From 8c7a68f3808a8d52f5cfc297a249ca4ef2480238 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn=20Gustavsson?= Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2017 15:55:34 +0100 Subject: filename: Add safe_relative_path/1 Add safe_relative_path/1 to guard against directory traversal attacks. It either returns a shorter path without any ".." or "." components, or 'unsafe' if an ".." component would climb up above the root of the relative path. Here are a few examples: safe_relative_path("a/b/..") => "a" safe_relative_path("a/..") => "" safe_relative_path("a/../..") => unsafe safe_relative_path("/absolute/path") => unsafe The returned path can be used directly or combined with an absolute path using filename:join/2. --- lib/stdlib/doc/src/filename.xml | 27 +++++++++++++++ lib/stdlib/src/filename.erl | 36 +++++++++++++++++++- lib/stdlib/test/filename_SUITE.erl | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/filename.xml b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/filename.xml index 2a413835d0..f7f3f7b504 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/filename.xml +++ b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/filename.xml @@ -510,6 +510,33 @@ true + + + Sanitize a relative path to avoid directory traversal attacks. + +

Sanitizes the relative path by eliminating ".." and "." + components to protect against directory traversal attacks. + Either returns the sanitized path name, or the atom + unsafe if the path is unsafe. + The path is considered unsafe in the following circumstances:

+ +

The path is not relative.

+

A ".." component would climb up above the root of + the relative path.

+
+

Examples:

+
+1> filename:safe_relative_path("dir/sub_dir/..").
+"dir"
+2> filename:safe_relative_path("dir/..").
+[]
+3> filename:safe_relative_path("dir/../..").
+unsafe
+4> filename:safe_relative_path("/abs/path").
+unsafe
+
+
+ Split a filename into its path components. diff --git a/lib/stdlib/src/filename.erl b/lib/stdlib/src/filename.erl index c4586171ca..5d60b3837e 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/src/filename.erl +++ b/lib/stdlib/src/filename.erl @@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ -export([absname/1, absname/2, absname_join/2, basename/1, basename/2, dirname/1, extension/1, join/1, join/2, pathtype/1, - rootname/1, rootname/2, split/1, nativename/1]). + rootname/1, rootname/2, split/1, nativename/1, + safe_relative_path/1]). -export([find_src/1, find_src/2, flatten/1]). -export([basedir/2, basedir/3]). @@ -750,6 +751,39 @@ separators() -> _ -> {false, false} end. +-spec safe_relative_path(Filename) -> 'unsafe' | SafeFilename when + Filename :: file:name_all(), + SafeFilename :: file:name_all(). + +safe_relative_path(Path) -> + case pathtype(Path) of + relative -> + Cs0 = split(Path), + safe_relative_path_1(Cs0, []); + _ -> + unsafe + end. + +safe_relative_path_1(["."|T], Acc) -> + safe_relative_path_1(T, Acc); +safe_relative_path_1([<<".">>|T], Acc) -> + safe_relative_path_1(T, Acc); +safe_relative_path_1([".."|T], Acc) -> + climb(T, Acc); +safe_relative_path_1([<<"..">>|T], Acc) -> + climb(T, Acc); +safe_relative_path_1([H|T], Acc) -> + safe_relative_path_1(T, [H|Acc]); +safe_relative_path_1([], []) -> + []; +safe_relative_path_1([], Acc) -> + join(lists:reverse(Acc)). + +climb(_, []) -> + unsafe; +climb(T, [_|Acc]) -> + safe_relative_path_1(T, Acc). + %% find_src(Module) -- diff --git a/lib/stdlib/test/filename_SUITE.erl b/lib/stdlib/test/filename_SUITE.erl index b7c4d3a6e5..f64ec6acb7 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/test/filename_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/stdlib/test/filename_SUITE.erl @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ dirname_bin/1, extension_bin/1, join_bin/1, t_nativename_bin/1]). -export([pathtype_bin/1,rootname_bin/1,split_bin/1]). -export([t_basedir_api/1, t_basedir_xdg/1, t_basedir_windows/1]). +-export([safe_relative_path/1]). -include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl"). @@ -41,7 +42,8 @@ all() -> find_src, absname_bin, absname_bin_2, {group,p}, - t_basedir_xdg, t_basedir_windows]. + t_basedir_xdg, t_basedir_windows, + safe_relative_path]. groups() -> [{p, [parallel], @@ -768,6 +770,71 @@ t_nativename_bin(Config) when is_list(Config) -> filename:nativename(<<"/usr/tmp//arne/">>) end. +safe_relative_path(Config) -> + PrivDir = proplists:get_value(priv_dir, Config), + Root = filename:join(PrivDir, ?FUNCTION_NAME), + ok = file:make_dir(Root), + ok = file:set_cwd(Root), + + ok = file:make_dir("a"), + ok = file:set_cwd("a"), + ok = file:make_dir("b"), + ok = file:set_cwd("b"), + ok = file:make_dir("c"), + + ok = file:set_cwd(Root), + + "a" = test_srp("a"), + "a/b" = test_srp("a/b"), + "a/b" = test_srp("a/./b"), + "a/b" = test_srp("a/./b/."), + + "" = test_srp("a/.."), + "" = test_srp("a/./.."), + "" = test_srp("a/../."), + "a" = test_srp("a/b/.."), + "a" = test_srp("a/../a"), + "a" = test_srp("a/../a/../a"), + "a/b/c" = test_srp("a/../a/b/c"), + + unsafe = test_srp("a/../.."), + unsafe = test_srp("a/../../.."), + unsafe = test_srp("a/./../.."), + unsafe = test_srp("a/././../../.."), + unsafe = test_srp("a/b/././../../.."), + + unsafe = test_srp(PrivDir), %Absolute path. + + ok. + +test_srp(RelPath) -> + Res = do_test_srp(RelPath), + Res = case do_test_srp(list_to_binary(RelPath)) of + Bin when is_binary(Bin) -> + binary_to_list(Bin); + Other -> + Other + end. + +do_test_srp(RelPath) -> + {ok,Root} = file:get_cwd(), + ok = file:set_cwd(RelPath), + {ok,Cwd} = file:get_cwd(), + ok = file:set_cwd(Root), + case filename:safe_relative_path(RelPath) of + unsafe -> + true = length(Cwd) < length(Root), + unsafe; + "" -> + ""; + SafeRelPath -> + ok = file:set_cwd(SafeRelPath), + {ok,Cwd} = file:get_cwd(), + true = length(Cwd) >= length(Root), + ok = file:set_cwd(Root), + SafeRelPath + end. + %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %% basedirs t_basedir_api(Config) when is_list(Config) -> -- cgit v1.2.3