%% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% %% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2012. All Rights Reserved. %% %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in %% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the %% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be %% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/. %% %% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" %% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See %% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations %% under the License. %% %% %CopyrightEnd% %% %%---------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Purpose: Help funtions for handling the SSL-handshake protocol %%---------------------------------------------------------------------- -module(ssl_handshake). -include("ssl_handshake.hrl"). -include("ssl_record.hrl"). -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). -export([master_secret/4, client_hello/8, server_hello/4, hello/4, hello_request/0, certify/7, certificate/4, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, certificate_request/3, key_exchange/3, server_key_exchange_hash/2, finished/5, verify_connection/6, get_tls_handshake/3, decode_client_key/3, server_hello_done/0, encode_handshake/2, init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/2, decrypt_premaster_secret/2, prf/5]). -export([dec_hello_extensions/2]). -type tls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | #server_hello{} | #server_hello_done{} | #certificate{} | #certificate_request{} | #client_key_exchange{} | #finished{} | #certificate_verify{} | #hello_request{}. %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec client_hello(host(), inet:port_number(), #connection_states{}, #ssl_options{}, integer(), atom(), boolean(), der_cert()) -> #client_hello{}. %% %% Description: Creates a client hello message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, ciphers = UserSuites } = SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert) -> Fun = fun(Version) -> ssl_record:protocol_version(Version) end, Version = ssl_record:highest_protocol_version(lists:map(Fun, Versions)), Pending = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters, Ciphers = available_suites(UserSuites, Version), Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert), #client_hello{session_id = Id, client_version = Version, cipher_suites = cipher_suites(Ciphers, Renegotiation), compression_methods = ssl_record:compressions(), random = SecParams#security_parameters.client_random, renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(client, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), hash_signs = default_hash_signs() }. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec server_hello(session_id(), tls_version(), #connection_states{}, boolean()) -> #server_hello{}. %% %% Description: Creates a server hello message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> Pending = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters, #server_hello{server_version = Version, cipher_suite = SecParams#security_parameters.cipher_suite, compression_method = SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm, random = SecParams#security_parameters.server_random, session_id = SessionId, renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(server, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) }. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec hello_request() -> #hello_request{}. %% %% Description: Creates a hello request message sent by server to %% trigger renegotiation. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- hello_request() -> #hello_request{}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec hello(#server_hello{} | #client_hello{}, #ssl_options{}, #connection_states{} | {inet:port_number(), #session{}, db_handle(), atom(), #connection_states{}, binary()}, boolean()) -> {tls_version(), session_id(), #connection_states{}}| {tls_version(), {resumed | new, #session{}}, #connection_states{}} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Handles a recieved hello message %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, server_version = Version, compression_method = Compression, random = Random, session_id = SessionId, renegotiation_info = Info, hash_signs = _HashSigns}, #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation}, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> %%TODO: select hash and signature algorigthm case ssl_record:is_acceptable_version(Version) of true -> case handle_renegotiation_info(client, Info, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, []) of {ok, ConnectionStates1} -> ConnectionStates = hello_pending_connection_states(client, Version, CipherSuite, Random, Compression, ConnectionStates1), {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates}; #alert{} = Alert -> Alert end; false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION) end; hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion, random = Random, cipher_suites = CipherSuites, renegotiation_info = Info, hash_signs = _HashSigns} = Hello, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation} = SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert}, Renegotiation) -> %% TODO: select hash and signature algorithm Version = select_version(ClientVersion, Versions), case ssl_record:is_acceptable_version(Version) of true -> {Type, #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression} = Session} = select_session(Hello, Port, Session0, Version, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert), case CipherSuite of no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); _ -> case handle_renegotiation_info(server, Info, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) of {ok, ConnectionStates1} -> ConnectionStates = hello_pending_connection_states(server, Version, CipherSuite, Random, Compression, ConnectionStates1), {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates}; #alert{} = Alert -> Alert end end; false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), integer() | nolimit, verify_peer | verify_none, {fun(), term}, client | server) -> {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, MaxPathLen, _Verify, VerifyFunAndState, Role) -> [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs, ValidationFunAndState = case VerifyFunAndState of undefined -> {fun(OtpCert, ExtensionOrVerifyResult, SslState) -> ssl_certificate:validate_extension(OtpCert, ExtensionOrVerifyResult, SslState) end, Role}; {Fun, UserState0} -> {fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) -> case ssl_certificate:validate_extension(OtpCert, Extension, SslState) of {valid, NewSslState} -> {valid, {NewSslState, UserState}}; {fail, Reason} -> apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Reason, UserState, SslState); {unknown, _} -> apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Extension, UserState, SslState) end; (OtpCert, VerifyResult, {SslState, UserState}) -> apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState, SslState) end, {Role, UserState0}} end, {TrustedErlCert, CertPath} = ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedErlCert, CertPath, [{max_path_length, MaxPathLen}, {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; {error, Reason} -> path_validation_alert(Reason) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certificate(der_cert(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), client | server) -> #certificate{} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Creates a certificate message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client) -> Chain = case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of {ok, CertChain} -> CertChain; {error, _} -> %% If no suitable certificate is available, the client %% SHOULD send a certificate message containing no %% certificates. (chapter 7.4.6. RFC 4346) [] end, #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain}; certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) -> case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of {ok, Chain} -> #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain}; {error, _} -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec client_certificate_verify(undefined | der_cert(), binary(), tls_version(), term(), private_key(), tls_handshake_history()) -> #certificate_verify{} | ignore | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Creates a certificate_verify message, called by the client. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- client_certificate_verify(undefined, _, _, _, _, _) -> ignore; client_certificate_verify(_, _, _, _, undefined, _) -> ignore; client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, PrivateKey, {Handshake, _}) -> case public_key:pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(OwnCert) of true -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); false -> Hashes = calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake), Signed = digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey), #certificate_verify{signature = Signed, hashsign_algorithm = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}} end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), tls_version(), term(), binary(), tls_handshake_history()) -> valid | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certificate_verify(Signature, {?'rsaEncryption', PublicKey, _}, Version, {HashAlgo, _SignAlgo}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) -> Hashes = calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake), case certificate_verify_rsa(Hashes, HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKey, Version) of true -> valid; _ -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE) end; certificate_verify(Signature, {?'id-dsa', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}, Version, {HashAlgo, _SignAlgo}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) -> Hashes = calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake), case public_key:verify({digest, Hashes}, sha, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) of true -> valid; false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certificate_request(#connection_states{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref()) -> #certificate_request{}. %% %% Description: Creates a certificate_request message, called by the server. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certificate_request(ConnectionStates, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> #connection_state{security_parameters = #security_parameters{cipher_suite = CipherSuite}} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), Types = certificate_types(CipherSuite), HashSigns = hashsign_algorithms(CipherSuite), Authorities = certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), #certificate_request{ certificate_types = Types, hashsign_algorithms = HashSigns, certificate_authorities = Authorities }. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec key_exchange(client | server, tls_version(), {premaster_secret, binary(), public_key_info()} | {dh, binary()} | {dh, {binary(), binary()}, #'DHParameter'{}, hash_algo(), binary(), binary(), private_key()}) -> #client_key_exchange{} | #server_key_exchange{}. %% %% Description: Creates a keyexchange message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- key_exchange(client, _Version, {premaster_secret, Secret, {_, PublicKey, _}}) -> EncPremasterSecret = encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, PublicKey), #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = EncPremasterSecret}; key_exchange(client, _Version, {dh, <>}) -> #client_key_exchange{ exchange_keys = #client_diffie_hellman_public{ dh_public = PublicKey} }; key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, {<>, _}, #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G}, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) -> <> = crypto:mpint(P), <> = crypto:mpint(G), PLen = byte_size(PBin), GLen = byte_size(GBin), YLen = byte_size(PublicKey), ServerDHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = PBin, dh_g = GBin, dh_y = PublicKey}, case HashAlgo of null -> #server_key_exchange{params = ServerDHParams, signed_params = <<>>, hashsign = {null, anon}}; _ -> Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <>), Signed = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey), #server_key_exchange{params = ServerDHParams, signed_params = Signed, hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}} end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec master_secret(tls_version(), #session{} | binary(), #connection_states{}, client | server) -> {binary(), #connection_states{}} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys, %% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update %% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails. %%------------------------------------------------------------------- master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret}, ConnectionStates, Role) -> ConnectionState = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role) catch exit:Reason -> Report = io_lib:format("Key calculation failed due to ~p", [Reason]), error_logger:error_report(Report), ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) end; master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) -> ConnectionState = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo, client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, try master_secret(Version, calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom), SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role) catch exit:Reason -> Report = io_lib:format("Master secret calculation failed" " due to ~p", [Reason]), error_logger:error_report(Report), ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec finished(tls_version(), client | server, integer(), binary(), tls_handshake_history()) -> #finished{}. %% %% Description: Creates a handshake finished message %%------------------------------------------------------------------- finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {Handshake, _}) -> % use the current handshake #finished{verify_data = calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake)}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec verify_connection(tls_version(), #finished{}, client | server, integer(), binary(), tls_handshake_history()) -> verified | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Checks the ssl handshake finished message to verify %% the connection. %%------------------------------------------------------------------- verify_connection(Version, #finished{verify_data = Data}, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) -> %% use the previous hashes case calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) of Data -> verified; _ -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec server_hello_done() -> #server_hello_done{}. %% %% Description: Creates a server hello done message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- server_hello_done() -> #server_hello_done{}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec encode_handshake(tls_handshake(), tls_version()) -> iolist(). %% %% Description: Encode a handshake packet to binary %%--------------------------------------------------------------------x encode_handshake(Package, Version) -> {MsgType, Bin} = enc_hs(Package, Version), Len = byte_size(Bin), [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), Bin]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec get_tls_handshake(tls_version(), binary(), binary() | iolist()) -> {[tls_handshake()], binary()}. %% %% Description: Given buffered and new data from ssl_record, collects %% and returns it as a list of handshake messages, also returns leftover %% data. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- get_tls_handshake(Version, Data, <<>>) -> get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, Data, []); get_tls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffer) -> get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), []). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decode_client_key(binary(), key_algo(), tls_version()) -> #encrypted_premaster_secret{} | #client_diffie_hellman_public{}. %% %% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) -> dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec init_handshake_history() -> tls_handshake_history(). %% %% Description: Initialize the empty handshake history buffer. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- init_handshake_history() -> {[], []}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec update_handshake_history(tls_handshake_history(), Data ::term()) -> tls_handshake_history(). %% %% Description: Update the handshake history buffer with Data. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- update_handshake_history(Handshake, % special-case SSL2 client hello <>) -> update_handshake_history(Handshake, <>); update_handshake_history({Handshake0, _Prev}, Data) -> {[Data|Handshake0], Handshake0}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decrypt_premaster_secret(binary(), #'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> binary(). %% %% Description: Public key decryption using the private key. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) -> try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey, [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) catch _:_ -> io:format("decrypt_premaster_secret error"), throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary(). %% %% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) -> MD5 = crypto:md5(Value), SHA = crypto:sha(Value), <>; server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) -> crypto:hash(Hash, Value). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec prf(tls_version(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}. %% %% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _) -> {error, undefined}; prf({3,1}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> {ok, ssl_tls1:prf(?MD5SHA, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}; prf({3,_N}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> {ok, ssl_tls1:prf(?SHA256, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, <>, Acc) -> Raw = <>, H = dec_hs(Version, Type, Body), get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, Rest, [{H,Raw} | Acc]); get_tls_handshake_aux(_Version, Data, Acc) -> {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}. path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_expired}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_issuer}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_signature}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, name_not_permitted}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_critical_extension}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_revoked}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, selfsigned_peer}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNKNOWN_CA); path_validation_alert(_) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE). select_session(Hello, Port, Session, Version, #ssl_options{ciphers = UserSuites} = SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert) -> SuggestedSessionId = Hello#client_hello.session_id, {SessionId, Resumed} = ssl_session:server_id(Port, SuggestedSessionId, SslOpts, Cert, Cache, CacheCb), Suites = available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version), case Resumed of undefined -> CipherSuite = select_cipher_suite(Hello#client_hello.cipher_suites, Suites), Compressions = Hello#client_hello.compression_methods, Compression = select_compression(Compressions), {new, Session#session{session_id = SessionId, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression}}; _ -> {resumed, Resumed} end. available_suites(UserSuites, Version) -> case UserSuites of [] -> ssl_cipher:suites(Version); _ -> UserSuites end. available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version) -> ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version)). cipher_suites(Suites, false) -> [?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV | Suites]; cipher_suites(Suites, true) -> Suites. renegotiation_info(client, _, false) -> #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}; renegotiation_info(server, ConnectionStates, false) -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of true -> #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}; false -> #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} end; renegotiation_info(client, ConnectionStates, true) -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of true -> Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data}; false -> #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} end; renegotiation_info(server, ConnectionStates, true) -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of true -> CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data, SData =CS#connection_state.server_verify_data, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <>}; false -> #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} end. handle_renegotiation_info(_, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; handle_renegotiation_info(server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; false -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)} end; handle_renegotiation_info(_, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}; handle_renegotiation_info(client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, ConnectionStates, true, _, _) -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data, SData = CS#connection_state.server_verify_data, case <> == ClientServerVerify of true -> {ok, ConnectionStates}; false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) end; handle_renegotiation_info(server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); false -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data, case Data == ClientVerify of true -> {ok, ConnectionStates}; false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) end end; handle_renegotiation_info(client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) -> handle_renegotiation_info(ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation); handle_renegotiation_info(server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); false -> handle_renegotiation_info(ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) end. handle_renegotiation_info(ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), case {SecureRenegotation, CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation} of {_, true} -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); {true, false} -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION); {false, false} -> {ok, ConnectionStates} end. %% Update pending connection states with parameters exchanged via %% hello messages %% NOTE : Role is the role of the receiver of the hello message %% currently being processed. hello_pending_connection_states(Role, Version, CipherSuite, Random, Compression, ConnectionStates) -> ReadState = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), WriteState = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), NewReadSecParams = hello_security_parameters(Role, Version, ReadState, CipherSuite, Random, Compression), NewWriteSecParams = hello_security_parameters(Role, Version, WriteState, CipherSuite, Random, Compression), ssl_record:update_security_params(NewReadSecParams, NewWriteSecParams, ConnectionStates). hello_security_parameters(client, Version, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random, Compression) -> SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams), NewSecParams#security_parameters{ server_random = Random, compression_algorithm = Compression }; hello_security_parameters(server, Version, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random, Compression) -> SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams), NewSecParams#security_parameters{ client_random = Random, compression_algorithm = Compression }. select_version(ClientVersion, Versions) -> Fun = fun(Version) -> ssl_record:protocol_version(Version) end, ServerVersion = ssl_record:highest_protocol_version(lists:map(Fun, Versions)), ssl_record:lowest_protocol_version(ClientVersion, ServerVersion). select_cipher_suite([], _) -> no_suite; select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) -> case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of true -> Suite; false -> select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites) end. is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) -> lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites). select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) -> ?NULL. master_secret(Version, MasterSecret, #security_parameters{ client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom, hash_size = HashSize, prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo, key_material_length = KML, expanded_key_material_length = EKML, iv_size = IVS}, ConnectionStates, Role) -> {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV} = setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS), ConnStates1 = ssl_record:set_master_secret(MasterSecret, ConnectionStates), ConnStates2 = ssl_record:set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, Role, ConnStates1), ClientCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ClientIV, key = ClientWriteKey}, ServerCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ServerIV, key = ServerWriteKey}, {MasterSecret, ssl_record:set_pending_cipher_state(ConnStates2, ClientCipherState, ServerCipherState, Role)}. dec_hs(_Version, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) -> #hello_request{}; %% Client hello v2. %% The server must be able to receive such messages, from clients that %% are willing to use ssl v3 or higher, but have ssl v2 compatibility. dec_hs(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <>) -> #client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, random = ssl_ssl2:client_random(ChallengeData, CDLength), session_id = 0, cipher_suites = from_3bytes(CipherSuites), compression_methods = [?NULL], renegotiation_info = undefined }; dec_hs(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <>) -> HelloExtensions = dec_hello_extensions(Extensions), RenegotiationInfo = proplists:get_value(renegotiation_info, HelloExtensions, undefined), HashSigns = proplists:get_value(hash_signs, HelloExtensions, undefined), #client_hello{ client_version = {Major,Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suites = from_2bytes(CipherSuites), compression_methods = Comp_methods, renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, hash_signs = HashSigns }; dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <>) -> #server_hello{ server_version = {Major,Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, compression_method = Comp_method, renegotiation_info = undefined, hash_signs = undefined}; dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <>) -> HelloExtensions = dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, []), RenegotiationInfo = proplists:get_value(renegotiation_info, HelloExtensions, undefined), HashSigns = proplists:get_value(hash_signs, HelloExtensions, undefined), #server_hello{ server_version = {Major,Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, compression_method = Comp_method, renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, hash_signs = HashSigns}; dec_hs(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE, <>) -> #certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)}; dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <>) -> %% May happen if key_algorithm is dh_anon #server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, signed_params = <<>>, hashsign = {null, anon}}; dec_hs({Major, Minor}, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <>) when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 -> #server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, signed_params = Sig, hashsign = {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)}}; dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <>) -> #server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, signed_params = Sig, hashsign = undefined}; dec_hs({Major, Minor}, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <>) when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 -> #certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes, hashsign_algorithms = HashSigns, certificate_authorities = CertAuths}; dec_hs(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <>) -> #certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes, certificate_authorities = CertAuths}; dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>) -> #server_hello_done{}; dec_hs({Major, Minor}, ?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,<>) when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 -> #certificate_verify{hashsign_algorithm = hashsign_dec(HashSign), signature = Signature}; dec_hs(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,<>)-> #certificate_verify{hashsign_algorithm = {unknown, unknown}, signature = Signature}; dec_hs(_Version, ?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, PKEPMS) -> #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = PKEPMS}; dec_hs(_Version, ?FINISHED, VerifyData) -> #finished{verify_data = VerifyData}; dec_hs(_, _, _) -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)). dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) -> #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}; dec_client_key(<>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) -> #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}; dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE)); dec_client_key(<>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) -> #client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y}. dec_hello_extensions(<<>>) -> []; dec_hello_extensions(<>) -> dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, []); dec_hello_extensions(_) -> []. dec_hello_extensions(<<>>, Acc) -> Acc; dec_hello_extensions(<>, Acc) -> RenegotiateInfo = case Len of 1 -> % Initial handshake Info; % should be <<0>> will be matched in handle_renegotiation_info _ -> VerifyLen = Len - 1, <> = Info, VerifyInfo end, dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{renegotiation_info, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = RenegotiateInfo}} | Acc]); dec_hello_extensions(<>, Acc) -> SignAlgoListLen = Len - 2, <> = ExtData, HashSignAlgos = [{ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)} || <> <= SignAlgoList], dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{hash_signs, #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos}} | Acc]); %% Ignore data following the ClientHello (i.e., %% extensions) if not understood. dec_hello_extensions(<>, Acc) -> dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc); %% This theoretically should not happen if the protocol is followed, but if it does it is ignored. dec_hello_extensions(_, Acc) -> Acc. encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) -> try PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey, [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]), #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret} catch _:_-> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)) end. %% encode/decode stream of certificate data to/from list of certificate data certs_to_list(ASN1Certs) -> certs_to_list(ASN1Certs, []). certs_to_list(<>, Acc) -> certs_to_list(Rest, [Cert | Acc]); certs_to_list(<<>>, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc, []). certs_from_list(ACList) -> list_to_binary([begin CertLen = byte_size(Cert), <> end || Cert <- ACList]). enc_hs(#hello_request{}, _Version) -> {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>}; enc_hs(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, random = Random, session_id = SessionID, cipher_suites = CipherSuites, compression_methods = CompMethods, renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, hash_signs = HashSigns}, _Version) -> SIDLength = byte_size(SessionID), BinCompMethods = list_to_binary(CompMethods), CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods), BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites), CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites), Extensions0 = hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo), Extensions1 = if Major == 3, Minor >=3 -> Extensions0 ++ hello_extensions(HashSigns); true -> Extensions0 end, ExtensionsBin = enc_hello_extensions(Extensions1), {?CLIENT_HELLO, <>}; enc_hs(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, compression_method = Comp_method, renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo}, _Version) -> SID_length = byte_size(Session_ID), Extensions = hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo), ExtensionsBin = enc_hello_extensions(Extensions), {?SERVER_HELLO, <>}; enc_hs(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1CertList}, _Version) -> ASN1Certs = certs_from_list(ASN1CertList), ACLen = erlang:iolist_size(ASN1Certs), {?CERTIFICATE, <>}; enc_hs(#server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{ dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, signed_params = SignedParams, hashsign = HashSign}, Version) -> PLen = byte_size(P), GLen = byte_size(G), YLen = byte_size(Y), Signature = enc_sign(HashSign, SignedParams, Version), {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <> }; enc_hs(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes, hashsign_algorithms = HashSigns, certificate_authorities = CertAuths}, {Major, Minor}) when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 -> CertTypesLen = byte_size(CertTypes), HashSignsLen = byte_size(HashSigns), CertAuthsLen = byte_size(CertAuths), {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <> }; enc_hs(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes, certificate_authorities = CertAuths}, _Version) -> CertTypesLen = byte_size(CertTypes), CertAuthsLen = byte_size(CertAuths), {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <> }; enc_hs(#server_hello_done{}, _Version) -> {?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>}; enc_hs(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version) -> {?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, enc_cke(ExchangeKeys, Version)}; enc_hs(#certificate_verify{signature = BinSig, hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}, Version) -> EncSig = enc_sign(HashSign, BinSig, Version), {?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, EncSig}; enc_hs(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, _Version) -> {?FINISHED, VerifyData}. enc_cke(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS},{3, 0}) -> PKEPMS; enc_cke(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}, _) -> PKEPMSLen = byte_size(PKEPMS), <>; enc_cke(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DHPublic}, _) -> Len = byte_size(DHPublic), <>. enc_sign({HashAlg, SignAlg}, Signature, _Version = {Major, Minor}) when Major == 3, Minor >= 3-> SignLen = byte_size(Signature), HashSign = hashsign_enc(HashAlg, SignAlg), <>; enc_sign(_HashSign, Sign, _Version) -> SignLen = byte_size(Sign), <>. hello_extensions(undefined) -> []; %% Renegotiation info hello_extensions(#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}) -> []; hello_extensions(#renegotiation_info{} = Info) -> [Info]; hello_extensions(#hash_sign_algos{} = Info) -> [Info]. enc_hello_extensions(Extensions) -> enc_hello_extensions(Extensions, <<>>). enc_hello_extensions([], <<>>) -> <<>>; enc_hello_extensions([], Acc) -> Size = byte_size(Acc), <>; enc_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0) = Info} | Rest], Acc) -> Len = byte_size(Info), enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <>); enc_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Info} | Rest], Acc) -> InfoLen = byte_size(Info), Len = InfoLen +1, enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <>); enc_hello_extensions([#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos} | Rest], Acc) -> SignAlgoList = << <<(ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash)):8, (ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)):8>> || {Hash, Sign} <- HashSignAlgos >>, ListLen = byte_size(SignAlgoList), Len = ListLen + 2, enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <>). from_3bytes(Bin3) -> from_3bytes(Bin3, []). from_3bytes(<<>>, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc); from_3bytes(<>, Acc) -> from_3bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]). from_2bytes(Bin2) -> from_2bytes(Bin2, []). from_2bytes(<<>>, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc); from_2bytes(<>, Acc) -> from_2bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]). certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}) when KeyExchange == rsa; KeyExchange == dhe_dss; KeyExchange == dhe_rsa -> <>; certificate_types(_) -> <>. hashsign_dec(<>) -> {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)}. hashsign_enc(HashAlgo, SignAlgo) -> Hash = ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), Sign = ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo), <>. hashsign_algorithms(_) -> hashsign_enc(sha, rsa). certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) -> OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject, DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp), %%Subj = public_key:pkix_transform(OTPSubj, encode), %% {ok, DNEncoded} = 'OTP-PUB-KEY':encode('Name', Subj), %% DNEncodedBin = iolist_to_binary(DNEncoded), DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin), <> end, list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]). certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref == CertDbRef -> [Cert | Acc]; (_, Acc) -> Acc end, ssl_certificate_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle). digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) when Minor >= 3 -> public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key); digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) -> public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, sha, Key); digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) -> public_key:encrypt_private(Hash, Key, [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]). calc_master_secret({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) -> ssl_ssl3:master_secret(PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom); calc_master_secret({3,_}, PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) -> ssl_tls1:master_secret(PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom). setup_keys({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS) -> ssl_ssl3:setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS); setup_keys({3,N}, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, _EKML, IVS) -> ssl_tls1:setup_keys(N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, IVS). calc_finished({3, 0}, Role, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) -> ssl_ssl3:finished(Role, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)); calc_finished({3, N}, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) -> ssl_tls1:finished(Role, N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)). calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) -> ssl_ssl3:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)); calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, HashAlgo, _MasterSecret, Handshake) -> ssl_tls1:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, N, lists:reverse(Handshake)). key_exchange_alg(rsa) -> ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA; key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa; Alg == dh_anon -> ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN; key_exchange_alg(_) -> ?NULL. apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0, SslState) -> case Fun(OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0) of {valid, UserState} -> {valid, {SslState, UserState}}; {fail, _} = Fail -> Fail; {unknown, UserState} -> {unknown, {SslState, UserState}} end. certificate_verify_rsa(Hashes, sha, Signature, PublicKey, {Major, Minor}) when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 -> public_key:verify({digest, Hashes}, sha, Signature, PublicKey); certificate_verify_rsa(Hashes, HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKey, {Major, Minor}) when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 -> public_key:verify({digest, Hashes}, HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKey); certificate_verify_rsa(Hashes, _HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKey, _Version) -> case public_key:decrypt_public(Signature, PublicKey, [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) of Hashes -> true; _ -> false end. -define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(MD), {MD, rsa}). -define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_DSA(MD), {MD, dsa}). -define(TLSEXT_SIGALG(MD), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(MD)). default_hash_signs() -> #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = [?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha512), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha384), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha256), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_DSA(sha), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(md5)]}.