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author | Alexey Lebedeff <[email protected]> | 2016-05-19 15:11:37 +0300 |
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committer | Ingela Anderton Andin <[email protected]> | 2016-05-31 10:33:31 +0200 |
commit | 8c419a6edecc86dc4c682d040c4bb3e3506c7876 (patch) | |
tree | c6dd89c9715818f3e153ee96225e121216e3557c /lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl | |
parent | 98f13e3c4cf6282e2114deb71805c54596ffdc8a (diff) | |
download | otp-8c419a6edecc86dc4c682d040c4bb3e3506c7876.tar.gz otp-8c419a6edecc86dc4c682d040c4bb3e3506c7876.tar.bz2 otp-8c419a6edecc86dc4c682d040c4bb3e3506c7876.zip |
Improve SSL diagnostics
There are a lot of cases where `ssl` application just returns unhelpful
`handshake failure` or `internal error`. This patch tries to provide
better diagnostics so operator can debug his SSL misconfiguration
without doing hardcore erlang debugging.
Here is an example escript that incorrectly uses server certificate as a
client one:
https://gist.github.com/binarin/35c34c2df7556bf04c8a878682ef3d67
With the patch it is properly reported as an error in "extended key
usage".
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl | 68 |
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index 598d4e4112..6f0cfb5cc1 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) -> {ok, _, Chain} -> #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain}; {error, _} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, server_has_no_suitable_certificates) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version, PrivateKey, {Handshake, _}) -> case public_key:pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(OwnCert) of true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, fixed_diffie_hellman_prohibited); false -> Hashes = calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake), @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams, %% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certificate_verify(_, _, _, undefined, _, _) -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, invalid_certificate_verify_message); certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo, Version, HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) -> @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, catch error:_ -> %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, failed_to_decode_certificate) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, false end, HashSigns) of [] -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); [HashSign | _] -> HashSign end; @@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ master_secret(RecordCB, Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret}, Report = io_lib:format("Key calculation failed due to ~p", [Reason]), error_logger:error_report(Report), - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure) end; master_secret(RecordCB, Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) -> @@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ master_secret(RecordCB, Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) -> Report = io_lib:format("Master secret calculation failed" " due to ~p", [Reason]), error_logger:error_report(Report), - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure) end. %%-------------Encode/Decode -------------------------------- @@ -958,8 +958,8 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, PKEPMS) -> #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = PKEPMS}; decode_handshake(_Version, ?FINISHED, VerifyData) -> #finished{verify_data = VerifyData}; -decode_handshake(_, _, _) -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)). +decode_handshake(_, Message, _) -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_handshake, Message})). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decode_hello_extensions({client, binary()} | binary()) -> #hello_extensions{}. @@ -1031,8 +1031,8 @@ dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary, params_bin = BinMsg, hashsign = HashSign, signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(_, _, _) -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)). +dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decode_suites('2_bytes'|'3_bytes', binary()) -> list(). @@ -1253,8 +1253,12 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, Protocol -> {ConnectionStates, npn, Protocol} end; - _ -> %% {error, _Reason} or a list of 0/2+ protocols. - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) + {error, Reason} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason); + [] -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, no_protocols_in_server_hello); + [_|_] -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, too_many_protocols_in_server_hello) end. select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) -> @@ -1316,14 +1320,14 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co true -> {ok, ConnectionStates}; false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation) end; handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); false -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data, @@ -1331,7 +1335,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co true -> {ok, ConnectionStates}; false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation) end end; @@ -1341,7 +1345,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, S handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); false -> handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) end. @@ -1350,7 +1354,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), case {SecureRenegotation, CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation} of {_, true} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure); {true, false} -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION); {false, false} -> @@ -1523,8 +1527,8 @@ path_validation_alert({bad_cert, selfsigned_peer}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNKNOWN_CA); -path_validation_alert(_) -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE). +path_validation_alert(Reason) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason). encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) -> try @@ -1533,8 +1537,8 @@ encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) -> rsa_pkcs1_padding}]), #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret} catch - _:_-> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)) + _:_-> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed)) end. digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) when Minor >= 3 -> @@ -1751,12 +1755,12 @@ dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) -> dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) -> #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}; dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE)); + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, empty_dh_public)); dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) -> #client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y}; dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE)); + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, empty_dh_public)); dec_client_key(<<?BYTE(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) -> #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y}; @@ -1800,7 +1804,7 @@ dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(0)>>, _) -> dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, _) -> {Params, undefined, Signature}; dec_server_key_signature(_, _, _) -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)). + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, failed_to_decrypt_server_key_sign)). dec_hello_extensions(<<>>, Acc) -> Acc; @@ -1955,8 +1959,8 @@ key_exchange_alg(_) -> %%-------------Extension handling -------------------------------- %% Receive protocols, choose one from the list, return it. -handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, _Reason}) -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); +handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, Reason}) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason); handle_alpn_extension([], _) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); handle_alpn_extension([ServerProtocol|Tail], ClientProtocols) -> @@ -1976,7 +1980,7 @@ handle_next_protocol(#next_protocol_negotiation{} = NextProtocols, true -> select_next_protocol(decode_next_protocols(NextProtocols), NextProtocolSelector); false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) % unexpected next protocol extension + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, unexpected_next_protocol_extension) end. @@ -1996,17 +2000,17 @@ handle_next_protocol_on_server(#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<>>} Protocols; handle_next_protocol_on_server(_Hello, _Renegotiation, _SSLOpts) -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE). % unexpected next protocol extension + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, unexpected_next_protocol_extension). next_protocol_extension_allowed(NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) -> NextProtocolSelector =/= undefined andalso not Renegotiating. -select_next_protocol({error, _Reason}, _NextProtocolSelector) -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); +select_next_protocol({error, Reason}, _NextProtocolSelector) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason); select_next_protocol(Protocols, NextProtocolSelector) -> case NextProtocolSelector(Protocols) of ?NO_PROTOCOL -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, no_next_protocol); Protocol when is_binary(Protocol) -> Protocol end. |