aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/lib/public_key/doc
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorIngela Anderton Andin <[email protected]>2014-09-01 15:39:21 +0200
committerIngela Anderton Andin <[email protected]>2014-09-09 11:28:36 +0200
commit1c9e0651c4917b63f49d8505dba7e820da8e32d2 (patch)
tree3aeadc7daec09d1b2f9c3303484859468ab34a1e /lib/public_key/doc
parent6e2fd45bad619fd7e06f21798eac94d415dff64e (diff)
downloadotp-1c9e0651c4917b63f49d8505dba7e820da8e32d2.tar.gz
otp-1c9e0651c4917b63f49d8505dba7e820da8e32d2.tar.bz2
otp-1c9e0651c4917b63f49d8505dba7e820da8e32d2.zip
ssl, public_key: Add new option partial_chain
Check that the certificate chain ends with a trusted ROOT CA e.i. a self-signed certificate, but provide an option partial_chain to enable the application to define an intermediat CA as trusted. TLS RFC says: "unknown_ca A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This message is always fatal." and also states: "certificate_list This is a sequence (chain) of certificates. The sender's certificate MUST come first in the list. Each following certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. Because certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root certificate authority MAY be omitted from the chain, under the assumption that the remote end must already possess it in order to validate it in any case." X509 RFC says: "The selection of a trust anchor is a matter of policy: it could be the top CA in a hierarchical PKI, the CA that issued the verifier's own certificate(s), or any other CA in a network PKI. The path validation procedure is the same regardless of the choice of trust anchor. In addition, different applications may rely on different trust anchors, or may accept paths that begin with any of a set of trust anchors."
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/public_key/doc')
-rw-r--r--lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml45
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml b/lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml
index 88b1a9248e..c1ea33f735 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml
+++ b/lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml
@@ -431,10 +431,12 @@
<name>pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, CertChain, Options) -> {ok, {PublicKeyInfo, PolicyTree}} | {error, {bad_cert, Reason}} </name>
<fsummary> Performs a basic path validation according to RFC 5280.</fsummary>
<type>
- <v> TrustedCert = #'OTPCertificate'{} | der_encode() | unknown_ca | selfsigned_peer </v>
- <d>Normally a trusted certificate but it can also be one of the path validation
- errors <c>unknown_ca </c> or <c>selfsigned_peer </c> that can be discovered while
- constructing the input to this function and that should be run through the <c>verify_fun</c>.</d>
+ <v> TrustedCert = #'OTPCertificate'{} | der_encode() | atom() </v>
+ <d>Normally a trusted certificate but it can also be a path validation
+ error that can be discovered while
+ constructing the input to this function and that should be run through the <c>verify_fun</c>.
+ For example <c>unknown_ca </c> or <c>selfsigned_peer </c>
+ </d>
<v> CertChain = [der_encode()]</v>
<d>A list of DER encoded certificates in trust order ending with the peer certificate.</d>
<v> Options = proplists:proplist()</v>
@@ -442,8 +444,8 @@
rsa_public_key() | integer(), 'NULL' | 'Dss-Parms'{}}</v>
<v> PolicyTree = term() </v>
<d>At the moment this will always be an empty list as Policies are not currently supported</d>
- <v> Reason = cert_expired | invalid_issuer | invalid_signature | unknown_ca |
- selfsigned_peer | name_not_permitted | missing_basic_constraint | invalid_key_usage | crl_reason()
+ <v> Reason = cert_expired | invalid_issuer | invalid_signature | name_not_permitted |
+ missing_basic_constraint | invalid_key_usage | {revoked, crl_reason()} | atom()
</v>
</type>
<desc>
@@ -464,7 +466,7 @@
<code>
fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{},
- Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom()} |
+ Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom() | {revoked, atom()}} |
{extension, #'Extension'{}},
InitialUserState :: term()) ->
{valid, UserState :: term()} |
@@ -493,6 +495,35 @@ fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{},
on.
</item>
</taglist>
+
+ <p> Possible reasons for a bad certificate are: </p>
+ <taglist>
+ <tag>cert_expired</tag>
+ <item>The certificate is no longer valid as its expiration date has passed.</item>
+
+ <tag>invalid_issuer</tag>
+ <item>The certificate issuer name does not match the name of the issuer certificate in the chain.</item>
+
+ <tag>invalid_signature</tag>
+ <item>The certificate was not signed by its issuer certificate in the chain.</item>
+
+ <tag>name_not_permitted</tag>
+ <item>Invalid Subject Alternative Name extension.</item>
+
+ <tag>missing_basic_constraint</tag>
+ <item>Certificate, required to have the basic constraints extension, does not have
+ a basic constraints extension.</item>
+
+ <tag>invalid_key_usage</tag>
+ <item>Certificate key is used in an invalid way according to the key usage extension.</item>
+
+ <tag>{revoked, crl_reason()}</tag>
+ <item>Certificate has been revoked.</item>
+
+ <tag>atom()</tag>
+ <item>Application specific error reason that should be checked by the verify_fun</item>
+ </taglist>
+
</desc>
</func>