diff options
author | Ingela Anderton Andin <[email protected]> | 2014-09-01 15:39:21 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ingela Anderton Andin <[email protected]> | 2014-09-09 11:28:36 +0200 |
commit | 1c9e0651c4917b63f49d8505dba7e820da8e32d2 (patch) | |
tree | 3aeadc7daec09d1b2f9c3303484859468ab34a1e /lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml | |
parent | 6e2fd45bad619fd7e06f21798eac94d415dff64e (diff) | |
download | otp-1c9e0651c4917b63f49d8505dba7e820da8e32d2.tar.gz otp-1c9e0651c4917b63f49d8505dba7e820da8e32d2.tar.bz2 otp-1c9e0651c4917b63f49d8505dba7e820da8e32d2.zip |
ssl, public_key: Add new option partial_chain
Check that the certificate chain ends with a trusted ROOT CA e.i. a
self-signed certificate, but provide an option partial_chain to
enable the application to define an intermediat CA as trusted.
TLS RFC says:
"unknown_ca
A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the
certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not
be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This
message is always fatal."
and also states:
"certificate_list
This is a sequence (chain) of certificates. The sender's
certificate MUST come first in the list. Each following
certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. Because
certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root
certificate authority MAY be omitted from the chain, under the
assumption that the remote end must already possess it in order to
validate it in any case."
X509 RFC says:
"The selection of a trust anchor is a matter of policy: it could be
the top CA in a hierarchical PKI, the CA that issued the verifier's
own certificate(s), or any other CA in a network PKI. The path
validation procedure is the same regardless of the choice of trust
anchor. In addition, different applications may rely on different
trust anchors, or may accept paths that begin with any of a set of
trust anchors."
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml | 45 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml b/lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml index 88b1a9248e..c1ea33f735 100644 --- a/lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml +++ b/lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml @@ -431,10 +431,12 @@ <name>pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, CertChain, Options) -> {ok, {PublicKeyInfo, PolicyTree}} | {error, {bad_cert, Reason}} </name> <fsummary> Performs a basic path validation according to RFC 5280.</fsummary> <type> - <v> TrustedCert = #'OTPCertificate'{} | der_encode() | unknown_ca | selfsigned_peer </v> - <d>Normally a trusted certificate but it can also be one of the path validation - errors <c>unknown_ca </c> or <c>selfsigned_peer </c> that can be discovered while - constructing the input to this function and that should be run through the <c>verify_fun</c>.</d> + <v> TrustedCert = #'OTPCertificate'{} | der_encode() | atom() </v> + <d>Normally a trusted certificate but it can also be a path validation + error that can be discovered while + constructing the input to this function and that should be run through the <c>verify_fun</c>. + For example <c>unknown_ca </c> or <c>selfsigned_peer </c> + </d> <v> CertChain = [der_encode()]</v> <d>A list of DER encoded certificates in trust order ending with the peer certificate.</d> <v> Options = proplists:proplist()</v> @@ -442,8 +444,8 @@ rsa_public_key() | integer(), 'NULL' | 'Dss-Parms'{}}</v> <v> PolicyTree = term() </v> <d>At the moment this will always be an empty list as Policies are not currently supported</d> - <v> Reason = cert_expired | invalid_issuer | invalid_signature | unknown_ca | - selfsigned_peer | name_not_permitted | missing_basic_constraint | invalid_key_usage | crl_reason() + <v> Reason = cert_expired | invalid_issuer | invalid_signature | name_not_permitted | + missing_basic_constraint | invalid_key_usage | {revoked, crl_reason()} | atom() </v> </type> <desc> @@ -464,7 +466,7 @@ <code> fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{}, - Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom()} | + Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom() | {revoked, atom()}} | {extension, #'Extension'{}}, InitialUserState :: term()) -> {valid, UserState :: term()} | @@ -493,6 +495,35 @@ fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{}, on. </item> </taglist> + + <p> Possible reasons for a bad certificate are: </p> + <taglist> + <tag>cert_expired</tag> + <item>The certificate is no longer valid as its expiration date has passed.</item> + + <tag>invalid_issuer</tag> + <item>The certificate issuer name does not match the name of the issuer certificate in the chain.</item> + + <tag>invalid_signature</tag> + <item>The certificate was not signed by its issuer certificate in the chain.</item> + + <tag>name_not_permitted</tag> + <item>Invalid Subject Alternative Name extension.</item> + + <tag>missing_basic_constraint</tag> + <item>Certificate, required to have the basic constraints extension, does not have + a basic constraints extension.</item> + + <tag>invalid_key_usage</tag> + <item>Certificate key is used in an invalid way according to the key usage extension.</item> + + <tag>{revoked, crl_reason()}</tag> + <item>Certificate has been revoked.</item> + + <tag>atom()</tag> + <item>Application specific error reason that should be checked by the verify_fun</item> + </taglist> + </desc> </func> |