%% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% %% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved. %% %% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, %% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in %% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the %% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be %% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/. %% %% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" %% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See %% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations %% under the License. %% %% %CopyrightEnd% %% %% %%---------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Purpose: Handles an ssl connection, e.i. both the setup %% e.i. SSL-Handshake, SSL-Alert and SSL-Cipher protocols and delivering %% data to the application. All data on the connectinon is received and %% sent according to the SSL-record protocol. %%---------------------------------------------------------------------- -module(tls_connection). -behaviour(gen_fsm). -include("tls_handshake.hrl"). -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("tls_record.hrl"). -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_srp.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). %% Internal application API -export([send/2, recv/3, connect/7, ssl_accept/6, handshake/2, socket_control/3, close/1, shutdown/2, new_user/2, get_opts/2, set_opts/2, info/1, session_info/1, peer_certificate/1, renegotiation/1, negotiated_next_protocol/1, prf/5]). %% Called by ssl_connection_sup -export([start_link/7]). %% gen_fsm callbacks -export([init/1, hello/2, certify/2, cipher/2, abbreviated/2, connection/2, handle_event/3, handle_sync_event/4, handle_info/3, terminate/3, code_change/4]). -record(state, { role, % client | server user_application, % {MonitorRef, pid()} transport_cb, % atom() - callback module data_tag, % atom() - ex tcp. close_tag, % atom() - ex tcp_closed error_tag, % atom() - ex tcp_error host, % string() | ipadress() port, % integer() socket, % socket() ssl_options, % #ssl_options{} socket_options, % #socket_options{} connection_states, % #connection_states{} from ssl_record.hrl tls_packets = [], % Not yet handled decode ssl/tls packets. tls_record_buffer, % binary() buffer of incomplete records tls_handshake_buffer, % binary() buffer of incomplete handshakes tls_handshake_history, % tls_handshake_history() tls_cipher_texts, % list() received but not deciphered yet cert_db, % session, % #session{} from tls_handshake.hrl session_cache, % session_cache_cb, % negotiated_version, % tls_version() client_certificate_requested = false, key_algorithm, % atom as defined by cipher_suite hashsign_algorithm, % atom as defined by cipher_suite public_key_info, % PKIX: {Algorithm, PublicKey, PublicKeyParams} private_key, % PKIX: #'RSAPrivateKey'{} diffie_hellman_params, % PKIX: #'DHParameter'{} relevant for server side diffie_hellman_keys, % {PublicKey, PrivateKey} psk_identity, % binary() - server psk identity hint srp_params, % #srp_user{} srp_keys, % {PublicKey, PrivateKey} premaster_secret, % file_ref_db, % ets() cert_db_ref, % ref() bytes_to_read, % integer(), # bytes to read in passive mode user_data_buffer, % binary() log_alert, % boolean() renegotiation, % {boolean(), From | internal | peer} start_or_recv_from, % "gen_fsm From" timer, % start_or_recv_timer send_queue, % queue() terminated = false, % allow_renegotiate = true, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false :: boolean(), next_protocol = undefined :: undefined | binary(), client_ecc % {Curves, PointFmt} }). -define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS, #'DHParameter'{prime = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME, base = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR}). -define(WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, 12000). -type state_name() :: hello | abbreviated | certify | cipher | connection. -type gen_fsm_state_return() :: {next_state, state_name(), #state{}} | {next_state, state_name(), #state{}, timeout()} | {stop, term(), #state{}}. %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec send(pid(), iodata()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Sends data over the ssl connection %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- send(Pid, Data) -> sync_send_all_state_event(Pid, {application_data, %% iolist_to_binary should really %% be called iodata_to_binary() erlang:iolist_to_binary(Data)}). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec recv(pid(), integer(), timeout()) -> {ok, binary() | list()} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Receives data when active = false %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- recv(Pid, Length, Timeout) -> sync_send_all_state_event(Pid, {recv, Length, Timeout}). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec connect(host(), inet:port_number(), port(), {#ssl_options{}, #socket_options{}}, pid(), tuple(), timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Connect to an ssl server. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- connect(Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo, Timeout) -> try start_fsm(client, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo, Timeout) catch exit:{noproc, _} -> {error, ssl_not_started} end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec ssl_accept(inet:port_number(), port(), {#ssl_options{}, #socket_options{}}, pid(), tuple(), timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Performs accept on an ssl listen socket. e.i. performs %% ssl handshake. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- ssl_accept(Port, Socket, Opts, User, CbInfo, Timeout) -> try start_fsm(server, "localhost", Port, Socket, Opts, User, CbInfo, Timeout) catch exit:{noproc, _} -> {error, ssl_not_started} end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec handshake(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Starts ssl handshake. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- handshake(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Timeout) -> case sync_send_all_state_event(Pid, {start, Timeout}) of connected -> ok; Error -> Error end. %-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec socket_control(port(), pid(), atom()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Set the ssl process to own the accept socket %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- socket_control(Socket, Pid, Transport) -> case Transport:controlling_process(Socket, Pid) of ok -> {ok, ssl_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket)}; {error, Reason} -> {error, Reason} end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec close(pid()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Close an ssl connection %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- close(ConnectionPid) -> case sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, close) of {error, closed} -> ok; Other -> Other end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec shutdown(pid(), atom()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Same as gen_tcp:shutdown/2 %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- shutdown(ConnectionPid, How) -> sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {shutdown, How}). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec new_user(pid(), pid()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Changes process that receives the messages when active = true %% or once. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- new_user(ConnectionPid, User) -> sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {new_user, User}). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec negotiated_next_protocol(pid()) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Returns the negotiated protocol %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- negotiated_next_protocol(ConnectionPid) -> sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, negotiated_next_protocol). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec get_opts(pid(), list()) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Same as inet:getopts/2 %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- get_opts(ConnectionPid, OptTags) -> sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {get_opts, OptTags}). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec set_opts(pid(), list()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Same as inet:setopts/2 %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- set_opts(ConnectionPid, Options) -> sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {set_opts, Options}). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec info(pid()) -> {ok, {atom(), tuple()}} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Returns ssl protocol and cipher used for the connection %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- info(ConnectionPid) -> sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, info). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec session_info(pid()) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Returns info about the ssl session %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- session_info(ConnectionPid) -> sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, session_info). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec peer_certificate(pid()) -> {ok, binary()| undefined} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Returns the peer cert %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- peer_certificate(ConnectionPid) -> sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, peer_certificate). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec renegotiation(pid()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Starts a renegotiation of the ssl session. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- renegotiation(ConnectionPid) -> sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, renegotiate). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec prf(pid(), binary() | 'master_secret', binary(), binary() | ssl:prf_random(), non_neg_integer()) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()} | {'EXIT', term()}. %% %% Description: use a ssl sessions TLS PRF to generate key material %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- prf(ConnectionPid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}). %%==================================================================== %% ssl_connection_sup API %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Creates a gen_fsm process which calls Module:init/1 to %% initialize. To ensure a synchronized start-up procedure, this function %% does not return until Module:init/1 has returned. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) -> {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}. init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOpts0, _} = Options, User, CbInfo]) -> State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), Handshake = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(), TimeStamp = calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds({date(), time()}), try ssl_init(SSLOpts0, Role) of {ok, Ref, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, CacheHandle, OwnCert, Key, DHParams} -> Session = State0#state.session, State = State0#state{ tls_handshake_history = Handshake, session = Session#session{own_certificate = OwnCert, time_stamp = TimeStamp}, file_ref_db = FileRefHandle, cert_db_ref = Ref, cert_db = CertDbHandle, session_cache = CacheHandle, private_key = Key, diffie_hellman_params = DHParams}, gen_fsm:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], hello, State, get_timeout(State)) catch throw:Error -> gen_fsm:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error,State0}, get_timeout(State0)) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Description:There should be one instance of this function for each %% possible state name. Whenever a gen_fsm receives an event sent %% using gen_fsm:send_event/2, the instance of this function with the %% same name as the current state name StateName is called to handle %% the event. It is also called if a timeout occurs. %% %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec hello(start | #hello_request{} | #client_hello{} | #server_hello{} | term(), #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- hello(start, #state{host = Host, port = Port, role = client, ssl_options = SslOpts, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb, transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = State0) -> Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version, Handshake0 = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Hello, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, negotiated_version = Version, %% Requested version session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}, {Record, State} = next_record(State1), next_state(hello, hello, Record, State); hello(start, #state{role = server} = State0) -> {Record, State} = next_record(State0), next_state(hello, hello, Record, State); hello(#hello_request{}, #state{role = client} = State0) -> {Record, State} = next_record(State0), next_state(hello, hello, Record, State); hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression} = Hello, #state{session = #session{session_id = OldId}, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, role = client, negotiated_version = ReqVersion, renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, ssl_options = SslOptions} = State0) -> case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOptions, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, hello, State0); {Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, NextProtocol} -> {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion, KeyAlgorithm), NewNextProtocol = case NextProtocol of undefined -> State0#state.next_protocol; _ -> NextProtocol end, State = State0#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm, hashsign_algorithm = default_hashsign(Version, KeyAlgorithm), negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates, premaster_secret = PremasterSecret, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocol =/= undefined, next_protocol = NewNextProtocol}, case ssl_session:is_new(OldId, NewId) of true -> handle_new_session(NewId, CipherSuite, Compression, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}); false -> handle_resumed_session(NewId, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) end end; hello(Hello = #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion}, State = #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb, ssl_options = SslOpts}) -> case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert}, Renegotiation) of {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, ProtocolsToAdvertise, EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} -> do_server_hello(Type, ProtocolsToAdvertise, EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, negotiated_version = Version, session = Session, client_ecc = {EllipticCurves, EcPointFormats}}); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State) end; hello(timeout, State) -> { next_state, hello, State, hibernate }; hello(Msg, State) -> handle_unexpected_message(Msg, hello, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec abbreviated(#hello_request{} | #finished{} | term(), #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- abbreviated(#hello_request{}, State0) -> {Record, State} = next_record(State0), next_state(abbreviated, hello, Record, State); abbreviated(#finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #state{role = server, negotiated_version = Version, tls_handshake_history = Handshake, session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> case tls_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, client, get_current_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, write), MasterSecret, Handshake) of verified -> ConnectionStates = tls_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0), next_state_connection(abbreviated, ack_connection(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates})); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, abbreviated, State) end; abbreviated(#finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #state{role = client, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0, session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}, negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> case tls_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, server, get_pending_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, write), MasterSecret, Handshake0) of verified -> ConnectionStates1 = tls_record:set_server_verify_data(current_read, Data, ConnectionStates0), {ConnectionStates, Handshake} = finalize_handshake(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}, abbreviated), next_state_connection(abbreviated, ack_connection(State#state{tls_handshake_history = Handshake, connection_states = ConnectionStates})); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, abbreviated, State) end; %% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec %% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation abbreviated(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = State0) -> {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{next_protocol = SelectedProtocol}), next_state(abbreviated, abbreviated, Record, State); abbreviated(timeout, State) -> { next_state, abbreviated, State, hibernate }; abbreviated(Msg, State) -> handle_unexpected_message(Msg, abbreviated, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certify(#hello_request{} | #certificate{} | #server_key_exchange{} | #certificate_request{} | #server_hello_done{} | #client_key_exchange{} | term(), #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certify(#hello_request{}, State0) -> {Record, State} = next_record(State0), next_state(certify, hello, Record, State); certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, #state{role = server, negotiated_version = Version, ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer, fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} = State) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State); certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, #state{role = server, ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer, fail_if_no_peer_cert = false}} = State0) -> {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = false}), next_state(certify, certify, Record, State); certify(#certificate{} = Cert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, role = Role, cert_db = CertDbHandle, cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, ssl_options = Opts} = State) -> case tls_handshake:certify(Cert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Opts#ssl_options.depth, Opts#ssl_options.verify, Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role) of {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo} -> handle_peer_cert(PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, State#state{client_certificate_requested = false}); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State) end; certify(#server_key_exchange{} = KeyExchangeMsg, #state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version, key_algorithm = Alg} = State0) when Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa; Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon; Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk; Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon -> case handle_server_key(KeyExchangeMsg, State0) of #state{} = State1 -> {Record, State} = next_record(State1), next_state(certify, certify, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end; certify(#server_key_exchange{} = Msg, #state{role = client, key_algorithm = rsa} = State) -> handle_unexpected_message(Msg, certify_server_keyexchange, State); certify(#certificate_request{}, State0) -> {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = true}), next_state(certify, certify, Record, State); %% PSK and RSA_PSK might bypass the Server-Key-Exchange certify(#server_hello_done{}, #state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined}, negotiated_version = Version, psk_identity = PSKIdentity, premaster_secret = undefined, role = client, key_algorithm = Alg} = State0) when Alg == psk -> case server_psk_master_secret(PSKIdentity, State0) of #state{} = State -> client_certify_and_key_exchange(State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end; certify(#server_hello_done{}, #state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined}, ssl_options = SslOpts, negotiated_version = Version, psk_identity = PSKIdentity, premaster_secret = undefined, role = client, key_algorithm = Alg} = State0) when Alg == rsa_psk -> case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, SslOpts#ssl_options.user_lookup_fun) of {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa), Len = byte_size(PSK), RealPMS = <>, State1 = State0#state{premaster_secret = PremasterSecret}, State = master_from_premaster_secret(RealPMS, State1), client_certify_and_key_exchange(State); #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; _ -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) end; %% Master secret was determined with help of server-key exchange msg certify(#server_hello_done{}, #state{session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} = Session, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, negotiated_version = Version, premaster_secret = undefined, role = client} = State0) -> case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session, ConnectionStates0, client) of {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} -> State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, client_certify_and_key_exchange(State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end; %% Master secret is calculated from premaster_secret certify(#server_hello_done{}, #state{session = Session0, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, negotiated_version = Version, premaster_secret = PremasterSecret, role = client} = State0) -> case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates0, client) of {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} -> Session = Session0#session{master_secret = MasterSecret}, State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, session = Session}, client_certify_and_key_exchange(State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end; certify(#client_key_exchange{} = Msg, #state{role = server, client_certificate_requested = true, ssl_options = #ssl_options{fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} = State) -> %% We expect a certificate here handle_unexpected_message(Msg, certify_client_key_exchange, State); certify(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, State = #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg, negotiated_version = Version}) -> try certify_client_key_exchange(tls_handshake:decode_client_key(Keys, KeyAlg, Version), State) catch #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State) end; certify(timeout, State) -> { next_state, certify, State, hibernate }; certify(Msg, State) -> handle_unexpected_message(Msg, certify, State). certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS}, #state{negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, session = Session0, private_key = Key} = State0) -> PremasterSecret = tls_handshake:decrypt_premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key), case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates0, server) of {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} -> Session = Session0#session{master_secret = MasterSecret}, State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, session = Session}, {Record, State} = next_record(State1), next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end; certify_client_key_exchange(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey}, #state{negotiated_version = Version, diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} = State0) -> case dh_master_secret(Params, ClientPublicDhKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, State0) of #state{} = State1 -> {Record, State} = next_record(State1), next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end; certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicEcDhPoint}, #state{negotiated_version = Version, diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey} = State0) -> case ec_dh_master_secret(ECDHKey, #'ECPoint'{point = ClientPublicEcDhPoint}, State0) of #state{} = State1 -> {Record, State} = next_record(State1), next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end; certify_client_key_exchange(#client_psk_identity{identity = ClientPSKIdentity}, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State0) -> case server_psk_master_secret(ClientPSKIdentity, State0) of #state{} = State1 -> {Record, State} = next_record(State1), next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end; certify_client_key_exchange(#client_dhe_psk_identity{ identity = ClientPSKIdentity, dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey}, #state{negotiated_version = Version, diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G}, diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} = State0) -> case dhe_psk_master_secret(ClientPSKIdentity, P, G, ClientPublicDhKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, State0) of #state{} = State1 -> {Record, State} = next_record(State1), next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end; certify_client_key_exchange(#client_rsa_psk_identity{ identity = PskIdentity, exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS}}, #state{negotiated_version = Version, private_key = Key} = State0) -> PremasterSecret = tls_handshake:decrypt_premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key), case server_rsa_psk_master_secret(PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, State0) of #state{} = State1 -> {Record, State} = next_record(State1), next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end; certify_client_key_exchange(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, #state{negotiated_version = Version, srp_params = #srp_user{prime = Prime, verifier = Verifier} } = State0) -> case server_srp_master_secret(Verifier, Prime, ClientPublicKey, State0) of #state{} = State1 -> {Record, State} = next_record(State1), next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec cipher(#hello_request{} | #certificate_verify{} | #finished{} | term(), #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher(#hello_request{}, State0) -> {Record, State} = next_record(State0), next_state(cipher, hello, Record, State); cipher(#certificate_verify{signature = Signature, hashsign_algorithm = CertHashSign}, #state{role = server, public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, negotiated_version = Version, session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}, hashsign_algorithm = ConnectionHashSign, tls_handshake_history = Handshake } = State0) -> HashSign = case CertHashSign of {_, _} -> CertHashSign; _ -> ConnectionHashSign end, case tls_handshake:certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo, Version, HashSign, MasterSecret, Handshake) of valid -> {Record, State} = next_record(State0), next_state(cipher, cipher, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, cipher, State0) end; %% client must send a next protocol message if we are expecting it cipher(#finished{}, #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true, next_protocol = undefined, negotiated_version = Version} = State0) -> handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), Version, cipher, State0); cipher(#finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #state{negotiated_version = Version, host = Host, port = Port, role = Role, session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} = Session0, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) -> case tls_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, opposite_role(Role), get_current_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, read), MasterSecret, Handshake0) of verified -> Session = register_session(Role, Host, Port, Session0), cipher_role(Role, Data, Session, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, cipher, State) end; %% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec %% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation cipher(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = State0) -> {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{next_protocol = SelectedProtocol}), next_state(cipher, cipher, Record, State); cipher(timeout, State) -> { next_state, cipher, State, hibernate }; cipher(Msg, State) -> handle_unexpected_message(Msg, cipher, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec connection(#hello_request{} | #client_hello{} | term(), #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- connection(#hello_request{}, #state{host = Host, port = Port, socket = Socket, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb, ssl_options = SslOpts, negotiated_version = Version, transport_cb = Transport, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State0) -> Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Hello, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}), next_state(connection, hello, Record, State); connection(#client_hello{} = Hello, #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = true} = State) -> %% Mitigate Computational DoS attack %% http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2011/10/ssltls_and_computational_dos.html %% http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/ Rather than disabling client %% initiated renegotiation we will disallow many client initiated %% renegotiations immediately after each other. erlang:send_after(?WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, self(), allow_renegotiate), hello(Hello, State#state{allow_renegotiate = false}); connection(#client_hello{}, #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = false, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, negotiated_version = Version} = State0) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), next_state_connection(connection, State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}); connection(timeout, State) -> {next_state, connection, State, hibernate}; connection(Msg, State) -> handle_unexpected_message(Msg, connection, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Description: Whenever a gen_fsm receives an event sent using %% gen_fsm:send_all_state_event/2, this function is called to handle %% the event. Not currently used! %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- handle_event(_Event, StateName, State) -> {next_state, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Description: Whenever a gen_fsm receives an event sent using %% gen_fsm:sync_send_all_state_event/2,3, this function is called to handle %% the event. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- handle_sync_event({application_data, Data}, From, connection, State) -> %% We should look into having a worker process to do this to %% parallize send and receive decoding and not block the receiver %% if sending is overloading the socket. try write_application_data(Data, From, State) catch throw:Error -> {reply, Error, connection, State, get_timeout(State)} end; handle_sync_event({application_data, Data}, From, StateName, #state{send_queue = Queue} = State) -> %% In renegotiation priorities handshake, send data when handshake is finished {next_state, StateName, State#state{send_queue = queue:in({From, Data}, Queue)}, get_timeout(State)}; handle_sync_event({start, Timeout}, StartFrom, hello, State) -> Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, StartFrom), hello(start, State#state{start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, timer = Timer}); %% The two clauses below could happen if a server upgrades a socket in %% active mode. Note that in this case we are lucky that %% controlling_process has been evalueated before receiving handshake %% messages from client. The server should put the socket in passive %% mode before telling the client that it is willing to upgrade %% and before calling ssl:ssl_accept/2. These clauses are %% here to make sure it is the users problem and not owers if %% they upgrade an active socket. handle_sync_event({start,_}, _, connection, State) -> {reply, connected, connection, State, get_timeout(State)}; handle_sync_event({start,_}, _From, error, {Error, State = #state{}}) -> {stop, {shutdown, Error}, {error, Error}, State}; handle_sync_event({start, Timeout}, StartFrom, StateName, State) -> Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, StartFrom), {next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, timer = Timer}, get_timeout(State)}; handle_sync_event(close, _, StateName, State) -> %% Run terminate before returning %% so that the reuseaddr inet-option will work %% as intended. (catch terminate(user_close, StateName, State)), {stop, normal, ok, State#state{terminated = true}}; handle_sync_event({shutdown, How0}, _, StateName, #state{transport_cb = Transport, negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates, socket = Socket} = State) -> case How0 of How when How == write; How == both -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), {BinMsg, _} = encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg); _ -> ok end, case Transport:shutdown(Socket, How0) of ok -> {reply, ok, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}; Error -> {stop, normal, Error, State} end; handle_sync_event({recv, N, Timeout}, RecvFrom, connection = StateName, State0) -> Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom), passive_receive(State0#state{bytes_to_read = N, start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, timer = Timer}, StateName); %% Doing renegotiate wait with handling request until renegotiate is %% finished. Will be handled by next_state_is_connection/2. handle_sync_event({recv, N, Timeout}, RecvFrom, StateName, State) -> Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom), {next_state, StateName, State#state{bytes_to_read = N, start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, timer = Timer}, get_timeout(State)}; handle_sync_event({new_user, User}, _From, StateName, State =#state{user_application = {OldMon, _}}) -> NewMon = erlang:monitor(process, User), erlang:demonitor(OldMon, [flush]), {reply, ok, StateName, State#state{user_application = {NewMon,User}}, get_timeout(State)}; handle_sync_event({get_opts, OptTags}, _From, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, socket_options = SockOpts} = State) -> OptsReply = get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, OptTags, SockOpts, []), {reply, OptsReply, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}; handle_sync_event(negotiated_next_protocol, _From, StateName, #state{next_protocol = undefined} = State) -> {reply, {error, next_protocol_not_negotiated}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}; handle_sync_event(negotiated_next_protocol, _From, StateName, #state{next_protocol = NextProtocol} = State) -> {reply, {ok, NextProtocol}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}; handle_sync_event({set_opts, Opts0}, _From, StateName0, #state{socket_options = Opts1, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, user_data_buffer = Buffer} = State0) -> {Reply, Opts} = set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts0, Opts1, []), State1 = State0#state{socket_options = Opts}, if Opts#socket_options.active =:= false -> {reply, Reply, StateName0, State1, get_timeout(State1)}; Buffer =:= <<>>, Opts1#socket_options.active =:= false -> %% Need data, set active once {Record, State2} = next_record_if_active(State1), %% Note: Renogotiation may cause StateName0 =/= StateName case next_state(StateName0, StateName0, Record, State2) of {next_state, StateName, State, Timeout} -> {reply, Reply, StateName, State, Timeout}; {stop, Reason, State} -> {stop, Reason, State} end; Buffer =:= <<>> -> %% Active once already set {reply, Reply, StateName0, State1, get_timeout(State1)}; true -> case read_application_data(<<>>, State1) of Stop = {stop,_,_} -> Stop; {Record, State2} -> %% Note: Renogotiation may cause StateName0 =/= StateName case next_state(StateName0, StateName0, Record, State2) of {next_state, StateName, State, Timeout} -> {reply, Reply, StateName, State, Timeout}; {stop, Reason, State} -> {stop, Reason, State} end end end; handle_sync_event(renegotiate, From, connection, State) -> renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, From}}); handle_sync_event(renegotiate, _, StateName, State) -> {reply, {error, already_renegotiating}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}; handle_sync_event({prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}, _, StateName, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> ConnectionState = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, #security_parameters{master_secret = MasterSecret, client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, Reply = try SecretToUse = case Secret of _ when is_binary(Secret) -> Secret; master_secret -> MasterSecret end, SeedToUse = lists:reverse( lists:foldl(fun(X, Acc) when is_binary(X) -> [X|Acc]; (client_random, Acc) -> [ClientRandom|Acc]; (server_random, Acc) -> [ServerRandom|Acc] end, [], Seed)), tls_handshake:prf(Version, SecretToUse, Label, SeedToUse, WantedLength) catch exit:_ -> {error, badarg}; error:Reason -> {error, Reason} end, {reply, Reply, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}; handle_sync_event(info, _, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version, session = #session{cipher_suite = Suite}} = State) -> AtomVersion = tls_record:protocol_version(Version), {reply, {ok, {AtomVersion, ssl:suite_definition(Suite)}}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}; handle_sync_event(session_info, _, StateName, #state{session = #session{session_id = Id, cipher_suite = Suite}} = State) -> {reply, [{session_id, Id}, {cipher_suite, ssl:suite_definition(Suite)}], StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}; handle_sync_event(peer_certificate, _, StateName, #state{session = #session{peer_certificate = Cert}} = State) -> {reply, {ok, Cert}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Description: This function is called by a gen_fsm when it receives any %% other message than a synchronous or asynchronous event %% (or a system message). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% raw data from TCP, unpack records handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName, #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) -> case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of {Record, State} -> next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State0} end; handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag, negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> %% Note that as of TLS 1.1, %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a %% session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform %% with widespread implementation practice. case Version of {1, N} when N >= 1 -> ok; _ -> %% As invalidate_sessions here causes performance issues, %% we will conform to the widespread implementation %% practice and go aginst the spec %%invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session) ok end, handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State}; handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, econnaborted}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, role = Role, error_tag = ErrorTag} = State) when StateName =/= connection -> alert_user(Transport, Socket, StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role), {stop, normal, State}; handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, error_tag = ErrorTag} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Reason]), error_logger:info_report(Report), handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), {stop, normal, State}; handle_info({'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, _}, _, State = #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid}}) -> {stop, normal, State}; handle_info(allow_renegotiate, StateName, State) -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{allow_renegotiate = true}, get_timeout(State)}; handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, StartFrom}, StateName, #state{renegotiation = {false, first}} = State) when StateName =/= connection -> gen_fsm:reply(StartFrom, {error, timeout}), {stop, {shutdown, user_timeout}, State#state{timer = undefined}}; handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}, StateName, #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State) -> gen_fsm:reply(RecvFrom, {error, timeout}), {next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, bytes_to_read = undefined, timer = undefined}, get_timeout(State)}; handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, _RecvFrom}, StateName, State) -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{timer = undefined}, get_timeout(State)}; handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Got unexpected info: ~p ~n", [Msg]), error_logger:info_report(Report), {next_state, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Description:This function is called by a gen_fsm when it is about %% to terminate. It should be the opposite of Module:init/1 and do any %% necessary cleaning up. When it returns, the gen_fsm terminates with %% Reason. The return value is ignored. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- terminate(_, _, #state{terminated = true}) -> %% Happens when user closes the connection using ssl:close/1 %% we want to guarantee that Transport:close has been called %% when ssl:close/1 returns. ok; terminate({shutdown, transport_closed}, StateName, #state{send_queue = SendQueue, renegotiation = Renegotiate} = State) -> handle_unrecv_data(StateName, State), handle_trusted_certs_db(State), notify_senders(SendQueue), notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate); terminate({shutdown, own_alert}, _StateName, #state{send_queue = SendQueue, renegotiation = Renegotiate} = State) -> handle_trusted_certs_db(State), notify_senders(SendQueue), notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate); terminate(Reason, connection, #state{negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates, transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket, send_queue = SendQueue, renegotiation = Renegotiate} = State) -> handle_trusted_certs_db(State), notify_senders(SendQueue), notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate), BinAlert = terminate_alert(Reason, Version, ConnectionStates), Transport:send(Socket, BinAlert), workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, Transport); terminate(_Reason, _StateName, #state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket, send_queue = SendQueue, renegotiation = Renegotiate} = State) -> handle_trusted_certs_db(State), notify_senders(SendQueue), notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate), Transport:close(Socket). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% code_change(OldVsn, StateName, State, Extra) -> {ok, StateName, NewState} %% Description: Convert process state when code is changed %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _Extra) -> {ok, StateName, State}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_} = Opts, User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, Timeout) -> try {ok, Pid} = ssl_connection_sup:start_child([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Opts, User, CbInfo]), {ok, SslSocket} = socket_control(Socket, Pid, CbModule), ok = handshake(SslSocket, Timeout), {ok, SslSocket} catch error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} -> Error end; start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = true},_} = Opts, User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, Timeout) -> try {ok, Pid} = ssl_connection_sup:start_child_dist([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Opts, User, CbInfo]), {ok, SslSocket} = socket_control(Socket, Pid, CbModule), ok = handshake(SslSocket, Timeout), {ok, SslSocket} catch error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} -> Error end. ssl_init(SslOpts, Role) -> init_manager_name(SslOpts#ssl_options.erl_dist), {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, OwnCert} = init_certificates(SslOpts, Role), PrivateKey = init_private_key(PemCacheHandle, SslOpts#ssl_options.key, SslOpts#ssl_options.keyfile, SslOpts#ssl_options.password, Role), DHParams = init_diffie_hellman(PemCacheHandle, SslOpts#ssl_options.dh, SslOpts#ssl_options.dhfile, Role), {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, CacheHandle, OwnCert, PrivateKey, DHParams}. init_manager_name(false) -> put(ssl_manager, ssl_manager); init_manager_name(true) -> put(ssl_manager, ssl_manager_dist). init_certificates(#ssl_options{cacerts = CaCerts, cacertfile = CACertFile, certfile = CertFile, cert = Cert}, Role) -> {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle} = try Certs = case CaCerts of undefined -> CACertFile; _ -> {der, CaCerts} end, {ok, _, _, _, _, _} = ssl_manager:connection_init(Certs, Role) catch _:Reason -> file_error(CACertFile, {cacertfile, Reason}) end, init_certificates(Cert, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, CertFile, Role). init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, <<>>, _) -> {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, undefined}; init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, CertFile, client) -> try %% Ignoring potential proxy-certificates see: %% http://dev.globus.org/wiki/Security/ProxyFileFormat [OwnCert|_] = ssl_certificate:file_to_certificats(CertFile, PemCacheHandle), {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, OwnCert} catch _Error:_Reason -> {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, undefined} end; init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, CertFile, server) -> try [OwnCert|_] = ssl_certificate:file_to_certificats(CertFile, PemCacheHandle), {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, OwnCert} catch _:Reason -> file_error(CertFile, {certfile, Reason}) end; init_certificates(Cert, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, _, _) -> {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, Cert}. init_private_key(_, undefined, <<>>, _Password, _Client) -> undefined; init_private_key(DbHandle, undefined, KeyFile, Password, _) -> try {ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(KeyFile, DbHandle), [PemEntry] = [PemEntry || PemEntry = {PKey, _ , _} <- List, PKey =:= 'RSAPrivateKey' orelse PKey =:= 'DSAPrivateKey' orelse PKey =:= 'ECPrivateKey' orelse PKey =:= 'PrivateKeyInfo' ], private_key(public_key:pem_entry_decode(PemEntry, Password)) catch _:Reason -> file_error(KeyFile, {keyfile, Reason}) end; %% First two clauses are for backwards compatibility init_private_key(_,{rsa, PrivateKey}, _, _,_) -> init_private_key('RSAPrivateKey', PrivateKey); init_private_key(_,{dsa, PrivateKey},_,_,_) -> init_private_key('DSAPrivateKey', PrivateKey); init_private_key(_,{ec, PrivateKey},_,_,_) -> init_private_key('ECPrivateKey', PrivateKey); init_private_key(_,{Asn1Type, PrivateKey},_,_,_) -> private_key(init_private_key(Asn1Type, PrivateKey)). init_private_key(Asn1Type, PrivateKey) -> public_key:der_decode(Asn1Type, PrivateKey). private_key(#'PrivateKeyInfo'{privateKeyAlgorithm = #'PrivateKeyInfo_privateKeyAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'rsaEncryption'}, privateKey = Key}) -> public_key:der_decode('RSAPrivateKey', iolist_to_binary(Key)); private_key(#'PrivateKeyInfo'{privateKeyAlgorithm = #'PrivateKeyInfo_privateKeyAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'id-dsa'}, privateKey = Key}) -> public_key:der_decode('DSAPrivateKey', iolist_to_binary(Key)); private_key(Key) -> Key. -spec(file_error(_,_) -> no_return()). file_error(File, Throw) -> case Throw of {Opt,{badmatch, {error, {badmatch, Error}}}} -> throw({options, {Opt, binary_to_list(File), Error}}); _ -> throw(Throw) end. init_diffie_hellman(_,Params, _,_) when is_binary(Params)-> public_key:der_decode('DHParameter', Params); init_diffie_hellman(_,_,_, client) -> undefined; init_diffie_hellman(_,_,undefined, _) -> ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS; init_diffie_hellman(DbHandle,_, DHParamFile, server) -> try {ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(DHParamFile,DbHandle), case [Entry || Entry = {'DHParameter', _ , _} <- List] of [Entry] -> public_key:pem_entry_decode(Entry); [] -> ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS end catch _:Reason -> file_error(DHParamFile, {dhfile, Reason}) end. sync_send_all_state_event(FsmPid, Event) -> try gen_fsm:sync_send_all_state_event(FsmPid, Event, infinity) catch exit:{noproc, _} -> {error, closed}; exit:{normal, _} -> {error, closed}; exit:{{shutdown, _},_} -> {error, closed} end. %% We do currently not support cipher suites that use fixed DH. %% If we want to implement that we should add a code %% here to extract DH parameters form cert. handle_peer_cert(PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, #state{session = Session} = State0) -> State1 = State0#state{session = Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert}, public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo}, State2 = case PublicKeyInfo of {?'id-ecPublicKey', #'ECPoint'{point = _ECPoint} = PublicKey, PublicKeyParams} -> ECDHKey = public_key:generate_key(PublicKeyParams), State3 = State1#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey}, ec_dh_master_secret(ECDHKey, PublicKey, State3); _ -> State1 end, {Record, State} = next_record(State2), next_state(certify, certify, Record, State). certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, transport_cb = Transport, negotiated_version = Version, cert_db = CertDbHandle, cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert}, socket = Socket, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) -> Certificate = tls_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client), {BinCert, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Certificate, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinCert), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State) -> State. verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, transport_cb = Transport, negotiated_version = Version, socket = Socket, private_key = PrivateKey, session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret, own_certificate = OwnCert}, hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) -> %%TODO: for TLS 1.2 we can choose a different/stronger HashSign combination for this. case tls_handshake:client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version, HashSign, PrivateKey, Handshake0) of #certificate_verify{} = Verified -> {BinVerified, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Verified, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinVerified), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; ignore -> State; #alert{} = Alert -> throw(Alert) end; verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State) -> State. do_server_hello(Type, NextProtocolsToSend, EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, #state{negotiated_version = Version, session = #session{session_id = SessId}, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = State0) when is_atom(Type) -> ServerHello = tls_handshake:server_hello(SessId, Version, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, NextProtocolsToSend, EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves), State = server_hello(ServerHello, State0#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolsToSend =/= undefined}), case Type of new -> new_server_hello(ServerHello, State); resumed -> resumed_server_hello(State) end. new_server_hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression, session_id = SessionId}, #state{session = Session0, negotiated_version = Version} = State0) -> try server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0) of #state{} = State1 -> State2 = server_hello_done(State1), Session = Session0#session{session_id = SessionId, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression}, {Record, State} = next_record(State2#state{session = Session}), next_state(hello, certify, Record, State) catch #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0) end. resumed_server_hello(#state{session = Session, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, negotiated_version = Version} = State0) -> case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session, ConnectionStates0, server) of {_, ConnectionStates1} -> State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1, session = Session}, {ConnectionStates, Handshake} = finalize_handshake(State1, abbreviated), State2 = State1#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}, {Record, State} = next_record(State2), next_state(hello, abbreviated, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0) end. handle_new_session(NewId, CipherSuite, Compression, #state{session = Session0} = State0) -> Session = Session0#session{session_id = NewId, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression}, {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{session = Session}), next_state(hello, certify, Record, State). handle_resumed_session(SessId, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, negotiated_version = Version, host = Host, port = Port, session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb} = State0) -> Session = CacheCb:lookup(Cache, {{Host, Port}, SessId}), case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session, ConnectionStates0, client) of {_, ConnectionStates} -> {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{ connection_states = ConnectionStates, session = Session}), next_state(hello, abbreviated, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0) end. client_certify_and_key_exchange(#state{negotiated_version = Version} = State0) -> try do_client_certify_and_key_exchange(State0) of State1 = #state{} -> {ConnectionStates, Handshake} = finalize_handshake(State1, certify), State2 = State1#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, %% Reinitialize client_certificate_requested = false, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}, {Record, State} = next_record(State2), next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State) catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end. do_client_certify_and_key_exchange(State0) -> State1 = certify_client(State0), State2 = key_exchange(State1), verify_client_cert(State2). server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0) -> State1 = certify_server(State0), State2 = key_exchange(State1), request_client_cert(State2). server_hello(ServerHello, #state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) -> CipherSuite = ServerHello#server_hello.cipher_suite, {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates1, Handshake1} = encode_handshake(ServerHello, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1, tls_handshake_history = Handshake1, key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm, hashsign_algorithm = default_hashsign(Version, KeyAlgorithm)}. server_hello_done(#state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) -> HelloDone = tls_handshake:server_hello_done(), {BinHelloDone, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(HelloDone, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinHelloDone), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}. certify_server(#state{key_algorithm = Algo} = State) when Algo == dh_anon; Algo == ecdh_anon; Algo == psk; Algo == dhe_psk; Algo == srp_anon -> State; certify_server(#state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0, cert_db = CertDbHandle, cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert}} = State) -> case tls_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) of CertMsg = #certificate{} -> {BinCertMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(CertMsg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinCertMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake }; Alert = #alert{} -> throw(Alert) end. key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa} = State) -> State; key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, private_key = PrivateKey, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, negotiated_version = Version, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport } = State) when Algo == dhe_dss; Algo == dhe_rsa; Algo == dh_anon -> DHKeys = public_key:generate_key(Params), ConnectionState = tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, DHKeys, Params, HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; key_exchange(#state{role = server, private_key = Key, key_algorithm = Algo} = State) when Algo == ecdh_ecdsa; Algo == ecdh_rsa -> State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Key}; key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, private_key = PrivateKey, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, negotiated_version = Version, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport } = State) when Algo == ecdhe_ecdsa; Algo == ecdhe_rsa; Algo == ecdh_anon -> ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(select_curve(State)), ConnectionState = tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdh, ECDHKeys, HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake1} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys, tls_handshake_history = Handshake1}; key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State) -> State; key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint}, hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, private_key = PrivateKey, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, negotiated_version = Version, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport } = State) -> ConnectionState = tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint, HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint}, hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, private_key = PrivateKey, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, negotiated_version = Version, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport } = State) -> DHKeys = public_key:generate_key(Params), ConnectionState = tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {dhe_psk, PskIdentityHint, DHKeys, Params, HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State) -> State; key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint}, hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, private_key = PrivateKey, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, negotiated_version = Version, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport } = State) -> ConnectionState = tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint, HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = LookupFun}, hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, session = #session{srp_username = Username}, private_key = PrivateKey, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, negotiated_version = Version, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport } = State) when Algo == srp_dss; Algo == srp_rsa; Algo == srp_anon -> SrpParams = handle_srp_identity(Username, LookupFun), Keys = case generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams, 0) of Alert = #alert{} -> throw(Alert); Keys0 = {_,_} -> Keys0 end, ConnectionState = tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, Keys, SrpParams, HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, srp_params = SrpParams, srp_keys = Keys, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; key_exchange(#state{role = client, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, key_algorithm = rsa, public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, negotiated_version = Version, premaster_secret = PremasterSecret, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) -> Msg = rsa_key_exchange(Version, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; key_exchange(#state{role = client, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, key_algorithm = Algorithm, negotiated_version = Version, diffie_hellman_keys = {DhPubKey, _}, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) when Algorithm == dhe_dss; Algorithm == dhe_rsa; Algorithm == dh_anon -> Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {dh, DhPubKey}), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; key_exchange(#state{role = client, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, key_algorithm = Algorithm, negotiated_version = Version, diffie_hellman_keys = Keys, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) when Algorithm == ecdhe_ecdsa; Algorithm == ecdhe_rsa; Algorithm == ecdh_ecdsa; Algorithm == ecdh_rsa; Algorithm == ecdh_anon -> Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {ecdh, Keys}), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; key_exchange(#state{role = client, ssl_options = SslOpts, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, key_algorithm = psk, negotiated_version = Version, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) -> Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity}), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; key_exchange(#state{role = client, ssl_options = SslOpts, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, key_algorithm = dhe_psk, negotiated_version = Version, diffie_hellman_keys = {DhPubKey, _}, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) -> Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {dhe_psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, DhPubKey}), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; key_exchange(#state{role = client, ssl_options = SslOpts, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, key_algorithm = rsa_psk, public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, negotiated_version = Version, premaster_secret = PremasterSecret, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) -> Msg = rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; key_exchange(#state{role = client, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, key_algorithm = Algorithm, negotiated_version = Version, srp_keys = {ClientPubKey, _}, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) when Algorithm == srp_dss; Algorithm == srp_rsa; Algorithm == srp_anon -> Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {srp, ClientPubKey}), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}. rsa_key_exchange(Version, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _}) when Algorithm == ?rsaEncryption; Algorithm == ?md2WithRSAEncryption; Algorithm == ?md5WithRSAEncryption; Algorithm == ?sha1WithRSAEncryption; Algorithm == ?sha224WithRSAEncryption; Algorithm == ?sha256WithRSAEncryption; Algorithm == ?sha384WithRSAEncryption; Algorithm == ?sha512WithRSAEncryption -> tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {premaster_secret, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo}); rsa_key_exchange(_, _, _) -> throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)). rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _}) when Algorithm == ?rsaEncryption; Algorithm == ?md2WithRSAEncryption; Algorithm == ?md5WithRSAEncryption; Algorithm == ?sha1WithRSAEncryption; Algorithm == ?sha224WithRSAEncryption; Algorithm == ?sha256WithRSAEncryption; Algorithm == ?sha384WithRSAEncryption; Algorithm == ?sha512WithRSAEncryption -> tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo}); rsa_psk_key_exchange(_, _, _, _) -> throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)). request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer}, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, cert_db = CertDbHandle, cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0, negotiated_version = Version, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> Msg = tls_handshake:certificate_request(ConnectionStates0, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{client_certificate_requested = true, connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_none}} = State) -> State. finalize_handshake(State, StateName) -> ConnectionStates0 = cipher_protocol(State), ConnectionStates = tls_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, write), State1 = State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, State2 = next_protocol(State1), finished(State2, StateName). next_protocol(#state{role = server} = State) -> State; next_protocol(#state{next_protocol = undefined} = State) -> State; next_protocol(#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false} = State) -> State; next_protocol(#state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version, next_protocol = NextProtocol, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) -> NextProtocolMessage = tls_handshake:next_protocol(NextProtocol), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(NextProtocolMessage, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Handshake}. cipher_protocol(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version, transport_cb = Transport}) -> {BinChangeCipher, ConnectionStates} = encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates0), Transport:send(Socket, BinChangeCipher), ConnectionStates. finished(#state{role = Role, socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version, transport_cb = Transport, session = Session, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0}, StateName) -> MasterSecret = Session#session.master_secret, Finished = tls_handshake:finished(Version, Role, get_current_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, write), MasterSecret, Handshake0), ConnectionStates1 = save_verify_data(Role, Finished, ConnectionStates0, StateName), {BinFinished, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Finished, Version, ConnectionStates1, Handshake0), Transport:send(Socket, BinFinished), {ConnectionStates, Handshake}. save_verify_data(client, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, certify) -> tls_record:set_client_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates); save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, cipher) -> tls_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates); save_verify_data(client, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbreviated) -> tls_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates); save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbreviated) -> tls_record:set_server_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates). handle_server_key(#server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg, negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> Params = tls_handshake:decode_server_key(Keys, KeyAlg, Version), HashSign = connection_hashsign(Params#server_key_params.hashsign, State), case HashSign of {_, SignAlgo} when SignAlgo == anon; SignAlgo == ecdh_anon -> server_master_secret(Params#server_key_params.params, State); _ -> verify_server_key(Params, HashSign, State) end. verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params = Params, params_bin = EncParams, signature = Signature}, HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, #state{negotiated_version = Version, public_key_info = PubKeyInfo, connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> ConnectionState = tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, Hash = tls_handshake:server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <>), case tls_handshake:verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo) of true -> server_master_secret(Params, State); false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR) end. server_master_secret(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey}, State) -> dh_master_secret(P, G, ServerPublicDhKey, undefined, State); server_master_secret(#server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve, public = ECServerPubKey}, State) -> ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(ECCurve), ec_dh_master_secret(ECDHKeys, #'ECPoint'{point = ECServerPubKey}, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys}); server_master_secret(#server_psk_params{ hint = IdentityHint}, State) -> %% store for later use State#state{psk_identity = IdentityHint}; server_master_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{ hint = IdentityHint, dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey}}, State) -> dhe_psk_master_secret(IdentityHint, P, G, ServerPublicDhKey, undefined, State); server_master_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B}, State) -> client_srp_master_secret(G, N, S, B, undefined, State). master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, #state{session = Session, negotiated_version = Version, role = Role, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates0, Role) of {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} -> State#state{ session = Session#session{master_secret = MasterSecret}, connection_states = ConnectionStates}; #alert{} = Alert -> Alert end. dh_master_secret(#'DHParameter'{} = Params, OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, State) -> PremasterSecret = public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params), master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State). dh_master_secret(Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, undefined, State) -> Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} = crypto:generate_key(dh, [Prime, Base]), dh_master_secret(Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys}); dh_master_secret(Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, State) -> PremasterSecret = crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base]), master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State). ec_dh_master_secret(ECDHKeys, ECPoint, State) -> PremasterSecret = public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys), master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State). handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun) when LookupFun == undefined -> error; handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) -> Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState). server_psk_master_secret(ClientPSKIdentity, #state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> case handle_psk_identity(ClientPSKIdentity, SslOpts#ssl_options.user_lookup_fun) of {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> Len = byte_size(PSK), PremasterSecret = <>, master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State); #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; _ -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) end. dhe_psk_master_secret(PSKIdentity, Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, undefined, State) -> Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} = crypto:generate_key(dh, [Prime, Base]), dhe_psk_master_secret(PSKIdentity, Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys}); dhe_psk_master_secret(PSKIdentity, Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, SslOpts#ssl_options.user_lookup_fun) of {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> DHSecret = crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base]), DHLen = erlang:byte_size(DHSecret), Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK), PremasterSecret = <>, master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State); #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; _ -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) end. server_rsa_psk_master_secret(PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, #state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> case handle_psk_identity(PskIdentity, SslOpts#ssl_options.user_lookup_fun) of {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> Len = byte_size(PSK), RealPMS = <>, master_from_premaster_secret(RealPMS, State); #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; _ -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) end. generate_srp_server_keys(_SrpParams, 10) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams = #srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime, verifier = Verifier}, N) -> case crypto:generate_key(srp, {host, [Verifier, Generator, Prime, '6a']}) of error -> generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams, N+1); Keys -> Keys end. generate_srp_client_keys(_Generator, _Prime, 10) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, N) -> case crypto:generate_key(srp, {user, [Generator, Prime, '6a']}) of error -> generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, N+1); Keys -> Keys end. handle_srp_identity(Username, {Fun, UserState}) -> case Fun(srp, Username, UserState) of {ok, {SRPParams, Salt, DerivedKey}} when is_atom(SRPParams), is_binary(Salt), is_binary(DerivedKey) -> {Generator, Prime} = ssl_srp_primes:get_srp_params(SRPParams), Verifier = crypto:mod_pow(Generator, DerivedKey, Prime), #srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime, salt = Salt, verifier = Verifier}; #alert{} = Alert -> throw(Alert); _ -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) end. server_srp_master_secret(Verifier, Prime, ClientPub, State = #state{srp_keys = ServerKeys}) -> case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPub, ServerKeys, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of error -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); PremasterSecret -> master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State) end. client_srp_master_secret(_Generator, _Prime, _Salt, _ServerPub, #alert{} = Alert, _State) -> Alert; client_srp_master_secret(Generator, Prime, Salt, ServerPub, undefined, State) -> Keys = generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, 0), client_srp_master_secret(Generator, Prime, Salt, ServerPub, Keys, State#state{srp_keys = Keys}); client_srp_master_secret(Generator, Prime, Salt, ServerPub, ClientKeys, #state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of ok -> {Username, Password} = SslOpts#ssl_options.srp_identity, DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]), case crypto:compute_key(srp, ServerPub, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of error -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); PremasterSecret -> master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State) end; _ -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) end. cipher_role(client, Data, Session, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> ConnectionStates = tls_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0), next_state_connection(cipher, ack_connection(State#state{session = Session, connection_states = ConnectionStates})); cipher_role(server, Data, Session, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> ConnectionStates1 = tls_record:set_client_verify_data(current_read, Data, ConnectionStates0), {ConnectionStates, Handshake} = finalize_handshake(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1, session = Session}, cipher), next_state_connection(cipher, ack_connection(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, session = Session, tls_handshake_history = Handshake})). encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) -> tls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates). encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) -> tls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates). encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0) -> Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version), Handshake1 = tls_handshake:update_handshake_history(Handshake0, Frag), {E, ConnectionStates1} = tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0), {E, ConnectionStates1, Handshake1}. encode_packet(Data, #socket_options{packet=Packet}) -> case Packet of 1 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 8, (1 bsl 8) - 1); 2 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 16, (1 bsl 16) - 1); 4 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 32, (1 bsl 32) - 1); _ -> Data end. encode_size_packet(Bin, Size, Max) -> Len = erlang:byte_size(Bin), case Len > Max of true -> throw({error, {badarg, {packet_to_large, Len, Max}}}); false -> <> end. decode_alerts(Bin) -> decode_alerts(Bin, []). decode_alerts(<>, Acc) -> A = ?ALERT_REC(Level, Description), decode_alerts(Rest, [A | Acc]); decode_alerts(<<>>, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc, []). passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) -> case Buffer of <<>> -> {Record, State} = next_record(State0), next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State); _ -> case read_application_data(<<>>, State0) of Stop = {stop, _, _} -> Stop; {Record, State} -> next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State) end end. read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, socket_options = SOpts, bytes_to_read = BytesToRead, start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, timer = Timer, user_data_buffer = Buffer0} = State0) -> Buffer1 = if Buffer0 =:= <<>> -> Data; Data =:= <<>> -> Buffer0; true -> <> end, case get_data(SOpts, BytesToRead, Buffer1) of {ok, ClientData, Buffer} -> % Send data SocketOpt = deliver_app_data(Transport, Socket, SOpts, ClientData, Pid, RecvFrom), cancel_timer(Timer), State = State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer, start_or_recv_from = undefined, timer = undefined, bytes_to_read = undefined, socket_options = SocketOpt }, if SocketOpt#socket_options.active =:= false; Buffer =:= <<>> -> %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv %% Active and empty, get more data next_record_if_active(State); true -> %% We have more data read_application_data(<<>>, State) end; {more, Buffer} -> % no reply, we need more data next_record(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); {passive, Buffer} -> next_record_if_active(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); {error,_Reason} -> %% Invalid packet in packet mode deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Buffer1, Pid, RecvFrom), {stop, normal, State0} end. write_application_data(Data0, From, #state{socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version, transport_cb = Transport, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, send_queue = SendQueue, socket_options = SockOpts, ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}} = State) -> Data = encode_packet(Data0, SockOpts), case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of true -> renegotiate(State#state{send_queue = queue:in_r({From, Data}, SendQueue), renegotiation = {true, internal}}); false -> {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0), Result = Transport:send(Socket, Msgs), {reply, Result, connection, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, get_timeout(State)} end. time_to_renegotiate(_Data, #connection_states{current_write = #connection_state{sequence_number = Num}}, RenegotiateAt) -> %% We could do test: %% is_time_to_renegotiate((erlang:byte_size(_Data) div ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH) + 1, RenegotiateAt), %% but we chose to have a some what lower renegotiateAt and a much cheaper test is_time_to_renegotiate(Num, RenegotiateAt). is_time_to_renegotiate(N, M) when N < M-> false; is_time_to_renegotiate(_,_) -> true. %% Picks ClientData get_data(_, _, <<>>) -> {more, <<>>}; %% Recv timed out save buffer data until next recv get_data(#socket_options{active=false}, undefined, Buffer) -> {passive, Buffer}; get_data(#socket_options{active=Active, packet=Raw}, BytesToRead, Buffer) when Raw =:= raw; Raw =:= 0 -> %% Raw Mode if Active =/= false orelse BytesToRead =:= 0 -> %% Active true or once, or passive mode recv(0) {ok, Buffer, <<>>}; byte_size(Buffer) >= BytesToRead -> %% Passive Mode, recv(Bytes) <> = Buffer, {ok, Data, Rest}; true -> %% Passive Mode not enough data {more, Buffer} end; get_data(#socket_options{packet=Type, packet_size=Size}, _, Buffer) -> PacketOpts = [{packet_size, Size}], case decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts) of {more, _} -> {more, Buffer}; Decoded -> Decoded end. decode_packet({http, headers}, Buffer, PacketOpts) -> decode_packet(httph, Buffer, PacketOpts); decode_packet({http_bin, headers}, Buffer, PacketOpts) -> decode_packet(httph_bin, Buffer, PacketOpts); decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts) -> erlang:decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts). %% Just like with gen_tcp sockets, an ssl socket that has been configured with %% {packet, http} (or {packet, http_bin}) will automatically switch to expect %% HTTP headers after it sees a HTTP Request or HTTP Response line. We %% represent the current state as follows: %% #socket_options.packet =:= http: Expect a HTTP Request/Response line %% #socket_options.packet =:= {http, headers}: Expect HTTP Headers %% Note that if the user has explicitly configured the socket to expect %% HTTP headers using the {packet, httph} option, we don't do any automatic %% switching of states. deliver_app_data(Transport, Socket, SOpts = #socket_options{active=Active, packet=Type}, Data, Pid, From) -> send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_reply(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Data)), SO = case Data of {P, _, _, _} when ((P =:= http_request) or (P =:= http_response)), ((Type =:= http) or (Type =:= http_bin)) -> SOpts#socket_options{packet={Type, headers}}; http_eoh when tuple_size(Type) =:= 2 -> % End of headers - expect another Request/Response line {Type1, headers} = Type, SOpts#socket_options{packet=Type1}; _ -> SOpts end, case Active of once -> SO#socket_options{active=false}; _ -> SO end. format_reply(_, _,#socket_options{active = false, mode = Mode, packet = Packet, header = Header}, Data) -> {ok, do_format_reply(Mode, Packet, Header, Data)}; format_reply(Transport, Socket, #socket_options{active = _, mode = Mode, packet = Packet, header = Header}, Data) -> {ssl, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket), do_format_reply(Mode, Packet, Header, Data)}. deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SO= #socket_options{active = Active}, Data, Pid, From) -> send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SO, Data)). format_packet_error(_, _,#socket_options{active = false, mode = Mode}, Data) -> {error, {invalid_packet, do_format_reply(Mode, raw, 0, Data)}}; format_packet_error(Transport, Socket, #socket_options{active = _, mode = Mode}, Data) -> {ssl_error, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket), {invalid_packet, do_format_reply(Mode, raw, 0, Data)}}. do_format_reply(binary, _, N, Data) when N > 0 -> % Header mode header(N, Data); do_format_reply(binary, _, _, Data) -> Data; do_format_reply(list, Packet, _, Data) when Packet == http; Packet == {http, headers}; Packet == http_bin; Packet == {http_bin, headers}; Packet == httph; Packet == httph_bin -> Data; do_format_reply(list, _,_, Data) -> binary_to_list(Data). header(0, <<>>) -> <<>>; header(_, <<>>) -> []; header(0, Binary) -> Binary; header(N, Binary) -> <> = Binary, [ByteN | header(N-1, NewBinary)]. send_or_reply(false, _Pid, From, Data) when From =/= undefined -> gen_fsm:reply(From, Data); %% Can happen when handling own alert or tcp error/close and there is %% no outstanding gen_fsm sync events send_or_reply(false, no_pid, _, _) -> ok; send_or_reply(_, Pid, _From, Data) -> send_user(Pid, Data). opposite_role(client) -> server; opposite_role(server) -> client. send_user(Pid, Msg) -> Pid ! Msg. handle_tls_handshake(Handle, StateName, #state{tls_packets = [Packet]} = State) -> FsmReturn = {next_state, StateName, State#state{tls_packets = []}}, Handle(Packet, FsmReturn); handle_tls_handshake(Handle, StateName, #state{tls_packets = [Packet | Packets]} = State0) -> FsmReturn = {next_state, StateName, State0#state{tls_packets = Packets}}, case Handle(Packet, FsmReturn) of {next_state, NextStateName, State, _Timeout} -> handle_tls_handshake(Handle, NextStateName, State); {stop, _,_} = Stop -> Stop end. next_state(Current,_, #alert{} = Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, Current, State); next_state(_,Next, no_record, State) -> {next_state, Next, State, get_timeout(State)}; next_state(_,Next, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, State) -> Alerts = decode_alerts(EncAlerts), handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, Next, State, get_timeout(State)}); next_state(Current, Next, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, State0 = #state{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf0, negotiated_version = Version}) -> Handle = fun({#hello_request{} = Packet, _}, {next_state, connection = SName, State}) -> %% This message should not be included in handshake %% message hashes. Starts new handshake (renegotiation) Hs0 = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(), ?MODULE:SName(Packet, State#state{tls_handshake_history=Hs0, renegotiation = {true, peer}}); ({#hello_request{} = Packet, _}, {next_state, SName, State}) -> %% This message should not be included in handshake %% message hashes. Already in negotiation so it will be ignored! ?MODULE:SName(Packet, State); ({#client_hello{} = Packet, Raw}, {next_state, connection = SName, State}) -> Version = Packet#client_hello.client_version, Hs0 = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(), Hs1 = tls_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hs0, Raw), ?MODULE:SName(Packet, State#state{tls_handshake_history=Hs1, renegotiation = {true, peer}}); ({Packet, Raw}, {next_state, SName, State = #state{tls_handshake_history=Hs0}}) -> Hs1 = tls_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hs0, Raw), ?MODULE:SName(Packet, State#state{tls_handshake_history=Hs1}); (_, StopState) -> StopState end, try {Packets, Buf} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version,Data,Buf0), State = State0#state{tls_packets = Packets, tls_handshake_buffer = Buf}, handle_tls_handshake(Handle, Next, State) catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, Current, State0) end; next_state(_, StateName, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, State0) -> case read_application_data(Data, State0) of Stop = {stop,_,_} -> Stop; {Record, State} -> next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State) end; next_state(Current, Next, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = <<1>>} = _ChangeCipher, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> ConnectionStates1 = tls_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}), next_state(Current, Next, Record, State); next_state(Current, Next, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, State0) -> %% Ignore unknown type {Record, State} = next_record(State0), next_state(Current, Next, Record, State). next_tls_record(Data, #state{tls_record_buffer = Buf0, tls_cipher_texts = CT0} = State0) -> case tls_record:get_tls_records(Data, Buf0) of {Records, Buf1} -> CT1 = CT0 ++ Records, next_record(State0#state{tls_record_buffer = Buf1, tls_cipher_texts = CT1}); #alert{} = Alert -> Alert end. next_record(#state{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [], socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]), {no_record, State}; next_record(#state{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest], connection_states = ConnStates0} = State) -> case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0) of {Plain, ConnStates} -> {Plain, State#state{tls_cipher_texts = Rest, connection_states = ConnStates}}; #alert{} = Alert -> {Alert, State} end; next_record(State) -> {no_record, State}. next_record_if_active(State = #state{socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}}) -> {no_record ,State}; next_record_if_active(State) -> next_record(State). next_state_connection(StateName, #state{send_queue = Queue0, negotiated_version = Version, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, connection_states = ConnectionStates0 } = State) -> %% Send queued up data that was queued while renegotiating case queue:out(Queue0) of {{value, {From, Data}}, Queue} -> {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0), Result = Transport:send(Socket, Msgs), gen_fsm:reply(From, Result), next_state_connection(StateName, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, send_queue = Queue}); {empty, Queue0} -> next_state_is_connection(StateName, State) end. %% In next_state_is_connection/1: clear tls_handshake, %% premaster_secret and public_key_info (only needed during handshake) %% to reduce memory foot print of a connection. next_state_is_connection(_, State = #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}}) when RecvFrom =/= undefined -> passive_receive(State#state{premaster_secret = undefined, public_key_info = undefined, tls_handshake_history = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history()}, connection); next_state_is_connection(StateName, State0) -> {Record, State} = next_record_if_active(State0), next_state(StateName, connection, Record, State#state{premaster_secret = undefined, public_key_info = undefined, tls_handshake_history = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history()}). register_session(client, Host, Port, #session{is_resumable = new} = Session0) -> Session = Session0#session{is_resumable = true}, ssl_manager:register_session(Host, Port, Session), Session; register_session(server, _, Port, #session{is_resumable = new} = Session0) -> Session = Session0#session{is_resumable = true}, ssl_manager:register_session(Port, Session), Session; register_session(_, _, _, Session) -> Session. %% Already registered invalidate_session(client, Host, Port, Session) -> ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Host, Port, Session); invalidate_session(server, _, Port, Session) -> ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Port, Session). initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions}, User, {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) -> ConnectionStates = tls_record:init_connection_states(Role), SessionCacheCb = case application:get_env(ssl, session_cb) of {ok, Cb} when is_atom(Cb) -> Cb; _ -> ssl_session_cache end, Monitor = erlang:monitor(process, User), #state{socket_options = SocketOptions, %% We do not want to save the password in the state so that %% could be written in the clear into error logs. ssl_options = SSLOptions#ssl_options{password = undefined}, session = #session{is_resumable = new}, transport_cb = CbModule, data_tag = DataTag, close_tag = CloseTag, error_tag = ErrorTag, role = Role, host = Host, port = Port, socket = Socket, connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_buffer = <<>>, tls_record_buffer = <<>>, tls_cipher_texts = [], user_application = {Monitor, User}, user_data_buffer = <<>>, log_alert = true, session_cache_cb = SessionCacheCb, renegotiation = {false, first}, start_or_recv_from = undefined, send_queue = queue:new() }. get_socket_opts(_,_,[], _, Acc) -> {ok, Acc}; get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [mode | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) -> get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{mode, SockOpts#socket_options.mode} | Acc]); get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [packet | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) -> case SockOpts#socket_options.packet of {Type, headers} -> get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{packet, Type} | Acc]); Type -> get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{packet, Type} | Acc]) end; get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [header | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) -> get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{header, SockOpts#socket_options.header} | Acc]); get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [active | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) -> get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{active, SockOpts#socket_options.active} | Acc]); get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [Tag | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) -> try ssl_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, [Tag]) of {ok, [Opt]} -> get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [Opt | Acc]); {error, Error} -> {error, {options, {socket_options, Tag, Error}}} catch %% So that inet behavior does not crash our process _:Error -> {error, {options, {socket_options, Tag, Error}}} end; get_socket_opts(_, _,Opts, _,_) -> {error, {options, {socket_options, Opts, function_clause}}}. set_socket_opts(_,_, [], SockOpts, []) -> {ok, SockOpts}; set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [], SockOpts, Other) -> %% Set non emulated options try ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) of ok -> {ok, SockOpts}; {error, InetError} -> {{error, {options, {socket_options, Other, InetError}}}, SockOpts} catch _:Error -> %% So that inet behavior does not crash our process {{error, {options, {socket_options, Other, Error}}}, SockOpts} end; set_socket_opts(Transport,Socket, [{mode, Mode}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) when Mode == list; Mode == binary -> set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, SockOpts#socket_options{mode = Mode}, Other); set_socket_opts(_, _, [{mode, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) -> {{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}}}, SockOpts}; set_socket_opts(Transport,Socket, [{packet, Packet}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) when Packet == raw; Packet == 0; Packet == 1; Packet == 2; Packet == 4; Packet == asn1; Packet == cdr; Packet == sunrm; Packet == fcgi; Packet == tpkt; Packet == line; Packet == http; Packet == httph; Packet == http_bin; Packet == httph_bin -> set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, SockOpts#socket_options{packet = Packet}, Other); set_socket_opts(_, _, [{packet, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) -> {{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}}}, SockOpts}; set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [{header, Header}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) when is_integer(Header) -> set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, SockOpts#socket_options{header = Header}, Other); set_socket_opts(_, _, [{header, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) -> {{error,{options, {socket_options, Opt}}}, SockOpts}; set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [{active, Active}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) when Active == once; Active == true; Active == false -> set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, SockOpts#socket_options{active = Active}, Other); set_socket_opts(_, _, [{active, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) -> {{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}} }, SockOpts}; set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [Opt | Opts], SockOpts, Other) -> set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, SockOpts, [Opt | Other]). handle_alerts([], Result) -> Result; handle_alerts(_, {stop, _, _} = Stop) -> %% If it is a fatal alert immediately close Stop; handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State, _Timeout}) -> handle_alerts(Alerts, handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)). handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, start_or_recv_from = From, host = Host, port = Port, session = Session, user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, log_alert = Log, role = Role, socket_options = Opts} = State) -> invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session), log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert), alert_user(Transport, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role), {stop, normal, State}; handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, StateName, State) -> handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}, State}; handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, #state{log_alert = Log, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) -> log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}, State}; handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, #state{log_alert = Log, renegotiation = {true, From}} = State0) -> log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert), gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}), {Record, State} = next_record(State0), next_state(StateName, connection, Record, State); handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?USER_CANCELED} = Alert, StateName, #state{log_alert = Log} = State0) -> log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert), {Record, State} = next_record(State0), next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State). alert_user(Transport, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role) -> alert_user(Transport,Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role); alert_user(Transport, Socket,_, _, _, From, Alert, Role) -> alert_user(Transport, Socket, From, Alert, Role). alert_user(Transport, Socket, From, Alert, Role) -> alert_user(Transport, Socket, false, no_pid, From, Alert, Role). alert_user(_,_, false = Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role) -> %% If there is an outstanding ssl_accept | recv %% From will be defined and send_or_reply will %% send the appropriate error message. ReasonCode = ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role), send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, {error, ReasonCode}); alert_user(Transport, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role) -> case ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role) of closed -> send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, {ssl_closed, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket)}); ReasonCode -> send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, {ssl_error, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket), ReasonCode}) end. log_alert(true, Info, Alert) -> Txt = ssl_alert:alert_txt(Alert), error_logger:format("SSL: ~p: ~s\n", [Info, Txt]); log_alert(false, _, _) -> ok. handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, #state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket, connection_states = ConnectionStates, log_alert = Log} = State) -> try %% Try to tell the other side {BinMsg, _} = encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, Transport) catch _:_ -> %% Can crash if we are in a uninitialized state ignore end, try %% Try to tell the local user log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert,StateName, State) catch _:_ -> ok end, {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State}. handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, _, #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, role = Role, renegotiation = {false, first}}) -> alert_user(Transport, Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role); handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, socket_options = Opts, transport_cb = Transport, user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, role = Role}) -> alert_user(Transport, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role). handle_unexpected_message(Msg, Info, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, {Info, Msg}, State). make_premaster_secret({MajVer, MinVer}, rsa) -> Rand = ssl:random_bytes(?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES-2), <>; make_premaster_secret(_, _) -> undefined. ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {true, Initiater}} = State) when Initiater == internal; Initiater == peer -> State#state{renegotiation = undefined}; ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {true, From}} = State) -> gen_fsm:reply(From, ok), State#state{renegotiation = undefined}; ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {false, first}, start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, timer = Timer} = State) when StartFrom =/= undefined -> gen_fsm:reply(StartFrom, connected), cancel_timer(Timer), State#state{renegotiation = undefined, start_or_recv_from = undefined, timer = undefined}; ack_connection(State) -> State. renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State) -> %% Handle same way as if server requested %% the renegotiation Hs0 = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(), connection(#hello_request{}, State#state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0}); renegotiate(#state{role = server, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> HelloRequest = tls_handshake:hello_request(), Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version), Hs0 = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0), Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg), {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Hs0}), next_state(connection, hello, Record, State#state{allow_renegotiate = true}). notify_senders(SendQueue) -> lists:foreach(fun({From, _}) -> gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, closed}) end, queue:to_list(SendQueue)). notify_renegotiater({true, From}) when not is_atom(From) -> gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, closed}); notify_renegotiater(_) -> ok. terminate_alert(Reason, Version, ConnectionStates) when Reason == normal; Reason == user_close -> {BinAlert, _} = encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Version, ConnectionStates), BinAlert; terminate_alert({shutdown, _}, Version, ConnectionStates) -> {BinAlert, _} = encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Version, ConnectionStates), BinAlert; terminate_alert(_, Version, ConnectionStates) -> {BinAlert, _} = encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR), Version, ConnectionStates), BinAlert. workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, gen_tcp = Transport) -> %% Standard trick to try to make sure all %% data sent to the tcp port is really delivered to the %% peer application before tcp port is closed so that the peer will %% get the correct TLS alert message and not only a transport close. ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]), Transport:shutdown(Socket, write), %% Will return when other side has closed or after 30 s %% e.g. we do not want to hang if something goes wrong %% with the network but we want to maximise the odds that %% peer application gets all data sent on the tcp connection. Transport:recv(Socket, 0, 30000); workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, Transport) -> Transport:close(Socket). get_timeout(#state{ssl_options=#ssl_options{hibernate_after = undefined}}) -> infinity; get_timeout(#state{ssl_options=#ssl_options{hibernate_after = HibernateAfter}}) -> HibernateAfter. handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = <<>>}}) -> %% No trusted certs specified ok; handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref, cert_db = CertDb, ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = undefined}}) -> %% Certs provided as DER directly can not be shared %% with other connections and it is safe to delete them when the connection ends. ssl_pkix_db:remove_trusted_certs(Ref, CertDb); handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{file_ref_db = undefined}) -> %% Something went wrong early (typically cacertfile does not exist) so there is nothing to handle ok; handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref, file_ref_db = RefDb, ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = File}}) -> case ssl_pkix_db:ref_count(Ref, RefDb, -1) of 0 -> ssl_manager:clean_cert_db(Ref, File); _ -> ok end. get_current_connection_state_prf(CStates, Direction) -> CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(CStates, Direction), CS#connection_state.security_parameters#security_parameters.prf_algorithm. get_pending_connection_state_prf(CStates, Direction) -> CS = tls_record:pending_connection_state(CStates, Direction), CS#connection_state.security_parameters#security_parameters.prf_algorithm. connection_hashsign(HashSign = {_, _}, _State) -> HashSign; connection_hashsign(_, #state{hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}) -> HashSign. %% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1. Signature Algorithms %% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the %% server MUST do the following: %% %% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA, %% DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had %% sent the value {sha1,rsa}. %% %% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS, %% DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}. %% %% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA, %% ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}. default_hashsign(_Version = {Major, Minor}, KeyExchange) when Major == 3 andalso Minor >= 3 andalso (KeyExchange == rsa orelse KeyExchange == dhe_rsa orelse KeyExchange == dh_rsa orelse KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa orelse KeyExchange == srp_rsa) -> {sha, rsa}; default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange) when KeyExchange == rsa; KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; KeyExchange == dh_rsa; KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa; KeyExchange == srp_rsa -> {md5sha, rsa}; default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange) when KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa; KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa -> {sha, ecdsa}; default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange) when KeyExchange == dhe_dss; KeyExchange == dh_dss; KeyExchange == srp_dss -> {sha, dsa}; default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange) when KeyExchange == dh_anon; KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; KeyExchange == psk; KeyExchange == dhe_psk; KeyExchange == rsa_psk; KeyExchange == srp_anon -> {null, anon}. start_or_recv_cancel_timer(infinity, _RecvFrom) -> undefined; start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom) -> erlang:send_after(Timeout, self(), {cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}). cancel_timer(undefined) -> ok; cancel_timer(Timer) -> erlang:cancel_timer(Timer), ok. handle_unrecv_data(StateName, #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]), case Transport:recv(Socket, 0, 0) of {error, closed} -> ok; {ok, Data} -> handle_close_alert(Data, StateName, State) end. handle_close_alert(Data, StateName, State0) -> case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of {#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, State} -> [Alert|_] = decode_alerts(EncAlerts), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State); _ -> ok end. select_curve(#state{client_ecc = {[Curve|_], _}}) -> {namedCurve, Curve}; select_curve(_) -> {namedCurve, ?secp256k1}.