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authorIngela Anderton Andin <[email protected]>2014-09-01 15:39:21 +0200
committerIngela Anderton Andin <[email protected]>2014-09-09 11:28:36 +0200
commit1c9e0651c4917b63f49d8505dba7e820da8e32d2 (patch)
tree3aeadc7daec09d1b2f9c3303484859468ab34a1e /erts
parent6e2fd45bad619fd7e06f21798eac94d415dff64e (diff)
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ssl, public_key: Add new option partial_chain
Check that the certificate chain ends with a trusted ROOT CA e.i. a self-signed certificate, but provide an option partial_chain to enable the application to define an intermediat CA as trusted. TLS RFC says: "unknown_ca A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This message is always fatal." and also states: "certificate_list This is a sequence (chain) of certificates. The sender's certificate MUST come first in the list. Each following certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. Because certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root certificate authority MAY be omitted from the chain, under the assumption that the remote end must already possess it in order to validate it in any case." X509 RFC says: "The selection of a trust anchor is a matter of policy: it could be the top CA in a hierarchical PKI, the CA that issued the verifier's own certificate(s), or any other CA in a network PKI. The path validation procedure is the same regardless of the choice of trust anchor. In addition, different applications may rely on different trust anchors, or may accept paths that begin with any of a set of trust anchors."
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