%% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% %% Copyright Ericsson AB 2010-2011. All Rights Reserved. %% %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in %% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the %% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be %% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/. %% %% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" %% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See %% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations %% under the License. %% %% %CopyrightEnd% %% %% %% This module builds CER and CEA records for use during capabilities %% exchange. All of a CER/CEA is built from AVP values configured on %% the service in question but values for Supported-Vendor-Id, %% Vendor-Specific-Application-Id, Auth-Application-Id and %% Acct-Application-id are also obtained using an older method that %% remains only for backwards compatibility. With this method, each %% dictionary module was required to export a cer/0 that returned a %% diameter_base_CER record (or corresponding list, although the list %% is also a later addition). Each returned CER contributes its member %% values for the aforementioned four AVPs to the resulting CER, with %% remaining AVP's either unspecified or identical to those configured %% on the service. Auth-Application-Id and Acct-Application-id were %% originally treated a little differently, each callback being %% required to return either no value of the same value as the other %% callbacks, but this coupled the callback modules unnecessarily. (A %% union is backwards compatible to boot.) %% %% Values obtained from the service and callbacks are all included %% when building a CER. Older code with only callback can continue to %% use them, newer code should probably stick to service configuration %% (since this is more explicit) or mix at their own peril. %% %% The cer/0 callback is now undocumented (despite never being fully %% documented to begin with) and should be considered deprecated even %% by those poor souls still using it. %% -module(diameter_capx). -export([build_CER/1, recv_CER/2, recv_CEA/2, make_caps/2]). -include_lib("diameter/include/diameter.hrl"). -include("diameter_internal.hrl"). -include("diameter_types.hrl"). -include("diameter_gen_base_rfc3588.hrl"). -define(SUCCESS, ?'DIAMETER_BASE_RESULT-CODE_DIAMETER_SUCCESS'). -define(NOAPP, ?'DIAMETER_BASE_RESULT-CODE_DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_APPLICATION'). -define(NOSECURITY, ?'DIAMETER_BASE_RESULT-CODE_DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_SECURITY'). -define(NO_INBAND_SECURITY, 0). %% =========================================================================== -type tried(T) :: {ok, T} | {error, {term(), list()}}. -spec build_CER(#diameter_caps{}) -> tried(#diameter_base_CER{}). build_CER(Caps) -> try_it([fun bCER/1, Caps]). -spec recv_CER(#diameter_base_CER{}, #diameter_service{}) -> tried({['Unsigned32'()], #diameter_caps{}, #diameter_base_CEA{}}). recv_CER(CER, Svc) -> try_it([fun rCER/2, CER, Svc]). -spec recv_CEA(#diameter_base_CEA{}, #diameter_service{}) -> tried({['Unsigned32'()], #diameter_caps{}}). recv_CEA(CEA, Svc) -> try_it([fun rCEA/2, CEA, Svc]). make_caps(Caps, Opts) -> try_it([fun mk_caps/2, Caps, Opts]). %% =========================================================================== %% =========================================================================== try_it([Fun | Args]) -> try apply(Fun, Args) of T -> {ok, T} catch throw: ?FAILURE(Reason) -> {error, {Reason, Args}} end. %% mk_caps/2 mk_caps(Caps0, Opts) -> {Caps, _} = lists:foldl(fun set_cap/2, {Caps0, #diameter_caps{_ = false}}, Opts), Caps. -define(SC(K,F), set_cap({K, Val}, {Caps, #diameter_caps{F = false} = C}) -> {Caps#diameter_caps{F = cap(K, Val)}, C#diameter_caps{F = true}}). ?SC('Origin-Host', origin_host); ?SC('Origin-Realm', origin_realm); ?SC('Host-IP-Address', host_ip_address); ?SC('Vendor-Id', vendor_id); ?SC('Product-Name', product_name); ?SC('Origin-State-Id', origin_state_id); ?SC('Supported-Vendor-Id', supported_vendor_id); ?SC('Auth-Application-Id', auth_application_id); ?SC('Inband-Security-Id', inband_security_id); ?SC('Acct-Application-Id', acct_application_id); ?SC('Vendor-Specific-Application-Id', vendor_specific_application_id); ?SC('Firmware-Revision', firmware_revision); set_cap({Key, _}, _) -> ?THROW({duplicate, Key}). cap(K, V) when K == 'Origin-Host'; K == 'Origin-Realm'; K == 'Vendor-Id'; K == 'Product-Name' -> V; cap('Host-IP-Address', Vs) when is_list(Vs) -> lists:map(fun ipaddr/1, Vs); cap('Firmware-Revision', V) -> [V]; %% Not documented but accept it as long as it's what we support. cap('Inband-Security-Id', [0] = Vs) -> %% NO_INBAND_SECURITY Vs; cap(K, Vs) when K /= 'Inband-Security-Id', is_list(Vs) -> Vs; cap(K, V) -> ?THROW({invalid, K, V}). ipaddr(A) -> try diameter_lib:ipaddr(A) catch error: {invalid_address, _} = T -> ?THROW(T) end. %% bCER/1 %% %% Build a CER record to send to a remote peer. bCER(#diameter_caps{origin_host = Host, origin_realm = Realm, host_ip_address = Addrs, vendor_id = Vid, product_name = Name, origin_state_id = OSI, supported_vendor_id = SVid, auth_application_id = AuId, acct_application_id = AcId, vendor_specific_application_id = VSA, firmware_revision = Rev}) -> #diameter_base_CER{'Origin-Host' = Host, 'Origin-Realm' = Realm, 'Host-IP-Address' = Addrs, 'Vendor-Id' = Vid, 'Product-Name' = Name, 'Origin-State-Id' = OSI, 'Supported-Vendor-Id' = SVid, 'Auth-Application-Id' = AuId, 'Acct-Application-Id' = AcId, 'Vendor-Specific-Application-Id' = VSA, 'Firmware-Revision' = Rev}. %% rCER/2 %% %% Build a CEA record to send to a remote peer in response to an %% incoming CER. RFC 3588 gives no guidance on what should be sent %% here: should we advertise applications that the peer hasn't sent in %% its CER (aside from the relay application) or not? If we send %% applications that the peer hasn't advertised then the peer may have %% to be aware of the possibility. If we don't then we just look like %% a server that supports a subset (possibly) of what the client %% advertised, so this feels like the path of least incompatibility. %% However, the current draft standard (draft-ietf-dime-rfc3588bis-26, %% expires 24 July 2011) says this in section 5.3, Capabilities %% Exchange: %% %% The receiver of the Capabilities-Exchange-Request (CER) MUST %% determine common applications by computing the intersection of its %% own set of supported Application Id against all of the application %% identifier AVPs (Auth-Application-Id, Acct-Application-Id and Vendor- %% Specific-Application-Id) present in the CER. The value of the %% Vendor-Id AVP in the Vendor-Specific-Application-Id MUST NOT be used %% during computation. The sender of the Capabilities-Exchange-Answer %% (CEA) SHOULD include all of its supported applications as a hint to %% the receiver regarding all of its application capabilities. %% %% Both RFC and the draft also say this: %% %% The receiver only issues commands to its peers that have advertised %% support for the Diameter application that defines the command. A %% Diameter node MUST cache the supported applications in order to %% ensure that unrecognized commands and/or AVPs are not unnecessarily %% sent to a peer. %% %% That is, each side sends all of its capabilities and is responsible for %% not sending commands that the peer doesn't support. %% TODO: Make it an option to send only common applications in CEA to %% allow backwards compatibility, and also because there are likely %% servers that expect this. Or maybe a callback. %% 6.10. Inband-Security-Id AVP %% %% NO_INBAND_SECURITY 0 %% This peer does not support TLS. This is the default value, if the %% AVP is omitted. rCER(CER, #diameter_service{capabilities = LCaps} = Svc) -> #diameter_base_CER{'Inband-Security-Id' = RIS} = CER, #diameter_base_CEA{} = CEA = cea_from_cer(bCER(LCaps)), RCaps = capx_to_caps(CER), SApps = common_applications(LCaps, RCaps, Svc), {SApps, RCaps, build_CEA([] == SApps, RIS, lists:member(?NO_INBAND_SECURITY, RIS), CEA#diameter_base_CEA{'Result-Code' = ?SUCCESS, 'Inband-Security-Id' = []})}. %% TODO: 5.3 of RFC3588 says we MUST return DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_APPLICATION %% in the CEA and SHOULD disconnect the transport. However, we have %% no way to guarantee the send before disconnecting. build_CEA(true, _, _, CEA) -> CEA#diameter_base_CEA{'Result-Code' = ?NOAPP}; build_CEA(false, [_|_], false, CEA) -> CEA#diameter_base_CEA{'Result-Code' = ?NOSECURITY}; build_CEA(false, [_|_], true, CEA) -> CEA#diameter_base_CEA{'Inband-Security-Id' = [?NO_INBAND_SECURITY]}; build_CEA(false, [], false, CEA) -> CEA. %% cea_from_cer/1 cea_from_cer(#diameter_base_CER{} = CER) -> lists:foldl(fun(F,A) -> to_cea(CER, F, A) end, #diameter_base_CEA{}, record_info(fields, diameter_base_CER)). to_cea(CER, Field, CEA) -> try ?BASE:'#info-'(diameter_base_CEA, {index, Field}) of N -> setelement(N, CEA, ?BASE:'#get-'(Field, CER)) catch error: _ -> CEA end. %% rCEA/2 rCEA(CEA, #diameter_service{capabilities = LCaps} = Svc) when is_record(CEA, diameter_base_CEA) -> #diameter_base_CEA{'Result-Code' = RC} = CEA, RC == ?SUCCESS orelse ?THROW({'Result-Code', RC}), RCaps = capx_to_caps(CEA), SApps = common_applications(LCaps, RCaps, Svc), [] == SApps andalso ?THROW({no_common_apps, LCaps, RCaps}), {SApps, RCaps}; rCEA(CEA, _Svc) -> ?THROW({invalid, CEA}). %% capx_to_caps/1 capx_to_caps(#diameter_base_CEA{'Origin-Host' = OH, 'Origin-Realm' = OR, 'Host-IP-Address' = IP, 'Vendor-Id' = VId, 'Product-Name' = PN, 'Origin-State-Id' = OSI, 'Supported-Vendor-Id' = SV, 'Auth-Application-Id' = Auth, 'Inband-Security-Id' = IS, 'Acct-Application-Id' = Acct, 'Vendor-Specific-Application-Id' = VSA, 'Firmware-Revision' = FR, 'AVP' = X}) -> #diameter_caps{origin_host = OH, origin_realm = OR, vendor_id = VId, product_name = PN, origin_state_id = OSI, host_ip_address = IP, supported_vendor_id = SV, auth_application_id = Auth, inband_security_id = IS, acct_application_id = Acct, vendor_specific_application_id = VSA, firmware_revision = FR, avp = X}; capx_to_caps(#diameter_base_CER{} = CER) -> capx_to_caps(cea_from_cer(CER)). %% --------------------------------------------------------------------------- %% --------------------------------------------------------------------------- %% common_applications/3 %% %% Identify the (local) applications to be supported on the connection %% in question. common_applications(LCaps, RCaps, #diameter_service{applications = Apps}) -> LA = app_union(LCaps), RA = app_union(RCaps), lists:foldl(fun(I,A) -> ca(I, Apps, RA, A) end, [], LA). ca(Id, Apps, RA, Acc) -> Relay = lists:member(?APP_ID_RELAY, RA), #diameter_app{alias = Alias} = find_app(Id, Apps), tcons(Relay %% peer is a relay orelse ?APP_ID_RELAY == Id %% we're a relay orelse lists:member(Id, RA), %% app is supported by the peer Id, Alias, Acc). %% 5.3 of the RFC states that a peer advertising itself as a relay must %% be interpreted as having common applications. %% Extract the list of all application identifiers from Auth-Application-Id, %% Acct-Application-Id and Vendor-Specific-Application-Id. app_union(#diameter_caps{auth_application_id = U, acct_application_id = C, vendor_specific_application_id = V}) -> set_list(U ++ C ++ lists:flatmap(fun vsa_apps/1, V)). vsa_apps(#'diameter_base_Vendor-Specific-Application-Id' {'Auth-Application-Id' = U, 'Acct-Application-Id' = C}) -> U ++ C; vsa_apps(L) -> Rec = ?BASE:'#new-'('diameter_base_Vendor-Specific-Application-Id', L), vsa_apps(Rec). %% It's a configuration error for a locally advertised application not %% to be represented in Apps. Don't just match on lists:keyfind/3 in %% order to generate a more helpful error. find_app(Id, Apps) -> case lists:keyfind(Id, #diameter_app.id, Apps) of #diameter_app{} = A -> A; false -> ?THROW({app_not_configured, Id}) end. set_list(L) -> sets:to_list(sets:from_list(L)). tcons(true, K, V, Acc) -> [{K,V} | Acc]; tcons(false, _, _, Acc) -> Acc.