%% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% %% Copyright Ericsson AB 2008-2010. All Rights Reserved. %% %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in %% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the %% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be %% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/. %% %% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" %% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See %% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations %% under the License. %% %% %CopyrightEnd% %% %% -module(pubkey_cert). -include("public_key.hrl"). -export([init_validation_state/3, prepare_for_next_cert/2, validate_time/3, validate_signature/6, validate_issuer/4, validate_names/6, validate_revoked_status/3, validate_extensions/4, normalize_general_name/1, digest_type/1, is_self_signed/1, is_issuer/2, issuer_id/2, is_fixed_dh_cert/1, verify_data/1, verify_fun/4]). -define(NULL, 0). %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec verify_data(der_encoded()) -> {md5 | sha, binary(), binary()}. %% %% Description: Extracts data from DerCert needed to call public_key:verify/4. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- verify_data(DerCert) -> {ok, OtpCert} = pubkey_cert_records:decode_cert(DerCert), extract_verify_data(OtpCert, DerCert). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec init_validation_state(#'OTPCertificate'{}, integer(), list()) -> #path_validation_state{}. %% %% Description: Creates inital version of path_validation_state for %% basic path validation of x509 certificates. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- init_validation_state(#'OTPCertificate'{} = OtpCert, DefaultPathLen, Options) -> PolicyTree = #policy_tree_node{valid_policy = ?anyPolicy, qualifier_set = [], criticality_indicator = false, expected_policy_set = [?anyPolicy]}, MaxLen = proplists:get_value(max_path_length, Options, DefaultPathLen), ExplicitPolicy = policy_indicator(MaxLen, proplists:get_value(explicit_policy, Options, false)), InhibitAnyPolicy = policy_indicator(MaxLen, proplists:get_value(inhibit_any_policy, Options, false)), PolicyMapping = policy_indicator(MaxLen, proplists:get_value(policy_mapping, Options, false)), {VerifyFun, UserState} = proplists:get_value(verify_fun, Options, ?DEFAULT_VERIFYFUN), State = #path_validation_state{max_path_length = MaxLen, valid_policy_tree = PolicyTree, explicit_policy = ExplicitPolicy, inhibit_any_policy = InhibitAnyPolicy, policy_mapping = PolicyMapping, verify_fun = VerifyFun, user_state = UserState, cert_num = 0}, prepare_for_next_cert(OtpCert, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec prepare_for_next_cert(#'OTPCertificate'{}, #path_validation_state{}) -> #path_validation_state{}. %% %% Description: Update path_validation_state for next iteration. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- prepare_for_next_cert(OtpCert, ValidationState = #path_validation_state{ working_public_key_algorithm = PrevAlgo, working_public_key_parameters = PrevParams}) -> TBSCert = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate, Issuer = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject, {Algorithm, PublicKey, PublicKeyParams0} = public_key_info(TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, ValidationState), PublicKeyParams = case PublicKeyParams0 of 'NULL' when Algorithm =:= PrevAlgo -> PrevParams; asn1_NOVALUE when Algorithm =:= PrevAlgo -> PrevParams; _ -> PublicKeyParams0 end, ValidationState#path_validation_state{ working_public_key_algorithm = Algorithm, working_public_key = PublicKey, working_public_key_parameters = PublicKeyParams, working_issuer_name = Issuer, cert_num = ValidationState#path_validation_state.cert_num + 1 }. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec validate_time(#'OTPCertificate'{}, term(), fun()) -> term(). %% %% Description: Check that the certificate validity period includes the %% current time. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- validate_time(OtpCert, UserState, VerifyFun) -> TBSCert = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate, {'Validity', NotBeforeStr, NotAfterStr} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.validity, Now = calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds(calendar:universal_time()), NotBefore = time_str_2_gregorian_sec(NotBeforeStr), NotAfter = time_str_2_gregorian_sec(NotAfterStr), case ((NotBefore =< Now) and (Now =< NotAfter)) of true -> UserState; false -> verify_fun(OtpCert, {bad_cert, cert_expired}, UserState, VerifyFun) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec validate_issuer(#'OTPCertificate'{}, term(), term(), fun()) -> term(). %% %% Description: Check that the certificate issuer name is the working_issuer_name %% in path_validation_state. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- validate_issuer(OtpCert, Issuer, UserState, VerifyFun) -> TBSCert = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate, case is_issuer(Issuer, TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer) of true -> UserState; _ -> verify_fun(OtpCert, {bad_cert, invalid_issuer}, UserState, VerifyFun) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec validate_signature(#'OTPCertificate'{}, der_encoded(), term(),term(), term(), fun()) -> term(). %% %% Description: Check that the signature on the certificate can be verified using %% working_public_key_algorithm, the working_public_key, and %% the working_public_key_parameters in path_validation_state. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- validate_signature(OtpCert, DerCert, Key, KeyParams, UserState, VerifyFun) -> case verify_signature(OtpCert, DerCert, Key, KeyParams) of true -> UserState; false -> verify_fun(OtpCert, {bad_cert, invalid_signature}, UserState, VerifyFun) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec validate_names(#'OTPCertificate'{}, list(), list(), term(), term(), fun())-> term(). %% %% Description: Validate Subject Alternative Name. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- validate_names(OtpCert, Permit, Exclude, Last, UserState, VerifyFun) -> case is_self_signed(OtpCert) andalso (not Last) of true -> UserState; false -> TBSCert = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate, Subject = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject, Extensions = extensions_list(TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.extensions), AltSubject = select_extension(?'id-ce-subjectAltName', Extensions), EmailAddress = extract_email(Subject), Name = [{directoryName, Subject}|EmailAddress], AltNames = case AltSubject of undefined -> []; _ -> AltSubject#'Extension'.extnValue end, case (is_permitted(Name, Permit) andalso is_permitted(AltNames, Permit) andalso (not is_excluded(Name, Exclude)) andalso (not is_excluded(AltNames, Exclude))) of true -> UserState; false -> verify_fun(OtpCert, {bad_cert, name_not_permitted}, UserState, VerifyFun) end end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec validate_revoked_status(#'OTPCertificate'{}, term(), fun()) -> term(). %% %% Description: Check if certificate has been revoked. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- validate_revoked_status(_OtpCert, UserState, _VerifyFun) -> %% TODO: Implement or leave for application?! %% valid | %% throw({bad_cert, cert_revoked}) UserState. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec validate_extensions(#'OTPCertificate'{}, #path_validation_state{}, term(), fun())-> {#path_validation_state{}, UserState :: term()}. %% %% Description: Check extensions included in basic path validation. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- validate_extensions(OtpCert, ValidationState, UserState, VerifyFun) -> TBSCert = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate, case TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.version of N when N >= 3 -> Extensions = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.extensions, validate_extensions(OtpCert, Extensions, ValidationState, no_basic_constraint, is_self_signed(OtpCert), UserState, VerifyFun); _ -> %% Extensions not present in versions 1 & 2 {ValidationState, UserState} end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec normalize_general_name({rdnSequence, term()}) -> {rdnSequence, term()}. %% %% Description: Normalizes a general name so that it can be easily %% compared to another genral name. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- normalize_general_name({rdnSequence, Issuer}) -> NormIssuer = do_normalize_general_name(Issuer), {rdnSequence, NormIssuer}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec is_self_signed(#'OTPCertificate'{}) -> boolean(). %% %% Description: Checks if the certificate is self signed. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- is_self_signed(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate= #'OTPTBSCertificate'{issuer = Issuer, subject = Subject}}) -> is_issuer(Issuer, Subject). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec is_issuer({rdnSequence, term()}, {rdnSequence, term()}) -> boolean(). %% %% Description: Checks if issued . %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- is_issuer({rdnSequence, Issuer}, {rdnSequence, Candidate}) -> is_dir_name(Issuer, Candidate, true). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec issuer_id(#'OTPCertificate'{}, self | other) -> {ok, {integer(), term()}} | {error, issuer_not_found}. %% %% Description: Extracts the issuer id from a certificate if possible. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- issuer_id(Otpcert, other) -> TBSCert = Otpcert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate, Extensions = extensions_list(TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.extensions), case select_extension(?'id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier', Extensions) of undefined -> {error, issuer_not_found}; AuthKeyExt -> cert_auth_key_id(AuthKeyExt#'Extension'.extnValue) end; issuer_id(Otpcert, self) -> TBSCert = Otpcert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate, Issuer = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer, SerialNr = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.serialNumber, {ok, {SerialNr, normalize_general_name(Issuer)}}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec is_fixed_dh_cert(#'OTPCertificate'{}) -> boolean(). %% %% Description: Checks if the certificate can be be used %% for DH key agreement. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- is_fixed_dh_cert(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = #'OTPTBSCertificate'{subjectPublicKeyInfo = SubjectPublicKeyInfo, extensions = Extensions}}) -> is_fixed_dh_cert(SubjectPublicKeyInfo, extensions_list(Extensions)). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec verify_fun(#'OTPTBSCertificate'{}, {bad_cert, atom()} | {extension, #'Extension'{}}| valid, term(), fun()) -> term(). %% %% Description: Gives the user application the opportunity handle path %% validation errors and unknown extensions and optional do other %% things with a validated certificate. %% -------------------------------------------------------------------- verify_fun(Otpcert, Result, UserState0, VerifyFun) -> case VerifyFun(Otpcert, Result, UserState0) of {valid,UserState} -> UserState; {fail, Reason} -> case Result of {bad_cert, _} -> throw(Result); _ -> throw({bad_cert, Reason}) end; {unknown, UserState} -> case Result of {extension, #'Extension'{critical = true}} -> throw({bad_cert, unknown_critical_extension}); _ -> UserState end end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- do_normalize_general_name(Issuer) -> Normalize = fun([{Description, Type, {printableString, Value}}]) -> NewValue = string:to_lower(strip_spaces(Value)), [{Description, Type, {printableString, NewValue}}]; (Atter) -> Atter end, lists:sort(lists:map(Normalize, Issuer)). %% See rfc3280 4.1.2.6 Subject: regarding emails. extract_email({rdnSequence, List}) -> extract_email2(List). extract_email2([[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{type=?'id-emailAddress', value=Mail}]|_]) -> [{rfc822Name, Mail}]; extract_email2([_|Rest]) -> extract_email2(Rest); extract_email2([]) -> []. extensions_list(asn1_NOVALUE) -> []; extensions_list(Extensions) -> Extensions. extract_verify_data(OtpCert, DerCert) -> {0, Signature} = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.signature, SigAlgRec = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.signatureAlgorithm, SigAlg = SigAlgRec#'SignatureAlgorithm'.algorithm, PlainText = encoded_tbs_cert(DerCert), DigestType = digest_type(SigAlg), {DigestType, PlainText, Signature}. verify_signature(OtpCert, DerCert, Key, KeyParams) -> {DigestType, PlainText, Signature} = extract_verify_data(OtpCert, DerCert), case Key of #'RSAPublicKey'{} -> public_key:verify(PlainText, DigestType, Signature, Key); _ -> public_key:verify(PlainText, DigestType, Signature, {Key, KeyParams}) end. encoded_tbs_cert(Cert) -> {ok, PKIXCert} = 'OTP-PUB-KEY':decode_TBSCert_exclusive(Cert), {'Certificate', {'Certificate_tbsCertificate', EncodedTBSCert}, _, _} = PKIXCert, EncodedTBSCert. digest_type(?sha1WithRSAEncryption) -> sha; digest_type(?md5WithRSAEncryption) -> md5; digest_type(?'id-dsa-with-sha1') -> sha. public_key_info(PublicKeyInfo, #path_validation_state{working_public_key_algorithm = WorkingAlgorithm, working_public_key_parameters = WorkingParams}) -> PublicKey = PublicKeyInfo#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'.subjectPublicKey, AlgInfo = PublicKeyInfo#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'.algorithm, PublicKeyParams = AlgInfo#'PublicKeyAlgorithm'.parameters, Algorithm = AlgInfo#'PublicKeyAlgorithm'.algorithm, NewPublicKeyParams = case PublicKeyParams of 'NULL' when WorkingAlgorithm == Algorithm -> WorkingParams; _ -> PublicKeyParams end, {Algorithm, PublicKey, NewPublicKeyParams}. time_str_2_gregorian_sec({utcTime, [Y1,Y2,M1,M2,D1,D2,H1,H2,M3,M4,S1,S2,Z]}) -> case list_to_integer([Y1,Y2]) of N when N >= 50 -> time_str_2_gregorian_sec({generalTime, [$1,$9,Y1,Y2,M1,M2,D1,D2, H1,H2,M3,M4,S1,S2,Z]}); _ -> time_str_2_gregorian_sec({generalTime, [$2,$0,Y1,Y2,M1,M2,D1,D2, H1,H2,M3,M4,S1,S2,Z]}) end; time_str_2_gregorian_sec({_,[Y1,Y2,Y3,Y4,M1,M2,D1,D2,H1,H2,M3,M4,S1,S2,$Z]}) -> Year = list_to_integer([Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4]), Month = list_to_integer([M1, M2]), Day = list_to_integer([D1, D2]), Hour = list_to_integer([H1, H2]), Min = list_to_integer([M3, M4]), Sec = list_to_integer([S1, S2]), calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds({{Year, Month, Day}, {Hour, Min, Sec}}). is_dir_name([], [], _Exact) -> true; is_dir_name([H|R1],[H|R2], Exact) -> is_dir_name(R1,R2, Exact); is_dir_name([[{'AttributeTypeAndValue', Type, What1}]|Rest1], [[{'AttributeTypeAndValue', Type, What2}]|Rest2],Exact) -> case is_dir_name2(What1,What2) of true -> is_dir_name(Rest1,Rest2,Exact); false -> false end; is_dir_name(_,[],false) -> true; is_dir_name(_,_,_) -> false. is_dir_name2(Value, Value) -> true; is_dir_name2({printableString, Value1}, {printableString, Value2}) -> string:to_lower(strip_spaces(Value1)) =:= string:to_lower(strip_spaces(Value2)); is_dir_name2({utf8String, Value1}, String) -> %% BUGBUG FIX UTF8 conv is_dir_name2({printableString, binary_to_list(Value1)}, String); is_dir_name2(String, {utf8String, Value1}) -> %% BUGBUG FIX UTF8 conv is_dir_name2(String, {printableString, binary_to_list(Value1)}); is_dir_name2(_, _) -> false. cert_auth_key_id(#'AuthorityKeyIdentifier'{authorityCertIssuer = asn1_NOVALUE}) -> {error, issuer_not_found}; cert_auth_key_id(#'AuthorityKeyIdentifier'{authorityCertIssuer = AuthCertIssuer, authorityCertSerialNumber = SerialNr}) -> {ok, {SerialNr, decode_general_name(AuthCertIssuer)}}. decode_general_name([{directoryName, Issuer}]) -> normalize_general_name(Issuer). %% Strip all leading and trailing spaces and make %% sure there is no double spaces in between. strip_spaces(String) -> NewString = lists:foldl(fun(Char, Acc) -> Acc ++ Char ++ " " end, [], string:tokens(String, " ")), string:strip(NewString). select_extension(_, []) -> undefined; select_extension(Id, [#'Extension'{extnID = Id} = Extension | _]) -> Extension; select_extension(Id, [_ | Extensions]) -> select_extension(Id, Extensions). %% No extensions present validate_extensions(OtpCert, asn1_NOVALUE, ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun) -> validate_extensions(OtpCert, [], ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun); validate_extensions(_,[], ValidationState, basic_constraint, _SelfSigned, UserState, _) -> {ValidationState, UserState}; validate_extensions(OtpCert, [], ValidationState = #path_validation_state{max_path_length = Len, last_cert = Last}, no_basic_constraint, SelfSigned, UserState0, VerifyFun) -> case Last of true when SelfSigned -> {ValidationState, UserState0}; true -> {ValidationState#path_validation_state{max_path_length = Len - 1}, UserState0}; %% basic_constraint must appear in certs used for digital sign %% see 4.2.1.10 in rfc 3280 false -> UserState = verify_fun(OtpCert, {bad_cert, missing_basic_constraint}, UserState0, VerifyFun), case SelfSigned of true -> {ValidationState, UserState}; false -> {ValidationState#path_validation_state{max_path_length = Len - 1}, UserState} end end; validate_extensions(OtpCert, [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-basicConstraints', extnValue = #'BasicConstraints'{cA = true, pathLenConstraint = N}} | Rest], ValidationState = #path_validation_state{max_path_length = Len}, _, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun) -> Length = if SelfSigned -> erlang:min(N, Len); true -> erlang:min(N, Len-1) end, validate_extensions(OtpCert, Rest, ValidationState#path_validation_state{max_path_length = Length}, basic_constraint, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun); %% The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if cA is set to %% TRUE. validate_extensions(OtpCert, [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-basicConstraints', extnValue = #'BasicConstraints'{cA = false}} | Rest], ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun) -> validate_extensions(OtpCert, Rest, ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun); validate_extensions(OtpCert, [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-keyUsage', extnValue = KeyUse } | Rest], #path_validation_state{last_cert=Last} = ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState0, VerifyFun) -> case Last orelse is_valid_key_usage(KeyUse, keyCertSign) of true -> validate_extensions(OtpCert, Rest, ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState0, VerifyFun); false -> UserState = verify_fun(OtpCert, {bad_cert, invalid_key_usage}, UserState0, VerifyFun), validate_extensions(OtpCert, Rest, ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun) end; validate_extensions(OtpCert, [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-subjectAltName', extnValue = Names, critical = true} = Ext | Rest], ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState0, VerifyFun) -> case validate_subject_alt_names(Names) of true -> validate_extensions(OtpCert, Rest, ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState0, VerifyFun); false -> UserState = verify_fun(OtpCert, {extension, Ext}, UserState0, VerifyFun), validate_extensions(OtpCert, Rest, ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun) end; validate_extensions(OtpCert, [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-nameConstraints', extnValue = NameConst} | Rest], ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun) -> Permitted = NameConst#'NameConstraints'.permittedSubtrees, Excluded = NameConst#'NameConstraints'.excludedSubtrees, NewValidationState = add_name_constraints(Permitted, Excluded, ValidationState), validate_extensions(OtpCert, Rest, NewValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun); validate_extensions(OtpCert, [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-certificatePolicies', critical = true} = Ext| Rest], ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState0, VerifyFun) -> %% TODO: Remove this clause when policy handling is %% fully implemented UserState = verify_fun(OtpCert, {extension, Ext}, UserState0, VerifyFun), validate_extensions(OtpCert,Rest, ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun); validate_extensions(OtpCert, [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-certificatePolicies', extnValue = #'PolicyInformation'{ policyIdentifier = Id, policyQualifiers = Qualifier}} | Rest], #path_validation_state{valid_policy_tree = Tree} = ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun) -> %% TODO: Policy imp incomplete NewTree = process_policy_tree(Id, Qualifier, Tree), validate_extensions(OtpCert, Rest, ValidationState#path_validation_state{ valid_policy_tree = NewTree}, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun); validate_extensions(OtpCert, [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-policyConstraints', critical = true} = Ext | Rest], ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState0, VerifyFun) -> %% TODO: Remove this clause when policy handling is %% fully implemented UserState = verify_fun(OtpCert, {extension, Ext}, UserState0, VerifyFun), validate_extensions(OtpCert, Rest, ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun); validate_extensions(OtpCert, [#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-policyConstraints', extnValue = #'PolicyConstraints'{ requireExplicitPolicy = ExpPolicy, inhibitPolicyMapping = MapPolicy}} | Rest], ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun) -> %% TODO: Policy imp incomplete NewValidationState = add_policy_constraints(ExpPolicy, MapPolicy, ValidationState), validate_extensions(OtpCert, Rest, NewValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun); validate_extensions(OtpCert, [#'Extension'{} = Extension | Rest], ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState0, VerifyFun) -> UserState = verify_fun(OtpCert, {extension, Extension}, UserState0, VerifyFun), validate_extensions(OtpCert, Rest, ValidationState, ExistBasicCon, SelfSigned, UserState, VerifyFun). is_valid_key_usage(KeyUse, Use) -> lists:member(Use, KeyUse). validate_subject_alt_names([]) -> false; validate_subject_alt_names([AltName | Rest]) -> case is_valid_subject_alt_name(AltName) of true -> true; false -> validate_subject_alt_names(Rest) end. is_valid_subject_alt_name({Name, Value}) when Name == rfc822Name; Name == dNSName -> case Value of "" -> false; _ -> true end; is_valid_subject_alt_name({iPAdress, Addr}) -> case length(Addr) of 4 -> %ipv4 true; 16 -> %ipv6 true; _ -> false end; is_valid_subject_alt_name({uniformResourceIdentifier, URI}) -> is_valid_uri(URI); is_valid_subject_alt_name({directoryName, _}) -> true; is_valid_subject_alt_name({_, [_|_]}) -> true; is_valid_subject_alt_name({otherName, #'AnotherName'{}}) -> false; is_valid_subject_alt_name({_, _}) -> false. is_ip_address(Address) -> case inet_parse:address(Address) of {ok, _} -> true; _ -> false end. is_fully_qualified_name(_Name) -> true. is_valid_uri(AbsURI) -> case split_uri(AbsURI) of incomplete -> false; {StrScheme, _, Host, _, _} -> case string:to_lower(StrScheme) of Scheme when Scheme =:= "http"; Scheme =:= "ftp" -> is_valid_host(Host); _ -> false end end. is_valid_host(Host) -> case is_ip_address(Host) of true -> true; false -> is_fully_qualified_name(Host) end. %% Could have a more general split URI in stdlib? Maybe when %% regexs are improved. Needed also in inets! split_uri(Uri) -> case split_uri(Uri, ":", {error, no_scheme}, 1, 1) of {error, no_scheme} -> incomplete; {StrScheme, "//" ++ URIPart} -> {Authority, PathQuery} = split_auth_path(URIPart), {UserInfo, HostPort} = split_uri(Authority, "@", {"", Authority}, 1, 1), {Host, Port} = split_uri(HostPort, ":", {HostPort, dummy_port}, 1, 1), {StrScheme, UserInfo, Host, Port, PathQuery} end. split_auth_path(URIPart) -> case split_uri(URIPart, "/", URIPart, 1, 0) of Split = {_, _} -> Split; URIPart -> case split_uri(URIPart, "\\?", URIPart, 1, 0) of Split = {_, _} -> Split; URIPart -> {URIPart,""} end end. split_uri(UriPart, SplitChar, NoMatchResult, SkipLeft, SkipRight) -> case re:run(UriPart, SplitChar) of {match,[{Start, _}]} -> StrPos = Start + 1, {string:substr(UriPart, 1, StrPos - SkipLeft), string:substr(UriPart, StrPos + SkipRight, length(UriPart))}; nomatch -> NoMatchResult end. is_rdnSeq({rdnSequence,[]}, {rdnSequence,[none]}) -> true; is_rdnSeq({rdnSequence,DirName}, {rdnSequence,Permitted}) -> is_dir_name(DirName, Permitted, false). is_permitted(_, no_constraints) -> true; is_permitted(Names, Constraints) -> is_valid_name(Names, Constraints, true). is_excluded([], _) -> false; is_excluded(Names, Constraints) -> is_valid_name(Names, Constraints, false). is_valid_name([], _, Default) -> Default; is_valid_name([{Type, Name} | Rest], Constraints, Default) -> case type_subtree_names(Type, Constraints) of [_|_] = ConstraintNames -> case match_name(Type, Name, ConstraintNames) of Default -> is_valid_name(Rest, Constraints, Default); Fail -> Fail end; [] -> is_valid_name(Rest, Constraints,Default) end. add_name_constraints(NewPermittedTrees, NewExcludedTrees, #path_validation_state{ permitted_subtrees = PermittedTrees, excluded_subtrees = ExcludedTrees} = ValidationState) -> NewPermitted = subtree_intersection(NewPermittedTrees, PermittedTrees), NewExcluded = subtree_union(NewExcludedTrees, ExcludedTrees), ValidationState#path_validation_state{permitted_subtrees = NewPermitted, excluded_subtrees = NewExcluded}. subtree_union(asn1_NOVALUE, Trees) -> Trees; subtree_union(Trees1, Trees2) -> Trees1 ++ Trees2. subtree_intersection(asn1_NOVALUE, Trees) -> Trees; subtree_intersection(List, no_constraints) -> List; subtree_intersection([Tree | Trees1], Trees2) -> Trees = is_in_intersection(Tree, Trees2), subtree_intersection(Trees1, Trees); subtree_intersection([], TreesInt) -> TreesInt. is_in_intersection(#'GeneralSubtree'{base = {directoryName, {rdnSequence, Name1}}} = Name, [#'GeneralSubtree'{base = {directoryName, {rdnSequence, Name2}}} | Trees]) -> case is_dir_name(Name1, Name2, false) of true -> [Name|Trees]; false -> [Name#'GeneralSubtree'{base = {directoryName, {rdnSequence,[none]}}} | Trees] end; is_in_intersection(#'GeneralSubtree'{base = {ipAdress, Ip}}, Trees = [#'GeneralSubtree'{base = {ipAdress, Ip}} | _]) -> %% BUGBUG Trees; is_in_intersection(#'GeneralSubtree'{base = {x400Address, OrAddr1}} = Addr, [#'GeneralSubtree'{base = {x400Address, OrAddr2}} | Trees]) -> case is_or_address(OrAddr1, OrAddr2) of true -> [Addr|Trees]; false -> [#'GeneralSubtree'{base = {x400Address, ""}} | Trees] end; is_in_intersection(#'GeneralSubtree'{base = {Type, Name1}} = Name, [#'GeneralSubtree'{base = {Type, Name2}} | Trees]) -> case case_insensitive_match(Name1, Name2) of true -> [Name|Trees]; false -> [#'GeneralSubtree'{base = {Type, ""}} | Trees] end; is_in_intersection(New, []) -> [New]; is_in_intersection(Name, [Other | IntCandidates]) -> [Other|is_in_intersection(Name, IntCandidates)]. type_subtree_names(Type, SubTrees) -> [Name || #'GeneralSubtree'{base = {TreeType, Name}} <- SubTrees, TreeType =:= Type]. match_name(rfc822Name, Name, [PermittedName | Rest]) -> match_name(fun is_valid_host_or_domain/2, Name, PermittedName, Rest); match_name(directoryName, DirName, [PermittedName | Rest]) -> match_name(fun is_rdnSeq/2, DirName, PermittedName, Rest); match_name(uniformResourceIdentifier, URI, [PermittedName | Rest]) -> case split_uri(URI) of incomplete -> false; {_, _, Host, _, _} -> match_name(fun is_valid_host_or_domain/2, Host, PermittedName, Rest) end; match_name(emailAddress, Name, [PermittedName | Rest]) -> Fun = fun(Email, PermittedEmail) -> is_valid_email_address(Email, PermittedEmail, string:tokens(PermittedEmail,"@")) end, match_name(Fun, Name, PermittedName, Rest); match_name(dNSName, Name, [PermittedName | Rest]) -> Fun = fun(Domain, [$.|Domain]) -> true; (Name1,Name2) -> lists:suffix(string:to_lower(Name2), string:to_lower(Name1)) end, match_name(Fun, Name, [$.|PermittedName], Rest); match_name(x400Address, OrAddress, [PermittedAddr | Rest]) -> match_name(fun is_or_address/2, OrAddress, PermittedAddr, Rest); match_name(ipAdress, IP, [PermittedIP | Rest]) -> Fun = fun([IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4], [IP5, IP6, IP7, IP8, M1, M2, M3, M4]) -> is_permitted_ip([IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4], [IP5, IP6, IP7, IP8], [M1, M2, M3, M4]); ([IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4, IP5, IP6, IP7, IP8, IP9, IP10, IP11, IP12, IP13, IP14, IP15, IP16], [IP17, IP18, IP19, IP20, IP21, IP22, IP23, IP24, IP25, IP26, IP27, IP28, IP29, IP30, IP31, IP32, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M6, M7, M8, M9, M10, M11, M12, M13, M14, M15, M16]) -> is_permitted_ip([IP1, IP2, IP3, IP4, IP5, IP6, IP7, IP8, IP9, IP10, IP11, IP12, IP13, IP14, IP15, IP16], [IP17, IP18, IP19, IP20, IP21, IP22, IP23, IP24,IP25, IP26, IP27, IP28, IP29, IP30, IP31, IP32], [M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M6, M7, M8, M9, M10, M11, M12, M13, M14, M15, M16]); (_,_) -> false end, match_name(Fun, IP, PermittedIP, Rest). match_name(Fun, Name, PermittedName, []) -> Fun(Name, PermittedName); match_name(Fun, Name, PermittedName, [Head | Tail]) -> case Fun(Name, PermittedName) of true -> true; false -> match_name(Fun, Name, Head, Tail) end. is_permitted_ip([], [], []) -> true; is_permitted_ip([CandidatIp | CandidatIpRest], [PermittedIp | PermittedIpRest], [Mask | MaskRest] ) -> case mask_cmp(CandidatIp, PermittedIp, Mask) of true -> is_permitted_ip(CandidatIpRest, PermittedIpRest, MaskRest); false -> false end. mask_cmp(Canditate, Permitted, Mask) -> (Canditate band Mask) == Permitted. is_valid_host_or_domain(Canditate, [$.|_] = Permitted) -> is_suffix(Permitted, Canditate); is_valid_host_or_domain(Canditate, Permitted) -> case string:tokens(Canditate,"@") of [CanditateHost] -> case_insensitive_match(CanditateHost, Permitted); [_, CanditateHost] -> case_insensitive_match(CanditateHost, Permitted) end. is_valid_email_address(Canditate, [$.|Permitted], [_]) -> is_suffix(Permitted, Canditate); is_valid_email_address(Canditate, PermittedHost, [_]) -> [_ , CanditateHost] = string:tokens(Canditate,"@"), case_insensitive_match(CanditateHost, PermittedHost); is_valid_email_address(Canditate, Permitted, [_, _]) -> case_insensitive_match(Canditate, Permitted). is_suffix(Suffix, Str) -> lists:suffix(string:to_lower(Suffix), string:to_lower(Str)). case_insensitive_match(Str1, Str2) -> string:to_lower(Str1) == string:to_lower(Str2). is_or_address(Address, Canditate) -> %% TODO: Is case_insensitive_match sufficient? %% study rfc2156 probably need more a complex check. is_double_quoted(Address) andalso is_double_quoted(Canditate) andalso case_insensitive_match(Address, Canditate). is_double_quoted(["\"" | Tail]) -> is_double_quote(lists:last(Tail)); is_double_quoted("%22" ++ Tail) -> case lists:reverse(Tail) of [A, B, C | _] -> is_double_quote([C, B, A]); _ -> false end; is_double_quoted(_) -> false. is_double_quote("%22") -> true; is_double_quote("\"") -> true; is_double_quote(_) -> false. add_policy_constraints(ExpPolicy, MapPolicy, #path_validation_state{cert_num = CertNum, explicit_policy = CurExpPolicy, policy_mapping = CurMapPolicy} = ValidationState) -> NewExpPolicy = policy_constraint(CurExpPolicy, ExpPolicy, CertNum), NewMapPolicy = policy_constraint(CurMapPolicy, MapPolicy, CertNum), ValidationState#path_validation_state{explicit_policy = NewExpPolicy, policy_mapping = NewMapPolicy}. policy_constraint(Current, asn1_NOVALUE, _) -> Current; policy_constraint(Current, New, CertNum) -> erlang:min(Current, New + CertNum). process_policy_tree(_,_, ?NULL) -> ?NULL; process_policy_tree(_Id, _Qualifier, Tree) -> %% TODO real imp. Tree. policy_indicator(_, true) -> 0; policy_indicator(N, false) -> N + 1. is_fixed_dh_cert(PublicKeyInfo, Extensions) -> AlgInfo = PublicKeyInfo#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'.algorithm, Algorithm = AlgInfo#'PublicKeyAlgorithm'.algorithm, case select_extension(?'id-ce-keyUsage', Extensions) of undefined -> is_dh(Algorithm); #'Extension'{extnValue=KeyUse} -> is_dh(Algorithm) andalso is_valid_key_usage(KeyUse, keyAgreement) end. is_dh(?'dhpublicnumber')-> true; is_dh(_) -> false.