%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
%%
%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
%%
%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
%% under the License.
%%
%% %CopyrightEnd%
%%
%%
%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Purpose: Handles an ssl connection, e.i. both the setup
%% e.i. SSL-Handshake, SSL-Alert and SSL-Cipher protocols and delivering
%% data to the application. All data on the connectinon is received and
%% sent according to the SSL-record protocol.
%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
-module(ssl_connection).
-behaviour(gen_fsm).
-include("ssl_handshake.hrl").
-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
-include("ssl_record.hrl").
-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
-include("ssl_srp.hrl").
-include("ssl_srp_primes.hrl").
-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
%% Internal application API
-export([send/2, recv/3, connect/7, ssl_accept/6, handshake/2,
socket_control/3, close/1, shutdown/2,
new_user/2, get_opts/2, set_opts/2, info/1, session_info/1,
peer_certificate/1, renegotiation/1, negotiated_next_protocol/1, prf/5]).
%% Called by ssl_connection_sup
-export([start_link/7]).
%% gen_fsm callbacks
-export([init/1, hello/2, certify/2, cipher/2,
abbreviated/2, connection/2, handle_event/3,
handle_sync_event/4, handle_info/3, terminate/3, code_change/4]).
-record(state, {
role, % client | server
user_application, % {MonitorRef, pid()}
transport_cb, % atom() - callback module
data_tag, % atom() - ex tcp.
close_tag, % atom() - ex tcp_closed
error_tag, % atom() - ex tcp_error
host, % string() | ipadress()
port, % integer()
socket, % socket()
ssl_options, % #ssl_options{}
socket_options, % #socket_options{}
connection_states, % #connection_states{} from ssl_record.hrl
tls_packets = [], % Not yet handled decode ssl/tls packets.
tls_record_buffer, % binary() buffer of incomplete records
tls_handshake_buffer, % binary() buffer of incomplete handshakes
tls_handshake_history, % tls_handshake_history()
tls_cipher_texts, % list() received but not deciphered yet
cert_db, %
session, % #session{} from ssl_handshake.hrl
session_cache, %
session_cache_cb, %
negotiated_version, % tls_version()
client_certificate_requested = false,
key_algorithm, % atom as defined by cipher_suite
hashsign_algorithm, % atom as defined by cipher_suite
public_key_info, % PKIX: {Algorithm, PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}
private_key, % PKIX: #'RSAPrivateKey'{}
diffie_hellman_params, % PKIX: #'DHParameter'{} relevant for server side
diffie_hellman_keys, % {PublicKey, PrivateKey}
psk_identity, % binary() - server psk identity hint
srp_params, % #srp_user{}
srp_keys, % {PublicKey, PrivateKey}
premaster_secret, %
file_ref_db, % ets()
cert_db_ref, % ref()
bytes_to_read, % integer(), # bytes to read in passive mode
user_data_buffer, % binary()
log_alert, % boolean()
renegotiation, % {boolean(), From | internal | peer}
start_or_recv_from, % "gen_fsm From"
timer, % start_or_recv_timer
send_queue, % queue()
terminated = false, %
allow_renegotiate = true,
expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false :: boolean(),
next_protocol = undefined :: undefined | binary(),
client_ecc % {Curves, PointFmt}
}).
-define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS,
#'DHParameter'{prime = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME,
base = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR}).
-define(WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, 12000).
-type state_name() :: hello | abbreviated | certify | cipher | connection.
-type gen_fsm_state_return() :: {next_state, state_name(), #state{}} |
{next_state, state_name(), #state{}, timeout()} |
{stop, term(), #state{}}.
%%====================================================================
%% Internal application API
%%====================================================================
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec send(pid(), iodata()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Sends data over the ssl connection
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
send(Pid, Data) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(Pid, {application_data,
%% iolist_to_binary should really
%% be called iodata_to_binary()
erlang:iolist_to_binary(Data)}).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec recv(pid(), integer(), timeout()) ->
{ok, binary() | list()} | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Receives data when active = false
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
recv(Pid, Length, Timeout) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(Pid, {recv, Length, Timeout}).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec connect(host(), inet:port_number(), port(), {#ssl_options{}, #socket_options{}},
pid(), tuple(), timeout()) ->
{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Connect to an ssl server.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
connect(Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo, Timeout) ->
try start_fsm(client, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo,
Timeout)
catch
exit:{noproc, _} ->
{error, ssl_not_started}
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec ssl_accept(inet:port_number(), port(), {#ssl_options{}, #socket_options{}},
pid(), tuple(), timeout()) ->
{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Performs accept on an ssl listen socket. e.i. performs
%% ssl handshake.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
ssl_accept(Port, Socket, Opts, User, CbInfo, Timeout) ->
try start_fsm(server, "localhost", Port, Socket, Opts, User,
CbInfo, Timeout)
catch
exit:{noproc, _} ->
{error, ssl_not_started}
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec handshake(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Starts ssl handshake.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
handshake(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Timeout) ->
case sync_send_all_state_event(Pid, {start, Timeout}) of
connected ->
ok;
Error ->
Error
end.
%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec socket_control(port(), pid(), atom()) ->
{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Set the ssl process to own the accept socket
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
socket_control(Socket, Pid, Transport) ->
case Transport:controlling_process(Socket, Pid) of
ok ->
{ok, ssl_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket)};
{error, Reason} ->
{error, Reason}
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec close(pid()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Close an ssl connection
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
close(ConnectionPid) ->
case sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, close) of
{error, closed} ->
ok;
Other ->
Other
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec shutdown(pid(), atom()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Same as gen_tcp:shutdown/2
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
shutdown(ConnectionPid, How) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {shutdown, How}).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec new_user(pid(), pid()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Changes process that receives the messages when active = true
%% or once.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
new_user(ConnectionPid, User) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {new_user, User}).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec negotiated_next_protocol(pid()) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Returns the negotiated protocol
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
negotiated_next_protocol(ConnectionPid) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, negotiated_next_protocol).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec get_opts(pid(), list()) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Same as inet:getopts/2
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
get_opts(ConnectionPid, OptTags) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {get_opts, OptTags}).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec set_opts(pid(), list()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Same as inet:setopts/2
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
set_opts(ConnectionPid, Options) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {set_opts, Options}).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec info(pid()) -> {ok, {atom(), tuple()}} | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Returns ssl protocol and cipher used for the connection
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
info(ConnectionPid) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, info).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec session_info(pid()) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Returns info about the ssl session
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
session_info(ConnectionPid) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, session_info).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec peer_certificate(pid()) -> {ok, binary()| undefined} | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Returns the peer cert
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
peer_certificate(ConnectionPid) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, peer_certificate).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec renegotiation(pid()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Starts a renegotiation of the ssl session.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
renegotiation(ConnectionPid) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, renegotiate).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec prf(pid(), binary() | 'master_secret', binary(),
binary() | ssl:prf_random(), non_neg_integer()) ->
{ok, binary()} | {error, reason()} | {'EXIT', term()}.
%%
%% Description: use a ssl sessions TLS PRF to generate key material
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
prf(ConnectionPid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}).
%%====================================================================
%% ssl_connection_sup API
%%====================================================================
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) ->
{ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Creates a gen_fsm process which calls Module:init/1 to
%% initialize. To ensure a synchronized start-up procedure, this function
%% does not return until Module:init/1 has returned.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) ->
{ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}.
init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOpts0, _} = Options, User, CbInfo]) ->
State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo),
Handshake = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
TimeStamp = calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds({date(), time()}),
try ssl_init(SSLOpts0, Role) of
{ok, Ref, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, CacheHandle, OwnCert, Key, DHParams} ->
Session = State0#state.session,
State = State0#state{
tls_handshake_history = Handshake,
session = Session#session{own_certificate = OwnCert,
time_stamp = TimeStamp},
file_ref_db = FileRefHandle,
cert_db_ref = Ref,
cert_db = CertDbHandle,
session_cache = CacheHandle,
private_key = Key,
diffie_hellman_params = DHParams},
gen_fsm:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], hello, State, get_timeout(State))
catch
throw:Error ->
gen_fsm:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error,State0}, get_timeout(State0))
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Description:There should be one instance of this function for each
%% possible state name. Whenever a gen_fsm receives an event sent
%% using gen_fsm:send_event/2, the instance of this function with the
%% same name as the current state name StateName is called to handle
%% the event. It is also called if a timeout occurs.
%%
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec hello(start | #hello_request{} | #client_hello{} | #server_hello{} | term(),
#state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
hello(start, #state{host = Host, port = Port, role = client,
ssl_options = SslOpts,
session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = State0) ->
Hello = ssl_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts,
Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert),
Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version,
Handshake0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Hello, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
negotiated_version = Version, %% Requested version
session =
Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id},
tls_handshake_history = Handshake},
{Record, State} = next_record(State1),
next_state(hello, hello, Record, State);
hello(start, #state{role = server} = State0) ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State0),
next_state(hello, hello, Record, State);
hello(#hello_request{}, #state{role = client} = State0) ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State0),
next_state(hello, hello, Record, State);
hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
compression_method = Compression} = Hello,
#state{session = #session{session_id = OldId},
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
role = client,
negotiated_version = ReqVersion,
renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
ssl_options = SslOptions} = State0) ->
case ssl_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOptions, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, hello, State0);
{Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, NextProtocol} ->
{KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} =
ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion, KeyAlgorithm),
NewNextProtocol = case NextProtocol of
undefined ->
State0#state.next_protocol;
_ ->
NextProtocol
end,
State = State0#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm,
hashsign_algorithm = default_hashsign(Version, KeyAlgorithm),
negotiated_version = Version,
connection_states = ConnectionStates,
premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocol =/= undefined,
next_protocol = NewNextProtocol},
case ssl_session:is_new(OldId, NewId) of
true ->
handle_new_session(NewId, CipherSuite, Compression,
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates});
false ->
handle_resumed_session(NewId, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates})
end
end;
hello(Hello = #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion},
State = #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
session_cache = Cache,
session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
ssl_options = SslOpts}) ->
case ssl_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb,
ConnectionStates0, Cert}, Renegotiation) of
{Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, ProtocolsToAdvertise,
EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} ->
do_server_hello(Type, ProtocolsToAdvertise,
EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves,
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
negotiated_version = Version,
session = Session,
client_ecc = {EllipticCurves, EcPointFormats}});
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State)
end;
hello(timeout, State) ->
{ next_state, hello, State, hibernate };
hello(Msg, State) ->
handle_unexpected_message(Msg, hello, State).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec abbreviated(#hello_request{} | #finished{} | term(),
#state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
abbreviated(#hello_request{}, State0) ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State0),
next_state(abbreviated, hello, Record, State);
abbreviated(#finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished,
#state{role = server,
negotiated_version = Version,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake,
session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
connection_states = ConnectionStates0} =
State) ->
case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, client,
get_current_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, write),
MasterSecret, Handshake) of
verified ->
ConnectionStates = ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0),
next_state_connection(abbreviated,
ack_connection(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}));
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, abbreviated, State)
end;
abbreviated(#finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished,
#state{role = client, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
negotiated_version = Version,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, server,
get_pending_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, write),
MasterSecret, Handshake0) of
verified ->
ConnectionStates1 = ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_read, Data, ConnectionStates0),
{ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
finalize_handshake(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}, abbreviated),
next_state_connection(abbreviated,
ack_connection(State#state{tls_handshake_history = Handshake,
connection_states =
ConnectionStates}));
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, abbreviated, State)
end;
%% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec
%% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation
abbreviated(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol},
#state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = State0) ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{next_protocol = SelectedProtocol}),
next_state(abbreviated, abbreviated, Record, State);
abbreviated(timeout, State) ->
{ next_state, abbreviated, State, hibernate };
abbreviated(Msg, State) ->
handle_unexpected_message(Msg, abbreviated, State).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec certify(#hello_request{} | #certificate{} | #server_key_exchange{} |
#certificate_request{} | #server_hello_done{} | #client_key_exchange{} | term(),
#state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
certify(#hello_request{}, State0) ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State0),
next_state(certify, hello, Record, State);
certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = []},
#state{role = server, negotiated_version = Version,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer,
fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} =
State) ->
Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE),
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State);
certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = []},
#state{role = server,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer,
fail_if_no_peer_cert = false}} =
State0) ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = false}),
next_state(certify, certify, Record, State);
certify(#certificate{} = Cert,
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
role = Role,
cert_db = CertDbHandle,
cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
ssl_options = Opts} = State) ->
case ssl_handshake:certify(Cert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Opts#ssl_options.depth,
Opts#ssl_options.verify,
Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role) of
{PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo} ->
handle_peer_cert(PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo,
State#state{client_certificate_requested = false});
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State)
end;
certify(#server_key_exchange{} = KeyExchangeMsg,
#state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version,
key_algorithm = Alg} = State0)
when Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dhe_rsa;
Alg == ecdhe_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa;
Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon;
Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk;
Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon ->
case handle_server_key(KeyExchangeMsg, State0) of
#state{} = State1 ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State1),
next_state(certify, certify, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
end;
certify(#server_key_exchange{} = Msg,
#state{role = client, key_algorithm = rsa} = State) ->
handle_unexpected_message(Msg, certify_server_keyexchange, State);
certify(#certificate_request{}, State0) ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = true}),
next_state(certify, certify, Record, State);
%% PSK and RSA_PSK might bypass the Server-Key-Exchange
certify(#server_hello_done{},
#state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined},
negotiated_version = Version,
psk_identity = PSKIdentity,
premaster_secret = undefined,
role = client,
key_algorithm = Alg} = State0)
when Alg == psk ->
case server_psk_master_secret(PSKIdentity, State0) of
#state{} = State ->
client_certify_and_key_exchange(State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
end;
certify(#server_hello_done{},
#state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined},
ssl_options = SslOpts,
negotiated_version = Version,
psk_identity = PSKIdentity,
premaster_secret = undefined,
role = client,
key_algorithm = Alg} = State0)
when Alg == rsa_psk ->
case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, SslOpts#ssl_options.user_lookup_fun) of
{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa),
Len = byte_size(PSK),
RealPMS = <<?UINT16(48), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>,
State1 = State0#state{premaster_secret = PremasterSecret},
State = master_from_premaster_secret(RealPMS, State1),
client_certify_and_key_exchange(State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
Alert;
_ ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)
end;
%% Master secret was determined with help of server-key exchange msg
certify(#server_hello_done{},
#state{session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} = Session,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
negotiated_version = Version,
premaster_secret = undefined,
role = client} = State0) ->
case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session,
ConnectionStates0, client) of
{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates},
client_certify_and_key_exchange(State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
end;
%% Master secret is calculated from premaster_secret
certify(#server_hello_done{},
#state{session = Session0,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
negotiated_version = Version,
premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
role = client} = State0) ->
case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret,
ConnectionStates0, client) of
{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
Session = Session0#session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
session = Session},
client_certify_and_key_exchange(State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
end;
certify(#client_key_exchange{} = Msg,
#state{role = server,
client_certificate_requested = true,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} = State) ->
%% We expect a certificate here
handle_unexpected_message(Msg, certify_client_key_exchange, State);
certify(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys},
State = #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg, negotiated_version = Version}) ->
try
certify_client_key_exchange(ssl_handshake:decode_client_key(Keys, KeyAlg, Version), State)
catch
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State)
end;
certify(timeout, State) ->
{ next_state, certify, State, hibernate };
certify(Msg, State) ->
handle_unexpected_message(Msg, certify, State).
certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS},
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
session = Session0,
private_key = Key} = State0) ->
PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:decrypt_premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret,
ConnectionStates0, server) of
{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
Session = Session0#session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
session = Session},
{Record, State} = next_record(State1),
next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
end;
certify_client_key_exchange(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey},
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{prime = P,
base = G} = Params,
diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} = State0) ->
case dh_master_secret(Params, ClientPublicDhKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, State0) of
#state{} = State1 ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State1),
next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
end;
certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicEcDhPoint},
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey} = State0) ->
case ec_dh_master_secret(ECDHKey, #'ECPoint'{point = ClientPublicEcDhPoint}, State0) of
#state{} = State1 ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State1),
next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
end;
certify_client_key_exchange(#client_psk_identity{identity = ClientPSKIdentity},
#state{negotiated_version = Version} = State0) ->
case server_psk_master_secret(ClientPSKIdentity, State0) of
#state{} = State1 ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State1),
next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
end;
certify_client_key_exchange(#client_dhe_psk_identity{
identity = ClientPSKIdentity,
dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey},
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{prime = P,
base = G},
diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} = State0) ->
case dhe_psk_master_secret(ClientPSKIdentity, P, G, ClientPublicDhKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, State0) of
#state{} = State1 ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State1),
next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
end;
certify_client_key_exchange(#client_rsa_psk_identity{
identity = PskIdentity,
exchange_keys =
#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS}},
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
private_key = Key} = State0) ->
PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:decrypt_premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
case server_rsa_psk_master_secret(PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, State0) of
#state{} = State1 ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State1),
next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
end;
certify_client_key_exchange(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey},
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
srp_params =
#srp_user{prime = Prime,
verifier = Verifier}
} = State0) ->
case server_srp_master_secret(Verifier, Prime, ClientPublicKey, State0) of
#state{} = State1 ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State1),
next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec cipher(#hello_request{} | #certificate_verify{} | #finished{} | term(),
#state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
cipher(#hello_request{}, State0) ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State0),
next_state(cipher, hello, Record, State);
cipher(#certificate_verify{signature = Signature, hashsign_algorithm = CertHashSign},
#state{role = server,
public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo,
negotiated_version = Version,
session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
hashsign_algorithm = ConnectionHashSign,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake
} = State0) ->
HashSign = case CertHashSign of
{_, _} -> CertHashSign;
_ -> ConnectionHashSign
end,
case ssl_handshake:certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo,
Version, HashSign, MasterSecret, Handshake) of
valid ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State0),
next_state(cipher, cipher, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, cipher, State0)
end;
%% client must send a next protocol message if we are expecting it
cipher(#finished{}, #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true,
next_protocol = undefined, negotiated_version = Version} = State0) ->
handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), Version, cipher, State0);
cipher(#finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished,
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
host = Host,
port = Port,
role = Role,
session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}
= Session0,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished,
opposite_role(Role),
get_current_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, read),
MasterSecret, Handshake0) of
verified ->
Session = register_session(Role, Host, Port, Session0),
cipher_role(Role, Data, Session, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, cipher, State)
end;
%% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec
%% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation
cipher(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol},
#state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = State0) ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{next_protocol = SelectedProtocol}),
next_state(cipher, cipher, Record, State);
cipher(timeout, State) ->
{ next_state, cipher, State, hibernate };
cipher(Msg, State) ->
handle_unexpected_message(Msg, cipher, State).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec connection(#hello_request{} | #client_hello{} | term(),
#state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
connection(#hello_request{}, #state{host = Host, port = Port,
socket = Socket,
session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
ssl_options = SslOpts,
negotiated_version = Version,
transport_cb = Transport,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State0) ->
Hello = ssl_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts,
Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Hello, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
{Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{connection_states =
ConnectionStates,
session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id},
tls_handshake_history = Handshake}),
next_state(connection, hello, Record, State);
connection(#client_hello{} = Hello, #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = true} = State) ->
%% Mitigate Computational DoS attack
%% http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2011/10/ssltls_and_computational_dos.html
%% http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/ Rather than disabling client
%% initiated renegotiation we will disallow many client initiated
%% renegotiations immediately after each other.
erlang:send_after(?WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, self(), allow_renegotiate),
hello(Hello, State#state{allow_renegotiate = false});
connection(#client_hello{}, #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = false,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
negotiated_version = Version} = State0) ->
Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates} =
encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
next_state_connection(connection, State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates});
connection(timeout, State) ->
{next_state, connection, State, hibernate};
connection(Msg, State) ->
handle_unexpected_message(Msg, connection, State).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Description: Whenever a gen_fsm receives an event sent using
%% gen_fsm:send_all_state_event/2, this function is called to handle
%% the event. Not currently used!
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
handle_event(_Event, StateName, State) ->
{next_state, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Description: Whenever a gen_fsm receives an event sent using
%% gen_fsm:sync_send_all_state_event/2,3, this function is called to handle
%% the event.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
handle_sync_event({application_data, Data}, From, connection, State) ->
%% We should look into having a worker process to do this to
%% parallize send and receive decoding and not block the receiver
%% if sending is overloading the socket.
try
write_application_data(Data, From, State)
catch throw:Error ->
{reply, Error, connection, State, get_timeout(State)}
end;
handle_sync_event({application_data, Data}, From, StateName,
#state{send_queue = Queue} = State) ->
%% In renegotiation priorities handshake, send data when handshake is finished
{next_state, StateName,
State#state{send_queue = queue:in({From, Data}, Queue)},
get_timeout(State)};
handle_sync_event({start, Timeout}, StartFrom, hello, State) ->
Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, StartFrom),
hello(start, State#state{start_or_recv_from = StartFrom,
timer = Timer});
%% The two clauses below could happen if a server upgrades a socket in
%% active mode. Note that in this case we are lucky that
%% controlling_process has been evalueated before receiving handshake
%% messages from client. The server should put the socket in passive
%% mode before telling the client that it is willing to upgrade
%% and before calling ssl:ssl_accept/2. These clauses are
%% here to make sure it is the users problem and not owers if
%% they upgrade an active socket.
handle_sync_event({start,_}, _, connection, State) ->
{reply, connected, connection, State, get_timeout(State)};
handle_sync_event({start,_}, _From, error, {Error, State = #state{}}) ->
{stop, {shutdown, Error}, {error, Error}, State};
handle_sync_event({start, Timeout}, StartFrom, StateName, State) ->
Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, StartFrom),
{next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = StartFrom,
timer = Timer}, get_timeout(State)};
handle_sync_event(close, _, StateName, State) ->
%% Run terminate before returning
%% so that the reuseaddr inet-option will work
%% as intended.
(catch terminate(user_close, StateName, State)),
{stop, normal, ok, State#state{terminated = true}};
handle_sync_event({shutdown, How0}, _, StateName,
#state{transport_cb = Transport,
negotiated_version = Version,
connection_states = ConnectionStates,
socket = Socket} = State) ->
case How0 of
How when How == write; How == both ->
Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY),
{BinMsg, _} =
encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg);
_ ->
ok
end,
case Transport:shutdown(Socket, How0) of
ok ->
{reply, ok, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
Error ->
{stop, normal, Error, State}
end;
handle_sync_event({recv, N, Timeout}, RecvFrom, connection = StateName, State0) ->
Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom),
passive_receive(State0#state{bytes_to_read = N,
start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, timer = Timer}, StateName);
%% Doing renegotiate wait with handling request until renegotiate is
%% finished. Will be handled by next_state_is_connection/2.
handle_sync_event({recv, N, Timeout}, RecvFrom, StateName, State) ->
Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom),
{next_state, StateName, State#state{bytes_to_read = N, start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom,
timer = Timer},
get_timeout(State)};
handle_sync_event({new_user, User}, _From, StateName,
State =#state{user_application = {OldMon, _}}) ->
NewMon = erlang:monitor(process, User),
erlang:demonitor(OldMon, [flush]),
{reply, ok, StateName, State#state{user_application = {NewMon,User}},
get_timeout(State)};
handle_sync_event({get_opts, OptTags}, _From, StateName,
#state{socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport,
socket_options = SockOpts} = State) ->
OptsReply = get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, OptTags, SockOpts, []),
{reply, OptsReply, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
handle_sync_event(negotiated_next_protocol, _From, StateName, #state{next_protocol = undefined} = State) ->
{reply, {error, next_protocol_not_negotiated}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
handle_sync_event(negotiated_next_protocol, _From, StateName, #state{next_protocol = NextProtocol} = State) ->
{reply, {ok, NextProtocol}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
handle_sync_event({set_opts, Opts0}, _From, StateName,
#state{socket_options = Opts1,
socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport,
user_data_buffer = Buffer} = State0) ->
{Reply, Opts} = set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts0, Opts1, []),
State1 = State0#state{socket_options = Opts},
if
Opts#socket_options.active =:= false ->
{reply, Reply, StateName, State1, get_timeout(State1)};
Buffer =:= <<>>, Opts1#socket_options.active =:= false ->
%% Need data, set active once
{Record, State2} = next_record_if_active(State1),
case next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State2) of
{next_state, StateName, State, Timeout} ->
{reply, Reply, StateName, State, Timeout};
{stop, Reason, State} ->
{stop, Reason, State}
end;
Buffer =:= <<>> ->
%% Active once already set
{reply, Reply, StateName, State1, get_timeout(State1)};
true ->
case read_application_data(<<>>, State1) of
Stop = {stop,_,_} ->
Stop;
{Record, State2} ->
case next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State2) of
{next_state, StateName, State, Timeout} ->
{reply, Reply, StateName, State, Timeout};
{stop, Reason, State} ->
{stop, Reason, State}
end
end
end;
handle_sync_event(renegotiate, From, connection, State) ->
renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, From}});
handle_sync_event(renegotiate, _, StateName, State) ->
{reply, {error, already_renegotiating}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
handle_sync_event({prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}, _, StateName,
#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
ConnectionState =
ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
#security_parameters{master_secret = MasterSecret,
client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
Reply = try
SecretToUse = case Secret of
_ when is_binary(Secret) -> Secret;
master_secret -> MasterSecret
end,
SeedToUse = lists:reverse(
lists:foldl(fun(X, Acc) when is_binary(X) -> [X|Acc];
(client_random, Acc) -> [ClientRandom|Acc];
(server_random, Acc) -> [ServerRandom|Acc]
end, [], Seed)),
ssl_handshake:prf(Version, SecretToUse, Label, SeedToUse, WantedLength)
catch
exit:_ -> {error, badarg};
error:Reason -> {error, Reason}
end,
{reply, Reply, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
handle_sync_event(info, _, StateName,
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
session = #session{cipher_suite = Suite}} = State) ->
AtomVersion = ssl_record:protocol_version(Version),
{reply, {ok, {AtomVersion, ssl:suite_definition(Suite)}},
StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
handle_sync_event(session_info, _, StateName,
#state{session = #session{session_id = Id,
cipher_suite = Suite}} = State) ->
{reply, [{session_id, Id},
{cipher_suite, ssl:suite_definition(Suite)}],
StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
handle_sync_event(peer_certificate, _, StateName,
#state{session = #session{peer_certificate = Cert}}
= State) ->
{reply, {ok, Cert}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Description: This function is called by a gen_fsm when it receives any
%% other message than a synchronous or asynchronous event
%% (or a system message).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% raw data from TCP, unpack records
handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName,
#state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) ->
case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of
{Record, State} ->
next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0),
{stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State0}
end;
handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName,
#state{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag,
negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
%% Note that as of TLS 1.1,
%% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a
%% session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform
%% with widespread implementation practice.
case Version of
{1, N} when N >= 1 ->
ok;
_ ->
%% As invalidate_sessions here causes performance issues,
%% we will conform to the widespread implementation
%% practice and go aginst the spec
%%invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session)
ok
end,
handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State),
{stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State};
handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, econnaborted}, StateName,
#state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, role = Role,
error_tag = ErrorTag} = State) when StateName =/= connection ->
alert_user(Transport, Socket, StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role),
{stop, normal, State};
handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket,
error_tag = ErrorTag} = State) ->
Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Reason]),
error_logger:info_report(Report),
handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State),
{stop, normal, State};
handle_info({'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, _}, _,
State = #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid}}) ->
{stop, normal, State};
handle_info(allow_renegotiate, StateName, State) ->
{next_state, StateName, State#state{allow_renegotiate = true}, get_timeout(State)};
handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, StartFrom}, StateName,
#state{renegotiation = {false, first}} = State) when StateName =/= connection ->
gen_fsm:reply(StartFrom, {error, timeout}),
{stop, {shutdown, user_timeout}, State#state{timer = undefined}};
handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}, StateName, #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State) ->
gen_fsm:reply(RecvFrom, {error, timeout}),
{next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined,
bytes_to_read = undefined,
timer = undefined}, get_timeout(State)};
handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, _RecvFrom}, StateName, State) ->
{next_state, StateName, State#state{timer = undefined}, get_timeout(State)};
handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) ->
Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Got unexpected info: ~p ~n", [Msg]),
error_logger:info_report(Report),
{next_state, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Description:This function is called by a gen_fsm when it is about
%% to terminate. It should be the opposite of Module:init/1 and do any
%% necessary cleaning up. When it returns, the gen_fsm terminates with
%% Reason. The return value is ignored.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
terminate(_, _, #state{terminated = true}) ->
%% Happens when user closes the connection using ssl:close/1
%% we want to guarantee that Transport:close has been called
%% when ssl:close/1 returns.
ok;
terminate({shutdown, transport_closed}, StateName, #state{send_queue = SendQueue,
renegotiation = Renegotiate} = State) ->
handle_unrecv_data(StateName, State),
handle_trusted_certs_db(State),
notify_senders(SendQueue),
notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate);
terminate({shutdown, own_alert}, _StateName, #state{send_queue = SendQueue,
renegotiation = Renegotiate} = State) ->
handle_trusted_certs_db(State),
notify_senders(SendQueue),
notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate);
terminate(Reason, connection, #state{negotiated_version = Version,
connection_states = ConnectionStates,
transport_cb = Transport,
socket = Socket, send_queue = SendQueue,
renegotiation = Renegotiate} = State) ->
handle_trusted_certs_db(State),
notify_senders(SendQueue),
notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate),
BinAlert = terminate_alert(Reason, Version, ConnectionStates),
Transport:send(Socket, BinAlert),
workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, Transport);
terminate(_Reason, _StateName, #state{transport_cb = Transport,
socket = Socket, send_queue = SendQueue,
renegotiation = Renegotiate} = State) ->
handle_trusted_certs_db(State),
notify_senders(SendQueue),
notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate),
Transport:close(Socket).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% code_change(OldVsn, StateName, State, Extra) -> {ok, StateName, NewState}
%% Description: Convert process state when code is changed
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _Extra) ->
{ok, StateName, State}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_} = Opts,
User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo,
Timeout) ->
try
{ok, Pid} = ssl_connection_sup:start_child([Role, Host, Port, Socket,
Opts, User, CbInfo]),
{ok, SslSocket} = socket_control(Socket, Pid, CbModule),
ok = handshake(SslSocket, Timeout),
{ok, SslSocket}
catch
error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} ->
Error
end;
start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = true},_} = Opts,
User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo,
Timeout) ->
try
{ok, Pid} = ssl_connection_sup:start_child_dist([Role, Host, Port, Socket,
Opts, User, CbInfo]),
{ok, SslSocket} = socket_control(Socket, Pid, CbModule),
ok = handshake(SslSocket, Timeout),
{ok, SslSocket}
catch
error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} ->
Error
end.
ssl_init(SslOpts, Role) ->
init_manager_name(SslOpts#ssl_options.erl_dist),
{ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, OwnCert} = init_certificates(SslOpts, Role),
PrivateKey =
init_private_key(PemCacheHandle, SslOpts#ssl_options.key, SslOpts#ssl_options.keyfile,
SslOpts#ssl_options.password, Role),
DHParams = init_diffie_hellman(PemCacheHandle, SslOpts#ssl_options.dh, SslOpts#ssl_options.dhfile, Role),
{ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, CacheHandle, OwnCert, PrivateKey, DHParams}.
init_manager_name(false) ->
put(ssl_manager, ssl_manager);
init_manager_name(true) ->
put(ssl_manager, ssl_manager_dist).
init_certificates(#ssl_options{cacerts = CaCerts,
cacertfile = CACertFile,
certfile = CertFile,
cert = Cert}, Role) ->
{ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle} =
try
Certs = case CaCerts of
undefined ->
CACertFile;
_ ->
{der, CaCerts}
end,
{ok, _, _, _, _, _} = ssl_manager:connection_init(Certs, Role)
catch
_:Reason ->
file_error(CACertFile, {cacertfile, Reason})
end,
init_certificates(Cert, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, CertFile, Role).
init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, <<>>, _) ->
{ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, undefined};
init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, CertFile, client) ->
try
%% Ignoring potential proxy-certificates see:
%% http://dev.globus.org/wiki/Security/ProxyFileFormat
[OwnCert|_] = ssl_certificate:file_to_certificats(CertFile, PemCacheHandle),
{ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, OwnCert}
catch _Error:_Reason ->
{ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, undefined}
end;
init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, CertFile, server) ->
try
[OwnCert|_] = ssl_certificate:file_to_certificats(CertFile, PemCacheHandle),
{ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, OwnCert}
catch
_:Reason ->
file_error(CertFile, {certfile, Reason})
end;
init_certificates(Cert, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, _, _) ->
{ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, Cert}.
init_private_key(_, undefined, <<>>, _Password, _Client) ->
undefined;
init_private_key(DbHandle, undefined, KeyFile, Password, _) ->
try
{ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(KeyFile, DbHandle),
[PemEntry] = [PemEntry || PemEntry = {PKey, _ , _} <- List,
PKey =:= 'RSAPrivateKey' orelse
PKey =:= 'DSAPrivateKey' orelse
PKey =:= 'ECPrivateKey' orelse
PKey =:= 'PrivateKeyInfo'
],
private_key(public_key:pem_entry_decode(PemEntry, Password))
catch
_:Reason ->
file_error(KeyFile, {keyfile, Reason})
end;
%% First two clauses are for backwards compatibility
init_private_key(_,{rsa, PrivateKey}, _, _,_) ->
init_private_key('RSAPrivateKey', PrivateKey);
init_private_key(_,{dsa, PrivateKey},_,_,_) ->
init_private_key('DSAPrivateKey', PrivateKey);
init_private_key(_,{ec, PrivateKey},_,_,_) ->
init_private_key('ECPrivateKey', PrivateKey);
init_private_key(_,{Asn1Type, PrivateKey},_,_,_) ->
private_key(init_private_key(Asn1Type, PrivateKey)).
init_private_key(Asn1Type, PrivateKey) ->
public_key:der_decode(Asn1Type, PrivateKey).
private_key(#'PrivateKeyInfo'{privateKeyAlgorithm =
#'PrivateKeyInfo_privateKeyAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'rsaEncryption'},
privateKey = Key}) ->
public_key:der_decode('RSAPrivateKey', iolist_to_binary(Key));
private_key(#'PrivateKeyInfo'{privateKeyAlgorithm =
#'PrivateKeyInfo_privateKeyAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'id-dsa'},
privateKey = Key}) ->
public_key:der_decode('DSAPrivateKey', iolist_to_binary(Key));
private_key(Key) ->
Key.
-spec(file_error(_,_) -> no_return()).
file_error(File, Throw) ->
case Throw of
{Opt,{badmatch, {error, {badmatch, Error}}}} ->
throw({options, {Opt, binary_to_list(File), Error}});
_ ->
throw(Throw)
end.
init_diffie_hellman(_,Params, _,_) when is_binary(Params)->
public_key:der_decode('DHParameter', Params);
init_diffie_hellman(_,_,_, client) ->
undefined;
init_diffie_hellman(_,_,undefined, _) ->
?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS;
init_diffie_hellman(DbHandle,_, DHParamFile, server) ->
try
{ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(DHParamFile,DbHandle),
case [Entry || Entry = {'DHParameter', _ , _} <- List] of
[Entry] ->
public_key:pem_entry_decode(Entry);
[] ->
?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS
end
catch
_:Reason ->
file_error(DHParamFile, {dhfile, Reason})
end.
sync_send_all_state_event(FsmPid, Event) ->
try gen_fsm:sync_send_all_state_event(FsmPid, Event, infinity)
catch
exit:{noproc, _} ->
{error, closed};
exit:{normal, _} ->
{error, closed};
exit:{{shutdown, _},_} ->
{error, closed}
end.
%% We do currently not support cipher suites that use fixed DH.
%% If we want to implement that we should add a code
%% here to extract DH parameters form cert.
handle_peer_cert(PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo,
#state{session = Session} = State0) ->
State1 = State0#state{session =
Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert},
public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo},
State2 = case PublicKeyInfo of
{?'id-ecPublicKey', #'ECPoint'{point = _ECPoint} = PublicKey, PublicKeyParams} ->
ECDHKey = public_key:generate_key(PublicKeyParams),
State3 = State1#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey},
ec_dh_master_secret(ECDHKey, PublicKey, State3);
_ -> State1
end,
{Record, State} = next_record(State2),
next_state(certify, certify, Record, State).
certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
transport_cb = Transport,
negotiated_version = Version,
cert_db = CertDbHandle,
cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert},
socket = Socket,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
Certificate = ssl_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client),
{BinCert, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Certificate, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinCert),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State) ->
State.
verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
transport_cb = Transport,
negotiated_version = Version,
socket = Socket,
private_key = PrivateKey,
session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret,
own_certificate = OwnCert},
hashsign_algorithm = HashSign,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
%%TODO: for TLS 1.2 we can choose a different/stronger HashSign combination for this.
case ssl_handshake:client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret,
Version, HashSign, PrivateKey, Handshake0) of
#certificate_verify{} = Verified ->
{BinVerified, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Verified, Version,
ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinVerified),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
ignore ->
State;
#alert{} = Alert ->
throw(Alert)
end;
verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State) ->
State.
do_server_hello(Type, NextProtocolsToSend,
EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves,
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
session = #session{session_id = SessId},
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}}
= State0) when is_atom(Type) ->
ServerHello =
ssl_handshake:server_hello(SessId, Version,
ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation,
NextProtocolsToSend, EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves),
State = server_hello(ServerHello,
State0#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation =
NextProtocolsToSend =/= undefined}),
case Type of
new ->
new_server_hello(ServerHello, State);
resumed ->
resumed_server_hello(State)
end.
new_server_hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
compression_method = Compression,
session_id = SessionId},
#state{session = Session0,
negotiated_version = Version} = State0) ->
try server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0) of
#state{} = State1 ->
State2 = server_hello_done(State1),
Session =
Session0#session{session_id = SessionId,
cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
compression_method = Compression},
{Record, State} = next_record(State2#state{session = Session}),
next_state(hello, certify, Record, State)
catch
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0)
end.
resumed_server_hello(#state{session = Session,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
negotiated_version = Version} = State0) ->
case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session,
ConnectionStates0, server) of
{_, ConnectionStates1} ->
State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
session = Session},
{ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
finalize_handshake(State1, abbreviated),
State2 = State1#state{connection_states =
ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake},
{Record, State} = next_record(State2),
next_state(hello, abbreviated, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0)
end.
handle_new_session(NewId, CipherSuite, Compression, #state{session = Session0} = State0) ->
Session = Session0#session{session_id = NewId,
cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
compression_method = Compression},
{Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{session = Session}),
next_state(hello, certify, Record, State).
handle_resumed_session(SessId, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
negotiated_version = Version,
host = Host, port = Port,
session_cache = Cache,
session_cache_cb = CacheCb} = State0) ->
Session = CacheCb:lookup(Cache, {{Host, Port}, SessId}),
case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session,
ConnectionStates0, client) of
{_, ConnectionStates} ->
{Record, State} =
next_record(State0#state{
connection_states = ConnectionStates,
session = Session}),
next_state(hello, abbreviated, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0)
end.
client_certify_and_key_exchange(#state{negotiated_version = Version} =
State0) ->
try do_client_certify_and_key_exchange(State0) of
State1 = #state{} ->
{ConnectionStates, Handshake} = finalize_handshake(State1, certify),
State2 = State1#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
%% Reinitialize
client_certificate_requested = false,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake},
{Record, State} = next_record(State2),
next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State)
catch
throw:#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
end.
do_client_certify_and_key_exchange(State0) ->
State1 = certify_client(State0),
State2 = key_exchange(State1),
verify_client_cert(State2).
server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0) ->
State1 = certify_server(State0),
State2 = key_exchange(State1),
request_client_cert(State2).
server_hello(ServerHello, #state{transport_cb = Transport,
socket = Socket,
negotiated_version = Version,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
CipherSuite = ServerHello#server_hello.cipher_suite,
{KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates1, Handshake1} =
encode_handshake(ServerHello, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake1,
key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm,
hashsign_algorithm = default_hashsign(Version, KeyAlgorithm)}.
server_hello_done(#state{transport_cb = Transport,
socket = Socket,
negotiated_version = Version,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
HelloDone = ssl_handshake:server_hello_done(),
{BinHelloDone, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(HelloDone, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinHelloDone),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake}.
certify_server(#state{key_algorithm = Algo} = State)
when Algo == dh_anon; Algo == ecdh_anon; Algo == psk; Algo == dhe_psk; Algo == srp_anon ->
State;
certify_server(#state{transport_cb = Transport,
socket = Socket,
negotiated_version = Version,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
cert_db = CertDbHandle,
cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert}} = State) ->
case ssl_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) of
CertMsg = #certificate{} ->
{BinCertMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(CertMsg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinCertMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake
};
Alert = #alert{} ->
throw(Alert)
end.
key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa} = State) ->
State;
key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params,
private_key = PrivateKey,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
negotiated_version = Version,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport
} = State)
when Algo == dhe_dss;
Algo == dhe_rsa;
Algo == dh_anon ->
DHKeys = public_key:generate_key(Params),
ConnectionState =
ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
#security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, DHKeys, Params,
HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
ServerRandom,
PrivateKey}),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
key_exchange(#state{role = server, private_key = Key, key_algorithm = Algo} = State)
when Algo == ecdh_ecdsa; Algo == ecdh_rsa ->
State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Key};
key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
private_key = PrivateKey,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
negotiated_version = Version,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport
} = State)
when Algo == ecdhe_ecdsa; Algo == ecdhe_rsa;
Algo == ecdh_anon ->
ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(select_curve(State)),
ConnectionState =
ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
#security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdh, ECDHKeys,
HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
ServerRandom,
PrivateKey}),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake1} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake1};
key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State) ->
State;
key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint},
hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
private_key = PrivateKey,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
negotiated_version = Version,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport
} = State) ->
ConnectionState =
ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
#security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
ServerRandom,
PrivateKey}),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint},
hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params,
private_key = PrivateKey,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
negotiated_version = Version,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport
} = State) ->
DHKeys = public_key:generate_key(Params),
ConnectionState =
ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
#security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {dhe_psk, PskIdentityHint, DHKeys, Params,
HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
ServerRandom,
PrivateKey}),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State) ->
State;
key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint},
hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
private_key = PrivateKey,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
negotiated_version = Version,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport
} = State) ->
ConnectionState =
ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
#security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
ServerRandom,
PrivateKey}),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = LookupFun},
hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
session = #session{srp_username = Username},
private_key = PrivateKey,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
negotiated_version = Version,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport
} = State)
when Algo == srp_dss;
Algo == srp_rsa;
Algo == srp_anon ->
SrpParams = handle_srp_identity(Username, LookupFun),
Keys = case generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams, 0) of
Alert = #alert{} ->
throw(Alert);
Keys0 = {_,_} ->
Keys0
end,
ConnectionState =
ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
#security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, Keys, SrpParams,
HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
ServerRandom,
PrivateKey}),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
srp_params = SrpParams,
srp_keys = Keys,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
key_exchange(#state{role = client,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
key_algorithm = rsa,
public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo,
negotiated_version = Version,
premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
Msg = rsa_key_exchange(Version, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
key_exchange(#state{role = client,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
key_algorithm = Algorithm,
negotiated_version = Version,
diffie_hellman_keys = {DhPubKey, _},
socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State)
when Algorithm == dhe_dss;
Algorithm == dhe_rsa;
Algorithm == dh_anon ->
Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {dh, DhPubKey}),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
key_exchange(#state{role = client,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
key_algorithm = Algorithm,
negotiated_version = Version,
diffie_hellman_keys = Keys,
socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State)
when Algorithm == ecdhe_ecdsa; Algorithm == ecdhe_rsa;
Algorithm == ecdh_ecdsa; Algorithm == ecdh_rsa;
Algorithm == ecdh_anon ->
Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {ecdh, Keys}),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
key_exchange(#state{role = client,
ssl_options = SslOpts,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
key_algorithm = psk,
negotiated_version = Version,
socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity}),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
key_exchange(#state{role = client,
ssl_options = SslOpts,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
key_algorithm = dhe_psk,
negotiated_version = Version,
diffie_hellman_keys = {DhPubKey, _},
socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {dhe_psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, DhPubKey}),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
key_exchange(#state{role = client,
ssl_options = SslOpts,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
key_algorithm = rsa_psk,
public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo,
negotiated_version = Version,
premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
Msg = rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
key_exchange(#state{role = client,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
key_algorithm = Algorithm,
negotiated_version = Version,
srp_keys = {ClientPubKey, _},
socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State)
when Algorithm == srp_dss;
Algorithm == srp_rsa;
Algorithm == srp_anon ->
Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {srp, ClientPubKey}),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake}.
rsa_key_exchange(Version, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _})
when Algorithm == ?rsaEncryption;
Algorithm == ?md2WithRSAEncryption;
Algorithm == ?md5WithRSAEncryption;
Algorithm == ?sha1WithRSAEncryption;
Algorithm == ?sha224WithRSAEncryption;
Algorithm == ?sha256WithRSAEncryption;
Algorithm == ?sha384WithRSAEncryption;
Algorithm == ?sha512WithRSAEncryption
->
ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version,
{premaster_secret, PremasterSecret,
PublicKeyInfo});
rsa_key_exchange(_, _, _) ->
throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _})
when Algorithm == ?rsaEncryption;
Algorithm == ?md2WithRSAEncryption;
Algorithm == ?md5WithRSAEncryption;
Algorithm == ?sha1WithRSAEncryption;
Algorithm == ?sha224WithRSAEncryption;
Algorithm == ?sha256WithRSAEncryption;
Algorithm == ?sha384WithRSAEncryption;
Algorithm == ?sha512WithRSAEncryption
->
ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version,
{psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret,
PublicKeyInfo});
rsa_psk_key_exchange(_, _, _, _) ->
throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer},
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
cert_db = CertDbHandle,
cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
negotiated_version = Version,
socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport} = State) ->
Msg = ssl_handshake:certificate_request(ConnectionStates0, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{client_certificate_requested = true,
connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_none}} =
State) ->
State.
finalize_handshake(State, StateName) ->
ConnectionStates0 = cipher_protocol(State),
ConnectionStates =
ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0,
write),
State1 = State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates},
State2 = next_protocol(State1),
finished(State2, StateName).
next_protocol(#state{role = server} = State) ->
State;
next_protocol(#state{next_protocol = undefined} = State) ->
State;
next_protocol(#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false} = State) ->
State;
next_protocol(#state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket,
negotiated_version = Version,
next_protocol = NextProtocol,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
NextProtocolMessage = ssl_handshake:next_protocol(NextProtocol),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(NextProtocolMessage, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake}.
cipher_protocol(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
socket = Socket,
negotiated_version = Version,
transport_cb = Transport}) ->
{BinChangeCipher, ConnectionStates} =
encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{},
Version, ConnectionStates0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinChangeCipher),
ConnectionStates.
finished(#state{role = Role, socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version,
transport_cb = Transport,
session = Session,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake0}, StateName) ->
MasterSecret = Session#session.master_secret,
Finished = ssl_handshake:finished(Version, Role,
get_current_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, write),
MasterSecret, Handshake0),
ConnectionStates1 = save_verify_data(Role, Finished, ConnectionStates0, StateName),
{BinFinished, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
encode_handshake(Finished, Version, ConnectionStates1, Handshake0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinFinished),
{ConnectionStates, Handshake}.
save_verify_data(client, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, certify) ->
ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates);
save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, cipher) ->
ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates);
save_verify_data(client, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbreviated) ->
ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates);
save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbreviated) ->
ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates).
handle_server_key(#server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys},
#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg,
negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
Params = ssl_handshake:decode_server_key(Keys, KeyAlg, Version),
HashSign = connection_hashsign(Params#server_key_params.hashsign, State),
case HashSign of
{_, SignAlgo} when SignAlgo == anon; SignAlgo == ecdh_anon ->
server_master_secret(Params#server_key_params.params, State);
_ ->
verify_server_key(Params, HashSign, State)
end.
verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params = Params,
params_bin = EncParams,
signature = Signature},
HashSign = {HashAlgo, _},
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
public_key_info = PubKeyInfo,
connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) ->
ConnectionState =
ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
#security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
Hash = ssl_handshake:server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo,
<<ClientRandom/binary,
ServerRandom/binary,
EncParams/binary>>),
case ssl_handshake:verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo) of
true ->
server_master_secret(Params, State);
false ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)
end.
server_master_secret(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey},
State) ->
dh_master_secret(P, G, ServerPublicDhKey, undefined, State);
server_master_secret(#server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve, public = ECServerPubKey},
State) ->
ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(ECCurve),
ec_dh_master_secret(ECDHKeys, #'ECPoint'{point = ECServerPubKey}, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys});
server_master_secret(#server_psk_params{
hint = IdentityHint},
State) ->
%% store for later use
State#state{psk_identity = IdentityHint};
server_master_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{
hint = IdentityHint,
dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey}},
State) ->
dhe_psk_master_secret(IdentityHint, P, G, ServerPublicDhKey, undefined, State);
server_master_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B},
State) ->
client_srp_master_secret(G, N, S, B, undefined, State).
master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret,
#state{session = Session,
negotiated_version = Version, role = Role,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret,
ConnectionStates0, Role) of
{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
State#state{
session =
Session#session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
connection_states = ConnectionStates};
#alert{} = Alert ->
Alert
end.
dh_master_secret(#'DHParameter'{} = Params, OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, State) ->
PremasterSecret =
public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params),
master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State).
dh_master_secret(Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, undefined, State) ->
Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} = crypto:generate_key(dh, [Prime, Base]),
dh_master_secret(Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys});
dh_master_secret(Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, State) ->
PremasterSecret =
crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base]),
master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State).
ec_dh_master_secret(ECDHKeys, ECPoint, State) ->
PremasterSecret =
public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys),
master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State).
handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun)
when LookupFun == undefined ->
error;
handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) ->
Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState).
server_psk_master_secret(ClientPSKIdentity,
#state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) ->
case handle_psk_identity(ClientPSKIdentity, SslOpts#ssl_options.user_lookup_fun) of
{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
Len = byte_size(PSK),
PremasterSecret = <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>,
master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
Alert;
_ ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)
end.
dhe_psk_master_secret(PSKIdentity, Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, undefined, State) ->
Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} =
crypto:generate_key(dh, [Prime, Base]),
dhe_psk_master_secret(PSKIdentity, Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey,
State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys});
dhe_psk_master_secret(PSKIdentity, Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey,
#state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) ->
case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, SslOpts#ssl_options.user_lookup_fun) of
{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
DHSecret =
crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey,
[Prime, Base]),
DHLen = erlang:byte_size(DHSecret),
Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK),
PremasterSecret = <<?UINT16(DHLen), DHSecret/binary, ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>,
master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
Alert;
_ ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)
end.
server_rsa_psk_master_secret(PskIdentity, PremasterSecret,
#state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) ->
case handle_psk_identity(PskIdentity, SslOpts#ssl_options.user_lookup_fun) of
{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
Len = byte_size(PSK),
RealPMS = <<?UINT16(48), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>,
master_from_premaster_secret(RealPMS, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
Alert;
_ ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)
end.
generate_srp_server_keys(_SrpParams, 10) ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams =
#srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime,
verifier = Verifier}, N) ->
case crypto:generate_key(srp, {host, [Verifier, Generator, Prime, '6a']}) of
error ->
generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams, N+1);
Keys ->
Keys
end.
generate_srp_client_keys(_Generator, _Prime, 10) ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, N) ->
case crypto:generate_key(srp, {user, [Generator, Prime, '6a']}) of
error ->
generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, N+1);
Keys ->
Keys
end.
handle_srp_identity(Username, {Fun, UserState}) ->
case Fun(srp, Username, UserState) of
{ok, {SRPParams, Salt, DerivedKey}}
when is_atom(SRPParams), is_binary(Salt), is_binary(DerivedKey) ->
{Generator, Prime} = ssl_srp_primes:get_srp_params(SRPParams),
Verifier = crypto:mod_pow(Generator, DerivedKey, Prime),
#srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime,
salt = Salt, verifier = Verifier};
#alert{} = Alert ->
throw(Alert);
_ ->
throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
end.
server_srp_master_secret(Verifier, Prime, ClientPub, State = #state{srp_keys = ServerKeys}) ->
case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPub, ServerKeys, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of
error ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
PremasterSecret ->
master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State)
end.
client_srp_master_secret(_Generator, _Prime, _Salt, _ServerPub, #alert{} = Alert, _State) ->
Alert;
client_srp_master_secret(Generator, Prime, Salt, ServerPub, undefined, State) ->
Keys = generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, 0),
client_srp_master_secret(Generator, Prime, Salt, ServerPub, Keys, State#state{srp_keys = Keys});
client_srp_master_secret(Generator, Prime, Salt, ServerPub, ClientKeys,
#state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) ->
case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of
ok ->
{Username, Password} = SslOpts#ssl_options.srp_identity,
DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]),
case crypto:compute_key(srp, ServerPub, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of
error ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
PremasterSecret ->
master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State)
end;
_ ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)
end.
cipher_role(client, Data, Session, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
ConnectionStates = ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0),
next_state_connection(cipher, ack_connection(State#state{session = Session,
connection_states = ConnectionStates}));
cipher_role(server, Data, Session, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
ConnectionStates1 = ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_read, Data, ConnectionStates0),
{ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
finalize_handshake(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
session = Session}, cipher),
next_state_connection(cipher, ack_connection(State#state{connection_states =
ConnectionStates,
session = Session,
tls_handshake_history =
Handshake})).
encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
ssl_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates).
encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
ssl_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates).
encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0) ->
Frag = ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version),
Handshake1 = ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Handshake0, Frag),
{E, ConnectionStates1} =
ssl_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
{E, ConnectionStates1, Handshake1}.
encode_packet(Data, #socket_options{packet=Packet}) ->
case Packet of
1 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 8, (1 bsl 8) - 1);
2 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 16, (1 bsl 16) - 1);
4 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 32, (1 bsl 32) - 1);
_ -> Data
end.
encode_size_packet(Bin, Size, Max) ->
Len = erlang:byte_size(Bin),
case Len > Max of
true -> throw({error, {badarg, {packet_to_large, Len, Max}}});
false -> <<Len:Size, Bin/binary>>
end.
decode_alerts(Bin) ->
decode_alerts(Bin, []).
decode_alerts(<<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
A = ?ALERT_REC(Level, Description),
decode_alerts(Rest, [A | Acc]);
decode_alerts(<<>>, Acc) ->
lists:reverse(Acc, []).
passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) ->
case Buffer of
<<>> ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State0),
next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State);
_ ->
case read_application_data(<<>>, State0) of
Stop = {stop, _, _} ->
Stop;
{Record, State} ->
next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State)
end
end.
read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid},
socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport,
socket_options = SOpts,
bytes_to_read = BytesToRead,
start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom,
timer = Timer,
user_data_buffer = Buffer0} = State0) ->
Buffer1 = if
Buffer0 =:= <<>> -> Data;
Data =:= <<>> -> Buffer0;
true -> <<Buffer0/binary, Data/binary>>
end,
case get_data(SOpts, BytesToRead, Buffer1) of
{ok, ClientData, Buffer} -> % Send data
SocketOpt = deliver_app_data(Transport, Socket, SOpts, ClientData, Pid, RecvFrom),
cancel_timer(Timer),
State = State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer,
start_or_recv_from = undefined,
timer = undefined,
bytes_to_read = undefined,
socket_options = SocketOpt
},
if
SocketOpt#socket_options.active =:= false; Buffer =:= <<>> ->
%% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv
%% Active and empty, get more data
next_record_if_active(State);
true -> %% We have more data
read_application_data(<<>>, State)
end;
{more, Buffer} -> % no reply, we need more data
next_record(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer});
{passive, Buffer} ->
next_record_if_active(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer});
{error,_Reason} -> %% Invalid packet in packet mode
deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Buffer1, Pid, RecvFrom),
{stop, normal, State0}
end.
write_application_data(Data0, From, #state{socket = Socket,
negotiated_version = Version,
transport_cb = Transport,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
send_queue = SendQueue,
socket_options = SockOpts,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}} = State) ->
Data = encode_packet(Data0, SockOpts),
case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of
true ->
renegotiate(State#state{send_queue = queue:in_r({From, Data}, SendQueue),
renegotiation = {true, internal}});
false ->
{Msgs, ConnectionStates} = ssl_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0),
Result = Transport:send(Socket, Msgs),
{reply, Result,
connection, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, get_timeout(State)}
end.
time_to_renegotiate(_Data, #connection_states{current_write =
#connection_state{sequence_number = Num}}, RenegotiateAt) ->
%% We could do test:
%% is_time_to_renegotiate((erlang:byte_size(_Data) div ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH) + 1, RenegotiateAt),
%% but we chose to have a some what lower renegotiateAt and a much cheaper test
is_time_to_renegotiate(Num, RenegotiateAt).
is_time_to_renegotiate(N, M) when N < M->
false;
is_time_to_renegotiate(_,_) ->
true.
%% Picks ClientData
get_data(_, _, <<>>) ->
{more, <<>>};
%% Recv timed out save buffer data until next recv
get_data(#socket_options{active=false}, undefined, Buffer) ->
{passive, Buffer};
get_data(#socket_options{active=Active, packet=Raw}, BytesToRead, Buffer)
when Raw =:= raw; Raw =:= 0 -> %% Raw Mode
if
Active =/= false orelse BytesToRead =:= 0 ->
%% Active true or once, or passive mode recv(0)
{ok, Buffer, <<>>};
byte_size(Buffer) >= BytesToRead ->
%% Passive Mode, recv(Bytes)
<<Data:BytesToRead/binary, Rest/binary>> = Buffer,
{ok, Data, Rest};
true ->
%% Passive Mode not enough data
{more, Buffer}
end;
get_data(#socket_options{packet=Type, packet_size=Size}, _, Buffer) ->
PacketOpts = [{packet_size, Size}],
case decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts) of
{more, _} ->
{more, Buffer};
Decoded ->
Decoded
end.
decode_packet({http, headers}, Buffer, PacketOpts) ->
decode_packet(httph, Buffer, PacketOpts);
decode_packet({http_bin, headers}, Buffer, PacketOpts) ->
decode_packet(httph_bin, Buffer, PacketOpts);
decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts) ->
erlang:decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts).
%% Just like with gen_tcp sockets, an ssl socket that has been configured with
%% {packet, http} (or {packet, http_bin}) will automatically switch to expect
%% HTTP headers after it sees a HTTP Request or HTTP Response line. We
%% represent the current state as follows:
%% #socket_options.packet =:= http: Expect a HTTP Request/Response line
%% #socket_options.packet =:= {http, headers}: Expect HTTP Headers
%% Note that if the user has explicitly configured the socket to expect
%% HTTP headers using the {packet, httph} option, we don't do any automatic
%% switching of states.
deliver_app_data(Transport, Socket, SOpts = #socket_options{active=Active, packet=Type},
Data, Pid, From) ->
send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_reply(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Data)),
SO = case Data of
{P, _, _, _} when ((P =:= http_request) or (P =:= http_response)),
((Type =:= http) or (Type =:= http_bin)) ->
SOpts#socket_options{packet={Type, headers}};
http_eoh when tuple_size(Type) =:= 2 ->
% End of headers - expect another Request/Response line
{Type1, headers} = Type,
SOpts#socket_options{packet=Type1};
_ ->
SOpts
end,
case Active of
once ->
SO#socket_options{active=false};
_ ->
SO
end.
format_reply(_, _,#socket_options{active = false, mode = Mode, packet = Packet,
header = Header}, Data) ->
{ok, do_format_reply(Mode, Packet, Header, Data)};
format_reply(Transport, Socket, #socket_options{active = _, mode = Mode, packet = Packet,
header = Header}, Data) ->
{ssl, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket), do_format_reply(Mode, Packet, Header, Data)}.
deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SO= #socket_options{active = Active}, Data, Pid, From) ->
send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SO, Data)).
format_packet_error(_, _,#socket_options{active = false, mode = Mode}, Data) ->
{error, {invalid_packet, do_format_reply(Mode, raw, 0, Data)}};
format_packet_error(Transport, Socket, #socket_options{active = _, mode = Mode}, Data) ->
{ssl_error, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket), {invalid_packet, do_format_reply(Mode, raw, 0, Data)}}.
do_format_reply(binary, _, N, Data) when N > 0 -> % Header mode
header(N, Data);
do_format_reply(binary, _, _, Data) ->
Data;
do_format_reply(list, Packet, _, Data)
when Packet == http; Packet == {http, headers};
Packet == http_bin; Packet == {http_bin, headers};
Packet == httph; Packet == httph_bin ->
Data;
do_format_reply(list, _,_, Data) ->
binary_to_list(Data).
header(0, <<>>) ->
[];
header(_, <<>>) ->
[];
header(0, Binary) ->
Binary;
header(N, Binary) ->
<<?BYTE(ByteN), NewBinary/binary>> = Binary,
[ByteN | header(N-1, NewBinary)].
send_or_reply(false, _Pid, From, Data) when From =/= undefined ->
gen_fsm:reply(From, Data);
%% Can happen when handling own alert or tcp error/close and there is
%% no outstanding gen_fsm sync events
send_or_reply(false, no_pid, _, _) ->
ok;
send_or_reply(_, Pid, _From, Data) ->
send_user(Pid, Data).
opposite_role(client) ->
server;
opposite_role(server) ->
client.
send_user(Pid, Msg) ->
Pid ! Msg.
handle_tls_handshake(Handle, StateName, #state{tls_packets = [Packet]} = State) ->
FsmReturn = {next_state, StateName, State#state{tls_packets = []}},
Handle(Packet, FsmReturn);
handle_tls_handshake(Handle, StateName, #state{tls_packets = [Packet | Packets]} = State0) ->
FsmReturn = {next_state, StateName, State0#state{tls_packets = Packets}},
case Handle(Packet, FsmReturn) of
{next_state, NextStateName, State, _Timeout} ->
handle_tls_handshake(Handle, NextStateName, State);
{stop, _,_} = Stop ->
Stop
end.
next_state(Current,_, #alert{} = Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, Current, State);
next_state(_,Next, no_record, State) ->
{next_state, Next, State, get_timeout(State)};
next_state(_,Next, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, State) ->
Alerts = decode_alerts(EncAlerts),
handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, Next, State, get_timeout(State)});
next_state(Current, Next, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data},
State0 = #state{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf0, negotiated_version = Version}) ->
Handle =
fun({#hello_request{} = Packet, _}, {next_state, connection = SName, State}) ->
%% This message should not be included in handshake
%% message hashes. Starts new handshake (renegotiation)
Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
?MODULE:SName(Packet, State#state{tls_handshake_history=Hs0,
renegotiation = {true, peer}});
({#hello_request{} = Packet, _}, {next_state, SName, State}) ->
%% This message should not be included in handshake
%% message hashes. Already in negotiation so it will be ignored!
?MODULE:SName(Packet, State);
({#client_hello{} = Packet, Raw}, {next_state, connection = SName, State}) ->
Version = Packet#client_hello.client_version,
Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
Hs1 = ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hs0, Raw),
?MODULE:SName(Packet, State#state{tls_handshake_history=Hs1,
renegotiation = {true, peer}});
({Packet, Raw}, {next_state, SName, State = #state{tls_handshake_history=Hs0}}) ->
Hs1 = ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hs0, Raw),
?MODULE:SName(Packet, State#state{tls_handshake_history=Hs1});
(_, StopState) -> StopState
end,
try
{Packets, Buf} = ssl_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version,Data,Buf0),
State = State0#state{tls_packets = Packets, tls_handshake_buffer = Buf},
handle_tls_handshake(Handle, Next, State)
catch throw:#alert{} = Alert ->
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, Current, State0)
end;
next_state(_, StateName, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, State0) ->
case read_application_data(Data, State0) of
Stop = {stop,_,_} ->
Stop;
{Record, State} ->
next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State)
end;
next_state(Current, Next, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = <<1>>} =
_ChangeCipher,
#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
ConnectionStates1 =
ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
{Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}),
next_state(Current, Next, Record, State);
next_state(Current, Next, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, State0) ->
%% Ignore unknown type
{Record, State} = next_record(State0),
next_state(Current, Next, Record, State).
next_tls_record(Data, #state{tls_record_buffer = Buf0,
tls_cipher_texts = CT0} = State0) ->
case ssl_record:get_tls_records(Data, Buf0) of
{Records, Buf1} ->
CT1 = CT0 ++ Records,
next_record(State0#state{tls_record_buffer = Buf1,
tls_cipher_texts = CT1});
#alert{} = Alert ->
Alert
end.
next_record(#state{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [], socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport} = State) ->
ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]),
{no_record, State};
next_record(#state{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest],
connection_states = ConnStates0} = State) ->
case ssl_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0) of
{Plain, ConnStates} ->
{Plain, State#state{tls_cipher_texts = Rest, connection_states = ConnStates}};
#alert{} = Alert ->
{Alert, State}
end;
next_record(State) ->
{no_record, State}.
next_record_if_active(State =
#state{socket_options =
#socket_options{active = false}}) ->
{no_record ,State};
next_record_if_active(State) ->
next_record(State).
next_state_connection(StateName, #state{send_queue = Queue0,
negotiated_version = Version,
socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0
} = State) ->
%% Send queued up data that was queued while renegotiating
case queue:out(Queue0) of
{{value, {From, Data}}, Queue} ->
{Msgs, ConnectionStates} =
ssl_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0),
Result = Transport:send(Socket, Msgs),
gen_fsm:reply(From, Result),
next_state_connection(StateName,
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
send_queue = Queue});
{empty, Queue0} ->
next_state_is_connection(StateName, State)
end.
%% In next_state_is_connection/1: clear tls_handshake,
%% premaster_secret and public_key_info (only needed during handshake)
%% to reduce memory foot print of a connection.
next_state_is_connection(_, State =
#state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom,
socket_options =
#socket_options{active = false}}) when RecvFrom =/= undefined ->
passive_receive(State#state{premaster_secret = undefined,
public_key_info = undefined,
tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history()}, connection);
next_state_is_connection(StateName, State0) ->
{Record, State} = next_record_if_active(State0),
next_state(StateName, connection, Record, State#state{premaster_secret = undefined,
public_key_info = undefined,
tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history()}).
register_session(client, Host, Port, #session{is_resumable = new} = Session0) ->
Session = Session0#session{is_resumable = true},
ssl_manager:register_session(Host, Port, Session),
Session;
register_session(server, _, Port, #session{is_resumable = new} = Session0) ->
Session = Session0#session{is_resumable = true},
ssl_manager:register_session(Port, Session),
Session;
register_session(_, _, _, Session) ->
Session. %% Already registered
invalidate_session(client, Host, Port, Session) ->
ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Host, Port, Session);
invalidate_session(server, _, Port, Session) ->
ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Port, Session).
initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions}, User,
{CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) ->
ConnectionStates = ssl_record:init_connection_states(Role),
SessionCacheCb = case application:get_env(ssl, session_cb) of
{ok, Cb} when is_atom(Cb) ->
Cb;
_ ->
ssl_session_cache
end,
Monitor = erlang:monitor(process, User),
#state{socket_options = SocketOptions,
%% We do not want to save the password in the state so that
%% could be written in the clear into error logs.
ssl_options = SSLOptions#ssl_options{password = undefined},
session = #session{is_resumable = new},
transport_cb = CbModule,
data_tag = DataTag,
close_tag = CloseTag,
error_tag = ErrorTag,
role = Role,
host = Host,
port = Port,
socket = Socket,
connection_states = ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_buffer = <<>>,
tls_record_buffer = <<>>,
tls_cipher_texts = [],
user_application = {Monitor, User},
user_data_buffer = <<>>,
log_alert = true,
session_cache_cb = SessionCacheCb,
renegotiation = {false, first},
start_or_recv_from = undefined,
send_queue = queue:new()
}.
get_socket_opts(_,_,[], _, Acc) ->
{ok, Acc};
get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [mode | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts,
[{mode, SockOpts#socket_options.mode} | Acc]);
get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [packet | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
case SockOpts#socket_options.packet of
{Type, headers} ->
get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{packet, Type} | Acc]);
Type ->
get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{packet, Type} | Acc])
end;
get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [header | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts,
[{header, SockOpts#socket_options.header} | Acc]);
get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [active | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts,
[{active, SockOpts#socket_options.active} | Acc]);
get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [Tag | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
try ssl_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, [Tag]) of
{ok, [Opt]} ->
get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [Opt | Acc]);
{error, Error} ->
{error, {options, {socket_options, Tag, Error}}}
catch
%% So that inet behavior does not crash our process
_:Error -> {error, {options, {socket_options, Tag, Error}}}
end;
get_socket_opts(_, _,Opts, _,_) ->
{error, {options, {socket_options, Opts, function_clause}}}.
set_socket_opts(_,_, [], SockOpts, []) ->
{ok, SockOpts};
set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [], SockOpts, Other) ->
%% Set non emulated options
try ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) of
ok ->
{ok, SockOpts};
{error, InetError} ->
{{error, {options, {socket_options, Other, InetError}}}, SockOpts}
catch
_:Error ->
%% So that inet behavior does not crash our process
{{error, {options, {socket_options, Other, Error}}}, SockOpts}
end;
set_socket_opts(Transport,Socket, [{mode, Mode}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) when Mode == list; Mode == binary ->
set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts,
SockOpts#socket_options{mode = Mode}, Other);
set_socket_opts(_, _, [{mode, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) ->
{{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}}}, SockOpts};
set_socket_opts(Transport,Socket, [{packet, Packet}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) when Packet == raw;
Packet == 0;
Packet == 1;
Packet == 2;
Packet == 4;
Packet == asn1;
Packet == cdr;
Packet == sunrm;
Packet == fcgi;
Packet == tpkt;
Packet == line;
Packet == http;
Packet == httph;
Packet == http_bin;
Packet == httph_bin ->
set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts,
SockOpts#socket_options{packet = Packet}, Other);
set_socket_opts(_, _, [{packet, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) ->
{{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}}}, SockOpts};
set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [{header, Header}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) when is_integer(Header) ->
set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts,
SockOpts#socket_options{header = Header}, Other);
set_socket_opts(_, _, [{header, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) ->
{{error,{options, {socket_options, Opt}}}, SockOpts};
set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [{active, Active}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) when Active == once;
Active == true;
Active == false ->
set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts,
SockOpts#socket_options{active = Active}, Other);
set_socket_opts(_, _, [{active, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) ->
{{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}} }, SockOpts};
set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [Opt | Opts], SockOpts, Other) ->
set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, SockOpts, [Opt | Other]).
handle_alerts([], Result) ->
Result;
handle_alerts(_, {stop, _, _} = Stop) ->
%% If it is a fatal alert immediately close
Stop;
handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State, _Timeout}) ->
handle_alerts(Alerts, handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)).
handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName,
#state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
start_or_recv_from = From, host = Host,
port = Port, session = Session, user_application = {_Mon, Pid},
log_alert = Log, role = Role, socket_options = Opts} = State) ->
invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session),
log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
alert_user(Transport, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role),
{stop, normal, State};
handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert,
StateName, State) ->
handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State),
{stop, {shutdown, peer_close}, State};
handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName,
#state{log_alert = Log, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) ->
log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State),
{stop, {shutdown, peer_close}, State};
handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName,
#state{log_alert = Log, renegotiation = {true, From}} = State0) ->
log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}),
{Record, State} = next_record(State0),
next_state(StateName, connection, Record, State);
handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?USER_CANCELED} = Alert, StateName,
#state{log_alert = Log} = State0) ->
log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
{Record, State} = next_record(State0),
next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State).
alert_user(Transport, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role) ->
alert_user(Transport,Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role);
alert_user(Transport, Socket,_, _, _, From, Alert, Role) ->
alert_user(Transport, Socket, From, Alert, Role).
alert_user(Transport, Socket, From, Alert, Role) ->
alert_user(Transport, Socket, false, no_pid, From, Alert, Role).
alert_user(_,_, false = Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role) ->
%% If there is an outstanding ssl_accept | recv
%% From will be defined and send_or_reply will
%% send the appropriate error message.
ReasonCode = ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role),
send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, {error, ReasonCode});
alert_user(Transport, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role) ->
case ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role) of
closed ->
send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From,
{ssl_closed, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket)});
ReasonCode ->
send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From,
{ssl_error, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket), ReasonCode})
end.
log_alert(true, Info, Alert) ->
Txt = ssl_alert:alert_txt(Alert),
error_logger:format("SSL: ~p: ~s\n", [Info, Txt]);
log_alert(false, _, _) ->
ok.
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName,
#state{transport_cb = Transport,
socket = Socket,
connection_states = ConnectionStates,
log_alert = Log} = State) ->
try %% Try to tell the other side
{BinMsg, _} =
encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, Transport)
catch _:_ -> %% Can crash if we are in a uninitialized state
ignore
end,
try %% Try to tell the local user
log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
handle_normal_shutdown(Alert,StateName, State)
catch _:_ ->
ok
end,
{stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State}.
handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, _, #state{socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport,
start_or_recv_from = StartFrom,
role = Role, renegotiation = {false, first}}) ->
alert_user(Transport, Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role);
handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{socket = Socket,
socket_options = Opts,
transport_cb = Transport,
user_application = {_Mon, Pid},
start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, role = Role}) ->
alert_user(Transport, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role).
handle_unexpected_message(Msg, Info, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE),
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, {Info, Msg}, State).
make_premaster_secret({MajVer, MinVer}, rsa) ->
Rand = ssl:random_bytes(?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES-2),
<<?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), Rand/binary>>;
make_premaster_secret(_, _) ->
undefined.
ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {true, Initiater}} = State)
when Initiater == internal;
Initiater == peer ->
State#state{renegotiation = undefined};
ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {true, From}} = State) ->
gen_fsm:reply(From, ok),
State#state{renegotiation = undefined};
ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {false, first},
start_or_recv_from = StartFrom,
timer = Timer} = State) when StartFrom =/= undefined ->
gen_fsm:reply(StartFrom, connected),
cancel_timer(Timer),
State#state{renegotiation = undefined, start_or_recv_from = undefined, timer = undefined};
ack_connection(State) ->
State.
renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State) ->
%% Handle same way as if server requested
%% the renegotiation
Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
connection(#hello_request{}, State#state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0});
renegotiate(#state{role = server,
socket = Socket,
transport_cb = Transport,
negotiated_version = Version,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(),
Frag = ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version),
Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates} =
ssl_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
{Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{connection_states =
ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_history = Hs0}),
next_state(connection, hello, Record, State#state{allow_renegotiate = true}).
notify_senders(SendQueue) ->
lists:foreach(fun({From, _}) ->
gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, closed})
end, queue:to_list(SendQueue)).
notify_renegotiater({true, From}) when not is_atom(From) ->
gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, closed});
notify_renegotiater(_) ->
ok.
terminate_alert(Reason, Version, ConnectionStates) when Reason == normal;
Reason == user_close ->
{BinAlert, _} = encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY),
Version, ConnectionStates),
BinAlert;
terminate_alert({shutdown, _}, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
{BinAlert, _} = encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY),
Version, ConnectionStates),
BinAlert;
terminate_alert(_, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
{BinAlert, _} = encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR),
Version, ConnectionStates),
BinAlert.
workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, gen_tcp = Transport) ->
%% Standard trick to try to make sure all
%% data sent to the tcp port is really delivered to the
%% peer application before tcp port is closed so that the peer will
%% get the correct TLS alert message and not only a transport close.
ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]),
Transport:shutdown(Socket, write),
%% Will return when other side has closed or after 30 s
%% e.g. we do not want to hang if something goes wrong
%% with the network but we want to maximise the odds that
%% peer application gets all data sent on the tcp connection.
Transport:recv(Socket, 0, 30000);
workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, Transport) ->
Transport:close(Socket).
get_timeout(#state{ssl_options=#ssl_options{hibernate_after = undefined}}) ->
infinity;
get_timeout(#state{ssl_options=#ssl_options{hibernate_after = HibernateAfter}}) ->
HibernateAfter.
handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = <<>>}}) ->
%% No trusted certs specified
ok;
handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref,
cert_db = CertDb,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = undefined}}) ->
%% Certs provided as DER directly can not be shared
%% with other connections and it is safe to delete them when the connection ends.
ssl_certificate_db:remove_trusted_certs(Ref, CertDb);
handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{file_ref_db = undefined}) ->
%% Something went wrong early (typically cacertfile does not exist) so there is nothing to handle
ok;
handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref,
file_ref_db = RefDb,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = File}}) ->
case ssl_certificate_db:ref_count(Ref, RefDb, -1) of
0 ->
ssl_manager:clean_cert_db(Ref, File);
_ ->
ok
end.
get_current_connection_state_prf(CStates, Direction) ->
CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(CStates, Direction),
CS#connection_state.security_parameters#security_parameters.prf_algorithm.
get_pending_connection_state_prf(CStates, Direction) ->
CS = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(CStates, Direction),
CS#connection_state.security_parameters#security_parameters.prf_algorithm.
connection_hashsign(HashSign = {_, _}, _State) ->
HashSign;
connection_hashsign(_, #state{hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}) ->
HashSign.
%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1. Signature Algorithms
%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
%% server MUST do the following:
%%
%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA,
%% DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had
%% sent the value {sha1,rsa}.
%%
%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS,
%% DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}.
%%
%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
%% ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}.
default_hashsign(_Version = {Major, Minor}, KeyExchange)
when Major == 3 andalso Minor >= 3 andalso
(KeyExchange == rsa orelse
KeyExchange == dhe_rsa orelse
KeyExchange == dh_rsa orelse
KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa orelse
KeyExchange == srp_rsa) ->
{sha, rsa};
default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange)
when KeyExchange == rsa;
KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
KeyExchange == dh_rsa;
KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa;
KeyExchange == srp_rsa ->
{md5sha, rsa};
default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange)
when KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa;
KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa;
KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa ->
{sha, ecdsa};
default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange)
when KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
KeyExchange == dh_dss;
KeyExchange == srp_dss ->
{sha, dsa};
default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange)
when KeyExchange == dh_anon;
KeyExchange == ecdh_anon;
KeyExchange == psk;
KeyExchange == dhe_psk;
KeyExchange == rsa_psk;
KeyExchange == srp_anon ->
{null, anon}.
start_or_recv_cancel_timer(infinity, _RecvFrom) ->
undefined;
start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom) ->
erlang:send_after(Timeout, self(), {cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}).
cancel_timer(undefined) ->
ok;
cancel_timer(Timer) ->
erlang:cancel_timer(Timer),
ok.
handle_unrecv_data(StateName, #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport} = State) ->
ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]),
case Transport:recv(Socket, 0, 0) of
{error, closed} ->
ok;
{ok, Data} ->
handle_close_alert(Data, StateName, State)
end.
handle_close_alert(Data, StateName, State0) ->
case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of
{#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, State} ->
[Alert|_] = decode_alerts(EncAlerts),
handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State);
_ ->
ok
end.
select_curve(#state{client_ecc = {[Curve|_], _}}) ->
{namedCurve, Curve};
select_curve(_) ->
{namedCurve, ?secp256k1}.