Merge branch 'ingela/ssl/code-enhance' into maint

* ingela/ssl/code-enhance:
  ssl: Align code of TLS/DTLS handshake handling
  ssl: Align code of TLS/DTLS record handling
  ssl: Align code of main modules implementing the gen_statem behaviour
  dtls: Add state spec

1 files changed, 955 insertions, 970 deletions

diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index b47a11dc0d..560d5a3aaf 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -44,46 +44,44 @@
 			 #client_key_exchange{} | #finished{} | #certificate_verify{} |
 			 #hello_request{} | #next_protocol{}.
 
-%% Handshake messages
+%% Create handshake messages
 -export([hello_request/0, server_hello/4, server_hello_done/0,
-	 certificate/4, certificate_request/5, key_exchange/3,
+	 certificate/4,  client_certificate_verify/6,  certificate_request/5, key_exchange/3,
 	 finished/5,  next_protocol/1]).
 
 %% Handle handshake messages
--export([certify/7, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5,
+-export([certify/7, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5,
 	 master_secret/4, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6,
-	 init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/3, verify_server_key/5
+	 init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/3, verify_server_key/5,
+         select_version/3
 	]).
 
-%% Encode/Decode
+%% Encode
 -export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/1,
-	 encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1,
-	 decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1,
+	 encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1]).
+%% Decode
+-export([decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1,
 	 decode_server_key/3, decode_client_key/3,
 	 decode_suites/2
 	]).
 
 %% Cipher suites handling
--export([available_suites/2, available_signature_algs/2, cipher_suites/2,
-	 select_session/11, supported_ecc/1, available_signature_algs/4]).
+-export([available_suites/2, available_signature_algs/2,  available_signature_algs/4, 
+         cipher_suites/2, prf/6, select_session/11, supported_ecc/1,
+         premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]).
 
 %% Extensions handling
 -export([client_hello_extensions/5,
 	 handle_client_hello_extensions/9, %% Returns server hello extensions
-	 handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3
+	 handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3,
+         select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5,
+	 select_hashsign_algs/3
 	]).
 
-%% MISC
--export([select_version/3, prf/6,  select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5,
-	 select_hashsign_algs/3,
-	 premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]).
-
 %%====================================================================
-%% Internal application API
+%% Create handshake messages 
 %%====================================================================
 
-%% ---------- Create handshake messages  ----------
-
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec hello_request() -> #hello_request{}.
 %%
@@ -119,31 +117,6 @@ server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Extensions) ->
 server_hello_done() ->
     #server_hello_done{}.
 
-client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, 
-			#ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns,
-				     eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) ->
-    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} =
-	case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of
-	    true ->
-		client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs);
-	    false ->
-		{undefined, undefined}
-	end,
-    SRP = srp_user(SslOpts),
-
-    #hello_extensions{
-       renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client,
-					       ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
-       srp = SRP,
-       signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version),
-       ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
-       elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-       alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation),
-       next_protocol_negotiation =
-	   encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector,
-					      Renegotiation),
-       sni = sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}.
-
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec certificate(der_cert(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), client | server) -> #certificate{} | #alert{}.
 %%
@@ -171,14 +144,6 @@ certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) ->
     end.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a next protocol message
-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) ->
-  #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec client_certificate_verify(undefined | der_cert(), binary(),
 				ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(), public_key:private_key(),
 				ssl_handshake_history()) ->
@@ -328,22 +293,51 @@ key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, {PublicKey, _},
 finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {Handshake, _}) -> % use the current handshake
     #finished{verify_data =
 	      calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake)}.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a next protocol message
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) ->
+  #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}.
 
-%% ---------- Handle handshake messages  ----------
+%%====================================================================
+%% Handle handshake messages 
+%%====================================================================
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), #ssl_options{}, term(),
+	      client | server, inet:hostname() | inet:ip_address()) ->  {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
+        Opts, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) ->    
 
-verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams,
-				     signature = Signature},
-		  HashSign = {HashAlgo, _},
-		  ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) ->
-    #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
-	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo,
-				    <<ClientRandom/binary,
-				      ServerRandom/binary,
-				      EncParams/binary>>),
-    verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo).
+    ServerName = server_name(Opts#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role),
+    [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs,       
+    try
+	{TrustedCert, CertPath}  =
+	    ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,  
+                                                  Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain),
+        ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role, 
+                                                         CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerName,
+                                                         Opts#ssl_options.crl_check, CRLDbHandle, CertPath),
+	case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert,
+					     CertPath,
+					     [{max_path_length,  Opts#ssl_options.depth},
+					      {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of
+	    {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} ->
+		{PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo};
+	    {error, Reason} ->
+		path_validation_alert(Reason)
+	end
+    catch
+	error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} ->
+	    %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason});
+        error:OtherReason ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {unexpected_error, OtherReason})
+    end.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(),
@@ -386,43 +380,55 @@ verify_signature(_, Hash, {HashAlgo, _SignAlg}, Signature,
 		 {?'id-ecPublicKey', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) ->
     public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}).
 
-
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), #ssl_options{}, term(),
-	      client | server, inet:hostname() | inet:ip_address()) ->  {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}.
+-spec master_secret(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(),
+		   client | server) -> {binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()} | #alert{}.
 %%
-%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
-        Opts, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) ->    
+%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys,
+%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update
+%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails.
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret},
+	      ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+    #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams,
+		      ConnectionStates, Role)
+    catch
+	exit:_ ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure)
+    end;
 
-    ServerName = server_name(Opts#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role),
-    [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs,       
-    try
-	{TrustedCert, CertPath}  =
-	    ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,  
-                                                  Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain),
-        ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role, 
-                                                         CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerName,
-                                                         Opts#ssl_options.crl_check, CRLDbHandle, CertPath),
-	case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert,
-					     CertPath,
-					     [{max_path_length,  Opts#ssl_options.depth},
-					      {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of
-	    {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} ->
-		{PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo};
-	    {error, Reason} ->
-		path_validation_alert(Reason)
-	end
+master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+    #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    
+    #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
+			 client_random = ClientRandom,
+			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+    try master_secret(Version,
+		      calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret,
+					 ClientRandom, ServerRandom),
+		      SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role)
     catch
-	error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} ->
-	    %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed
-            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason});
-        error:OtherReason ->
-            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {unexpected_error, OtherReason})
+	exit:_ ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure)
     end.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary().
+%%
+%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) ->
+    MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value),
+    SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value),
+    <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
+
+server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) ->
+    crypto:hash(Hash, Value).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec verify_connection(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #finished{}, client | server, integer(), binary(),
 			ssl_handshake_history()) -> verified | #alert{}.
 %%
@@ -469,275 +475,31 @@ update_handshake_history(Handshake, % special-case SSL2 client hello
 update_handshake_history({Handshake0, _Prev}, Data, _) ->
     {[Data|Handshake0], Handshake0}.
 
-%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% -spec decrypt_premaster_secret(binary(), #'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> binary().
-
-%% %%
-%% %% Description: Public key decryption using the private key.
-%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) ->
-%%     try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey,
-%% 				   [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
-%%     catch
-%% 	_:_ ->
-%% 	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR))
-%%     end.
-
-premaster_secret(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params) ->
-    try 
-	public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params)  
-    catch 
-	error:computation_failed -> 
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
-    end;	   
-premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}) ->
-    try 
-	crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base])
-    catch 
-	error:computation_failed -> 
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
-    end;
-premaster_secret(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, ServerKey, #srp_user{prime = Prime,
-										   verifier = Verifier}) ->
-    case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of
-	error ->
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER));
-	PremasterSecret ->
-	    PremasterSecret
-    end;
-premaster_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator, srp_s = Salt, srp_b = Public},
-		 ClientKeys, {Username, Password}) ->
-    case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of
-	ok ->
-	    DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]),
-	    case crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of
-		error ->
-		    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER));
-		PremasterSecret ->
-		    PremasterSecret
-	    end;
-	_ ->
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
-    end;
-premaster_secret(#client_rsa_psk_identity{
-		    identity = PSKIdentity,
-		    exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = EncPMS}
-		   }, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key, PSKLookup) ->
-    PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
-    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret);
-premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{
-		    hint = IdentityHint,
-		    dh_params =  #server_dh_params{dh_y = PublicDhKey} = Params},
-		    PrivateDhKey,
-		    LookupFun) ->
-    PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params),
-    psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret);
-premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) ->
-    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret).
-
-premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{
-		    identity =  PSKIdentity,
-		    dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) ->
-    PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateKey, Params),
-    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret).
-premaster_secret(#client_psk_identity{identity = PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) ->
-    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup);
-premaster_secret({psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) ->
-    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup);
-premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{} = ECPoint, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ECDHKeys) ->
-    public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys);
-premaster_secret(EncSecret, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = RSAPrivateKey) ->
-    try public_key:decrypt_private(EncSecret, RSAPrivateKey,
-				   [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
-    catch
-	_:_ ->
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR))
-    end.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary().
-%%
-%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) ->
-    MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value),
-    SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value),
-    <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
-
-server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) ->
-    crypto:hash(Hash, Value).
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), non_neg_integer(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) ->
-		 {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}.
-%%
-%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) ->
-    {error, undefined};
-prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
-    {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}.
-
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{} | undefined,  undefined | binary(), 
-		      atom(), [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
-			     {atom(), atom()} | undefined  | #alert{}.
-
-%%
-%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms hello extension (server)
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-select_hashsign(_, undefined, _,  _, _Version) ->
-    {null, anon};
-%% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have
-%% negotiated a lower version.
-select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, 
-		undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version)  when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
-    select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version);
-select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns,
-		{Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
-    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
-    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert,
-		      signatureAlgorithm =  {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
-    #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = 
-     	TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
-
-    Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
-    SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
-
-    case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign ->
-			      is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign,
-						      SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
-			 (_)  ->
-			      false
-		      end, HashSigns) of
-	[] ->
-            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
-	[HashSign | _] ->
-	    HashSign
-    end;
-select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) ->
-    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
-    #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
-    select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version).
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec select_hashsign(#certificate_request{},  binary(), 
-		      [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
-			     {atom(), atom()} | #alert{}.
-
-%%
-%% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client) 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, undefined, _, {Major, Minor})  when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
-    %% There client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail 
-    %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is
-    %% no certificate to verify.
-    {undefined, undefined}; 
- 
-select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, 
-				     certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, 
-		{Major, Minor})  when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
-    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
-    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert,
-		      signatureAlgorithm =  {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
-    #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = 
-     	TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
-
-    Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
-    SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
-    
-    case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of
-	true ->
-	    case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign ->
-				 is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
-			    (_)  ->
-				      false
-			      end, HashSigns) of
-		[] ->
-		    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
-		[HashSign | _] ->
-		    HashSign
-	    end;
-	false ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm)
-    end;
-select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) ->
-    select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
-				  {atom(), atom()}.
-
-%% Description: For TLS 1.2 hash function and signature algorithm pairs can be
-%% negotiated with the signature_algorithms extension,
-%% for previous versions always use appropriate defaults.
-%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1.  Signature Algorithms
-%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
-%% server MUST do the following: (e.i defaults for TLS 1.2)
-%%
-%% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA,
-%%    DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had
-%%    sent the value {sha1,rsa}.
-%%
-%% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS,
-%%    DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}.
-%%
-%% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
-%%    ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-select_hashsign_algs(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso
-						       Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
-    HashSign;
-select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
-    {sha, rsa};
-select_hashsign_algs(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) ->
-    {sha, ecdsa};
-select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) -> 
-    {md5sha, rsa};
-select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) ->
-    {sha, dsa}.
-
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec master_secret(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(),
-		   client | server) -> {binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()} | #alert{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys,
-%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update
-%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails.
-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret},
-	      ConnectionStates, Role) ->
-    #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
-	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams,
-		      ConnectionStates, Role)
-    catch
-	exit:_ ->
-            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure)
-    end;
-
-master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams,
+				     signature = Signature},
+		  HashSign = {HashAlgo, _},
+		  ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) ->
     #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
 	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    
-    #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
-			 client_random = ClientRandom,
+    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
 			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    try master_secret(Version,
-		      calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret,
-					 ClientRandom, ServerRandom),
-		      SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role)
-    catch
-	exit:_ ->
-            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure)
-    end.
+    Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo,
+				    <<ClientRandom/binary,
+				      ServerRandom/binary,
+				      EncParams/binary>>),
+    verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo).
+
+select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) ->
+    do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions).
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Encode handshake 
+%%====================================================================
 
-%%-------------Encode/Decode --------------------------------
 encode_handshake(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, _Version) ->
     PaddingLength = 32 - ((byte_size(SelectedProtocol) + 2) rem 32),
     {?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE((byte_size(SelectedProtocol))), SelectedProtocol/binary,
                          ?BYTE(PaddingLength), 0:(PaddingLength * 8)>>};
-
 encode_handshake(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor},
 			       random = Random,
 			       session_id = Session_ID,
@@ -859,70 +621,6 @@ encode_hello_extensions([#sni{hostname = Hostname} | Rest], Acc) ->
 				    ?UINT16(HostLen), HostnameBin/binary,
 				    Acc/binary>>).
 
-enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
-			ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) ->
-    EncParams = encode_server_key(Params),
-    case HashAlgo of
-	null ->
-	    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-			       params_bin = EncParams,
-			       hashsign = {null, anon},
-			       signature = <<>>};
-	_ ->
-	    Hash =
-		server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary,
-						     ServerRandom/binary,
-						     EncParams/binary>>),
-	    Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey),
-	    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-			       params_bin = EncParams,
-			       hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
-			       signature = Signature}
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
-			    #encrypted_premaster_secret{}
-			    | #client_diffie_hellman_public{}
-			    | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{}
-			    | #client_psk_identity{}
-			    | #client_dhe_psk_identity{}
-			    | #client_rsa_psk_identity{}
-			    | #client_srp_public{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) ->
-    dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
-			       #server_key_params{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) ->
-    dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
-
-%%
-%% Description: Encode and decode functions for ALPN extension data.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-%% While the RFC opens the door to allow ALPN during renegotiation, in practice
-%% this does not work and it is recommended to ignore any ALPN extension during
-%% renegotiation, as done here.
-encode_alpn(_, true) ->
-    undefined;
-encode_alpn(undefined, _) ->
-    undefined;
-encode_alpn(Protocols, _) ->
-    #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}.
-
-decode_alpn(undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) ->
-    decode_protocols(Data, []).
-
 encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) ->
     undefined;
 encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, false) ->
@@ -936,6 +634,10 @@ encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(undefined) ->
 encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(Protocols) ->
 	#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}.
 
+%%====================================================================
+%% Decode handshake 
+%%====================================================================
+
 decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) ->
     #hello_request{};
 decode_handshake(_, ?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE(SelectedProtocolLength),
@@ -968,7 +670,6 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:3
        cipher_suite = Cipher_suite,
        compression_method = Comp_method,
        extensions = HelloExtensions};
-
 decode_handshake(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>) ->
     #certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)};
 decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys) ->
@@ -1015,66 +716,29 @@ decode_hello_extensions({client, <<?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>})
 decode_hello_extensions(Extensions) ->
     dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, #hello_extensions{}).
 
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
-    Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-%% ECParameters with named_curve
-%% TODO: explicit curve
-dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID),
-		 ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary,
-		 _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
-    Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)},
-				 public = ECPoint},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       KeyExchange, Version)
-  when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ->
-    Params = #server_psk_params{
-		hint = PskIdentityHint},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) ->
-    DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
-    Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{
-      hint = IdentityHint,
-      dh_params = DHParams},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
-		 ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) ->
-    Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+			       #server_key_params{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) ->
+    dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+			    #encrypted_premaster_secret{}
+			    | #client_diffie_hellman_public{}
+			    | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{}
+			    | #client_psk_identity{}
+			    | #client_dhe_psk_identity{}
+			    | #client_rsa_psk_identity{}
+			    | #client_srp_public{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) ->
+    dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec decode_suites('2_bytes'|'3_bytes', binary()) -> list().
@@ -1086,7 +750,9 @@ decode_suites('2_bytes', Dec) ->
 decode_suites('3_bytes', Dec) ->
     from_3bytes(Dec).
 
-%%-------------Cipeher suite handling --------------------------------
+%%====================================================================
+%% Cipher suite handling
+%%====================================================================
 
 available_suites(UserSuites, Version) ->
     lists:filtermap(fun(Suite) ->
@@ -1099,60 +765,37 @@ available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) ->
 available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, Curve) ->
     Suites = available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve),
     filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, []).
-filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns,
-		 Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
-			   KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
-    do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
-
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns,
-		 Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa;
-			   KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
-			   KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa;
-			   KeyExchange == srp_rsa;
-			   KeyExchange == rsa_psk ->
-    do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when 
-      KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
-      KeyExchange == srp_dss ->							       
-    do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when 
-      KeyExchange == dh_dss; 
-      KeyExchange == dh_rsa; 
-      KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
-      KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa;    
-      KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa ->
-      %%  Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature
-      %%  algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension.  The names
-    %%  DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical.
-    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when 
-      KeyExchange == dh_anon;
-      KeyExchange == ecdh_anon;
-      KeyExchange == srp_anon;
-      KeyExchange == psk;
-      KeyExchange == dhe_psk ->
-    %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous
-    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]).
 
-do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) ->
-    case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of
-	true ->
-	    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
-	false ->
-	    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc)
-    end.
-
-unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) ->
-    ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites();
-unavailable_ecc_suites(_) ->
-    [].
+available_signature_algs(undefined, _)  ->
+    undefined;
+available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} ->
+    #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = SupportedHashSigns};
+available_signature_algs(_, _) ->
+    undefined.
+available_signature_algs(undefined, SupportedHashSigns, _, Version) when 
+      Version >= {3,3} ->
+    SupportedHashSigns;
+available_signature_algs(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, SupportedHashSigns, 
+                         _, Version) when Version >= {3,3} ->
+    sets:to_list(sets:intersection(sets:from_list(ClientHashSigns), 
+				   sets:from_list(SupportedHashSigns)));
+available_signature_algs(_, _, _, _) -> 
+    undefined.
 
 cipher_suites(Suites, false) ->
     [?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV | Suites];
 cipher_suites(Suites, true) ->
     Suites.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), non_neg_integer(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) ->
+		 {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}.
+%%
+%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) ->
+    {error, undefined};
+prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
+    {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}.
 
 select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve} = 
 		   Session, Version,
@@ -1173,68 +816,109 @@ select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port,
 	    {resumed, Resumed}
     end.
 
-%% Deprecated?
 supported_ecc({Major, Minor}) when ((Major == 3) and (Minor >= 1)) orelse (Major > 3) ->
     Curves = tls_v1:ecc_curves(Minor),
     #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = Curves};
 supported_ecc(_) ->
     #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = []}.
 
-%%-------------certificate handling --------------------------------
-
-certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 ->
-    case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa,  
-			    proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of
-	true ->
-	    <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
-	false ->
-	    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>
+premaster_secret(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params) ->
+    try 
+	public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params)  
+    catch 
+	error:computation_failed -> 
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+    end;	   
+premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}) ->
+    try 
+	crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base])
+    catch 
+	error:computation_failed -> 
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
     end;
+premaster_secret(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, ServerKey, #srp_user{prime = Prime,
+										   verifier = Verifier}) ->
+    case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of
+	error ->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER));
+	PremasterSecret ->
+	    PremasterSecret
+    end;
+premaster_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator, srp_s = Salt, srp_b = Public},
+		 ClientKeys, {Username, Password}) ->
+    case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of
+	ok ->
+	    DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]),
+	    case crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of
+		error ->
+		    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER));
+		PremasterSecret ->
+		    PremasterSecret
+	    end;
+	_ ->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+    end;
+premaster_secret(#client_rsa_psk_identity{
+		    identity = PSKIdentity,
+		    exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = EncPMS}
+		   }, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key, PSKLookup) ->
+    PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
+    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret);
+premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{
+		    hint = IdentityHint,
+		    dh_params =  #server_dh_params{dh_y = PublicDhKey} = Params},
+		    PrivateDhKey,
+		    LookupFun) ->
+    PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params),
+    psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret);
+premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) ->
+    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret).
 
-certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa;
-						  KeyExchange == dh_rsa;
-						  KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
-						  KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa ->
-    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>;
-
-certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _)  when KeyExchange == dh_dss; 
-						   KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
-						   KeyExchange == srp_dss ->
-    <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
-
-certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
-						  KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
-						  KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa;
-						  KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
-    <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>;
-
-certificate_types(_, _) ->
-    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>.
-
-certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
-    Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
-    Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) ->
-		  OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject,
-		  DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp),
-		  DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin),
-		  <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>>
-	  end,
-    list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]).
-
-certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) when is_reference(CertDbRef) ->
-    ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref  == CertDbRef ->
-			      [Cert | Acc];
-			 (_, Acc) ->
-			      Acc
-		      end,
-    ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle);
-certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) ->
-    %% Cache disabled, Ref contains data
-    lists:foldl(fun({decoded, {_Key,Cert}}, Acc) -> [Cert | Acc] end,
-		[], CertDbData).
-
+premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{
+		    identity =  PSKIdentity,
+		    dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) ->
+    PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateKey, Params),
+    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret).
+premaster_secret(#client_psk_identity{identity = PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) ->
+    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup);
+premaster_secret({psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) ->
+    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup);
+premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{} = ECPoint, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ECDHKeys) ->
+    public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys);
+premaster_secret(EncSecret, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = RSAPrivateKey) ->
+    try public_key:decrypt_private(EncSecret, RSAPrivateKey,
+				   [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
+    catch
+	_:_ ->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR))
+    end.
+%%====================================================================
+%% Extensions handling
+%%====================================================================
+client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, 
+			#ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns,
+				     eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) ->
+    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} =
+	case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of
+	    true ->
+		client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs);
+	    false ->
+		{undefined, undefined}
+	end,
+    SRP = srp_user(SslOpts),
 
-%%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
+    #hello_extensions{
+       renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client,
+					       ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
+       srp = SRP,
+       signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version),
+       ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
+       elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
+       alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation),
+       next_protocol_negotiation =
+	   encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector,
+					      Renegotiation),
+       sni = sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}.
 
 handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, ClientCipherSuites,
 			       #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info,
@@ -1311,231 +995,210 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression,
             ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, too_many_protocols_in_server_hello)
     end.
 
-select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) ->
-    do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions).
-
-do_select_version(_, ClientVersion, []) ->
-    ClientVersion;
-do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions]) ->
-    case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of
-	true ->
-	    %% Version too high for client - keep looking
-	    do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions);
-	false ->
-	    %% Version ok for client - look for a higher
-	    do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, Version)
-    end.
-%%
-do_select_version(_, _, [], GoodVersion) ->
-    GoodVersion;
-do_select_version(
-  RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions], GoodVersion) ->
-    BetterVersion =
-	case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of
-	    true ->
-		%% Version too high for client
-		GoodVersion;
-	    false ->
-		%% Version ok for client
-		case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, GoodVersion) of
-		    true ->
-			%% Use higher version
-			Version;
-		    false ->
-			GoodVersion
-		end
-	end,
-    do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, BetterVersion).
+select_curve(Client, Server) ->
+    select_curve(Client, Server, false).
 
-renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) ->
-    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined};
-renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) ->
-    ConnectionState  = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
-	true ->
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)};
-	false ->
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
-    end;
-renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) ->
-    ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    case  maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
-	true ->
-	    Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data};
-	false ->
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves},
+	     #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves},
+	     ServerOrder) ->
+    case ServerOrder of
+        false ->
+            select_shared_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves);
+        true ->
+            select_shared_curve(ServerCurves, ClientCurves)
     end;
+select_curve(undefined, _, _) ->
+    %% Client did not send ECC extension use default curve if 
+    %% ECC cipher is negotiated
+    {namedCurve, ?secp256r1}.
 
-renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) ->
-    ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
-	true ->
-	    CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
-	    SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState),
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>};
-	false ->
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
-    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{} | undefined,  undefined | binary(), 
+		      atom(), [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+			     {atom(), atom()} | undefined  | #alert{}.
 
-handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)},
-			  ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
-    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
+%%
+%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms hello extension (server)
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+select_hashsign(_, undefined, _,  _, _Version) ->
+    {null, anon};
+%% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have
+%% negotiated a lower version.
+select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, 
+		undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version)  when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+    select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version);
+select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns,
+		{Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
+    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert,
+		      signatureAlgorithm =  {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+    #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = 
+     	TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
 
-handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) ->
-    case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
-	true ->
-	    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
-	false ->
-	    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}
+    Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
+    SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
+
+    case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign ->
+			      is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign,
+						      SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
+			 (_)  ->
+			      false
+		      end, HashSigns) of
+	[] ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
+	[HashSign | _] ->
+	    HashSign
     end;
+select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) ->
+    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+    #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+    select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec select_hashsign(#certificate_request{},  binary(), 
+		      [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+			     {atom(), atom()} | #alert{}.
 
-handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
-    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)};
+%%
+%% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client) 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, undefined, _, {Major, Minor})  when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+    %% There client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail 
+    %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is
+    %% no certificate to verify.
+    {undefined, undefined}; 
+ 
+select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, 
+				     certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, 
+		{Major, Minor})  when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert,
+		      signatureAlgorithm =  {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+    #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = 
+     	TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
 
-handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify},
-			  ConnectionStates, true, _, _) ->
-    ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
-    SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState),
-    case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of
+    Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
+    SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
+    
+    case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of
 	true ->
-	    {ok, ConnectionStates};
+	    case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign ->
+				 is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+			    (_)  ->
+				      false
+			      end, HashSigns) of
+		[] ->
+		    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
+		[HashSign | _] ->
+		    HashSign
+	    end;
 	false ->
-            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation)
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm)
     end;
-handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify},
-			  ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) ->
-
-      case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
-	  true ->
-              ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
-	  false ->
-	      ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-	      Data =  maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
-	      case Data == ClientVerify of
-		  true ->
-		      {ok, ConnectionStates};
-		  false ->
-                      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation)
-	      end
-      end;
+select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) ->
+    select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version).
 
-handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) ->
-    handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation);
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+				  {atom(), atom()}.
 
-handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) ->
-     case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
-	  true ->
-             ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
-	 false ->
-	     handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation)
-     end.
+%% Description: For TLS 1.2 hash function and signature algorithm pairs can be
+%% negotiated with the signature_algorithms extension,
+%% for previous versions always use appropriate defaults.
+%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1.  Signature Algorithms
+%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
+%% server MUST do the following: (e.i defaults for TLS 1.2)
+%%
+%% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA,
+%%    DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had
+%%    sent the value {sha1,rsa}.
+%%
+%% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS,
+%%    DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}.
+%%
+%% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
+%%    ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}.
 
-handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
-    ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    case {SecureRenegotation, maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState)} of
-	{_, true} ->
-            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure);
-	{true, false} ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION);
-	{false, false} ->
-	    {ok, ConnectionStates}
-    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+select_hashsign_algs(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso
+						       Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
+    HashSign;
+select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
+    {sha, rsa};
+select_hashsign_algs(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) ->
+    {sha, ecdsa};
+select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) -> 
+    {md5sha, rsa};
+select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) ->
+    {sha, dsa}.
 
-hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
-					srp = SRP,
-					signature_algs = HashSigns,
-					ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
-					elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-                                        alpn = ALPN,
-					next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation,
-					sni = Sni}) ->
-    [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns,
-		    EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined].
 
 srp_user(#ssl_options{srp_identity = {UserName, _}}) ->
     #srp{username = UserName};
 srp_user(_) ->
     undefined.
 
-client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) ->
-    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
-    case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
-	true ->
-	    EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]},
-	    EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs,
-	    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves};
-	_ ->
-	    {undefined, undefined}
-    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%------------- Create handshake messages ----------------------------
 
-server_ecc_extension(_Version, EcPointFormats) ->
-    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
-    case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
+int_to_bin(I) ->
+    L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2,
+    <<I:(L*8)>>.
+
+certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 ->
+    case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa,  
+			    proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of
 	true ->
-	    handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats);
+	    <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
 	false ->
-	    undefined
-    end.
+	    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>
+    end;
 
-handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) ->
-    #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}.
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa;
+						  KeyExchange == dh_rsa;
+						  KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
+						  KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa ->
+    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>;
 
-advertises_ec_ciphers([]) ->
-    false;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) ->
-    advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest).
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _)  when KeyExchange == dh_dss; 
+						   KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
+						   KeyExchange == srp_dss ->
+    <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
 
-select_curve(Client, Server) ->
-    select_curve(Client, Server, false).
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
+						  KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
+						  KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa;
+						  KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
+    <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>;
 
-select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves},
-	     #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves},
-	     ServerOrder) ->
-    case ServerOrder of
-        false ->
-            select_shared_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves);
-        true ->
-            select_shared_curve(ServerCurves, ClientCurves)
-    end;
-select_curve(undefined, _, _) ->
-    %% Client did not send ECC extension use default curve if 
-    %% ECC cipher is negotiated
-    {namedCurve, ?secp256r1}.
+certificate_types(_, _) ->
+    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>.
 
-select_shared_curve([], _) ->
-    no_curve;
-select_shared_curve([Curve | Rest], Curves) ->
-    case lists:member(Curve, Curves) of
-	true ->
-	    {namedCurve, Curve};
-	false ->
-	    select_shared_curve(Rest, Curves)
-    end.
+certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
+    Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
+    Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) ->
+		  OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject,
+		  DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp),
+		  DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin),
+		  <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>>
+	  end,
+    list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]).
 
-sni(undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-sni(disable) ->
-    undefined;
-sni(Hostname) ->
-    #sni{hostname = Hostname}.
+certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) when is_reference(CertDbRef) ->
+    ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref  == CertDbRef ->
+			      [Cert | Acc];
+			 (_, Acc) ->
+			      Acc
+		      end,
+    ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle);
+certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) ->
+    %% Cache disabled, Ref contains data
+    lists:foldl(fun({decoded, {_Key,Cert}}, Acc) -> [Cert | Acc] end,
+		[], CertDbData).
+
+%%-------------Handle handshake messages --------------------------------
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%%% Internal functions
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 validation_fun_and_state({Fun, UserState0}, Role,  CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, 
                          ServerNameIndication, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, CertPath) ->
     {fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) ->
@@ -1627,17 +1290,6 @@ path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) ->
 path_validation_alert(Reason) ->
     ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason).
 
-encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) ->
-    try
-	PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey,
-						    [{rsa_pad,
-						      rsa_pkcs1_padding}]),
-	#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret}
-    catch
-        _:_->
-            throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed))
-    end.
-
 digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) ->
     try do_digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of
 	Signature ->
@@ -1663,6 +1315,106 @@ do_digitally_signed({3, _}, Hash, HashAlgo, #{algorithm := Alg} = Engine) ->
 do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) ->
     public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key).
 
+bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
+    unacceptable_dsa_key;
+bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
+    unacceptable_rsa_key;
+bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) ->
+    unacceptable_ecdsa_key.
+
+crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _, _) ->
+    valid;
+crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid, _) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option.
+    valid;
+crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, CertPath) ->
+    Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) ->
+				     ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, {CertPath,
+                                                                                 DBInfo})
+			     end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}}, 
+	       {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end},
+               {undetermined_details, true}
+	      ],
+    case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of
+	no_dps ->
+	    crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check,
+				  dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer),
+				  Options);
+	DpsAndCRLs ->  %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed 
+	    %% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined}
+	    case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of
+		{bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} ->
+		    crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, 
+								       CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options);
+		Other ->
+		    Other
+	    end
+    end.
+
+crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) ->		
+    case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of 
+	{bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}}   ->
+	    valid;
+	Other ->
+	    Other
+    end;
+crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, _, Dps, Options) ->    
+    public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options).
+
+dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) ->
+    case public_key:pkix_dist_points(OtpCert) of
+	[] ->
+	    no_dps;
+	DistPoints ->
+	    Issuer = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer,
+	    CRLs = distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle),
+            dps_and_crls(DistPoints, CRLs, [])
+    end;
+
+dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) ->    
+    DP = #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, GenNames}} = 
+	public_key:pkix_dist_point(OtpCert),
+    CRLs = lists:flatmap(fun({directoryName, Issuer}) -> 
+				 Callback:select(Issuer, CRLDbHandle);
+			    (_) ->
+				 []
+			 end, GenNames),
+    [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} ||  CRL <- CRLs].
+
+dps_and_crls([], _, Acc) ->
+    Acc;
+dps_and_crls([DP | Rest], CRLs, Acc) ->
+    DpCRL = [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} ||  CRL <- CRLs],
+    dps_and_crls(Rest, CRLs, DpCRL ++ Acc).
+    
+distpoints_lookup([],_, _, _) ->
+    [];
+distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) ->
+    Result =
+	try Callback:lookup(DistPoint, Issuer, CRLDbHandle)
+	catch
+	    error:undef ->
+		%% The callback module still uses the 2-argument
+		%% version of the lookup function.
+		Callback:lookup(DistPoint, CRLDbHandle)
+	end,
+    case Result of
+	not_available ->
+	    distpoints_lookup(Rest, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle);
+	CRLs ->
+	    CRLs
+    end.
+
+encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) ->
+    try
+	PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey,
+						    [{rsa_pad,
+						      rsa_pkcs1_padding}]),
+	#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret}
+    catch
+        _:_->
+            throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed))
+    end.
+
 calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
     ssl_v3:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake));
 calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, HashAlgo, _MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
@@ -1715,24 +1467,7 @@ calc_master_secret({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom)
 
 calc_master_secret({3,_}, PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) ->
     tls_v1:master_secret(PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom).
-
-handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, 
-			       ClientCipherSuites, Compression,
-			       ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) ->
-    case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0,
-				   Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation,
-				   ClientCipherSuites) of
-	{ok, ConnectionStates} ->
-	    hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role,
-					    Version,
-					    NegotiatedCipherSuite,
-					    Random,
-					    Compression,
-					    ConnectionStates);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    throw(Alert)
-    end.
-
+	
 %% Update pending connection states with parameters exchanged via
 %% hello messages
 %% NOTE : Role is the role of the receiver of the hello message
@@ -1772,7 +1507,43 @@ hello_security_parameters(server, Version, #{security_parameters := SecParams},
       compression_algorithm = Compression
      }.
 
-%%-------------Encode/Decode --------------------------------
+select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) ->
+    ?NULL.
+
+do_select_version(_, ClientVersion, []) ->
+    ClientVersion;
+do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions]) ->
+    case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of
+	true ->
+	    %% Version too high for client - keep looking
+	    do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions);
+	false ->
+	    %% Version ok for client - look for a higher
+	    do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, Version)
+    end.
+%%
+do_select_version(_, _, [], GoodVersion) ->
+    GoodVersion;
+do_select_version(
+  RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions], GoodVersion) ->
+    BetterVersion =
+	case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of
+	    true ->
+		%% Version too high for client
+		GoodVersion;
+	    false ->
+		%% Version ok for client
+		case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, GoodVersion) of
+		    true ->
+			%% Use higher version
+			Version;
+		    false ->
+			GoodVersion
+		end
+	end,
+    do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, BetterVersion).
+
+%%-------------Encode handshakes --------------------------------
 
 encode_server_key(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}) ->
     PLen = byte_size(P),
@@ -1860,6 +1631,110 @@ encode_protocol(Protocol, Acc) ->
 	Len = byte_size(Protocol),
 	<<Acc/binary, ?BYTE(Len), Protocol/binary>>.
 
+enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
+			ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) ->
+    EncParams = encode_server_key(Params),
+    case HashAlgo of
+	null ->
+	    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+			       params_bin = EncParams,
+			       hashsign = {null, anon},
+			       signature = <<>>};
+	_ ->
+	    Hash =
+		server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary,
+						     ServerRandom/binary,
+						     EncParams/binary>>),
+	    Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey),
+	    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+			       params_bin = EncParams,
+			       hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
+			       signature = Signature}
+    end.
+
+%% While the RFC opens the door to allow ALPN during renegotiation, in practice
+%% this does not work and it is recommended to ignore any ALPN extension during
+%% renegotiation, as done here.
+encode_alpn(_, true) ->
+    undefined;
+encode_alpn(undefined, _) ->
+    undefined;
+encode_alpn(Protocols, _) ->
+    #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}.
+
+hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
+					srp = SRP,
+					signature_algs = HashSigns,
+					ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
+					elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
+                                        alpn = ALPN,
+					next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation,
+					sni = Sni}) ->
+    [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns,
+		    EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined].
+
+%%-------------Decode handshakes---------------------------------
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
+    Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+%% ECParameters with named_curve
+%% TODO: explicit curve
+dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID),
+		 ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary,
+		 _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
+    Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)},
+				 public = ECPoint},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       KeyExchange, Version)
+  when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ->
+    Params = #server_psk_params{
+		hint = PskIdentityHint},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) ->
+    DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
+    Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{
+      hint = IdentityHint,
+      dh_params = DHParams},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+		 ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) ->
+    Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})).
+
 dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) ->
     #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS};
 dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) ->
@@ -2001,6 +1876,11 @@ dec_sni(<<?BYTE(?SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME), ?UINT16(Len),
 dec_sni(<<?BYTE(_), ?UINT16(Len), _:Len, Rest/binary>>) -> dec_sni(Rest);
 dec_sni(_) -> undefined.
 
+decode_alpn(undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) ->
+    decode_protocols(Data, []).
+
 decode_next_protocols({next_protocol_negotiation, Protocols}) ->
     decode_protocols(Protocols, []).
 
@@ -2045,6 +1925,7 @@ from_2bytes(<<>>, Acc) ->
     lists:reverse(Acc);
 from_2bytes(<<?UINT16(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
     from_2bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]).
+
 key_exchange_alg(rsa) ->
     ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA;
 key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss;
@@ -2066,8 +1947,122 @@ key_exchange_alg(Alg)
 key_exchange_alg(_) ->
     ?NULL.
 
+%%-------------Cipher suite handling -----------------------------
+select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, false) ->
+    select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites);
+select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, true) ->
+    select_cipher_suite(Suites, CipherSuites).
+
+select_cipher_suite([], _) ->
+   no_suite;
+select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) ->
+    case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of
+	true ->
+	    Suite;
+        false ->
+	    select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites)
+    end.
+
+is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) ->
+    lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites).
+
+psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) ->
+    case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of
+	{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
+	    Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK),
+	    <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>;
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert;
+	_ ->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+    end.
+
+psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret) ->
+    case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of
+	{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
+	    Len = erlang:byte_size(PremasterSecret),
+	    PSKLen = erlang:byte_size(PSK),
+	    <<?UINT16(Len), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(PSKLen), PSK/binary>>;
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert;
+	_ ->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+    end.
+
+handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun)
+  when LookupFun == undefined ->
+    error;
+handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) ->
+    Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState).
+
+filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns,
+		 Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
+			   KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
+    do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
+
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns,
+		 Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa;
+			   KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
+			   KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa;
+			   KeyExchange == srp_rsa;
+			   KeyExchange == rsa_psk ->
+    do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when 
+      KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
+      KeyExchange == srp_dss ->							       
+    do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when 
+      KeyExchange == dh_dss; 
+      KeyExchange == dh_rsa; 
+      KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
+      KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa;    
+      KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa ->
+      %%  Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature
+      %%  algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension.  The names
+    %%  DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical.
+    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when 
+      KeyExchange == dh_anon;
+      KeyExchange == ecdh_anon;
+      KeyExchange == srp_anon;
+      KeyExchange == psk;
+      KeyExchange == dhe_psk ->
+    %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous
+    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]).
+
+do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) ->
+    case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of
+	true ->
+	    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
+	false ->
+	    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc)
+    end.
+
+unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) ->
+    ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites();
+unavailable_ecc_suites(_) ->
+    [].
 %%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
 
+handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, 
+			       ClientCipherSuites, Compression,
+			       ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) ->
+    case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0,
+				   Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation,
+				   ClientCipherSuites) of
+	{ok, ConnectionStates} ->
+	    hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role,
+					    Version,
+					    NegotiatedCipherSuite,
+					    Random,
+					    Compression,
+					    ConnectionStates);
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    throw(Alert)
+    end.
+
 %% Receive protocols, choose one from the list, return it.
 handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, Reason}) ->
     ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason);
@@ -2130,150 +2125,6 @@ handle_srp_extension(undefined, Session) ->
 handle_srp_extension(#srp{username = Username}, Session) ->
     Session#session{srp_username = Username}.
 
-%%-------------Misc --------------------------------
-
-select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, false) ->
-    select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites);
-select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, true) ->
-    select_cipher_suite(Suites, CipherSuites).
-
-select_cipher_suite([], _) ->
-   no_suite;
-select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) ->
-    case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of
-	true ->
-	    Suite;
-        false ->
-	    select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites)
-    end.
-
-int_to_bin(I) ->
-    L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2,
-    <<I:(L*8)>>.
-
-is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) ->
-    lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites).
-
-select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) ->
-    ?NULL.
-
-available_signature_algs(undefined, _)  ->
-    undefined;
-available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} ->
-    #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = SupportedHashSigns};
-available_signature_algs(_, _) ->
-    undefined.
-
-psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) ->
-    case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of
-	{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
-	    Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK),
-	    <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>;
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    Alert;
-	_ ->
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
-    end.
-
-psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret) ->
-    case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of
-	{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
-	    Len = erlang:byte_size(PremasterSecret),
-	    PSKLen = erlang:byte_size(PSK),
-	    <<?UINT16(Len), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(PSKLen), PSK/binary>>;
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    Alert;
-	_ ->
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
-    end.
-
-handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun)
-  when LookupFun == undefined ->
-    error;
-handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) ->
-    Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState).
-
-crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _, _) ->
-    valid;
-crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid, _) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option.
-    valid;
-crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, CertPath) ->
-    Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) ->
-				     ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, {CertPath,
-                                                                                 DBInfo})
-			     end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}}, 
-	       {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end},
-               {undetermined_details, true}
-	      ],
-    case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of
-	no_dps ->
-	    crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check,
-				  dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer),
-				  Options);
-	DpsAndCRLs ->  %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed 
-	    %% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined}
-	    case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of
-		{bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} ->
-		    crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, 
-								       CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options);
-		Other ->
-		    Other
-	    end
-    end.
-
-crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) ->		
-    case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of 
-	{bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}}   ->
-	    valid;
-	Other ->
-	    Other
-    end;
-crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, _, Dps, Options) ->    
-    public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options).
-
-dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) ->
-    case public_key:pkix_dist_points(OtpCert) of
-	[] ->
-	    no_dps;
-	DistPoints ->
-	    Issuer = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer,
-	    CRLs = distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle),
-            dps_and_crls(DistPoints, CRLs, [])
-    end;
-
-dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) ->    
-    DP = #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, GenNames}} = 
-	public_key:pkix_dist_point(OtpCert),
-    CRLs = lists:flatmap(fun({directoryName, Issuer}) -> 
-				 Callback:select(Issuer, CRLDbHandle);
-			    (_) ->
-				 []
-			 end, GenNames),
-    [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} ||  CRL <- CRLs].
-
-dps_and_crls([], _, Acc) ->
-    Acc;
-dps_and_crls([DP | Rest], CRLs, Acc) ->
-    DpCRL = [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} ||  CRL <- CRLs],
-    dps_and_crls(Rest, CRLs, DpCRL ++ Acc).
-    
-distpoints_lookup([],_, _, _) ->
-    [];
-distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) ->
-    Result =
-	try Callback:lookup(DistPoint, Issuer, CRLDbHandle)
-	catch
-	    error:undef ->
-		%% The callback module still uses the 2-argument
-		%% version of the lookup function.
-		Callback:lookup(DistPoint, CRLDbHandle)
-	end,
-    case Result of
-	not_available ->
-	    distpoints_lookup(Rest, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle);
-	CRLs ->
-	    CRLs
-    end.	
 
 sign_algo(?rsaEncryption) ->
     rsa;
@@ -2323,7 +2174,6 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when
     true; 
 is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_, _,_,_) ->
     false.					
-
 is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) ->
     lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns).
 
@@ -2343,27 +2193,162 @@ sign_type(dsa) ->
 sign_type(ecdsa) ->
     ?ECDSA_SIGN.
 
-
-bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
-    unacceptable_dsa_key;
-bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
-    unacceptable_rsa_key;
-bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) ->
-    unacceptable_ecdsa_key.
-
-available_signature_algs(undefined, SupportedHashSigns, _, Version) when 
-      Version >= {3,3} ->
-    SupportedHashSigns;
-available_signature_algs(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, SupportedHashSigns, 
-                         _, Version) when Version >= {3,3} ->
-    sets:to_list(sets:intersection(sets:from_list(ClientHashSigns), 
-				   sets:from_list(SupportedHashSigns)));
-available_signature_algs(_, _, _, _) -> 
-    undefined.
-
 server_name(_, _, server) ->
     undefined; %% Not interesting to check your own name.
 server_name(undefined, Host, client) ->
     {fallback, Host}; %% Fallback to Host argument to connect
 server_name(SNI, _, client) ->
     SNI. %% If Server Name Indication is available
+
+client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) ->
+    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
+    case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
+	true ->
+	    EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]},
+	    EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs,
+	    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves};
+	_ ->
+	    {undefined, undefined}
+    end.
+
+server_ecc_extension(_Version, EcPointFormats) ->
+    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
+    case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
+	true ->
+	    handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats);
+	false ->
+	    undefined
+    end.
+
+handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) ->
+    #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}.
+
+advertises_ec_ciphers([]) ->
+    false;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) ->
+    advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest).
+
+select_shared_curve([], _) ->
+    no_curve;
+select_shared_curve([Curve | Rest], Curves) ->
+    case lists:member(Curve, Curves) of
+	true ->
+	    {namedCurve, Curve};
+	false ->
+	    select_shared_curve(Rest, Curves)
+    end.
+
+sni(undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+sni(disable) ->
+    undefined;
+sni(Hostname) ->
+    #sni{hostname = Hostname}.
+
+renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) ->
+    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined};
+renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) ->
+    ConnectionState  = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
+	true ->
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)};
+	false ->
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+    end;
+renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) ->
+    ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    case  maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
+	true ->
+	    Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data};
+	false ->
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+    end;
+
+renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) ->
+    ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
+	true ->
+	    CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+	    SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>};
+	false ->
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+    end.
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)},
+			  ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
+    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) ->
+    case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
+	true ->
+	    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
+	false ->
+	    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}
+    end;
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
+    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)};
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify},
+			  ConnectionStates, true, _, _) ->
+    ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+    SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+    case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of
+	true ->
+	    {ok, ConnectionStates};
+	false ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation)
+    end;
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify},
+			  ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) ->
+
+      case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
+	  true ->
+              ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
+	  false ->
+	      ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+	      Data =  maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+	      case Data == ClientVerify of
+		  true ->
+		      {ok, ConnectionStates};
+		  false ->
+                      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation)
+	      end
+      end;
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) ->
+    handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation);
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) ->
+     case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
+	  true ->
+             ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
+	 false ->
+	     handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation)
+     end.
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
+    ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    case {SecureRenegotation, maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState)} of
+	{_, true} ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure);
+	{true, false} ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+	{false, false} ->
+	    {ok, ConnectionStates}
+    end.