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author | Björn Gustavsson <[email protected]> | 2015-01-12 12:25:52 +0100 |
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committer | Björn Gustavsson <[email protected]> | 2015-01-12 12:25:52 +0100 |
commit | 8ee2d5f59f0e3ceee6895b5af41e563a29a22be2 (patch) | |
tree | e6a25247f76d72cefaacbce0d5affc1033e7adb0 /lib/asn1/test/asn1_SUITE_data/rfcs/PKIXCRMF-2009.asn1 | |
parent | 71b35f78c12f31ae33cf51fd948c22483c77ff7c (diff) | |
parent | 17ec629959088f0b213a5559ab2e793e9ec0f124 (diff) | |
download | otp-8ee2d5f59f0e3ceee6895b5af41e563a29a22be2.tar.gz otp-8ee2d5f59f0e3ceee6895b5af41e563a29a22be2.tar.bz2 otp-8ee2d5f59f0e3ceee6895b5af41e563a29a22be2.zip |
Merge branch 'bjorn/asn1/rfc-5912/OTP-12395'
* bjorn/asn1/rfc-5912/OTP-12395: (79 commits)
Remove the old unused yecc-based parser
Improve error handling for illegal object definitions
Reimplement storeindb/2 to avoid excessive process communication
Remove useless fields in #state{}
Remove vestiges of obsolete {TypeName,Value} notation
Remove old error handling
Modernize the remaining cases
Further improve error handling for instatiation of parameterized types
asn1ct_tok: Clean up
Add a test case for EXTENSIBILITY IMPLIED
asn1ct_parser2: Remove expensive lookahead_assignment/1 function
asn1ct_parser2: Clean up error handling and reporting
asn1ct, asn1ct_parser2: Refactor the upper levels of error handling
asn1ct_parser2: Eliminate all uses of old-style 'catch'
asn1ct_parser2: Clean up parse_or/3 and parse_or_tag/3
asn1ct_parser2: Correct extraction of line number from token
asn1ct_parser2: Throw an {asn1_error,...} for *all* parse errors
asn1ct_parser2: Simplify parse_Type/1
asn1ct_parser2: Remove unsuccessful parsing of ValueSetFromObjects
Move checking of UNIQUE & DEFAULT error to asn1ct_check
...
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/asn1/test/asn1_SUITE_data/rfcs/PKIXCRMF-2009.asn1')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/asn1/test/asn1_SUITE_data/rfcs/PKIXCRMF-2009.asn1 | 409 |
1 files changed, 409 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/asn1/test/asn1_SUITE_data/rfcs/PKIXCRMF-2009.asn1 b/lib/asn1/test/asn1_SUITE_data/rfcs/PKIXCRMF-2009.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1c0b780499 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/asn1/test/asn1_SUITE_data/rfcs/PKIXCRMF-2009.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,409 @@ + PKIXCRMF-2009 + {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) + mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005-02(55)} + DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= + BEGIN + IMPORTS + + AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE, + SingleAttribute{} + FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 + {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) + security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) + id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } + + AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, + DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY + FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 + {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) + mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) + id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} + + Version, Name, Time, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, UniqueIdentifier, id-pkix, + SignatureAlgorithms + FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 + {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) + mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)} + + GeneralName, CertExtensions + FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 + {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) + mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} + + EnvelopedData, CONTENT-TYPE + FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 + { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) + smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)} + maca-hMAC-SHA1 + FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms-2009 + { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) + smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cmsalg-2001-02(37) } + + mda-sha1 + FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 + { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) + internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) + id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } ; + + -- arc for Internet X.509 PKI protocols and their components + + id-pkip OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 5 } + + id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) + us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 } + + id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 } -- content types + + -- Core definitions for this module + + CertReqMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertReqMsg + + CertReqMsg ::= SEQUENCE { + certReq CertRequest, + popo ProofOfPossession OPTIONAL, + -- content depends upon key type + regInfo SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF + SingleAttribute{{RegInfoSet}} OPTIONAL } + + CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + certReqId INTEGER, + -- ID for matching request and reply + certTemplate CertTemplate, + -- Selected fields of cert to be issued + controls Controls OPTIONAL } + -- Attributes affecting issuance + + CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE { + version [0] Version OPTIONAL, + serialNumber [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + signingAlg [2] AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, + {SignatureAlgorithms}} OPTIONAL, + issuer [3] Name OPTIONAL, + validity [4] OptionalValidity OPTIONAL, + subject [5] Name OPTIONAL, + publicKey [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, + issuerUID [7] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, + subjectUID [8] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, + extensions [9] Extensions{{CertExtensions}} OPTIONAL } + + OptionalValidity ::= SEQUENCE { + notBefore [0] Time OPTIONAL, + notAfter [1] Time OPTIONAL } -- at least one MUST be present + + Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF SingleAttribute + {{RegControlSet}} + + ProofOfPossession ::= CHOICE { + raVerified [0] NULL, + -- used if the RA has already verified that the requester is in + -- possession of the private key + signature [1] POPOSigningKey, + keyEncipherment [2] POPOPrivKey, + keyAgreement [3] POPOPrivKey } + + POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE { + poposkInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL, + algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, + {SignatureAlgorithms}}, + signature BIT STRING } + -- The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the + -- DER-encoded value of poposkInput. NOTE: If the CertReqMsg + -- certReq CertTemplate contains the subject and publicKey values, + -- then poposkInput MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be + -- computed over the DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq. If + -- the CertReqMsg certReq CertTemplate does not contain both the + -- public key and subject values (i.e., if it contains only one + -- of these, or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present and + -- MUST be signed. + + POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE { + authInfo CHOICE { + sender [0] GeneralName, + -- used only if an authenticated identity has been + -- established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a + -- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate) + publicKeyMAC PKMACValue }, + -- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for + -- the sender; publicKeyMAC contains a password-based MAC + -- on the DER-encoded value of publicKey + publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo } -- from CertTemplate + + PKMACValue ::= SEQUENCE { + algId AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, + {Password-MACAlgorithms}}, + value BIT STRING } + + -- + -- Define the currently only acceptable MAC algorithm to be used + -- for the PKMACValue structure + -- + + id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) + usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 } + + Password-MACAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { + {IDENTIFIER id-PasswordBasedMac + PARAMS TYPE PBMParameter ARE required + IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE + }, ... + } + + PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { + salt OCTET STRING, + owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, + {DigestAlgorithms}}, + -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) + iterationCount INTEGER, + -- number of times the OWF is applied + mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, + {MACAlgorithms}} + -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC, or HMAC + } + + DigestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { + mda-sha1, ... + } + + MACAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { + -- The modules containing the ASN.1 for the DES and 3DES MAC + -- algorithms have not been updated at the time that this is + -- being published. Users of this module should define the + -- appropriate MAC-ALGORITHM objects and uncomment the + -- following lines if they support these MAC algorithms. + -- maca-des-mac | maca-3des-mac -- + maca-hMAC-SHA1, + ... + } + + POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE { + thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, -- Deprecated + -- possession is proven in this message (which contains + -- the private key itself (encrypted for the CA)) + subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage, + -- possession will be proven in a subsequent message + dhMAC [2] BIT STRING, -- Deprecated + agreeMAC [3] PKMACValue, + encryptedKey [4] EnvelopedData } + -- for keyAgreement (only), possession is proven in this message + -- (which contains a MAC (over the DER-encoded value of the + -- certReq parameter in CertReqMsg, which MUST include both + -- subject and publicKey) based on a key derived from the end + -- entity's private DH key and the CA's public DH key); + + SubsequentMessage ::= INTEGER { + encrCert (0), + -- requests that resulting certificate be encrypted for the + -- end entity (following which, POP will be proven in a + -- confirmation message) + challengeResp (1) } + -- requests that CA engage in challenge-response exchange with + -- end entity in order to prove private key possession + + -- + -- id-ct-encKeyWithID content type used as the content type for the + -- EnvelopedData in POPOPrivKey. + -- It contains both a private key and an identifier for key escrow + -- agents to check against recovery requestors. + -- + + ct-encKeyWithID CONTENT-TYPE ::= + { EncKeyWithID IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-encKeyWithID } + + id-ct-encKeyWithID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ct 21} + + EncKeyWithID ::= SEQUENCE { + privateKey PrivateKeyInfo, + identifier CHOICE { + string UTF8String, + generalName GeneralName + } OPTIONAL + } + + PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + version INTEGER, + privateKeyAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY, {...}}, + privateKey OCTET STRING, + -- Structure of public key is in PUBLIC-KEY.&PrivateKey + attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL + } + + Attributes ::= SET OF AttributeSet{{PrivateKeyAttributes}} + PrivateKeyAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= {...} + + -- + -- 6. Registration Controls in CRMF + -- + + id-regCtrl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkip 1 } + + RegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { + regCtrl-regToken | regCtrl-authenticator | + regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo | regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions | + regCtrl-oldCertID | regCtrl-protocolEncrKey, ... } + + -- + -- 6.1. Registration Token Control + -- + + regCtrl-regToken ATTRIBUTE ::= + { TYPE RegToken IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-regToken } + + id-regCtrl-regToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 1 } + + RegToken ::= UTF8String + + -- + -- 6.2. Authenticator Control + -- + + regCtrl-authenticator ATTRIBUTE ::= + { TYPE Authenticator IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-authenticator } + + id-regCtrl-authenticator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 2 } + + Authenticator ::= UTF8String + + -- + -- 6.3. Publication Information Control + -- + + regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo ATTRIBUTE ::= + { TYPE PKIPublicationInfo IDENTIFIED BY + id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo } + + id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 3 } + + PKIPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + action INTEGER { + dontPublish (0), + pleasePublish (1) }, + pubInfos SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SinglePubInfo OPTIONAL } + -- pubInfos MUST NOT be present if action is "dontPublish" + -- (if action is "pleasePublish" and pubInfos is omitted, + -- "dontCare" is assumed) + + SinglePubInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + pubMethod INTEGER { + dontCare (0), + x500 (1), + web (2), + ldap (3) }, + pubLocation GeneralName OPTIONAL } + + -- + -- 6.4. Archive Options Control + -- + + regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions ATTRIBUTE ::= + { TYPE PKIArchiveOptions IDENTIFIED BY + id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions } + + id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 4 } + + PKIArchiveOptions ::= CHOICE { + encryptedPrivKey [0] EncryptedKey, + -- the actual value of the private key + keyGenParameters [1] KeyGenParameters, + -- parameters that allow the private key to be re-generated + archiveRemGenPrivKey [2] BOOLEAN } + -- set to TRUE if sender wishes receiver to archive the private + -- key of a key pair that the receiver generates in response to + -- this request; set to FALSE if no archive is desired. + + EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { + encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- Deprecated + envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } + -- The encrypted private key MUST be placed in the envelopedData + -- encryptedContentInfo encryptedContent OCTET STRING. + + -- + -- We skipped doing the full constraints here since this structure + -- has been deprecated in favor of EnvelopedData + -- + + EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE { + intendedAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, + -- the intended algorithm for which the value will be used + symmAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, + -- the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the value + encSymmKey [2] BIT STRING OPTIONAL, + -- the (encrypted) symmetric key used to encrypt the value + keyAlg [3] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, + -- algorithm used to encrypt the symmetric key + valueHint [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- a brief description or identifier of the encValue content + -- (may be meaningful only to the sending entity, and used only + -- if EncryptedValue might be re-examined by the sending entity + -- in the future) + encValue BIT STRING } + -- the encrypted value itself + -- When EncryptedValue is used to carry a private key (as opposed to + -- a certificate), implementations MUST support the encValue field + -- containing an encrypted PrivateKeyInfo as defined in [PKCS11], + -- section 12.11. If encValue contains some other format/encoding + -- for the private key, the first octet of valueHint MAY be used + -- to indicate the format/encoding (but note that the possible values + -- of this octet are not specified at this time). In all cases, the + -- intendedAlg field MUST be used to indicate at least the OID of + -- the intended algorithm of the private key, unless this information + -- is known a priori to both sender and receiver by some other means. + + KeyGenParameters ::= OCTET STRING + + -- + -- 6.5. OldCert ID Control + -- + + regCtrl-oldCertID ATTRIBUTE ::= + { TYPE OldCertId IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-oldCertID } + + id-regCtrl-oldCertID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 5 } + + OldCertId ::= CertId + + CertId ::= SEQUENCE { + issuer GeneralName, + serialNumber INTEGER } + + -- + -- 6.6. Protocol Encryption Key Control + -- + + regCtrl-protocolEncrKey ATTRIBUTE ::= + { TYPE ProtocolEncrKey IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey } + id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 6 } + + ProtocolEncrKey ::= SubjectPublicKeyInfo + + -- + -- 7. Registration Info in CRMF + -- + + id-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkip 2 } + + RegInfoSet ATTRIBUTE ::= + { regInfo-utf8Pairs | regInfo-certReq } + + -- + -- 7.1. utf8Pairs RegInfo Control + -- + + regInfo-utf8Pairs ATTRIBUTE ::= + { TYPE UTF8Pairs IDENTIFIED BY id-regInfo-utf8Pairs } + + id-regInfo-utf8Pairs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regInfo 1 } + --with syntax + UTF8Pairs ::= UTF8String + + -- + -- 7.2. certReq RegInfo Control + -- + + regInfo-certReq ATTRIBUTE ::= + { TYPE CertReq IDENTIFIED BY id-regInfo-certReq } + + id-regInfo-certReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regInfo 2 } + --with syntax + CertReq ::= CertRequest + + END |