%% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% %% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2018. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. %% You may obtain a copy of the License at %% %% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 %% %% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software %% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, %% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. %% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and %% limitations under the License. %% %% %CopyrightEnd% %% %% -module(inet_tls_dist). -export([childspecs/0]). -export([listen/1, accept/1, accept_connection/5, setup/5, close/1, select/1, is_node_name/1]). %% Generalized dist API -export([gen_listen/2, gen_accept/2, gen_accept_connection/6, gen_setup/6, gen_close/2, gen_select/2]). -export([nodelay/0]). -export([verify_client/3, verify_server/3, cert_nodes/1]). -export([dbg/0]). % Debug -include_lib("kernel/include/net_address.hrl"). -include_lib("kernel/include/dist.hrl"). -include_lib("kernel/include/dist_util.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). -include("ssl_api.hrl"). %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- childspecs() -> {ok, [{ssl_dist_sup,{ssl_dist_sup, start_link, []}, permanent, infinity, supervisor, [ssl_dist_sup]}]}. select(Node) -> gen_select(inet_tcp, Node). gen_select(Driver, Node) -> case dist_util:split_node(Node) of {_,Host} -> case Driver:getaddr(Host) of {ok, _} -> true; _ -> false end; _ -> false end. %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- is_node_name(Node) -> dist_util:is_node_name(Node). %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- hs_data_common(#sslsocket{pid = DistCtrl} = SslSocket) -> #hs_data{ f_send = fun (Ctrl, Packet) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> f_send(SslSocket, Packet) end, f_recv = fun (Ctrl, Length, Timeout) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> f_recv(SslSocket, Length, Timeout) end, f_setopts_pre_nodeup = fun (Ctrl) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> f_setopts_pre_nodeup(SslSocket) end, f_setopts_post_nodeup = fun (Ctrl) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> %%% sys:trace(Ctrl, true), f_setopts_post_nodeup(SslSocket) end, f_getll = fun (Ctrl) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> f_getll(DistCtrl) end, f_address = fun (Ctrl, Node) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> f_address(SslSocket, Node) end, mf_tick = fun (Ctrl) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> mf_tick(DistCtrl) end, mf_getstat = fun (Ctrl) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> mf_getstat(SslSocket) end, mf_setopts = fun (Ctrl, Opts) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> mf_setopts(SslSocket, Opts) end, mf_getopts = fun (Ctrl, Opts) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> mf_getopts(SslSocket, Opts) end, f_handshake_complete = fun (Ctrl, Node, DHandle) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> f_handshake_complete(DistCtrl, Node, DHandle) end}. f_send(SslSocket, Packet) -> ssl:send(SslSocket, Packet). f_recv(SslSocket, Length, Timeout) -> case ssl:recv(SslSocket, Length, Timeout) of {ok, Bin} when is_binary(Bin) -> {ok, binary_to_list(Bin)}; Other -> Other end. f_setopts_pre_nodeup(_SslSocket) -> ok. f_setopts_post_nodeup(_SslSocket) -> ok. f_getll(DistCtrl) -> {ok, DistCtrl}. f_address(SslSocket, Node) -> case ssl:peername(SslSocket) of {ok, Address} -> case dist_util:split_node(Node) of {_,Host} -> #net_address{ address=Address, host=Host, protocol=tls, family=inet}; _ -> {error, no_node} end end. mf_tick(DistCtrl) -> DistCtrl ! tick, ok. mf_getstat(SslSocket) -> case ssl:getstat( SslSocket, [recv_cnt, send_cnt, send_pend]) of {ok, Stat} -> split_stat(Stat,0,0,0); Error -> Error end. mf_setopts(SslSocket, Opts) -> case setopts_filter(Opts) of [] -> ssl:setopts(SslSocket, Opts); Opts1 -> {error, {badopts,Opts1}} end. mf_getopts(SslSocket, Opts) -> ssl:getopts(SslSocket, Opts). f_handshake_complete(DistCtrl, Node, DHandle) -> ssl_connection:handshake_complete(DistCtrl, Node, DHandle). setopts_filter(Opts) -> [Opt || {K,_} = Opt <- Opts, K =:= active orelse K =:= deliver orelse K =:= packet]. split_stat([{recv_cnt, R}|Stat], _, W, P) -> split_stat(Stat, R, W, P); split_stat([{send_cnt, W}|Stat], R, _, P) -> split_stat(Stat, R, W, P); split_stat([{send_pend, P}|Stat], R, W, _) -> split_stat(Stat, R, W, P); split_stat([], R, W, P) -> {ok, R, W, P}. %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- listen(Name) -> gen_listen(inet_tcp, Name). gen_listen(Driver, Name) -> case inet_tcp_dist:gen_listen(Driver, Name) of {ok, {Socket, Address, Creation}} -> inet:setopts(Socket, [{packet, 4}]), {ok, {Socket, Address#net_address{protocol=tls}, Creation}}; Other -> Other end. %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- accept(Listen) -> gen_accept(inet_tcp, Listen). gen_accept(Driver, Listen) -> Kernel = self(), monitor_pid( spawn_opt( fun () -> accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel) end, [link, {priority, max}])). accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel) -> case Driver:accept(Listen) of {ok, Socket} -> Opts = get_ssl_options(server), CertNodesFun = verify_client_cert_nodes_fun(Opts), wait_for_code_server(), case ssl:ssl_accept( Socket, trace([{active, false},{packet, 4}|Opts]), net_kernel:connecttime()) of {ok, #sslsocket{pid = DistCtrl} = SslSocket} -> trace( Kernel ! {accept, self(), DistCtrl, Driver:family(), tls}), receive {Kernel, controller, Pid} -> ok = ssl:controlling_process(SslSocket, Pid), trace( Pid ! {self(), controller, CertNodesFun}); {Kernel, unsupported_protocol} -> exit(trace(unsupported_protocol)) end, accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel); {error, {options, _}} = Error -> %% Bad options: that's probably our fault. %% Let's log that. error_logger:error_msg( "Cannot accept TLS distribution connection: ~s~n", [ssl:format_error(Error)]), gen_tcp:close(Socket), exit(trace(Error)); Other -> gen_tcp:close(Socket), exit(trace(Other)) end; Error -> exit(trace(Error)) end. %% {verify_fun,{fun ?MODULE:verify_client/3,_}} is used %% as a marker that the peer certificate shall be parsed %% for node names after succesful connection %% verify_client_cert_nodes_fun([]) -> undefined; verify_client_cert_nodes_fun([Opt|Opts]) -> case Opt of {verify_fun,{Fun,CertNodesFun}} -> case Fun =:= fun ?MODULE:verify_client/3 of true when not is_function(CertNodesFun, 1) -> exit( trace( {verify_client_bad_argument,CertNodesFun})); true -> CertNodesFun; false -> verify_client_cert_nodes_fun(Opts) end; _ -> verify_client_cert_nodes_fun(Opts) end. %% Same as verify_peer - approves all valid certificates verify_client(_, {bad_cert,_} = Reason, _) -> {fail,Reason}; verify_client(_, {extension,_}, F) -> {unknown,F}; verify_client(_, valid, F) -> {valid,F}; verify_client(_, valid_peer, F) -> {valid_peer,F}. wait_for_code_server() -> %% This is an ugly hack. Upgrading a socket to TLS requires the %% crypto module to be loaded. Loading the crypto module triggers %% its on_load function, which calls code:priv_dir/1 to find the %% directory where its NIF library is. However, distribution is %% started earlier than the code server, so the code server is not %% necessarily started yet, and code:priv_dir/1 might fail because %% of that, if we receive an incoming connection on the %% distribution port early enough. %% %% If the on_load function of a module fails, the module is %% unloaded, and the function call that triggered loading it fails %% with 'undef', which is rather confusing. %% %% Thus, the accept process will terminate, and be %% restarted by ssl_dist_sup. However, it won't have any memory %% of being asked by net_kernel to listen for incoming %% connections. Hence, the node will believe that it's open for %% distribution, but it actually isn't. %% %% So let's avoid that by waiting for the code server to start. case whereis(code_server) of undefined -> timer:sleep(10), wait_for_code_server(); Pid when is_pid(Pid) -> ok end. %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- accept_connection(AcceptPid, DistCtrl, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) -> gen_accept_connection( inet_tcp, AcceptPid, DistCtrl, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime). gen_accept_connection( Driver, AcceptPid, DistCtrl, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) -> Kernel = self(), monitor_pid( spawn_opt( fun() -> do_accept( Driver, Kernel, AcceptPid, DistCtrl, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) end, [link, {priority, max}])). do_accept(Driver, Kernel, AcceptPid, DistCtrl, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) -> SslSocket = ssl_connection:get_sslsocket(DistCtrl), receive {AcceptPid, controller, CertNodesFun} -> Timer = dist_util:start_timer(SetupTime), case check_ip(Driver, SslSocket) of true -> NewAllowed = allowed_nodes(CertNodesFun, SslSocket, Allowed), HSData0 = hs_data_common(SslSocket), HSData = HSData0#hs_data{ kernel_pid = Kernel, this_node = MyNode, socket = DistCtrl, timer = Timer, this_flags = 0, allowed = NewAllowed}, link(DistCtrl), dist_util:handshake_other_started(trace(HSData)); {false,IP} -> error_logger:error_msg( "** Connection attempt from " "disallowed IP ~w ** ~n", [IP]), ?shutdown2(no_node, trace({disallowed, IP})) end end. allowed_nodes(undefined, _SslSocket, Allowed) -> Allowed; allowed_nodes(CertNodesFun, SslSocket, Allowed) -> case ssl:peercert(SslSocket) of {ok,PeerCertDER} -> PeerCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(PeerCertDER, otp), %% %% Parse out all node names from the peer's certificate %% case CertNodesFun(PeerCert) of [] -> ?shutdown(cert_missing_node_name); CertNodes -> allowed(CertNodes, Allowed) end; Error -> ?shutdown2(no_peer_cert, trace(Error)) end. allowed(CertNodes, []) -> %% All allowed -> allow only certificate nodes CertNodes; allowed(CertNodes, Allowed) -> %% Find the intersection of the allowed list and certificate nodes case [CertNode || CertNode <- CertNodes, dist_util:is_allowed(CertNode, Allowed)] of [] -> error_logger:error_msg( "** Connection attempt from " "disallowed node(s) ~p ** ~n", [CertNodes]), ?shutdown2(CertNodes, trace({is_allowed, not_allowed})); NewAllowed -> NewAllowed end. setup(Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> gen_setup(inet_tcp, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime). gen_setup(Driver, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> Kernel = self(), monitor_pid( spawn_opt( fun() -> do_setup( Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) end, [link, {priority, max}])). do_setup(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> {Name, Address} = split_node(Driver, Node, LongOrShortNames), case Driver:getaddr(Address) of {ok, Ip} -> Timer = trace(dist_util:start_timer(SetupTime)), ErlEpmd = net_kernel:epmd_module(), case ErlEpmd:port_please(Name, Ip) of {port, TcpPort, Version} -> Opts = trace( connect_options( %% %% Use verify_server/3 to verify that %% the server's certificate is for Node %% setup_verify_server( get_ssl_options(client), Node))), dist_util:reset_timer(Timer), case ssl:connect( Address, TcpPort, [binary, {active, false}, {packet, 4}, Driver:family(), nodelay()] ++ Opts, net_kernel:connecttime()) of {ok, #sslsocket{pid = DistCtrl} = SslSocket} -> _ = monitor_pid(DistCtrl), ok = ssl:controlling_process(SslSocket, self()), HSData0 = hs_data_common(SslSocket), HSData = HSData0#hs_data{ kernel_pid = Kernel, other_node = Node, this_node = MyNode, socket = DistCtrl, timer = Timer, this_flags = 0, other_version = Version, request_type = Type}, link(DistCtrl), dist_util:handshake_we_started(trace(HSData)); Other -> %% Other Node may have closed since %% port_please ! ?shutdown2( Node, trace( {ssl_connect_failed, Ip, TcpPort, Other})) end; Other -> ?shutdown2( Node, trace( {port_please_failed, ErlEpmd, Name, Ip, Other})) end; Other -> ?shutdown2( Node, trace({getaddr_failed, Driver, Address, Other})) end. close(Socket) -> gen_close(inet, Socket). gen_close(Driver, Socket) -> trace(Driver:close(Socket)). %% {verify_fun,{fun ?MODULE:verify_server/3,_}} is used %% as a configuration marker that verify_server/3 shall be used. %% %% Replace the State in the first occurence of %% {verify_fun,{fun ?MODULE:verify_server/3,State}} %% with Node and remove the rest. Node can not be used %% from a configuration file since it is dynamic %% and connection dependent. %% setup_verify_server(Opts, Node) -> setup_verify_server(Opts, Node, true). %% setup_verify_server([], _Node, _) -> []; setup_verify_server([Opt|Opts], Node, Once) -> case Opt of {verify_fun,{Fun,CertNodesFun}} -> case Fun =:= fun ?MODULE:verify_server/3 of true when not is_function(CertNodesFun, 1) -> ?shutdown2( Node, {verify_server_bad_argument,CertNodesFun}); true when Once -> [{verify_fun,{Fun,{CertNodesFun,Node}}} |setup_verify_server(Opts, Node, false)]; true -> setup_verify_server(Opts, Node, Once); false -> [Opt|setup_verify_server(Opts, Node, Once)] end; _ -> [Opt|setup_verify_server(Opts, Node, Once)] end. verify_server(_, {bad_cert,_} = Reason, _) -> {fail,Reason}; verify_server(_, {extension,_}, S) -> {unknown,S}; verify_server(_, valid, S) -> {valid,S}; verify_server(PeerCert, valid_peer, {CertNodesFun,Node} = S) -> %% %% Parse out all node names from the peer's certificate %% case CertNodesFun(PeerCert) of [] -> {fail,cert_missing_node_name}; CertNodes -> case dist_util:is_allowed(Node, CertNodes) of true -> {valid,S}; false -> {fail,wrong_nodes_in_cert} end end. %% ------------------------------------------------------------ %% Do only accept new connection attempts from nodes at our %% own LAN, if the check_ip environment parameter is true. %% ------------------------------------------------------------ check_ip(Driver, SslSocket) -> case application:get_env(check_ip) of {ok, true} -> case get_ifs(SslSocket) of {ok, IFs, IP} -> check_ip(Driver, IFs, IP); Other -> ?shutdown2( no_node, trace({check_ip_failed, SslSocket, Other})) end; _ -> true end. check_ip(Driver, [{OwnIP, _, Netmask}|IFs], PeerIP) -> case {Driver:mask(Netmask, PeerIP), Driver:mask(Netmask, OwnIP)} of {M, M} -> true; _ -> check_ip(IFs, PeerIP) end; check_ip(_Driver, [], PeerIP) -> {false, PeerIP}. get_ifs(#sslsocket{fd = {gen_tcp, Socket, _}}) -> case inet:peername(Socket) of {ok, {IP, _}} -> %% XXX this is seriously broken for IPv6 case inet:getif(Socket) of {ok, IFs} -> {ok, IFs, IP}; Error -> Error end; Error -> Error end. %% Look in Extensions, in all subjectAltName:s %% to find node names in this certificate. %% Host names are picked up as a subjectAltName containing %% a dNSName, and the first subjectAltName containing %% a commonName is the node name. %% cert_nodes( #'OTPCertificate'{ tbsCertificate = #'OTPTBSCertificate'{extensions = Extensions}}) -> parse_extensions(Extensions). parse_extensions(Extensions) when is_list(Extensions) -> parse_extensions(Extensions, [], none); parse_extensions(asn1_NOVALUE) -> []. %% parse_extensions([], Hosts, none) -> lists:reverse(Hosts); parse_extensions([], Hosts, Name) -> [Name ++ "@" ++ Host || Host <- lists:reverse(Hosts)]; parse_extensions( [#'Extension'{ extnID = ?'id-ce-subjectAltName', extnValue = AltNames} |Extensions], Hosts, Name) -> case parse_subject_altname(AltNames) of none -> parse_extensions(Extensions, Hosts, Name); {host,Host} -> parse_extensions(Extensions, [Host|Hosts], Name); {name,NewName} when Name =:= none -> parse_extensions(Extensions, Hosts, NewName); {Name,_} -> parse_extensions(Extensions, Hosts, Name) end; parse_extensions([_|Extensions], Hosts, Name) -> parse_extensions(Extensions, Hosts, Name). parse_subject_altname([]) -> none; parse_subject_altname([{dNSName,Host}|_AltNames]) -> {host,Host}; parse_subject_altname( [{directoryName,{rdnSequence,[Rdn|_]}}|AltNames]) -> %% %% XXX Why is rdnSequence a sequence? %% Should we parse all members? %% case parse_rdn(Rdn) of none -> parse_subject_altname(AltNames); Name -> {name,Name} end; parse_subject_altname([_|AltNames]) -> parse_subject_altname(AltNames). parse_rdn([]) -> none; parse_rdn( [#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{ type = ?'id-at-commonName', value = {utf8String,CommonName}}|_]) -> unicode:characters_to_list(CommonName); parse_rdn([_|Rdn]) -> parse_rdn(Rdn). %% If Node is illegal terminate the connection setup!! split_node(Driver, Node, LongOrShortNames) -> case dist_util:split_node(Node) of {Name, Host} -> check_node(Driver, Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames); [_] -> error_logger:error_msg( "** Nodename ~p illegal, no '@' character **~n", [Node]), ?shutdown2(Node, trace({illegal_node_n@me, Node})); _ -> error_logger:error_msg( "** Nodename ~p illegal **~n", [Node]), ?shutdown2(Node, trace({illegal_node_name, Node})) end. check_node(Driver, Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames) -> case string:split(Host, ".") of [_] when LongOrShortNames =:= longnames -> case Driver:parse_address(Host) of {ok, _} -> {Name, Host}; _ -> error_logger:error_msg( "** System running to use " "fully qualified hostnames **~n" "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", [Host]), ?shutdown2(Node, trace({not_longnames, Host})) end; [_,_|_] when LongOrShortNames =:= shortnames -> error_logger:error_msg( "** System NOT running to use " "fully qualified hostnames **~n" "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", [Host]), ?shutdown2(Node, trace({not_shortnames, Host})); _ -> {Name, Host} end. %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- connect_options(Opts) -> case application:get_env(kernel, inet_dist_connect_options) of {ok,ConnectOpts} -> lists:ukeysort(1, ConnectOpts ++ Opts); _ -> Opts end. %% we may not always want the nodelay behaviour %% for performance reasons nodelay() -> case application:get_env(kernel, dist_nodelay) of undefined -> {nodelay, true}; {ok, true} -> {nodelay, true}; {ok, false} -> {nodelay, false}; _ -> {nodelay, true} end. get_ssl_options(Type) -> try ets:lookup(ssl_dist_opts, Type) of [{Type, Opts}] -> [{erl_dist, true} | Opts]; _ -> get_ssl_dist_arguments(Type) catch error:badarg -> get_ssl_dist_arguments(Type) end. get_ssl_dist_arguments(Type) -> case init:get_argument(ssl_dist_opt) of {ok, Args} -> [{erl_dist, true} | ssl_options(Type, lists:append(Args))]; _ -> [{erl_dist, true}] end. ssl_options(_,[]) -> []; ssl_options(server, ["client_" ++ _, _Value |T]) -> ssl_options(server,T); ssl_options(client, ["server_" ++ _, _Value|T]) -> ssl_options(client,T); ssl_options(server, ["server_certfile", Value|T]) -> [{certfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_certfile", Value | T]) -> [{certfile, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_cacertfile", Value|T]) -> [{cacertfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_cacertfile", Value|T]) -> [{cacertfile, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_keyfile", Value|T]) -> [{keyfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_keyfile", Value|T]) -> [{keyfile, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_password", Value|T]) -> [{password, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_password", Value|T]) -> [{password, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_verify", Value|T]) -> [{verify, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_verify", Value|T]) -> [{verify, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_verify_fun", Value|T]) -> [{verify_fun, verify_fun(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_verify_fun", Value|T]) -> [{verify_fun, verify_fun(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_crl_check", Value|T]) -> [{crl_check, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_crl_check", Value|T]) -> [{crl_check, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_crl_cache", Value|T]) -> [{crl_cache, termify(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_crl_cache", Value|T]) -> [{crl_cache, termify(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_reuse_sessions", Value|T]) -> [{reuse_sessions, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_reuse_sessions", Value|T]) -> [{reuse_sessions, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_secure_renegotiate", Value|T]) -> [{secure_renegotiate, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_secure_renegotiate", Value|T]) -> [{secure_renegotiate, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_depth", Value|T]) -> [{depth, list_to_integer(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_depth", Value|T]) -> [{depth, list_to_integer(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_hibernate_after", Value|T]) -> [{hibernate_after, list_to_integer(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_hibernate_after", Value|T]) -> [{hibernate_after, list_to_integer(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_ciphers", Value|T]) -> [{ciphers, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(client, ["client_ciphers", Value|T]) -> [{ciphers, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_dhfile", Value|T]) -> [{dhfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(server, ["server_fail_if_no_peer_cert", Value|T]) -> [{fail_if_no_peer_cert, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; ssl_options(Type, Opts) -> error(malformed_ssl_dist_opt, [Type, Opts]). atomize(List) when is_list(List) -> list_to_atom(List); atomize(Atom) when is_atom(Atom) -> Atom. termify(String) when is_list(String) -> {ok, Tokens, _} = erl_scan:string(String ++ "."), {ok, Term} = erl_parse:parse_term(Tokens), Term. verify_fun(Value) -> case termify(Value) of {Mod, Func, State} when is_atom(Mod), is_atom(Func) -> Fun = fun Mod:Func/3, {Fun, State}; _ -> error(malformed_ssl_dist_opt, [Value]) end. %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Trace point trace(Term) -> Term. %% Keep an eye on distribution Pid:s we know of monitor_pid(Pid) -> %%spawn( %% fun () -> %% MRef = erlang:monitor(process, Pid), %% receive %% {'DOWN', MRef, _, _, normal} -> %% error_logger:error_report( %% [dist_proc_died, %% {reason, normal}, %% {pid, Pid}]); %% {'DOWN', MRef, _, _, Reason} -> %% error_logger:info_report( %% [dist_proc_died, %% {reason, Reason}, %% {pid, Pid}]) %% end %% end), Pid. dbg() -> dbg:stop(), dbg:tracer(), dbg:p(all, c), dbg:tpl(?MODULE, cx), dbg:tpl(erlang, dist_ctrl_get_data_notification, cx), dbg:tpl(erlang, dist_ctrl_get_data, cx), dbg:tpl(erlang, dist_ctrl_put_data, cx), ok.