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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="latin1" ?>
<!DOCTYPE chapter SYSTEM "chapter.dtd">
<chapter>
<header>
<copyright>
<year>2011</year>
<holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder>
</copyright>
<legalnotice>
The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
under the License.
</legalnotice>
<title>Standards Compliance</title>
<prepared></prepared>
<responsible></responsible>
<docno></docno>
<approved></approved>
<checked></checked>
<date></date>
<rev></rev>
<file>diameter_soc.xml</file>
</header>
<p>
Known points of questionable or non-compliance.</p>
<!-- ===================================================================== -->
<section>
<title>RFC 3588</title>
<list>
<item>
<p>
The End-to-End Security framework (section 2.9) isn't implemented
since it is largely unspecified.
The document that was to describe it
(reference [AAACMS]) was abandoned in an uncompleted state several
years ago and the current draft RFC deprecates the framework,
including the P Flag in the AVP header.</p>
</item>
<item>
<p>
There is no TLS support.
It's unclear (aka uninvestigated) how TLS would impact
diameter but IPsec can be used without it needing to know.</p>
</item>
<item>
<p>
There is no explicit support for peer discovery (section 5.2).
It can possibly be implemented on top of diameter as is but this is
probably something that diameter should do.
The current draft deprecates portions of the original RFC's mechanisms
however.</p>
</item>
<item>
<p>
The peer state machine's election process (section 5.6.4) isn't
implemented as specified since it assumes knowledge of a
peer's Origin-Host before sending it a CER. (The identity becoming known
upon reception of CEA.)
The possibility of configuring
the peer's Origin-Host could be added, along with handling of the case
that it sends something else, but for many applications this will
just be unnecessary configuration of a value that it has no control over.</p>
</item>
<!-- Transport protocol plus address/port, which we do know when
sending and receiving CER, is enough to definitely identify
the peer. However, there's nothing stopping a peer from using
different identities on different transport protocols, even
if it's maybe a bit far-fetched. -->
</list>
</section>
<!-- ===================================================================== -->
<section>
<title>RFC 3539</title>
<p>
RFC 3539 is more difficult to comply to since it discusses
problems as much as it requires functionality but all the MUST's are
covered, the watchdog state machine being the primary one.
Of the optional functionality, load balancing is left to the
diameter user (since it's the one deciding who to send to) and
there is no Congestion Manager.</p>
</section>
</chapter>
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