-                equal to GRANT_AND_LOSE
-
-      PendingI  Failure to send and no         Disconnect   Idle
-                buffer space available and     user/dev
-                real time not equal to
-                GRANT_AND_LOSE
-
-      PendingI  Failed accounting interim                   Open
-                answer received and real time
-                equal to GRANT_AND_LOSE
-
-      PendingI  Failed accounting interim      Disconnect   Idle
-                answer received and            user/dev
-                real time not equal to
-                GRANT_AND_LOSE
-
-      PendingI  User service terminated        Store        PendingI
-                                               stop
-                                               record
-      PendingE  Successful accounting                       Idle
-                event answer received
-
-      PendingE  Failure to send and buffer     Store        Idle
-                space available                event
-                                               record
-
-      PendingE  Failure to send and no buffer               Idle
-                space available
-
-      PendingE  Failed accounting event answer              Idle
-                received
-
-      PendingB  Successful accounting answer   Delete       Idle
-                received                       record
-
-      PendingB  Failure to send                             Idle
-
-      PendingB  Failed accounting answer       Delete       Idle
-                received                       record
-
-      PendingL  Successful accounting                       Idle
-                stop answer received
-
-      PendingL  Failure to send and buffer     Store        Idle
-                space available                stop
-                                               record
-
-
-
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-
-
-      PendingL  Failure to send and no buffer               Idle
-                space available
-
-      PendingL  Failed accounting stop answer               Idle
-                received
-
-
-                       SERVER, STATELESS ACCOUNTING
-      State     Event                          Action       New State
-      ---------------------------------------------------------------
-
-      Idle      Accounting start request       Send         Idle
-                received and successfully      accounting
-                processed.                     start
-                                               answer
-
-      Idle      Accounting event request       Send         Idle
-                received and successfully      accounting
-                processed.                     event
-                                               answer
-
-      Idle      Interim record received        Send         Idle
-                and successfully processed.    accounting
-                                               interim
-                                               answer
-
-      Idle      Accounting stop request        Send         Idle
-                received and successfully      accounting
-                processed                      stop answer
-
-      Idle      Accounting request received;   Send         Idle
-                no space left to store         accounting
-                records                        answer;
-                                               Result-Code =
-                                               OUT_OF_
-                                               SPACE
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-                            SERVER, STATEFUL ACCOUNTING
-      State     Event                          Action       New State
-      ---------------------------------------------------------------
-
-      Idle      Accounting start request       Send         Open
-                received and successfully      accounting
-                processed.                     start
-                                               answer;
-                                               Start Ts
-
-      Idle      Accounting event request       Send         Idle
-                received and successfully      accounting
-                processed.                     event
-                                               answer
-      Idle      Accounting request received;   Send         Idle
-                no space left to store         accounting
-                records                        answer;
-                                               Result-Code =
-                                               OUT_OF_
-                                               SPACE
-
-      Open      Interim record received        Send         Open
-                and successfully processed.    accounting
-                                               interim
-                                               answer;
-                                               Restart Ts
-
-      Open      Accounting stop request        Send         Idle
-                received and successfully      accounting
-                processed                      stop answer;
-                                               Stop Ts
-
-      Open      Accounting request received;   Send         Idle
-                no space left to store         accounting
-                records                        answer;
-                                               Result-Code =
-                                               OUT_OF_
-                                               SPACE;
-                                               Stop Ts
-
-      Open      Session supervision timer Ts   Stop Ts      Idle
-                expired
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-8.3.  Server-Initiated Re-Auth
-
-   A Diameter server may initiate a re-authentication and/or re-
-   authorization service for a particular session by issuing a Re-Auth-
-   Request (RAR).
-
-   For example, for prepaid services, the Diameter server that
-   originally authorized a session may need some confirmation that the
-   user is still using the services.
-
-   An access device that receives an RAR message with the Session-Id
-   equal to a currently active session MUST initiate a re-auth towards
-   the user, if the service supports this particular feature.  Each
-   Diameter application MUST state whether server-initiated re-auth is
-   supported, since some applications do not allow access devices to
-   prompt the user for re-auth.
-
-8.3.1.  Re-Auth-Request
-
-   The Re-Auth-Request (RAR), indicated by the Command Code set to 258
-   and the message flags' 'R' bit set, may be sent by any server to the
-   access device that is providing session service, to request that the
-   user be re-authenticated and/or re-authorized.
-
-
-    Message Format
-
-         <RAR>  ::= < Diameter Header: 258, REQ, PXY >
-                    < Session-Id >
-                    { Origin-Host }
-                    { Origin-Realm }
-                    { Destination-Realm }
-                    { Destination-Host }
-                    { Auth-Application-Id }
-                    { Re-Auth-Request-Type }
-                    [ User-Name ]
-                    [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                  * [ Proxy-Info ]
-                  * [ Route-Record ]
-                  * [ AVP ]
-
-8.3.2.  Re-Auth-Answer
-
-   The Re-Auth-Answer (RAA), indicated by the Command Code set to 258
-   and the message flags' 'R' bit clear, is sent in response to the RAR.
-   The Result-Code AVP MUST be present, and it indicates the disposition
-   of the request.
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   A successful RAA message MUST be followed by an application-specific
-   authentication and/or authorization message.
-
-    Message Format
-
-         <RAA>  ::= < Diameter Header: 258, PXY >
-                    < Session-Id >
-                    { Result-Code }
-                    { Origin-Host }
-                    { Origin-Realm }
-                    [ User-Name ]
-                    [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                    [ Error-Message ]
-                    [ Error-Reporting-Host ]
-                    [ Failed-AVP ]
-                  * [ Redirect-Host ]
-                    [ Redirect-Host-Usage ]
-                    [ Redirect-Max-Cache-Time ]
-                  * [ Proxy-Info ]
-                  * [ AVP ]
-
-8.4.  Session Termination
-
-   It is necessary for a Diameter server that authorized a session, for
-   which it is maintaining state, to be notified when that session is no
-   longer active, both for tracking purposes as well as to allow
-   stateful agents to release any resources that they may have provided
-   for the user's session.  For sessions whose state is not being
-   maintained, this section is not used.
-
-   When a user session that required Diameter authorization terminates,
-   the access device that provided the service MUST issue a Session-
-   Termination-Request (STR) message to the Diameter server that
-   authorized the service, to notify it that the session is no longer
-   active.  An STR MUST be issued when a user session terminates for any
-   reason, including user logoff, expiration of Session-Timeout,
-   administrative action, termination upon receipt of an Abort-Session-
-   Request (see below), orderly shutdown of the access device, etc.
-
-   The access device also MUST issue an STR for a session that was
-   authorized but never actually started.  This could occur, for
-   example, due to a sudden resource shortage in the access device, or
-   because the access device is unwilling to provide the type of service
-   requested in the authorization, or because the access device does not
-   support a mandatory AVP returned in the authorization, etc.
-
-   It is also possible that a session that was authorized is never
-   actually started due to action of a proxy.  For example, a proxy may
-
-
-
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-
-
-   modify an authorization answer, converting the result from success to
-   failure, prior to forwarding the message to the access device.  If
-   the answer did not contain an Auth-Session-State AVP with the value
-   NO_STATE_MAINTAINED, a proxy that causes an authorized session not to
-   be started MUST issue an STR to the Diameter server that authorized
-   the session, since the access device has no way of knowing that the
-   session had been authorized.
-
-   A Diameter server that receives an STR message MUST clean up
-   resources (e.g., session state) associated with the Session-Id
-   specified in the STR and return a Session-Termination-Answer.
-
-   A Diameter server also MUST clean up resources when the Session-
-   Timeout expires, or when the Authorization-Lifetime and the Auth-
-   Grace-Period AVPs expire without receipt of a re-authorization
-   request, regardless of whether an STR for that session is received.
-   The access device is not expected to provide service beyond the
-   expiration of these timers; thus, expiration of either of these
-   timers implies that the access device may have unexpectedly shut
-   down.
-
-8.4.1.  Session-Termination-Request
-
-   The Session-Termination-Request (STR), indicated by the Command Code
-   set to 275 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit set, is sent by a Diameter
-   client or by a Diameter proxy to inform the Diameter server that an
-   authenticated and/or authorized session is being terminated.
-
-    Message Format
-
-        <STR>  ::= < Diameter Header: 275, REQ, PXY >
-                   < Session-Id >
-                   { Origin-Host }
-                   { Origin-Realm }
-                   { Destination-Realm }
-                   { Auth-Application-Id }
-                   { Termination-Cause }
-                   [ User-Name ]
-                   [ Destination-Host ]
-                 * [ Class ]
-                   [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                 * [ Proxy-Info ]
-                 * [ Route-Record ]
-                 * [ AVP ]
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-8.4.2.  Session-Termination-Answer
-
-   The Session-Termination-Answer (STA), indicated by the Command Code
-   set to 275 and the message flags' 'R' bit clear, is sent by the
-   Diameter server to acknowledge the notification that the session has
-   been terminated.  The Result-Code AVP MUST be present, and it MAY
-   contain an indication that an error occurred while servicing the STR.
-
-   Upon sending or receipt of the STA, the Diameter server MUST release
-   all resources for the session indicated by the Session-Id AVP.  Any
-   intermediate server in the Proxy-Chain MAY also release any
-   resources, if necessary.
-
-    Message Format
-
-         <STA> ::= < Diameter Header: 275, PXY >
-                    < Session-Id >
-                    { Result-Code }
-                    { Origin-Host }
-                    { Origin-Realm }
-                    [ User-Name ]
-                  * [ Class ]
-                    [ Error-Message ]
-                    [ Error-Reporting-Host ]
-                    [ Failed-AVP ]
-                    [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                  * [ Redirect-Host ]
-                    [ Redirect-Host-Usage ]
-                    [ Redirect-Max-Cache-Time ]
-                  * [ Proxy-Info ]
-                  * [ AVP ]
-
-8.5.  Aborting a Session
-
-   A Diameter server may request that the access device stop providing
-   service for a particular session by issuing an Abort-Session-Request
-   (ASR).
-
-   For example, the Diameter server that originally authorized the
-   session may be required to cause that session to be stopped for lack
-   of credit or other reasons that were not anticipated when the session
-   was first authorized.
-
-   An access device that receives an ASR with Session-ID equal to a
-   currently active session MAY stop the session.  Whether the access
-   device stops the session or not is implementation and/or
-   configuration dependent.  For example, an access device may honor
-   ASRs from certain agents only.  In any case, the access device MUST
-
-
-
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-
-
-   respond with an Abort-Session-Answer, including a Result-Code AVP to
-   indicate what action it took.
-
-8.5.1.  Abort-Session-Request
-
-   The Abort-Session-Request (ASR), indicated by the Command Code set to
-   274 and the message flags' 'R' bit set, may be sent by any Diameter
-   server or any Diameter proxy to the access device that is providing
-   session service, to request that the session identified by the
-   Session-Id be stopped.
-
-    Message Format
-
-         <ASR>  ::= < Diameter Header: 274, REQ, PXY >
-                    < Session-Id >
-                    { Origin-Host }
-                    { Origin-Realm }
-                    { Destination-Realm }
-                    { Destination-Host }
-                    { Auth-Application-Id }
-                    [ User-Name ]
-                    [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                  * [ Proxy-Info ]
-                  * [ Route-Record ]
-                  * [ AVP ]
-
-8.5.2.  Abort-Session-Answer
-
-   The Abort-Session-Answer (ASA), indicated by the Command Code set to
-   274 and the message flags' 'R' bit clear, is sent in response to the
-   ASR.  The Result-Code AVP MUST be present and indicates the
-   disposition of the request.
-
-   If the session identified by Session-Id in the ASR was successfully
-   terminated, the Result-Code is set to DIAMETER_SUCCESS.  If the
-   session is not currently active, the Result-Code is set to
-   DIAMETER_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID.  If the access device does not stop the
-   session for any other reason, the Result-Code is set to
-   DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-    Message Format
-
-         <ASA>  ::= < Diameter Header: 274, PXY >
-                    < Session-Id >
-                    { Result-Code }
-                    { Origin-Host }
-                    { Origin-Realm }
-                    [ User-Name ]
-                    [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                    [ Error-Message ]
-                    [ Error-Reporting-Host ]
-                    [ Failed-AVP ]
-                  * [ Redirect-Host ]
-                    [ Redirect-Host-Usage ]
-                    [ Redirect-Max-Cache-Time ]
-                  * [ Proxy-Info ]
-                  * [ AVP ]
-
-8.6.  Inferring Session Termination from Origin-State-Id
-
-   The Origin-State-Id is used to allow detection of terminated sessions
-   for which no STR would have been issued, due to unanticipated
-   shutdown of an access device.
-
-   A Diameter client or access device increments the value of the
-   Origin-State-Id every time it is started or powered up.  The new
-   Origin-State-Id is then sent in the CER/CEA message immediately upon
-   connection to the server.  The Diameter server receiving the new
-   Origin-State-Id can determine whether the sending Diameter client had
-   abruptly shut down by comparing the old value of the Origin-State-Id
-   it has kept for that specific client is less than the new value and
-   whether it has un-terminated sessions originating from that client.
-
-   An access device can also include the Origin-State-Id in request
-   messages other than the CER if there are relays or proxies in between
-   the access device and the server.  In this case, however, the server
-   cannot discover that the access device has been restarted unless and
-   until it receives a new request from it.  Therefore, this mechanism
-   is more opportunistic across proxies and relays.
-
-   The Diameter server may assume that all sessions that were active
-   prior to detection of a client restart have been terminated.  The
-   Diameter server MAY clean up all session state associated with such
-   lost sessions, and it MAY also issue STRs for all such lost sessions
-   that were authorized on upstream servers, to allow session state to
-   be cleaned up globally.
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-8.7.  Auth-Request-Type AVP
-
-   The Auth-Request-Type AVP (AVP Code 274) is of type Enumerated and is
-   included in application-specific auth requests to inform the peers
-   whether a user is to be authenticated only, authorized only, or both.
-   Note any value other than both MAY cause RADIUS interoperability
-   issues.  The following values are defined:
-
-   AUTHENTICATE_ONLY 1
-
-      The request being sent is for authentication only, and it MUST
-      contain the relevant application-specific authentication AVPs that
-      are needed by the Diameter server to authenticate the user.
-
-   AUTHORIZE_ONLY 2
-
-      The request being sent is for authorization only, and it MUST
-      contain the application-specific authorization AVPs that are
-      necessary to identify the service being requested/offered.
-
-   AUTHORIZE_AUTHENTICATE 3
-
-      The request contains a request for both authentication and
-      authorization.  The request MUST include both the relevant
-      application-specific authentication information and authorization
-      information necessary to identify the service being requested/
-      offered.
-
-8.8.  Session-Id AVP
-
-   The Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 263) is of type UTF8String and is used
-   to identify a specific session (see Section 8).  All messages
-   pertaining to a specific session MUST include only one Session-Id
-   AVP, and the same value MUST be used throughout the life of a
-   session.  When present, the Session-Id SHOULD appear immediately
-   following the Diameter header (see Section 3).
-
-   The Session-Id MUST be globally and eternally unique, as it is meant
-   to uniquely identify a user session without reference to any other
-   information, and it may be needed to correlate historical
-   authentication information with accounting information.  The
-   Session-Id includes a mandatory portion and an implementation-defined
-   portion; a recommended format for the implementation-defined portion
-   is outlined below.
-
-   The Session-Id MUST begin with the sender's identity encoded in the
-   DiameterIdentity type (see Section 4.3.1).  The remainder of the
-   Session-Id is delimited by a ";" character, and it MAY be any
-
-
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-
-
-   sequence that the client can guarantee to be eternally unique;
-   however, the following format is recommended, (square brackets []
-   indicate an optional element):
-
-      <DiameterIdentity>;<high 32 bits>;<low 32 bits>[;<optional value>]
-
-   <high 32 bits> and <low 32 bits> are decimal representations of the
-   high and low 32 bits of a monotonically increasing 64-bit value.  The
-   64-bit value is rendered in two part to simplify formatting by 32-bit
-   processors.  At startup, the high 32 bits of the 64-bit value MAY be
-   initialized to the time in NTP format [RFC5905], and the low 32 bits
-   MAY be initialized to zero.  This will for practical purposes
-   eliminate the possibility of overlapping Session-Ids after a reboot,
-   assuming the reboot process takes longer than a second.
-   Alternatively, an implementation MAY keep track of the increasing
-   value in non-volatile memory.
-
-
-   <optional value> is implementation specific, but it may include a
-   modem's device Id, a Layer 2 address, timestamp, etc.
-
-   Example, in which there is no optional value:
-
-      accesspoint7.example.com;1876543210;523
-
-   Example, in which there is an optional value:
-
-     accesspoint7.example.com;1876543210;523;mobile@200.1.1.88
-
-   The Session-Id is created by the Diameter application initiating the
-   session, which, in most cases, is done by the client.  Note that a
-   Session-Id MAY be used for both the authentication, authorization,
-   and accounting commands of a given application.
-
-8.9.  Authorization-Lifetime AVP
-
-   The Authorization-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 291) is of type Unsigned32
-   and contains the maximum number of seconds of service to be provided
-   to the user before the user is to be re-authenticated and/or re-
-   authorized.  Care should be taken when the Authorization-Lifetime
-   value is determined, since a low, non-zero value could create
-   significant Diameter traffic, which could congest both the network
-   and the agents.
-
-   A value of zero (0) means that immediate re-auth is necessary by the
-   access device.  The absence of this AVP, or a value of all ones
-   (meaning all bits in the 32-bit field are set to one) means no re-
-   auth is expected.
-
-
-
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-
-   If both this AVP and the Session-Timeout AVP are present in a
-   message, the value of the latter MUST NOT be smaller than the
-   Authorization-Lifetime AVP.
-
-   An Authorization-Lifetime AVP MAY be present in re-authorization
-   messages, and it contains the number of seconds the user is
-   authorized to receive service from the time the re-auth answer
-   message is received by the access device.
-
-   This AVP MAY be provided by the client as a hint of the maximum
-   lifetime that it is willing to accept.  The server MUST return a
-   value that is equal to, or smaller than, the one provided by the
-   client.
-
-8.10.  Auth-Grace-Period AVP
-
-   The Auth-Grace-Period AVP (AVP Code 276) is of type Unsigned32 and
-   contains the number of seconds the Diameter server will wait
-   following the expiration of the Authorization-Lifetime AVP before
-   cleaning up resources for the session.
-
-8.11.  Auth-Session-State AVP
-
-   The Auth-Session-State AVP (AVP Code 277) is of type Enumerated and
-   specifies whether state is maintained for a particular session.  The
-   client MAY include this AVP in requests as a hint to the server, but
-   the value in the server's answer message is binding.  The following
-   values are supported:
-
-   STATE_MAINTAINED 0
-
-      This value is used to specify that session state is being
-      maintained, and the access device MUST issue a session termination
-      message when service to the user is terminated.  This is the
-      default value.
-
-   NO_STATE_MAINTAINED 1
-
-      This value is used to specify that no session termination messages
-      will be sent by the access device upon expiration of the
-      Authorization-Lifetime.
-
-8.12.  Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP
-
-   The Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP (AVP Code 285) is of type Enumerated and
-   is included in application-specific auth answers to inform the client
-   of the action expected upon expiration of the Authorization-Lifetime.
-
-
-
-
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-
-   If the answer message contains an Authorization-Lifetime AVP with a
-   positive value, the Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP MUST be present in an
-   answer message.  The following values are defined:
-
-   AUTHORIZE_ONLY 0
-
-      An authorization only re-auth is expected upon expiration of the
-      Authorization-Lifetime.  This is the default value if the AVP is
-      not present in answer messages that include the Authorization-
-      Lifetime.
-
-   AUTHORIZE_AUTHENTICATE 1
-
-      An authentication and authorization re-auth is expected upon
-      expiration of the Authorization-Lifetime.
-
-8.13.  Session-Timeout AVP
-
-   The Session-Timeout AVP (AVP Code 27) [RFC2865] is of type Unsigned32
-   and contains the maximum number of seconds of service to be provided
-   to the user before termination of the session.  When both the
-   Session-Timeout and the Authorization-Lifetime AVPs are present in an
-   answer message, the former MUST be equal to or greater than the value
-   of the latter.
-
-   A session that terminates on an access device due to the expiration
-   of the Session-Timeout MUST cause an STR to be issued, unless both
-   the access device and the home server had previously agreed that no
-   session termination messages would be sent (see Section 8).
-
-   A Session-Timeout AVP MAY be present in a re-authorization answer
-   message, and it contains the remaining number of seconds from the
-   beginning of the re-auth.
-
-   A value of zero, or the absence of this AVP, means that this session
-   has an unlimited number of seconds before termination.
-
-   This AVP MAY be provided by the client as a hint of the maximum
-   timeout that it is willing to accept.  However, the server MAY return
-   a value that is equal to, or smaller than, the one provided by the
-   client.
-
-8.14.  User-Name AVP
-
-   The User-Name AVP (AVP Code 1) [RFC2865] is of type UTF8String, which
-   contains the User-Name, in a format consistent with the NAI
-   specification [RFC4282].
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-8.15.  Termination-Cause AVP
-
-   The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 295) is of type Enumerated, and
-   is used to indicate the reason why a session was terminated on the
-   access device.  The currently assigned values for this AVP can be
-   found in the IANA registry for Termination-Cause AVP Values
-   [IANATCV].
-
-8.16.  Origin-State-Id AVP
-
-   The Origin-State-Id AVP (AVP Code 278), of type Unsigned32, is a
-   monotonically increasing value that is advanced whenever a Diameter
-   entity restarts with loss of previous state, for example, upon
-   reboot.  Origin-State-Id MAY be included in any Diameter message,
-   including CER.
-
-   A Diameter entity issuing this AVP MUST create a higher value for
-   this AVP each time its state is reset.  A Diameter entity MAY set
-   Origin-State-Id to the time of startup, or it MAY use an incrementing
-   counter retained in non-volatile memory across restarts.
-
-   The Origin-State-Id, if present, MUST reflect the state of the entity
-   indicated by Origin-Host.  If a proxy modifies Origin-Host, it MUST
-   either remove Origin-State-Id or modify it appropriately as well.
-   Typically, Origin-State-Id is used by an access device that always
-   starts up with no active sessions; that is, any session active prior
-   to restart will have been lost.  By including Origin-State-Id in a
-   message, it allows other Diameter entities to infer that sessions
-   associated with a lower Origin-State-Id are no longer active.  If an
-   access device does not intend for such inferences to be made, it MUST
-   either not include Origin-State-Id in any message or set its value to
-   0.
-
-8.17.  Session-Binding AVP
-
-   The Session-Binding AVP (AVP Code 270) is of type Unsigned32, and it
-   MAY be present in application-specific authorization answer messages.
-   If present, this AVP MAY inform the Diameter client that all future
-   application-specific re-auth and Session-Termination-Request messages
-   for this session MUST be sent to the same authorization server.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   This field is a bit mask, and the following bits have been defined:
-
-   RE_AUTH 1
-
-      When set, future re-auth messages for this session MUST NOT
-      include the Destination-Host AVP.  When cleared, the default
-      value, the Destination-Host AVP MUST be present in all re-auth
-      messages for this session.
-
-   STR 2
-
-      When set, the STR message for this session MUST NOT include the
-      Destination-Host AVP.  When cleared, the default value, the
-      Destination-Host AVP MUST be present in the STR message for this
-      session.
-
-   ACCOUNTING 4
-
-      When set, all accounting messages for this session MUST NOT
-      include the Destination-Host AVP.  When cleared, the default
-      value, the Destination-Host AVP, if known, MUST be present in all
-      accounting messages for this session.
-
-8.18.  Session-Server-Failover AVP
-
-   The Session-Server-Failover AVP (AVP Code 271) is of type Enumerated
-   and MAY be present in application-specific authorization answer
-   messages that either do not include the Session-Binding AVP or
-   include the Session-Binding AVP with any of the bits set to a zero
-   value.  If present, this AVP MAY inform the Diameter client that if a
-   re-auth or STR message fails due to a delivery problem, the Diameter
-   client SHOULD issue a subsequent message without the Destination-Host
-   AVP.  When absent, the default value is REFUSE_SERVICE.
-
-   The following values are supported:
-
-   REFUSE_SERVICE 0
-
-      If either the re-auth or the STR message delivery fails, terminate
-      service with the user and do not attempt any subsequent attempts.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   TRY_AGAIN 1
-
-      If either the re-auth or the STR message delivery fails, resend
-      the failed message without the Destination-Host AVP present.
-
-   ALLOW_SERVICE 2
-
-      If re-auth message delivery fails, assume that re-authorization
-      succeeded.  If STR message delivery fails, terminate the session.
-
-   TRY_AGAIN_ALLOW_SERVICE 3
-
-      If either the re-auth or the STR message delivery fails, resend
-      the failed message without the Destination-Host AVP present.  If
-      the second delivery fails for re-auth, assume re-authorization
-      succeeded.  If the second delivery fails for STR, terminate the
-      session.
-
-8.19.  Multi-Round-Time-Out AVP
-
-   The Multi-Round-Time-Out AVP (AVP Code 272) is of type Unsigned32 and
-   SHOULD be present in application-specific authorization answer
-   messages whose Result-Code AVP is set to DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH.
-   This AVP contains the maximum number of seconds that the access
-   device MUST provide the user in responding to an authentication
-   request.
-
-8.20.  Class AVP
-
-   The Class AVP (AVP Code 25) is of type OctetString and is used by
-   Diameter servers to return state information to the access device.
-   When one or more Class AVPs are present in application-specific
-   authorization answer messages, they MUST be present in subsequent re-
-   authorization, session termination and accounting messages.  Class
-   AVPs found in a re-authorization answer message override the ones
-   found in any previous authorization answer message.  Diameter server
-   implementations SHOULD NOT return Class AVPs that require more than
-   4096 bytes of storage on the Diameter client.  A Diameter client that
-   receives Class AVPs whose size exceeds local available storage MUST
-   terminate the session.
-
-8.21.  Event-Timestamp AVP
-
-   The Event-Timestamp (AVP Code 55) is of type Time and MAY be included
-   in an Accounting-Request and Accounting-Answer messages to record the
-   time that the reported event occurred, in seconds since January 1,
-   1900 00:00 UTC.
-
-
-
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-
-9.  Accounting
-
-   This accounting protocol is based on a server directed model with
-   capabilities for real-time delivery of accounting information.
-   Several fault resilience methods [RFC2975] have been built into the
-   protocol in order minimize loss of accounting data in various fault
-   situations and under different assumptions about the capabilities of
-   the used devices.
-
-9.1.  Server Directed Model
-
-   The server directed model means that the device generating the
-   accounting data gets information from either the authorization server
-   (if contacted) or the accounting server regarding the way accounting
-   data shall be forwarded.  This information includes accounting record
-   timeliness requirements.
-
-   As discussed in [RFC2975], real-time transfer of accounting records
-   is a requirement, such as the need to perform credit-limit checks and
-   fraud detection.  Note that batch accounting is not a requirement,
-   and is therefore not supported by Diameter.  Should batched
-   accounting be required in the future, a new Diameter application will
-   need to be created, or it could be handled using another protocol.
-   Note, however, that even if at the Diameter layer, accounting
-   requests are processed one by one; transport protocols used under
-   Diameter typically batch several requests in the same packet under
-   heavy traffic conditions.  This may be sufficient for many
-   applications.
-
-   The authorization server (chain) directs the selection of proper
-   transfer strategy, based on its knowledge of the user and
-   relationships of roaming partnerships.  The server (or agents) uses
-   the Acct-Interim-Interval and Accounting-Realtime-Required AVPs to
-   control the operation of the Diameter peer operating as a client.
-   The Acct-Interim-Interval AVP, when present, instructs the Diameter
-   node acting as a client to produce accounting records continuously
-   even during a session.  Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP is used to
-   control the behavior of the client when the transfer of accounting
-   records from the Diameter client is delayed or unsuccessful.
-
-   The Diameter accounting server MAY override the interim interval or
-   the real-time requirements by including the Acct-Interim-Interval or
-   Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP in the Accounting-Answer message.
-   When one of these AVPs is present, the latest value received SHOULD
-   be used in further accounting activities for the same session.
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-9.2.  Protocol Messages
-
-   A Diameter node that receives a successful authentication and/or
-   authorization message from the Diameter server SHOULD collect
-   accounting information for the session.  The Accounting-Request
-   message is used to transmit the accounting information to the
-   Diameter server, which MUST reply with the Accounting-Answer message
-   to confirm reception.  The Accounting-Answer message includes the
-   Result-Code AVP, which MAY indicate that an error was present in the
-   accounting message.  The value of the Accounting-Realtime-Required
-   AVP received earlier for the session in question may indicate that
-   the user's session has to be terminated when a rejected Accounting-
-   Request message was received.
-
-9.3.  Accounting Application Extension and Requirements
-
-   Each Diameter application (e.g., NASREQ, Mobile IP) SHOULD define its
-   service-specific AVPs that MUST be present in the Accounting-Request
-   message in a section titled "Accounting AVPs".  The application MUST
-   assume that the AVPs described in this document will be present in
-   all Accounting messages, so only their respective service-specific
-   AVPs need to be defined in that section.
-
-   Applications have the option of using one or both of the following
-   accounting application extension models:
-
-   Split Accounting Service
-
-      The accounting message will carry the Application Id of the
-      Diameter base accounting application (see Section 2.4).
-      Accounting messages may be routed to Diameter nodes other than the
-      corresponding Diameter application.  These nodes might be
-      centralized accounting servers that provide accounting service for
-      multiple different Diameter applications.  These nodes MUST
-      advertise the Diameter base accounting Application Id during
-      capabilities exchange.
-
-   Coupled Accounting Service
-
-      The accounting message will carry the Application Id of the
-      application that is using it.  The application itself will process
-      the received accounting records or forward them to an accounting
-      server.  There is no accounting application advertisement required
-      during capabilities exchange, and the accounting messages will be
-      routed the same way as any of the other application messages.
-
-   In cases where an application does not define its own accounting
-   service, it is preferred that the split accounting model be used.
-
-
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-
-
-9.4.  Fault Resilience
-
-   Diameter base protocol mechanisms are used to overcome small message
-   loss and network faults of a temporary nature.
-
-   Diameter peers acting as clients MUST implement the use of failover
-   to guard against server failures and certain network failures.
-   Diameter peers acting as agents or related off-line processing
-   systems MUST detect duplicate accounting records caused by the
-   sending of the same record to several servers and duplication of
-   messages in transit.  This detection MUST be based on the inspection
-   of the Session-Id and Accounting-Record-Number AVP pairs.  Appendix C
-   discusses duplicate detection needs and implementation issues.
-
-   Diameter clients MAY have non-volatile memory for the safe storage of
-   accounting records over reboots or extended network failures, network
-   partitions, and server failures.  If such memory is available, the
-   client SHOULD store new accounting records there as soon as the
-   records are created and until a positive acknowledgement of their
-   reception from the Diameter server has been received.  Upon a reboot,
-   the client MUST start sending the records in the non-volatile memory
-   to the accounting server with the appropriate modifications in
-   termination cause, session length, and other relevant information in
-   the records.
-
-   A further application of this protocol may include AVPs to control
-   the maximum number of accounting records that may be stored in the
-   Diameter client without committing them to the non-volatile memory or
-   transferring them to the Diameter server.
-
-   The client SHOULD NOT remove the accounting data from any of its
-   memory areas before the correct Accounting-Answer has been received.
-   The client MAY remove the oldest, undelivered, or as yet
-   unacknowledged accounting data if it runs out of resources such as
-   memory.  It is an implementation-dependent matter for the client to
-   accept new sessions under this condition.
-
-9.5.  Accounting Records
-
-   In all accounting records, the Session-Id AVP MUST be present; the
-   User-Name AVP MUST be present if it is available to the Diameter
-   client.
-
-   Different types of accounting records are sent depending on the
-   actual type of accounted service and the authorization server's
-   directions for interim accounting.  If the accounted service is a
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   one-time event, meaning that the start and stop of the event are
-   simultaneous, then the Accounting-Record-Type AVP MUST be present and
-   set to the value EVENT_RECORD.
-
-   If the accounted service is of a measurable length, then the AVP MUST
-   use the values START_RECORD, STOP_RECORD, and possibly,
-   INTERIM_RECORD.  If the authorization server has not directed interim
-   accounting to be enabled for the session, two accounting records MUST
-   be generated for each service of type session.  When the initial
-   Accounting-Request for a given session is sent, the Accounting-
-   Record-Type AVP MUST be set to the value START_RECORD.  When the last
-   Accounting-Request is sent, the value MUST be STOP_RECORD.
-
-   If the authorization server has directed interim accounting to be
-   enabled, the Diameter client MUST produce additional records between
-   the START_RECORD and STOP_RECORD, marked INTERIM_RECORD.  The
-   production of these records is directed by Acct-Interim-Interval as
-   well as any re-authentication or re-authorization of the session.
-   The Diameter client MUST overwrite any previous interim accounting
-   records that are locally stored for delivery, if a new record is
-   being generated for the same session.  This ensures that only one
-   pending interim record can exist on an access device for any given
-   session.
-
-   A particular value of Accounting-Sub-Session-Id MUST appear only in
-   one sequence of accounting records from a Diameter client, except for
-   the purposes of retransmission.  The one sequence that is sent MUST
-   be either one record with Accounting-Record-Type AVP set to the value
-   EVENT_RECORD or several records starting with one having the value
-   START_RECORD, followed by zero or more INTERIM_RECORDs and a single
-   STOP_RECORD.  A particular Diameter application specification MUST
-   define the type of sequences that MUST be used.
-
-9.6.  Correlation of Accounting Records
-
-   If an application uses accounting messages, it can correlate
-   accounting records with a specific application session by using the
-   Session-Id of the particular application session in the accounting
-   messages.  Accounting messages MAY also use a different Session-Id
-   from that of the application sessions, in which case, other session-
-   related information is needed to perform correlation.
-
-   In cases where an application requires multiple accounting sub-
-   sessions, an Accounting-Sub-Session-Id AVP is used to differentiate
-   each sub-session.  The Session-Id would remain constant for all sub-
-   sessions and is used to correlate all the sub-sessions to a
-   particular application session.  Note that receiving a STOP_RECORD
-
-
-
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-
-
-   with no Accounting-Sub-Session-Id AVP when sub-sessions were
-   originally used in the START_RECORD messages implies that all sub-
-   sessions are terminated.
-
-   There are also cases where an application needs to correlate multiple
-   application sessions into a single accounting record; the accounting
-   record may span multiple different Diameter applications and sessions
-   used by the same user at a given time.  In such cases, the Acct-
-   Multi-Session-Id AVP is used.  The Acct-Multi-Session-Id AVP SHOULD
-   be signaled by the server to the access device (typically, during
-   authorization) when it determines that a request belongs to an
-   existing session.  The access device MUST then include the Acct-
-   Multi-Session-Id AVP in all subsequent accounting messages.
-
-   The Acct-Multi-Session-Id AVP MAY include the value of the original
-   Session-Id.  Its contents are implementation specific, but the MUST
-   be globally unique across other Acct-Multi-Session-Ids and MUST NOT
-   change during the life of a session.
-
-   A Diameter application document MUST define the exact concept of a
-   session that is being accounted, and it MAY define the concept of a
-   multi-session.  For instance, the NASREQ DIAMETER application treats
-   a single PPP connection to a Network Access Server as one session and
-   a set of Multilink PPP sessions as one multi-session.
-
-9.7.  Accounting Command Codes
-
-   This section defines Command Code values that MUST be supported by
-   all Diameter implementations that provide accounting services.
-
-9.7.1.  Accounting-Request
-
-   The Accounting-Request (ACR) command, indicated by the Command Code
-   field set to 271 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit set, is sent by a
-   Diameter node, acting as a client, in order to exchange accounting
-   information with a peer.
-
-   In addition to the AVPs listed below, Accounting-Request messages
-   SHOULD include service-specific accounting AVPs.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-      Message Format
-
-         <ACR> ::= < Diameter Header: 271, REQ, PXY >
-                   < Session-Id >
-                   { Origin-Host }
-                   { Origin-Realm }
-                   { Destination-Realm }
-                   { Accounting-Record-Type }
-                   { Accounting-Record-Number }
-                   [ Acct-Application-Id ]
-                   [ Vendor-Specific-Application-Id ]
-                   [ User-Name ]
-                   [ Destination-Host ]
-                   [ Accounting-Sub-Session-Id ]
-                   [ Acct-Session-Id ]
-                   [ Acct-Multi-Session-Id ]
-                   [ Acct-Interim-Interval ]
-                   [ Accounting-Realtime-Required ]
-                   [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                   [ Event-Timestamp ]
-                 * [ Proxy-Info ]
-                 * [ Route-Record ]
-                 * [ AVP ]
-
-9.7.2.  Accounting-Answer
-
-   The Accounting-Answer (ACA) command, indicated by the Command Code
-   field set to 271 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit cleared, is used to
-   acknowledge an Accounting-Request command.  The Accounting-Answer
-   command contains the same Session-Id as the corresponding request.
-
-   Only the target Diameter server, known as the home Diameter server,
-   SHOULD respond with the Accounting-Answer command.
-
-   In addition to the AVPs listed below, Accounting-Answer messages
-   SHOULD include service-specific accounting AVPs.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-      Message Format
-
-         <ACA> ::= < Diameter Header: 271, PXY >
-                   < Session-Id >
-                   { Result-Code }
-                   { Origin-Host }
-                   { Origin-Realm }
-                   { Accounting-Record-Type }
-                   { Accounting-Record-Number }
-                   [ Acct-Application-Id ]
-                   [ Vendor-Specific-Application-Id ]
-                   [ User-Name ]
-                   [ Accounting-Sub-Session-Id ]
-                   [ Acct-Session-Id ]
-                   [ Acct-Multi-Session-Id ]
-                   [ Error-Message ]
-                   [ Error-Reporting-Host ]
-                   [ Failed-AVP ]
-                   [ Acct-Interim-Interval ]
-                   [ Accounting-Realtime-Required ]
-                   [ Origin-State-Id ]
-                   [ Event-Timestamp ]
-                 * [ Proxy-Info ]
-                 * [ AVP ]
-
-9.8.  Accounting AVPs
-
-   This section contains AVPs that describe accounting usage information
-   related to a specific session.
-
-9.8.1.  Accounting-Record-Type AVP
-
-   The Accounting-Record-Type AVP (AVP Code 480) is of type Enumerated
-   and contains the type of accounting record being sent.  The following
-   values are currently defined for the Accounting-Record-Type AVP:
-
-   EVENT_RECORD 1
-
-      An Accounting Event Record is used to indicate that a one-time
-      event has occurred (meaning that the start and end of the event
-      are simultaneous).  This record contains all information relevant
-      to the service, and it is the only record of the service.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   START_RECORD 2
-
-      Accounting Start, Interim, and Stop Records are used to indicate
-      that a service of a measurable length has been given.  An
-      Accounting Start Record is used to initiate an accounting session
-      and contains accounting information that is relevant to the
-      initiation of the session.
-
-   INTERIM_RECORD 3
-
-      An Interim Accounting Record contains cumulative accounting
-      information for an existing accounting session.  Interim
-      Accounting Records SHOULD be sent every time a re-authentication
-      or re-authorization occurs.  Further, additional interim record
-      triggers MAY be defined by application-specific Diameter
-      applications.  The selection of whether to use INTERIM_RECORD
-      records is done by the Acct-Interim-Interval AVP.
-
-   STOP_RECORD 4
-
-      An Accounting Stop Record is sent to terminate an accounting
-      session and contains cumulative accounting information relevant to
-      the existing session.
-
-9.8.2.  Acct-Interim-Interval AVP
-
-   The Acct-Interim-Interval AVP (AVP Code 85) is of type Unsigned32 and
-   is sent from the Diameter home authorization server to the Diameter
-   client.  The client uses information in this AVP to decide how and
-   when to produce accounting records.  With different values in this
-   AVP, service sessions can result in one, two, or two+N accounting
-   records, based on the needs of the home organization.  The following
-   accounting record production behavior is directed by the inclusion of
-   this AVP:
-
-   1.  The omission of the Acct-Interim-Interval AVP or its inclusion
-       with Value field set to 0 means that EVENT_RECORD, START_RECORD,
-       and STOP_RECORD are produced, as appropriate for the service.
-
-   2.  The inclusion of the AVP with Value field set to a non-zero value
-       means that INTERIM_RECORD records MUST be produced between the
-       START_RECORD and STOP_RECORD records.  The Value field of this
-       AVP is the nominal interval between these records in seconds.
-       The Diameter node that originates the accounting information,
-       known as the client, MUST produce the first INTERIM_RECORD record
-       roughly at the time when this nominal interval has elapsed from
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-       the START_RECORD, the next one again as the interval has elapsed
-       once more, and so on until the session ends and a STOP_RECORD
-       record is produced.
-
-       The client MUST ensure that the interim record production times
-       are randomized so that large accounting message storms are not
-       created either among records or around a common service start
-       time.
-
-9.8.3.   Accounting-Record-Number AVP
-
-   The Accounting-Record-Number AVP (AVP Code 485) is of type Unsigned32
-   and identifies this record within one session.  As Session-Id AVPs
-   are globally unique, the combination of Session-Id and Accounting-
-   Record-Number AVPs is also globally unique and can be used in
-   matching accounting records with confirmations.  An easy way to
-   produce unique numbers is to set the value to 0 for records of type
-   EVENT_RECORD and START_RECORD and set the value to 1 for the first
-   INTERIM_RECORD, 2 for the second, and so on until the value for
-   STOP_RECORD is one more than for the last INTERIM_RECORD.
-
-9.8.4.  Acct-Session-Id AVP
-
-   The Acct-Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 44) is of type OctetString is only
-   used when RADIUS/Diameter translation occurs.  This AVP contains the
-   contents of the RADIUS Acct-Session-Id attribute.
-
-9.8.5.  Acct-Multi-Session-Id AVP
-
-   The Acct-Multi-Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 50) is of type UTF8String,
-   following the format specified in Section 8.8.  The Acct-Multi-
-   Session-Id AVP is used to link multiple related accounting sessions,
-   where each session would have a unique Session-Id but the same Acct-
-   Multi-Session-Id AVP.  This AVP MAY be returned by the Diameter
-   server in an authorization answer, and it MUST be used in all
-   accounting messages for the given session.
-
-9.8.6.  Accounting-Sub-Session-Id AVP
-
-   The Accounting-Sub-Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 287) is of type
-   Unsigned64 and contains the accounting sub-session identifier.  The
-   combination of the Session-Id and this AVP MUST be unique per sub-
-   session, and the value of this AVP MUST be monotonically increased by
-   one for all new sub-sessions.  The absence of this AVP implies no
-   sub-sessions are in use, with the exception of an Accounting-Request
-   whose Accounting-Record-Type is set to STOP_RECORD.  A STOP_RECORD
-   message with no Accounting-Sub-Session-Id AVP present will signal the
-   termination of all sub-sessions for a given Session-Id.
-
-
-
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-
-
-9.8.7.   Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP
-
-   The Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP (AVP Code 483) is of type
-   Enumerated and is sent from the Diameter home authorization server to
-   the Diameter client or in the Accounting-Answer from the accounting
-   server.  The client uses information in this AVP to decide what to do
-   if the sending of accounting records to the accounting server has
-   been temporarily prevented due to, for instance, a network problem.
-
-   DELIVER_AND_GRANT 1
-
-      The AVP with Value field set to DELIVER_AND_GRANT means that the
-      service MUST only be granted as long as there is a connection to
-      an accounting server.  Note that the set of alternative accounting
-      servers are treated as one server in this sense.  Having to move
-      the accounting record stream to a backup server is not a reason to
-      discontinue the service to the user.
-
-   GRANT_AND_STORE 2
-
-      The AVP with Value field set to GRANT_AND_STORE means that service
-      SHOULD be granted if there is a connection, or as long as records
-      can still be stored as described in Section 9.4.
-
-      This is the default behavior if the AVP isn't included in the
-      reply from the authorization server.
-
-   GRANT_AND_LOSE 3
-
-      The AVP with Value field set to GRANT_AND_LOSE means that service
-      SHOULD be granted even if the records cannot be delivered or
-      stored.
-
-10.  AVP Occurrence Tables
-
-   The following tables present the AVPs defined in this document and
-   specify in which Diameter messages they MAY or MAY NOT be present.
-   AVPs that occur only inside a Grouped AVP are not shown in these
-   tables.
-
-   The tables use the following symbols:
-
-   0     The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message.
-
-   0+    Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the
-         message.
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   0-1   Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message.
-         It is considered an error if there are more than one instance
-         of the AVP.
-
-   1     One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message.
-
-   1+    At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the
-         message.
-
-10.1.  Base Protocol Command AVP Table
-
-   The table in this section is limited to the non-Accounting Command
-   Codes defined in this specification.
-
-                       +-----------------------------------------------+
-                       |                  Command Code                 |
-                       +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
-   Attribute Name      |CER|CEA|DPR|DPA|DWR|DWA|RAR|RAA|ASR|ASA|STR|STA|
-   --------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
-   Acct-Interim-       |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0-1|0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-     Interval          |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
-   Accounting-Realtime-|0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0-1|0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-     Required          |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
-   Acct-Application-Id |0+ |0+ |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Auth-Application-Id |0+ |0+ |0  |0  |0  |0  |1  |0  |1  |0  |1  |0  |
-   Auth-Grace-Period   |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Auth-Request-Type   |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Auth-Session-State  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Authorization-      |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-     Lifetime          |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
-   Class               |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0+ |0+ |
-   Destination-Host    |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |1  |0  |1  |0  |0-1|0  |
-   Destination-Realm   |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |1  |0  |1  |0  |1  |0  |
-   Disconnect-Cause    |0  |0  |1  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Error-Message       |0  |0-1|0  |0-1|0  |0-1|0  |0-1|0  |0-1|0  |0-1|
-   Error-Reporting-Host|0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0-1|0  |0-1|0  |0-1|
-   Failed-AVP          |0  |0-1|0  |0-1|0  |0-1|0  |0-1|0  |0-1|0  |0-1|
-   Firmware-Revision   |0-1|0-1|0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Host-IP-Address     |1+ |1+ |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Inband-Security-Id  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Multi-Round-Time-Out|0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   Origin-Host         |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |
-   Origin-Realm        |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |
-   Origin-State-Id     |0-1|0-1|0  |0  |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
-   Product-Name        |1  |1  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Proxy-Info          |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0+ |0+ |0+ |0+ |0+ |0+ |
-   Redirect-Host       |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0+ |0  |0+ |0  |0+ |
-   Redirect-Host-Usage |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0-1|0  |0-1|0  |0-1|
-   Redirect-Max-Cache- |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0-1|0  |0-1|0  |0-1|
-     Time              |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
-   Result-Code         |0  |1  |0  |1  |0  |1  |0  |1  |0  |1  |0  |1  |
-   Re-Auth-Request-Type|0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |1  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Route-Record        |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0+ |0  |0+ |0  |0+ |0  |
-   Session-Binding     |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Session-Id          |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |1  |
-   Session-Server-     |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-     Failover          |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
-   Session-Timeout     |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Supported-Vendor-Id |0+ |0+ |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Termination-Cause   |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |1  |0  |
-   User-Name           |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
-   Vendor-Id           |1  |1  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-   Vendor-Specific-    |0+ |0+ |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |0  |
-     Application-Id    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
-   --------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
-
-10.2.  Accounting AVP Table
-
-   The table in this section is used to represent which AVPs defined in
-   this document are to be present in the Accounting messages.  These
-   AVP occurrence requirements are guidelines, which may be expanded,
-   and/or overridden by application-specific requirements in the
-   Diameter applications documents.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-                                    +-----------+
-                                    |  Command  |
-                                    |    Code   |
-                                    +-----+-----+
-      Attribute Name                | ACR | ACA |
-      ------------------------------+-----+-----+
-      Acct-Interim-Interval         | 0-1 | 0-1 |
-      Acct-Multi-Session-Id         | 0-1 | 0-1 |
-      Accounting-Record-Number      | 1   | 1   |
-      Accounting-Record-Type        | 1   | 1   |
-      Acct-Session-Id               | 0-1 | 0-1 |
-      Accounting-Sub-Session-Id     | 0-1 | 0-1 |
-      Accounting-Realtime-Required  | 0-1 | 0-1 |
-      Acct-Application-Id           | 0-1 | 0-1 |
-      Auth-Application-Id           | 0   | 0   |
-      Class                         | 0+  | 0+  |
-      Destination-Host              | 0-1 | 0   |
-      Destination-Realm             | 1   | 0   |
-      Error-Reporting-Host          | 0   | 0+  |
-      Event-Timestamp               | 0-1 | 0-1 |
-      Failed-AVP                    | 0   | 0-1 |
-      Origin-Host                   | 1   | 1   |
-      Origin-Realm                  | 1   | 1   |
-      Proxy-Info                    | 0+  | 0+  |
-      Route-Record                  | 0+  | 0   |
-      Result-Code                   | 0   | 1   |
-      Session-Id                    | 1   | 1   |
-      Termination-Cause             | 0   | 0   |
-      User-Name                     | 0-1 | 0-1 |
-      Vendor-Specific-Application-Id| 0-1 | 0-1 |
-      ------------------------------+-----+-----+
-
-11.  IANA Considerations
-
-   This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers
-   Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the
-   Diameter protocol, in accordance with [RFC5226].  Existing IANA
-   registries and assignments put in place by RFC 3588 remain the same
-   unless explicitly updated or deprecated in this section.
-
-11.1.  AVP Header
-
-   As defined in Section 4, the AVP header contains three fields that
-   require IANA namespace management: the AVP Code, Vendor-ID, and Flags
-   fields.
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-11.1.1.  AVP Codes
-
-   There are multiple namespaces.  Vendors can have their own AVP Codes
-   namespace that will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as
-   Enterprise-Number), and they control the assignments of their vendor-
-   specific AVP Codes within their own namespace.  The absence of a
-   Vendor-ID or a Vendor-ID value of zero (0) identifies the IETF AVP
-   Codes namespace, which is under IANA control.  The AVP Codes and
-   sometimes possible values in an AVP are controlled and maintained by
-   IANA.  AVP Code 0 is not used.  AVP Codes 1-255 are managed
-   separately as RADIUS Attribute Types.  Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is
-   implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should
-   be encouraged instead.
-
-   AVPs may be allocated following Expert Review (by a Designated
-   Expert) with Specification Required [RFC5226].  A block allocation
-   (release of more than three AVPs at a time for a given purpose)
-   requires IETF Review [RFC5226].
-
-11.1.2.  AVP Flags
-
-   Section 4.1 describes the existing AVP Flags.  The remaining bits can
-   only be assigned via a Standards Action [RFC5226].
-
-11.2.  Diameter Header
-
-11.2.1.  Command Codes
-
-   For the Diameter header, the Command Code namespace allocation has
-   changed.  The new allocation rules are as follows:
-
-      The Command Code values 256 - 8,388,607 (0x100 to 0x7fffff) are
-      for permanent, standard commands, allocated by IETF Review
-      [RFC5226].
-
-      The values 8,388,608 - 16,777,213 (0x800000 - 0xfffffd) are
-      reserved for vendor-specific Command Codes, to be allocated on a
-      First Come, First Served basis by IANA [RFC5226].  The request to
-      IANA for a Vendor-Specific Command Code SHOULD include a reference
-      to a publicly available specification that documents the command
-      in sufficient detail to aid in interoperability between
-      independent implementations.  If the specification cannot be made
-      publicly available, the request for a vendor-specific Command Code
-      MUST include the contact information of persons and/or entities
-      responsible for authoring and maintaining the command.
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-      The values 16,777,214 and 16,777,215 (hexadecimal values 0xfffffe
-      - 0xffffff) are reserved for experimental commands.  As these
-      codes are only for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee
-      is made for interoperability between Diameter peers using
-      experimental commands.
-
-11.2.2.  Command Flags
-
-   Section 3 describes the existing Command Flags field.  The remaining
-   bits can only be assigned via a Standards Action [RFC5226].
-
-11.3.  AVP Values
-
-   For AVP values, the Experimental-Result-Code AVP value allocation has
-   been added; see Section 11.3.1.  The old AVP value allocation rule,
-   IETF Consensus, has been updated to IETF Review as per [RFC5226], and
-   affected AVPs are listed as reminders.
-
-11.3.1.  Experimental-Result-Code AVP
-
-   Values for this AVP are purely local to the indicated vendor, and no
-   IANA registry is maintained for them.
-
-11.3.2.  Result-Code AVP Values
-
-   New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226].
-
-11.3.3.  Accounting-Record-Type AVP Values
-
-   New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226].
-
-11.3.4.  Termination-Cause AVP Values
-
-   New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226].
-
-11.3.5.  Redirect-Host-Usage AVP Values
-
-   New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226].
-
-11.3.6.  Session-Server-Failover AVP Values
-
-   New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226].
-
-11.3.7.  Session-Binding AVP Values
-
-   New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226].
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-11.3.8.  Disconnect-Cause AVP Values
-
-   New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226].
-
-11.3.9.  Auth-Request-Type AVP Values
-
-   New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226].
-
-11.3.10.  Auth-Session-State AVP Values
-
-   New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226].
-
-11.3.11.  Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP Values
-
-   New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226].
-
-11.3.12.  Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP Values
-
-   New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226].
-
-11.3.13.  Inband-Security-Id AVP (code 299)
-
-   The use of this AVP has been deprecated.
-
-11.4.  _diameters Service Name and Port Number Registration
-
-   IANA has registered the "_diameters" service name and assigned port
-   numbers for TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP according to the guidelines given
-   in [RFC6335].
-
-      Service Name:         _diameters
-
-      Transport Protocols:  TCP, SCTP
-
-      Assignee:             IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
-
-      Contact:              IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
-
-      Description:          Diameter over TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP
-
-      Reference:            RFC 6733
-
-      Port  Number:         5868, from the User Range
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-11.5.  SCTP Payload Protocol Identifiers
-
-   Two SCTP payload protocol identifiers have been registered in the
-   SCTP Payload Protocol Identifiers registry:
-
-
-    Value | SCTP Payload Protocol Identifier
-   -------|-----------------------------------
-     46   | Diameter in a SCTP DATA chunk
-     47   | Diameter in a DTLS/SCTP DATA chunk
-
-
-11.6.  S-NAPTR Parameters
-
-   The following tag has been registered in the S-NAPTR Application
-   Protocol Tags registry:
-
-   Tag                | Protocol
-   -------------------|---------
-   diameter.dtls.sctp | DTLS/SCTP
-
-12.  Diameter Protocol-Related Configurable Parameters
-
-   This section contains the configurable parameters that are found
-   throughout this document:
-
-   Diameter Peer
-
-      A Diameter entity MAY communicate with peers that are statically
-      configured.  A statically configured Diameter peer would require
-      that either the IP address or the fully qualified domain name
-      (FQDN) be supplied, which would then be used to resolve through
-      DNS.
-
-   Routing Table
-
-      A Diameter proxy server routes messages based on the realm portion
-      of a Network Access Identifier (NAI).  The server MUST have a
-      table of Realm Names, and the address of the peer to which the
-      message must be forwarded.  The routing table MAY also include a
-      "default route", which is typically used for all messages that
-      cannot be locally processed.
-
-   Tc timer
-
-      The Tc timer controls the frequency that transport connection
-      attempts are done to a peer with whom no active transport
-      connection exists.  The recommended value is 30 seconds.
-
-
-
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-
-
-13.  Security Considerations
-
-   The Diameter base protocol messages SHOULD be secured by using TLS
-   [RFC5246] or DTLS/SCTP [RFC6083].  Additional security mechanisms
-   such as IPsec [RFC4301] MAY also be deployed to secure connections
-   between peers.  However, all Diameter base protocol implementations
-   MUST support the use of TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP, and the Diameter
-   protocol MUST NOT be used without one of TLS, DTLS, or IPsec.
-
-   If a Diameter connection is to be protected via TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP
-   or IPsec, then TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP or IPsec/IKE SHOULD begin prior
-   to any Diameter message exchange.  All security parameters for TLS/
-   TCP and DTLS/SCTP or IPsec are configured independent of the Diameter
-   protocol.  All Diameter messages will be sent through the TLS/TCP and
-   DTLS/SCTP or IPsec connection after a successful setup.
-
-   For TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP connections to be established in the open
-   state, the CER/CEA exchange MUST include an Inband-Security-ID AVP
-   with a value of TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP.  The TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP
-   handshake will begin when both ends successfully reach the open
-   state, after completion of the CER/CEA exchange.  If the TLS/TCP and
-   DTLS/SCTP handshake is successful, all further messages will be sent
-   via TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP.  If the handshake fails, both ends MUST
-   move to the closed state.  See Section 13.1 for more details.
-
-13.1.  TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP Usage
-
-   Diameter nodes using TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP for security MUST mutually
-   authenticate as part of TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP session establishment.
-   In order to ensure mutual authentication, the Diameter node acting as
-   the TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP server MUST request a certificate from the
-   Diameter node acting as TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP client, and the
-   Diameter node acting as the TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP client MUST be
-   prepared to supply a certificate on request.
-
-   Diameter nodes MUST be able to negotiate the following TLS/TCP and
-   DTLS/SCTP cipher suites:
-
-         TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
-         TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
-         TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
-
-   Diameter nodes SHOULD be able to negotiate the following TLS/TCP and
-   DTLS/SCTP cipher suite:
-
-         TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   Note that it is quite possible that support for the
-   TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cipher suite will be REQUIRED at some
-   future date.  Diameter nodes MAY negotiate other TLS/TCP and DTLS/
-   SCTP cipher suites.
-
-   If public key certificates are used for Diameter security (for
-   example, with TLS), the value of the expiration times in the routing
-   and peer tables MUST NOT be greater than the expiry time in the
-   relevant certificates.
-
-13.2.  Peer-to-Peer Considerations
-
-   As with any peer-to-peer protocol, proper configuration of the trust
-   model within a Diameter peer is essential to security.  When
-   certificates are used, it is necessary to configure the root
-   certificate authorities trusted by the Diameter peer.  These root CAs
-   are likely to be unique to Diameter usage and distinct from the root
-   CAs that might be trusted for other purposes such as Web browsing.
-   In general, it is expected that those root CAs will be configured so
-   as to reflect the business relationships between the organization
-   hosting the Diameter peer and other organizations.  As a result, a
-   Diameter peer will typically not be configured to allow connectivity
-   with any arbitrary peer.  With certificate authentication, Diameter
-   peers may not be known beforehand and therefore peer discovery may be
-   required.
-
-13.3.  AVP Considerations
-
-   Diameter AVPs often contain security-sensitive data; for example,
-   user passwords and location data, network addresses and cryptographic
-   keys.  The following AVPs defined in this document are considered to
-   be security-sensitive:
-
-   o  Acct-Interim-Interval
-
-   o  Accounting-Realtime-Required
-
-   o  Acct-Multi-Session-Id
-
-   o  Accounting-Record-Number
-
-   o  Accounting-Record-Type
-
-   o  Accounting-Session-Id
-
-   o  Accounting-Sub-Session-Id
-
-   o  Class
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   o  Session-Id
-
-   o  Session-Binding
-
-   o  Session-Server-Failover
-
-   o  User-Name
-
-   Diameter messages containing these or any other AVPs considered to be
-   security-sensitive MUST only be sent protected via mutually
-   authenticated TLS or IPsec.  In addition, those messages MUST NOT be
-   sent via intermediate nodes unless there is end-to-end security
-   between the originator and recipient or the originator has locally
-   trusted configuration that indicates that end-to-end security is not
-   needed.  For example, end-to-end security may not be required in the
-   case where an intermediary node is known to be operated as part of
-   the same administrative domain as the endpoints so that an ability to
-   successfully compromise the intermediary would imply a high
-   probability of being able to compromise the endpoints as well.  Note
-   that no end-to-end security mechanism is specified in this document.
-
-14.  References
-
-14.1.  Normative References
-
-   [FLOATPOINT]
-              Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
-              Standard for Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic, ANSI/IEEE
-              Standard 754-1985", August 1985.
-
-   [IANAADFAM]
-              IANA, "Address Family Numbers",
-              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers>.
-
-   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
-              September 1981.
-
-   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
-              RFC 793, September 1981.
-
-   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
-              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
-
-   [RFC3492]  Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode
-              for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications
-              (IDNA)", RFC 3492, March 2003.
-
-
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                  [Page 142]
-
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-
-
-   [RFC3539]  Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization and
-              Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile", RFC 3539, June 2003.
-
-   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
-              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
-
-   [RFC3958]  Daigle, L. and A. Newton, "Domain-Based Application
-              Service Location Using SRV RRs and the Dynamic Delegation
-              Discovery Service (DDDS)", RFC 3958, January 2005.
-
-   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
-              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
-              RFC 3986, January 2005.
-
-   [RFC4004]  Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and
-              P. McCann, "Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application", RFC 4004,
-              August 2005.
-
-   [RFC4005]  Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton,
-              "Diameter Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005,
-              August 2005.
-
-   [RFC4006]  Hakala, H., Mattila, L., Koskinen, J-P., Stura, M., and J.
-              Loughney, "Diameter Credit-Control Application", RFC 4006,
-              August 2005.
-
-   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
-              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
-
-   [RFC4282]  Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
-              Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.
-
-   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
-              Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
-
-   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
-              RFC 4960, September 2007.
-
-   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
-              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
-              May 2008.
-
-   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
-              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
-
-   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
-              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
-              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
-              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
-              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
-
-   [RFC5729]  Korhonen, J., Jones, M., Morand, L., and T. Tsou,
-              "Clarifications on the Routing of Diameter Requests Based
-              on the Username and the Realm", RFC 5729, December 2009.
-
-   [RFC5890]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
-              Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
-              RFC 5890, August 2010.
-
-   [RFC5891]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names in
-              Applications (IDNA): Protocol", RFC 5891, August 2010.
-
-   [RFC6083]  Tuexen, M., Seggelmann, R., and E. Rescorla, "Datagram
-              Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for Stream Control
-              Transmission Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 6083, January 2011.
-
-   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
-              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.
-
-   [RFC6408]  Jones, M., Korhonen, J., and L. Morand, "Diameter
-              Straightforward-Naming Authority Pointer (S-NAPTR) Usage",
-              RFC 6408, November 2011.
-
-14.2.  Informative References
-
-   [ENTERPRISE]  IANA, "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise
-                 Codes",
-                 <http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers>.
-
-   [IANATCV]     IANA, "Termination-Cause AVP Values (code 295)",
-                 <http://www.iana.org/assignments/aaa-parameters/
-                 aaa-parameters.xml#aaa-parameters-16>.
-
-   [RFC1492]     Finseth, C., "An Access Control Protocol, Sometimes
-                 Called TACACS", RFC 1492, July 1993.
-
-   [RFC1661]     Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)",
-                 STD 51, RFC 1661, July 1994.
-
-   [RFC2104]     Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
-                 Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
-                 February 1997.
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   [RFC2782]     Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR
-                 for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)",
-                 RFC 2782, February 2000.
-
-   [RFC2865]     Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
-                 "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
-                 RFC 2865, June 2000.
-
-   [RFC2866]     Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.
-
-   [RFC2869]     Rigney, C., Willats, W., and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS
-                 Extensions", RFC 2869, June 2000.
-
-   [RFC2881]     Mitton, D. and M. Beadles, "Network Access Server
-                 Requirements Next Generation (NASREQNG) NAS Model",
-                 RFC 2881, July 2000.
-
-   [RFC2975]     Aboba, B., Arkko, J., and D. Harrington, "Introduction
-                 to Accounting Management", RFC 2975, October 2000.
-
-   [RFC2989]     Aboba, B., Calhoun, P., Glass, S., Hiller, T., McCann,
-                 P., Shiino, H., Walsh, P., Zorn, G., Dommety, G.,
-                 Perkins, C., Patil, B., Mitton, D., Manning, S.,
-                 Beadles, M., Chen, X., Sivalingham, S., Hameed, A.,
-                 Munson, M., Jacobs, S., Lim, B., Hirschman, B., Hsu,
-                 R., Koo, H., Lipford, M., Campbell, E., Xu, Y., Baba,
-                 S., and E. Jaques, "Criteria for Evaluating AAA
-                 Protocols for Network Access", RFC 2989, November 2000.
-
-   [RFC3162]     Aboba, B., Zorn, G., and D. Mitton, "RADIUS and IPv6",
-                 RFC 3162, August 2001.
-
-   [RFC3748]     Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and
-                 H. Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol
-                 (EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
-
-   [RFC4301]     Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
-                 Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
-
-   [RFC4690]     Klensin, J., Faltstrom, P., Karp, C., and IAB, "Review
-                 and Recommendations for Internationalized Domain Names
-                 (IDNs)", RFC 4690, September 2006.
-
-   [RFC5176]     Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B.
-                 Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
-                 Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
-                 RFC 5176, January 2008.
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-   [RFC5461]     Gont, F., "TCP's Reaction to Soft Errors", RFC 5461,
-                 February 2009.
-
-   [RFC5905]     Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
-                 "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
-                 Algorithms Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
-
-   [RFC5927]     Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927,
-                 July 2010.
-
-   [RFC6335]     Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and
-                 S. Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
-                 (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service
-                 Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry",
-                 BCP 165, RFC 6335, August 2011.
-
-   [RFC6737]     Kang, J. and G. Zorn, "The Diameter Capabilities Update
-                 Application", RFC 6737, October 2012.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-Appendix A.  Acknowledgements
-
-A.1.  This Document
-
-   The authors would like to thank the following people that have
-   provided proposals and contributions to this document:
-
-   To Vishnu Ram and Satendra Gera for their contributions on
-   capabilities updates, predictive loop avoidance, as well as many
-   other technical proposals.  To Tolga Asveren for his insights and
-   contributions on almost all of the proposed solutions incorporated
-   into this document.  To Timothy Smith for helping on the capabilities
-   Update and other topics.  To Tony Zhang for providing fixes to
-   loopholes on composing Failed-AVPs as well as many other issues and
-   topics.  To Jan Nordqvist for clearly stating the usage of
-   Application Ids.  To Anders Kristensen for providing needed technical
-   opinions.  To David Frascone for providing invaluable review of the
-   document.  To Mark Jones for providing clarifying text on vendor
-   command codes and other vendor-specific indicators.  To Victor
-   Pascual and Sebastien Decugis for new text and recommendations on
-   SCTP/DTLS.  To Jouni Korhonen for taking over the editing task and
-   resolving last bits from versions 27 through 29.
-
-   Special thanks to the Diameter extensibility design team, which
-   helped resolve the tricky question of mandatory AVPs and ABNF
-   semantics.  The members of this team are as follows:
-
-   Avi Lior, Jari Arkko, Glen Zorn, Lionel Morand, Mark Jones, Tolga
-   Asveren, Jouni Korhonen, and Glenn McGregor.
-
-   Special thanks also to people who have provided invaluable comments
-   and inputs especially in resolving controversial issues:
-
-   Glen Zorn, Yoshihiro Ohba, Marco Stura, Stephen Farrel, Pete Resnick,
-   Peter Saint-Andre, Robert Sparks, Krishna Prasad, Sean Turner, Barry
-   Leiba, and Pasi Eronen.
-
-   Finally, we would like to thank the original authors of this
-   document:
-
-   Pat Calhoun, John Loughney, Jari Arkko, Erik Guttman, and Glen Zorn.
-
-   Their invaluable knowledge and experience has given us a robust and
-   flexible AAA protocol that many people have seen great value in
-   adopting.  We greatly appreciate their support and stewardship for
-   the continued improvements of Diameter as a protocol.  We would also
-   like to extend our gratitude to folks aside from the authors who have
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-   assisted and contributed to the original version of this document.
-   Their efforts significantly contributed to the success of Diameter.
-
-A.2.  RFC 3588
-
-   The authors would like to thank Nenad Trifunovic, Tony Johansson and
-   Pankaj Patel for their participation in the pre-IETF Document Reading
-   Party.  Allison Mankin, Jonathan Wood, and Bernard Aboba provided
-   invaluable assistance in working out transport issues and this was
-   also the case with Steven Bellovin in the security area.
-
-   Paul Funk and David Mitton were instrumental in getting the Peer
-   State Machine correct, and our deep thanks go to them for their time.
-
-   Text in this document was also provided by Paul Funk, Mark Eklund,
-   Mark Jones, and Dave Spence.  Jacques Caron provided many great
-   comments as a result of a thorough review of the spec.
-
-   The authors would also like to acknowledge the following people for
-   their contribution in the development of the Diameter protocol:
-
-   Allan C. Rubens, Haseeb Akhtar, William Bulley, Stephen Farrell,
-   David Frascone, Daniel C. Fox, Lol Grant, Ignacio Goyret, Nancy
-   Greene, Peter Heitman, Fredrik Johansson, Mark Jones, Martin Julien,
-   Bob Kopacz, Paul Krumviede, Fergal Ladley, Ryan Moats, Victor Muslin,
-   Kenneth Peirce, John Schnizlein, Sumit Vakil, John R. Vollbrecht, and
-   Jeff Weisberg.
-
-   Finally, Pat Calhoun would like to thank Sun Microsystems since most
-   of the effort put into this document was done while he was in their
-   employ.
-
-Appendix B.  S-NAPTR Example
-
-   As an example, consider a client that wishes to resolve aaa:
-   ex1.example.com.  The client performs a NAPTR query for that domain,
-   and the following NAPTR records are returned:
-
-    ;;        order pref flags service   regexp replacement
-    IN NAPTR  50    50   "s"   "aaa:diameter.tls.tcp" ""
-                 _diameter._tls.ex1.example.com
-    IN NAPTR  100   50   "s"   "aaa:diameter.tcp"     ""
-                 _aaa._tcp.ex1.example.com
-    IN NAPTR  150   50   "s"   "aaa:diameter.sctp"    ""
-                 _diameter._sctp.ex1.example.com
-
-   This indicates that the server supports TLS, TCP, and SCTP in that
-   order.  If the client supports TLS, TLS will be used, targeted to a
-
-
-
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-
-
-   host determined by an SRV lookup of _diameter._tls.ex1.example.com.
-   That lookup would return:
-
-    ;;       Priority  Weight  Port    Target
-    IN SRV   0         1       5060    server1.ex1.example.com
-    IN SRV   0         2       5060    server2.ex1.example.com
-
-   As an alternative example, a client that wishes to resolve aaa:
-   ex2.example.com.  The client performs a NAPTR query for that domain,
-   and the following NAPTR records are returned:
-
-    ;;        order pref flags service   regexp replacement
-    IN NAPTR  150   50   "a"   "aaa:diameter.tls.tcp"  ""
-                 server1.ex2.example.com
-    IN NAPTR  150   50   "a"   "aaa:diameter.tls.tcp"  ""
-                 server2.ex2.example.com
-
-   This indicates that the server supports TCP available at the returned
-   host names.
-
-Appendix C.  Duplicate Detection
-
-   As described in Section 9.4, accounting record duplicate detection is
-   based on session identifiers.  Duplicates can appear for various
-   reasons:
-
-   o  Failover to an alternate server.  Where close to real-time
-      performance is required, failover thresholds need to be kept low.
-      This may lead to an increased likelihood of duplicates.  Failover
-      can occur at the client or within Diameter agents.
-
-   o  Failure of a client or agent after sending a record from non-
-      volatile memory, but prior to receipt of an application-layer ACK
-      and deletion of the record to be sent.  This will result in
-      retransmission of the record soon after the client or agent has
-      rebooted.
-
-   o  Duplicates received from RADIUS gateways.  Since the
-      retransmission behavior of RADIUS is not defined within [RFC2865],
-      the likelihood of duplication will vary according to the
-      implementation.
-
-   o  Implementation problems and misconfiguration.
-
-   The T flag is used as an indication of an application-layer
-   retransmission event, e.g., due to failover to an alternate server.
-   It is defined only for request messages sent by Diameter clients or
-   agents.  For instance, after a reboot, a client may not know whether
-
-
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-
-
-   it has already tried to send the accounting records in its non-
-   volatile memory before the reboot occurred.  Diameter servers MAY use
-   the T flag as an aid when processing requests and detecting duplicate
-   messages.  However, servers that do this MUST ensure that duplicates
-   are found even when the first transmitted request arrives at the
-   server after the retransmitted request.  It can be used only in cases
-   where no answer has been received from the server for a request and
-   the request is sent again, (e.g., due to a failover to an alternate
-   peer, due to a recovered primary peer or due to a client re-sending a
-   stored record from non-volatile memory such as after reboot of a
-   client or agent).
-
-   In some cases, the Diameter accounting server can delay the duplicate
-   detection and accounting record processing until a post-processing
-   phase takes place.  At that time records are likely to be sorted
-   according to the included User-Name and duplicate elimination is easy
-   in this case.  In other situations, it may be necessary to perform
-   real-time duplicate detection, such as when credit limits are imposed
-   or real-time fraud detection is desired.
-
-   In general, only generation of duplicates due to failover or re-
-   sending of records in non-volatile storage can be reliably detected
-   by Diameter clients or agents.  In such cases, the Diameter client or
-   agents can mark the message as a possible duplicate by setting the T
-   flag.  Since the Diameter server is responsible for duplicate
-   detection, it can choose whether or not to make use of the T flag, in
-   order to optimize duplicate detection.  Since the T flag does not
-   affect interoperability, and it may not be needed by some servers,
-   generation of the T flag is REQUIRED for Diameter clients and agents,
-   but it MAY be implemented by Diameter servers.
-
-   As an example, it can be usually be assumed that duplicates appear
-   within a time window of longest recorded network partition or device
-   fault, perhaps a day.  So only records within this time window need
-   to be looked at in the backward direction.  Secondly, hashing
-   techniques or other schemes, such as the use of the T flag in the
-   received messages, may be used to eliminate the need to do a full
-   search even in this set except for rare cases.
-
-   The following is an example of how the T flag may be used by the
-   server to detect duplicate requests.
-
-      A Diameter server MAY check the T flag of the received message to
-      determine if the record is a possible duplicate.  If the T flag is
-      set in the request message, the server searches for a duplicate
-      within a configurable duplication time window backward and
-      forward.  This limits database searching to those records where
-      the T flag is set.  In a well-run network, network partitions and
-
-
-
-Fajardo, et al.              Standards Track                  [Page 150]
-
-RFC 6733                 Diameter Base Protocol             October 2012
-
-
-      device faults will presumably be rare events, so this approach
-      represents a substantial optimization of the duplicate detection
-      process.  During failover, it is possible for the original record
-      to be received after the T-flag-marked record, due to differences
-      in network delays experienced along the path by the original and
-      duplicate transmissions.  The likelihood of this occurring
-      increases as the failover interval is decreased.  In order to be
-      able to detect duplicates that are out of order, the Diameter
-      server should use backward and forward time windows when
-      performing duplicate checking for the T-flag-marked request.  For
-      example, in order to allow time for the original record to exit
-      the network and be recorded by the accounting server, the Diameter
-      server can delay processing records with the T flag set until a
-      time period TIME_WAIT + RECORD_PROCESSING_TIME has elapsed after
-      the closing of the original transport connection.  After this time
-      period, it may check the T-flag-marked records against the
-      database with relative assurance that the original records, if
-      sent, have been received and recorded.
-
-Appendix D.  Internationalized Domain Names
-
-   To be compatible with the existing DNS infrastructure and simplify
-   host and domain name comparison, Diameter identities (FQDNs) are
-   represented in ASCII form.  This allows the Diameter protocol to fall
-   in-line with the DNS strategy of being transparent from the effects
-   of Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) by following the
-   recommendations in [RFC4690] and [RFC5890].  Applications that
-   provide support for IDNs outside of the Diameter protocol but
-   interacting with it SHOULD use the representation and conversion
-   framework described in [RFC5890], [RFC5891], and [RFC3492].
-
- -
diff --git a/lib/diameter/doc/src/files.mk b/lib/diameter/doc/src/files.mk index cb4f88a375..4c1297f6cc 100644 --- a/lib/diameter/doc/src/files.mk +++ b/lib/diameter/doc/src/files.mk @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # %CopyrightBegin% # -# Copyright Ericsson AB 2010-2016. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright Ericsson AB 2010-2017. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ XML_PART_FILES = \ user_man.xml XML_EXTRA_FILES = \ - seealso.ent \ - diameter_soc_rfc6733.xml + seealso.ent XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ diameter_intro.xml \ -- cgit v1.2.3