%% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% %% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2010. All Rights Reserved. %% %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in %% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the %% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be %% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/. %% %% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" %% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See %% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations %% under the License. %% %% %CopyrightEnd% %% %%---------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Purpose: Help funtions for handling the SSL-handshake protocol %%---------------------------------------------------------------------- -module(ssl_handshake). -include("ssl_handshake.hrl"). -include("ssl_record.hrl"). -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_debug.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). -export([master_secret/4, client_hello/5, server_hello/4, hello/4, hello_request/0, certify/7, certificate/3, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, certificate_request/2, key_exchange/2, server_key_exchange_hash/2, finished/4, verify_connection/5, get_tls_handshake/4, server_hello_done/0, sig_alg/1, encode_handshake/3, init_hashes/0, update_hashes/2, decrypt_premaster_secret/2]). %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, SslOpts) -> %% #client_hello{} %% Host %% Port %% ConnectionStates = #connection_states{} %% SslOpts = #ssl_options{} %% %% Description: Creates a client hello message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, ciphers = Ciphers} = SslOpts, Renegotiation) -> Fun = fun(Version) -> ssl_record:protocol_version(Version) end, Version = ssl_record:highest_protocol_version(lists:map(Fun, Versions)), Pending = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters, Id = ssl_manager:client_session_id(Host, Port, SslOpts), #client_hello{session_id = Id, client_version = Version, cipher_suites = cipher_suites(Ciphers, Renegotiation), compression_methods = ssl_record:compressions(), random = SecParams#security_parameters.client_random, renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(client, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) }. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: server_hello(SessionId, Version, %% ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> #server_hello{} %% SessionId %% Version %% ConnectionStates %% Renegotiation %% %% %% Description: Creates a server hello message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> Pending = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters, #server_hello{server_version = Version, cipher_suite = SecParams#security_parameters.cipher_suite, compression_method = SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm, random = SecParams#security_parameters.server_random, session_id = SessionId, renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(server, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) }. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: hello_request() -> #hello_request{} %% %% Description: Creates a hello request message sent by server to %% trigger renegotiation. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- hello_request() -> #hello_request{}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: hello(Hello, Info, Renegotiation) -> %% {Version, Id, NewConnectionStates} | %% #alert{} %% %% Hello = #client_hello{} | #server_hello{} %% Info = ConnectionStates | {Port, #ssl_options{}, Session, %% Cahce, CahceCb, ConnectionStates} %% ConnectionStates = #connection_states{} %% Renegotiation = boolean() %% %% Description: Handles a recieved hello message %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, server_version = Version, compression_method = Compression, random = Random, session_id = SessionId, renegotiation_info = Info}, #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation}, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> case handle_renegotiation_info(client, Info, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, []) of {ok, ConnectionStates1} -> ConnectionStates = hello_pending_connection_states(client, CipherSuite, Random, Compression, ConnectionStates1), {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates}; #alert{} = Alert -> Alert end; hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion, random = Random, cipher_suites = CipherSuites, renegotiation_info = Info} = Hello, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation} = SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0}, Renegotiation) -> Version = select_version(ClientVersion, Versions), case ssl_record:is_acceptable_version(Version) of true -> {Type, #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression} = Session} = select_session(Hello, Port, Session0, Version, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb), case CipherSuite of no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); _ -> case handle_renegotiation_info(server, Info, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) of {ok, ConnectionStates1} -> ConnectionStates = hello_pending_connection_states(server, CipherSuite, Random, Compression, ConnectionStates1), {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates}; #alert{} = Alert -> Alert end end; false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: certify(Certs, CertDbRef, MaxPathLen) -> %% {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo} | #alert{} %% %% Certs = #certificate{} %% CertDbRef = reference() %% MaxPathLen = integer() | nolimit %% %% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbRef, MaxPathLen, Verify, VerifyFun, ValidateFun, Role) -> [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs, VerifyBool = verify_bool(Verify), ValidateExtensionFun = case ValidateFun of undefined -> fun(Extensions, ValidationState, Verify0, AccError) -> ssl_certificate:validate_extensions(Extensions, ValidationState, [], Verify0, AccError, Role) end; Fun -> fun(Extensions, ValidationState, Verify0, AccError) -> {NewExtensions, NewValidationState, NewAccError} = ssl_certificate:validate_extensions(Extensions, ValidationState, [], Verify0, AccError, Role), Fun(NewExtensions, NewValidationState, Verify0, NewAccError) end end, try %% Allow missing root_cert and check that with VerifyFun ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbRef, false) of {TrustedErlCert, CertPath, VerifyErrors} -> Result = public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedErlCert, CertPath, [{max_path_length, MaxPathLen}, {verify, VerifyBool}, {validate_extensions_fun, ValidateExtensionFun}, {acc_errors, VerifyErrors}]), case Result of {error, Reason} -> path_validation_alert(Reason, Verify); {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_, []}} -> {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_, AccErrors = [Error | _]}} -> case VerifyFun(AccErrors) of true -> {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; false -> path_validation_alert(Error, Verify) end end catch throw:Alert -> Alert end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: certificate(OwnCert, CertDbRef, Role) -> #certificate{} %% %% OwnCert = binary() %% CertDbRef = term() as returned by ssl_certificate_db:create() %% %% Description: Creates a certificate message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certificate(OwnCert, CertDbRef, client) -> Chain = case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbRef) of {ok, CertChain} -> CertChain; {error, _} -> %% If no suitable certificate is available, the client %% SHOULD send a certificate message containing no %% certificates. (chapter 7.4.6. rfc 4346) [] end, #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain}; certificate(OwnCert, CertDbRef, server) -> case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbRef) of {ok, Chain} -> #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain}; {error, _} -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: client_certificate_verify(Cert, ConnectionStates) -> %% #certificate_verify{} | ignore %% Cert = #'OTPcertificate'{} %% ConnectionStates = #connection_states{} %% %% Description: Creates a certificate_verify message, called by the client. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- client_certificate_verify(undefined, _, _, _, _, _) -> ignore; client_certificate_verify(_, _, _, _, undefined, _) -> ignore; client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version, Algorithm, PrivateKey, {Hashes0, _}) -> case public_key:pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(OwnCert) of true -> ignore; false -> Hashes = calc_certificate_verify(Version, MasterSecret, Algorithm, Hashes0), Signed = digitally_signed(Hashes, PrivateKey), #certificate_verify{signature = Signed} end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo) -> valid | #alert{} %% %% Signature = binary() %% PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, PublicKey, PublicKeyParams} %% %% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certificate_verify(Signature, {_, PublicKey, _}, Version, MasterSecret, Algorithm, {_, Hashes0}) when Algorithm == rsa; Algorithm == dh_rsa; Algorithm == dhe_rsa -> Hashes = calc_certificate_verify(Version, MasterSecret, Algorithm, Hashes0), case public_key:decrypt_public(Signature, PublicKey, [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) of Hashes -> valid; _ -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE) end. %% TODO dsa clause %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: certificate_request(ConnectionStates, CertDbRef) -> %% #certificate_request{} %% %% Description: Creates a certificate_request message, called by the server. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certificate_request(ConnectionStates, CertDbRef) -> #connection_state{security_parameters = #security_parameters{cipher_suite = CipherSuite}} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), Types = certificate_types(CipherSuite), Authorities = certificate_authorities(CertDbRef), #certificate_request{ certificate_types = Types, certificate_authorities = Authorities }. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: key_exchange(Role, Secret, Params) -> %% #client_key_exchange{} | #server_key_exchange{} %% %% Secret - %% Params - %% %% Description: Creates a keyexchange message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- key_exchange(client, {premaster_secret, Secret, {_, PublicKey, _}}) -> EncPremasterSecret = encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, PublicKey), #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = EncPremasterSecret}; %% Uncomment if dh_rsa and dh_dss cipher suites should %% be supported. %% key_exchange(client, fixed_diffie_hellman) -> %% #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = %% #client_diffie_hellman_public{ %% dh_public = <<>> %% }}; key_exchange(client, {dh, <>}) -> #client_key_exchange{ exchange_keys = #client_diffie_hellman_public{ dh_public = PublicKey} }; key_exchange(server, {dh, {<>, _}, #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G}, KeyAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) -> <> = crypto:mpint(P), <> = crypto:mpint(G), PLen = byte_size(PBin), GLen = byte_size(GBin), YLen = byte_size(PublicKey), ServerDHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = PBin, dh_g = GBin, dh_y = PublicKey}, Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(KeyAlgo, <>), Signed = digitally_signed(Hash, PrivateKey), #server_key_exchange{params = ServerDHParams, signed_params = Signed}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: master_secret(Version, Session/PremasterSecret, %% ConnectionStates, Role) -> %% {MasterSecret, NewConnectionStates} | #alert{} %% Version = #protocol_version{} %% Session = #session{} (session contains master secret) %% PremasterSecret = binary() %% ConnectionStates = #connection_states{} %% Role = client | server %% %% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys, %% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update %% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails. %%------------------------------------------------------------------- master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret}, ConnectionStates, Role) -> ConnectionState = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role) catch exit:Reason -> error_logger:error_report("Key calculation failed due to ~p", [Reason]), ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) end; master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) -> ConnectionState = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, try master_secret(Version, calc_master_secret(Version,PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom), SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role) catch exit:Reason -> error_logger:error_report("Master secret calculation failed" " due to ~p", [Reason]), ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: finished(Version, Role, MacSecret, Hashes) -> #finished{} %% %% ConnectionStates = #connection_states{} %% %% Description: Creates a handshake finished message %%------------------------------------------------------------------- finished(Version, Role, MasterSecret, {Hashes, _}) -> % use the current hashes #finished{verify_data = calc_finished(Version, Role, MasterSecret, Hashes)}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: verify_connection(Finished, Role, %% MasterSecret, Hashes) -> verified | #alert{} %% %% Finished = #finished{} %% Role = client | server - the role of the process that sent the finished %% message. %% MasterSecret = binary() %% Hashes = binary() - {md5_hash, sha_hash} %% %% %% Description: Checks the ssl handshake finished message to verify %% the connection. %%------------------------------------------------------------------- verify_connection(Version, #finished{verify_data = Data}, Role, MasterSecret, {_, {MD5, SHA}}) -> %% use the previous hashes ?DBG_HEX(crypto:md5_final(MD5)), ?DBG_HEX(crypto:sha_final(SHA)), case calc_finished(Version, Role, MasterSecret, {MD5, SHA}) of Data -> verified; _E -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) end. server_hello_done() -> #server_hello_done{}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: encode_handshake(HandshakeRec) -> BinHandshake %% HandshakeRec = #client_hello | #server_hello{} | server_hello_done | %% #certificate{} | #client_key_exchange{} | #finished{} | %% #client_certify_request{} %% %% encode a handshake packet to binary %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_handshake(Package, Version, KeyAlg) -> SigAlg = sig_alg(KeyAlg), {MsgType, Bin} = enc_hs(Package, Version, SigAlg), Len = byte_size(Bin), [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), Bin]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Function: get_tls_handshake(Data, Buffer) -> Result %% Result = {[#handshake{}], [Raw], NewBuffer} %% Data = Buffer = NewBuffer = Raw = binary() %% %% Description: Given buffered and new data from ssl_record, collects %% and returns it as a list of #handshake, also returns leftover %% data. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- get_tls_handshake(Data, <<>>, KeyAlg, Version) -> get_tls_handshake_aux(Data, KeyAlg, Version, []); get_tls_handshake(Data, Buffer, KeyAlg, Version) -> get_tls_handshake_aux(list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), KeyAlg, Version, []). get_tls_handshake_aux(<>, KeyAlg, Version, Acc) -> Raw = <>, H = dec_hs(Type, Body, key_exchange_alg(KeyAlg), Version), get_tls_handshake_aux(Rest, KeyAlg, Version, [{H,Raw} | Acc]); get_tls_handshake_aux(Data, _KeyAlg, _Version, Acc) -> {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- verify_bool(verify_peer) -> true; verify_bool(verify_none) -> false. path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_expired}, _) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_issuer}, _) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_signature} , _) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, name_not_permitted}, _) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_critical_extension}, _) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_revoked}, _) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); path_validation_alert(_, _) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE). select_session(Hello, Port, Session, Version, #ssl_options{ciphers = UserSuites} = SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb) -> SuggestedSessionId = Hello#client_hello.session_id, SessionId = ssl_manager:server_session_id(Port, SuggestedSessionId, SslOpts), Suites = case UserSuites of [] -> ssl_cipher:suites(Version); _ -> UserSuites end, case ssl_session:is_new(SuggestedSessionId, SessionId) of true -> CipherSuite = select_cipher_suite(Hello#client_hello.cipher_suites, Suites), Compressions = Hello#client_hello.compression_methods, Compression = select_compression(Compressions), {new, Session#session{session_id = SessionId, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression}}; false -> {resumed, CacheCb:lookup(Cache, {Port, SessionId})} end. cipher_suites(Suites, false) -> [?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV | Suites]; cipher_suites(Suites, true) -> Suites. renegotiation_info(client, _, false) -> #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}; renegotiation_info(server, ConnectionStates, false) -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of true -> #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}; false -> #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} end; renegotiation_info(client, ConnectionStates, true) -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of true -> Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data}; false -> #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} end; renegotiation_info(server, ConnectionStates, true) -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of true -> CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data, SData =CS#connection_state.server_verify_data, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <>}; false -> #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} end. handle_renegotiation_info(_, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; handle_renegotiation_info(server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; false -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)} end; handle_renegotiation_info(_, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}; handle_renegotiation_info(client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, ConnectionStates, true, _, _) -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data, SData = CS#connection_state.server_verify_data, case <> == ClientServerVerify of true -> {ok, ConnectionStates}; false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) end; handle_renegotiation_info(server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); false -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data, case Data == ClientVerify of true -> {ok, ConnectionStates}; false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) end end; handle_renegotiation_info(client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) -> handle_renegotiation_info(ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation); handle_renegotiation_info(server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); false -> handle_renegotiation_info(ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) end. handle_renegotiation_info(ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), case {SecureRenegotation, CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation} of {_, true} -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); {true, false} -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION); {false, false} -> {ok, ConnectionStates} end. %% Update pending connection states with parameters exchanged via %% hello messages %% NOTE : Role is the role of the receiver of the hello message %% currently being processed. hello_pending_connection_states(Role, CipherSuite, Random, Compression, ConnectionStates) -> ReadState = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), WriteState = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), NewReadSecParams = hello_security_parameters(Role, ReadState, CipherSuite, Random, Compression), NewWriteSecParams = hello_security_parameters(Role, WriteState, CipherSuite, Random, Compression), ssl_record:update_security_params(NewReadSecParams, NewWriteSecParams, ConnectionStates). hello_security_parameters(client, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random, Compression) -> SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(CipherSuite, SecParams), NewSecParams#security_parameters{ server_random = Random, compression_algorithm = Compression }; hello_security_parameters(server, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random, Compression) -> SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(CipherSuite, SecParams), NewSecParams#security_parameters{ client_random = Random, compression_algorithm = Compression }. select_version(ClientVersion, Versions) -> Fun = fun(Version) -> ssl_record:protocol_version(Version) end, ServerVersion = ssl_record:highest_protocol_version(lists:map(Fun, Versions)), ssl_record:lowest_protocol_version(ClientVersion, ServerVersion). select_cipher_suite([], _) -> no_suite; select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) -> case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of true -> Suite; false -> select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites) end. is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) -> lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites). select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) -> ?NULL. master_secret(Version, MasterSecret, #security_parameters{ client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom, hash_size = HashSize, key_material_length = KML, expanded_key_material_length = EKML, iv_size = IVS, exportable = Exportable}, ConnectionStates, Role) -> {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV} = setup_keys(Version, Exportable, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS), ?DBG_HEX(ClientWriteKey), ?DBG_HEX(ClientIV), ConnStates1 = ssl_record:set_master_secret(MasterSecret, ConnectionStates), ConnStates2 = ssl_record:set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, Role, ConnStates1), ClientCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ClientIV, key = ClientWriteKey}, ServerCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ServerIV, key = ServerWriteKey}, {MasterSecret, ssl_record:set_pending_cipher_state(ConnStates2, ClientCipherState, ServerCipherState, Role)}. dec_hs(?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>, _, _) -> #hello_request{}; %% Client hello v2. %% The server must be able to receive such messages, from clients that %% are willing to use ssl v3 or higher, but have ssl v2 compatibility. dec_hs(?CLIENT_HELLO, <>, _, _) -> ?DBG_HEX(CipherSuites), ?DBG_HEX(CipherSuites), #client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, random = ssl_ssl2:client_random(ChallengeData, CDLength), session_id = 0, cipher_suites = from_3bytes(CipherSuites), compression_methods = [?NULL], renegotiation_info = undefined }; dec_hs(?CLIENT_HELLO, <>, _, _) -> RenegotiationInfo = proplists:get_value(renegotiation_info, dec_hello_extensions(Extensions), undefined), #client_hello{ client_version = {Major,Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suites = from_2bytes(CipherSuites), compression_methods = Comp_methods, renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo }; dec_hs(?SERVER_HELLO, <>, _, _) -> #server_hello{ server_version = {Major,Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, compression_method = Comp_method, renegotiation_info = undefined}; dec_hs(?SERVER_HELLO, <>, _, _) -> RenegotiationInfo = proplists:get_value(renegotiation_info, dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, []), undefined), #server_hello{ server_version = {Major,Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, compression_method = Comp_method, renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo}; dec_hs(?CERTIFICATE, <>, _, _) -> #certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)}; %% Uncomment if support for export ciphers is added. %% dec_hs(?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <>, %% ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) -> %% #server_key_exchange{params = #server_rsa_params{rsa_modulus = Mod, %% rsa_exponent = Exp}, %% signed_params = Sig}; dec_hs(?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) -> #server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, signed_params = Sig}; dec_hs(?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <>, _, _) -> %% TODO: maybe we should chop up CertAuths into a list? #certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes, certificate_authorities = CertAuths}; dec_hs(?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>, _, _) -> #server_hello_done{}; dec_hs(?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,<>, _, _)-> #certificate_verify{signature = Signature}; dec_hs(?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) -> PreSecret = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}, #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = PreSecret}; dec_hs(?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, <>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) -> PreSecret = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}, #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = PreSecret}; dec_hs(?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) -> %% TODO: Should check whether the cert already contains a suitable DH-key (7.4.7.2) throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, implicit_public_value_encoding)); dec_hs(?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, <>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) -> #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = #client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y}}; dec_hs(?FINISHED, VerifyData, _, _) -> #finished{verify_data = VerifyData}; dec_hs(_, _, _, _) -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)). dec_hello_extensions(<<>>) -> []; dec_hello_extensions(<>) -> dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, []); dec_hello_extensions(_) -> []. dec_hello_extensions(<<>>, Acc) -> Acc; dec_hello_extensions(<>, Acc) -> RenegotiateInfo = case Len of 1 -> % Initial handshake Info; % should be <<0>> will be matched in handle_renegotiation_info _ -> VerifyLen = Len - 1, <> = Info, VerifyInfo end, dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{renegotiation_info, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = RenegotiateInfo}} | Acc]); dec_hello_extensions(<>, Acc) -> dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc); %% Need this clause? dec_hello_extensions(_, Acc) -> Acc. encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) -> try PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey, [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]), #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret} catch _:_-> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)) end. decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) -> try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey, [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) catch _:_ -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPTION_FAILED)) end. %% encode/decode stream of certificate data to/from list of certificate data certs_to_list(ASN1Certs) -> certs_to_list(ASN1Certs, []). certs_to_list(<>, Acc) -> certs_to_list(Rest, [Cert | Acc]); certs_to_list(<<>>, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc, []). certs_from_list(ACList) -> list_to_binary([begin CertLen = byte_size(Cert), <> end || Cert <- ACList]). enc_hs(#hello_request{}, _Version, _) -> {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>}; enc_hs(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, random = Random, session_id = SessionID, cipher_suites = CipherSuites, compression_methods = CompMethods, renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo}, _Version, _) -> SIDLength = byte_size(SessionID), BinCompMethods = list_to_binary(CompMethods), CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods), BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites), CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites), Extensions = hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo), ExtensionsBin = enc_hello_extensions(Extensions), {?CLIENT_HELLO, <>}; enc_hs(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, compression_method = Comp_method, renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo}, _Version, _) -> SID_length = byte_size(Session_ID), Extensions = hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo), ExtensionsBin = enc_hello_extensions(Extensions), {?SERVER_HELLO, <>}; enc_hs(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1CertList}, _Version, _) -> ASN1Certs = certs_from_list(ASN1CertList), ACLen = erlang:iolist_size(ASN1Certs), {?CERTIFICATE, <>}; %% Uncomment if support for export ciphers is added. %% enc_hs(#server_key_exchange{params = #server_rsa_params{rsa_modulus = Mod, %% rsa_exponent = Exp}, %% signed_params = SignedParams}, _Version, _) -> %% ModLen = byte_size(Mod), %% ExpLen = byte_size(Exp), %% SignedLen = byte_size(SignedParams), %% {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <> %% }; enc_hs(#server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{ dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, signed_params = SignedParams}, _Version, _) -> PLen = byte_size(P), GLen = byte_size(G), YLen = byte_size(Y), SignedLen = byte_size(SignedParams), {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <> }; enc_hs(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes, certificate_authorities = CertAuths}, _Version, _) -> CertTypesLen = byte_size(CertTypes), CertAuthsLen = byte_size(CertAuths), {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <> }; enc_hs(#server_hello_done{}, _Version, _) -> {?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>}; enc_hs(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version, _) -> {?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, enc_cke(ExchangeKeys, Version)}; enc_hs(#certificate_verify{signature = BinSig}, _, _) -> EncSig = enc_bin_sig(BinSig), {?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, EncSig}; enc_hs(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, _Version, _) -> {?FINISHED, VerifyData}. enc_cke(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS},{3, 0}) -> PKEPMS; enc_cke(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}, _) -> PKEPMSLen = byte_size(PKEPMS), <>; enc_cke(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DHPublic}, _) -> Len = byte_size(DHPublic), <>. enc_bin_sig(BinSig) -> Size = byte_size(BinSig), <>. %% Renegotiation info, only current extension hello_extensions(#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}) -> []; hello_extensions(#renegotiation_info{} = Info) -> [Info]. enc_hello_extensions(Extensions) -> enc_hello_extensions(Extensions, <<>>). enc_hello_extensions([], <<>>) -> <<>>; enc_hello_extensions([], Acc) -> Size = byte_size(Acc), <>; enc_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0) = Info} | Rest], Acc) -> Len = byte_size(Info), enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <>); enc_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Info} | Rest], Acc) -> InfoLen = byte_size(Info), Len = InfoLen +1, enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <>). init_hashes() -> T = {crypto:md5_init(), crypto:sha_init()}, {T, T}. update_hashes(Hashes, % special-case SSL2 client hello <>) -> update_hashes(Hashes, <>); update_hashes({{MD50, SHA0}, _Prev}, Data) -> ?DBG_HEX(Data), {MD51, SHA1} = {crypto:md5_update(MD50, Data), crypto:sha_update(SHA0, Data)}, ?DBG_HEX(crypto:md5_final(MD51)), ?DBG_HEX(crypto:sha_final(SHA1)), {{MD51, SHA1}, {MD50, SHA0}}. from_3bytes(Bin3) -> from_3bytes(Bin3, []). from_3bytes(<<>>, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc); from_3bytes(<>, Acc) -> from_3bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]). from_2bytes(Bin2) -> from_2bytes(Bin2, []). from_2bytes(<<>>, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc); from_2bytes(<>, Acc) -> from_2bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]). certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}) when KeyExchange == rsa; KeyExchange == dh_dss; KeyExchange == dh_rsa; KeyExchange == dhe_dss; KeyExchange == dhe_rsa -> <>; certificate_types(_) -> %%TODO: Is this a good default, %% is there a case where we like to request %% a RSA_FIXED_DH or DSS_FIXED_DH <>. certificate_authorities(CertDbRef) -> Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbRef), Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) -> OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject, Subj = public_key:pkix_transform(OTPSubj, encode), {ok, DNEncoded} = 'OTP-PUB-KEY':encode('Name', Subj), DNEncodedBin = iolist_to_binary(DNEncoded), DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin), <> end, list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]). certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbRef) -> certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbRef, no_candidate, []). certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbRef, PrevKey, Acc) -> case ssl_certificate_db:issuer_candidate(PrevKey) of no_more_candidates -> lists:reverse(Acc); {{CertDbRef, _, _} = Key, Cert} -> certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbRef, Key, [Cert|Acc]); {Key, _Cert} -> %% skip certs not from this ssl connection certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbRef, Key, Acc) end. digitally_signed(Hashes, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) -> public_key:encrypt_private(Hashes, Key, [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]); digitally_signed(Hashes, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) -> public_key:sign(Hashes, Key). calc_master_secret({3,0}, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) -> ssl_ssl3:master_secret(PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom); calc_master_secret({3,N},PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) when N == 1; N == 2 -> ssl_tls1:master_secret(PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom). setup_keys({3,0}, Exportable, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS) -> ssl_ssl3:setup_keys(Exportable, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS); setup_keys({3,1}, _Exportable, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, _EKML, IVS) -> ssl_tls1:setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, IVS); setup_keys({3,2}, _Exportable, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, _EKML, _IVS) -> ssl_tls1:setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML). calc_finished({3, 0}, Role, MasterSecret, Hashes) -> ssl_ssl3:finished(Role, MasterSecret, Hashes); calc_finished({3, N}, Role, MasterSecret, Hashes) when N == 1; N == 2 -> ssl_tls1:finished(Role, MasterSecret, Hashes). calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, MasterSecret, Algorithm, Hashes) -> ssl_ssl3:certificate_verify(Algorithm, MasterSecret, Hashes); calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, _, Algorithm, Hashes) when N == 1; N == 2 -> ssl_tls1:certificate_verify(Algorithm, Hashes). server_key_exchange_hash(Algorithm, Value) when Algorithm == rsa; Algorithm == dh_rsa; Algorithm == dhe_rsa -> MD5Context = crypto:md5_init(), NewMD5Context = crypto:md5_update(MD5Context, Value), MD5 = crypto:md5_final(NewMD5Context), SHAContext = crypto:sha_init(), NewSHAContext = crypto:sha_update(SHAContext, Value), SHA = crypto:sha_final(NewSHAContext), <>; server_key_exchange_hash(Algorithm, Value) when Algorithm == dh_dss; Algorithm == dhe_dss -> SHAContext = crypto:sha_init(), NewSHAContext = crypto:sha_update(SHAContext, Value), crypto:sha_final(NewSHAContext). sig_alg(dh_anon) -> ?SIGNATURE_ANONYMOUS; sig_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == rsa; Alg == dh_rsa -> ?SIGNATURE_RSA; sig_alg(Alg) when Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dhe_dss -> ?SIGNATURE_DSA; sig_alg(_) -> ?NULL. key_exchange_alg(rsa) -> ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA; key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa; Alg == dh_anon -> ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN; key_exchange_alg(_) -> ?NULL.