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author | Anders Svensson <[email protected]> | 2011-09-29 09:08:31 +0200 |
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committer | Anders Svensson <[email protected]> | 2011-10-06 16:29:46 +0200 |
commit | b138f9e6879e44732e681d368704345acdf26b1b (patch) | |
tree | 0b6751230dc6fab72fe4dee860faf760443a57f5 /lib/orber/include | |
parent | d01551f400e2a7944dcc10319be0c9f248ca3179 (diff) | |
download | otp-b138f9e6879e44732e681d368704345acdf26b1b.tar.gz otp-b138f9e6879e44732e681d368704345acdf26b1b.tar.bz2 otp-b138f9e6879e44732e681d368704345acdf26b1b.zip |
Add tls support to capabilities exchange
To upgrade a connection to TLS or not, that is the question. It
is possible for us to send a CER offering both NO_INBAND_SECURITY
and TLS and for the peer to answer likewise: RFC 3588 doesn't make
clear that a CEA should be unambiguous about the choice of security.
Thus, if TLS is offered then assume the server is prepared to
for a handshake. Similarly, when receiving a CER, choose TLS if
it's offered and be unambiguous about our choice in CEA. There is
no ssl:maybe_accept that would let us receive a handshake if it
comes or another message if it doesn't.
The choice of TLS should probably be made into a callback so that
an application can decide based on the peer's Origin-Realm for
example. Such a callback could also be used to reject a CER/CEA.
Handle Inband-Security-Id values other than NO_INBAND_SECURITY and
TLS by assuming that they require no intervention by the transport
module, treating them like NO_INBAND_SECURITY. Whether or not this
is reasonable (or useful) is unclear. There may be a need for more
sychronization than we have on offer. (Having to do something before
taking the connection up for example.)
Note that diameter_peer_fsm must be upgraded before diameter_capx
because of the new return value from diameter_capx:recv_CEA/2.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/orber/include')
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