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| author | Erlang/OTP <[email protected]> | 2009-11-20 14:54:40 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Erlang/OTP <[email protected]> | 2009-11-20 14:54:40 +0000 |
| commit | 84adefa331c4159d432d22840663c38f155cd4c1 (patch) | |
| tree | bff9a9c66adda4df2106dfd0e5c053ab182a12bd /lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.2.ps | |
| download | otp-84adefa331c4159d432d22840663c38f155cd4c1.tar.gz otp-84adefa331c4159d432d22840663c38f155cd4c1.tar.bz2 otp-84adefa331c4159d432d22840663c38f155cd4c1.zip | |
The R13B03 release.OTP_R13B03
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.2.ps')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.2.ps | 3315 |
1 files changed, 3315 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.2.ps b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.2.ps new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d766a933b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.2.ps @@ -0,0 +1,3315 @@ +%!PS-Adobe-3.0 +%%BoundingBox: 75 0 595 747 +%%Title: Enscript Output +%%For: Magnus Thoang +%%Creator: GNU enscript 1.6.1 +%%CreationDate: Fri Oct 31 13:31:26 2003 +%%Orientation: Portrait +%%Pages: 15 0 +%%DocumentMedia: A4 595 842 0 () () +%%DocumentNeededResources: (atend) +%%EndComments +%%BeginProlog +%%BeginProcSet: PStoPS 1 15 +userdict begin +[/showpage/erasepage/copypage]{dup where{pop dup load + type/operatortype eq{1 array cvx dup 0 3 index cvx put + bind def}{pop}ifelse}{pop}ifelse}forall +[/letter/legal/executivepage/a4/a4small/b5/com10envelope + /monarchenvelope/c5envelope/dlenvelope/lettersmall/note + /folio/quarto/a5]{dup where{dup wcheck{exch{}put} + {pop{}def}ifelse}{pop}ifelse}forall +/setpagedevice {pop}bind 1 index where{dup wcheck{3 1 roll put} + {pop def}ifelse}{def}ifelse +/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix def +/PStoPSxform matrix def/PStoPSclip{clippath}def +/defaultmatrix{PStoPSmatrix exch PStoPSxform exch concatmatrix}bind def +/initmatrix{matrix defaultmatrix setmatrix}bind def +/initclip[{matrix currentmatrix PStoPSmatrix setmatrix + [{currentpoint}stopped{$error/newerror false put{newpath}} + {/newpath cvx 3 1 roll/moveto cvx 4 array astore cvx}ifelse] + {[/newpath cvx{/moveto cvx}{/lineto cvx} + {/curveto cvx}{/closepath cvx}pathforall]cvx exch pop} + stopped{$error/errorname get/invalidaccess eq{cleartomark + $error/newerror false put cvx exec}{stop}ifelse}if}bind aload pop + /initclip dup load dup type dup/operatortype eq{pop exch pop} + {dup/arraytype eq exch/packedarraytype eq or + {dup xcheck{exch pop aload pop}{pop cvx}ifelse} + {pop cvx}ifelse}ifelse + {newpath PStoPSclip clip newpath exec setmatrix} bind aload pop]cvx def +/initgraphics{initmatrix newpath initclip 1 setlinewidth + 0 setlinecap 0 setlinejoin []0 setdash 0 setgray + 10 setmiterlimit}bind def +end +%%EndProcSet +%%BeginResource: procset Enscript-Prolog 1.6 1 +% +% Procedures. +% + +/_S { % save current state + /_s save def +} def +/_R { % restore from saved state + _s restore +} def + +/S { % showpage protecting gstate + gsave + showpage + grestore +} bind def + +/MF { % fontname newfontname -> - 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Ylonen) s +5 690 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Communications Security Corp) s +5 679 M +(Expires: March 31, 2004 D. Moffat, Ed.) s +5 668 M +( Sun Microsystems, Inc) s +5 657 M +( Oct 2003) s +5 624 M +( SSH Protocol Architecture) s +5 613 M +( draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.txt) s +5 591 M +(Status of this Memo) s +5 569 M +( This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with) s +5 558 M +( all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.) s +5 536 M +( Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering) s +5 525 M +( Task Force \(IETF\), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other) s +5 514 M +( groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.) s +5 492 M +( Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months) s +5 481 M +( and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any) s +5 470 M +( time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference) s +5 459 M +( material or to cite them other than as "work in progress.") s +5 437 M +( The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://) s +5 426 M +( www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.) s +5 404 M +( The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at) s +5 393 M +( http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.) s +5 371 M +( This Internet-Draft will expire on March 31, 2004.) s +5 349 M +(Copyright Notice) s +5 327 M +( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2003\). All Rights Reserved.) s +5 305 M +(Abstract) s +5 283 M +( SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network) s +5 272 M +( services over an insecure network. This document describes the) s +5 261 M +( architecture of the SSH protocol, as well as the notation and) s +5 250 M +( terminology used in SSH protocol documents. It also discusses the SSH) s +5 239 M +( algorithm naming system that allows local extensions. The SSH) s +5 228 M +( protocol consists of three major components: The Transport Layer) s +5 217 M +( Protocol provides server authentication, confidentiality, and) s +5 206 M +( integrity with perfect forward secrecy. The User Authentication) s +5 195 M +( Protocol authenticates the client to the server. The Connection) s +5 184 M +( Protocol multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical) s +5 173 M +( channels. Details of these protocols are described in separate) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 1]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 2 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( documents.) s +5 668 M +(Table of Contents) s +5 646 M +( 1. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3) s +5 635 M +( 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3) s +5 624 M +( 3. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3) s +5 613 M +( 4. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3) s +5 602 M +( 4.1 Host Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4) s +5 591 M +( 4.2 Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5) s +5 580 M +( 4.3 Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5) s +5 569 M +( 4.4 Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6) s +5 558 M +( 4.5 Packet Size and Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6) s +5 547 M +( 4.6 Localization and Character Set Support . . . . . . . . . . . 7) s +5 536 M +( 5. Data Type Representations Used in the SSH Protocols . . . . 8) s +5 525 M +( 6. Algorithm Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10) s +5 514 M +( 7. Message Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11) s +5 503 M +( 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11) s +5 492 M +( 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12) s +5 481 M +( 9.1 Pseudo-Random Number Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12) s +5 470 M +( 9.2 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13) s +5 459 M +( 9.2.1 Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13) s +5 448 M +( 9.2.2 Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16) s +5 437 M +( 9.2.3 Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16) s +5 426 M +( 9.2.4 Man-in-the-middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17) s +5 415 M +( 9.2.5 Denial-of-service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19) s +5 404 M +( 9.2.6 Covert Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19) s +5 393 M +( 9.2.7 Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20) s +5 382 M +( 9.3 Authentication Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20) s +5 371 M +( 9.3.1 Weak Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21) s +5 360 M +( 9.3.2 Debug messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21) s +5 349 M +( 9.3.3 Local security policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21) s +5 338 M +( 9.3.4 Public key authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22) s +5 327 M +( 9.3.5 Password authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22) s +5 316 M +( 9.3.6 Host based authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23) s +5 305 M +( 9.4 Connection protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23) s +5 294 M +( 9.4.1 End point security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23) s +5 283 M +( 9.4.2 Proxy forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23) s +5 272 M +( 9.4.3 X11 forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24) s +5 261 M +( Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24) s +5 250 M +( Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25) s +5 239 M +( Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27) s +5 228 M +( Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 28) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 2]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (2,3) 2 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 3 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +(1. Contributors) s +5 668 M +( The major original contributors of this document were: Tatu Ylonen,) s +5 657 M +( Tero Kivinen, Timo J. Rinne, Sami Lehtinen \(all of SSH Communications) s +5 646 M +( Security Corp\), and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen \(University of) s +5 635 M +( Jyvaskyla\)) s +5 613 M +( The document editor is: [email protected]. Comments on this) s +5 602 M +( internet draft should be sent to the IETF SECSH working group,) s +5 591 M +( details at: http://ietf.org/html.charters/secsh-charter.html) s +5 569 M +(2. Introduction) s +5 547 M +( SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network) s +5 536 M +( services over an insecure network. It consists of three major) s +5 525 M +( components:) s +5 514 M +( o The Transport Layer Protocol [SSH-TRANS] provides server) s +5 503 M +( authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. It may optionally) s +5 492 M +( also provide compression. The transport layer will typically be) s +5 481 M +( run over a TCP/IP connection, but might also be used on top of any) s +5 470 M +( other reliable data stream.) s +5 459 M +( o The User Authentication Protocol [SSH-USERAUTH] authenticates the) s +5 448 M +( client-side user to the server. It runs over the transport layer) s +5 437 M +( protocol.) s +5 426 M +( o The Connection Protocol [SSH-CONNECT] multiplexes the encrypted) s +5 415 M +( tunnel into several logical channels. It runs over the user) s +5 404 M +( authentication protocol.) s +5 382 M +( The client sends a service request once a secure transport layer) s +5 371 M +( connection has been established. A second service request is sent) s +5 360 M +( after user authentication is complete. This allows new protocols to) s +5 349 M +( be defined and coexist with the protocols listed above.) s +5 327 M +( The connection protocol provides channels that can be used for a wide) s +5 316 M +( range of purposes. Standard methods are provided for setting up) s +5 305 M +( secure interactive shell sessions and for forwarding \("tunneling"\)) s +5 294 M +( arbitrary TCP/IP ports and X11 connections.) s +5 272 M +(3. Specification of Requirements) s +5 250 M +( All documents related to the SSH protocols shall use the keywords) s +5 239 M +( "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",) s +5 228 M +( "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" to describe) s +5 217 M +( requirements. They are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].) s +5 195 M +(4. Architecture) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 3]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 4 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +(4.1 Host Keys) s +5 668 M +( Each server host SHOULD have a host key. Hosts MAY have multiple) s +5 657 M +( host keys using multiple different algorithms. Multiple hosts MAY) s +5 646 M +( share the same host key. If a host has keys at all, it MUST have at) s +5 635 M +( least one key using each REQUIRED public key algorithm \(DSS) s +5 624 M +( [FIPS-186]\).) s +5 602 M +( The server host key is used during key exchange to verify that the) s +5 591 M +( client is really talking to the correct server. For this to be) s +5 580 M +( possible, the client must have a priori knowledge of the server's) s +5 569 M +( public host key.) s +5 547 M +( Two different trust models can be used:) s +5 536 M +( o The client has a local database that associates each host name \(as) s +5 525 M +( typed by the user\) with the corresponding public host key. This) s +5 514 M +( method requires no centrally administered infrastructure, and no) s +5 503 M +( third-party coordination. The downside is that the database of) s +5 492 M +( name-to-key associations may become burdensome to maintain.) s +5 481 M +( o The host name-to-key association is certified by some trusted) s +5 470 M +( certification authority. The client only knows the CA root key,) s +5 459 M +( and can verify the validity of all host keys certified by accepted) s +5 448 M +( CAs.) s +5 426 M +( The second alternative eases the maintenance problem, since) s +5 415 M +( ideally only a single CA key needs to be securely stored on the) s +5 404 M +( client. On the other hand, each host key must be appropriately) s +5 393 M +( certified by a central authority before authorization is possible.) s +5 382 M +( Also, a lot of trust is placed on the central infrastructure.) s +5 360 M +( The protocol provides the option that the server name - host key) s +5 349 M +( association is not checked when connecting to the host for the first) s +5 338 M +( time. This allows communication without prior communication of host) s +5 327 M +( keys or certification. The connection still provides protection) s +5 316 M +( against passive listening; however, it becomes vulnerable to active) s +5 305 M +( man-in-the-middle attacks. Implementations SHOULD NOT normally allow) s +5 294 M +( such connections by default, as they pose a potential security) s +5 283 M +( problem. However, as there is no widely deployed key infrastructure) s +5 272 M +( available on the Internet yet, this option makes the protocol much) s +5 261 M +( more usable during the transition time until such an infrastructure) s +5 250 M +( emerges, while still providing a much higher level of security than) s +5 239 M +( that offered by older solutions \(e.g. telnet [RFC-854] and rlogin) s +5 228 M +( [RFC-1282]\).) s +5 206 M +( Implementations SHOULD try to make the best effort to check host) s +5 195 M +( keys. An example of a possible strategy is to only accept a host key) s +5 184 M +( without checking the first time a host is connected, save the key in) s +5 173 M +( a local database, and compare against that key on all future) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 4]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (4,5) 3 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 5 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( connections to that host.) s +5 668 M +( Implementations MAY provide additional methods for verifying the) s +5 657 M +( correctness of host keys, e.g. a hexadecimal fingerprint derived from) s +5 646 M +( the SHA-1 hash of the public key. Such fingerprints can easily be) s +5 635 M +( verified by using telephone or other external communication channels.) s +5 613 M +( All implementations SHOULD provide an option to not accept host keys) s +5 602 M +( that cannot be verified.) s +5 580 M +( We believe that ease of use is critical to end-user acceptance of) s +5 569 M +( security solutions, and no improvement in security is gained if the) s +5 558 M +( new solutions are not used. Thus, providing the option not to check) s +5 547 M +( the server host key is believed to improve the overall security of) s +5 536 M +( the Internet, even though it reduces the security of the protocol in) s +5 525 M +( configurations where it is allowed.) s +5 503 M +(4.2 Extensibility) s +5 481 M +( We believe that the protocol will evolve over time, and some) s +5 470 M +( organizations will want to use their own encryption, authentication) s +5 459 M +( and/or key exchange methods. Central registration of all extensions) s +5 448 M +( is cumbersome, especially for experimental or classified features.) s +5 437 M +( On the other hand, having no central registration leads to conflicts) s +5 426 M +( in method identifiers, making interoperability difficult.) s +5 404 M +( We have chosen to identify algorithms, methods, formats, and) s +5 393 M +( extension protocols with textual names that are of a specific format.) s +5 382 M +( DNS names are used to create local namespaces where experimental or) s +5 371 M +( classified extensions can be defined without fear of conflicts with) s +5 360 M +( other implementations.) s +5 338 M +( One design goal has been to keep the base protocol as simple as) s +5 327 M +( possible, and to require as few algorithms as possible. However, all) s +5 316 M +( implementations MUST support a minimal set of algorithms to ensure) s +5 305 M +( interoperability \(this does not imply that the local policy on all) s +5 294 M +( hosts would necessary allow these algorithms\). The mandatory) s +5 283 M +( algorithms are specified in the relevant protocol documents.) s +5 261 M +( Additional algorithms, methods, formats, and extension protocols can) s +5 250 M +( be defined in separate drafts. See Section Algorithm Naming \(Section) s +5 239 M +( 6\) for more information.) s +5 217 M +(4.3 Policy Issues) s +5 195 M +( The protocol allows full negotiation of encryption, integrity, key) s +5 184 M +( exchange, compression, and public key algorithms and formats.) s +5 173 M +( Encryption, integrity, public key, and compression algorithms can be) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 5]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 6 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( different for each direction.) s +5 668 M +( The following policy issues SHOULD be addressed in the configuration) s +5 657 M +( mechanisms of each implementation:) s +5 646 M +( o Encryption, integrity, and compression algorithms, separately for) s +5 635 M +( each direction. The policy MUST specify which is the preferred) s +5 624 M +( algorithm \(e.g. the first algorithm listed in each category\).) s +5 613 M +( o Public key algorithms and key exchange method to be used for host) s +5 602 M +( authentication. The existence of trusted host keys for different) s +5 591 M +( public key algorithms also affects this choice.) s +5 580 M +( o The authentication methods that are to be required by the server) s +5 569 M +( for each user. The server's policy MAY require multiple) s +5 558 M +( authentication for some or all users. The required algorithms MAY) s +5 547 M +( depend on the location where the user is trying to log in from.) s +5 536 M +( o The operations that the user is allowed to perform using the) s +5 525 M +( connection protocol. Some issues are related to security; for) s +5 514 M +( example, the policy SHOULD NOT allow the server to start sessions) s +5 503 M +( or run commands on the client machine, and MUST NOT allow) s +5 492 M +( connections to the authentication agent unless forwarding such) s +5 481 M +( connections has been requested. Other issues, such as which TCP/) s +5 470 M +( IP ports can be forwarded and by whom, are clearly issues of local) s +5 459 M +( policy. Many of these issues may involve traversing or bypassing) s +5 448 M +( firewalls, and are interrelated with the local security policy.) s +5 426 M +(4.4 Security Properties) s +5 404 M +( The primary goal of the SSH protocol is improved security on the) s +5 393 M +( Internet. It attempts to do this in a way that is easy to deploy,) s +5 382 M +( even at the cost of absolute security.) s +5 371 M +( o All encryption, integrity, and public key algorithms used are) s +5 360 M +( well-known, well-established algorithms.) s +5 349 M +( o All algorithms are used with cryptographically sound key sizes) s +5 338 M +( that are believed to provide protection against even the strongest) s +5 327 M +( cryptanalytic attacks for decades.) s +5 316 M +( o All algorithms are negotiated, and in case some algorithm is) s +5 305 M +( broken, it is easy to switch to some other algorithm without) s +5 294 M +( modifying the base protocol.) s +5 272 M +( Specific concessions were made to make wide-spread fast deployment) s +5 261 M +( easier. The particular case where this comes up is verifying that) s +5 250 M +( the server host key really belongs to the desired host; the protocol) s +5 239 M +( allows the verification to be left out \(but this is NOT RECOMMENDED\).) s +5 228 M +( This is believed to significantly improve usability in the short) s +5 217 M +( term, until widespread Internet public key infrastructures emerge.) s +5 195 M +(4.5 Packet Size and Overhead) s +5 173 M +( Some readers will worry about the increase in packet size due to new) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 6]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (6,7) 4 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 7 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( headers, padding, and MAC. The minimum packet size is in the order) s +5 679 M +( of 28 bytes \(depending on negotiated algorithms\). The increase is) s +5 668 M +( negligible for large packets, but very significant for one-byte) s +5 657 M +( packets \(telnet-type sessions\). There are, however, several factors) s +5 646 M +( that make this a non-issue in almost all cases:) s +5 635 M +( o The minimum size of a TCP/IP header is 32 bytes. Thus, the) s +5 624 M +( increase is actually from 33 to 51 bytes \(roughly\).) s +5 613 M +( o The minimum size of the data field of an Ethernet packet is 46) s +5 602 M +( bytes [RFC-894]. Thus, the increase is no more than 5 bytes. When) s +5 591 M +( Ethernet headers are considered, the increase is less than 10) s +5 580 M +( percent.) s +5 569 M +( o The total fraction of telnet-type data in the Internet is) s +5 558 M +( negligible, even with increased packet sizes.) s +5 536 M +( The only environment where the packet size increase is likely to have) s +5 525 M +( a significant effect is PPP [RFC-1134] over slow modem lines \(PPP) s +5 514 M +( compresses the TCP/IP headers, emphasizing the increase in packet) s +5 503 M +( size\). However, with modern modems, the time needed to transfer is in) s +5 492 M +( the order of 2 milliseconds, which is a lot faster than people can) s +5 481 M +( type.) s +5 459 M +( There are also issues related to the maximum packet size. To) s +5 448 M +( minimize delays in screen updates, one does not want excessively) s +5 437 M +( large packets for interactive sessions. The maximum packet size is) s +5 426 M +( negotiated separately for each channel.) s +5 404 M +(4.6 Localization and Character Set Support) s +5 382 M +( For the most part, the SSH protocols do not directly pass text that) s +5 371 M +( would be displayed to the user. However, there are some places where) s +5 360 M +( such data might be passed. When applicable, the character set for the) s +5 349 M +( data MUST be explicitly specified. In most places, ISO 10646 with) s +5 338 M +( UTF-8 encoding is used [RFC-2279]. When applicable, a field is also) s +5 327 M +( provided for a language tag [RFC-3066].) s +5 305 M +( One big issue is the character set of the interactive session. There) s +5 294 M +( is no clear solution, as different applications may display data in) s +5 283 M +( different formats. Different types of terminal emulation may also be) s +5 272 M +( employed in the client, and the character set to be used is) s +5 261 M +( effectively determined by the terminal emulation. Thus, no place is) s +5 250 M +( provided for directly specifying the character set or encoding for) s +5 239 M +( terminal session data. However, the terminal emulation type \(e.g.) s +5 228 M +( "vt100"\) is transmitted to the remote site, and it implicitly) s +5 217 M +( specifies the character set and encoding. Applications typically use) s +5 206 M +( the terminal type to determine what character set they use, or the) s +5 195 M +( character set is determined using some external means. The terminal) s +5 184 M +( emulation may also allow configuring the default character set. In) s +5 173 M +( any case, the character set for the terminal session is considered) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 7]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 8 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( primarily a client local issue.) s +5 668 M +( Internal names used to identify algorithms or protocols are normally) s +5 657 M +( never displayed to users, and must be in US-ASCII.) s +5 635 M +( The client and server user names are inherently constrained by what) s +5 624 M +( the server is prepared to accept. They might, however, occasionally) s +5 613 M +( be displayed in logs, reports, etc. They MUST be encoded using ISO) s +5 602 M +( 10646 UTF-8, but other encodings may be required in some cases. It) s +5 591 M +( is up to the server to decide how to map user names to accepted user) s +5 580 M +( names. Straight bit-wise binary comparison is RECOMMENDED.) s +5 558 M +( For localization purposes, the protocol attempts to minimize the) s +5 547 M +( number of textual messages transmitted. When present, such messages) s +5 536 M +( typically relate to errors, debugging information, or some externally) s +5 525 M +( configured data. For data that is normally displayed, it SHOULD be) s +5 514 M +( possible to fetch a localized message instead of the transmitted) s +5 503 M +( message by using a numerical code. The remaining messages SHOULD be) s +5 492 M +( configurable.) s +5 470 M +(5. Data Type Representations Used in the SSH Protocols) s +5 459 M +( byte) s +5 437 M +( A byte represents an arbitrary 8-bit value \(octet\) [RFC-1700].) s +5 426 M +( Fixed length data is sometimes represented as an array of bytes,) s +5 415 M +( written byte[n], where n is the number of bytes in the array.) s +5 393 M +( boolean) s +5 371 M +( A boolean value is stored as a single byte. The value 0) s +5 360 M +( represents FALSE, and the value 1 represents TRUE. All non-zero) s +5 349 M +( values MUST be interpreted as TRUE; however, applications MUST NOT) s +5 338 M +( store values other than 0 and 1.) s +5 316 M +( uint32) s +5 294 M +( Represents a 32-bit unsigned integer. Stored as four bytes in the) s +5 283 M +( order of decreasing significance \(network byte order\). For) s +5 272 M +( example, the value 699921578 \(0x29b7f4aa\) is stored as 29 b7 f4) s +5 261 M +( aa.) s +5 239 M +( uint64) s +5 217 M +( Represents a 64-bit unsigned integer. Stored as eight bytes in) s +5 206 M +( the order of decreasing significance \(network byte order\).) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 8]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (8,9) 5 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 9 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( string) s +5 668 M +( Arbitrary length binary string. Strings are allowed to contain) s +5 657 M +( arbitrary binary data, including null characters and 8-bit) s +5 646 M +( characters. They are stored as a uint32 containing its length) s +5 635 M +( \(number of bytes that follow\) and zero \(= empty string\) or more) s +5 624 M +( bytes that are the value of the string. Terminating null) s +5 613 M +( characters are not used.) s +5 591 M +( Strings are also used to store text. In that case, US-ASCII is) s +5 580 M +( used for internal names, and ISO-10646 UTF-8 for text that might) s +5 569 M +( be displayed to the user. The terminating null character SHOULD) s +5 558 M +( NOT normally be stored in the string.) s +5 536 M +( For example, the US-ASCII string "testing" is represented as 00 00) s +5 525 M +( 00 07 t e s t i n g. The UTF8 mapping does not alter the encoding) s +5 514 M +( of US-ASCII characters.) s +5 492 M +( mpint) s +5 470 M +( Represents multiple precision integers in two's complement format,) s +5 459 M +( stored as a string, 8 bits per byte, MSB first. Negative numbers) s +5 448 M +( have the value 1 as the most significant bit of the first byte of) s +5 437 M +( the data partition. If the most significant bit would be set for a) s +5 426 M +( positive number, the number MUST be preceded by a zero byte.) s +5 415 M +( Unnecessary leading bytes with the value 0 or 255 MUST NOT be) s +5 404 M +( included. The value zero MUST be stored as a string with zero) s +5 393 M +( bytes of data.) s +5 371 M +( By convention, a number that is used in modular computations in) s +5 360 M +( Z_n SHOULD be represented in the range 0 <= x < n.) s +5 338 M +( Examples:) s +5 327 M +( value \(hex\) representation \(hex\)) s +5 316 M +( ---------------------------------------------------------------) s +5 305 M +( 0 00 00 00 00) s +5 294 M +( 9a378f9b2e332a7 00 00 00 08 09 a3 78 f9 b2 e3 32 a7) s +5 283 M +( 80 00 00 00 02 00 80) s +5 272 M +( -1234 00 00 00 02 ed cc) s +5 261 M +( -deadbeef 00 00 00 05 ff 21 52 41 11) s +5 217 M +( name-list) s +5 195 M +( A string containing a comma separated list of names. A name list) s +5 184 M +( is represented as a uint32 containing its length \(number of bytes) s +5 173 M +( that follow\) followed by a comma-separated list of zero or more) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 9]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 10 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( names. A name MUST be non-zero length, and it MUST NOT contain a) s +5 679 M +( comma \(','\). Context may impose additional restrictions on the) s +5 668 M +( names; for example, the names in a list may have to be valid) s +5 657 M +( algorithm identifier \(see Algorithm Naming below\), or [RFC-3066]) s +5 646 M +( language tags. The order of the names in a list may or may not be) s +5 635 M +( significant, also depending on the context where the list is is) s +5 624 M +( used. Terminating NUL characters are not used, neither for the) s +5 613 M +( individual names, nor for the list as a whole.) s +5 591 M +( Examples:) s +5 580 M +( value representation \(hex\)) s +5 569 M +( ---------------------------------------) s +5 558 M +( \(\), the empty list 00 00 00 00) s +5 547 M +( \("zlib"\) 00 00 00 04 7a 6c 69 62) s +5 536 M +( \("zlib", "none"\) 00 00 00 09 7a 6c 69 62 2c 6e 6f 6e 65) s +5 481 M +(6. Algorithm Naming) s +5 459 M +( The SSH protocols refer to particular hash, encryption, integrity,) s +5 448 M +( compression, and key exchange algorithms or protocols by names.) s +5 437 M +( There are some standard algorithms that all implementations MUST) s +5 426 M +( support. There are also algorithms that are defined in the protocol) s +5 415 M +( specification but are OPTIONAL. Furthermore, it is expected that) s +5 404 M +( some organizations will want to use their own algorithms.) s +5 382 M +( In this protocol, all algorithm identifiers MUST be printable) s +5 371 M +( US-ASCII non-empty strings no longer than 64 characters. Names MUST) s +5 360 M +( be case-sensitive.) s +5 338 M +( There are two formats for algorithm names:) s +5 327 M +( o Names that do not contain an at-sign \(@\) are reserved to be) s +5 316 M +( assigned by IETF consensus \(RFCs\). Examples include `3des-cbc',) s +5 305 M +( `sha-1', `hmac-sha1', and `zlib' \(the quotes are not part of the) s +5 294 M +( name\). Names of this format MUST NOT be used without first) s +5 283 M +( registering them. Registered names MUST NOT contain an at-sign) s +5 272 M +( \(@\) or a comma \(,\).) s +5 261 M +( o Anyone can define additional algorithms by using names in the) s +5 250 M +( format name@domainname, e.g. "[email protected]". The) s +5 239 M +( format of the part preceding the at sign is not specified; it MUST) s +5 228 M +( consist of US-ASCII characters except at-sign and comma. The part) s +5 217 M +( following the at-sign MUST be a valid fully qualified internet) s +5 206 M +( domain name [RFC-1034] controlled by the person or organization) s +5 195 M +( defining the name. It is up to each domain how it manages its) s +5 184 M +( local namespace.) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 10]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (10,11) 6 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 11 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +(7. Message Numbers) s +5 668 M +( SSH packets have message numbers in the range 1 to 255. These numbers) s +5 657 M +( have been allocated as follows:) s +5 624 M +( Transport layer protocol:) s +5 602 M +( 1 to 19 Transport layer generic \(e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug,) s +5 591 M +( etc.\)) s +5 580 M +( 20 to 29 Algorithm negotiation) s +5 569 M +( 30 to 49 Key exchange method specific \(numbers can be reused for) s +5 558 M +( different authentication methods\)) s +5 536 M +( User authentication protocol:) s +5 514 M +( 50 to 59 User authentication generic) s +5 503 M +( 60 to 79 User authentication method specific \(numbers can be) s +5 492 M +( reused for different authentication methods\)) s +5 470 M +( Connection protocol:) s +5 448 M +( 80 to 89 Connection protocol generic) s +5 437 M +( 90 to 127 Channel related messages) s +5 415 M +( Reserved for client protocols:) s +5 393 M +( 128 to 191 Reserved) s +5 371 M +( Local extensions:) s +5 349 M +( 192 to 255 Local extensions) s +5 305 M +(8. IANA Considerations) s +5 283 M +( The initial state of the IANA registry is detailed in [SSH-NUMBERS].) s +5 261 M +( Allocation of the following types of names in the SSH protocols is) s +5 250 M +( assigned by IETF consensus:) s +5 239 M +( o SSH encryption algorithm names,) s +5 228 M +( o SSH MAC algorithm names,) s +5 217 M +( o SSH public key algorithm names \(public key algorithm also implies) s +5 206 M +( encoding and signature/encryption capability\),) s +5 195 M +( o SSH key exchange method names, and) s +5 184 M +( o SSH protocol \(service\) names.) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 11]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 12 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( These names MUST be printable US-ASCII strings, and MUST NOT contain) s +5 679 M +( the characters at-sign \('@'\), comma \(','\), or whitespace or control) s +5 668 M +( characters \(ASCII codes 32 or less\). Names are case-sensitive, and) s +5 657 M +( MUST NOT be longer than 64 characters.) s +5 635 M +( Names with the at-sign \('@'\) in them are allocated by the owner of) s +5 624 M +( DNS name after the at-sign \(hierarchical allocation in [RFC-2343]\),) s +5 613 M +( otherwise the same restrictions as above.) s +5 591 M +( Each category of names listed above has a separate namespace.) s +5 580 M +( However, using the same name in multiple categories SHOULD be avoided) s +5 569 M +( to minimize confusion.) s +5 547 M +( Message numbers \(see Section Message Numbers \(Section 7\)\) in the) s +5 536 M +( range of 0..191 are allocated via IETF consensus; message numbers in) s +5 525 M +( the 192..255 range \(the "Local extensions" set\) are reserved for) s +5 514 M +( private use.) s +5 492 M +(9. Security Considerations) s +5 470 M +( In order to make the entire body of Security Considerations more) s +5 459 M +( accessible, Security Considerations for the transport,) s +5 448 M +( authentication, and connection documents have been gathered here.) s +5 426 M +( The transport protocol [1] provides a confidential channel over an) s +5 415 M +( insecure network. It performs server host authentication, key) s +5 404 M +( exchange, encryption, and integrity protection. It also derives a) s +5 393 M +( unique session id that may be used by higher-level protocols.) s +5 371 M +( The authentication protocol [2] provides a suite of mechanisms which) s +5 360 M +( can be used to authenticate the client user to the server.) s +5 349 M +( Individual mechanisms specified in the in authentication protocol use) s +5 338 M +( the session id provided by the transport protocol and/or depend on) s +5 327 M +( the security and integrity guarantees of the transport protocol.) s +5 305 M +( The connection protocol [3] specifies a mechanism to multiplex) s +5 294 M +( multiple streams [channels] of data over the confidential and) s +5 283 M +( authenticated transport. It also specifies channels for accessing an) s +5 272 M +( interactive shell, for 'proxy-forwarding' various external protocols) s +5 261 M +( over the secure transport \(including arbitrary TCP/IP protocols\), and) s +5 250 M +( for accessing secure 'subsystems' on the server host.) s +5 228 M +(9.1 Pseudo-Random Number Generation) s +5 206 M +( This protocol binds each session key to the session by including) s +5 195 M +( random, session specific data in the hash used to produce session) s +5 184 M +( keys. Special care should be taken to ensure that all of the random) s +5 173 M +( numbers are of good quality. If the random data here \(e.g., DH) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 12]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (12,13) 7 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 13 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( parameters\) are pseudo-random then the pseudo-random number generator) s +5 679 M +( should be cryptographically secure \(i.e., its next output not easily) s +5 668 M +( guessed even when knowing all previous outputs\) and, furthermore,) s +5 657 M +( proper entropy needs to be added to the pseudo-random number) s +5 646 M +( generator. RFC 1750 [1750] offers suggestions for sources of random) s +5 635 M +( numbers and entropy. Implementors should note the importance of) s +5 624 M +( entropy and the well-meant, anecdotal warning about the difficulty in) s +5 613 M +( properly implementing pseudo-random number generating functions.) s +5 591 M +( The amount of entropy available to a given client or server may) s +5 580 M +( sometimes be less than what is required. In this case one must) s +5 569 M +( either resort to pseudo-random number generation regardless of) s +5 558 M +( insufficient entropy or refuse to run the protocol. The latter is) s +5 547 M +( preferable.) s +5 525 M +(9.2 Transport) s +5 503 M +(9.2.1 Confidentiality) s +5 481 M +( It is beyond the scope of this document and the Secure Shell Working) s +5 470 M +( Group to analyze or recommend specific ciphers other than the ones) s +5 459 M +( which have been established and accepted within the industry. At the) s +5 448 M +( time of this writing, ciphers commonly in use include 3DES, ARCFOUR,) s +5 437 M +( twofish, serpent and blowfish. AES has been accepted by The) s +5 426 M +( published as a US Federal Information Processing Standards [FIPS-197]) s +5 415 M +( and the cryptographic community as being acceptable for this purpose) s +5 404 M +( as well has accepted AES. As always, implementors and users should) s +5 393 M +( check current literature to ensure that no recent vulnerabilities) s +5 382 M +( have been found in ciphers used within products. Implementors should) s +5 371 M +( also check to see which ciphers are considered to be relatively) s +5 360 M +( stronger than others and should recommend their use to users over) s +5 349 M +( relatively weaker ciphers. It would be considered good form for an) s +5 338 M +( implementation to politely and unobtrusively notify a user that a) s +5 327 M +( stronger cipher is available and should be used when a weaker one is) s +5 316 M +( actively chosen.) s +5 294 M +( The "none" cipher is provided for debugging and SHOULD NOT be used) s +5 283 M +( except for that purpose. It's cryptographic properties are) s +5 272 M +( sufficiently described in RFC 2410, which will show that its use does) s +5 261 M +( not meet the intent of this protocol.) s +5 239 M +( The relative merits of these and other ciphers may also be found in) s +5 228 M +( current literature. Two references that may provide information on) s +5 217 M +( the subject are [SCHNEIER] and [KAUFMAN,PERLMAN,SPECINER]. Both of) s +5 206 M +( these describe the CBC mode of operation of certain ciphers and the) s +5 195 M +( weakness of this scheme. Essentially, this mode is theoretically) s +5 184 M +( vulnerable to chosen cipher-text attacks because of the high) s +5 173 M +( predictability of the start of packet sequence. However, this attack) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 13]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 14 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( is still deemed difficult and not considered fully practicable) s +5 679 M +( especially if relatively longer block sizes are used.) s +5 657 M +( Additionally, another CBC mode attack may be mitigated through the) s +5 646 M +( insertion of packets containing SSH_MSG_IGNORE. Without this) s +5 635 M +( technique, a specific attack may be successful. For this attack) s +5 624 M +( \(commonly known as the Rogaway attack) s +5 613 M +( [ROGAWAY],[DAI],[BELLARE,KOHNO,NAMPREMPRE]\) to work, the attacker) s +5 602 M +( would need to know the IV of the next block that is going to be) s +5 591 M +( encrypted. In CBC mode that is the output of the encryption of the) s +5 580 M +( previous block. If the attacker does not have any way to see the) s +5 569 M +( packet yet \(i.e it is in the internal buffers of the ssh) s +5 558 M +( implementation or even in the kernel\) then this attack will not work.) s +5 547 M +( If the last packet has been sent out to the network \(i.e the attacker) s +5 536 M +( has access to it\) then he can use the attack.) s +5 514 M +( In the optimal case an implementor would need to add an extra packet) s +5 503 M +( only if the packet has been sent out onto the network and there are) s +5 492 M +( no other packets waiting for transmission. Implementors may wish to) s +5 481 M +( check to see if there are any unsent packets awaiting transmission,) s +5 470 M +( but unfortunately it is not normally easy to obtain this information) s +5 459 M +( from the kernel or buffers. If there are not, then a packet) s +5 448 M +( containing SSH_MSG_IGNORE SHOULD be sent. If a new packet is added) s +5 437 M +( to the stream every time the attacker knows the IV that is supposed) s +5 426 M +( to be used for the next packet, then the attacker will not be able to) s +5 415 M +( guess the correct IV, thus the attack will never be successfull.) s +5 393 M +( As an example, consider the following case:) s +5 360 M +( Client Server) s +5 349 M +( ------ ------) s +5 338 M +( TCP\(seq=x, len=500\) ->) s +5 327 M +( contains Record 1) s +5 305 M +( [500 ms passes, no ACK]) s +5 283 M +( TCP\(seq=x, len=1000\) ->) s +5 272 M +( contains Records 1,2) s +5 250 M +( ACK) s +5 217 M +( 1. The Nagle algorithm + TCP retransmits mean that the two records) s +5 206 M +( get coalesced into a single TCP segment) s +5 195 M +( 2. Record 2 is *not* at the beginning of the TCP segment and never) s +5 184 M +( will be, since it gets ACKed.) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 14]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (14,15) 8 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 15 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( 3. Yet, the attack is possible because Record 1 has already been) s +5 679 M +( seen.) s +5 657 M +( As this example indicates, it's totally unsafe to use the existence) s +5 646 M +( of unflushed data in the TCP buffers proper as a guide to whether you) s +5 635 M +( need an empty packet, since when you do the second write\(\), the) s +5 624 M +( buffers will contain the un-ACKed Record 1.) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 15]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 16 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( On the other hand, it's perfectly safe to have the following) s +5 679 M +( situation:) s +5 646 M +( Client Server) s +5 635 M +( ------ ------) s +5 624 M +( TCP\(seq=x, len=500\) ->) s +5 613 M +( contains SSH_MSG_IGNORE) s +5 591 M +( TCP\(seq=y, len=500\) ->) s +5 580 M +( contains Data) s +5 558 M +( Provided that the IV for second SSH Record is fixed after the data for) s +5 547 M +( the Data packet is determined -i.e. you do:) s +5 536 M +( read from user) s +5 525 M +( encrypt null packet) s +5 514 M +( encrypt data packet) s +5 481 M +(9.2.2 Data Integrity) s +5 459 M +( This protocol does allow the Data Integrity mechanism to be disabled.) s +5 448 M +( Implementors SHOULD be wary of exposing this feature for any purpose) s +5 437 M +( other than debugging. Users and administrators SHOULD be explicitly) s +5 426 M +( warned anytime the "none" MAC is enabled.) s +5 404 M +( So long as the "none" MAC is not used, this protocol provides data) s +5 393 M +( integrity.) s +5 371 M +( Because MACs use a 32 bit sequence number, they might start to leak) s +5 360 M +( information after 2**32 packets have been sent. However, following) s +5 349 M +( the rekeying recommendations should prevent this attack. The) s +5 338 M +( transport protocol [1] recommends rekeying after one gigabyte of) s +5 327 M +( data, and the smallest possible packet is 16 bytes. Therefore,) s +5 316 M +( rekeying SHOULD happen after 2**28 packets at the very most.) s +5 294 M +(9.2.3 Replay) s +5 272 M +( The use of a MAC other than 'none' provides integrity and) s +5 261 M +( authentication. In addition, the transport protocol provides a) s +5 250 M +( unique session identifier \(bound in part to pseudo-random data that) s +5 239 M +( is part of the algorithm and key exchange process\) that can be used) s +5 228 M +( by higher level protocols to bind data to a given session and prevent) s +5 217 M +( replay of data from prior sessions. For example, the authentication) s +5 206 M +( protocol uses this to prevent replay of signatures from previous) s +5 195 M +( sessions. Because public key authentication exchanges are) s +5 184 M +( cryptographically bound to the session \(i.e., to the initial key) s +5 173 M +( exchange\) they cannot be successfully replayed in other sessions.) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 16]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (16,17) 9 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 17 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( Note that the session ID can be made public without harming the) s +5 679 M +( security of the protocol.) s +5 657 M +( If two session happen to have the same session ID [hash of key) s +5 646 M +( exchanges] then packets from one can be replayed against the other.) s +5 635 M +( It must be stressed that the chances of such an occurrence are,) s +5 624 M +( needless to say, minimal when using modern cryptographic methods.) s +5 613 M +( This is all the more so true when specifying larger hash function) s +5 602 M +( outputs and DH parameters.) s +5 580 M +( Replay detection using monotonically increasing sequence numbers as) s +5 569 M +( input to the MAC, or HMAC in some cases, is described in [RFC2085] />) s +5 558 M +( [RFC2246], [RFC2743], [RFC1964], [RFC2025], and [RFC1510]. The) s +5 547 M +( underlying construct is discussed in [RFC2104]. Essentially a) s +5 536 M +( different sequence number in each packet ensures that at least this) s +5 525 M +( one input to the MAC function will be unique and will provide a) s +5 514 M +( nonrecurring MAC output that is not predictable to an attacker. If) s +5 503 M +( the session stays active long enough, however, this sequence number) s +5 492 M +( will wrap. This event may provide an attacker an opportunity to) s +5 481 M +( replay a previously recorded packet with an identical sequence number) s +5 470 M +( but only if the peers have not rekeyed since the transmission of the) s +5 459 M +( first packet with that sequence number. If the peers have rekeyed,) s +5 448 M +( then the replay will be detected as the MAC check will fail. For) s +5 437 M +( this reason, it must be emphasized that peers MUST rekey before a) s +5 426 M +( wrap of the sequence numbers. Naturally, if an attacker does attempt) s +5 415 M +( to replay a captured packet before the peers have rekeyed, then the) s +5 404 M +( receiver of the duplicate packet will not be able to validate the MAC) s +5 393 M +( and it will be discarded. The reason that the MAC will fail is) s +5 382 M +( because the receiver will formulate a MAC based upon the packet) s +5 371 M +( contents, the shared secret, and the expected sequence number. Since) s +5 360 M +( the replayed packet will not be using that expected sequence number) s +5 349 M +( \(the sequence number of the replayed packet will have already been) s +5 338 M +( passed by the receiver\) then the calculated MAC will not match the) s +5 327 M +( MAC received with the packet.) s +5 305 M +(9.2.4 Man-in-the-middle) s +5 283 M +( This protocol makes no assumptions nor provisions for an) s +5 272 M +( infrastructure or means for distributing the public keys of hosts. It) s +5 261 M +( is expected that this protocol will sometimes be used without first) s +5 250 M +( verifying the association between the server host key and the server) s +5 239 M +( host name. Such usage is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.) s +5 228 M +( This section describes this and encourages administrators and users) s +5 217 M +( to understand the importance of verifying this association before any) s +5 206 M +( session is initiated.) s +5 184 M +( There are three cases of man-in-the-middle attacks to consider. The) s +5 173 M +( first is where an attacker places a device between the client and the) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 17]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 18 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( server before the session is initiated. In this case, the attack) s +5 679 M +( device is trying to mimic the legitimate server and will offer its) s +5 668 M +( public key to the client when the client initiates a session. If it) s +5 657 M +( were to offer the public key of the server, then it would not be able) s +5 646 M +( to decrypt or sign the transmissions between the legitimate server) s +5 635 M +( and the client unless it also had access to the private-key of the) s +5 624 M +( host. The attack device will also, simultaneously to this, initiate) s +5 613 M +( a session to the legitimate server masquerading itself as the client.) s +5 602 M +( If the public key of the server had been securely distributed to the) s +5 591 M +( client prior to that session initiation, the key offered to the) s +5 580 M +( client by the attack device will not match the key stored on the) s +5 569 M +( client. In that case, the user SHOULD be given a warning that the) s +5 558 M +( offered host key does not match the host key cached on the client.) s +5 547 M +( As described in Section 3.1 of [ARCH], the user may be free to accept) s +5 536 M +( the new key and continue the session. It is RECOMMENDED that the) s +5 525 M +( warning provide sufficient information to the user of the client) s +5 514 M +( device so they may make an informed decision. If the user chooses to) s +5 503 M +( continue the session with the stored public-key of the server \(not) s +5 492 M +( the public-key offered at the start of the session\), then the session) s +5 481 M +( specific data between the attacker and server will be different) s +5 470 M +( between the client-to-attacker session and the attacker-to-server) s +5 459 M +( sessions due to the randomness discussed above. From this, the) s +5 448 M +( attacker will not be able to make this attack work since the attacker) s +5 437 M +( will not be able to correctly sign packets containing this session) s +5 426 M +( specific data from the server since he does not have the private key) s +5 415 M +( of that server.) s +5 393 M +( The second case that should be considered is similar to the first) s +5 382 M +( case in that it also happens at the time of connection but this case) s +5 371 M +( points out the need for the secure distribution of server public) s +5 360 M +( keys. If the server public keys are not securely distributed then) s +5 349 M +( the client cannot know if it is talking to the intended server. An) s +5 338 M +( attacker may use social engineering techniques to pass off server) s +5 327 M +( keys to unsuspecting users and may then place a man-in-the-middle) s +5 316 M +( attack device between the legitimate server and the clients. If this) s +5 305 M +( is allowed to happen then the clients will form client-to-attacker) s +5 294 M +( sessions and the attacker will form attacker-to-server sessions and) s +5 283 M +( will be able to monitor and manipulate all of the traffic between the) s +5 272 M +( clients and the legitimate servers. Server administrators are) s +5 261 M +( encouraged to make host key fingerprints available for checking by) s +5 250 M +( some means whose security does not rely on the integrity of the) s +5 239 M +( actual host keys. Possible mechanisms are discussed in Section 3.1) s +5 228 M +( of [SSH-ARCH] and may also include secured Web pages, physical pieces) s +5 217 M +( of paper, etc. Implementors SHOULD provide recommendations on how) s +5 206 M +( best to do this with their implementation. Because the protocol is) s +5 195 M +( extensible, future extensions to the protocol may provide better) s +5 184 M +( mechanisms for dealing with the need to know the server's host key) s +5 173 M +( before connecting. For example, making the host key fingerprint) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 18]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (18,19) 10 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 19 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( available through a secure DNS lookup, or using kerberos over gssapi) s +5 679 M +( during key exchange to authenticate the server are possibilities.) s +5 657 M +( In the third man-in-the-middle case, attackers may attempt to) s +5 646 M +( manipulate packets in transit between peers after the session has) s +5 635 M +( been established. As described in the Replay part of this section, a) s +5 624 M +( successful attack of this nature is very improbable. As in the) s +5 613 M +( Replay section, this reasoning does assume that the MAC is secure and) s +5 602 M +( that it is infeasible to construct inputs to a MAC algorithm to give) s +5 591 M +( a known output. This is discussed in much greater detail in Section) s +5 580 M +( 6 of RFC 2104. If the MAC algorithm has a vulnerability or is weak) s +5 569 M +( enough, then the attacker may be able to specify certain inputs to) s +5 558 M +( yield a known MAC. With that they may be able to alter the contents) s +5 547 M +( of a packet in transit. Alternatively the attacker may be able to) s +5 536 M +( exploit the algorithm vulnerability or weakness to find the shared) s +5 525 M +( secret by reviewing the MACs from captured packets. In either of) s +5 514 M +( those cases, an attacker could construct a packet or packets that) s +5 503 M +( could be inserted into an SSH stream. To prevent that, implementors) s +5 492 M +( are encouraged to utilize commonly accepted MAC algorithms and) s +5 481 M +( administrators are encouraged to watch current literature and) s +5 470 M +( discussions of cryptography to ensure that they are not using a MAC) s +5 459 M +( algorithm that has a recently found vulnerability or weakness.) s +5 437 M +( In summary, the use of this protocol without a reliable association) s +5 426 M +( of the binding between a host and its host keys is inherently) s +5 415 M +( insecure and is NOT RECOMMENDED. It may however be necessary in) s +5 404 M +( non-security critical environments, and will still provide protection) s +5 393 M +( against passive attacks. Implementors of protocols and applications) s +5 382 M +( running on top of this protocol should keep this possibility in mind.) s +5 360 M +(9.2.5 Denial-of-service) s +5 338 M +( This protocol is designed to be used over a reliable transport. If) s +5 327 M +( transmission errors or message manipulation occur, the connection is) s +5 316 M +( closed. The connection SHOULD be re-established if this occurs.) s +5 305 M +( Denial of service attacks of this type \("wire cutter"\) are almost) s +5 294 M +( impossible to avoid.) s +5 272 M +( In addition, this protocol is vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks) s +5 261 M +( because an attacker can force the server to go through the CPU and) s +5 250 M +( memory intensive tasks of connection setup and key exchange without) s +5 239 M +( authenticating. Implementors SHOULD provide features that make this) s +5 228 M +( more difficult. For example, only allowing connections from a subset) s +5 217 M +( of IPs known to have valid users.) s +5 195 M +(9.2.6 Covert Channels) s +5 173 M +( The protocol was not designed to eliminate covert channels. For) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 19]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 20 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( example, the padding, SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages, and several other) s +5 679 M +( places in the protocol can be used to pass covert information, and) s +5 668 M +( the recipient has no reliable way to verify whether such information) s +5 657 M +( is being sent.) s +5 635 M +(9.2.7 Forward Secrecy) s +5 613 M +( It should be noted that the Diffie-Hellman key exchanges may provide) s +5 602 M +( perfect forward secrecy \(PFS\). PFS is essentially defined as the) s +5 591 M +( cryptographic property of a key-establishment protocol in which the) s +5 580 M +( compromise of a session key or long-term private key after a given) s +5 569 M +( session does not cause the compromise of any earlier session. [ANSI) s +5 558 M +( T1.523-2001] SSHv2 sessions resulting from a key exchange using) s +5 547 M +( diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 are secure even if private keying/) s +5 536 M +( authentication material is later revealed, but not if the session) s +5 525 M +( keys are revealed. So, given this definition of PFS, SSHv2 does have) s +5 514 M +( PFS. It is hoped that all other key exchange mechanisms proposed and) s +5 503 M +( used in the future will also provide PFS. This property is not) s +5 492 M +( commuted to any of the applications or protocols using SSH as a) s +5 481 M +( transport however. The transport layer of SSH provides) s +5 470 M +( confidentiality for password authentication and other methods that) s +5 459 M +( rely on secret data.) s +5 437 M +( Of course, if the DH private parameters for the client and server are) s +5 426 M +( revealed then the session key is revealed, but these items can be) s +5 415 M +( thrown away after the key exchange completes. It's worth pointing) s +5 404 M +( out that these items should not be allowed to end up on swap space) s +5 393 M +( and that they should be erased from memory as soon as the key) s +5 382 M +( exchange completes.) s +5 360 M +(9.3 Authentication Protocol) s +5 338 M +( The purpose of this protocol is to perform client user) s +5 327 M +( authentication. It assumes that this run over a secure transport) s +5 316 M +( layer protocol, which has already authenticated the server machine,) s +5 305 M +( established an encrypted communications channel, and computed a) s +5 294 M +( unique session identifier for this session.) s +5 272 M +( Several authentication methods with different security) s +5 261 M +( characteristics are allowed. It is up to the server's local policy) s +5 250 M +( to decide which methods \(or combinations of methods\) it is willing to) s +5 239 M +( accept for each user. Authentication is no stronger than the weakest) s +5 228 M +( combination allowed.) s +5 206 M +( The server may go into a "sleep" period after repeated unsuccessful) s +5 195 M +( authentication attempts to make key search more difficult for) s +5 184 M +( attackers. Care should be taken so that this doesn't become a) s +5 173 M +( self-denial of service vector.) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 20]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (20,21) 11 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 21 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +(9.3.1 Weak Transport) s +5 668 M +( If the transport layer does not provide confidentiality,) s +5 657 M +( authentication methods that rely on secret data SHOULD be disabled.) s +5 646 M +( If it does not provide strong integrity protection, requests to) s +5 635 M +( change authentication data \(e.g. a password change\) SHOULD be) s +5 624 M +( disabled to prevent an attacker from modifying the ciphertext) s +5 613 M +( without being noticed, or rendering the new authentication data) s +5 602 M +( unusable \(denial of service\).) s +5 580 M +( The assumption as stated above that the Authentication Protocol only) s +5 569 M +( run over a secure transport that has previously authenticated the) s +5 558 M +( server is very important to note. People deploying SSH are reminded) s +5 547 M +( of the consequences of man-in-the-middle attacks if the client does) s +5 536 M +( not have a very strong a priori association of the server with the) s +5 525 M +( host key of that server. Specifically for the case of the) s +5 514 M +( Authentication Protocol the client may form a session to a) s +5 503 M +( man-in-the-middle attack device and divulge user credentials such as) s +5 492 M +( their username and password. Even in the cases of authentication) s +5 481 M +( where no user credentials are divulged, an attacker may still gain) s +5 470 M +( information they shouldn't have by capturing key-strokes in much the) s +5 459 M +( same way that a honeypot works.) s +5 437 M +(9.3.2 Debug messages) s +5 415 M +( Special care should be taken when designing debug messages. These) s +5 404 M +( messages may reveal surprising amounts of information about the host) s +5 393 M +( if not properly designed. Debug messages can be disabled \(during) s +5 382 M +( user authentication phase\) if high security is required.) s +5 371 M +( Administrators of host machines should make all attempts to) s +5 360 M +( compartmentalize all event notification messages and protect them) s +5 349 M +( from unwarranted observation. Developers should be aware of the) s +5 338 M +( sensitive nature of some of the normal event messages and debug) s +5 327 M +( messages and may want to provide guidance to administrators on ways) s +5 316 M +( to keep this information away from unauthorized people. Developers) s +5 305 M +( should consider minimizing the amount of sensitive information) s +5 294 M +( obtainable by users during the authentication phase in accordance) s +5 283 M +( with the local policies. For this reason, it is RECOMMENDED that) s +5 272 M +( debug messages be initially disabled at the time of deployment and) s +5 261 M +( require an active decision by an administrator to allow them to be) s +5 250 M +( enabled. It is also RECOMMENDED that a message expressing this) s +5 239 M +( concern be presented to the administrator of a system when the action) s +5 228 M +( is taken to enable debugging messages.) s +5 206 M +(9.3.3 Local security policy) s +5 184 M +( Implementer MUST ensure that the credentials provided validate the) s +5 173 M +( professed user and also MUST ensure that the local policy of the) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 21]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 22 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( server permits the user the access requested. In particular, because) s +5 679 M +( of the flexible nature of the SSH connection protocol, it may not be) s +5 668 M +( possible to determine the local security policy, if any, that should) s +5 657 M +( apply at the time of authentication because the kind of service being) s +5 646 M +( requested is not clear at that instant. For example, local policy) s +5 635 M +( might allow a user to access files on the server, but not start an) s +5 624 M +( interactive shell. However, during the authentication protocol, it is) s +5 613 M +( not known whether the user will be accessing files or attempting to) s +5 602 M +( use an interactive shell, or even both. In any event, where local) s +5 591 M +( security policy for the server host exists, it MUST be applied and) s +5 580 M +( enforced correctly.) s +5 558 M +( Implementors are encouraged to provide a default local policy and) s +5 547 M +( make its parameters known to administrators and users. At the) s +5 536 M +( discretion of the implementors, this default policy may be along the) s +5 525 M +( lines of 'anything goes' where there are no restrictions placed upon) s +5 514 M +( users, or it may be along the lines of 'excessively restrictive' in) s +5 503 M +( which case the administrators will have to actively make changes to) s +5 492 M +( this policy to meet their needs. Alternatively, it may be some) s +5 481 M +( attempt at providing something practical and immediately useful to) s +5 470 M +( the administrators of the system so they don't have to put in much) s +5 459 M +( effort to get SSH working. Whatever choice is made MUST be applied) s +5 448 M +( and enforced as required above.) s +5 426 M +(9.3.4 Public key authentication) s +5 404 M +( The use of public-key authentication assumes that the client host has) s +5 393 M +( not been compromised. It also assumes that the private-key of the) s +5 382 M +( server host has not been compromised.) s +5 360 M +( This risk can be mitigated by the use of passphrases on private keys;) s +5 349 M +( however, this is not an enforceable policy. The use of smartcards,) s +5 338 M +( or other technology to make passphrases an enforceable policy is) s +5 327 M +( suggested.) s +5 305 M +( The server could require both password and public-key authentication,) s +5 294 M +( however, this requires the client to expose its password to the) s +5 283 M +( server \(see section on password authentication below.\)) s +5 261 M +(9.3.5 Password authentication) s +5 239 M +( The password mechanism as specified in the authentication protocol) s +5 228 M +( assumes that the server has not been compromised. If the server has) s +5 217 M +( been compromised, using password authentication will reveal a valid) s +5 206 M +( username / password combination to the attacker, which may lead to) s +5 195 M +( further compromises.) s +5 173 M +( This vulnerability can be mitigated by using an alternative form of) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 22]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (22,23) 12 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 23 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( authentication. For example, public-key authentication makes no) s +5 679 M +( assumptions about security on the server.) s +5 657 M +(9.3.6 Host based authentication) s +5 635 M +( Host based authentication assumes that the client has not been) s +5 624 M +( compromised. There are no mitigating strategies, other than to use) s +5 613 M +( host based authentication in combination with another authentication) s +5 602 M +( method.) s +5 580 M +(9.4 Connection protocol) s +5 558 M +(9.4.1 End point security) s +5 536 M +( End point security is assumed by the connection protocol. If the) s +5 525 M +( server has been compromised, any terminal sessions, port forwarding,) s +5 514 M +( or systems accessed on the host are compromised. There are no) s +5 503 M +( mitigating factors for this.) s +5 481 M +( If the client end point has been compromised, and the server fails to) s +5 470 M +( stop the attacker at the authentication protocol, all services) s +5 459 M +( exposed \(either as subsystems or through forwarding\) will be) s +5 448 M +( vulnerable to attack. Implementors SHOULD provide mechanisms for) s +5 437 M +( administrators to control which services are exposed to limit the) s +5 426 M +( vulnerability of other services.) s +5 404 M +( These controls might include controlling which machines and ports can) s +5 393 M +( be target in 'port-forwarding' operations, which users are allowed to) s +5 382 M +( use interactive shell facilities, or which users are allowed to use) s +5 371 M +( exposed subsystems.) s +5 349 M +(9.4.2 Proxy forwarding) s +5 327 M +( The SSH connection protocol allows for proxy forwarding of other) s +5 316 M +( protocols such as SNMP, POP3, and HTTP. This may be a concern for) s +5 305 M +( network administrators who wish to control the access of certain) s +5 294 M +( applications by users located outside of their physical location.) s +5 283 M +( Essentially, the forwarding of these protocols may violate site) s +5 272 M +( specific security policies as they may be undetectably tunneled) s +5 261 M +( through a firewall. Implementors SHOULD provide an administrative) s +5 250 M +( mechanism to control the proxy forwarding functionality so that site) s +5 239 M +( specific security policies may be upheld.) s +5 217 M +( In addition, a reverse proxy forwarding functionality is available,) s +5 206 M +( which again can be used to bypass firewall controls.) s +5 184 M +( As indicated above, end-point security is assumed during proxy) s +5 173 M +( forwarding operations. Failure of end-point security will compromise) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 23]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 24 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( all data passed over proxy forwarding.) s +5 668 M +(9.4.3 X11 forwarding) s +5 646 M +( Another form of proxy forwarding provided by the ssh connection) s +5 635 M +( protocol is the forwarding of the X11 protocol. If end-point) s +5 624 M +( security has been compromised, X11 forwarding may allow attacks) s +5 613 M +( against the X11 server. Users and administrators should, as a matter) s +5 602 M +( of course, use appropriate X11 security mechanisms to prevent) s +5 591 M +( unauthorized use of the X11 server. Implementors, administrators and) s +5 580 M +( users who wish to further explore the security mechanisms of X11 are) s +5 569 M +( invited to read [SCHEIFLER] and analyze previously reported problems) s +5 558 M +( with the interactions between SSH forwarding and X11 in CERT) s +5 547 M +( vulnerabilities VU#363181 and VU#118892 [CERT].) s +5 525 M +( X11 display forwarding with SSH, by itself, is not sufficient to) s +5 514 M +( correct well known problems with X11 security [VENEMA]. However, X11) s +5 503 M +( display forwarding in SSHv2 \(or other, secure protocols\), combined) s +5 492 M +( with actual and pseudo-displays which accept connections only over) s +5 481 M +( local IPC mechanisms authorized by permissions or ACLs, does correct) s +5 470 M +( many X11 security problems as long as the "none" MAC is not used. It) s +5 459 M +( is RECOMMENDED that X11 display implementations default to allowing) s +5 448 M +( display opens only over local IPC. It is RECOMMENDED that SSHv2) s +5 437 M +( server implementations that support X11 forwarding default to) s +5 426 M +( allowing display opens only over local IPC. On single-user systems) s +5 415 M +( it might be reasonable to default to allowing local display opens) s +5 404 M +( over TCP/IP.) s +5 382 M +( Implementors of the X11 forwarding protocol SHOULD implement the) s +5 371 M +( magic cookie access checking spoofing mechanism as described in) s +5 360 M +( [ssh-connect] as an additional mechanism to prevent unauthorized use) s +5 349 M +( of the proxy.) s +5 327 M +(Normative References) s +5 305 M +( [SSH-ARCH]) s +5 294 M +( Ylonen, T., "SSH Protocol Architecture", I-D) s +5 283 M +( draft-ietf-architecture-15.txt, Oct 2003.) s +5 261 M +( [SSH-TRANS]) s +5 250 M +( Ylonen, T., "SSH Transport Layer Protocol", I-D) s +5 239 M +( draft-ietf-transport-17.txt, Oct 2003.) s +5 217 M +( [SSH-USERAUTH]) s +5 206 M +( Ylonen, T., "SSH Authentication Protocol", I-D) s +5 195 M +( draft-ietf-userauth-18.txt, Oct 2003.) s +5 173 M +( [SSH-CONNECT]) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 24]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (24,25) 13 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 25 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( Ylonen, T., "SSH Connection Protocol", I-D) s +5 679 M +( draft-ietf-connect-18.txt, Oct 2003.) s +5 657 M +( [SSH-NUMBERS]) s +5 646 M +( Lehtinen, S. and D. Moffat, "SSH Protocol Assigned) s +5 635 M +( Numbers", I-D draft-ietf-secsh-assignednumbers-05.txt, Oct) s +5 624 M +( 2003.) s +5 602 M +( [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate) s +5 591 M +( Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.) s +5 569 M +(Informative References) s +5 547 M +( [FIPS-186]) s +5 536 M +( Federal Information Processing Standards Publication,) s +5 525 M +( "FIPS PUB 186, Digital Signature Standard", May 1994.) s +5 503 M +( [FIPS-197]) s +5 492 M +( National Institue of Standards and Technology, "FIPS 197,) s +5 481 M +( Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard",) s +5 470 M +( November 2001.) s +5 448 M +( [ANSI T1.523-2001]) s +5 437 M +( American National Standards Insitute, Inc., "Telecom) s +5 426 M +( Glossary 2000", February 2001.) s +5 404 M +( [SCHEIFLER]) s +5 393 M +( Scheifler, R., "X Window System : The Complete Reference) s +5 382 M +( to Xlib, X Protocol, Icccm, Xlfd, 3rd edition.", Digital) s +5 371 M +( Press ISBN 1555580882, Feburary 1992.) s +5 349 M +( [RFC0854] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol) s +5 338 M +( Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, May 1983.) s +5 316 M +( [RFC0894] Hornig, C., "Standard for the transmission of IP datagrams) s +5 305 M +( over Ethernet networks", STD 41, RFC 894, April 1984.) s +5 283 M +( [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",) s +5 272 M +( STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.) s +5 250 M +( [RFC1134] Perkins, D., "Point-to-Point Protocol: A proposal for) s +5 239 M +( multi-protocol transmission of datagrams over) s +5 228 M +( Point-to-Point links", RFC 1134, November 1989.) s +5 206 M +( [RFC1282] Kantor, B., "BSD Rlogin", RFC 1282, December 1991.) s +5 184 M +( [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and B. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network) s +5 173 M +( Authentication Service \(V5\)", RFC 1510, September 1993.) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 25]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 26 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( [RFC1700] Reynolds, J. and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", RFC 1700,) s +5 679 M +( October 1994.) s +5 657 M +( [RFC1750] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness) s +5 646 M +( Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.) s +5 624 M +( [RFC3066] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of) s +5 613 M +( Languages", BCP 47, RFC 3066, January 2001.) s +5 591 M +( [RFC1964] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC) s +5 580 M +( 1964, June 1996.) s +5 558 M +( [RFC2025] Adams, C., "The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism) s +5 547 M +( \(SPKM\)", RFC 2025, October 1996.) s +5 525 M +( [RFC2085] Oehler, M. and R. Glenn, "HMAC-MD5 IP Authentication with) s +5 514 M +( Replay Prevention", RFC 2085, February 1997.) s +5 492 M +( [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC:) s +5 481 M +( Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,) s +5 470 M +( February 1997.) s +5 448 M +( [RFC2246] Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A.) s +5 437 M +( and P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246,) s +5 426 M +( January 1999.) s +5 404 M +( [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO) s +5 393 M +( 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.) s +5 371 M +( [RFC2410] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and) s +5 360 M +( Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, November 1998.) s +5 338 M +( [RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an) s +5 327 M +( IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,) s +5 316 M +( October 1998.) s +5 294 M +( [RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program) s +5 283 M +( Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.) s +5 261 M +( [SCHNEIER]) s +5 250 M +( Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition:) s +5 239 M +( protocols algorithms and source in code in C", 1996.) s +5 217 M +( [KAUFMAN,PERLMAN,SPECINER]) s +5 206 M +( Kaufman, C., Perlman, R. and M. Speciner, "Network) s +5 195 M +( Security: PRIVATE Communication in a PUBLIC World", 1995.) s +5 173 M +( [CERT] CERT Coordination Center, The., "http://www.cert.org/nav/) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 26]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +%%Page: (26,27) 14 +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 0.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 27 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +( index_red.html".) s +5 668 M +( [VENEMA] Venema, W., "Murphy's Law and Computer Security",) s +5 657 M +( Proceedings of 6th USENIX Security Symposium, San Jose CA) s +5 646 M +( http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/) s +5 635 M +( sec96/venema.html, July 1996.) s +5 613 M +( [ROGAWAY] Rogaway, P., "Problems with Proposed IP Cryptography",) s +5 602 M +( Unpublished paper http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/) s +5 591 M +( papers/draft-rogaway-ipsec-comments-00.txt, 1996.) s +5 569 M +( [DAI] Dai, W., "An attack against SSH2 protocol", Email to the) s +5 558 M +( SECSH Working Group [email protected] ftp://) s +5 547 M +( ftp.ietf.org/ietf-mail-archive/secsh/2002-02.mail, Feb) s +5 536 M +( 2002.) s +5 514 M +( [BELLARE,KOHNO,NAMPREMPRE]) s +5 503 M +( Bellaire, M., Kohno, T. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated) s +5 492 M +( Encryption in SSH: Fixing the SSH Binary Packet Protocol",) s +5 481 M +( , Sept 2002.) s +5 448 M +(Authors' Addresses) s +5 426 M +( Tatu Ylonen) s +5 415 M +( SSH Communications Security Corp) s +5 404 M +( Fredrikinkatu 42) s +5 393 M +( HELSINKI FIN-00100) s +5 382 M +( Finland) s +5 360 M +( EMail: [email protected]) s +5 327 M +( Darren J. Moffat \(editor\)) s +5 316 M +( Sun Microsystems, Inc) s +5 305 M +( 17 Network Circle) s +5 294 M +( Menlo Park CA 94025) s +5 283 M +( USA) s +5 261 M +( EMail: [email protected]) s +5 129 M +(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 27]) s +_R +S +PStoPSsaved restore +userdict/PStoPSsaved save put +PStoPSmatrix setmatrix +595.000000 421.271378 translate +90 rotate +0.706651 dup scale +userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put +userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto + 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto + closepath}put initclip +PStoPSxform concat +%%BeginPageSetup +_S +75 0 translate +/pagenum 28 def +/fname () def +/fdir () def +/ftail () def +/user_header_p false def +%%EndPageSetup +5 723 M +(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s +5 690 M +(Intellectual Property Statement) s +5 668 M +( The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any) s +5 657 M +( intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to) s +5 646 M +( pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in) s +5 635 M +( this document or the extent to which any license under such rights) s +5 624 M +( might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it) s +5 613 M +( has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the) s +5 602 M +( IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and) s +5 591 M +( standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of) s +5 580 M +( claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of) s +5 569 M +( licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to) s +5 558 M +( obtain a general license or permission for the use of such) s +5 547 M +( proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can) s +5 536 M +( be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.) s +5 514 M +( The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any) s +5 503 M +( copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary) s +5 492 M +( rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice) s +5 481 M +( this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive) s +5 470 M +( Director.) s +5 448 M +( The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in) s +5 437 M +( regard to some or all of the specification contained in this) s +5 426 M +( document. For more information consult the online list of claimed) s +5 415 M +( rights.) s +5 382 M +(Full Copyright Statement) s +5 360 M +( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2003\). All Rights Reserved.) s +5 338 M +( This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to) s +5 327 M +( others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it) s +5 316 M +( or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published) s +5 305 M +( and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any) s +5 294 M +( kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are) s +5 283 M +( included on all such copies and derivative works. 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