ssl: Avoid hardcoding of cipher suites and fix ECDH suite handling

ECDH suite handling did not use the EC parameters form the certs
as expected.

Conflicts:
	lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl

1 files changed, 73 insertions, 33 deletions

diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index 8b1ea52ac9..35cd50a9a7 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -759,11 +759,12 @@ available_suites(UserSuites, Version) ->
     lists:filtermap(fun(Suite) -> lists:member(Suite, VersionSuites) end, UserSuites).
 
 available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) ->
-    ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version))
-	-- unavailable_ecc_suites(Curve);
+    Suites = ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version), Version),
+    filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(Curve, Suites);
 available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, Curve) ->
     Suites = available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve),
-    filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, []).
+    filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, 
+                     Version, []).
 
 available_signature_algs(undefined, _)  ->
     undefined;
@@ -801,7 +802,7 @@ prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) ->
 prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
     {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}.
 
-select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve} = 
+select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve0} = 
 		   Session, Version,
 	       #ssl_options{ciphers = UserSuites, honor_cipher_order = HonorCipherOrder} = SslOpts,
 	       Cache, CacheCb, Cert) ->
@@ -810,10 +811,12 @@ select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port,
 						 Cache, CacheCb),
     case Resumed of
         undefined ->
-	    Suites = available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, ECCCurve),
-	    CipherSuite = select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, HonorCipherOrder),
+	    Suites = available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, ECCCurve0),
+	    CipherSuite0 = select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, HonorCipherOrder),
+            {ECCCurve, CipherSuite} = cert_curve(Cert, ECCCurve0, CipherSuite0),
 	    Compression = select_compression(Compressions),
 	    {new, Session#session{session_id = SessionId,
+                                  ecc = ECCCurve,
 				  cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
 				  compression_method = Compression}};
 	_ ->
@@ -1041,11 +1044,11 @@ select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo,
      	TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
 
     Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
-    SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
-
-    case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign ->
+    SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
+    
+    case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign ->
 			      is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign,
-						      SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
+						      SubSign, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
 			 (_)  ->
 			      false
 		      end, HashSigns) of
@@ -1993,25 +1996,26 @@ handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun)
 handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) ->
     Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState).
 
-filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns,
-		 Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
-			   KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
-    do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
 
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns,
+filter_hashsigns([], [], _, _, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Version,
+ 		 Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
+ 			   KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
+    do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc); 
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Version,
 		 Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa;
 			   KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
 			   KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa;
 			   KeyExchange == srp_rsa;
 			   KeyExchange == rsa_psk ->
-    do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when 
+    do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Version, Acc) when 
       KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
       KeyExchange == srp_dss ->							       
-    do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when 
+    do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Verion,
+                 Acc) when 
       KeyExchange == dh_dss; 
       KeyExchange == dh_rsa; 
       KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
@@ -2020,28 +2024,37 @@ filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], Has
       %%  Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature
       %%  algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension.  The names
     %%  DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical.
-    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when 
+    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Verion, [Suite| Acc]);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Version,
+                 Acc) when 
       KeyExchange == dh_anon;
       KeyExchange == ecdh_anon;
       KeyExchange == srp_anon;
       KeyExchange == psk;
       KeyExchange == dhe_psk ->
     %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous
-    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]).
+    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, [Suite| Acc]).
 
-do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) ->
+do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc) ->
     case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of
 	true ->
-	    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
+	    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, [Suite| Acc]);
 	false ->
-	    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc)
+	    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc)
     end.
 
-unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) ->
-    ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites();
-unavailable_ecc_suites(_) ->
-    [].
+filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve, Suites) ->
+    ECCSuites = ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(ecdh_ecdsa) -> true; 
+                                                                               (ecdhe_ecdsa) -> true; 
+                                                                               (ecdh_rsa) -> true; 
+                                                                               (_) -> false 
+                                                                            end],
+                                                   cipher_filters => [],
+                                                   mac_filters => [],
+                                                   prf_filters => []}),
+    Suites -- ECCSuites;       
+filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(_, Suites) ->
+    Suites.
 %%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
 
 handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, 
@@ -2137,8 +2150,11 @@ sign_algo(Alg) ->
 is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, _, _, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns) when 
       KeyExAlgo == dh_dss;
       KeyExAlgo == dh_rsa;
-      KeyExAlgo == dh_ecdsa ->
-    %% dh_* could be called only dh in TLS-1.2
+      KeyExAlgo == ecdh_ecdsa;
+      KeyExAlgo == ecdh_rsa;
+      KeyExAlgo == ecdh_ecdsa
+      ->
+    %% *dh_* could be called only *dh in TLS-1.2
     is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); 
 is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, rsa, ecdsa, ecdh_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
     is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); 
@@ -2350,3 +2366,27 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
 	{false, false} ->
 	    {ok, ConnectionStates}
     end.
+
+cert_curve(_, _, no_suite) ->
+    {no_curve, no_suite};
+cert_curve(Cert, ECCCurve0, CipherSuite) ->
+    case ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite) of
+        #{key_exchange := Kex} when Kex == ecdh_ecdsa; 
+                                    Kex == ecdh_rsa ->
+            OtpCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+            TBSCert = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate,
+            #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = AlgInfo} 
+                = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+            {namedCurve, Oid}  = AlgInfo#'PublicKeyAlgorithm'.parameters,
+            try pubkey_cert_records:namedCurves(Oid) of
+                Curve ->
+                    {{named_curve, Curve}, CipherSuite}
+            catch 
+                _:_ ->
+                    {no_curve, no_suite}
+            end;
+        _ ->
+            {ECCCurve0, CipherSuite}
+    end.
+
+