From 909fa9fc39bee9d12d35bc9a82049b3d940fdd0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lars Thorsen Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 09:28:13 +0100 Subject: [ssh] Align documentation to DTD --- lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_app.xml | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_app.xml') diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_app.xml b/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_app.xml index 79dd1e210e..f6ce44c015 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_app.xml +++ b/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_app.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
- 20122013 + 20122015 Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved. @@ -214,21 +214,21 @@

The following rfc:s are supported:

RFC 4251, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture. -

Except +

Except

9.4.6 Host-Based Authentication 9.5.2 Proxy Forwarding 9.5.3 X11 Forwarding -

+

RFC 4252, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol. -

Except +

Except

9. Host-Based Authentication: "hostbased" -

+

RFC 4253, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol. @@ -236,32 +236,32 @@ RFC 4254, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol. -

Except +

Except

6.3. X11 Forwarding 7. TCP/IP Port Forwarding -

+

RFC 4256, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH). -

Except +

Except

num-prompts > 1 password changing other identification methods than userid-password -

+

RFC 4419, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol. -

+

RFC 4716, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format. -

+

RFC 5647, AES Galois Counter Mode for @@ -270,34 +270,35 @@ This is resolved by OpenSSH in the ciphers aes128-gcm@openssh.com and aes256-gcm@openssh.com which are implemented. If the explicit ciphers and macs AEAD_AES_128_GCM or AEAD_AES_256_GCM are needed, they could be enabled with the option preferred_algorithms. +

- If the client or the server is not Erlang/OTP, it is the users responsibility to check that - other implementation has the same interpretation of AEAD_AES_*_GCM as the Erlang/OTP SSH before - enabling them. The aes*-gcm@openssh.com variants are always safe to use since they lack the - ambiguity. +

+ If the client or the server is not Erlang/OTP, it is the users responsibility to check that + other implementation has the same interpretation of AEAD_AES_*_GCM as the Erlang/OTP SSH before + enabling them. The aes*-gcm@openssh.com variants are always safe to use since they lack the + ambiguity. +

-

-

The second paragraph in section 5.1 is resolved as: +

The second paragraph in section 5.1 is resolved as:

If the negotiated cipher is AEAD_AES_128_GCM, the mac algorithm is set to AEAD_AES_128_GCM. If the negotiated cipher is AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the mac algorithm is set to AEAD_AES_256_GCM. If the mac algorithm is AEAD_AES_128_GCM, the cipher is set to AEAD_AES_128_GCM. If the mac algorithm is AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the cipher is set to AEAD_AES_256_GCM. - The first rule that matches when read in order from the top is applied -

+

The first rule that matches when read in order from the top is applied

RFC 5656, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer. -

Except +

Except

5. ECMQV Key Exchange 6.4. ECMQV Key Exchange and Verification Method Name 7.2. ECMQV Message Numbers 10.2. Recommended Curves -

+

RFC 6668, SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for -- cgit v1.2.3