Merge tag 'OTP-19.0' into sverker/19/binary_to_atom-utf8-crash/ERL-474/OTP-14590

57 files changed, 12466 insertions, 7019 deletions

diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/Makefile b/lib/ssl/src/Makefile
index cf9f7d5001..b625db0656 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/Makefile
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/Makefile
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 #
 # %CopyrightBegin%
 #
-# Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2015. All Rights Reserved.
 #
-# The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-# Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-# compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-# Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-# retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
 #
-# Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-# basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-# the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-# under the License.
+#     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
 #
 # %CopyrightEnd%
 #
@@ -38,7 +39,8 @@ RELSYSDIR = $(RELEASE_PATH)/lib/ssl-$(VSN)
 # ----------------------------------------------------
 
 BEHAVIOUR_MODULES= \
-        ssl_session_cache_api
+        ssl_session_cache_api \
+	ssl_crl_cache_api
 
 MODULES= \
 	ssl \
@@ -49,29 +51,41 @@ MODULES= \
 	ssl_dist_sup\
 	ssl_sup \
 	inet_tls_dist \
+	inet6_tls_dist \
 	ssl_certificate\
 	ssl_pkix_db\
 	ssl_cipher \
 	ssl_srp_primes \
 	tls_connection \
 	dtls_connection \
-	ssl_connection_sup \
+	ssl_config \
+	ssl_connection \
+	tls_connection_sup \
+	dtls_connection_sup \
 	tls_handshake \
 	dtls_handshake\
+	ssl_handshake\
 	ssl_manager \
 	ssl_session \
 	ssl_session_cache \
+	ssl_crl\
+	ssl_crl_cache \
+	ssl_crl_hash_dir \
 	ssl_socket \
+	ssl_listen_tracker_sup \
 	tls_record \
 	dtls_record \
-	ssl_ssl2 \
-	ssl_ssl3 \
-	ssl_tls1 \
+	ssl_record \
+	ssl_v2 \
+	ssl_v3 \
+	tls_v1 \
+	dtls_v1 \
 	ssl_tls_dist_proxy
 
 INTERNAL_HRL_FILES = \
-	ssl_alert.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl tls_handshake.hrl \
-	dtls_handshake.hrl ssl_internal.hrl \
+	ssl_alert.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl \
+	tls_connection.hrl dtls_connection.hrl ssl_connection.hrl \
+        ssl_handshake.hrl tls_handshake.hrl dtls_handshake.hrl ssl_api.hrl ssl_internal.hrl \
         ssl_record.hrl tls_record.hrl dtls_record.hrl ssl_srp.hrl
 
 ERL_FILES= \
@@ -110,7 +124,7 @@ $(TARGET_FILES): $(BEHAVIOUR_TARGET_FILES)
 debug opt: $(TARGET_FILES) $(APP_TARGET) $(APPUP_TARGET) 
 
 clean:
-	rm -f $(TARGET_FILES) $(APP_TARGET) $(APPUP_TARGET) 
+	rm -f $(TARGET_FILES) $(APP_TARGET) $(APPUP_TARGET) $(BEHAVIOUR_TARGET_FILES) 
 	rm -f errs core *~
 
 $(APP_TARGET):	$(APP_SRC) ../vsn.mk
@@ -145,9 +159,10 @@ $(EBIN)/ssl_alert.$(EMULATOR): ssl_alert.hrl ssl_record.hrl
 $(EBIN)/ssl_certificate.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl
 $(EBIN)/ssl_certificate_db.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl ../../kernel/include/file.hrl
 $(EBIN)/ssl_cipher.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl
-$(EBIN)/tls_connection.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl tls_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl tls_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl
-$(EBIN)/dtls_connection.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl dtls_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl dtls_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl
+$(EBIN)/tls_connection.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl tls_connection.hrl tls_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl tls_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl
+$(EBIN)/dtls_connection.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl dtls_connection.hrl dtls_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl dtls_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl
 $(EBIN)/tls_handshake.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl tls_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl tls_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl
+$(EBIN)/tls_handshake.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_connection.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl
 $(EBIN)/ssl_manager.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ../../kernel/include/file.hrl
 $(EBIN)/ssl_record.$(EMULATOR):  ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl
 $(EBIN)/ssl_session.$(EMULATOR):  ssl_internal.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl
@@ -155,5 +170,5 @@ $(EBIN)/ssl_session_cache.$(EMULATOR):  ssl_internal.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl
 $(EBIN)/ssl_session_cache_api.$(EMULATOR):  ssl_internal.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl
 $(EBIN)/ssl_ssl3.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl
 $(EBIN)/ssl_tls1.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl
-
+$(EBIN)/ssl_cache.$(EMULATOR): ssl_cache.erl ssl_internal.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl
 
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls.erl
index 013286c9bd..cd705152a8 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls.erl
@@ -1,25 +1,113 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
 
 %%
 
-%%% Purpose : API for DTLS.
+%%% Purpose : Reflect DTLS specific API options (fairly simple wrapper at the moment)
+%% First implementation will support DTLS connections only in a "TLS/TCP like way"
 
 -module(dtls).
 
+-include("ssl_api.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+
+-export([connect/2, connect/3, listen/2, accept/1, accept/2,
+	 handshake/1, handshake/2, handshake/3]).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%
+%% Description: Connect to a DTLS server.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()]) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} |
+					      {error, reason()}.
+
+connect(Socket, Options) when is_port(Socket) ->
+    connect(Socket, Options, infinity).
+
+-spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()] | inet:port_number(),
+	      timeout() | list()) ->
+		     {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+
+connect(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout)  when is_port(Socket) ->
+    DTLSOpts = [{protocol, dtls} | SslOptions],
+    ssl:connect(Socket, DTLSOpts, Timeout);
+connect(Host, Port, Options) ->
+    connect(Host, Port, Options, infinity).
+
+-spec connect(host() | port(), inet:port_number(), list(), timeout()) ->
+		     {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+
+connect(Host, Port, Options, Timeout) ->
+    DTLSOpts = [{protocol, dtls} | Options],
+    ssl:connect(Host, Port, DTLSOpts, Timeout).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec listen(inet:port_number(), [listen_option()]) ->{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+
+%%
+%% Description: Creates an ssl listen socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+listen(Port, Options) ->
+    DTLSOpts = [{protocol, dtls} | Options],
+    ssl:listen(Port, DTLSOpts).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%
+%% Description: Performs transport accept on an ssl listen socket
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec accept(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} |
+					{error, reason()}.
+accept(ListenSocket) ->
+    accept(ListenSocket, infinity).
+
+-spec accept(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} |
+						   {error, reason()}.
+accept(Socket, Timeout) ->
+    ssl:transport_accept(Socket, Timeout).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%
+%% Description: Performs accept on an ssl listen socket. e.i. performs
+%%              ssl handshake.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-spec handshake(#sslsocket{}) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
+
+handshake(ListenSocket) ->
+    handshake(ListenSocket, infinity).
+
+
+-spec handshake(#sslsocket{} | port(), timeout()| [ssl_option()
+						    | transport_option()]) ->
+			ok | {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+
+handshake(#sslsocket{} = Socket, Timeout) ->
+    ssl:ssl_accept(Socket, Timeout);
+
+handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions)  when is_port(ListenSocket) ->
+    handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions, infinity).
+
+
+-spec handshake(port(), [ssl_option()| transport_option()], timeout()) ->
+			{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+
+handshake(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket) ->
+    ssl:ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
index ac2ee0d09f..b8be686b99 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
@@ -1,19 +1,635 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2015. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
 -module(dtls_connection).
+
+%% Internal application API
+
+-behaviour(gen_statem).
+
+-include("dtls_connection.hrl").
+-include("dtls_handshake.hrl").
+-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
+-include("dtls_record.hrl").
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+-include("ssl_api.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_srp.hrl").
+-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). 
+
+%% Internal application API
+
+%% Setup
+-export([start_fsm/8, start_link/7, init/1]).
+
+%% State transition handling	 
+-export([next_record/1, next_event/3]).
+
+%% Handshake handling
+-export([%%renegotiate/2,
+        send_handshake/2, queue_handshake/2, queue_change_cipher/2]).
+
+%% Alert and close handling
+-export([%%send_alert/2, handle_own_alert/4, handle_close_alert/3,
+	 handle_normal_shutdown/3 %%, close/5
+	 %%alert_user/6, alert_user/9
+	]).
+
+%% Data handling
+
+-export([%%write_application_data/3, 
+	 read_application_data/2,
+	 passive_receive/2,  next_record_if_active/1%, 
+	 %%handle_common_event/4,
+	 %handle_packet/3
+	]).
+
+%% gen_statem state functions
+-export([init/3, error/3, downgrade/3, %% Initiation and take down states
+	 hello/3, certify/3, cipher/3, abbreviated/3, %% Handshake states 
+	 connection/3]). 
+%% gen_statem callbacks
+-export([terminate/3, code_change/4, format_status/2]).
+
+-define(GEN_STATEM_CB_MODE, state_functions).
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Internal application API
+%%====================================================================	     
+start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} = Opts,
+	  User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, 
+	  Timeout) -> 
+    try 
+	{ok, Pid} = dtls_connection_sup:start_child([Role, Host, Port, Socket, 
+						     Opts, User, CbInfo]), 
+	{ok, SslSocket} = ssl_connection:socket_control(?MODULE, Socket, Pid, CbModule, Tracker),
+	ok = ssl_connection:handshake(SslSocket, Timeout),
+	{ok, SslSocket} 
+    catch
+	error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} ->
+	    Error
+    end;
+
+start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = true},_, Tracker} = Opts,
+	  User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, 
+	  Timeout) -> 
+    try 
+	{ok, Pid} = dtls_connection_sup:start_child_dist([Role, Host, Port, Socket, 
+							  Opts, User, CbInfo]), 
+	{ok, SslSocket} = ssl_connection:socket_control(?MODULE, Socket, Pid, CbModule, Tracker),
+	ok = ssl_connection:handshake(SslSocket, Timeout),
+	{ok, SslSocket} 
+    catch
+	error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} ->
+	    Error
+    end.
+
+send_handshake(Handshake, State) ->
+    send_handshake_flight(queue_handshake(Handshake, State)).
+
+queue_flight_buffer(Msg, #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+				connection_states = #connection_states{
+				  current_write =
+				      #connection_state{epoch = Epoch}},
+				flight_buffer = Flight} = State) ->
+    State#state{flight_buffer = Flight ++ [{Version, Epoch, Msg}]}.
+
+queue_handshake(Handshake, #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+				  tls_handshake_history = Hist0,
+				  connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
+    {Frag, ConnectionStates, Hist} =
+	encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hist0),
+    queue_flight_buffer(Frag, State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+					   tls_handshake_history = Hist}).
+
+send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket,
+			     transport_cb = Transport,
+			     flight_buffer = Flight,
+			     connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
+
+    {Encoded, ConnectionStates} =
+	encode_handshake_flight(Flight, ConnectionStates0),
+
+    Transport:send(Socket, Encoded),
+    State0#state{flight_buffer = [], connection_states = ConnectionStates}.
+
+queue_change_cipher(Msg, State) ->
+    queue_flight_buffer(Msg, State).
+
+send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+			 socket = Socket,
+			 transport_cb = Transport,
+			 connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
+    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} =
+	ssl_alert:encode(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
+    State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}.
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% tls_connection_sup API
+%%====================================================================
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) ->
+    {ok, pid()} | ignore |  {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a gen_fsm process which calls Module:init/1 to
+%% initialize. To ensure a synchronized start-up procedure, this function
+%% does not return until Module:init/1 has returned.  
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) ->
+    {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}.
+
+init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options,  User, CbInfo]) ->
+    process_flag(trap_exit, true),
+    State0 =  initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo),
+    try
+	State = ssl_connection:ssl_config(State0#state.ssl_options, Role, State0),
+	gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], ?GEN_STATEM_CB_MODE, init, State)
+    catch
+	throw:Error ->
+	    gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], ?GEN_STATEM_CB_MODE, error, {Error,State0})
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% State functionsconnection/2
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, 
+     #state{host = Host, port = Port, role = client,
+	    ssl_options = SslOpts,
+	    session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
+	    transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket,
+	    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+	    renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
+	    session_cache = Cache,
+	    session_cache_cb = CacheCb
+	   } = State0) ->
+    Timer = ssl_connection:start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, From),
+    Hello = dtls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts,
+				       Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert),
+    
+    Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version,
+    HelloVersion = dtls_record:lowest_protocol_version(SslOpts#ssl_options.versions),
+    Handshake0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
+    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
+        encode_handshake(Hello,  HelloVersion, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
+    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
+    State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+			  negotiated_version = Version, %% Requested version
+			  session =
+			      Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id},
+			  tls_handshake_history = Handshake,
+			  start_or_recv_from = From,
+			  timer = Timer},
+    {Record, State} = next_record(State1),
+    next_event(hello, Record, State);
+init(Type, Event, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:init(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
+ 
+error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, {Error, State}) ->
+    {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State};
+error({call, From}, Msg, State) ->
+    handle_call(Msg, From, error, State);
+error(_, _, _) ->
+     {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec hello(gen_statem:event_type(),
+	    #hello_request{} | #client_hello{} | #server_hello{} | term(),
+	    #state{}) ->
+		   gen_statem:state_function_result().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+hello(internal, #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion,
+			      extensions = #hello_extensions{ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
+							     elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves}} = Hello,
+      State = #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+		     port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
+		     renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
+		     session_cache = Cache,
+		     session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
+		     negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol,
+		     key_algorithm = KeyExAlg,
+		     ssl_options = SslOpts}) ->
+
+    case dtls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb,
+					      ConnectionStates0, Cert, KeyExAlg}, Renegotiation) of
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State);
+	{Version, {Type, Session},
+	 ConnectionStates, Protocol0, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} ->
+	    Protocol = case Protocol0 of
+			   undefined -> CurrentProtocol;
+			   _ -> Protocol0
+		       end,
+
+	    ssl_connection:hello(internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt},
+				 State#state{connection_states	= ConnectionStates,
+					     negotiated_version = Version,
+					     hashsign_algorithm = HashSign,
+					     session = Session,
+					     client_ecc = {EllipticCurves, EcPointFormats},
+					     negotiated_protocol = Protocol}, ?MODULE)
+    end;
+hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello,
+      #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+	     negotiated_version = ReqVersion,
+	     role = client,
+	     renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
+	     ssl_options = SslOptions} = State) ->
+    case dtls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOptions, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, hello, State);
+	{Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} ->
+	    ssl_connection:handle_session(Hello, 
+					  Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol, State)
+    end;
+hello(info, Event, State) ->
+    handle_info(Event, hello, State);
+
+hello(Type, Event, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:hello(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
+
+abbreviated(info, Event, State) ->
+    handle_info(Event, abbreviated, State);
+abbreviated(Type, Event, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:abbreviated(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
+
+certify(info, Event, State) ->
+    handle_info(Event, certify, State);
+certify(Type, Event, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:certify(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
+
+cipher(info, Event, State) ->
+    handle_info(Event, cipher, State);
+cipher(Type, Event, State) ->
+     ssl_connection:cipher(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
+
+connection(info, Event, State) ->
+    handle_info(Event, connection, State);
+connection(internal, #hello_request{}, #state{host = Host, port = Port,
+				    session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
+				    session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
+				    ssl_options = SslOpts,
+				    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+				    renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = State0) ->
+    Hello = dtls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts,
+					Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert),
+    State1 = send_handshake(Hello, State0),
+    {Record, State} =
+	next_record(
+	  State1#state{session = Session0#session{session_id
+						  = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}),
+    next_event(hello, Record, State);
+
+connection(internal, #client_hello{} = Hello, #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = true} = State) ->
+    %% Mitigate Computational DoS attack
+    %% http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2011/10/ssltls_and_computational_dos.html
+    %% http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/ Rather than disabling client
+    %% initiated renegotiation we will disallow many client initiated
+    %% renegotiations immediately after each other.
+    erlang:send_after(?WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, self(), allow_renegotiate),
+    {next_state, hello, State#state{allow_renegotiate = false}, [{next_event, internal, Hello}]};
+
+
+connection(internal, #client_hello{}, #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = false} = State0) ->
+    Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION),
+    State1 = send_alert(Alert, State0),
+    {Record, State} = ssl_connection:prepare_connection(State1, ?MODULE),
+    next_event(connection, Record, State);
+  
+connection(Type, Event, State) ->
+     ssl_connection:connection(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
+
+downgrade(Type, Event, State) ->
+     ssl_connection:downgrade(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Description: This function is called by a gen_fsm when it receives any
+%% other message than a synchronous or asynchronous event
+%% (or a system message).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+%% raw data from socket, unpack records
+handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName,
+            #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) ->
+     case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of
+	{Record, State} ->
+	    next_event(StateName, Record, State);
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), 
+	    {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}}
+     end;
+handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName,
+	    #state{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag,
+		   negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
+    %% Note that as of DTLS 1.2 (TLS 1.1),
+    %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a
+    %% session not be resumed.	This is a change from DTLS 1.0 to conform
+    %% with widespread implementation practice.
+    case Version of
+	{254, N} when N =< 253 ->
+	    ok;
+	_ ->
+	    %% As invalidate_sessions here causes performance issues,
+	    %% we will conform to the widespread implementation
+	    %% practice and go aginst the spec
+	    %%invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session)
+	    ok
+    end,
+    handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State),
+    {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}};
+handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:handle_info(Msg, StateName, State).
+
+handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State, ?MODULE).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Description:This function is called by a gen_fsm when it is about
+%% to terminate. It should be the opposite of Module:init/1 and do any
+%% necessary cleaning up. When it returns, the gen_fsm terminates with
+%% Reason. The return value is ignored.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+terminate(Reason, StateName, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:terminate(Reason, StateName, State).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% code_change(OldVsn, StateName, State, Extra) -> {ok, StateName, NewState}
+%% Description: Convert process state when code is changed
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _Extra) ->
+    {?GEN_STATEM_CB_MODE, StateName, State}.
+
+format_status(Type, Data) ->
+    ssl_connection:format_status(Type, Data).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hist0) ->
+    {Seq, ConnectionStates} = sequence(ConnectionStates0),
+    {EncHandshake, Frag} = dtls_handshake:encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, Seq),
+    Hist = ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hist0, EncHandshake),
+    {Frag, ConnectionStates, Hist}.
+
+encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+    dtls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates).
+
+encode_handshake_flight(Flight, ConnectionStates) ->
+    MSS = 1400,
+    encode_handshake_records(Flight, ConnectionStates, MSS, init_pack_records()).
+
+encode_handshake_records([], CS, _MSS, Recs) ->
+    {finish_pack_records(Recs), CS};
+
+encode_handshake_records([{Version, _Epoch, Frag = #change_cipher_spec{}}|Tail], ConnectionStates0, MSS, Recs0) ->
+    {Encoded, ConnectionStates} =
+        encode_change_cipher(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+    Recs = append_pack_records([Encoded], MSS, Recs0),
+    encode_handshake_records(Tail, ConnectionStates, MSS, Recs);
+
+encode_handshake_records([{Version, Epoch, {MsgType, MsgSeq, Bin}}|Tail], CS0, MSS, Recs0 = {Buf0, _}) ->
+    Space = MSS - iolist_size(Buf0),
+    Len = byte_size(Bin),
+    {Encoded, CS} =
+	encode_handshake_record(Version, Epoch, Space, MsgType, MsgSeq, Len, Bin, 0, MSS, [], CS0),
+    Recs = append_pack_records(Encoded, MSS, Recs0),
+    encode_handshake_records(Tail, CS, MSS, Recs).
+
+%% TODO: move to dtls_handshake????
+encode_handshake_record(_Version, _Epoch, _Space, _MsgType, _MsgSeq, _Len, <<>>, _Offset, _MRS, Encoded, CS)
+  when length(Encoded) > 0 ->
+    %% make sure we encode at least one segment (for empty messages like Server Hello Done
+    {lists:reverse(Encoded), CS};
+
+encode_handshake_record(Version, Epoch, Space, MsgType, MsgSeq, Len, Bin,
+			Offset, MRS, Encoded0, CS0) ->
+    MaxFragmentLen = Space - 25,
+    case Bin of
+	<<BinFragment:MaxFragmentLen/bytes, Rest/binary>> ->
+	    ok;
+	_ ->
+	    BinFragment = Bin,
+	    Rest = <<>>
+    end,
+    FragLength = byte_size(BinFragment),
+    Frag = [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), ?uint16(MsgSeq), ?uint24(Offset), ?uint24(FragLength), BinFragment],
+    %% TODO Real solution, now avoid dialyzer error {Encoded, CS} = ssl_record:encode_handshake({Epoch, Frag}, Version, CS0),
+    {Encoded, CS} = ssl_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, CS0),
+    encode_handshake_record(Version, Epoch, MRS, MsgType, MsgSeq, Len, Rest, Offset + FragLength, MRS, [Encoded|Encoded0], CS).
+
+init_pack_records() ->
+    {[], []}.
+
+append_pack_records([], MSS, Recs = {Buf0, Acc0}) ->
+    Remaining = MSS - iolist_size(Buf0),
+    if Remaining < 12 ->
+	    {[], [lists:reverse(Buf0)|Acc0]};
+       true ->
+	    Recs
+    end;
+append_pack_records([Head|Tail], MSS, {Buf0, Acc0}) ->
+    TotLen = iolist_size(Buf0) + iolist_size(Head),
+    if TotLen > MSS ->
+	    append_pack_records(Tail, MSS, {[Head], [lists:reverse(Buf0)|Acc0]});
+       true ->
+	    append_pack_records(Tail, MSS, {[Head|Buf0], Acc0})
+    end.
+
+finish_pack_records({[], Acc}) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+finish_pack_records({Buf, Acc}) ->
+    lists:reverse([lists:reverse(Buf)|Acc]).
+
+%% decode_alerts(Bin) ->
+%%     ssl_alert:decode(Bin).
+
+initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions}, User,
+	      {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) ->
+    #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation} = SSLOptions,
+    ConnectionStates = ssl_record:init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation),
+    
+    SessionCacheCb = case application:get_env(ssl, session_cb) of
+			 {ok, Cb} when is_atom(Cb) ->
+			    Cb;
+			 _  ->
+			     ssl_session_cache
+		     end,
+    
+    Monitor = erlang:monitor(process, User),
+
+    #state{socket_options = SocketOptions,
+	   %% We do not want to save the password in the state so that
+	   %% could be written in the clear into error logs.
+	   ssl_options = SSLOptions#ssl_options{password = undefined},	   
+	   session = #session{is_resumable = new},
+	   transport_cb = CbModule,
+	   data_tag = DataTag,
+	   close_tag = CloseTag,
+	   error_tag = ErrorTag,
+	   role = Role,
+	   host = Host,
+	   port = Port,
+	   socket = Socket,
+	   connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+	   protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{},
+	   user_application = {Monitor, User},
+	   user_data_buffer = <<>>,
+	   session_cache_cb = SessionCacheCb,
+	   renegotiation = {false, first},
+	   allow_renegotiate = SSLOptions#ssl_options.client_renegotiation,
+	   start_or_recv_from = undefined,
+	   protocol_cb = ?MODULE
+	  }.
+
+next_tls_record(Data, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{
+						   dtls_record_buffer = Buf0,
+						   dtls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers} = State0) ->
+    case dtls_record:get_dtls_records(Data, Buf0) of
+	{Records, Buf1} ->
+	    CT1 = CT0 ++ Records,
+	    next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers =
+					 Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_record_buffer = Buf1,
+								  dtls_cipher_texts = CT1}});
+
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert
+   end.
+
+next_record(#state{%%flight = #flight{state = finished}, 
+		   protocol_buffers =
+		       #protocol_buffers{dtls_packets = [], dtls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest]}
+		   = Buffers,
+		   connection_states = ConnStates0} = State) ->
+    case dtls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0) of
+	{Plain, ConnStates} ->		      
+	    {Plain, State#state{protocol_buffers =
+				    Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest},
+				connection_states = ConnStates}};
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    {Alert, State}
+    end;
+next_record(#state{socket = Socket,
+		   transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> %% when FlightState =/= finished
+    ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]),
+    {no_record, State};
+next_record(State) ->
+    {no_record, State}.
+
+next_record_if_active(State =
+		      #state{socket_options =
+			     #socket_options{active = false}}) ->
+    {no_record ,State};
+
+next_record_if_active(State) ->
+    next_record(State).
+
+passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) ->
+    case Buffer of
+	<<>> ->
+	    {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
+	    next_event(StateName, Record, State);
+	_ ->
+	    {Record, State} = read_application_data(<<>>, State0),
+	    next_event(StateName, Record, State)
+    end.
+
+next_event(StateName, Record, State) ->
+    next_event(StateName, Record, State, []).
+
+next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) ->
+    case next_record_if_active(State0) of
+	{no_record, State} ->
+	    ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions);
+	{#ssl_tls{} = Record, State} ->
+	    {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {dtls_record, Record}} | Actions]};
+	{#alert{} = Alert, State} ->
+	    {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]}
+    end;
+next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions) ->
+    case Record of
+	no_record ->
+	    {next_state, StateName, State, Actions};
+	#ssl_tls{} = Record ->
+	    {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {dtls_record, Record}} | Actions]};
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]}
+    end.
+
+read_application_data(_,State) ->
+    {#ssl_tls{fragment = <<"place holder">>}, State}.
+
+handle_own_alert(_,_,_, State) -> %% Place holder
+    {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State}.
+
+handle_normal_shutdown(_, _, _State) -> %% Place holder
+    ok.
+
+%% TODO This generates dialyzer warnings, has to be handled differently.
+%% handle_packet(Address, Port, Packet) ->
+%%     try dtls_record:get_dtls_records(Packet, <<>>) of
+%% 	%% expect client hello
+%% 	{[#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, version = {254, _}} = Record], <<>>} ->
+%% 	    handle_dtls_client_hello(Address, Port, Record);
+%% 	_Other ->
+%% 	    {error, not_dtls}
+%%     catch
+%% 	_Class:_Error ->
+%% 	    {error, not_dtls}
+%%     end.
+
+%% handle_dtls_client_hello(Address, Port,
+%% 			 #ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = Seq,
+%% 				  version = Version} = Record) ->
+%%     {[{Hello, _}], _} =
+%% 	dtls_handshake:get_dtls_handshake(Record,
+%% 					 dtls_handshake:dtls_handshake_new_flight(undefined)),
+%%     #client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor},
+%% 		  random = Random,
+%% 		  session_id = SessionId,
+%% 		  cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
+%% 		  compression_methods = CompressionMethods} = Hello,
+%%     CookieData = [address_to_bin(Address, Port),
+%% 		  <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor)>>,
+%% 		  Random, SessionId, CipherSuites, CompressionMethods],
+%%     Cookie = crypto:hmac(sha, <<"secret">>, CookieData),
+
+%%     case Hello of
+%% 	#client_hello{cookie = Cookie} ->
+%% 	    accept;
+
+%% 	_ ->
+%% 	    %% generate HelloVerifyRequest
+%% 	    {RequestFragment, _} = dtls_handshake:encode_handshake(
+%% 				     dtls_handshake:hello_verify_request(Cookie),
+%% 				     Version, 0),
+%% 	    HelloVerifyRequest =
+%% 		dtls_record:encode_tls_cipher_text(?HANDSHAKE, Version, Epoch, Seq, RequestFragment),
+%% 	    {reply, HelloVerifyRequest}
+%%     end.
+
+%% address_to_bin({A,B,C,D}, Port) ->
+%%     <<0:80,16#ffff:16,A,B,C,D,Port:16>>;
+%% address_to_bin({A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H}, Port) ->
+%%     <<A:16,B:16,C:16,D:16,E:16,F:16,G:16,H:16,Port:16>>.
+
+sequence(#connection_states{dtls_write_msg_seq = Seq} = CS) ->
+    {Seq, CS#connection_states{dtls_write_msg_seq = Seq + 1}}.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.hrl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ee3daa3c14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.hrl
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+
+%%
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: SSL/TLS specific state
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-ifndef(dtls_connection).
+-define(dtls_connection, true).
+
+-include("ssl_connection.hrl").
+
+-record(protocol_buffers, {
+	  dtls_packets = [],              %%::[binary()],  % Not yet handled decode ssl/tls packets.
+          dtls_record_buffer = <<>>,      %%:: binary(),   % Buffer of incomplete records
+	  dtls_fragment_state,            %%:: [],         % DTLS fragments
+          dtls_handshake_buffer = <<>>,   %%:: binary(),   % Buffer of incomplete handshakes
+	  dtls_cipher_texts = [],         %%:: [binary()],
+	  dtls_cipher_texts_next          %%:: [binary()]  % Received for Epoch not yet active
+	 }).
+
+-record(flight, {
+	  last_retransmit,
+	  last_read_seq,
+	  msl_timer,
+	  state,
+	  buffer        % buffer of not yet ACKed TLS records
+	 }).
+
+-endif. % -ifdef(dtls_connection).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection_sup.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection_sup.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc7601a684
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection_sup.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%% 
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%% 
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%% 
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+
+%%
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: Supervisor of DTLS connection.
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+-module(dtls_connection_sup).
+
+-behaviour(supervisor).
+
+%% API
+-export([start_link/0, start_link_dist/0]).
+-export([start_child/1, start_child_dist/1]).
+
+%% Supervisor callback
+-export([init/1]).
+
+%%%=========================================================================
+%%%  API
+%%%=========================================================================
+start_link() ->
+    supervisor:start_link({local, ?MODULE}, ?MODULE, []).
+
+start_link_dist() ->
+    supervisor:start_link({local, dtls_connection_sup_dist}, ?MODULE, []).
+
+start_child(Args) ->
+    supervisor:start_child(?MODULE, Args).
+        
+start_child_dist(Args) ->
+    supervisor:start_child(dtls_connection_sup_dist, Args).
+    
+%%%=========================================================================
+%%%  Supervisor callback
+%%%=========================================================================
+init(_O) ->
+    RestartStrategy = simple_one_for_one,
+    MaxR = 0,
+    MaxT = 3600,
+   
+    Name = undefined, % As simple_one_for_one is used.
+    StartFunc = {dtls_connection, start_link, []},
+    Restart = temporary, % E.g. should not be restarted
+    Shutdown = 4000,
+    Modules = [dtls_connection],
+    Type = worker,
+    
+    ChildSpec = {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules},
+    {ok, {{RestartStrategy, MaxR, MaxT}, [ChildSpec]}}.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl
index b25daa59d9..5a799cf441 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,502 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 -module(dtls_handshake).
+
+-include("dtls_handshake.hrl").
+-include("dtls_record.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
+
+-export([client_hello/8, client_hello/9, hello/4,
+	 hello_verify_request/1, get_dtls_handshake/2,
+	 dtls_handshake_new_flight/1, dtls_handshake_new_epoch/1,
+	 encode_handshake/3]).
+
+-type dtls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | #hello_verify_request{} | 
+			  ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake().
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Internal application API
+%%====================================================================
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec client_hello(host(), inet:port_number(), #connection_states{},
+		   #ssl_options{}, integer(), atom(), boolean(), der_cert()) ->
+			  #client_hello{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a client hello message.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, SslOpts,
+	     Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert) ->
+    %% First client hello (two sent in DTLS ) uses empty Cookie
+    client_hello(Host, Port, <<>>, ConnectionStates, SslOpts,
+		 Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec client_hello(host(), inet:port_number(), term(), #connection_states{},
+		   #ssl_options{}, integer(), atom(), boolean(), der_cert()) ->
+			  #client_hello{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a client hello message.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+client_hello(Host, Port, Cookie, ConnectionStates,
+	     #ssl_options{versions = Versions,
+			  ciphers = UserSuites
+			 } = SslOpts,
+	     Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert) ->
+    Version =  dtls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions),
+    Pending = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    CipherSuites = ssl_handshake:available_suites(UserSuites, Version),
+
+    Extensions = ssl_handshake:client_hello_extensions(Host, dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), CipherSuites,
+						SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
+
+    Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert),
+
+    #client_hello{session_id = Id,
+		  client_version = Version,
+		  cipher_suites = ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(CipherSuites, Renegotiation),
+		  compression_methods = ssl_record:compressions(),
+		  random = SecParams#security_parameters.client_random,
+		  cookie = Cookie,
+		  extensions = Extensions
+		 }.
+
+hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, random = Random,
+		    cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+		    compression_method = Compression,
+		    session_id = SessionId, extensions = HelloExt},
+      #ssl_options{versions = SupportedVersions} = SslOpt,
+      ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
+    case dtls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, SupportedVersions) of
+	true ->
+	    handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite,
+					   Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation);
+	false ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION)
+    end;
+
+hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello,
+      #ssl_options{versions = Versions} = SslOpts,
+      Info, Renegotiation) ->
+    Version = ssl_handshake:select_version(dtls_record, ClientVersion, Versions),
+    %%
+    %% TODO: handle Cipher Fallback
+    %%
+    handle_client_hello(Version, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation).
+
+-spec hello_verify_request(binary()) -> #hello_verify_request{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a hello verify request message sent by server to
+%% verify client
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+hello_verify_request(Cookie) ->
+    %% TODO: DTLS Versions?????
+    #hello_verify_request{protocol_version = {254, 255}, cookie = Cookie}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, MsgSeq) ->
+    {MsgType, Bin} = enc_handshake(Handshake, Version),
+    Len = byte_size(Bin),
+    Enc = [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), ?uint16(MsgSeq), ?uint24(0), ?uint24(Len), Bin],
+    Frag = {MsgType, MsgSeq, Bin},
+    {Enc, Frag}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec get_dtls_handshake(#ssl_tls{}, #dtls_hs_state{} | undefined) ->
+				{[dtls_handshake()], #dtls_hs_state{}} | {retransmit, #dtls_hs_state{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Given a DTLS state and new data from ssl_record, collects
+%% and returns it as a list of handshake messages, also returns a new
+%% DTLS state
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+get_dtls_handshake(Records, undefined) ->
+    HsState = #dtls_hs_state{highest_record_seq = 0,
+			     starting_read_seq = 0,
+			     fragments = gb_trees:empty(),
+			     completed = []},
+    get_dtls_handshake(Records, HsState);
+get_dtls_handshake(Records, HsState0) when is_list(Records) ->
+    HsState1 = lists:foldr(fun get_dtls_handshake_aux/2, HsState0, Records),
+    get_dtls_handshake_completed(HsState1);
+get_dtls_handshake(Record, HsState0) when is_record(Record, ssl_tls) ->
+    HsState1 = get_dtls_handshake_aux(Record, HsState0),
+    get_dtls_handshake_completed(HsState1).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec dtls_handshake_new_epoch(#dtls_hs_state{}) -> #dtls_hs_state{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Reset the DTLS decoder state for a new Epoch
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% dtls_handshake_new_epoch(<<>>) ->
+%%     dtls_hs_state_init();
+dtls_handshake_new_epoch(HsState) ->
+    HsState#dtls_hs_state{highest_record_seq = 0,
+			  starting_read_seq = HsState#dtls_hs_state.current_read_seq,
+			  fragments = gb_trees:empty(), completed = []}.
+
+%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec dtls_handshake_new_flight(integer() | undefined) -> #dtls_hs_state{}.
+%
+% Description: Init the DTLS decoder state for a new Flight
+dtls_handshake_new_flight(ExpectedReadReq) ->
+    #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = ExpectedReadReq,
+		   highest_record_seq = 0,
+		   starting_read_seq = 0,
+		   fragments = gb_trees:empty(), completed = []}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+handle_client_hello(Version, #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId,
+					   cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
+					   compression_methods = Compressions,
+					   random = Random,
+					   extensions = #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves,
+									  signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} = HelloExt},
+		    #ssl_options{versions = Versions,
+				 signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns} = SslOpts,
+		    {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert, _}, Renegotiation) ->
+    case dtls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of
+	true ->
+	    AvailableHashSigns = ssl_handshake:available_signature_algs(
+				   ClientHashSigns, SupportedHashSigns, Cert,
+				   dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version)),
+	    ECCCurve = ssl_handshake:select_curve(Curves, ssl_handshake:supported_ecc(Version)),
+	    {Type, #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session1}
+		= ssl_handshake:select_session(SugesstedId, CipherSuites, AvailableHashSigns, Compressions,
+					       Port, Session0#session{ecc = ECCCurve}, Version,
+					       SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert),
+	    case CipherSuite of
+		no_suite ->
+		    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+		_ ->
+		    {KeyExAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
+		    case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, Version) of
+			#alert{} = Alert ->
+			    Alert;
+			HashSign ->
+			    handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, HelloExt,
+							   SslOpts, Session1, ConnectionStates0,
+							   Renegotiation, HashSign)
+		    end
+	    end;
+	false ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION)
+    end.
+
+handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites,
+			HelloExt, SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, HashSign) ->
+    try ssl_handshake:handle_client_hello_extensions(dtls_record, Random, CipherSuites,
+						     HelloExt, dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version),
+						     SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert;
+	{Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt} ->
+	    {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt, HashSign}
+    catch throw:Alert ->
+	    Alert
+    end.
+
+handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite,
+			       Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
+    case ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions(dtls_record, Random, CipherSuite,
+						      Compression, HelloExt,
+						      dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version),
+						      SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert;
+	{ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} ->
+	    {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol}
+    end.
+
+get_dtls_handshake_completed(HsState = #dtls_hs_state{completed = Completed}) ->
+    {lists:reverse(Completed), HsState#dtls_hs_state{completed = []}}.
+
+get_dtls_handshake_aux(#ssl_tls{version = Version,
+ 				sequence_number = SeqNo,
+ 				fragment = Data}, HsState) ->
+    get_dtls_handshake_aux(Version, SeqNo, Data, HsState).
+
+get_dtls_handshake_aux(Version, SeqNo,
+ 		       <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length),
+ 			 ?UINT16(MessageSeq),
+ 			 ?UINT24(FragmentOffset), ?UINT24(FragmentLength),
+ 			 Body:FragmentLength/binary, Rest/binary>>,
+ 		       HsState0) ->
+    case reassemble_dtls_fragment(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+				  FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+				  Body, HsState0) of
+ 	{HsState1, HighestSeqNo, MsgBody} ->
+ 	    HsState2 = dec_dtls_fragment(Version, HighestSeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq, MsgBody, HsState1),
+ 	    HsState3 = process_dtls_fragments(Version, HsState2),
+ 	    get_dtls_handshake_aux(Version, SeqNo, Rest, HsState3);
+
+ 	HsState2 ->
+ 	    HsState3 = process_dtls_fragments(Version, HsState2),
+ 	    get_dtls_handshake_aux(Version, SeqNo, Rest, HsState3)
+     end;
+
+get_dtls_handshake_aux(_Version, _SeqNo, <<>>, HsState) ->
+    HsState.
+
+dec_dtls_fragment(Version, SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq, MsgBody,
+ 		  HsState = #dtls_hs_state{highest_record_seq = HighestSeqNo, completed = Acc}) ->
+    Raw = <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), ?UINT16(MessageSeq), ?UINT24(0), ?UINT24(Length), MsgBody/binary>>,
+    H = decode_handshake(Version, Type, MsgBody),
+    HsState#dtls_hs_state{completed = [{H,Raw}|Acc], highest_record_seq = erlang:max(HighestSeqNo, SeqNo)}.
+
+process_dtls_fragments(Version,
+ 		       HsState0 = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq,
+ 						 fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    case gb_trees:is_empty(Fragments0) of
+ 	true ->
+ 	    HsState0;
+ 	_ ->
+ 	    case gb_trees:smallest(Fragments0) of
+ 		{CurrentReadSeq, {SeqNo, Type, Length, CurrentReadSeq, {Length, [{0, Length}], MsgBody}}} ->
+ 		    HsState1 = dtls_hs_state_process_seq(HsState0),
+ 		    HsState2 = dec_dtls_fragment(Version, SeqNo, Type, Length, CurrentReadSeq, MsgBody, HsState1),
+ 		    process_dtls_fragments(Version, HsState2);
+ 		_ ->
+ 		    HsState0
+ 	    end
+     end.
+
+dtls_hs_state_process_seq(HsState0 = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq,
+ 						    fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    Fragments1 = gb_trees:delete_any(CurrentReadSeq, Fragments0),
+    HsState0#dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq + 1,
+ 			   fragments = Fragments1}.
+
+dtls_hs_state_add_fragment(MessageSeq, Fragment, HsState0 = #dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    Fragments1 = gb_trees:enter(MessageSeq, Fragment, Fragments0),
+    HsState0#dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments1}.
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq, 0, Length,
+ 			 Body, HsState0 = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = undefined})
+  when Type == ?CLIENT_HELLO;
+       Type == ?SERVER_HELLO;
+        Type == ?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST ->
+    %% First message, should be client hello
+    %% return the current message and set the next expected Sequence
+    %%
+    %% Note: this could (should?) be restricted further, ClientHello and
+    %%       HelloVerifyRequest have to have message_seq = 0, ServerHello
+    %%       can have a message_seq of 0 or 1
+    %%
+    {HsState0#dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = MessageSeq + 1}, SeqNo, Body};
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(_SeqNo, _Type, Length, _MessageSeq, _, Length,
+			 _Body, HsState = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = undefined}) ->
+    %% not what we expected, drop it
+    HsState;
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(SeqNo, _Type, Length, MessageSeq, 0, Length,
+ 			 Body, HsState0 =
+ 			     #dtls_hs_state{starting_read_seq = StartingReadSeq})
+  when MessageSeq < StartingReadSeq ->
+    %% this has to be the start of a new flight, let it through
+    %%
+    %% Note: this could (should?) be restricted further, the first message of a
+    %%       new flight has to have message_seq = 0
+    %%
+    HsState = dtls_hs_state_process_seq(HsState0),
+    {HsState, SeqNo, Body};
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(_SeqNo, _Type, Length, MessageSeq, 0, Length,
+ 			 _Body, HsState = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq})
+  when MessageSeq < CurrentReadSeq ->
+    HsState;
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(SeqNo, _Type, Length, MessageSeq, 0, Length,
+ 			 Body, HsState0 = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = MessageSeq}) ->
+    %% Message fully contained and it's the current seq
+    HsState1 = dtls_hs_state_process_seq(HsState0),
+    {HsState1, SeqNo, Body};
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq, 0, Length,
+ 			 Body, HsState) ->
+    %% Message fully contained and it's the NOT the current seq -> buffer
+    Fragment = {SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+ 		dtls_fragment_init(Length, 0, Length, Body)},
+    dtls_hs_state_add_fragment(MessageSeq, Fragment, HsState);
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(_SeqNo, _Type, Length, MessageSeq, FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+ 			 _Body,
+ 			 HsState = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq})
+  when FragmentOffset + FragmentLength == Length andalso MessageSeq == (CurrentReadSeq - 1) ->
+    {retransmit, HsState};
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(_SeqNo, _Type, _Length, MessageSeq, _FragmentOffset, _FragmentLength,
+ 			 _Body,
+ 			 HsState = #dtls_hs_state{current_read_seq = CurrentReadSeq})
+  when MessageSeq < CurrentReadSeq ->
+    HsState;
+
+reassemble_dtls_fragment(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+ 			 FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+ 			 Body,
+ 			 HsState = #dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    case gb_trees:lookup(MessageSeq, Fragments0) of
+ 	{value, Fragment} ->
+ 	    dtls_fragment_reassemble(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+ 				     FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+ 				     Body, Fragment, HsState);
+ 	none ->
+ 	    dtls_fragment_start(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+ 				FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+ 				Body, HsState)
+    end.
+
+dtls_fragment_start(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+		    FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+		    Body, HsState = #dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    Fragment = {SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+ 		dtls_fragment_init(Length, FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Body)},
+     Fragments1 = gb_trees:insert(MessageSeq, Fragment, Fragments0),
+    HsState#dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments1}.
+
+dtls_fragment_reassemble(SeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq,
+			 FragmentOffset, FragmentLength,
+ 			 Body,
+ 			 {LastSeqNo, Type, Length, MessageSeq, FragBuffer0},
+ 			 HsState = #dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    FragBuffer1 = dtls_fragment_add(FragBuffer0, FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Body),
+    Fragment = {erlang:max(SeqNo, LastSeqNo), Type, Length, MessageSeq, FragBuffer1},
+    Fragments1 = gb_trees:enter(MessageSeq, Fragment, Fragments0),
+    HsState#dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments1};
+
+%% Type, Length or Seq mismatch, drop everything...
+%% Note: the RFC is not clear on how to handle this...
+dtls_fragment_reassemble(_SeqNo, _Type, _Length, MessageSeq,
+ 			 _FragmentOffset, _FragmentLength, _Body, _Fragment,
+ 			 HsState = #dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments0}) ->
+    Fragments1 = gb_trees:delete_any(MessageSeq, Fragments0),
+    HsState#dtls_hs_state{fragments = Fragments1}.
+
+dtls_fragment_add({Length, FragmentList0, Bin0}, FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Body) ->
+    Bin1 = dtls_fragment_bin_add(FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Body, Bin0),
+    FragmentList1 = add_fragment(FragmentList0, {FragmentOffset, FragmentLength}),
+    {Length, FragmentList1, Bin1}.
+
+dtls_fragment_init(Length, 0, Length, Body) ->
+    {Length, [{0, Length}], Body};
+dtls_fragment_init(Length, FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Body) ->
+    Bin = dtls_fragment_bin_add(FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Body, <<0:(Length*8)>>),
+    {Length, [{FragmentOffset, FragmentOffset + FragmentLength}], Bin}.
+
+dtls_fragment_bin_add(FragmentOffset, FragmentLength, Add, Buffer) ->
+    <<First:FragmentOffset/bytes, _:FragmentLength/bytes, Rest/binary>> = Buffer,
+    <<First/binary, Add/binary, Rest/binary>>.
+
+merge_fragment_list([], Fragment, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse([Fragment|Acc]);
+
+merge_fragment_list([H = {_, HEnd}|Rest], Frag = {FStart, _}, Acc)
+  when FStart > HEnd ->
+    merge_fragment_list(Rest, Frag, [H|Acc]);
+
+merge_fragment_list(Rest = [{HStart, _HEnd}|_], Frag = {_FStart, FEnd}, Acc)
+  when FEnd < HStart ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc) ++ [Frag|Rest];
+
+merge_fragment_list([{HStart, HEnd}|Rest], _Frag = {FStart, FEnd}, Acc)
+   when
+      FStart =< HEnd orelse FEnd >= HStart ->
+    Start = erlang:min(HStart, FStart),
+    End = erlang:max(HEnd, FEnd),
+    NewFrag = {Start, End},
+    merge_fragment_list(Rest, NewFrag, Acc).
+
+add_fragment(List, {FragmentOffset, FragmentLength}) ->
+    merge_fragment_list(List, {FragmentOffset, FragmentOffset + FragmentLength}, []).
+
+enc_handshake(#hello_verify_request{protocol_version = {Major, Minor},
+ 				       cookie = Cookie}, _Version) ->
+     CookieLength = byte_size(Cookie),
+    {?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
+ 			      ?BYTE(CookieLength),
+ 			      Cookie/binary>>};
+
+enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, _Version) ->
+    {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>};
+enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor},
+			       random = Random,
+			       session_id = SessionID,
+			       cookie = Cookie,
+			       cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
+			       compression_methods = CompMethods,
+			       extensions = HelloExtensions}, Version) ->
+    SIDLength = byte_size(SessionID),
+    BinCookie = enc_client_hello_cookie(Version, Cookie),
+    BinCompMethods = list_to_binary(CompMethods),
+    CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods),
+    BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites),
+    CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites),
+    ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions),
+    
+    {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+ 		      ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary,
+ 		      BinCookie/binary,
+		      ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary,
+ 		      ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>};
+enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version) ->
+    ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version).
+
+enc_client_hello_cookie(_, <<>>) ->
+    <<>>;
+enc_client_hello_cookie(_, Cookie) ->
+    CookieLength = byte_size(Cookie),
+    <<?BYTE(CookieLength), Cookie/binary>>.
+
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+					    ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
+					    ?BYTE(Cookie_length), Cookie:Cookie_length/binary,
+					    ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary,
+					    ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary,
+					    Extensions/binary>>) ->
+    
+    DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(Extensions),
+    
+    #client_hello{
+       client_version = {Major,Minor},
+       random = Random,
+        session_id = Session_ID,
+       cookie = Cookie,
+       cipher_suites = ssl_handshake:decode_suites('2_bytes', CipherSuites),
+       compression_methods = Comp_methods,
+       extensions = DecodedExtensions
+       };
+
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
+						    ?BYTE(CookieLength), Cookie:CookieLength/binary>>) ->
+
+    #hello_verify_request{
+       protocol_version = {Major,Minor},
+       cookie = Cookie};
+decode_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg) ->
+    ssl_handshake:decode_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg).
+
+%% address_to_bin({A,B,C,D}, Port) ->
+%%     <<0:80,16#ffff:16,A,B,C,D,Port:16>>;
+%% address_to_bin({A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H}, Port) ->
+%%     <<A:16,B:16,C:16,D:16,E:16,F:16,G:16,H:16,Port:16>>.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl
index db7b8596ae..0298fd3105 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -27,6 +28,8 @@
 
 -include("ssl_handshake.hrl"). %% Common TLS and DTLS records and Constantes
 
+-define(HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, 3).
+
 -record(client_hello, {
 	  client_version,
 	  random,             
@@ -35,16 +38,20 @@
 	  cipher_suites,       % cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>
 	  compression_methods, % compression_methods<1..2^8-1>,
 	  %% Extensions
-	  renegotiation_info,
-	  hash_signs,          % supported combinations of hashes/signature algos
-	  next_protocol_negotiation = undefined % [binary()]
+	  extensions
 	 }).
 
--record(hello_verify_request  {
+-record(hello_verify_request, {
 	  protocol_version,
 	  cookie
 	 }).
 
--define(HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, 3).
+-record(dtls_hs_state,
+	{current_read_seq,
+	 starting_read_seq,
+	 highest_record_seq,
+	 fragments,
+	 completed
+	}).
 
 -endif. % -ifdef(dtls_handshake).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
index 2469a7d26c..5387fcafa8 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,481 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2015. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
+
+%%
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: Handle DTLS record protocol. (Parts that are not shared with SSL/TLS)
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 -module(dtls_record).
+
+-include("dtls_record.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
+-include("dtls_handshake.hrl").
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+
+%% Handling of incoming data
+-export([get_dtls_records/2]).
+
+%% Decoding
+-export([decode_cipher_text/2]).
+
+%% Encoding
+-export([encode_plain_text/4, encode_tls_cipher_text/5, encode_change_cipher_spec/2]).
+
+%% Protocol version handling
+-export([protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/2,
+	 highest_protocol_version/1, highest_protocol_version/2,
+	 is_higher/2, supported_protocol_versions/0,
+	 is_acceptable_version/2]).
+
+%% DTLS Epoch handling
+-export([init_connection_state_seq/2, current_connection_state_epoch/2,
+	 set_connection_state_by_epoch/3, connection_state_by_epoch/3]).
+
+-export_type([dtls_version/0, dtls_atom_version/0]).
+
+-type dtls_version()       :: ssl_record:ssl_version().
+-type dtls_atom_version()  :: dtlsv1 | 'dtlsv1.2'.
+
+-compile(inline).
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Internal application API
+%%====================================================================
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec get_dtls_records(binary(), binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Given old buffer and new data from UDP/SCTP, packs up a records
+%% and returns it as a list of tls_compressed binaries also returns leftover
+%% data
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+get_dtls_records(Data, <<>>) ->
+    get_dtls_records_aux(Data, []);
+get_dtls_records(Data, Buffer) ->
+    get_dtls_records_aux(list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), []).
+
+get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?APPLICATION_DATA),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer),
+		       ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber),
+		       ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>,
+		     Acc) ->
+    get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA,
+					 version = {MajVer, MinVer},
+					 epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber,
+					 fragment = Data} | Acc]);
+get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?HANDSHAKE),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer),
+		       ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber),
+		       ?UINT16(Length),
+		       Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) when MajVer >= 128 ->
+    get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE,
+					 version = {MajVer, MinVer},
+					 epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber,
+					 fragment = Data} | Acc]);
+get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?ALERT),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer),
+		       ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber),
+		       ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary,
+		       Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT,
+					 version = {MajVer, MinVer},
+					 epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber,
+					 fragment = Data} | Acc]);
+get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer),
+		       ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber),
+		       ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>,
+		     Acc) ->
+    get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+					 version = {MajVer, MinVer},
+					 epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber,
+					 fragment = Data} | Acc]);
+
+get_dtls_records_aux(<<0:1, _CT:7, ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer),
+		       ?UINT16(Length), _/binary>>,
+		     _Acc) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW);
+
+get_dtls_records_aux(<<1:1, Length0:15, _/binary>>,_Acc)
+  when Length0 > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW);
+
+get_dtls_records_aux(Data, Acc) ->
+    case size(Data) =< ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH + ?INITIAL_BYTES of
+	true ->
+	    {lists:reverse(Acc), Data};
+	false ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE)
+    end.
+
+encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data,
+		  #connection_states{current_write =
+					 #connection_state{
+					    epoch = Epoch,
+					    sequence_number = Seq,
+					    compression_state=CompS0,
+					    security_parameters=
+						#security_parameters{
+						   cipher_type = ?AEAD,
+						   compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+					   }= WriteState0} = ConnectionStates) ->
+    {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0),
+    WriteState1 = WriteState0#connection_state{compression_state = CompS1},
+    AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, Epoch, Seq),
+    {CipherFragment, WriteState} = ssl_record:cipher_aead(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version),
+							  Comp, WriteState1, AAD),
+    CipherText = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, Epoch, Seq, CipherFragment),
+    {CipherText, ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_write =
+							WriteState#connection_state{sequence_number = Seq +1}}};
+
+encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data,
+		  #connection_states{current_write=#connection_state{
+						      epoch = Epoch,
+						      sequence_number = Seq,
+						      compression_state=CompS0,
+						      security_parameters=
+							  #security_parameters{compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+						     }= WriteState0} = ConnectionStates) ->
+    {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0),
+    WriteState1 = WriteState0#connection_state{compression_state = CompS1},
+    MacHash = calc_mac_hash(WriteState1, Type, Version, Epoch, Seq, Comp),
+    {CipherFragment, WriteState} = ssl_record:cipher(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), 
+						     Comp, WriteState1, MacHash),
+    CipherText = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, Epoch, Seq, CipherFragment),
+    {CipherText, ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_write =
+							WriteState#connection_state{sequence_number = Seq +1}}}.
+
+decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version,
+			    epoch = Epoch,
+			    sequence_number = Seq,
+			    fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText,
+		   #connection_states{current_read =
+					  #connection_state{
+					     compression_state = CompressionS0,
+					     security_parameters=
+						 #security_parameters{
+						    cipher_type = ?AEAD,
+						    compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+					    } = ReadState0}= ConnnectionStates0) ->
+    AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, Epoch, Seq),
+    case ssl_record:decipher_aead(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version),
+				  CipherFragment, ReadState0, AAD) of
+	{PlainFragment, ReadState1} ->
+	    {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg,
+							   PlainFragment, CompressionS0),
+	    ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states{
+				  current_read = ReadState1#connection_state{
+						   compression_state = CompressionS1}},
+	    {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates};
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert
+    end;
+
+decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version,
+			    epoch = Epoch,
+			    sequence_number = Seq,
+			    fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText,
+		   #connection_states{current_read =
+					  #connection_state{
+					     compression_state = CompressionS0,
+					     security_parameters=
+						 #security_parameters{
+						    compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+					    } = ReadState0}= ConnnectionStates0) ->
+    {PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} = ssl_record:decipher(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version),
+							   CipherFragment, ReadState0, true),
+    MacHash = calc_mac_hash(ReadState1, Type, Version, Epoch, Seq, PlainFragment),
+    case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of
+	true ->
+	    {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg,
+							   PlainFragment, CompressionS0),
+	    ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states{
+				  current_read = ReadState1#connection_state{
+						   compression_state = CompressionS1}},
+	    {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates};
+	false ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_change_cipher_spec(dtls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+				       {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes a change_cipher_spec-message to send on the ssl socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+    encode_plain_text(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, Version, <<1:8>>, ConnectionStates).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec protocol_version(dtls_atom_version() | dtls_version()) ->
+			      dtls_version() | dtls_atom_version().
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a protocol version record from a version atom
+%% or vice versa.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+protocol_version('dtlsv1.2') ->
+    {254, 253};
+protocol_version(dtlsv1) ->
+    {254, 255};
+protocol_version({254, 253}) ->
+    'dtlsv1.2';
+protocol_version({254, 255}) ->
+    dtlsv1.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec lowest_protocol_version(dtls_version(), dtls_version()) -> dtls_version().
+%%
+%% Description: Lowes protocol version of two given versions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+lowest_protocol_version(Version = {M, N}, {M, O}) when N > O ->
+    Version;
+lowest_protocol_version({M, _}, Version = {M, _}) ->
+    Version;
+lowest_protocol_version(Version = {M,_}, {N, _}) when M > N ->
+    Version;
+lowest_protocol_version(_,Version) ->
+    Version.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec lowest_protocol_version([dtls_version()]) -> dtls_version().
+%%     
+%% Description: Lowest protocol version present in a list
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+lowest_protocol_version([]) ->
+    lowest_protocol_version();
+lowest_protocol_version(Versions) ->
+    [Ver | Vers] = Versions,
+    lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, Vers).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec highest_protocol_version([dtls_version()]) -> dtls_version().
+%%
+%% Description: Highest protocol version present in a list
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+highest_protocol_version([]) ->
+    highest_protocol_version();
+highest_protocol_version(Versions) ->
+    [Ver | Vers] = Versions,
+    highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, Vers).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec highest_protocol_version(dtls_version(), dtls_version()) -> dtls_version().
+%%
+%% Description: Highest protocol version of two given versions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+highest_protocol_version(Version = {M, N}, {M, O})   when N < O ->
+    Version;
+highest_protocol_version({M, _},
+			Version = {M, _}) ->
+    Version;
+highest_protocol_version(Version = {M,_},
+			{N, _}) when M < N ->
+    Version;
+highest_protocol_version(_,Version) ->
+    Version.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec is_higher(V1 :: dtls_version(), V2::dtls_version()) -> boolean().
+%%
+%% Description: Is V1 > V2
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+is_higher({M, N}, {M, O}) when N < O ->
+    true;
+is_higher({M, _}, {N, _}) when M < N ->
+    true;
+is_higher(_, _) ->
+    false.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec supported_protocol_versions() -> [dtls_version()].
+%%
+%% Description: Protocol versions supported
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+supported_protocol_versions() ->
+    Fun = fun(Version) ->
+		  protocol_version(Version)
+	  end,
+    case application:get_env(ssl, dtls_protocol_version) of
+	undefined ->
+	    lists:map(Fun, supported_protocol_versions([]));
+	{ok, []} ->
+	    lists:map(Fun, supported_protocol_versions([]));
+	{ok, Vsns} when is_list(Vsns) ->
+	    supported_protocol_versions(lists:map(Fun, Vsns));
+	{ok, Vsn} ->
+	    supported_protocol_versions([Fun(Vsn)])
+     end.
+
+supported_protocol_versions([]) ->
+    Vsns = case sufficient_dtlsv1_2_crypto_support() of
+	       true ->
+		   ?ALL_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS;
+	       false ->
+		   ?MIN_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS
+	   end,
+    application:set_env(ssl, dtls_protocol_version, Vsns),
+    Vsns;
+
+supported_protocol_versions([_|_] = Vsns) ->
+    case sufficient_dtlsv1_2_crypto_support() of
+	true ->
+	    Vsns;
+	false ->
+	    case Vsns -- ['dtlsv1.2'] of
+		[] ->
+		    ?MIN_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS;
+		NewVsns ->
+		    NewVsns
+	    end
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec is_acceptable_version(dtls_version(), Supported :: [dtls_version()]) -> boolean().
+%%
+%% Description: ssl version 2 is not acceptable security risks are too big.
+%%
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) ->
+    lists:member(Version, Versions).
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec init_connection_state_seq(dtls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+				       #connection_state{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Copy the read sequence number to the write sequence number
+%% This is only valid for DTLS in the first client_hello
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+init_connection_state_seq({254, _},
+			  #connection_states{
+			     current_read = Read = #connection_state{epoch = 0},
+			     current_write = Write = #connection_state{epoch = 0}} = CS0) ->
+    CS0#connection_states{current_write =
+			      Write#connection_state{
+				sequence_number = Read#connection_state.sequence_number}};
+init_connection_state_seq(_, CS) ->
+    CS.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------
+-spec current_connection_state_epoch(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
+					    integer().
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the epoch the connection_state record
+%% that is currently defined as the current conection state.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+current_connection_state_epoch(#connection_states{current_read = Current},
+			       read) ->
+    Current#connection_state.epoch;
+current_connection_state_epoch(#connection_states{current_write = Current},
+			       write) ->
+    Current#connection_state.epoch.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-spec connection_state_by_epoch(#connection_states{}, integer(), read | write) ->
+				      #connection_state{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the instance of the connection_state record
+%% that is defined by the Epoch.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+connection_state_by_epoch(#connection_states{current_read = CS}, Epoch, read)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    CS;
+connection_state_by_epoch(#connection_states{pending_read = CS}, Epoch, read)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    CS;
+connection_state_by_epoch(#connection_states{current_write = CS}, Epoch, write)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    CS;
+connection_state_by_epoch(#connection_states{pending_write = CS}, Epoch, write)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    CS.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_connection_state_by_epoch(#connection_states{},
+				    #connection_state{}, read | write)
+				   -> #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the instance of the connection_state record
+%% that is defined by the Epoch.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_connection_state_by_epoch(ConnectionStates0 =
+				  #connection_states{current_read = CS},
+			      NewCS = #connection_state{epoch = Epoch}, read)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    ConnectionStates0#connection_states{current_read = NewCS};
+
+set_connection_state_by_epoch(ConnectionStates0 =
+				  #connection_states{pending_read = CS},
+			      NewCS = #connection_state{epoch = Epoch}, read)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    ConnectionStates0#connection_states{pending_read = NewCS};
+
+set_connection_state_by_epoch(ConnectionStates0 =
+				  #connection_states{current_write = CS},
+			      NewCS = #connection_state{epoch = Epoch}, write)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    ConnectionStates0#connection_states{current_write = NewCS};
+
+set_connection_state_by_epoch(ConnectionStates0 =
+				  #connection_states{pending_write = CS},
+			      NewCS = #connection_state{epoch = Epoch}, write)
+  when CS#connection_state.epoch == Epoch ->
+    ConnectionStates0#connection_states{pending_write = NewCS}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) ->
+    Ver;
+lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver1,  [Ver2 | Rest]) ->
+    lowest_list_protocol_version(lowest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest).
+
+highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) ->
+    Ver;
+highest_list_protocol_version(Ver1,  [Ver2 | Rest]) ->
+    highest_list_protocol_version(highest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest).
+
+encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Epoch, Seq, Fragment) ->
+    Length = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
+    [<<?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Epoch),
+       ?UINT48(Seq), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Fragment].
+
+calc_mac_hash(#connection_state{mac_secret = MacSecret,
+				security_parameters = #security_parameters{mac_algorithm = MacAlg}},
+	      Type, Version, Epoch, SeqNo, Fragment) ->
+    Length = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
+    NewSeq = (Epoch bsl 48) + SeqNo,
+    mac_hash(Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, NewSeq, Type,
+	     Length, Fragment).
+
+highest_protocol_version() ->
+    highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()).
+
+lowest_protocol_version() ->
+    lowest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()).
+
+sufficient_dtlsv1_2_crypto_support() ->
+    CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(),
+    proplists:get_bool(sha256, proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport)).
+
+mac_hash(Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) ->
+    dtls_v1:mac_hash(Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type,
+		     Length, Fragment).
+
+calc_aad(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Epoch, SeqNo) ->
+    NewSeq = (Epoch bsl 48) + SeqNo,
+    <<NewSeq:64/integer, ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.hrl
index e935d84bdf..b9f84cbe7f 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.hrl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -28,16 +29,15 @@
 
 -include("ssl_record.hrl"). %% Common TLS and DTLS records and Constantes
 
-%% Used to handle tls_plain_text, tls_compressed and tls_cipher_text
+%% Used to handle dtls_plain_text, dtls_compressed and dtls_cipher_text
 
 -record(ssl_tls, {   
 	  type,
 	  version,
-	  record_seq,      % used in plain_text
-	  epoch,           % used in plain_text  
-	  message_seq, 
-	  fragment_offset,
-	  fragment_length,
+	  epoch,           
+	  sequence_number,      
+	  offset,
+	  length,
 	  fragment
 	 }).
 
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c03bda513
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+-module(dtls_v1).
+
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+
+-export([suites/1, mac_hash/7, ecc_curves/1, corresponding_tls_version/1]).
+
+-spec suites(Minor:: 253|255) -> [ssl_cipher:cipher_suite()].
+
+suites(Minor) ->
+   tls_v1:suites(corresponding_minor_tls_version(Minor)).
+
+mac_hash(Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) ->
+    tls_v1:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, corresponding_tls_version(Version),
+		    Length, Fragment).
+
+ecc_curves({_Major, Minor}) ->
+    tls_v1:ecc_curves(corresponding_minor_tls_version(Minor)).
+
+corresponding_tls_version({254, Minor}) ->
+    {3, corresponding_minor_tls_version(Minor)}.
+
+corresponding_minor_tls_version(255) ->
+    2;
+corresponding_minor_tls_version(253) ->
+    3.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/inet6_tls_dist.erl b/lib/ssl/src/inet6_tls_dist.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ffd7296f93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/inet6_tls_dist.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2015. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+
+%%
+-module(inet6_tls_dist).
+
+-export([childspecs/0, listen/1, accept/1, accept_connection/5,
+	 setup/5, close/1, select/1]).
+
+childspecs() ->
+    inet_tls_dist:childspecs().
+
+select(Node) ->
+    inet_tls_dist:gen_select(inet6_tcp, Node).
+
+listen(Name) ->
+    inet_tls_dist:gen_listen(inet6_tcp, Name).
+
+accept(Listen) ->
+    inet_tls_dist:gen_accept(inet6_tcp, Listen).
+
+accept_connection(AcceptPid, Socket, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) ->
+    inet_tls_dist:gen_accept_connection(inet6_tcp, AcceptPid, Socket, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime).
+
+setup(Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames,SetupTime) ->
+    inet_tls_dist:gen_setup(inet6_tcp, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames,SetupTime).
+
+close(Socket) ->
+    inet_tls_dist:close(Socket).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl
index 57c859bf24..0da4b3587f 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2012. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -23,18 +24,28 @@
 -export([childspecs/0, listen/1, accept/1, accept_connection/5,
 	 setup/5, close/1, select/1, is_node_name/1]).
 
+%% Generalized dist API
+-export([gen_listen/2, gen_accept/2, gen_accept_connection/6,
+	 gen_setup/6, gen_select/2]).
+
 -include_lib("kernel/include/net_address.hrl").
 -include_lib("kernel/include/dist.hrl").
 -include_lib("kernel/include/dist_util.hrl").
 
 childspecs() ->
     {ok, [{ssl_dist_sup,{ssl_dist_sup, start_link, []},
-	   permanent, 2000, worker, [ssl_dist_sup]}]}.
+	   permanent, infinity, supervisor, [ssl_dist_sup]}]}.
 
 select(Node) ->
+    gen_select(inet_tcp, Node).
+
+gen_select(Driver, Node) ->
     case split_node(atom_to_list(Node), $@, []) of
-	[_,_Host] -> 
-	    true;
+	[_, Host] ->
+	    case inet:getaddr(Host, Driver:family()) of
+		{ok, _} -> true;
+		_ -> false
+	    end;
 	_ -> 
 	    false
     end.
@@ -45,70 +56,78 @@ is_node_name(_) ->
     false.
 
 listen(Name) ->
-    ssl_tls_dist_proxy:listen(Name).
+    gen_listen(inet_tcp, Name).
+
+gen_listen(Driver, Name) ->
+    ssl_tls_dist_proxy:listen(Driver, Name).
 
 accept(Listen) ->
-    ssl_tls_dist_proxy:accept(Listen).
+    gen_accept(inet_tcp, Listen).
+
+gen_accept(Driver, Listen) ->
+    ssl_tls_dist_proxy:accept(Driver, Listen).
 
 accept_connection(AcceptPid, Socket, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) ->
+    gen_accept_connection(inet_tcp, AcceptPid, Socket, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime).
+
+gen_accept_connection(Driver, AcceptPid, Socket, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) ->
     Kernel = self(),
-    spawn_link(fun() -> do_accept(Kernel, AcceptPid, Socket, 
+    spawn_link(fun() -> do_accept(Driver, Kernel, AcceptPid, Socket,
 				  MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) end).
 
 setup(Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames,SetupTime) ->
+    gen_setup(inet_tcp, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames,SetupTime).
+
+gen_setup(Driver, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames,SetupTime) ->
     Kernel = self(),
-    spawn_opt(fun() -> do_setup(Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) end, [link, {priority, max}]).
+    spawn_opt(fun() -> do_setup(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) end, [link, {priority, max}]).
 		   
-do_setup(Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) ->
-    [Name, Address] = splitnode(Node, LongOrShortNames),
-    case inet:getaddr(Address, inet) of
+do_setup(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) ->
+    [Name, Address] = splitnode(Driver, Node, LongOrShortNames),
+    case inet:getaddr(Address, Driver:family()) of
 	{ok, Ip} ->
 	    Timer = dist_util:start_timer(SetupTime),
-	    case erl_epmd:port_please(Name, Ip) of
+	    ErlEpmd = net_kernel:epmd_module(),
+	    case ErlEpmd:port_please(Name, Ip) of
 		{port, TcpPort, Version} ->
 		    ?trace("port_please(~p) -> version ~p~n", 
 			   [Node,Version]),
 		    dist_util:reset_timer(Timer),
-		    case ssl_tls_dist_proxy:connect(Ip, TcpPort) of
+		    case ssl_tls_dist_proxy:connect(Driver, Ip, TcpPort) of
 			{ok, Socket} ->
 			    HSData = connect_hs_data(Kernel, Node, MyNode, Socket, 
 						     Timer, Version, Ip, TcpPort, Address,
 						     Type),
 			    dist_util:handshake_we_started(HSData);
-			_ ->
+			Other ->
 			    %% Other Node may have closed since 
 			    %% port_please !
 			    ?trace("other node (~p) "
 				   "closed since port_please.~n", 
 				   [Node]),
-			    ?shutdown(Node)
+			    ?shutdown2(Node, {shutdown, {connect_failed, Other}})
 		    end;
-		_ ->
+		Other ->
 		    ?trace("port_please (~p) "
 			   "failed.~n", [Node]),
-		    ?shutdown(Node)
+		    ?shutdown2(Node, {shutdown, {port_please_failed, Other}})
 	    end;
-	_Other ->
+	Other ->
 	    ?trace("inet_getaddr(~p) "
 		   "failed (~p).~n", [Node,Other]),
-	    ?shutdown(Node)
+	    ?shutdown2(Node, {shutdown, {inet_getaddr_failed, Other}})
     end.
 
 close(Socket) ->
-    try
-	erlang:error(foo)
-    catch _:_ ->
-	    io:format("close called ~p ~p~n",[Socket, erlang:get_stacktrace()])
-    end,
     gen_tcp:close(Socket),
     ok.
 
-do_accept(Kernel, AcceptPid, Socket, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) ->
+do_accept(Driver, Kernel, AcceptPid, Socket, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) ->
     process_flag(priority, max),
     receive
 	{AcceptPid, controller} ->
 	    Timer = dist_util:start_timer(SetupTime),
-	    case check_ip(Socket) of
+	    case check_ip(Driver, Socket) of
 		true ->
 		    HSData = accept_hs_data(Kernel, MyNode, Socket, Timer, Allowed),
 		    dist_util:handshake_other_started(HSData);
@@ -122,12 +141,12 @@ do_accept(Kernel, AcceptPid, Socket, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) ->
 %% Do only accept new connection attempts from nodes at our
 %% own LAN, if the check_ip environment parameter is true.
 %% ------------------------------------------------------------
-check_ip(Socket) ->
+check_ip(Driver, Socket) ->
     case application:get_env(check_ip) of
 	{ok, true} ->
 	    case get_ifs(Socket) of
 		{ok, IFs, IP} ->
-		    check_ip(IFs, IP);
+		    check_ip(Driver, IFs, IP);
 		_ ->
 		    ?shutdown(no_node)
 	    end;
@@ -146,37 +165,21 @@ get_ifs(Socket) ->
 	    Error
     end.
 
-check_ip([{OwnIP, _, Netmask}|IFs], PeerIP) ->
-    case {mask(Netmask, PeerIP), mask(Netmask, OwnIP)} of
+check_ip(Driver, [{OwnIP, _, Netmask}|IFs], PeerIP) ->
+    case {Driver:mask(Netmask, PeerIP), Driver:mask(Netmask, OwnIP)} of
 	{M, M} -> true;
 	_      -> check_ip(IFs, PeerIP)
     end;
-check_ip([], PeerIP) ->
+check_ip(_Driver, [], PeerIP) ->
     {false, PeerIP}.
 
-mask({M1,M2,M3,M4}, {IP1,IP2,IP3,IP4}) ->
-    {M1 band IP1,
-     M2 band IP2,
-     M3 band IP3,
-     M4 band IP4};
-
-mask({M1,M2,M3,M4, M5, M6, M7, M8}, {IP1,IP2,IP3,IP4, IP5, IP6, IP7, IP8}) ->
-    {M1 band IP1,
-     M2 band IP2,
-     M3 band IP3,
-     M4 band IP4,
-     M5 band IP5,
-     M6 band IP6,
-     M7 band IP7,
-     M8 band IP8}.
-
 
 %% If Node is illegal terminate the connection setup!!
-splitnode(Node, LongOrShortNames) ->
+splitnode(Driver, Node, LongOrShortNames) ->
     case split_node(atom_to_list(Node), $@, []) of
 	[Name|Tail] when Tail =/= [] ->
 	    Host = lists:append(Tail),
-	    check_node(Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames);
+	    check_node(Driver, Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames);
 	[_] ->
 	    error_logger:error_msg("** Nodename ~p illegal, no '@' character **~n",
 		      [Node]),
@@ -186,15 +189,20 @@ splitnode(Node, LongOrShortNames) ->
 	    ?shutdown(Node)
     end.
 
-check_node(Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames) ->
+check_node(Driver, Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames) ->
     case split_node(Host, $., []) of
 	[_] when LongOrShortNames == longnames ->
-	    error_logger:error_msg("** System running to use "
-		      "fully qualified "
-		      "hostnames **~n"
-		      "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n",
-		      [Host]),
-	    ?shutdown(Node);
+	    case Driver:parse_address(Host) of
+		{ok, _} ->
+		    [Name, Host];
+		_ ->
+		    error_logger:error_msg("** System running to use "
+					   "fully qualified "
+					   "hostnames **~n"
+					   "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n",
+					   [Host]),
+		    ?shutdown(Node)
+	    end;
 	[_, _ | _] when LongOrShortNames == shortnames ->
 	    error_logger:error_msg("** System NOT running to use fully qualified "
 			      "hostnames **~n"
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src
index 582a60635f..b26efbd88f 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src
@@ -3,44 +3,59 @@
     {vsn, "%VSN%"},
     {modules, [
 	       %% TLS/SSL 
-	       tls,
 	       tls_connection,
 	       tls_handshake,
 	       tls_record,
+	       tls_v1,
+	       ssl_v3,
+	       ssl_v2,
 	       %% DTLS
-	       dtls_record,
-	       dtls_handshake,
 	       dtls_connection,
-	       dtls,	
-	       %% Backwards compatibility
-               ssl,
+	       dtls_handshake,
+	       dtls_record,
+	       dtls_v1,
+	       %% API
+	       ssl,  %% Main API		  
+	       tls,  %% TLS specific
+	       dtls, %% DTLS specific 
+	       ssl_session_cache_api,
 	       %% Both TLS/SSL and DTLS
-	       ssl_app,
-	       ssl_sup,
+	       ssl_config,
+	       ssl_connection,
+	       ssl_handshake,
+	       ssl_record,
+	       ssl_cipher,
+	       ssl_srp_primes,
+	       ssl_alert,
+	       ssl_socket,
+	       ssl_listen_tracker_sup,	
+	       %% Erlang Distribution over SSL/TLS
 	       inet_tls_dist,
+	       inet6_tls_dist,
 	       ssl_tls_dist_proxy,
 	       ssl_dist_sup,
-	       ssl_tls1,
-	       ssl_ssl3,
-	       ssl_ssl2,
+	       %% SSL/TLS session handling
 	       ssl_session,
-	       ssl_session_cache_api,
 	       ssl_session_cache,
-	       ssl_socket,	
-	       %%ssl_record,
 	       ssl_manager,
-	       %%ssl_handshake,
-	       ssl_connection_sup,
-	       %%ssl_connection,
-	       ssl_cipher,
-	       ssl_srp_primes,
 	       ssl_pkix_db,
 	       ssl_certificate,
-	       ssl_alert
+	       %% CRL handling
+	       ssl_crl,
+	       ssl_crl_cache, 
+	       ssl_crl_cache_api,
+	       ssl_crl_hash_dir,
+	       %% App structure
+	       ssl_app,
+	       ssl_sup,
+	       tls_connection_sup,
+	       dtls_connection_sup	
 	       ]},
     {registered, [ssl_sup, ssl_manager]},
     {applications, [crypto, public_key, kernel, stdlib]},
     {env, []},
-    {mod, {ssl_app, []}}]}.
+    {mod, {ssl_app, []}},
+    {runtime_dependencies, ["stdlib-3.0","public_key-1.2","kernel-3.0",
+			    "erts-7.0","crypto-3.3", "inets-5.10.7"]}]}.
 
 
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src
index 9e5bec26f1..11728128c4 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src
@@ -1,17 +1,18 @@
 %% -*- erlang -*-
 {"%VSN%",
  [
-  {<<"5.2\\*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
-  {<<"5.1\\*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
-  {<<"5.0\\*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
-  {<<"4\\.*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
-  {<<"3\\.*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}
+  {<<"7\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
+  {<<"6\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
+  {<<"5\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
+  {<<"4\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
+  {<<"3\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}
  ], 
  [
-  {<<"5.2\\*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
-  {<<"5.1\\*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
-  {<<"5.0\\*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
-  {<<"4\\.*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
-  {<<"3\\.*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}
- ]}.
+  {<<"7\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
+  {<<"6\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
+  {<<"5\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
+  {<<"4\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
+  {<<"3\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}
+ ]
+}.
 
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
index 0c1e47311d..d2aeb3258f 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
@@ -1,149 +1,374 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
 
 %%
 
-%%% Purpose : Backwards compatibility
+%%% Purpose : Main API module for SSL see also tls.erl and dtls.erl
 
 -module(ssl).
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
+
+%% Application handling
+-export([start/0, start/1, stop/0, clear_pem_cache/0]).
+
+%% Socket handling
+-export([connect/3, connect/2, connect/4,
+	 listen/2, transport_accept/1, transport_accept/2,
+	 ssl_accept/1, ssl_accept/2, ssl_accept/3,
+	 controlling_process/2, peername/1, peercert/1, sockname/1,
+	 close/1, close/2, shutdown/2, recv/2, recv/3, send/2,
+	 getopts/2, setopts/2, getstat/1, getstat/2
+	]).
+%% SSL/TLS protocol handling
+-export([cipher_suites/0, cipher_suites/1,
+	 connection_info/1, versions/0, session_info/1, format_error/1,
+     renegotiate/1, prf/5, negotiated_protocol/1, negotiated_next_protocol/1,
+	 connection_information/1, connection_information/2]).
+%% Misc
+-export([handle_options/2]).
 
--export([start/0, start/1, stop/0, transport_accept/1,
-	 transport_accept/2, ssl_accept/1, ssl_accept/2, ssl_accept/3,
-	 cipher_suites/0, cipher_suites/1, suite_definition/1,
-	 close/1, shutdown/2,
-	 connect/3, connect/2, connect/4, connection_info/1,
-	 controlling_process/2, listen/2, peername/1, peercert/1,
-	 recv/2, recv/3, send/2, getopts/2, setopts/2, sockname/1,
-	 versions/0, session_info/1, format_error/1,
-	 renegotiate/1, prf/5, clear_pem_cache/0, random_bytes/1, negotiated_next_protocol/1]).
+-deprecated({negotiated_next_protocol, 1, next_major_release}).
+-deprecated({connection_info, 1, next_major_release}).
 
+-include("ssl_api.hrl").
 -include("ssl_internal.hrl").
 -include("ssl_record.hrl").
 -include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
 -include("ssl_handshake.hrl").
+-include("ssl_srp.hrl").
 
 -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). 
 
-%% Visible in API
--export_type([connect_option/0, listen_option/0, ssl_option/0, transport_option/0,
-	      erl_cipher_suite/0, %% From ssl_cipher.hrl 
-	      tls_atom_version/0, %% From ssl_internal.hrl
-	      prf_random/0, sslsocket/0]).
-
--type sslsocket()                :: #sslsocket{}.
--type connect_option()           :: socket_connect_option() | ssl_option() | transport_option().
--type socket_connect_option()    :: gen_tcp:connect_option().
--type listen_option()            :: socket_listen_option() | ssl_option() | transport_option().
--type socket_listen_option()     :: gen_tcp:listen_option().
-
--type ssl_option()    :: {verify, verify_type()} |
-			{verify_fun, {fun(), InitialUserState::term()}} |
-                        {fail_if_no_peer_cert, boolean()} | {depth, integer()} |
-                        {cert, Der::binary()} | {certfile, path()} | {key, Der::binary()} |
-                        {keyfile, path()} | {password, string()} | {cacerts, [Der::binary()]} |
-                        {cacertfile, path()} | {dh, Der::binary()} | {dhfile, path()} |
-                        {user_lookup_fun, {fun(), InitialUserState::term()}} |
-                        {psk_identity, string()} |
-                        {srp_identity, {string(), string()}} |
-                        {ciphers, ciphers()} | {ssl_imp, ssl_imp()} | {reuse_sessions, boolean()} |
-                        {reuse_session, fun()} | {hibernate_after, integer()|undefined} |
-                        {next_protocols_advertised, list(binary())} |
-                        {client_preferred_next_protocols, binary(), client | server, list(binary())}.
-
--type verify_type()  :: verify_none | verify_peer.
--type path()         :: string().
--type ciphers()      :: [erl_cipher_suite()] |
-			string(). % (according to old API)
--type ssl_imp()      :: new | old.
-
--type transport_option() :: {cb_info, {CallbackModule::atom(), DataTag::atom(), 
-				       ClosedTag::atom(), ErrTag::atom()}}.
--type prf_random() :: client_random | server_random.
-
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec start() -> ok  | {error, reason()}.
 -spec start(permanent | transient | temporary) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
 %%
-%% Description: Utility function that starts the ssl, 
-%% crypto and public_key applications. Default type
-%% is temporary. see application(3)
+%% Description: Utility function that starts the ssl and applications
+%% that it depends on.
+%% see application(3)
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 start() ->
-   tls:start().
+    start(temporary).
 start(Type) ->
-    tls:start(Type).
-
+    case application:ensure_all_started(ssl, Type) of
+	{ok, _} ->
+	    ok;
+	Other ->
+	    Other
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec stop() -> ok.
+%%
+%% Description: Stops the ssl application.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 stop() ->
-   tls:stop().
+    application:stop(ssl).
 
-connect(Socket, SslOptions) ->
-    tls:connect(Socket, SslOptions).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()]) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} |
+					      {error, reason()}.
+-spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()] | inet:port_number(),
+	      timeout() | list()) ->
+		     {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+-spec connect(host() | port(), inet:port_number(), list(), timeout()) ->
+		     {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
 
-connect(Socket, SslOptions0, TimeoutOrOpts) ->
-    tls:connect(Socket, SslOptions0, TimeoutOrOpts).
+%%
+%% Description: Connect to an ssl server.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+connect(Socket, SslOptions) when is_port(Socket) ->
+    connect(Socket, SslOptions, infinity).
 
-connect(Host, Port, Options, Timeout) ->
-    tls:connect(Host, Port, Options, Timeout).
+connect(Socket, SslOptions0, Timeout) when is_port(Socket),
+					    (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) ->
+    {Transport,_,_,_} = proplists:get_value(cb_info, SslOptions0,
+					      {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}),
+    EmulatedOptions = ssl_socket:emulated_options(),
+    {ok, SocketValues} = ssl_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, EmulatedOptions),
+    try handle_options(SslOptions0 ++ SocketValues, client) of
+	{ok, #config{transport_info = CbInfo, ssl = SslOptions, emulated = EmOpts,
+		     connection_cb = ConnectionCb}} ->
 
-listen(Port, Options) ->
-    tls:listen(Port, Options).
+	    ok = ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, ssl_socket:internal_inet_values()),
+	    case ssl_socket:peername(Transport, Socket) of
+		{ok, {Address, Port}} ->
+		    ssl_connection:connect(ConnectionCb, Address, Port, Socket,
+					   {SslOptions, emulated_socket_options(EmOpts, #socket_options{}), undefined},
+					   self(), CbInfo, Timeout);
+		{error, Error} ->
+		    {error, Error}
+	    end
+    catch
+	_:{error, Reason} ->
+            {error, Reason}
+    end;
 
+connect(Host, Port, Options) ->
+    connect(Host, Port, Options, infinity).
+
+connect(Host, Port, Options, Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) ->
+    try handle_options(Options, client) of
+	{ok, Config} ->
+	    do_connect(Host,Port,Config,Timeout)
+    catch
+	throw:Error ->
+	    Error
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec listen(inet:port_number(), [listen_option()]) ->{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+
+%%
+%% Description: Creates an ssl listen socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+listen(_Port, []) ->
+    {error, nooptions};
+listen(Port, Options0) ->
+    try
+	{ok, Config} = handle_options(Options0, server),
+	ConnectionCb = connection_cb(Options0),
+	#config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}, inet_user = Options, connection_cb = ConnectionCb,
+		ssl = SslOpts, emulated = EmOpts} = Config,
+	case Transport:listen(Port, Options) of
+	    {ok, ListenSocket} ->
+		ok = ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, ListenSocket, ssl_socket:internal_inet_values()),
+		{ok, Tracker} = ssl_socket:inherit_tracker(ListenSocket, EmOpts, SslOpts),
+		{ok, #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, Config#config{emulated = Tracker}}}};
+	    Err = {error, _} ->
+		Err
+	end
+    catch
+	Error = {error, _} ->
+	    Error
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec transport_accept(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} |
+					{error, reason()}.
+-spec transport_accept(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} |
+						   {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Performs transport accept on an ssl listen socket
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 transport_accept(ListenSocket) ->
-    tls:transport_accept(ListenSocket).
+    transport_accept(ListenSocket, infinity).
+
+transport_accept(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket,
+				   #config{transport_info =  {Transport,_,_, _} =CbInfo,
+					   connection_cb = ConnectionCb,
+					   ssl = SslOpts,
+					   emulated = Tracker}}}, Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) ->
+    case Transport:accept(ListenSocket, Timeout) of
+	{ok, Socket} ->
+	    {ok, EmOpts} = ssl_socket:get_emulated_opts(Tracker),
+	    {ok, Port} = ssl_socket:port(Transport, Socket),
+	    ConnArgs = [server, "localhost", Port, Socket,
+			{SslOpts, emulated_socket_options(EmOpts, #socket_options{}), Tracker}, self(), CbInfo],
+	    ConnectionSup = connection_sup(ConnectionCb),
+	    case ConnectionSup:start_child(ConnArgs) of
+		{ok, Pid} ->
+		    ssl_connection:socket_control(ConnectionCb, Socket, Pid, Transport, Tracker);
+		{error, Reason} ->
+		    {error, Reason}
+	    end;
+	{error, Reason} ->
+	    {error, Reason}
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec ssl_accept(#sslsocket{}) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
+-spec ssl_accept(#sslsocket{} | port(), timeout()| [ssl_option()
+						    | transport_option()]) ->
+			ok | {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
 
-transport_accept(ListenSocket, Timeout) ->
-    tls:transport_accept(ListenSocket, Timeout).
-   
+-spec ssl_accept(#sslsocket{} | port(), [ssl_option()] | [ssl_option()| transport_option()], timeout()) ->
+			{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Performs accept on an ssl listen socket. e.i. performs
+%%              ssl handshake.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 ssl_accept(ListenSocket) ->
-    tls:ssl_accept(ListenSocket, infinity).
+    ssl_accept(ListenSocket, infinity).
 
-ssl_accept(#sslsocket{} = Socket, Timeout) ->
-    tls:ssl_accept(Socket, Timeout);
-    
-ssl_accept(ListenSocket, SslOptions)  when is_port(ListenSocket) -> 
-    tls:ssl_accept(ListenSocket, SslOptions, infinity).
+ssl_accept(#sslsocket{} = Socket, Timeout) when  (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) ->
+    ssl_connection:handshake(Socket, Timeout);
+
+ssl_accept(ListenSocket, SslOptions)  when is_port(ListenSocket) ->
+    ssl_accept(ListenSocket, SslOptions, infinity).
+
+ssl_accept(#sslsocket{} = Socket, [], Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity)->
+    ssl_accept(#sslsocket{} = Socket, Timeout);
+ssl_accept(#sslsocket{fd = {_, _, _, Tracker}} = Socket, SslOpts0, Timeout) when
+      (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity)->
+    try
+	{ok, EmOpts, InheritedSslOpts} = ssl_socket:get_all_opts(Tracker),
+	SslOpts = handle_options(SslOpts0, InheritedSslOpts),
+	ssl_connection:handshake(Socket, {SslOpts, emulated_socket_options(EmOpts, #socket_options{})}, Timeout)
+    catch
+	Error = {error, _Reason} -> Error
+    end;
+ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket),
+					     (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) ->
+    {Transport,_,_,_} =
+	proplists:get_value(cb_info, SslOptions, {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}),
+    EmulatedOptions = ssl_socket:emulated_options(),
+    {ok, SocketValues} = ssl_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, EmulatedOptions),
+    ConnetionCb = connection_cb(SslOptions),
+    try handle_options(SslOptions ++ SocketValues, server) of
+	{ok, #config{transport_info = CbInfo, ssl = SslOpts, emulated = EmOpts}} ->
+	    ok = ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, ssl_socket:internal_inet_values()),
+	    {ok, Port} = ssl_socket:port(Transport, Socket),
+	    ssl_connection:ssl_accept(ConnetionCb, Port, Socket,
+				      {SslOpts, emulated_socket_options(EmOpts, #socket_options{}), undefined},
+				      self(), CbInfo, Timeout)
+    catch
+	Error = {error, _Reason} -> Error
+    end.
 
-ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket) -> 
-    tls:ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec  close(#sslsocket{}) -> term().
+%%
+%% Description: Close an ssl connection
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+close(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) ->
+    ssl_connection:close(Pid, {close, ?DEFAULT_TIMEOUT});
+close(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info={Transport,_, _, _}}}}) ->
+    Transport:close(ListenSocket).
 
-close(Socket) ->
-    tls:close(Socket).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec  close(#sslsocket{}, timeout() | {pid(), integer()}) -> term().
+%%
+%% Description: Close an ssl connection
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+close(#sslsocket{pid = TLSPid},
+      {Pid, Timeout} = DownGrade) when is_pid(TLSPid),
+				       is_pid(Pid),
+				       (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) ->
+    ssl_connection:close(TLSPid, {close, DownGrade});
+close(#sslsocket{pid = TLSPid}, Timeout) when is_pid(TLSPid),
+					      (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) ->
+    ssl_connection:close(TLSPid, {close, Timeout});
+close(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info={Transport,_, _, _}}}}, _) ->
+    Transport:close(ListenSocket).
 
-send(Socket, Data)  ->
-    tls:send(Socket, Data).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec send(#sslsocket{}, iodata()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Sends data over the ssl connection
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+send(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Data) when is_pid(Pid) ->
+    ssl_connection:send(Pid, Data);
+send(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info={Transport, _, _, _}}}}, Data) ->
+    Transport:send(ListenSocket, Data). %% {error,enotconn}
 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec recv(#sslsocket{}, integer()) -> {ok, binary()| list()} | {error, reason()}.
+-spec recv(#sslsocket{}, integer(), timeout()) -> {ok, binary()| list()} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Receives data when active = false
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 recv(Socket, Length) ->
-    tls:recv(Socket, Length, infinity).
-recv(Socket, Length, Timeout) ->
-    tls:recv(Socket, Length, Timeout).
+    recv(Socket, Length, infinity).
+recv(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Length, Timeout) when is_pid(Pid),
+						  (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity)->
+    ssl_connection:recv(Pid, Length, Timeout);
+recv(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,
+		       #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}}}}, _,_) when is_port(Listen)->
+    Transport:recv(Listen, 0). %% {error,enotconn}
 
-controlling_process(Socket, NewOwner) ->
-    tls:controlling_process(Socket, NewOwner).
-    
-connection_info(Socket) ->
-    tls:connection_info(Socket).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec controlling_process(#sslsocket{}, pid()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Changes process that receives the messages when active = true
+%% or once.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+controlling_process(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, NewOwner) when is_pid(Pid), is_pid(NewOwner) ->
+    ssl_connection:new_user(Pid, NewOwner);
+controlling_process(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,
+				      #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}}}},
+		    NewOwner) when is_port(Listen),
+				   is_pid(NewOwner) ->
+    Transport:controlling_process(Listen, NewOwner).
 
-peername(Socket) ->
-    tls:peername(Socket).
 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec connection_information(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Return SSL information for the connection
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+connection_information(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) -> 
+    case ssl_connection:connection_information(Pid) of
+	{ok, Info} ->
+	    {ok, [Item || Item = {_Key, Value} <- Info,  Value =/= undefined]};
+	Error ->
+            Error
+    end;
+connection_information(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, _}}) when is_port(Listen) -> 
+    {error, enotconn}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec connection_information(#sslsocket{}, [atom()]) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Return SSL information for the connection
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+connection_information(#sslsocket{} = SSLSocket, Items) -> 
+    case connection_information(SSLSocket) of
+        {ok, Info} ->
+            {ok, [Item || Item = {Key, Value} <- Info,  lists:member(Key, Items),
+			  Value =/= undefined]};
+	Error ->
+            Error
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Deprecated
+-spec connection_info(#sslsocket{}) -> 	{ok, {tls_record:tls_atom_version(), ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()}} |
+					{error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Returns ssl protocol and cipher used for the connection
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+connection_info(#sslsocket{} = SSLSocket) ->
+    case connection_information(SSLSocket) of
+        {ok, Result} ->
+            {ok, {proplists:get_value(protocol, Result), proplists:get_value(cipher_suite, Result)}};
+        Error ->
+            Error
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec peername(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, {inet:ip_address(), inet:port_number()}} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: same as inet:peername/1.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+peername(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {Transport, Socket, _, _}}) when is_pid(Pid)->
+    ssl_socket:peername(Transport, Socket);
+peername(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket,  #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}}}}) ->
+    ssl_socket:peername(Transport, ListenSocket). %% Will return {error, enotconn}
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec peercert(#sslsocket{}) ->{ok, DerCert::binary()} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the peercert.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 peercert(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) ->
-    case tls_connection:peer_certificate(Pid) of
+    case ssl_connection:peer_certificate(Pid) of
 	{ok, undefined} ->
 	    {error, no_peercert};
         Result ->
@@ -152,71 +377,1023 @@ peercert(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) ->
 peercert(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, _}}) when is_port(Listen) ->
     {error, enotconn}.
 
-suite_definition(S) ->
-    {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, _} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(S),
-    {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}.
-
-negotiated_next_protocol(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) ->
-    tls_connection:negotiated_next_protocol(Pid).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec negotiated_protocol(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the protocol that has been negotiated. If no
+%% protocol has been negotiated will return {error, protocol_not_negotiated}
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+negotiated_protocol(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) ->
+    ssl_connection:negotiated_protocol(Pid).
 
-%%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec cipher_suites() -> [erl_cipher_suite()].
--spec cipher_suites(erlang | openssl | all ) -> [erl_cipher_suite()] | [string()].
-			   
-%% Description: Returns all supported cipher suites.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec negotiated_next_protocol(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the next protocol that has been negotiated. If no
+%% protocol has been negotiated will return {error, next_protocol_not_negotiated}
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+negotiated_next_protocol(Socket) ->
+    case negotiated_protocol(Socket) of
+        {error, protocol_not_negotiated} ->
+            {error, next_protocol_not_negotiated};
+        Res ->
+            Res
+    end.
 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec cipher_suites() -> [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] | [string()].
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 cipher_suites() ->
     cipher_suites(erlang).
-  
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec cipher_suites(erlang | openssl | all) -> [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] |
+					       [string()].
+%% Description: Returns all supported cipher suites.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 cipher_suites(erlang) ->
-    Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]),
-    [suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:suites(Version)];
+    [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(default)];
 
 cipher_suites(openssl) ->
-    Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]),
-    [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite_name(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:suites(Version)];
+    [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite_name(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(default)];
 
 cipher_suites(all) ->
-    Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]),
-    Supported = ssl_cipher:suites(Version)
-	++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites()
-	++ ssl_cipher:psk_suites(Version)
-	++ ssl_cipher:srp_suites(),
-    [suite_definition(S) || S <- Supported].
+    [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(all)].
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec getopts(#sslsocket{}, [gen_tcp:option_name()]) ->
+		     {ok, [gen_tcp:option()]} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Gets options
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+getopts(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, OptionTags) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(OptionTags) ->
+    ssl_connection:get_opts(Pid, OptionTags);
+getopts(#sslsocket{pid = {_,  #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}}}} = ListenSocket,
+	OptionTags) when is_list(OptionTags) ->
+    try ssl_socket:getopts(Transport, ListenSocket, OptionTags) of
+	{ok, _} = Result ->
+	    Result;
+	{error, InetError} ->
+	    {error, {options, {socket_options, OptionTags, InetError}}}
+    catch
+	_:Error ->
+	    {error, {options, {socket_options, OptionTags, Error}}}
+    end;
+getopts(#sslsocket{}, OptionTags) ->
+    {error, {options, {socket_options, OptionTags}}}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec setopts(#sslsocket{},  [gen_tcp:option()]) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Sets options
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+setopts(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Options0) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(Options0)  ->
+    try proplists:expand([{binary, [{mode, binary}]},
+			  {list, [{mode, list}]}], Options0) of
+	Options ->
+	    ssl_connection:set_opts(Pid, Options)
+    catch
+	_:_ ->
+	    {error, {options, {not_a_proplist, Options0}}}
+    end;
 
-getopts(Socket, OptionTags) ->
-    tls:getopts(Socket, OptionTags).
+setopts(#sslsocket{pid = {_, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}}}} = ListenSocket, Options) when is_list(Options) ->
+    try ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, ListenSocket, Options) of
+	ok ->
+	    ok;
+	{error, InetError} ->
+	    {error, {options, {socket_options, Options, InetError}}}
+    catch
+	_:Error ->
+	    {error, {options, {socket_options, Options, Error}}}
+    end;
+setopts(#sslsocket{}, Options) ->
+    {error, {options,{not_a_proplist, Options}}}.
 
-setopts(Socket, Options) ->
-    tls:setopts(Socket, Options).
+%%---------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec getstat(Socket) ->
+	{ok, OptionValues} | {error, inet:posix()} when
+      Socket :: #sslsocket{},
+      OptionValues :: [{inet:stat_option(), integer()}].
+%%
+%% Description: Get all statistic options for a socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+getstat(Socket) ->
+	getstat(Socket, inet:stats()).
 
-shutdown(Socket, How) ->
-    tls:shutdown(Socket, How).
+%%---------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec getstat(Socket, Options) ->
+	{ok, OptionValues} | {error, inet:posix()} when
+      Socket :: #sslsocket{},
+      Options :: [inet:stat_option()],
+      OptionValues :: [{inet:stat_option(), integer()}].
+%%
+%% Description: Get one or more statistic options for a socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+getstat(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,  #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}}}}, Options) when is_port(Listen), is_list(Options) ->
+    ssl_socket:getstat(Transport, Listen, Options);
 
-sockname(Socket)  ->
-    tls:sockname(Socket).
+getstat(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {Transport, Socket, _, _}}, Options) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(Options) ->
+    ssl_socket:getstat(Transport, Socket, Options).
 
+%%---------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec shutdown(#sslsocket{}, read | write | read_write) ->  ok | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Same as gen_tcp:shutdown/2
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+shutdown(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_, _, _}}}},
+	 How) when is_port(Listen) ->
+    Transport:shutdown(Listen, How);
+shutdown(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, How) ->
+    ssl_connection:shutdown(Pid, How).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec sockname(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, {inet:ip_address(), inet:port_number()}} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Same as inet:sockname/1
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+sockname(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,  #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}}}}) when is_port(Listen) ->
+    ssl_socket:sockname(Transport, Listen);
+
+sockname(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {Transport, Socket, _, _}}) when is_pid(Pid) ->
+    ssl_socket:sockname(Transport, Socket).
+
+%%---------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec session_info(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Returns list of session info currently [{session_id, session_id(),
+%% {cipher_suite, cipher_suite()}]
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 session_info(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) ->
-    tls_connection:session_info(Pid);
+    ssl_connection:session_info(Pid);
 session_info(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,_}}) when is_port(Listen) ->
     {error, enotconn}.
 
+%%---------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec versions() -> [{ssl_app, string()} | {supported, [tls_record:tls_atom_version()]} |
+		     {available, [tls_record:tls_atom_version()]}].
+%%
+%% Description: Returns a list of relevant versions.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 versions() ->
-   tls:versions().
+    Vsns = tls_record:supported_protocol_versions(),
+    SupportedVsns = [tls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Vsns],
+    AvailableVsns = ?ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS,
+    %% TODO Add DTLS versions when supported
+    [{ssl_app, ?VSN}, {supported, SupportedVsns}, {available, AvailableVsns}].
+
 
-renegotiate(Socket) ->
-    tls:renegotiate(Socket).
+%%---------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec renegotiate(#sslsocket{}) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Initiates a renegotiation.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+renegotiate(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) ->
+    ssl_connection:renegotiation(Pid);
+renegotiate(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,_}}) when is_port(Listen) ->
+    {error, enotconn}.
 
-prf(Socket, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
-    tls:prf(Socket, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec prf(#sslsocket{}, binary() | 'master_secret', binary(),
+	  binary() | prf_random(), non_neg_integer()) ->
+		 {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: use a ssl sessions TLS PRF to generate key material
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+prf(#sslsocket{pid = Pid},
+    Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) when is_pid(Pid) ->
+    ssl_connection:prf(Pid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength);
+prf(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,_}}, _,_,_,_) when is_port(Listen) ->
+    {error, enotconn}.
 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec clear_pem_cache() -> ok.
+%%
+%% Description: Clear the PEM cache
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 clear_pem_cache() ->
-    tls:clear_pem_cache().
+    ssl_manager:clear_pem_cache().
+
+%%---------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec format_error({error, term()}) -> list().
+%%
+%% Description: Creates error string.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+format_error({error, Reason}) ->
+    format_error(Reason);
+format_error(Reason) when is_list(Reason) ->
+    Reason;
+format_error(closed) ->
+    "TLS connection is closed";
+format_error({tls_alert, Description}) ->
+    "TLS Alert: " ++ Description;
+format_error({options,{FileType, File, Reason}}) when FileType == cacertfile;
+						      FileType == certfile;
+						      FileType == keyfile;
+						      FileType == dhfile ->
+    Error = file_error_format(Reason),
+    file_desc(FileType) ++ File ++ ": " ++ Error;
+format_error({options, {socket_options, Option, Error}}) ->
+    lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Invalid transport socket option ~p: ~s", [Option, format_error(Error)]));
+format_error({options, {socket_options, Option}}) ->
+    lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Invalid socket option: ~p", [Option]));
+format_error({options, Options}) ->
+    lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Invalid TLS option: ~p", [Options]));
+
+format_error(Error) ->
+    case inet:format_error(Error) of
+        "unknown POSIX" ++ _ ->
+            unexpected_format(Error);
+        Other ->
+            Other
+    end.
+
+%%%--------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+%% Possible filters out suites not supported by crypto 
+available_suites(default) ->  
+    Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]),			  
+    ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:suites(Version));
+
+available_suites(all) ->  
+    Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]),			  
+    ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:all_suites(Version)).
+
+do_connect(Address, Port,
+	   #config{transport_info = CbInfo, inet_user = UserOpts, ssl = SslOpts,
+		   emulated = EmOpts, inet_ssl = SocketOpts, connection_cb = ConnetionCb},
+	   Timeout) ->
+    {Transport, _, _, _} = CbInfo,
+    try Transport:connect(Address, Port,  SocketOpts, Timeout) of
+	{ok, Socket} ->
+	    ssl_connection:connect(ConnetionCb, Address, Port, Socket, 
+				   {SslOpts, emulated_socket_options(EmOpts, #socket_options{}), undefined},
+				   self(), CbInfo, Timeout);
+	{error, Reason} ->
+	    {error, Reason}
+    catch
+	exit:{function_clause, _} ->
+	    {error, {options, {cb_info, CbInfo}}};
+	exit:badarg ->
+	    {error, {options, {socket_options, UserOpts}}};
+	exit:{badarg, _} ->
+	    {error, {options, {socket_options, UserOpts}}}
+    end.
+
+%% Handle extra ssl options given to ssl_accept
+handle_options(Opts0, #ssl_options{protocol = Protocol, cacerts = CaCerts0,
+				   cacertfile = CaCertFile0} = InheritedSslOpts) ->
+    RecordCB = record_cb(Protocol),
+    CaCerts = handle_option(cacerts, Opts0, CaCerts0),
+    {Verify, FailIfNoPeerCert, CaCertDefault, VerifyFun, PartialChainHanlder,
+     VerifyClientOnce} = handle_verify_options(Opts0, CaCerts),
+    CaCertFile = case proplists:get_value(cacertfile, Opts0, CaCertFile0) of
+		     undefined ->
+			 CaCertDefault;
+		     CAFile ->
+			 CAFile
+		 end,
+
+    NewVerifyOpts = InheritedSslOpts#ssl_options{cacerts = CaCerts,
+						 cacertfile = CaCertFile,
+						 verify = Verify,
+						 verify_fun = VerifyFun,
+						 partial_chain = PartialChainHanlder,
+						 fail_if_no_peer_cert = FailIfNoPeerCert,
+						 verify_client_once = VerifyClientOnce},
+    SslOpts1 = lists:foldl(fun(Key, PropList) ->
+				   proplists:delete(Key, PropList)
+			   end, Opts0, [cacerts, cacertfile, verify, verify_fun, partial_chain,
+					fail_if_no_peer_cert, verify_client_once]),
+    case handle_option(versions, SslOpts1, []) of
+	[] ->
+	    new_ssl_options(SslOpts1, NewVerifyOpts, RecordCB);
+	Value ->
+	    Versions = [RecordCB:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Value],
+	    new_ssl_options(proplists:delete(versions, SslOpts1), 
+			    NewVerifyOpts#ssl_options{versions = Versions}, record_cb(Protocol))
+    end;
+
+%% Handle all options in listen and connect
+handle_options(Opts0, Role) ->
+    Opts = proplists:expand([{binary, [{mode, binary}]},
+			     {list, [{mode, list}]}], Opts0),
+    assert_proplist(Opts),
+    RecordCb = record_cb(Opts),
+
+    ReuseSessionFun = fun(_, _, _, _) -> true end,
+    CaCerts = handle_option(cacerts, Opts, undefined),
+
+    {Verify, FailIfNoPeerCert, CaCertDefault, VerifyFun, PartialChainHanlder, VerifyClientOnce} =
+	handle_verify_options(Opts, CaCerts),
+    
+    CertFile = handle_option(certfile, Opts, <<>>),
+    RecordCb = record_cb(Opts),
+    
+    Versions = case handle_option(versions, Opts, []) of
+		   [] ->
+		       RecordCb:supported_protocol_versions();
+		   Vsns  ->
+		       [RecordCb:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Vsns]
+	       end,
+
+    SSLOptions = #ssl_options{
+		    versions   = Versions,
+		    verify     = validate_option(verify, Verify),
+		    verify_fun = VerifyFun,
+		    partial_chain = PartialChainHanlder,
+		    fail_if_no_peer_cert = FailIfNoPeerCert,
+		    verify_client_once = VerifyClientOnce,
+		    depth      = handle_option(depth,  Opts, 1),
+		    cert       = handle_option(cert, Opts, undefined),
+		    certfile   = CertFile,
+		    key        = handle_option(key, Opts, undefined),
+		    keyfile    = handle_option(keyfile,  Opts, CertFile),
+		    password   = handle_option(password, Opts, ""),
+		    cacerts    = CaCerts,
+		    cacertfile = handle_option(cacertfile, Opts, CaCertDefault),
+		    dh         = handle_option(dh, Opts, undefined),
+		    dhfile     = handle_option(dhfile, Opts, undefined),
+		    user_lookup_fun = handle_option(user_lookup_fun, Opts, undefined),
+		    psk_identity = handle_option(psk_identity, Opts, undefined),
+		    srp_identity = handle_option(srp_identity, Opts, undefined),
+		    ciphers    = handle_cipher_option(proplists:get_value(ciphers, Opts, []), 
+						      RecordCb:highest_protocol_version(Versions)),
+		    signature_algs = handle_hashsigns_option(proplists:get_value(signature_algs, Opts, 
+									     default_option_role(server, 
+												 tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Versions), Role)),
+							 RecordCb:highest_protocol_version(Versions)), 
+		    %% Server side option
+		    reuse_session = handle_option(reuse_session, Opts, ReuseSessionFun),
+		    reuse_sessions = handle_option(reuse_sessions, Opts, true),
+		    secure_renegotiate = handle_option(secure_renegotiate, Opts, false),
+		    client_renegotiation = handle_option(client_renegotiation, Opts, 
+							 default_option_role(server, true, Role), 
+							 server, Role),
+		    renegotiate_at = handle_option(renegotiate_at, Opts, ?DEFAULT_RENEGOTIATE_AT),
+		    hibernate_after = handle_option(hibernate_after, Opts, infinity),
+		    erl_dist = handle_option(erl_dist, Opts, false),
+		    alpn_advertised_protocols =
+			handle_option(alpn_advertised_protocols, Opts, undefined),
+		    alpn_preferred_protocols =
+			handle_option(alpn_preferred_protocols, Opts, undefined),
+		    next_protocols_advertised =
+			handle_option(next_protocols_advertised, Opts, undefined),
+		    next_protocol_selector =
+			make_next_protocol_selector(
+			  handle_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, Opts, undefined)),
+		    log_alert = handle_option(log_alert, Opts, true),
+		    server_name_indication = handle_option(server_name_indication, Opts, undefined),
+		    sni_hosts = handle_option(sni_hosts, Opts, []),
+		    sni_fun = handle_option(sni_fun, Opts, undefined),
+		    honor_cipher_order = handle_option(honor_cipher_order, Opts, 
+						       default_option_role(server, false, Role), 
+						       server, Role),
+		    protocol = proplists:get_value(protocol, Opts, tls),
+		    padding_check =  proplists:get_value(padding_check, Opts, true),
+		    beast_mitigation = handle_option(beast_mitigation, Opts, one_n_minus_one),
+		    fallback = handle_option(fallback, Opts,
+					     proplists:get_value(fallback, Opts,    
+								 default_option_role(client, 
+										     false, Role)),
+					     client, Role),
+		    crl_check = handle_option(crl_check, Opts, false),
+		    crl_cache = handle_option(crl_cache, Opts, {ssl_crl_cache, {internal, []}}),
+		    v2_hello_compatible = handle_option(v2_hello_compatible, Opts, false)
+		   },
+
+    CbInfo  = proplists:get_value(cb_info, Opts, {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}),
+    SslOptions = [protocol, versions, verify, verify_fun, partial_chain,
+		  fail_if_no_peer_cert, verify_client_once,
+		  depth, cert, certfile, key, keyfile,
+		  password, cacerts, cacertfile, dh, dhfile,
+		  user_lookup_fun, psk_identity, srp_identity, ciphers,
+		  reuse_session, reuse_sessions, ssl_imp, client_renegotiation,
+		  cb_info, renegotiate_at, secure_renegotiate, hibernate_after,
+		  erl_dist, alpn_advertised_protocols, sni_hosts, sni_fun,
+		  alpn_preferred_protocols, next_protocols_advertised,
+		  client_preferred_next_protocols, log_alert,
+		  server_name_indication, honor_cipher_order, padding_check, crl_check, crl_cache,
+		  fallback, signature_algs, beast_mitigation, v2_hello_compatible],
+
+    SockOpts = lists:foldl(fun(Key, PropList) ->
+				   proplists:delete(Key, PropList)
+			   end, Opts, SslOptions),
+
+    {Sock, Emulated} = emulated_options(SockOpts),
+    ConnetionCb = connection_cb(Opts),
+
+    {ok, #config{ssl = SSLOptions, emulated = Emulated, inet_ssl = Sock,
+		 inet_user = SockOpts, transport_info = CbInfo, connection_cb = ConnetionCb
+		}}.
+
+
+
+handle_option(OptionName, Opts, Default, Role, Role) ->
+    handle_option(OptionName, Opts, Default);
+handle_option(_, _, undefined = Value, _, _) ->
+    Value.
+
+handle_option(sni_fun, Opts, Default) ->
+    OptFun = validate_option(sni_fun,
+                             proplists:get_value(sni_fun, Opts, Default)),
+    OptHosts = proplists:get_value(sni_hosts, Opts, undefined),
+    case {OptFun, OptHosts} of
+        {Default, _} ->
+            Default;
+        {_, undefined} ->
+            OptFun;
+        _ ->
+            throw({error, {conflict_options, [sni_fun, sni_hosts]}})
+    end;
+handle_option(OptionName, Opts, Default) ->
+    validate_option(OptionName,
+		    proplists:get_value(OptionName, Opts, Default)).
+
+validate_option(versions, Versions)  ->
+    validate_versions(Versions, Versions);
+validate_option(verify, Value)
+  when Value == verify_none; Value == verify_peer ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(verify_fun, undefined)  ->
+    undefined;
+%% Backwards compatibility
+validate_option(verify_fun, Fun) when is_function(Fun) ->
+    {fun(_,{bad_cert, _} = Reason, OldFun) ->
+	     case OldFun([Reason]) of
+		 true ->
+		     {valid, OldFun};
+		 false ->
+		     {fail, Reason}
+	     end;
+	(_,{extension, _}, UserState) ->
+	     {unknown, UserState};
+	(_, valid, UserState) ->
+	     {valid, UserState};
+	(_, valid_peer, UserState) ->
+	     {valid, UserState}
+     end, Fun};
+validate_option(verify_fun, {Fun, _} = Value) when is_function(Fun) ->
+   Value;
+validate_option(partial_chain, Value) when is_function(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(fail_if_no_peer_cert, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(verify_client_once, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(depth, Value) when is_integer(Value),
+                                   Value >= 0, Value =< 255->
+    Value;
+validate_option(cert, Value) when Value == undefined;
+                                 is_binary(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(certfile, undefined = Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(certfile, Value) when is_binary(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(certfile, Value) when is_list(Value) ->
+    binary_filename(Value);
+
+validate_option(key, undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+validate_option(key, {KeyType, Value}) when is_binary(Value),
+					    KeyType == rsa; %% Backwards compatibility
+					    KeyType == dsa; %% Backwards compatibility
+					    KeyType == 'RSAPrivateKey';
+					    KeyType == 'DSAPrivateKey';
+					    KeyType == 'ECPrivateKey';
+					    KeyType == 'PrivateKeyInfo' ->
+    {KeyType, Value};
+
+validate_option(keyfile, undefined) ->
+   <<>>;
+validate_option(keyfile, Value) when is_binary(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(keyfile, Value) when is_list(Value), Value =/= "" ->
+    binary_filename(Value);
+validate_option(password, Value) when is_list(Value) ->
+    Value;
+
+validate_option(cacerts, Value) when Value == undefined;
+				     is_list(Value) ->
+    Value;
+%% certfile must be present in some cases otherwhise it can be set
+%% to the empty string.
+validate_option(cacertfile, undefined) ->
+   <<>>;
+validate_option(cacertfile, Value) when is_binary(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(cacertfile, Value) when is_list(Value), Value =/= ""->
+    binary_filename(Value);
+validate_option(dh, Value) when Value == undefined;
+				is_binary(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(dhfile, undefined = Value)  ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(dhfile, Value) when is_binary(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(dhfile, Value) when is_list(Value), Value =/= "" ->
+    binary_filename(Value);
+validate_option(psk_identity, undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+validate_option(psk_identity, Identity)
+  when is_list(Identity), Identity =/= "", length(Identity) =< 65535 ->
+    binary_filename(Identity);
+validate_option(user_lookup_fun, undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+validate_option(user_lookup_fun, {Fun, _} = Value) when is_function(Fun, 3) ->
+   Value;
+validate_option(srp_identity, undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+validate_option(srp_identity, {Username, Password})
+  when is_list(Username), is_list(Password), Username =/= "", length(Username) =< 255 ->
+    {unicode:characters_to_binary(Username),
+     unicode:characters_to_binary(Password)};
+
+validate_option(reuse_session, Value) when is_function(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(reuse_sessions, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
+    Value;
+
+validate_option(secure_renegotiate, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(client_renegotiation, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(renegotiate_at, Value) when is_integer(Value) ->
+    erlang:min(Value, ?DEFAULT_RENEGOTIATE_AT);
+
+validate_option(hibernate_after, undefined) -> %% Backwards compatibility
+    infinity;
+validate_option(hibernate_after, infinity) ->
+    infinity;
+validate_option(hibernate_after, Value) when is_integer(Value), Value >= 0 ->
+    Value;
+
+validate_option(erl_dist,Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(Opt, Value)
+  when Opt =:= alpn_advertised_protocols orelse Opt =:= alpn_preferred_protocols,
+       is_list(Value) ->
+    case tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]) of
+	{3,0} ->
+	    throw({error, {options, {not_supported_in_sslv3, {Opt, Value}}}});
+	_ ->
+	    validate_binary_list(Opt, Value),
+	    Value
+    end;
+validate_option(Opt, Value)
+  when Opt =:= alpn_advertised_protocols orelse Opt =:= alpn_preferred_protocols,
+       Value =:= undefined ->
+    undefined;
+validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols = Opt, {Precedence, PreferredProtocols} = Value)
+  when is_list(PreferredProtocols) ->
+    case tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]) of
+	{3,0} ->
+	    throw({error, {options, {not_supported_in_sslv3, {Opt, Value}}}});
+	_ ->
+	    validate_binary_list(client_preferred_next_protocols, PreferredProtocols),
+	    validate_npn_ordering(Precedence),
+	    {Precedence, PreferredProtocols, ?NO_PROTOCOL}
+    end;
+validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols = Opt, {Precedence, PreferredProtocols, Default} = Value)
+      when is_list(PreferredProtocols), is_binary(Default),
+           byte_size(Default) > 0, byte_size(Default) < 256 ->
+    case tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]) of
+	{3,0} ->
+	    throw({error, {options, {not_supported_in_sslv3, {Opt, Value}}}});
+	_ ->
+	    validate_binary_list(client_preferred_next_protocols, PreferredProtocols),
+	    validate_npn_ordering(Precedence),
+	    Value
+    end;
+
+validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+validate_option(log_alert, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(next_protocols_advertised = Opt, Value) when is_list(Value) ->
+    case tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]) of
+	{3,0} ->
+	    throw({error, {options, {not_supported_in_sslv3, {Opt, Value}}}});
+	_ ->
+	    validate_binary_list(next_protocols_advertised, Value),
+	    Value
+    end;
+
+validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+validate_option(server_name_indication, Value) when is_list(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(server_name_indication, disable) ->
+    disable;
+validate_option(server_name_indication, undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+validate_option(sni_hosts, []) ->
+    [];
+validate_option(sni_hosts, [{Hostname, SSLOptions} | Tail]) when is_list(Hostname) ->
+	RecursiveSNIOptions = proplists:get_value(sni_hosts, SSLOptions, undefined),
+	case RecursiveSNIOptions of
+		undefined ->
+			[{Hostname, validate_options(SSLOptions)} | validate_option(sni_hosts, Tail)];
+		_ ->
+			throw({error, {options, {sni_hosts, RecursiveSNIOptions}}})
+	end;
+validate_option(sni_fun, undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+validate_option(sni_fun, Fun) when is_function(Fun) ->
+    Fun;
+validate_option(honor_cipher_order, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(padding_check, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(fallback, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(crl_check, Value) when is_boolean(Value)  ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(crl_check, Value) when (Value == best_effort) or (Value == peer) -> 
+    Value;
+validate_option(crl_cache, {Cb, {_Handle, Options}} = Value) when is_atom(Cb) and is_list(Options) ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(beast_mitigation, Value) when Value == one_n_minus_one orelse
+                                              Value == zero_n orelse
+                                              Value == disabled ->
+  Value;
+validate_option(v2_hello_compatible, Value) when is_boolean(Value)  ->
+    Value;
+validate_option(Opt, Value) ->
+    throw({error, {options, {Opt, Value}}}).
+
+handle_hashsigns_option(Value, {Major, Minor} = Version) when is_list(Value) 
+							      andalso Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+    case tls_v1:signature_algs(Version, Value) of
+	[] ->
+	    throw({error, {options, no_supported_algorithms, {signature_algs, Value}}});
+	_ ->	
+	    Value
+    end;
+handle_hashsigns_option(_, {Major, Minor} = Version) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+    handle_hashsigns_option(tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version);
+handle_hashsigns_option(_, _Version) ->
+    undefined.
+
+validate_options([]) ->
+	[];
+validate_options([{Opt, Value} | Tail]) ->
+	[{Opt, validate_option(Opt, Value)} | validate_options(Tail)].
+
+validate_npn_ordering(client) ->
+    ok;
+validate_npn_ordering(server) ->
+    ok;
+validate_npn_ordering(Value) ->
+    throw({error, {options, {client_preferred_next_protocols, {invalid_precedence, Value}}}}).
+
+validate_binary_list(Opt, List) ->
+    lists:foreach(
+        fun(Bin) when is_binary(Bin),
+                      byte_size(Bin) > 0,
+                      byte_size(Bin) < 256 ->
+            ok;
+           (Bin) ->
+            throw({error, {options, {Opt, {invalid_protocol, Bin}}}})
+        end, List).
+
+validate_versions([], Versions) ->
+    Versions;
+validate_versions([Version | Rest], Versions) when Version == 'tlsv1.2';
+                                                   Version == 'tlsv1.1';
+                                                   Version == tlsv1;
+                                                   Version == sslv3 ->
+    validate_versions(Rest, Versions);
+validate_versions([Ver| _], Versions) ->
+    throw({error, {options, {Ver, {versions, Versions}}}}).
+
+validate_inet_option(mode, Value)
+  when Value =/= list, Value =/= binary ->
+    throw({error, {options, {mode,Value}}});
+validate_inet_option(packet, Value)
+  when not (is_atom(Value) orelse is_integer(Value)) ->
+    throw({error, {options, {packet,Value}}});
+validate_inet_option(packet_size, Value)
+  when not is_integer(Value) ->
+    throw({error, {options, {packet_size,Value}}});
+validate_inet_option(header, Value)
+  when not is_integer(Value) ->
+    throw({error, {options, {header,Value}}});
+validate_inet_option(active, Value)
+  when Value =/= true, Value =/= false, Value =/= once ->
+    throw({error, {options, {active,Value}}});
+validate_inet_option(_, _) ->
+    ok.
+
+%% The option cacerts overrides cacertsfile
+ca_cert_default(_,_, [_|_]) ->
+    undefined;
+ca_cert_default(verify_none, _, _) ->
+    undefined;
+ca_cert_default(verify_peer, {Fun,_}, _) when is_function(Fun) ->
+    undefined;
+%% Server that wants to verify_peer and has no verify_fun must have
+%% some trusted certs.
+ca_cert_default(verify_peer, undefined, _) ->
+    "".
+emulated_options(Opts) ->
+    emulated_options(Opts, ssl_socket:internal_inet_values(), ssl_socket:default_inet_values()).
+
+emulated_options([{mode, Value} = Opt |Opts], Inet, Emulated) ->
+    validate_inet_option(mode, Value),
+    emulated_options(Opts, Inet, [Opt | proplists:delete(mode, Emulated)]);
+emulated_options([{header, Value} = Opt | Opts], Inet, Emulated) ->
+    validate_inet_option(header, Value),
+    emulated_options(Opts, Inet,  [Opt | proplists:delete(header, Emulated)]);
+emulated_options([{active, Value} = Opt |Opts], Inet, Emulated) ->
+    validate_inet_option(active, Value),
+    emulated_options(Opts, Inet, [Opt | proplists:delete(active, Emulated)]);
+emulated_options([{packet, Value} = Opt |Opts], Inet, Emulated) ->
+    validate_inet_option(packet, Value),
+    emulated_options(Opts, Inet, [Opt | proplists:delete(packet, Emulated)]);
+emulated_options([{packet_size, Value} = Opt | Opts], Inet, Emulated) ->
+    validate_inet_option(packet_size, Value),
+    emulated_options(Opts, Inet, [Opt | proplists:delete(packet_size, Emulated)]);
+emulated_options([Opt|Opts], Inet, Emulated) ->
+    emulated_options(Opts, [Opt|Inet], Emulated);
+emulated_options([], Inet,Emulated) ->
+    {Inet, Emulated}.
+
+handle_cipher_option(Value, Version)  when is_list(Value) ->
+    try binary_cipher_suites(Version, Value) of
+	Suites ->
+	    Suites
+    catch
+	exit:_ ->
+	    throw({error, {options, {ciphers, Value}}});
+	error:_->
+	    throw({error, {options, {ciphers, Value}}})
+    end.
+
+binary_cipher_suites(Version, []) -> 
+    %% Defaults to all supported suites that does
+    %% not require explicit configuration
+    ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:suites(Version));
+binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Tuple|_] = Ciphers0) when is_tuple(Tuple) ->
+    Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0],
+    binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers);
+
+binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Cipher0 | _] = Ciphers0) when is_binary(Cipher0) ->
+    All = ssl_cipher:all_suites(Version),
+    case [Cipher || Cipher <- Ciphers0, lists:member(Cipher, All)] of
+	[] ->
+	    %% Defaults to all supported suites that does
+	    %% not require explicit configuration
+	    ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:suites(Version));
+	Ciphers ->
+	    Ciphers
+    end;
+binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Head | _] = Ciphers0) when is_list(Head) ->
+    %% Format: ["RC4-SHA","RC4-MD5"]
+    Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0],
+    binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers);
+binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers0)  ->
+    %% Format: "RC4-SHA:RC4-MD5"
+    Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite(C) || C <- string:tokens(Ciphers0, ":")],
+    binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers).
+
+unexpected_format(Error) ->
+    lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Unexpected error: ~p", [Error])).
+
+file_error_format({error, Error})->
+    case file:format_error(Error) of
+	"unknown POSIX error" ->
+	    "decoding error";
+	Str ->
+	    Str
+    end;
+file_error_format(_) ->
+    "decoding error".
+
+file_desc(cacertfile) ->
+    "Invalid CA certificate file ";
+file_desc(certfile) ->
+    "Invalid certificate file ";
+file_desc(keyfile) ->
+    "Invalid key file ";
+file_desc(dhfile) ->
+    "Invalid DH params file ".
+
+detect(_Pred, []) ->
+    undefined;
+detect(Pred, [H|T]) ->
+    case Pred(H) of
+        true ->
+            H;
+        _ ->
+            detect(Pred, T)
+    end.
+
+make_next_protocol_selector(undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+make_next_protocol_selector({client, AllProtocols, DefaultProtocol}) ->
+    fun(AdvertisedProtocols) ->
+        case detect(fun(PreferredProtocol) ->
+			    lists:member(PreferredProtocol, AdvertisedProtocols)
+		    end, AllProtocols) of
+            undefined ->
+		DefaultProtocol;
+            PreferredProtocol ->
+		PreferredProtocol
+        end
+    end;
+
+make_next_protocol_selector({server, AllProtocols, DefaultProtocol}) ->
+    fun(AdvertisedProtocols) ->
+	    case detect(fun(PreferredProtocol) ->
+				lists:member(PreferredProtocol, AllProtocols)
+			end,
+			AdvertisedProtocols) of
+		undefined ->
+		    DefaultProtocol;
+            PreferredProtocol ->
+		    PreferredProtocol
+	    end
+    end.
+
+connection_cb(tls) ->
+    tls_connection;
+connection_cb(dtls) ->
+    dtls_connection;
+connection_cb(Opts) ->
+   connection_cb(proplists:get_value(protocol, Opts, tls)).
+
+record_cb(tls) ->
+    tls_record;
+record_cb(dtls) ->
+    dtls_record;
+record_cb(Opts) ->
+    record_cb(proplists:get_value(protocol, Opts, tls)).
+
+connection_sup(tls_connection) ->
+    tls_connection_sup;
+connection_sup(dtls_connection) ->
+    dtls_connection_sup.
+
+binary_filename(FileName) ->
+    Enc = file:native_name_encoding(),
+    unicode:characters_to_binary(FileName, unicode, Enc).
+
+assert_proplist([]) ->
+    true;
+assert_proplist([{Key,_} | Rest]) when is_atom(Key) ->
+    assert_proplist(Rest);
+%% Handle exceptions 
+assert_proplist([{raw,_,_,_} | Rest]) ->
+    assert_proplist(Rest);
+assert_proplist([inet | Rest]) ->
+    assert_proplist(Rest);
+assert_proplist([inet6 | Rest]) ->
+    assert_proplist(Rest);
+assert_proplist([Value | _]) ->
+    throw({option_not_a_key_value_tuple, Value}).
+
+emulated_socket_options(InetValues, #socket_options{
+				       mode   = Mode,
+				       header = Header,
+				       active = Active,
+				       packet = Packet,
+				       packet_size = Size}) ->
+    #socket_options{
+       mode   = proplists:get_value(mode, InetValues, Mode),
+       header = proplists:get_value(header, InetValues, Header),
+       active = proplists:get_value(active, InetValues, Active),
+       packet = proplists:get_value(packet, InetValues, Packet),
+       packet_size = proplists:get_value(packet_size, InetValues, Size)
+      }.
+
+new_ssl_options([], #ssl_options{} = Opts, _) -> 
+    Opts;
+new_ssl_options([{verify_client_once, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{verify_client_once = 
+					       validate_option(verify_client_once, Value)}, RecordCB); 
+new_ssl_options([{depth, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{depth = validate_option(depth, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{cert, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{cert = validate_option(cert, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{certfile, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{certfile = validate_option(certfile, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{key, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{key = validate_option(key, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{keyfile, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{keyfile = validate_option(keyfile, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{password, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{password = validate_option(password, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{dh, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{dh = validate_option(dh, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{dhfile, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{dhfile = validate_option(dhfile, Value)}, RecordCB); 
+new_ssl_options([{user_lookup_fun, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = validate_option(user_lookup_fun, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{psk_identity, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{psk_identity = validate_option(psk_identity, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{srp_identity, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{srp_identity = validate_option(srp_identity, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{ciphers, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{versions = Versions} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    Ciphers = handle_cipher_option(Value, RecordCB:highest_protocol_version(Versions)),
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, 
+		    Opts#ssl_options{ciphers = Ciphers}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{reuse_session, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{reuse_session = validate_option(reuse_session, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{reuse_sessions, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{reuse_sessions = validate_option(reuse_sessions, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{ssl_imp, _Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> %% Not used backwards compatibility
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{renegotiate_at, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{ renegotiate_at = validate_option(renegotiate_at, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{secure_renegotiate, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = validate_option(secure_renegotiate, Value)}, RecordCB); 
+new_ssl_options([{client_renegotiation, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{client_renegotiation = validate_option(client_renegotiation, Value)}, RecordCB); 
+new_ssl_options([{hibernate_after, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{hibernate_after = validate_option(hibernate_after, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{alpn_advertised_protocols, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) ->
+	new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{alpn_advertised_protocols = validate_option(alpn_advertised_protocols, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{alpn_preferred_protocols, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) ->
+	new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{alpn_preferred_protocols = validate_option(alpn_preferred_protocols, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{next_protocols_advertised, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{next_protocols_advertised = validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{client_preferred_next_protocols, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{next_protocol_selector = 
+					       make_next_protocol_selector(validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, Value))}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{log_alert, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{log_alert = validate_option(log_alert, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{server_name_indication, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{server_name_indication = validate_option(server_name_indication, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{honor_cipher_order, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{honor_cipher_order = validate_option(honor_cipher_order, Value)}, RecordCB);
+new_ssl_options([{signature_algs, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> 
+    new_ssl_options(Rest, 
+		    Opts#ssl_options{signature_algs = 
+					 handle_hashsigns_option(Value, 
+								 RecordCB:highest_protocol_version())}, 
+		    RecordCB);
+
+new_ssl_options([{Key, Value} | _Rest], #ssl_options{}, _) -> 
+    throw({error, {options, {Key, Value}}}).
+
+
+handle_verify_options(Opts, CaCerts) ->
+    DefaultVerifyNoneFun =
+	{fun(_,{bad_cert, _}, UserState) ->
+		 {valid, UserState};
+	    (_,{extension, #'Extension'{critical = true}}, UserState) ->
+		 %% This extension is marked as critical, so
+		 %% certificate verification should fail if we don't
+		 %% understand the extension.  However, this is
+		 %% `verify_none', so let's accept it anyway.
+		 {valid, UserState};
+	    (_,{extension, _}, UserState) ->
+		 {unknown, UserState};
+	    (_, valid, UserState) ->
+		 {valid, UserState};
+	    (_, valid_peer, UserState) ->
+		 {valid, UserState}
+	 end, []},
+    VerifyNoneFun = handle_option(verify_fun, Opts, DefaultVerifyNoneFun),
+
+    UserFailIfNoPeerCert = handle_option(fail_if_no_peer_cert, Opts, false),
+    UserVerifyFun = handle_option(verify_fun, Opts, undefined),
+    
+    PartialChainHanlder = handle_option(partial_chain, Opts,
+					fun(_) -> unknown_ca end),
 
-format_error(Error)  ->
-    tls:format_error(Error).
+    VerifyClientOnce = handle_option(verify_client_once, Opts, false),
 
-random_bytes(N) ->
-   tls:random_bytes(N).
+    %% Handle 0, 1, 2 for backwards compatibility
+    case proplists:get_value(verify, Opts, verify_none) of
+	0 ->
+	    {verify_none, false,
+		 ca_cert_default(verify_none, VerifyNoneFun, CaCerts),
+	     VerifyNoneFun, PartialChainHanlder, VerifyClientOnce};
+	1  ->
+	    {verify_peer, false,
+	     ca_cert_default(verify_peer, UserVerifyFun, CaCerts),
+	     UserVerifyFun, PartialChainHanlder, VerifyClientOnce};
+	2 ->
+	    {verify_peer, true,
+	     ca_cert_default(verify_peer, UserVerifyFun, CaCerts),
+	     UserVerifyFun, PartialChainHanlder, VerifyClientOnce};
+	verify_none ->
+	    {verify_none, false,
+	     ca_cert_default(verify_none, VerifyNoneFun, CaCerts),
+	     VerifyNoneFun, PartialChainHanlder, VerifyClientOnce};
+	verify_peer ->
+	    {verify_peer, UserFailIfNoPeerCert,
+	     ca_cert_default(verify_peer, UserVerifyFun, CaCerts),
+	     UserVerifyFun, PartialChainHanlder, VerifyClientOnce};
+	Value ->
+	    throw({error, {options, {verify, Value}}})
+    end.
 
+default_option_role(Role, Value, Role) ->
+    Value;
+default_option_role(_,_,_) ->
+    undefined.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl
index 1810043dfb..db71b16d80 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -29,12 +30,32 @@
 
 -include("ssl_alert.hrl").
 -include("ssl_record.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
 
--export([alert_txt/1, reason_code/2]).
+-export([encode/3, decode/1, alert_txt/1, reason_code/2]).
 
 %%====================================================================
 %% Internal application API
 %%====================================================================
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode(#alert{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), #connection_states{}) -> 
+		    {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes an alert
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+    ssl_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode(binary()) -> [#alert{}] | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decode alert(s), will return a singel own alert if peer
+%% sends garbage or too many warning alerts.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode(Bin) ->
+    decode(Bin, [], 0).
+
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server) -> closed | {essl, string()}.
 %%
@@ -52,14 +73,34 @@ reason_code(#alert{description = Description}, _) ->
 %%
 %% Description: Returns the error string for given alert.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-alert_txt(#alert{level = Level, description = Description, where = {Mod,Line}}) ->
+alert_txt(#alert{level = Level, description = Description, where = {Mod,Line}, reason = undefined}) ->
     Mod ++ ":" ++ integer_to_list(Line) ++ ":" ++ 
-	level_txt(Level) ++" "++ description_txt(Description).
+        level_txt(Level) ++" "++ description_txt(Description);
+alert_txt(#alert{reason = Reason} = Alert) ->
+    BaseTxt = alert_txt(Alert#alert{reason = undefined}),
+    FormatDepth = 9, % Some limit on printed representation of an error
+    ReasonTxt = lists:flatten(io_lib:format("~P", [Reason, FormatDepth])),
+    BaseTxt ++ " - " ++ ReasonTxt.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %%% Internal functions
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+%% It is very unlikely that an correct implementation will send more than one alert at the time
+%% So it there is more than 10 warning alerts we consider it an error
+decode(<<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(_), _/binary>>, _, N) when Level == ?WARNING, N > ?MAX_ALERTS ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECODE_ERROR, too_many_remote_alerts);
+decode(<<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description), Rest/binary>>, Acc, N) when Level == ?WARNING ->
+    Alert = ?ALERT_REC(Level, Description),
+    decode(Rest, [Alert | Acc], N + 1);
+decode(<<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description), _Rest/binary>>, Acc, _) when Level == ?FATAL->
+    Alert = ?ALERT_REC(Level, Description),
+    lists:reverse([Alert | Acc]); %% No need to decode rest fatal alert will end the connection
+decode(<<?BYTE(_Level), _/binary>>, _, _) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, failed_to_decode_remote_alert);
+decode(<<>>, Acc, _) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc, []).
+
 level_txt(?WARNING) ->
     "Warning:";
 level_txt(?FATAL) ->
@@ -113,5 +154,21 @@ description_txt(?USER_CANCELED) ->
     "user canceled";
 description_txt(?NO_RENEGOTIATION) ->
     "no renegotiation";
+description_txt(?UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION) ->
+    "unsupported extension";
+description_txt(?CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE) ->
+    "certificate unobtainable";
+description_txt(?UNRECOGNISED_NAME) ->
+    "unrecognised name";
+description_txt(?BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE) ->
+    "bad certificate status response";
+description_txt(?BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE) ->
+    "bad certificate hash value";
 description_txt(?UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) ->
-    "unknown psk identity".
+    "unknown psk identity";
+description_txt(?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK) ->
+    "inappropriate fallback";
+description_txt(?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL) ->
+    "no application protocol";
+description_txt(Enum) ->
+    lists:flatten(io_lib:format("unsupported/unknown alert: ~p", [Enum])).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl
index 2a8a91aefa..38facb964f 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %% 
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2012. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved.
 %% 
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%% 
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %% 
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@
 %%       unsupported_certificate(43),
 %%       certificate_revoked(44),
 %%       certificate_expired(45),
-   %%       certificate_unknown(46),
+%%       certificate_unknown(46),
 %%       illegal_parameter(47),
 %%       unknown_ca(48),
 %%       access_denied(49),
@@ -58,9 +59,19 @@
 %%       protocol_version(70),
 %%       insufficient_security(71),
 %%       internal_error(80),
+%%       inappropriate_fallback(86),
 %%       user_canceled(90),
 %%       no_renegotiation(100),
+%% RFC 4366
+%%         unsupported_extension(110),           
+%%         certificate_unobtainable(111),        
+%%         unrecognized_name(112),               
+%%         bad_certificate_status_response(113), 
+%%         bad_certificate_hash_value(114),      
+%% RFC 4366
 %%       unknown_psk_identity(115),
+%% RFC 7301
+%%       no_application_protocol(120),
 %%           (255)
 %%       } AlertDescription;
 
@@ -86,16 +97,27 @@
 -define(PROTOCOL_VERSION, 70).
 -define(INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, 71).
 -define(INTERNAL_ERROR, 80).
+-define(INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, 86).
 -define(USER_CANCELED, 90).
 -define(NO_RENEGOTIATION, 100).
+-define(UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, 110).
+-define(CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE, 111).
+-define(UNRECOGNISED_NAME, 112).
+-define(BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, 113).
+-define(BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE, 114).
 -define(UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, 115).
+-define(NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, 120).
 
 -define(ALERT_REC(Level,Desc), #alert{level=Level,description=Desc,where={?FILE, ?LINE}}).
+-define(ALERT_REC(Level,Desc,Reason), #alert{level=Level,description=Desc,where={?FILE, ?LINE},reason=Reason}).
+
+-define(MAX_ALERTS, 10).
 
 %% Alert
 -record(alert, {
 	  level,
 	  description,
-	  where = {?FILE, ?LINE}
+          where = {?FILE, ?LINE},
+          reason
 	 }).
 -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_alert).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_api.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_api.hrl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2bd51cf91e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_api.hrl
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+
+-ifndef(ssl_api).
+-define(ssl_api, true).
+
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+
+%% Visible in API
+-export_type([connect_option/0, listen_option/0, ssl_option/0, transport_option/0,
+	      prf_random/0, sslsocket/0]).
+
+
+%% Looks like it does for backwards compatibility reasons
+-record(sslsocket, {fd = nil, pid = nil}).
+
+
+-type sslsocket()                :: #sslsocket{}.
+-type connect_option()           :: socket_connect_option() | ssl_option() | transport_option().
+-type socket_connect_option()    :: gen_tcp:connect_option().
+-type listen_option()            :: socket_listen_option() | ssl_option() | transport_option().
+-type socket_listen_option()     :: gen_tcp:listen_option().
+
+-type ssl_option()    :: {versions, ssl_record:ssl_atom_version()} |
+			 {verify, verify_type()} |
+			 {verify_fun, {fun(), InitialUserState::term()}} |
+                         {fail_if_no_peer_cert, boolean()} | {depth, integer()} |
+                         {cert, Der::binary()} | {certfile, path()} | {key, Der::binary()} |
+                         {keyfile, path()} | {password, string()} | {cacerts, [Der::binary()]} |
+                         {cacertfile, path()} | {dh, Der::binary()} | {dhfile, path()} |
+                         {user_lookup_fun, {fun(), InitialUserState::term()}} |
+                         {psk_identity, string()} |
+                         {srp_identity, {string(), string()}} |
+                         {ciphers, ciphers()} | {ssl_imp, ssl_imp()} | {reuse_sessions, boolean()} |
+                         {reuse_session, fun()} | {hibernate_after, integer()|undefined} |
+                         {alpn_advertised_protocols, [binary()]} |
+                         {alpn_preferred_protocols, [binary()]} |
+                         {next_protocols_advertised, list(binary())} |
+                         {client_preferred_next_protocols, binary(), client | server, list(binary())}.
+
+-type verify_type()  :: verify_none | verify_peer.
+-type path()         :: string().
+-type ciphers()      :: [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] |
+			string(). % (according to old API)
+-type ssl_imp()      :: new | old.
+
+-type transport_option() :: {cb_info, {CallbackModule::atom(), DataTag::atom(),
+				       ClosedTag::atom(), ErrTag::atom()}}.
+-type prf_random() :: client_random | server_random.
+
+-endif. % -ifdef(ssl_api).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_app.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_app.erl
index 0c475a6d01..62e8765d4a 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_app.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_app.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %% 
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1998-2011. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1998-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %% 
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%% 
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %% 
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
index b186a1015a..3ec3f50e05 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016 All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -30,10 +31,11 @@
 -include("ssl_internal.hrl").
 -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). 
 
--export([trusted_cert_and_path/3,
+-export([trusted_cert_and_path/4,
 	 certificate_chain/3,
 	 file_to_certificats/2,
-	 validate_extension/3,
+	 file_to_crls/2,
+	 validate/3,
 	 is_valid_extkey_usage/2,
 	 is_valid_key_usage/2,
 	 select_extension/2,
@@ -46,62 +48,56 @@
 %%====================================================================
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec trusted_cert_and_path([der_cert()], db_handle(), certdb_ref()) ->
+-spec trusted_cert_and_path([der_cert()], db_handle(), certdb_ref(), fun()) ->
 				   {der_cert() | unknown_ca, [der_cert()]}.
 %%
 %% Description: Extracts the root cert (if not presents tries to 
 %% look it up, if not found {bad_cert, unknown_ca} will be added verification
 %% errors. Returns {RootCert, Path, VerifyErrors}
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-trusted_cert_and_path(CertChain, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
-    Path = [Cert | _] = lists:reverse(CertChain),
-    OtpCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+trusted_cert_and_path(CertChain, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, PartialChainHandler) ->
+    Path = [BinCert | _] = lists:reverse(CertChain),
+    OtpCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(BinCert, otp),
     SignedAndIssuerID =
 	case public_key:pkix_is_self_signed(OtpCert) of
 	    true ->
 		{ok, IssuerId} = public_key:pkix_issuer_id(OtpCert, self),
 		{self, IssuerId};
 	    false ->
-		case public_key:pkix_issuer_id(OtpCert, other) of
-		    {ok, IssuerId} ->
-			{other, IssuerId};
-		    {error, issuer_not_found} ->
-			case find_issuer(OtpCert, CertDbHandle) of
-			    {ok, IssuerId} ->
-				{other, IssuerId};
-			    Other ->
-				Other
-			end
-		end
+		other_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle)
 	end,
     
     case SignedAndIssuerID of
 	{error, issuer_not_found} ->
 	    %% The root CA was not sent and can not be found.
-	    {unknown_ca, Path};
+	    handle_incomplete_chain(Path, PartialChainHandler);
 	{self, _} when length(Path) == 1 ->
 	    {selfsigned_peer, Path};
 	{_ ,{SerialNr, Issuer}} ->
 	    case ssl_manager:lookup_trusted_cert(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, SerialNr, Issuer) of
-		{ok, {BinCert,_}} ->
-		    {BinCert, Path};
+		{ok, Trusted} ->
+		    %% Trusted must be selfsigned or it is an incomplete chain
+		    handle_path(Trusted, Path, PartialChainHandler);
 		_ ->
 		    %% Root CA could not be verified
-		    {unknown_ca, Path}
+		    handle_incomplete_chain(Path, PartialChainHandler)
 	    end
     end.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec certificate_chain(undefined | binary(), db_handle(), certdb_ref()) ->
-			  {error, no_cert} | {ok, [der_cert()]}.
+-spec certificate_chain(undefined | binary() | #'OTPCertificate'{} , db_handle(), certdb_ref()) ->
+			  {error, no_cert} | {ok, #'OTPCertificate'{} | undefined, [der_cert()]}.
 %%
 %% Description: Return the certificate chain to send to peer.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 certificate_chain(undefined, _, _) ->
     {error, no_cert};
-certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) ->
+certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) when is_binary(OwnCert) ->
     ErlCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(OwnCert, otp),
-    certificate_chain(ErlCert, OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, [OwnCert]).
+    certificate_chain(ErlCert, OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, [OwnCert]);
+certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) ->
+    DerCert = public_key:pkix_encode('OTPCertificate', OwnCert, otp),
+    certificate_chain(OwnCert, DerCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, [DerCert]).
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec file_to_certificats(binary(), term()) -> [der_cert()].
 %%
@@ -110,29 +106,39 @@ certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) ->
 file_to_certificats(File, DbHandle) ->
     {ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(File, DbHandle),
     [Bin || {'Certificate', Bin, not_encrypted} <- List].
+
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec validate_extension(term(), {extension, #'Extension'{}} | {bad_cert, atom()} | valid,
-			 term()) -> {valid, term()} |
-				    {fail, tuple()} |
-				    {unknown, term()}.
+-spec file_to_crls(binary(), term()) -> [der_cert()].
+%%
+%% Description: Return list of DER encoded certificates.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+file_to_crls(File, DbHandle) ->
+    {ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(File, DbHandle),
+    [Bin || {'CertificateList', Bin, not_encrypted} <- List].
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec validate(term(), {extension, #'Extension'{}} | {bad_cert, atom()} | valid,
+	       term()) -> {valid, term()} |
+			  {fail, tuple()} |
+			  {unknown, term()}.
 %%
 %% Description:  Validates ssl/tls specific extensions
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-validate_extension(_,{extension, #'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-extKeyUsage',
-					      extnValue = KeyUse}}, Role) ->
+validate(_,{extension, #'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-extKeyUsage',
+				    extnValue = KeyUse}}, {Role, _,_, _, _}) ->
     case is_valid_extkey_usage(KeyUse, Role) of
 	true ->
 	    {valid, Role};
 	false ->
 	    {fail, {bad_cert, invalid_ext_key_usage}}
     end;
-validate_extension(_, {bad_cert, _} = Reason, _) ->
-    {fail, Reason};
-validate_extension(_, {extension, _}, Role) ->
+validate(_, {extension, _}, Role) ->
     {unknown, Role};
-validate_extension(_, valid, Role) ->
+validate(_, {bad_cert, _} = Reason, _) ->
+    {fail, Reason};
+validate(_, valid, Role) ->
     {valid, Role};
-validate_extension(_, valid_peer, Role) ->
+validate(_, valid_peer, Role) ->
     {valid, Role}.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -181,7 +187,7 @@ public_key_type(?'id-ecPublicKey') ->
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %%% Internal functions
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certificate_chain(OtpCert, _Cert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain) ->
+certificate_chain(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain) ->
     IssuerAndSelfSigned = 
 	case public_key:pkix_is_self_signed(OtpCert) of
 	    true ->
@@ -194,7 +200,7 @@ certificate_chain(OtpCert, _Cert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain) ->
 	{_, true = SelfSigned} ->
 	    certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, ignore, ignore, SelfSigned);
 	{{error, issuer_not_found}, SelfSigned} ->
-	    case find_issuer(OtpCert, CertDbHandle) of
+	    case find_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle) of
 		{ok, {SerialNr, Issuer}} ->
 		    certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain,
 				      SerialNr, Issuer, SelfSigned);
@@ -203,14 +209,14 @@ certificate_chain(OtpCert, _Cert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain) ->
 		    %% certificate. The verification of the
 		    %% cert chain will fail if guess is
 		    %% incorrect.
-		    {ok, lists:reverse(Chain)}
+		    {ok, undefined, lists:reverse(Chain)}
 	    end;
 	{{ok, {SerialNr, Issuer}}, SelfSigned} -> 
 	    certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, SerialNr, Issuer, SelfSigned)
     end.
   
-certificate_chain(_,_, Chain, _SerialNr, _Issuer, true) ->
-    {ok, lists:reverse(Chain)};
+certificate_chain(_, _, [RootCert | _] = Chain, _, _, true) ->	  
+    {ok, RootCert, lists:reverse(Chain)};		      
 
 certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, SerialNr, Issuer, _SelfSigned) ->
     case ssl_manager:lookup_trusted_cert(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef,
@@ -222,23 +228,27 @@ certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, SerialNr, Issuer, _SelfSigned
 	_ ->
 	    %% The trusted cert may be obmitted from the chain as the
 	    %% counter part needs to have it anyway to be able to
-	    %% verify it.  This will be the normal case for servers
-	    %% that does not verify the clients and hence have not
-	    %% specified the cacertfile.
-	    {ok, lists:reverse(Chain)}		      
+	    %% verify it.
+	    {ok, undefined, lists:reverse(Chain)}		      
     end.
 
-find_issuer(OtpCert, CertDbHandle) ->
-    IsIssuerFun = fun({_Key, {_Der, #'OTPCertificate'{} = ErlCertCandidate}}, Acc) ->
-			  case public_key:pkix_is_issuer(OtpCert, ErlCertCandidate) of
-			      true ->
-				  throw(public_key:pkix_issuer_id(ErlCertCandidate, self));
-			      false ->
-				  Acc
-			  end;
-		     (_, Acc) ->
-			  Acc
-		  end,
+find_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle) ->
+    IsIssuerFun =
+	fun({_Key, {_Der, #'OTPCertificate'{} = ErlCertCandidate}}, Acc) ->
+		case public_key:pkix_is_issuer(OtpCert, ErlCertCandidate) of
+		    true ->
+			case verify_cert_signer(BinCert, ErlCertCandidate#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate) of
+			    true ->
+				throw(public_key:pkix_issuer_id(ErlCertCandidate, self));
+			    false ->
+				Acc
+			end;
+		    false ->
+			Acc
+		end;
+	   (_, Acc) ->
+		Acc
+	end,
 
     try ssl_pkix_db:foldl(IsIssuerFun, issuer_not_found, CertDbHandle) of
 	issuer_not_found ->
@@ -254,3 +264,57 @@ is_valid_extkey_usage(KeyUse, client) ->
 is_valid_extkey_usage(KeyUse, server) ->
     %% Server wants to verify client
     is_valid_key_usage(KeyUse, ?'id-kp-clientAuth').
+
+verify_cert_signer(BinCert, SignerTBSCert) ->
+    PublicKey = public_key(SignerTBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo),
+    public_key:pkix_verify(BinCert, PublicKey).
+
+public_key(#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = #'PublicKeyAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'id-ecPublicKey',
+									parameters = Params},
+				      subjectPublicKey = Point}) ->
+    {Point, Params};
+public_key(#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = #'PublicKeyAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'rsaEncryption'}, 
+				      subjectPublicKey = Key}) ->
+    Key;
+public_key(#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = #'PublicKeyAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'id-dsa',
+									parameters = {params, Params}},
+				      subjectPublicKey = Key}) ->
+    {Key, Params}.
+
+other_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle) ->
+    case public_key:pkix_issuer_id(OtpCert, other) of
+	{ok, IssuerId} ->
+	    {other, IssuerId};
+	{error, issuer_not_found} ->
+	    case find_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle) of
+		{ok, IssuerId} ->
+		    {other, IssuerId};
+		Other ->
+		    Other
+	    end
+    end.
+
+handle_path({BinCert, OTPCert}, Path, PartialChainHandler) ->
+    case public_key:pkix_is_self_signed(OTPCert) of
+	true ->
+	    {BinCert, lists:delete(BinCert, Path)};
+	false ->
+	   handle_incomplete_chain(Path, PartialChainHandler)
+    end.
+
+handle_incomplete_chain(Chain, Fun) ->
+    case catch Fun(Chain) of
+	{trusted_ca, DerCert} ->
+	    new_trusteded_chain(DerCert, Chain);
+	unknown_ca = Error ->
+	    {Error, Chain};
+	_  ->
+	    {unknown_ca, Chain}
+    end.
+
+new_trusteded_chain(DerCert, [DerCert | Chain]) ->
+    {DerCert, Chain};
+new_trusteded_chain(DerCert, [_ | Rest]) ->
+    new_trusteded_chain(DerCert, Rest);
+new_trusteded_chain(_, []) ->
+    unknown_ca.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
index ec5d793d65..e935c033c7 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
-%%
+%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -32,16 +33,49 @@
 -include("ssl_alert.hrl").
 -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
 
--export([security_parameters/3, suite_definition/1,
-	 decipher/5, cipher/5,
-	 suite/1, suites/1, anonymous_suites/0, psk_suites/1, srp_suites/0,
-	 openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1, filter/2, filter_suites/1,
-	 hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1]).
+-export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, suite_definition/1,
+	 erl_suite_definition/1,
+	 cipher_init/3, decipher/6, cipher/5, decipher_aead/6, cipher_aead/6,
+	 suite/1, suites/1, all_suites/1, 
+	 ec_keyed_suites/0, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, srp_suites/0,
+	 rc4_suites/1, des_suites/1, openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1, filter/2, filter_suites/1,
+	 hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1, is_acceptable_hash/2, is_fallback/1,
+	 random_bytes/1]).
+
+-export_type([cipher_suite/0,
+	      erl_cipher_suite/0, openssl_cipher_suite/0,
+	      hash/0, key_algo/0, sign_algo/0]).
+
+-type cipher()            :: null |rc4_128 | idea_cbc | des40_cbc | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' 
+			   | aes_128_cbc |  aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm | chacha20_poly1305.
+-type hash()              :: null | sha | md5 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512.
+-type sign_algo()         :: rsa | dsa | ecdsa.
+-type key_algo()          :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | 
+			     psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon.
+-type erl_cipher_suite()  :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()} % Pre TLS 1.2 
+			     %% TLS 1.2, internally PRE TLS 1.2 will use default_prf
+			   | {key_algo(), cipher(), hash(), hash() | default_prf}. 
+
+ 
+-type cipher_suite()      :: binary().
+-type cipher_enum()        :: integer().
+-type openssl_cipher_suite()  :: string().
+
 
 -compile(inline).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec security_parameters(tls_version(), cipher_suite(), #security_parameters{}) ->
+-spec security_parameters(cipher_suite(), #security_parameters{}) ->
+				 #security_parameters{}.
+%% Only security_parameters/2 should call security_parameters/3 with undefined as
+%% first argument.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+security_parameters(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL = CipherSuite, SecParams) ->
+    security_parameters(undefined, CipherSuite, SecParams).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec security_parameters(ssl_record:ssl_version() | undefined, cipher_suite(), #security_parameters{}) ->
 				 #security_parameters{}.
 %%
 %% Description: Returns a security parameters record where the
@@ -62,20 +96,32 @@ security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams) ->
       hash_size = hash_size(Hash)}.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec cipher(cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, binary(), binary(), tls_version()) ->
+-spec cipher_init(cipher_enum(), binary(), binary()) -> #cipher_state{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Initializes the #cipher_state according to BCA
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+cipher_init(?RC4, IV, Key) ->
+    State = crypto:stream_init(rc4, Key),
+    #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, state = State};
+cipher_init(?AES_GCM, IV, Key) ->
+    <<Nonce:64>> = random_bytes(8),
+    #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, nonce = Nonce};
+cipher_init(_BCA, IV, Key) ->
+    #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec cipher(cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, binary(), iodata(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
 		    {binary(), #cipher_state{}}. 
 %%
 %% Description: Encrypts the data and the MAC using chipher described
 %% by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state
+%% Used for "MAC then Cipher" suites where first an HMAC of the
+%% data is calculated and the data plus the HMAC is ecncrypted.
 %%-------------------------------------------------------------------
 cipher(?NULL, CipherState, <<>>, Fragment, _Version) ->
     GenStreamCipherList = [Fragment, <<>>],
     {GenStreamCipherList, CipherState};
-cipher(?RC4, CipherState, Mac, Fragment, _Version) ->
-    State0 = case CipherState#cipher_state.state of
-                 undefined -> crypto:stream_init(rc4, CipherState#cipher_state.key);
-                 S -> S
-             end,
+cipher(?RC4, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Mac, Fragment, _Version) ->
     GenStreamCipherList = [Fragment, Mac],
     {State1, T} = crypto:stream_encrypt(State0, GenStreamCipherList),
     {T, CipherState#cipher_state{state = State1}};
@@ -87,13 +133,40 @@ cipher(?'3DES', CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version) ->
     block_cipher(fun(<<K1:8/binary, K2:8/binary, K3:8/binary>>, IV, T) ->
 			 crypto:block_encrypt(des3_cbc, [K1, K2, K3], IV, T)
 		 end, block_size(des_cbc), CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version);
-cipher(?AES, CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version) ->
+cipher(?AES_CBC, CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version) ->
     block_cipher(fun(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 16 ->
 			 crypto:block_encrypt(aes_cbc128, Key, IV, T);
 		    (Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 32 ->
 			 crypto:block_encrypt(aes_cbc256, Key, IV, T)
 		 end, block_size(aes_128_cbc), CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version).
 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec cipher_aead(cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, integer(), binary(), iodata(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+		    {binary(), #cipher_state{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encrypts the data and protects associated data (AAD) using chipher
+%% described by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state
+%% Use for suites that use authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+cipher_aead(?AES_GCM, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) ->
+    aead_cipher(aes_gcm, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version);
+cipher_aead(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) ->
+    aead_cipher(chacha20_poly1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version).
+
+aead_cipher(chacha20_poly1305, #cipher_state{key=Key} = CipherState, SeqNo, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) ->
+    CipherLen = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
+    AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>,
+    Nonce = <<SeqNo:64/integer>>,
+    {Content, CipherTag} = crypto:block_encrypt(chacha20_poly1305, Key, Nonce, {AAD, Fragment}),
+    {<<Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>, CipherState};
+aead_cipher(Type, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv = IV0, nonce = Nonce} = CipherState, _SeqNo, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) ->
+    CipherLen = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
+    AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>,
+    <<Salt:4/bytes, _/binary>> = IV0,
+    IV = <<Salt/binary, Nonce:64/integer>>,
+    {Content, CipherTag} = crypto:block_encrypt(Type, Key, IV, {AAD, Fragment}),
+    {<<Nonce:64/integer, Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>, CipherState#cipher_state{nonce = Nonce + 1}}.
+
 build_cipher_block(BlockSz, Mac, Fragment) ->
     TotSz = byte_size(Mac) + erlang:iolist_size(Fragment) + 1,
     {PaddingLength, Padding} = get_padding(TotSz, BlockSz),
@@ -117,19 +190,18 @@ block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CS0,
     {T, CS0#cipher_state{iv=NextIV}}.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decipher(cipher_enum(), integer(), #cipher_state{}, binary(), tls_version()) ->
+-spec decipher(cipher_enum(), integer(), #cipher_state{}, binary(), 
+	       ssl_record:ssl_version(), boolean()) ->
 		      {binary(), binary(), #cipher_state{}} | #alert{}.
 %%
 %% Description: Decrypts the data and the MAC using cipher described
 %% by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state.
+%% Used for "MAC then Cipher" suites where first the data is decrypted
+%% and the an HMAC of the decrypted data is checked
 %%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-decipher(?NULL, _HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _) ->
+decipher(?NULL, _HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _, _) ->
     {Fragment, <<>>, CipherState};
-decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _) ->
-    State0 = case CipherState#cipher_state.state of
-                 undefined -> crypto:stream_init(rc4, CipherState#cipher_state.key);
-                 S -> S
-             end,
+decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Fragment, _, _) ->
     try crypto:stream_decrypt(State0, Fragment) of
 	{State, Text} ->
 	    GSC = generic_stream_cipher_from_bin(Text, HashSz),
@@ -142,26 +214,39 @@ decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _) ->
 	    %% alerts may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in
 	    %% TLS [CBCATT].  It is preferable to uniformly use the
 	    %% bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of the error."
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
     end;
 
-decipher(?DES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version) ->
+decipher(?DES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
     block_decipher(fun(Key, IV, T) ->
 			   crypto:block_decrypt(des_cbc, Key, IV, T)
-		   end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version);
-decipher(?'3DES', HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version) ->
+		   end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck);
+decipher(?'3DES', HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
     block_decipher(fun(<<K1:8/binary, K2:8/binary, K3:8/binary>>, IV, T) ->
 			   crypto:block_decrypt(des3_cbc, [K1, K2, K3], IV, T)
-		   end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version);
-decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version) ->
+		   end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck);
+decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
     block_decipher(fun(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 16 ->
 			   crypto:block_decrypt(aes_cbc128, Key, IV, T);
 		      (Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 32 ->
 			   crypto:block_decrypt(aes_cbc256, Key, IV, T)
-		   end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version).
+		   end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decipher_aead(cipher_enum(),  #cipher_state{}, integer(), binary(), binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+			   {binary(), binary(), #cipher_state{}} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decrypts the data and checks the associated data (AAD) MAC using
+%% cipher described by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state.
+%% Use for suites that use authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+decipher_aead(?AES_GCM, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) ->
+    aead_decipher(aes_gcm, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version);
+decipher_aead(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) ->
+    aead_decipher(chacha20_poly1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version).
 
 block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0, 
-	       HashSz, Fragment, Version) ->
+	       HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
     try 
 	Text = Fun(Key, IV, Fragment),
 	NextIV = next_iv(Fragment, IV),
@@ -169,7 +254,7 @@ block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0,
 	Content = GBC#generic_block_cipher.content,
 	Mac = GBC#generic_block_cipher.mac,
 	CipherState1 = CipherState0#cipher_state{iv=GBC#generic_block_cipher.next_iv},
-	case is_correct_padding(GBC, Version) of
+	case is_correct_padding(GBC, Version, PaddingCheck) of
 	    true ->
 		{Content, Mac, CipherState1};
 	    false ->
@@ -187,25 +272,71 @@ block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0,
 	    %% alerts may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in
 	    %% TLS [CBCATT].  It is preferable to uniformly use the
 	    %% bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of the error."
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
     end.
+
+aead_ciphertext_to_state(chacha20_poly1305, SeqNo, _IV, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) ->
+    CipherLen = size(Fragment) - 16,
+    <<CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:16/bytes>> = Fragment,
+    AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>,
+    Nonce = <<SeqNo:64/integer>>,
+    {Nonce, AAD, CipherText, CipherTag};
+aead_ciphertext_to_state(_, _SeqNo, <<Salt:4/bytes, _/binary>>, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) ->
+    CipherLen = size(Fragment) - 24,
+    <<ExplicitNonce:8/bytes, CipherText:CipherLen/bytes,  CipherTag:16/bytes>> = Fragment,
+    AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>,
+    Nonce = <<Salt/binary, ExplicitNonce/binary>>,
+    {Nonce, AAD, CipherText, CipherTag}.
+
+aead_decipher(Type, #cipher_state{key = Key, iv = IV} = CipherState,
+	      SeqNo, AAD0, Fragment, Version) ->
+    try
+	{Nonce, AAD, CipherText, CipherTag} = aead_ciphertext_to_state(Type, SeqNo, IV, AAD0, Fragment, Version),
+	case crypto:block_decrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, {AAD, CipherText, CipherTag}) of
+	    Content when is_binary(Content) ->
+		{Content, CipherState};
+	    _ ->
+                ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
+	end
+    catch
+	_:_ ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
+    end.
+
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec suites(tls_version()) -> [cipher_suite()].
+-spec suites(ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [cipher_suite()].
 %%
 %% Description: Returns a list of supported cipher suites.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 suites({3, 0}) ->
-    ssl_ssl3:suites();
+    ssl_v3:suites();
 suites({3, N}) ->
-    ssl_tls1:suites(N).
-
+    tls_v1:suites(N).
+
+all_suites(Version) ->
+    suites(Version)
+	++ anonymous_suites(Version)
+	++ psk_suites(Version)
+	++ srp_suites()
+        ++ rc4_suites(Version)
+        ++ des_suites(Version).
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec anonymous_suites() -> [cipher_suite()].
+-spec anonymous_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()].
 %%
 %% Description: Returns a list of the anonymous cipher suites, only supported
 %% if explicitly set by user. Intended only for testing.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-anonymous_suites() ->
+
+anonymous_suites({3, N}) ->
+    anonymous_suites(N);
+
+anonymous_suites(N)
+  when N >= 3 ->
+    [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+    ] ++ anonymous_suites(0);
+
+anonymous_suites(_) ->
     [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
      ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
@@ -219,7 +350,7 @@ anonymous_suites() ->
      ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA].
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec psk_suites(tls_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()].
+-spec psk_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()].
 %%
 %% Description: Returns a list of the PSK cipher suites, only supported
 %% if explicitly set by user.
@@ -229,13 +360,20 @@ psk_suites({3, N}) ->
 
 psk_suites(N)
   when N >= 3 ->
-    psk_suites(0) ++
-	[?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
-	 ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
-	 ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
-	 ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
-	 ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
-	 ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256];
+    [
+     ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+    ] ++ psk_suites(0);
 
 psk_suites(_) ->
 	[?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
@@ -267,9 +405,37 @@ srp_suites() ->
      ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA].
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec rc4_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [cipher_suite()].
+%%
+%% Description: Returns a list of the RSA|(ECDH/RSA)| (ECDH/ECDSA) 
+%% with RC4 cipher suites, only supported if explicitly set by user. 
+%% Are not considered secure any more. Other RC4 suites already
+%% belonged to the user configured only category.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+rc4_suites({3, 0}) ->
+    [?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5];
+rc4_suites({3, N}) when N =< 3 ->
+    [?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
+     ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA].
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec des_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [cipher_suite()].
+%%
+%% Description: Returns a list of the cipher suites
+%% with DES cipher, only supported if explicitly set by user. 
+%% Are not considered secure any more. 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+des_suites(_)->
+    [?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+     ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA].
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> int_cipher_suite().
+-spec suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> erl_cipher_suite().
 %%
 %% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition.
 %% Note: Currently not supported suites are commented away.
@@ -387,6 +553,19 @@ suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) ->
 
 %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487
 
+suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+
 suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) ->
     {psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf};
 suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) ->
@@ -506,7 +685,73 @@ suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) ->
 suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) ->
     {ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256};
 suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) ->
-    {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}.
+    {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384};
+
+%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {dhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {dhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {dh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {dh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {dhe_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {dhe_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {dh_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {dh_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+
+%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    {ecdh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+
+%% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) ->
+    {ecdhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) ->
+    {ecdhe_ecdsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) ->
+    {dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec erl_suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> erl_cipher_suite().
+%%
+%% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. Filters last value
+%% for now (compatibility reasons).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+erl_suite_definition(S) ->
+    case suite_definition(S) of
+	{KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, default_prf} ->
+	    {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash};
+	Suite ->
+	    Suite
+    end.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec suite(erl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite().
@@ -610,6 +855,19 @@ suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) ->
 
 %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487
 
+suite({psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+
 suite({psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) ->
     ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256;
 suite({psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) ->
@@ -714,22 +972,75 @@ suite({ecdh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) ->
     ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA;
 
 %%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites
-suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) ->
+suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) ->
     ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256;
-suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) ->
+suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) ->
     ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384;
-suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) ->
+suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) ->
     ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256;
-suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) ->
+suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) ->
     ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384;
-suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) ->
+suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) ->
     ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256;
-suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) ->
+suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) ->
     ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384;
-suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) ->
+suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) ->
     ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256;
-suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) ->
-    ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.
+suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384;
+
+%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+suite({rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({dh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({dh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({dh_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({dh_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+
+%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+    ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+
+
+%% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites
+suite({ecdhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256;
+suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256;
+suite({dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) ->
+    ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec openssl_suite(openssl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite().
@@ -844,7 +1155,47 @@ openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384") ->
 openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256") ->
     ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256;
 openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384") ->
-    ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.
+    ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384;
+
+%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+openssl_suite("AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+    ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+    ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+    ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+    ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+    ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+    ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+    ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+    ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+    ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+    ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+
+%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+    ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+    ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+    ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+    ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+    ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+    ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+    ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+    ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec openssl_suite_name(cipher_suite()) -> openssl_cipher_suite().
@@ -981,6 +1332,46 @@ openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) ->
 openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) ->
     "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384";
 
+%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    "AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    "AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    "DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    "DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    "DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    "DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    "DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    "DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+
+%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+    "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+    "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+
 %% No oppenssl name
 openssl_suite_name(Cipher) ->
     suite_definition(Cipher).
@@ -988,7 +1379,8 @@ openssl_suite_name(Cipher) ->
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec filter(undefined | binary(), [cipher_suite()]) -> [cipher_suite()].
 %%
-%% Description: .
+%% Description: Select the cipher suites that can be used together with the 
+%% supplied certificate. (Server side functionality)  
 %%-------------------------------------------------------------------
 filter(undefined, Ciphers) -> 
     Ciphers;
@@ -1009,6 +1401,7 @@ filter(DerCert, Ciphers) ->
 		filter_keyuse(OtpCert, (Ciphers -- rsa_keyed_suites()) -- dsa_signed_suites(),
 			      [], ecdhe_ecdsa_suites())
 	end,
+
     case public_key:pkix_sign_types(SigAlg#'SignatureAlgorithm'.algorithm) of
 	{_, rsa} ->
 	    Ciphers1 -- ecdsa_signed_suites();
@@ -1021,20 +1414,16 @@ filter(DerCert, Ciphers) ->
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec filter_suites([cipher_suite()]) -> [cipher_suite()].
 %%
-%% Description: filter suites for algorithms
+%% Description: Filter suites for algorithms supported by crypto.
 %%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-filter_suites(Suites = [{_,_,_}|_]) ->
+filter_suites(Suites = [Value|_]) when is_tuple(Value) ->
     Algos = crypto:supports(),
+    Hashs =  proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos),
     lists:filter(fun({KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}) ->
 			 is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange,  proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso
 			     is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher,  proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso
-			     is_acceptable_hash(Hash,  proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos))
-		 end, Suites);
-
-filter_suites(Suites = [{_,_,_,_}|_]) ->
-    Algos = crypto:supports(),
-    Hashs =  proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos),
-    lists:filter(fun({KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf}) ->
+			     is_acceptable_hash(Hash,  proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos));
+		    ({KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf}) ->
 			 is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso
 			     is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso
 			     is_acceptable_hash(Hash, Hashs) andalso
@@ -1062,6 +1451,13 @@ is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos)
 is_acceptable_keyexchange(_, _) ->
     true.
 
+is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, Algos)
+  when Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
+       Cipher == aes_256_gcm ->
+    proplists:get_bool(aes_gcm, Algos);
+is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, Algos)
+  when Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
+    proplists:get_bool(Cipher, Algos);
 is_acceptable_cipher(_, _) ->
     true.
 
@@ -1075,6 +1471,19 @@ is_acceptable_prf(default_prf, _) ->
 is_acceptable_prf(Prf, Algos) ->
     proplists:get_bool(Prf, Algos).
 
+is_fallback(CipherSuites)->
+    lists:member(?TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV, CipherSuites).
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec random_bytes(integer()) -> binary().
+
+%%
+%% Description: Generates cryptographically secure random sequence 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+random_bytes(N) ->
+    crypto:strong_rand_bytes(N).
+
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %%% Internal functions
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1089,7 +1498,12 @@ bulk_cipher_algorithm('3des_ede_cbc') ->
     ?'3DES';
 bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
 				   Cipher == aes_256_cbc ->
-    ?AES.
+    ?AES_CBC;
+bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
+				   Cipher == aes_256_gcm ->
+    ?AES_GCM;
+bulk_cipher_algorithm(chacha20_poly1305) ->
+    ?CHACHA20_POLY1305.
 
 type(Cipher) when Cipher == null;
 		  Cipher == rc4_128 ->
@@ -1099,7 +1513,11 @@ type(Cipher) when Cipher == des_cbc;
 		  Cipher == '3des_ede_cbc';
 		  Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
 		  Cipher == aes_256_cbc ->
-    ?BLOCK.
+    ?BLOCK;
+type(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
+		  Cipher == aes_256_gcm;
+		  Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
+    ?AEAD.
 
 key_material(null) ->
     0;
@@ -1112,6 +1530,12 @@ key_material('3des_ede_cbc') ->
 key_material(aes_128_cbc) ->
     16;
 key_material(aes_256_cbc) ->
+    32;
+key_material(aes_128_gcm) ->
+    16;
+key_material(aes_256_gcm) ->
+    32;
+key_material(chacha20_poly1305) ->
     32.
 
 expanded_key_material(null) ->
@@ -1123,7 +1547,10 @@ expanded_key_material(Cipher) when Cipher == des_cbc ->
 expanded_key_material('3des_ede_cbc') ->
     24;
 expanded_key_material(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
- 				   Cipher == aes_256_cbc ->
+				   Cipher == aes_256_cbc;
+				   Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
+				   Cipher == aes_256_gcm;
+				   Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
     unknown.  
 
 
@@ -1132,16 +1559,25 @@ effective_key_bits(null) ->
 effective_key_bits(des_cbc) ->
     56;
 effective_key_bits(Cipher) when Cipher == rc4_128;
-				Cipher == aes_128_cbc ->
+				Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
+				Cipher == aes_128_gcm ->
     128;
 effective_key_bits('3des_ede_cbc') ->
     168;
-effective_key_bits(aes_256_cbc) ->
+effective_key_bits(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_256_cbc;
+				Cipher == aes_256_gcm;
+				Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
     256.
 
 iv_size(Cipher) when Cipher == null;
-		     Cipher == rc4_128 ->
+		     Cipher == rc4_128;
+		     Cipher == chacha20_poly1305->
     0;
+
+iv_size(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
+		     Cipher == aes_256_gcm ->
+    4;
+
 iv_size(Cipher) ->
     block_size(Cipher).
 
@@ -1150,7 +1586,10 @@ block_size(Cipher) when Cipher == des_cbc;
     8;
 
 block_size(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
-			Cipher == aes_256_cbc ->
+			Cipher == aes_256_cbc;
+			Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
+			Cipher == aes_256_gcm;
+			Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
     16.
 
 prf_algorithm(default_prf, {3, N}) when N >= 3 ->
@@ -1173,7 +1612,9 @@ hash_algorithm(?SHA) -> sha;
 hash_algorithm(?SHA224) -> sha224;
 hash_algorithm(?SHA256) -> sha256;
 hash_algorithm(?SHA384) -> sha384;
-hash_algorithm(?SHA512) -> sha512.
+hash_algorithm(?SHA512) -> sha512;
+hash_algorithm(Other)  when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 7) and (Other =< 223)) -> unassigned;
+hash_algorithm(Other)  when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 224) and (Other =< 255)) -> Other.
 
 sign_algorithm(anon)  -> ?ANON;
 sign_algorithm(rsa)   -> ?RSA;
@@ -1182,7 +1623,9 @@ sign_algorithm(ecdsa) -> ?ECDSA;
 sign_algorithm(?ANON) -> anon;
 sign_algorithm(?RSA) -> rsa;
 sign_algorithm(?DSA) -> dsa;
-sign_algorithm(?ECDSA) -> ecdsa.
+sign_algorithm(?ECDSA) -> ecdsa;
+sign_algorithm(Other) when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 4) and (Other =< 223)) -> unassigned;
+sign_algorithm(Other) when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 224) and (Other =< 255)) -> Other.
 
 hash_size(null) ->
     0;
@@ -1191,15 +1634,15 @@ hash_size(md5) ->
 hash_size(sha) ->
     20;
 %% Uncomment when adding cipher suite that needs it
-%% hash_size(sha224) ->
-%%     28;
+%hash_size(sha224) ->
+%    28;
 hash_size(sha256) ->
     32;
 hash_size(sha384) ->
     48.
 %% Uncomment when adding cipher suite that needs it
-%% hash_size(sha512) ->
-%%     64.
+%hash_size(sha512) ->
+%    64.
 
 %% RFC 5246: 6.2.3.2.  CBC Block Cipher
 %%
@@ -1255,19 +1698,21 @@ generic_stream_cipher_from_bin(T, HashSz) ->
     #generic_stream_cipher{content=Content,
 			   mac=Mac}.
 
-%% For interoperability reasons we do not check the padding content in
-%% SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 as it is not strictly required and breaks
-%% interopability with for instance Google. 
 is_correct_padding(#generic_block_cipher{padding_length = Len,
-										 padding = Padding}, {3, N})
-  when N == 0; N == 1 ->
-    Len == byte_size(Padding); 
-%% Padding must be check in TLS 1.1 and after  
+					 padding = Padding}, {3, 0}, _) ->
+    Len == byte_size(Padding); %% Only length check is done in SSL 3.0 spec
+%% For interoperability reasons it is possible to disable
+%% the padding check when using TLS 1.0, as it is not strictly required 
+%% in the spec (only recommended), howerver this makes TLS 1.0 vunrable to the Poodle attack 
+%% so by default this clause will not match
+is_correct_padding(GenBlockCipher, {3, 1}, false) ->
+    is_correct_padding(GenBlockCipher, {3, 0}, false);
+%% Padding must be checked in TLS 1.1 and after  
 is_correct_padding(#generic_block_cipher{padding_length = Len,
-										 padding = Padding}, _) ->
+					 padding = Padding}, _, _) ->
     Len == byte_size(Padding) andalso
 		list_to_binary(lists:duplicate(Len, Len)) == Padding.
-										      
+
 get_padding(Length, BlockSize) ->
     get_padding_aux(BlockSize, Length rem BlockSize).
 
@@ -1279,7 +1724,7 @@ get_padding_aux(BlockSize, PadLength) ->
 
 random_iv(IV) ->
     IVSz = byte_size(IV),
-    ssl:random_bytes(IVSz).
+    random_bytes(IVSz).
 
 next_iv(Bin, IV) ->
     BinSz = byte_size(Bin),
@@ -1291,7 +1736,7 @@ next_iv(Bin, IV) ->
 rsa_signed_suites() ->
     dhe_rsa_suites() ++ rsa_suites() ++
 	psk_rsa_suites() ++ srp_rsa_suites() ++
-	ecdh_rsa_suites().
+	ecdh_rsa_suites() ++ ecdhe_rsa_suites().
 
 rsa_keyed_suites() ->
     dhe_rsa_suites() ++ rsa_suites() ++
@@ -1304,10 +1749,16 @@ dhe_rsa_suites() ->
      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-     ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA].
+     ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+     ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+    ].
 
 psk_rsa_suites() ->
-    [?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+    [?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
      ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
@@ -1327,7 +1778,9 @@ rsa_suites() ->
      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
-     ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA].
+     ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+     ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384].
 
 ecdh_rsa_suites() ->
     [?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
@@ -1336,7 +1789,9 @@ ecdh_rsa_suites() ->
      ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
-     ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384].
+     ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384].
 
 ecdhe_rsa_suites() ->
     [?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
@@ -1345,7 +1800,10 @@ ecdhe_rsa_suites() ->
      ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
-     ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384].
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256].
 
 dsa_signed_suites() ->
     dhe_dss_suites() ++ srp_dss_suites().
@@ -1356,7 +1814,9 @@ dhe_dss_suites()  ->
      ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-     ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA].
+     ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384].
 
 srp_dss_suites() ->
     [?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
@@ -1380,7 +1840,9 @@ ecdh_ecdsa_suites() ->
      ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
-     ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384].
+     ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384].
 
 ecdhe_ecdsa_suites() ->
     [?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
@@ -1389,7 +1851,10 @@ ecdhe_ecdsa_suites() ->
      ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
      ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
-     ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384].
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256].
 
 filter_keyuse(OtpCert, Ciphers, Suites, SignSuites) ->
     TBSCert = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate, 
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl
index c7c71ee1a7..8e8f3d9c67 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -26,15 +27,6 @@
 -ifndef(ssl_cipher).
 -define(ssl_cipher, true).
 
--type cipher()            :: null |rc4_128 | idea_cbc | des40_cbc | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' 
-			   | aes_128_cbc |  aes_256_cbc.
--type hash()              :: null | sha | md5 | ssh224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512.
--type erl_cipher_suite()  :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()}.
--type int_cipher_suite()  :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash(), hash() | default_prf}.
--type cipher_suite()      :: binary().
--type cipher_enum()        :: integer().
--type openssl_cipher_suite()  :: string().
-
 %%% SSL cipher protocol  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 -define(CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC_PROTO, 1).           % _PROTO to not clash with 
 						% SSL record protocol
@@ -55,7 +47,8 @@
 -record(cipher_state, {
 	  iv,
 	  key,
-	  state
+	  state,
+	  nonce
 	 }).
 
 %%% TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL is specified and is the initial state of a
@@ -364,6 +357,10 @@
 %% hello extension data as they should.
 -define(TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#FF)>>).
 
+%% TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol
+%% Downgrade Attacks
+-define(TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV, <<?BYTE(16#56), ?BYTE(16#00)>>).
+
 %%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279
 
 %%      TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              = { 0x00, 0x8A };
@@ -404,6 +401,24 @@
 
 %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487
 
+%%      TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       = {0x00,0xA8};
+-define(TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A8)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       = {0x00,0xA9};
+-define(TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A9)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   = {0x00,0xAA};
+-define(TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#AA)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   = {0x00,0xAB};
+-define(TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#AB)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   = {0x00,0xAC};
+-define(TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#AC)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   = {0x00,0xAD};
+-define(TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#AD)>>).
+
 %%      TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256       = {0x00,0xAE};
 -define(TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#AE)>>).
 
@@ -469,4 +484,79 @@
 %%      TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA  = { 0xC0,0x22 };
 -define(TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#22)>>).
 
+%%% AES-GCM Cipher Suites RFC 5288
+
+%%      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256     = {0x00,0x9C}
+-define(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#9C)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384     = {0x00,0x9D}
+-define(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#9D)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0x9E}
+-define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#9E)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0x9F}
+-define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#9F)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0x00,0xA0}
+-define(TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A0)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0x00,0xA1}
+-define(TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A1)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA2}
+-define(TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A2)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xA3}
+-define(TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A3)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0x00,0xA4}
+-define(TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A4)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0x00,0xA5}
+-define(TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A5)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA6}
+-define(TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A6)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xA7}
+-define(TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A7)>>).
+
+%%% ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites RFC 5289
+
+%%      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0xC0,0x2B};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#2B)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xC0,0x2C};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#2C)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   = {0xC0,0x2D};
+-define(TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#2D)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   = {0xC0,0x2E};
+-define(TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#2E)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x2F};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#2F)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x30};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#30)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256     = {0xC0,0x31};
+-define(TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#31)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384     = {0xC0,0x32};
+-define(TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#32)>>).
+
+%%% Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04
+
+%%      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256   = {0xcc, 0x13}
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#13)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xcc, 0x14}
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#14)>>).
+
+%%      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256     = {0xcc, 0x15}
+-define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#15)>>).
+
 -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_cipher).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_config.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_config.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0652d029c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_config.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+
+%%
+
+-module(ssl_config).
+
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_connection.hrl").
+-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). 
+
+-export([init/2]).
+
+init(SslOpts, Role) ->
+    
+    init_manager_name(SslOpts#ssl_options.erl_dist),
+
+    {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, CRLDbHandle, OwnCert} 
+	= init_certificates(SslOpts, Role),
+    PrivateKey =
+	init_private_key(PemCacheHandle, SslOpts#ssl_options.key, SslOpts#ssl_options.keyfile,
+			 SslOpts#ssl_options.password, Role),
+    DHParams = init_diffie_hellman(PemCacheHandle, SslOpts#ssl_options.dh, SslOpts#ssl_options.dhfile, Role),
+    {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, CacheHandle, CRLDbHandle, OwnCert, PrivateKey, DHParams}.
+
+init_manager_name(false) ->
+    put(ssl_manager, ssl_manager:manager_name(normal));
+init_manager_name(true) ->
+    put(ssl_manager, ssl_manager:manager_name(dist)).
+
+init_certificates(#ssl_options{cacerts = CaCerts,
+			       cacertfile = CACertFile,
+			       certfile = CertFile,			   
+			       cert = Cert,
+			       crl_cache = CRLCache
+			      }, Role) ->
+    {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, CRLDbInfo} =
+	try 
+	    Certs = case CaCerts of
+			undefined ->
+			    CACertFile;
+			_ ->
+			    {der, CaCerts}
+		    end,
+	    {ok, _, _, _, _, _, _} = ssl_manager:connection_init(Certs, Role, CRLCache)
+	catch
+	    _:Reason ->
+		file_error(CACertFile, {cacertfile, Reason})
+	end,
+    init_certificates(Cert, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, 
+		      CacheHandle, CRLDbInfo, CertFile, Role).
+
+init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, 
+		  CRLDbInfo, <<>>, _) ->
+    {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, CRLDbInfo, undefined};
+
+init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, 
+		  CacheHandle, CRLDbInfo, CertFile, client) ->
+    try 
+	%% Ignoring potential proxy-certificates see: 
+	%% http://dev.globus.org/wiki/Security/ProxyFileFormat
+	[OwnCert|_] = ssl_certificate:file_to_certificats(CertFile, PemCacheHandle),
+	{ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, CRLDbInfo, OwnCert}
+    catch _Error:_Reason  ->
+	    {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, CRLDbInfo, undefined}
+    end;
+
+init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, 
+		  PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, CRLDbInfo, CertFile, server) ->
+    try
+	[OwnCert|_] = ssl_certificate:file_to_certificats(CertFile, PemCacheHandle),
+	{ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, CRLDbInfo, OwnCert}
+    catch
+	_:Reason ->
+	    file_error(CertFile, {certfile, Reason})	    
+    end;
+init_certificates(Cert, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, CRLDbInfo, _, _) ->
+    {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, CRLDbInfo, Cert}.
+
+init_private_key(_, undefined, <<>>, _Password, _Client) ->
+    undefined;
+init_private_key(DbHandle, undefined, KeyFile, Password, _) ->
+    try
+	{ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(KeyFile, DbHandle),
+	[PemEntry] = [PemEntry || PemEntry = {PKey, _ , _} <- List,
+				  PKey =:= 'RSAPrivateKey' orelse
+				      PKey =:= 'DSAPrivateKey' orelse
+				      PKey =:= 'ECPrivateKey' orelse
+				      PKey =:= 'PrivateKeyInfo'
+		     ],
+	private_key(public_key:pem_entry_decode(PemEntry, Password))
+    catch 
+	_:Reason ->
+	    file_error(KeyFile, {keyfile, Reason}) 
+    end;
+
+init_private_key(_,{Asn1Type, PrivateKey},_,_,_) ->
+    private_key(init_private_key(Asn1Type, PrivateKey)).
+
+init_private_key(Asn1Type, PrivateKey) ->
+    public_key:der_decode(Asn1Type, PrivateKey).
+
+private_key(#'PrivateKeyInfo'{privateKeyAlgorithm =
+				 #'PrivateKeyInfo_privateKeyAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'rsaEncryption'},
+			     privateKey = Key}) ->
+    public_key:der_decode('RSAPrivateKey', iolist_to_binary(Key));
+
+private_key(#'PrivateKeyInfo'{privateKeyAlgorithm =
+				 #'PrivateKeyInfo_privateKeyAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'id-dsa'},
+			     privateKey = Key}) ->
+    public_key:der_decode('DSAPrivateKey', iolist_to_binary(Key));
+
+private_key(Key) ->
+    Key.
+
+-spec(file_error(_,_) -> no_return()).
+file_error(File, Throw) ->
+    case Throw of
+	{Opt,{badmatch, {error, {badmatch, Error}}}} ->
+	    throw({options, {Opt, binary_to_list(File), Error}});
+	_ ->
+	    throw(Throw)
+    end.
+
+init_diffie_hellman(_,Params, _,_) when is_binary(Params)->
+    public_key:der_decode('DHParameter', Params);
+init_diffie_hellman(_,_,_, client) ->
+    undefined;
+init_diffie_hellman(_,_,undefined, _) ->
+    ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS;
+init_diffie_hellman(DbHandle,_, DHParamFile, server) ->
+    try
+	{ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(DHParamFile,DbHandle),
+	case [Entry || Entry = {'DHParameter', _ , _} <- List] of
+	    [Entry] ->
+		public_key:pem_entry_decode(Entry);
+	    [] ->
+		?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS
+	end
+    catch
+	_:Reason ->
+	    file_error(DHParamFile, {dhfile, Reason}) 
+    end.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..53282998d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,2059 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+
+%%
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: Common handling of a TLS/SSL/DTLS connection, see also
+%% tls_connection.erl and dtls_connection.erl
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-module(ssl_connection).
+
+-include("ssl_api.hrl").
+-include("ssl_connection.hrl").
+-include("ssl_handshake.hrl").
+-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
+-include("ssl_record.hrl").
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_srp.hrl").
+-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
+
+%% Setup
+-export([connect/8, ssl_accept/7, handshake/2, handshake/3,
+	 socket_control/4, socket_control/5, start_or_recv_cancel_timer/2]).
+
+%% User Events 
+-export([send/2, recv/3, close/2, shutdown/2,
+	 new_user/2, get_opts/2, set_opts/2, session_info/1, 
+	 peer_certificate/1, renegotiation/1, negotiated_protocol/1, prf/5,
+	 connection_information/1
+	]).
+
+%% General gen_statem state functions with extra callback argument 
+%% to determine if it is an SSL/TLS or DTLS gen_statem machine
+-export([init/4, hello/4, abbreviated/4, certify/4, cipher/4, connection/4, downgrade/4]).
+
+%% gen_statem callbacks
+-export([terminate/3, format_status/2]).
+
+%%
+-export([handle_info/3, handle_call/5, handle_session/7, ssl_config/3,
+	 prepare_connection/2, hibernate_after/3]).
+
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Internal application API
+%%====================================================================	     
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec connect(tls_connection | dtls_connection,
+	      host(), inet:port_number(), port(),
+	      {#ssl_options{}, #socket_options{},
+	       %% Tracker only needed on server side
+	       undefined},
+	      pid(), tuple(), timeout()) ->
+		     {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Connect to an ssl server.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+connect(Connection, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo, Timeout) ->
+    try Connection:start_fsm(client, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo,
+			     Timeout)
+    catch
+	exit:{noproc, _} ->
+	    {error, ssl_not_started}
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec ssl_accept(tls_connection | dtls_connection,
+		 inet:port_number(), port(),
+		 {#ssl_options{}, #socket_options{}, undefined | pid()},
+		 pid(), tuple(), timeout()) ->
+			{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Performs accept on an ssl listen socket. e.i. performs
+%%              ssl handshake. 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+ssl_accept(Connection, Port, Socket, Opts, User, CbInfo, Timeout) ->
+    try Connection:start_fsm(server, "localhost", Port, Socket, Opts, User, 
+		  CbInfo, Timeout)
+    catch
+	exit:{noproc, _} ->
+	    {error, ssl_not_started}
+    end.	
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec handshake(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) ->  ok | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Starts ssl handshake. 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+handshake(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Timeout) ->  
+    case call(Pid, {start, Timeout}) of
+	connected ->
+	    ok;
+ 	Error ->
+	    Error
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec handshake(#sslsocket{}, {#ssl_options{},#socket_options{}},
+		timeout()) ->  ok | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Starts ssl handshake with some new options 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+handshake(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, SslOptions, Timeout) ->  
+    case call(Pid, {start, SslOptions, Timeout}) of
+	connected ->
+	    ok;
+ 	Error ->
+	    Error
+    end.
+
+%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec socket_control(tls_connection | dtls_connection, port(), pid(), atom()) -> 
+    {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.  
+%%
+%% Description: Set the ssl process to own the accept socket
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------	    
+socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport) ->
+    socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport, undefined).
+
+%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec socket_control(tls_connection | dtls_connection, port(), pid(), atom(), pid()| undefined) -> 
+    {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.  
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------	    
+socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport, ListenTracker) ->
+    case Transport:controlling_process(Socket, Pid) of
+	ok ->
+	    {ok, ssl_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, ListenTracker)};
+	{error, Reason}	->
+	    {error, Reason}
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec send(pid(), iodata()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Sends data over the ssl connection
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+send(Pid, Data) -> 
+    call(Pid, {application_data, 
+				    %% iolist_to_binary should really
+				    %% be called iodata_to_binary()
+				    erlang:iolist_to_binary(Data)}).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec recv(pid(), integer(), timeout()) ->  
+    {ok, binary() | list()} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description:  Receives data when active = false
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+recv(Pid, Length, Timeout) -> 
+    call(Pid, {recv, Length, Timeout}).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec connection_information(pid()) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Get the SNI hostname
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+connection_information(Pid) when is_pid(Pid) ->
+    call(Pid, connection_information).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec close(pid(), {close, Timeout::integer() | 
+				    {NewController::pid(), Timeout::integer()}}) -> 
+		   ok | {ok, port()} | {error, reason()}.  
+%%
+%% Description:  Close an ssl connection
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+close(ConnectionPid, How) ->
+    case call(ConnectionPid, How) of
+	{error, closed} ->
+	    ok;
+	Other ->
+	    Other
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec shutdown(pid(), atom()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.  
+%%
+%% Description: Same as gen_tcp:shutdown/2
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+shutdown(ConnectionPid, How) ->
+    call(ConnectionPid, {shutdown, How}).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec new_user(pid(), pid()) ->  ok | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description:  Changes process that receives the messages when active = true
+%% or once. 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+new_user(ConnectionPid, User) ->
+    call(ConnectionPid, {new_user, User}).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec negotiated_protocol(pid()) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description:  Returns the negotiated protocol
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+negotiated_protocol(ConnectionPid) ->
+    call(ConnectionPid, negotiated_protocol).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec get_opts(pid(), list()) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}.    
+%%
+%% Description: Same as inet:getopts/2
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+get_opts(ConnectionPid, OptTags) ->
+    call(ConnectionPid, {get_opts, OptTags}).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_opts(pid(), list()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. 
+%%
+%% Description:  Same as inet:setopts/2
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_opts(ConnectionPid, Options) ->
+    call(ConnectionPid, {set_opts, Options}).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec session_info(pid()) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}. 
+%%
+%% Description:  Returns info about the ssl session
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+session_info(ConnectionPid) ->
+    call(ConnectionPid, session_info). 
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec peer_certificate(pid()) -> {ok, binary()| undefined} | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the peer cert
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+peer_certificate(ConnectionPid) ->
+    call(ConnectionPid, peer_certificate). 
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec renegotiation(pid()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
+%%
+%% Description: Starts a renegotiation of the ssl session.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+renegotiation(ConnectionPid) ->
+    call(ConnectionPid, renegotiate). 
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec prf(pid(), binary() | 'master_secret', binary(),
+	  binary() | ssl:prf_random(), non_neg_integer()) ->
+		 {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()} | {'EXIT', term()}.
+%%
+%% Description: use a ssl sessions TLS PRF to generate key material
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+prf(ConnectionPid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
+    call(ConnectionPid, {prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec handle_session(#server_hello{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(),
+		     binary(), #connection_states{}, _,_, #state{}) ->
+			    gen_statem:state_function_result().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+handle_session(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+			     compression_method = Compression}, 
+	       Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol0,
+	       #state{session = #session{session_id = OldId},
+		      negotiated_version = ReqVersion,
+			  negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol} = State0) ->
+    {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} =
+	ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
+    
+    PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion, KeyAlgorithm),
+
+	{ExpectNPN, Protocol} = case Protocol0 of
+		undefined -> {false, CurrentProtocol};
+		_ -> {ProtoExt =:= npn, Protocol0}
+	end,
+
+    State = State0#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm,
+				 negotiated_version = Version,
+			 connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+			 premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
+			 expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = ExpectNPN,
+			 negotiated_protocol = Protocol},
+    
+    case ssl_session:is_new(OldId, NewId) of
+	true ->
+	    handle_new_session(NewId, CipherSuite, Compression,
+			       State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates});
+	false ->
+	    handle_resumed_session(NewId,
+				   State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates})
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec ssl_config(#ssl_options{}, client | server, #state{}) -> #state{}.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+ssl_config(Opts, Role, State) ->
+    {ok, Ref, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, CacheHandle, CRLDbInfo, 
+     OwnCert, Key, DHParams} = 
+	ssl_config:init(Opts, Role), 
+    Handshake = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
+    TimeStamp = erlang:monotonic_time(),
+    Session = State#state.session,
+    State#state{tls_handshake_history = Handshake,
+		session = Session#session{own_certificate = OwnCert,
+					  time_stamp = TimeStamp},
+		file_ref_db = FileRefHandle,
+		cert_db_ref = Ref,
+		cert_db = CertDbHandle,
+		crl_db = CRLDbInfo,
+		session_cache = CacheHandle,
+		private_key = Key,
+		diffie_hellman_params = DHParams,
+		ssl_options = Opts}.
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% gen_statem state functions
+%%====================================================================	
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec init(gen_statem:event_type(),
+	   {start, timeout()} |  {start, {list(), list()}, timeout()}| term(),
+	    #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) ->
+		   gen_statem:state_function_result().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, State0, Connection) ->
+    Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, From),
+    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{start_or_recv_from = From,
+							  timer = Timer}),
+    Connection:next_event(hello, Record, State);
+init({call, From}, {start, {Opts, EmOpts}, Timeout}, 
+     #state{role = Role} = State0, Connection) ->
+    try 
+	State = ssl_config(Opts, Role, State0),
+	init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, 
+	     State#state{ssl_options = Opts, socket_options = EmOpts}, Connection)
+    catch throw:Error ->
+	    {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}}
+    end;
+init({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) ->
+    handle_call(Msg, From, init, State, Connection);
+init(_Type, _Event, _State, _Connection) ->
+    {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}.
+	
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec hello(gen_statem:event_type(),
+	    #hello_request{} | #server_hello{} | term(),
+	    #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) ->
+		   gen_statem:state_function_result().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+hello({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) ->
+    handle_call(Msg, From, hello, State, Connection);
+hello(internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, State, Connection) ->
+    do_server_hello(Type, ServerHelloExt, State, Connection);
+hello(info, Msg, State, _) ->
+    handle_info(Msg, hello, State);
+hello(Type, Msg, State, Connection) ->
+    handle_common_event(Type, Msg, hello, State, Connection).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec abbreviated(gen_statem:event_type(),
+		  #hello_request{} | #finished{} | term(),
+		  #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) ->
+			 gen_statem:state_function_result().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+abbreviated({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) ->
+    handle_call(Msg, From, abbreviated, State, Connection);
+
+abbreviated(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished,
+	    #state{role = server,
+		   negotiated_version = Version,
+		   expecting_finished = true,
+		   tls_handshake_history = Handshake,
+		   session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
+		   connection_states = ConnectionStates0} =
+		State0, Connection) ->
+    case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, client,
+					 get_current_prf(ConnectionStates0, write),
+					 MasterSecret, Handshake) of
+        verified ->
+	    ConnectionStates =
+		ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0),
+	    {Record, State} = prepare_connection(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+							      expecting_finished = false}, Connection),
+	    Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State);
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, abbreviated, State0)
+    end;
+
+abbreviated(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished,
+	    #state{role = client, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
+		   session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
+		   negotiated_version = Version,
+		   connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) ->
+    case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, server,
+					 get_pending_prf(ConnectionStates0, write),
+					 MasterSecret, Handshake0) of
+        verified ->
+	    ConnectionStates1 =
+		ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_read, Data, ConnectionStates0),
+	    State1 =
+		finalize_handshake(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1},
+				   abbreviated, Connection),
+	    {Record, State} = prepare_connection(State1#state{expecting_finished = false}, Connection),
+	    Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State);
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, abbreviated, State0)
+    end;
+
+%% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec
+%% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation
+abbreviated(internal, #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol},
+	    #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = State0,
+	    Connection) ->
+    {Record, State} =
+	Connection:next_record(State0#state{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol}),
+    Connection:next_event(abbreviated, Record, 
+			  State#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false});
+abbreviated(internal, 
+	    #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>},  #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} =
+		State0, Connection) ->
+    ConnectionStates1 =
+	ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{connection_states = 
+							      ConnectionStates1}),
+    Connection:next_event(abbreviated, Record, State#state{expecting_finished = true});
+abbreviated(info, Msg, State, _) ->
+    handle_info(Msg, abbreviated, State);
+abbreviated(Type, Msg, State, Connection) ->
+    handle_common_event(Type, Msg, abbreviated, State, Connection).
+ 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec certify(gen_statem:event_type(),
+	      #hello_request{} | #certificate{} |  #server_key_exchange{} |
+	      #certificate_request{} | #server_hello_done{} | #client_key_exchange{} | term(),
+	      #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) ->
+		     gen_statem:state_function_result().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+certify({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) ->
+    handle_call(Msg, From, certify, State, Connection);
+certify(info, Msg, State, _) ->
+    handle_info(Msg, certify, State);
+certify(internal, #certificate{asn1_certificates = []},
+	#state{role = server, negotiated_version = Version,
+	       ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer,
+					  fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} =
+	    State, Connection) ->
+    Alert =  ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE),
+    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State);
+
+certify(internal, #certificate{asn1_certificates = []},
+	#state{role = server,
+	       ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer,
+					  fail_if_no_peer_cert = false}} =
+	State0, Connection) ->
+    {Record, State} = 
+	Connection:next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = false}),
+    Connection:next_event(certify, Record, State);
+
+certify(internal, #certificate{},
+	#state{role = server,
+	       negotiated_version = Version,
+	       ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_none}} =
+	    State, Connection) ->
+    Alert =  ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, unrequested_certificate),
+    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State);
+
+certify(internal, #certificate{} = Cert,
+        #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+	       role = Role,
+	       cert_db = CertDbHandle,
+	       cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
+	       crl_db = CRLDbInfo,
+	       ssl_options = Opts} = State, Connection) ->
+    case ssl_handshake:certify(Cert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, 
+			       Opts#ssl_options.depth,
+			       Opts#ssl_options.verify,
+			       Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun,
+			       Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain,
+			       Opts#ssl_options.crl_check,
+			       CRLDbInfo,		       
+			       Role) of
+        {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo} ->
+	    handle_peer_cert(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo,
+			     State#state{client_certificate_requested = false}, Connection);
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+            Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State)
+    end;
+
+certify(internal, #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys},
+        #state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version,
+	       key_algorithm = Alg,
+	       public_key_info = PubKeyInfo,
+	       connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State, Connection)
+  when Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dhe_rsa;
+       Alg == ecdhe_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa;
+       Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon;
+       Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk;
+       Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon ->
+
+    Params = ssl_handshake:decode_server_key(Keys, Alg, Version),
+
+    %% Use negotiated value if TLS-1.2 otherwhise return default
+    HashSign = negotiated_hashsign(Params#server_key_params.hashsign, Alg, PubKeyInfo, Version),
+
+    case is_anonymous(Alg) of
+	true ->
+	    calculate_secret(Params#server_key_params.params,
+			     State#state{hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}, Connection);
+	false ->
+	    case  ssl_handshake:verify_server_key(Params, HashSign, 
+						  ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) of
+		true ->
+		    calculate_secret(Params#server_key_params.params,
+				     State#state{hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}, 
+				     Connection);
+		false ->
+		    Connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR),
+						Version, certify, State)
+	    end
+    end;
+
+certify(internal, #certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = HashSigns},
+	#state{session = #session{own_certificate = Cert},
+	       key_algorithm = KeyExAlg,
+	       ssl_options = #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns},
+	       negotiated_version = Version} = State0, Connection) ->
+
+    case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, Version) of
+	#alert {} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0);
+	NegotiatedHashSign -> 
+	    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = true}),
+	    Connection:next_event(certify, Record,
+				  State#state{cert_hashsign_algorithm = NegotiatedHashSign})
+    end;
+
+%% PSK and RSA_PSK might bypass the Server-Key-Exchange
+certify(internal, #server_hello_done{},
+	#state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined},
+	       negotiated_version = Version,
+	       psk_identity = PSKIdentity,
+	       ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup},
+	       premaster_secret = undefined,
+	       role = client,
+	       key_algorithm = Alg} = State0, Connection)
+  when Alg == psk ->
+    case ssl_handshake:premaster_secret({Alg, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) of
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0);
+	PremasterSecret ->
+	    State = master_secret(PremasterSecret,
+				  State0#state{premaster_secret = PremasterSecret}),
+	    client_certify_and_key_exchange(State, Connection)
+    end;
+
+certify(internal, #server_hello_done{},
+	#state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined},
+	       ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup},
+	       negotiated_version = {Major, Minor} = Version,
+	       psk_identity = PSKIdentity,
+	       premaster_secret = undefined,
+	       role = client,
+	       key_algorithm = Alg} = State0, Connection)
+  when Alg == rsa_psk ->
+    Rand = ssl_cipher:random_bytes(?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES-2),
+    RSAPremasterSecret = <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rand/binary>>,
+    case ssl_handshake:premaster_secret({Alg, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, 
+					RSAPremasterSecret) of
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0);
+	PremasterSecret ->
+	    State = master_secret(PremasterSecret, 
+				  State0#state{premaster_secret = RSAPremasterSecret}),
+	    client_certify_and_key_exchange(State, Connection)
+    end;
+
+%% Master secret was determined with help of server-key exchange msg
+certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, 
+	#state{session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} = Session,
+	       connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+	       negotiated_version = Version,
+	       premaster_secret = undefined,
+	       role = client} = State0, Connection) ->
+    case ssl_handshake:master_secret(record_cb(Connection), Version, Session,
+				     ConnectionStates0, client) of
+	{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
+	    State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates},
+	    client_certify_and_key_exchange(State, Connection);
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
+    end;
+
+%% Master secret is calculated from premaster_secret
+certify(internal, #server_hello_done{},
+	#state{session = Session0,
+	       connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+	       negotiated_version = Version,
+	       premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
+	       role = client} = State0, Connection) ->
+    case ssl_handshake:master_secret(record_cb(Connection), Version, PremasterSecret,
+				     ConnectionStates0, client) of
+	{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
+	    Session = Session0#session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
+	    State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+				 session = Session},
+	    client_certify_and_key_exchange(State, Connection);
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
+    end;
+
+certify(internal = Type, #client_key_exchange{} = Msg,
+	#state{role = server,
+	       client_certificate_requested = true,
+	       ssl_options = #ssl_options{fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} = State, 
+	Connection) ->
+    %% We expect a certificate here
+    handle_common_event(Type, Msg, certify, State, Connection);
+
+certify(internal, #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys},
+	State = #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg, negotiated_version = Version}, Connection) ->
+    try
+	certify_client_key_exchange(ssl_handshake:decode_client_key(Keys, KeyAlg, Version),
+				    State, Connection)
+    catch
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State)
+    end;
+
+certify(Type, Msg, State, Connection) ->
+    handle_common_event(Type, Msg, certify, State, Connection).
+ 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec cipher(gen_statem:event_type(),
+	     #hello_request{} | #certificate_verify{} | #finished{} | term(),
+	     #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) ->
+		    gen_statem:state_function_result().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+cipher({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) ->
+    handle_call(Msg, From, cipher, State, Connection);
+
+cipher(info, Msg, State, _) ->
+    handle_info(Msg, cipher, State);
+
+cipher(internal, #certificate_verify{signature = Signature, 
+				     hashsign_algorithm = CertHashSign},
+       #state{role = server,
+	      key_algorithm = KexAlg,
+	      public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo,
+	      negotiated_version = Version,
+	      session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
+	      tls_handshake_history = Handshake
+	     } = State0, Connection) ->
+    
+    %% Use negotiated value if TLS-1.2 otherwhise return default
+    HashSign = negotiated_hashsign(CertHashSign, KexAlg, PublicKeyInfo, Version),
+    case ssl_handshake:certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo,
+					  Version, HashSign, MasterSecret, Handshake) of
+	valid ->
+	    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0),
+	    Connection:next_event(cipher, Record,
+				  State#state{cert_hashsign_algorithm = HashSign});
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, cipher, State0)
+    end;
+
+%% client must send a next protocol message if we are expecting it
+cipher(internal, #finished{},
+       #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true,
+	      negotiated_protocol = undefined, negotiated_version = Version} = State0,
+       Connection) ->
+    Connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), Version, cipher, State0);
+
+cipher(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished,
+       #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+	      host = Host,
+	      port = Port,
+	      role = Role,
+	      expecting_finished = true,
+	      session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}
+	      = Session0,
+	      connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+	      tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State, Connection) ->
+    case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished,
+					 opposite_role(Role),
+					 get_current_prf(ConnectionStates0, read),
+					 MasterSecret, Handshake0) of
+        verified ->
+	    Session = register_session(Role, Host, Port, Session0),
+	    cipher_role(Role, Data, Session, 
+			State#state{expecting_finished = false}, Connection);
+        #alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, cipher, State)
+    end;
+
+%% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec
+%% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation
+cipher(internal, #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol},
+       #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true,
+	      expecting_finished = true} = State0, Connection) ->
+    {Record, State} = 
+	Connection:next_record(State0#state{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol}),
+    Connection:next_event(cipher, Record, 
+			  State#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false});
+cipher(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>},  #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} =
+	   State0, Connection) ->
+    ConnectionStates1 =
+	ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{connection_states = 
+							      ConnectionStates1}),
+    Connection:next_event(cipher, Record, State#state{expecting_finished = true});
+cipher(Type, Msg, State, Connection) ->
+    handle_common_event(Type, Msg, cipher, State, Connection).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec connection(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), 
+		 #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) ->
+			gen_statem:state_function_result().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+connection({call, From}, {application_data, Data},  
+	   #state{protocol_cb = Connection} = State, Connection) ->
+    %% We should look into having a worker process to do this to 
+    %% parallize send and receive decoding and not block the receiver
+    %% if sending is overloading the socket.
+     try
+	 Connection:write_application_data(Data, From, State)
+     catch throw:Error ->
+	     hibernate_after(connection, State, [{reply, From, Error}])
+     end;
+connection({call, RecvFrom}, {recv, N, Timeout},  
+	   #state{protocol_cb = Connection,  socket_options =
+		      #socket_options{active = false}} = State0, Connection) ->
+    Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom),
+    Connection:passive_receive(State0#state{bytes_to_read = N,
+					    start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, 
+					    timer = Timer}, connection);
+connection({call, From}, renegotiate, #state{protocol_cb = Connection} = State, 
+	   Connection) ->
+    Connection:renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, From}}, []);
+connection({call, From}, peer_certificate, 
+	   #state{session = #session{peer_certificate = Cert}} = State, _) ->
+    hibernate_after(connection, State, [{reply, From,  {ok, Cert}}]); 
+connection({call, From}, connection_information, State, _) ->
+    Info = connection_info(State),
+    hibernate_after(connection, State, [{reply, From, {ok, Info}}]);
+connection({call, From}, session_info,  #state{session = #session{session_id = Id,
+								  cipher_suite = Suite}} = State, _) ->
+    SessionInfo = [{session_id, Id}, 
+		   {cipher_suite, ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(Suite)}],
+    hibernate_after(connection, State, [{reply, From, SessionInfo}]);
+connection({call, From}, negotiated_protocol, 
+	   #state{negotiated_protocol = undefined} = State, _) ->
+    hibernate_after(connection, State, [{reply, From, {error, protocol_not_negotiated}}]);
+connection({call, From}, negotiated_protocol, 
+	   #state{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol} = State, _) ->
+    hibernate_after(connection, State,
+		    [{reply, From, {ok, SelectedProtocol}}]);
+connection({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) ->
+    handle_call(Msg, From, connection, State, Connection);
+connection(info, Msg, State, _) ->
+    handle_info(Msg, connection, State);
+connection(internal, {recv, _}, State, Connection) ->
+    Connection:passive_receive(State, connection);
+connection(Type, Msg, State, Connection) ->
+    handle_common_event(Type, Msg, connection, State, Connection).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec downgrade(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), 
+		#state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) ->
+		       gen_statem:state_function_result().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+downgrade(internal, #alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY},
+	  #state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket,
+		 downgrade = {Pid, From}} = State, _) ->
+    ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}, {packet, 0}, {mode, binary}]),
+    Transport:controlling_process(Socket, Pid),
+    gen_statem:reply(From, {ok, Socket}),
+    {stop, normal, State};
+downgrade(timeout, downgrade, #state{downgrade = {_, From}} = State, _) ->
+    gen_statem:reply(From, {error, timeout}),
+    {stop, normal, State};
+downgrade(Type, Event, State, Connection) ->
+    handle_common_event(Type, Event, downgrade, State, Connection).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Event handling functions called by state functions to handle
+%% common or unexpected events for the state.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {#hello_request{} = Handshake, _}}, connection = StateName,  
+		    #state{role = client} = State, _) ->
+    %% Should not be included in handshake history
+    {next_state, StateName, State#state{renegotiation = {true, peer}}, [{next_event, internal, Handshake}]};
+handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {#hello_request{}, _}}, StateName, #state{role = client}, _) 
+  when StateName =/= connection ->
+    {keep_state_and_data};
+handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {Handshake, Raw}}, StateName, 
+		    #state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0} = State0, Connection) ->
+    %% This function handles client SNI hello extension when Handshake is
+    %% a client_hello, which needs to be determined by the connection callback.
+    %% In other cases this is a noop
+    State = Connection:handle_sni_extension(Handshake, State0),
+    HsHist = ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hs0, Raw),
+    {next_state, StateName, State#state{tls_handshake_history = HsHist}, 
+     [{next_event, internal, Handshake}]};
+handle_common_event(internal, {tls_record, TLSRecord}, StateName, State, Connection) -> 
+    Connection:handle_common_event(internal, TLSRecord, StateName, State);
+handle_common_event(timeout, hibernate, _, _, _) ->
+    {keep_state_and_data, [hibernate]};
+handle_common_event(internal, {application_data, Data}, StateName, State0, Connection) ->
+    case Connection:read_application_data(Data, State0) of
+	{stop, Reason, State} ->
+   	    {stop, Reason, State};
+	{Record, State} ->
+   	    Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State)
+    end;
+handle_common_event(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, StateName, 
+		    #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State, Connection) ->
+    Connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), Version, 
+				StateName, State);
+handle_common_event(internal, _, _, _, _) ->
+    {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]};
+handle_common_event(_Type, Msg, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State, 
+		    Connection) ->
+    Alert =  ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE),
+    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, {StateName, Msg}, State).
+
+handle_call({application_data, _Data}, _, _, _, _) ->
+    %% In renegotiation priorities handshake, send data when handshake is finished
+    {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]};
+handle_call({close, {Pid, Timeout}}, From, StateName, State0, Connection) when is_pid(Pid) ->
+    %% terminate will send close alert to peer
+    State = State0#state{downgrade = {Pid, From}},
+    Connection:terminate(downgrade, StateName, State),
+    %% User downgrades connection
+    %% When downgrading an TLS connection to a transport connection
+    %% we must recive the close alert from the peer before releasing the 
+    %% transport socket.
+    {next_state, downgrade, State, [{timeout, Timeout, downgrade}]};
+handle_call({close, _} = Close, From, StateName, State, Connection) ->
+    %% Run terminate before returning so that the reuseaddr
+    %% inet-option 
+    Result = Connection:terminate(Close, StateName, State),
+    {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, normal},  
+     {reply, From, Result}, State};
+handle_call({shutdown, How0}, From, _,
+	    #state{transport_cb = Transport,
+		   negotiated_version = Version,
+		   connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+		   socket = Socket}, _) ->
+    case How0 of
+	How when How == write; How == both ->	    
+	    Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY),
+	    {BinMsg, _} =
+		ssl_alert:encode(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates),
+	    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg);
+	_ ->
+	    ok
+    end,
+
+    case Transport:shutdown(Socket, How0) of
+	ok ->
+	    {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, ok}]};
+	Error ->
+	    gen_statem:reply(From, {error, Error}),
+	    {stop, normal}
+    end;
+handle_call({recv, _N, _Timeout}, From, _,  
+		  #state{socket_options = 
+			     #socket_options{active = Active}}, _) when Active =/= false ->
+    {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, {error, einval}}]};
+handle_call({recv, N, Timeout}, RecvFrom, StateName, State, _) ->
+    %% Doing renegotiate wait with handling request until renegotiate is
+    %% finished. 
+    Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom),
+    {next_state, StateName, State#state{bytes_to_read = N, start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom,
+					timer = Timer}, 
+     [{next_event, internal, {recv, RecvFrom}}]};
+handle_call({new_user, User}, From, StateName, 
+		  State =#state{user_application = {OldMon, _}}, _) ->
+    NewMon = erlang:monitor(process, User),
+    erlang:demonitor(OldMon, [flush]),
+    {next_state, StateName, State#state{user_application = {NewMon,User}},
+     [{reply, From, ok}]};
+handle_call({get_opts, OptTags}, From, _,
+		  #state{socket = Socket,
+			 transport_cb = Transport,
+			 socket_options = SockOpts}, _) ->
+    OptsReply = get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, OptTags, SockOpts, []),
+    {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, OptsReply}]};
+handle_call({set_opts, Opts0}, From, StateName, 
+	    #state{socket_options = Opts1, 
+			 socket = Socket,
+			 transport_cb = Transport} = State0, _) ->
+    {Reply, Opts} = set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts0, Opts1, []),
+    State = State0#state{socket_options = Opts},
+    handle_active_option(Opts#socket_options.active, StateName, From, Reply, State);
+    
+handle_call(renegotiate, From, StateName, _, _) when StateName =/= connection ->
+    {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, {error, already_renegotiating}}]};
+handle_call({prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}, From, _,
+	    #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+		   negotiated_version = Version}, _) ->
+    ConnectionState =
+	ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    #security_parameters{master_secret = MasterSecret,
+			 client_random = ClientRandom,
+			 server_random = ServerRandom,
+			 prf_algorithm = PRFAlgorithm} = SecParams,
+    Reply = try
+		SecretToUse = case Secret of
+				  _ when is_binary(Secret) -> Secret;
+				  master_secret -> MasterSecret
+			      end,
+		SeedToUse = lists:reverse(
+			      lists:foldl(fun(X, Acc) when is_binary(X) -> [X|Acc];
+					     (client_random, Acc) -> [ClientRandom|Acc];
+					     (server_random, Acc) -> [ServerRandom|Acc]
+					  end, [], Seed)),
+		ssl_handshake:prf(Version, PRFAlgorithm, SecretToUse, Label, SeedToUse, WantedLength)
+	    catch
+		exit:_ -> {error, badarg};
+		error:Reason -> {error, Reason}
+	    end,
+    {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, Reply}]};
+handle_call(_,_,_,_,_) ->
+    {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}.
+
+handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, econnaborted}, StateName,  
+	    #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
+		   start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, role = Role,
+		   protocol_cb = Connection,
+		   error_tag = ErrorTag,
+		   tracker = Tracker} = State)  when StateName =/= connection ->
+    Connection:alert_user(Transport, Tracker,Socket, 
+			  StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role),
+    {stop, normal, State};
+
+handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket,
+							  protocol_cb = Connection,
+							  error_tag = ErrorTag} = State)  ->
+    Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Reason]),
+    error_logger:info_report(Report),
+    Connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State),
+    {stop, normal, State};
+
+handle_info({'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, _}, _, 
+	    State = #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid}}) ->
+    {stop, normal, State};   
+
+%%% So that terminate will be run when supervisor issues shutdown
+handle_info({'EXIT', _Sup, shutdown}, _StateName, State) ->
+    {stop, shutdown, State};
+handle_info({'EXIT', Socket, normal}, _StateName, #state{socket = Socket} = State) ->
+    %% Handle as transport close"
+    {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State};
+
+handle_info(allow_renegotiate, StateName, State) ->
+    {next_state, StateName, State#state{allow_renegotiate = true}};
+
+handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, StartFrom}, StateName,
+	    #state{renegotiation = {false, first}} = State) when StateName =/= connection ->
+    {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, user_timeout},  
+     {reply, StartFrom, {error, timeout}}, State#state{timer = undefined}};
+
+handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}, StateName, 
+	    #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State) when RecvFrom =/= undefined ->
+    {next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined,
+					bytes_to_read = undefined,
+					timer = undefined}, [{reply, RecvFrom, {error, timeout}}]};
+
+handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, _RecvFrom}, StateName, State) ->
+    {next_state, StateName, State#state{timer = undefined}};
+
+handle_info(Msg, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, error_tag = Tag} = State) ->
+    Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Got unexpected info: ~p ~n", [{Msg, Tag, Socket}]),
+    error_logger:info_report(Report),
+    {next_state, StateName, State}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% gen_statem callbacks
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+terminate(_, _, #state{terminated = true}) ->
+    %% Happens when user closes the connection using ssl:close/1
+    %% we want to guarantee that Transport:close has been called
+    %% when ssl:close/1 returns.
+    ok;
+
+terminate({shutdown, transport_closed} = Reason, 
+	  _StateName, #state{protocol_cb = Connection,
+			     socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport} = State) ->
+    handle_trusted_certs_db(State),
+    Connection:close(Reason, Socket, Transport, undefined, undefined);
+terminate({shutdown, own_alert}, _StateName, #state{%%send_queue = SendQueue, 
+						protocol_cb = Connection,
+						socket = Socket, 
+						transport_cb = Transport} = State) ->
+    handle_trusted_certs_db(State),
+    case application:get_env(ssl, alert_timeout) of
+	{ok, Timeout} when is_integer(Timeout) ->
+	    Connection:close({timeout, Timeout}, Socket, Transport, undefined, undefined);
+	_ ->
+	    Connection:close({timeout, ?DEFAULT_TIMEOUT}, Socket, Transport, undefined, undefined)
+    end;
+terminate(Reason, connection, #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+				     protocol_cb = Connection,
+				     connection_states = ConnectionStates0, 
+				     ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check},
+				     transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket
+				    } = State) ->
+    handle_trusted_certs_db(State),
+    {BinAlert, ConnectionStates} = terminate_alert(Reason, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+    Transport:send(Socket, BinAlert),
+    Connection:close(Reason, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check);
+
+terminate(Reason, _StateName, #state{transport_cb = Transport, protocol_cb = Connection,
+				     socket = Socket 
+				    } = State) ->
+    handle_trusted_certs_db(State),
+    Connection:close(Reason, Socket, Transport, undefined, undefined).
+
+format_status(normal, [_, StateName, State]) ->
+    [{data, [{"State", {StateName, State}}]}];  
+format_status(terminate, [_, StateName, State]) ->
+    SslOptions = (State#state.ssl_options),
+    NewOptions = SslOptions#ssl_options{password = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					cert = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					cacerts = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					key = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,			      
+					dh = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					psk_identity = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					srp_identity = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT},
+    [{data, [{"State", {StateName, State#state{connection_states = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					       protocol_buffers =  ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					       user_data_buffer = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					       tls_handshake_history =  ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					       session =  ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					       private_key =  ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					       diffie_hellman_params = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					       diffie_hellman_keys =  ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					       srp_params = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					       srp_keys =  ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					       premaster_secret =  ?SECRET_PRINTOUT,
+					       ssl_options = NewOptions,
+					       flight_buffer =  ?SECRET_PRINTOUT}
+		       }}]}].
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+connection_info(#state{sni_hostname = SNIHostname, 
+		       session = #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite}, 
+		       negotiated_version = Version, ssl_options = Opts}) ->
+    [{protocol, tls_record:protocol_version(Version)}, 
+     {cipher_suite, ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(CipherSuite)}, 
+     {sni_hostname, SNIHostname}] ++ ssl_options_list(Opts).
+
+do_server_hello(Type, #hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocols} =
+		    ServerHelloExt,
+		#state{negotiated_version = Version,
+		       session = #session{session_id = SessId},
+		       connection_states = ConnectionStates0}
+		= State0, Connection) when is_atom(Type) ->
+
+    ServerHello =
+	ssl_handshake:server_hello(SessId, Version, ConnectionStates0, ServerHelloExt),
+    State = server_hello(ServerHello,
+			 State0#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation =
+					  NextProtocols =/= undefined}, Connection),
+    case Type of
+	new ->
+	    new_server_hello(ServerHello, State, Connection);
+	resumed ->
+	    resumed_server_hello(State, Connection)
+    end.
+
+new_server_hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+			      compression_method = Compression,
+			      session_id = SessionId},
+		#state{session = Session0,
+		       negotiated_version = Version} = State0, Connection) ->
+    try server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) of
+        #state{} = State1 ->
+            State2 = server_hello_done(State1, Connection),
+	    Session =
+		Session0#session{session_id = SessionId,
+				 cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+				 compression_method = Compression},
+	    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State2#state{session = Session}),
+	    Connection:next_event(certify, Record, State)
+    catch
+        #alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0)
+    end.
+
+resumed_server_hello(#state{session = Session,
+			    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+			    negotiated_version = Version} = State0, Connection) ->
+
+    case ssl_handshake:master_secret(record_cb(Connection), Version, Session,
+				     ConnectionStates0, server) of
+	{_, ConnectionStates1} ->
+	    State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
+				  session = Session},
+	    State2 =
+		finalize_handshake(State1, abbreviated, Connection),
+	    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State2),
+	    Connection:next_event(abbreviated, Record, State);
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0)
+    end.
+
+server_hello(ServerHello, State0, Connection) ->
+    CipherSuite = ServerHello#server_hello.cipher_suite,
+    {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
+    State = Connection:queue_handshake(ServerHello, State0),
+    State#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm}.
+
+server_hello_done(State, Connection) ->
+    HelloDone = ssl_handshake:server_hello_done(),
+    Connection:send_handshake(HelloDone, State).
+
+handle_peer_cert(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo,
+		 #state{session = #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session} = State0,
+		 Connection) ->
+    State1 = State0#state{session =
+			 Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert},
+			 public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo},
+    {KeyAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
+    State2 = handle_peer_cert_key(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, KeyAlg, State1),
+
+    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State2),
+    Connection:next_event(certify, Record, State).
+
+handle_peer_cert_key(client, _,
+		     {?'id-ecPublicKey',  #'ECPoint'{point = _ECPoint} = PublicKey,
+		      PublicKeyParams},
+		     KeyAlg, State)  when KeyAlg == ecdh_rsa;
+					  KeyAlg == ecdh_ecdsa ->
+    ECDHKey = public_key:generate_key(PublicKeyParams),
+    PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(PublicKey, ECDHKey),
+    master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey});
+
+%% We do currently not support cipher suites that use fixed DH.
+%% If we want to implement that the following clause can be used
+%% to extract DH parameters form cert.
+%% handle_peer_cert_key(client, _PeerCert, {?dhpublicnumber, PublicKey, PublicKeyParams},
+%%                      {_,SignAlg},
+%% 		        #state{diffie_hellman_keys = {_, MyPrivatKey}} = State) when
+%%                                                                           SignAlg == dh_rsa;
+%% 									     SignAlg == dh_dss ->
+%%     dh_master_secret(PublicKeyParams, PublicKey, MyPrivatKey, State);
+handle_peer_cert_key(_, _, _, _, State) ->
+    State.
+
+certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client,
+		      cert_db = CertDbHandle,
+                      cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
+		      session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert}}
+	       = State, Connection) ->
+    Certificate = ssl_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client),
+    Connection:queue_handshake(Certificate, State);
+
+certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State, _) ->
+    State.
+
+verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client,
+			  negotiated_version = Version,
+			  private_key = PrivateKey,
+			  session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret,
+					     own_certificate = OwnCert},
+			  cert_hashsign_algorithm = HashSign,
+			  tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State, Connection) ->
+
+    case ssl_handshake:client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret,
+						 Version, HashSign, PrivateKey, Handshake0) of
+        #certificate_verify{} = Verified ->
+           Connection:queue_handshake(Verified, State);
+	ignore ->
+	    State;
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    throw(Alert)
+    end;
+verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State, _) ->
+    State.
+
+client_certify_and_key_exchange(#state{negotiated_version = Version} =
+				State0, Connection) ->
+    try do_client_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) of
+        State1 = #state{} ->
+	    State2 = finalize_handshake(State1, certify, Connection),
+            State3 = State2#state{
+		       %% Reinitialize
+		       client_certificate_requested = false},
+	    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State3),
+	    Connection:next_event(cipher, Record, State)
+    catch
+        throw:#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
+    end.
+
+do_client_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) ->
+    State1 = certify_client(State0, Connection),
+    State2 = key_exchange(State1, Connection),
+    verify_client_cert(State2, Connection).
+
+server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) ->
+    State1 = certify_server(State0, Connection),
+    State2 = key_exchange(State1, Connection),
+    request_client_cert(State2, Connection).
+
+certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS},
+			    #state{private_key = Key} = State, Connection) ->
+    PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
+    calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher);
+
+certify_client_key_exchange(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey},
+			    #state{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params,
+				   diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} = State,
+			    Connection) ->
+    PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientPublicDhKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, Params),
+    calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher);
+
+certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicEcDhPoint},
+			    #state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey} = State, Connection) ->
+    PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ClientPublicEcDhPoint}, ECDHKey),
+    calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher);
+
+certify_client_key_exchange(#client_psk_identity{} = ClientKey,
+			    #state{ssl_options = 
+				       #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State0,
+			    Connection) ->
+    PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, PSKLookup),
+    calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher);
+
+certify_client_key_exchange(#client_dhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey,
+			    #state{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params,
+				   diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey},
+				   ssl_options = 
+				       #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State0,
+			    Connection) ->
+    PremasterSecret = 
+	ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, Params, PSKLookup),
+    calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher);
+certify_client_key_exchange(#client_rsa_psk_identity{} = ClientKey,
+			    #state{private_key = Key,
+				   ssl_options = 
+				       #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State0,
+			    Connection) ->
+    PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, Key, PSKLookup),
+    calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher);
+
+certify_client_key_exchange(#client_srp_public{} = ClientKey,
+			    #state{srp_params = Params,
+				   srp_keys = Key
+				  } = State0, Connection) ->
+    PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, Key, Params),
+    calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher).
+
+certify_server(#state{key_algorithm = Algo} = State, _) when Algo == dh_anon; 
+							     Algo == ecdh_anon; 
+							     Algo == psk; 
+							     Algo == dhe_psk; 
+							     Algo == srp_anon  ->
+    State;
+
+certify_server(#state{cert_db = CertDbHandle,
+		      cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
+		      session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert}} = State, Connection) ->
+    case ssl_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) of
+	Cert = #certificate{} ->
+	    Connection:queue_handshake(Cert, State);
+	Alert = #alert{} ->
+	    throw(Alert)
+    end.
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa} = State,_) ->
+    State;
+key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
+		    hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
+		    diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params,
+		    private_key = PrivateKey,
+		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+		    negotiated_version = Version
+		   } = State0, Connection)
+  when Algo == dhe_dss;
+       Algo == dhe_rsa;
+       Algo == dh_anon ->
+    DHKeys = public_key:generate_key(Params),
+    ConnectionState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
+			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+    Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, DHKeys, Params,
+					       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
+					       ServerRandom,
+					       PrivateKey}),
+    State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0),
+    State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys};
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = server, private_key = Key, key_algorithm = Algo} = State, _)
+  when Algo == ecdh_ecdsa; Algo == ecdh_rsa ->
+    State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Key};
+key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
+		    hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
+		    private_key = PrivateKey,
+		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+		    negotiated_version = Version
+		   } = State0, Connection)
+  when Algo == ecdhe_ecdsa; Algo == ecdhe_rsa;
+       Algo == ecdh_anon ->
+
+    ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(select_curve(State0)),
+    ConnectionState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
+			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdh, ECDHKeys,
+							HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
+							ServerRandom,
+							PrivateKey}),
+    State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0),
+    State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys};
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk,
+		    ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State, _) ->
+    State;
+key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk,
+		    ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint},
+		    hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
+		    private_key = PrivateKey,
+		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+		    negotiated_version = Version
+		   } = State0, Connection) ->
+    ConnectionState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
+			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+    Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
+						       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
+						       ServerRandom,
+						       PrivateKey}),
+    Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0);
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk,
+		    ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint},
+		    hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
+		    diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params,
+		    private_key = PrivateKey,
+		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+		    negotiated_version = Version
+		   } = State0, Connection) ->
+    DHKeys = public_key:generate_key(Params),
+    ConnectionState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
+			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {dhe_psk, 
+							PskIdentityHint, DHKeys, Params,
+							HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
+							ServerRandom,
+							PrivateKey}),
+    State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0),
+    State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys};
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk,
+		    ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State, _) ->
+    State;
+key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk,
+		    ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint},
+		    hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
+		    private_key = PrivateKey,
+		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+		    negotiated_version = Version
+		   } = State0, Connection) ->
+    ConnectionState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
+			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
+					       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
+					       ServerRandom,
+					       PrivateKey}),
+    Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0);
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
+		    ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = LookupFun},
+		    hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
+		    session = #session{srp_username = Username},
+		    private_key = PrivateKey,
+		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+		    negotiated_version = Version
+		   } = State0, Connection)
+  when Algo == srp_dss;
+       Algo == srp_rsa;
+       Algo == srp_anon ->
+    SrpParams = handle_srp_identity(Username, LookupFun),
+    Keys = case generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams, 0) of
+	       Alert = #alert{} ->
+		   throw(Alert);
+	       Keys0 = {_,_} ->
+		   Keys0
+	   end,
+    ConnectionState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
+			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, Keys, SrpParams,
+					       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
+					       ServerRandom,
+					       PrivateKey}),
+    State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0),
+    State#state{srp_params = SrpParams,
+		srp_keys = Keys};
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = client,
+		    key_algorithm = rsa,
+		    public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo,
+		    negotiated_version = Version,
+		    premaster_secret = PremasterSecret} = State0, Connection) ->
+    Msg = rsa_key_exchange(Version, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo),
+    Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0);
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = client,
+		    key_algorithm = Algorithm,
+		    negotiated_version = Version,
+		    diffie_hellman_keys = {DhPubKey, _}
+		   } = State0, Connection)
+  when Algorithm == dhe_dss;
+       Algorithm == dhe_rsa;
+       Algorithm == dh_anon ->
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {dh, DhPubKey}),
+    Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0);
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = client,
+		    key_algorithm = Algorithm,
+		    negotiated_version = Version,
+		    diffie_hellman_keys = Keys} = State0, Connection)
+  when Algorithm == ecdhe_ecdsa; Algorithm == ecdhe_rsa;
+       Algorithm == ecdh_ecdsa; Algorithm == ecdh_rsa;
+       Algorithm == ecdh_anon ->
+    Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {ecdh, Keys}),
+    Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0);
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = client,
+		    ssl_options = SslOpts,
+		    key_algorithm = psk,
+		    negotiated_version = Version} = State0, Connection) ->
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, 
+				      {psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity}),
+    Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0);
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = client,
+		    ssl_options = SslOpts,
+		    key_algorithm = dhe_psk,
+		    negotiated_version = Version,
+		    diffie_hellman_keys = {DhPubKey, _}} = State0, Connection) ->
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version,
+				      {dhe_psk, 
+				       SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, DhPubKey}),
+    Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0);
+key_exchange(#state{role = client,
+		    ssl_options = SslOpts,
+		    key_algorithm = rsa_psk,
+		    public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo,
+		    negotiated_version = Version,
+		    premaster_secret = PremasterSecret}
+	     = State0, Connection) ->
+    Msg = rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity,
+			       PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo),
+    Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0);
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = client,
+		    key_algorithm = Algorithm,
+		    negotiated_version = Version,
+		    srp_keys = {ClientPubKey, _}}
+	     = State0, Connection)
+  when Algorithm == srp_dss;
+       Algorithm == srp_rsa;
+       Algorithm == srp_anon ->
+    Msg =  ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {srp, ClientPubKey}),
+    Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0).
+
+rsa_key_exchange(Version, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _})
+  when Algorithm == ?rsaEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?md2WithRSAEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?md5WithRSAEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?sha1WithRSAEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?sha224WithRSAEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?sha256WithRSAEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?sha384WithRSAEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?sha512WithRSAEncryption
+       ->
+    ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version,
+			       {premaster_secret, PremasterSecret,
+				PublicKeyInfo});
+rsa_key_exchange(_, _, _) ->
+    throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, pub_key_is_not_rsa)).
+
+rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, 
+		     PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _})
+  when Algorithm == ?rsaEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?md2WithRSAEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?md5WithRSAEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?sha1WithRSAEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?sha224WithRSAEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?sha256WithRSAEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?sha384WithRSAEncryption;
+       Algorithm == ?sha512WithRSAEncryption
+       ->
+    ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version,
+			       {psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret,
+				PublicKeyInfo});
+rsa_psk_key_exchange(_, _, _, _) ->
+    throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, pub_key_is_not_rsa)).
+
+request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer, 
+						      signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns},
+			   connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+			   cert_db = CertDbHandle,
+			   cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
+			   negotiated_version = Version} = State0, Connection) ->
+    #connection_state{security_parameters =
+			  #security_parameters{cipher_suite = CipherSuite}} =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+    HashSigns = ssl_handshake:available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version, [Version]),
+    Msg = ssl_handshake:certificate_request(CipherSuite, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, 
+					    HashSigns, Version),
+    State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0),
+    State#state{client_certificate_requested = true};
+
+request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_none}} =
+		    State, _) ->
+    State.
+
+calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, 
+			#state{negotiated_version = Version,
+			       connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+			       session = Session0} = State0, Connection,
+			_Current, Next) ->
+    case ssl_handshake:master_secret(record_cb(Connection), Version, PremasterSecret,
+				     ConnectionStates0, server) of
+	{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
+	    Session = Session0#session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
+	    State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+				  session = Session},
+	    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State1),
+	    Connection:next_event(Next, Record, State);
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
+    end.
+
+finalize_handshake(State0, StateName, Connection) ->
+    #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} =
+	State1 = cipher_protocol(State0, Connection),
+
+    ConnectionStates =
+        ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0,
+                                                     write),
+
+    State2 = State1#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates},
+    State = next_protocol(State2, Connection),
+    finished(State, StateName, Connection).
+
+next_protocol(#state{role = server} = State, _) ->
+    State;
+next_protocol(#state{negotiated_protocol = undefined} = State, _) ->
+    State;
+next_protocol(#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false} = State, _) ->
+    State;
+next_protocol(#state{negotiated_protocol = NextProtocol} = State0, Connection) ->
+    NextProtocolMessage = ssl_handshake:next_protocol(NextProtocol),
+    Connection:queue_handshake(NextProtocolMessage, State0).
+
+cipher_protocol(State, Connection) ->
+    Connection:queue_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, State).
+
+finished(#state{role = Role, negotiated_version = Version,
+		session = Session,
+                connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+                tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State0, StateName, Connection) ->
+    MasterSecret = Session#session.master_secret,
+    Finished = ssl_handshake:finished(Version, Role,
+				       get_current_prf(ConnectionStates0, write),
+				       MasterSecret, Handshake0),
+    ConnectionStates = save_verify_data(Role, Finished, ConnectionStates0, StateName),
+    Connection:send_handshake(Finished, State0#state{connection_states =
+								 ConnectionStates}).
+
+save_verify_data(client, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, certify) ->
+    ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates);
+save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, cipher) ->
+    ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates);
+save_verify_data(client, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbreviated) ->
+    ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates);
+save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbreviated) ->
+    ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates).
+
+calculate_secret(#server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base, 
+				   dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey} = Params,
+		 State, Connection) ->
+    Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} = crypto:generate_key(dh, [Prime, Base]),
+    PremasterSecret =
+	ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ServerPublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params),
+    calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret,
+			    State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys}, 
+			    Connection, certify, certify);
+
+calculate_secret(#server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve, public = ECServerPubKey},
+		     State, Connection) ->
+    ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(ECCurve),
+    PremasterSecret = 
+	ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ECServerPubKey}, ECDHKeys),
+    calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret,
+			    State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys}, 
+			    Connection, certify, certify);
+
+calculate_secret(#server_psk_params{
+		    hint = IdentityHint},
+		 State0, Connection) ->
+    %% store for later use
+    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{psk_identity = IdentityHint}),
+    Connection:next_event(certify, Record, State);
+
+calculate_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{
+		    dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}} = ServerKey,
+		    #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = 
+		     State, Connection) ->
+    Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} =
+	crypto:generate_key(dh, [Prime, Base]),
+    PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ServerKey, PrivateDhKey, PSKLookup),
+    calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys},
+			    Connection, certify, certify);
+
+calculate_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator} = ServerKey,
+		 #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{srp_identity = SRPId}} = State, 
+		 Connection) ->
+    Keys = generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, 0),
+    PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ServerKey, Keys, SRPId),
+    calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{srp_keys = Keys}, Connection, 
+			    certify, certify).
+
+master_secret(#alert{} = Alert, _) ->
+    Alert;
+master_secret(PremasterSecret, #state{session = Session,
+				      negotiated_version = Version, role = Role,
+				      connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
+    case ssl_handshake:master_secret(tls_record, Version, PremasterSecret,
+				     ConnectionStates0, Role) of
+	{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
+	    State#state{
+	      session =
+		  Session#session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
+	      connection_states = ConnectionStates};
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert
+    end.
+
+generate_srp_server_keys(_SrpParams, 10) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams =
+			     #srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime,
+				       verifier = Verifier}, N) ->
+    case crypto:generate_key(srp, {host, [Verifier, Generator, Prime, '6a']}) of
+	error ->
+	    generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams, N+1);
+	Keys ->
+	    Keys
+    end.
+
+generate_srp_client_keys(_Generator, _Prime, 10) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, N) ->
+
+    case crypto:generate_key(srp, {user, [Generator, Prime, '6a']}) of
+	error ->
+	    generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, N+1);
+	Keys ->
+	    Keys
+    end.
+
+handle_srp_identity(Username, {Fun, UserState}) ->
+    case Fun(srp, Username, UserState) of
+	{ok, {SRPParams, Salt, DerivedKey}}
+	  when is_atom(SRPParams), is_binary(Salt), is_binary(DerivedKey) ->
+	    {Generator, Prime} = ssl_srp_primes:get_srp_params(SRPParams),
+	    Verifier = crypto:mod_pow(Generator, DerivedKey, Prime),
+	    #srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime,
+		      salt = Salt, verifier = Verifier};
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    throw(Alert);
+	_ ->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+    end.
+
+
+cipher_role(client, Data, Session, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0,
+	    Connection) ->
+    ConnectionStates = ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, 
+							 ConnectionStates0),
+     {Record, State} = prepare_connection(State0#state{session = Session,
+						       connection_states = ConnectionStates},
+					 Connection),
+    Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State);
+cipher_role(server, Data, Session,  #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0,
+	    Connection) ->
+    ConnectionStates1 = ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_read, Data, 
+							  ConnectionStates0),
+    State1 =
+	finalize_handshake(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
+					session = Session}, cipher, Connection),
+    {Record, State} = prepare_connection(State1, Connection),
+    Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State).
+
+select_curve(#state{client_ecc = {[Curve|_], _}}) ->
+    {namedCurve, Curve};
+select_curve(_) ->
+    {namedCurve, ?secp256r1}.
+
+is_anonymous(Algo) when Algo == dh_anon;
+			Algo == ecdh_anon;
+			Algo == psk;
+			Algo == dhe_psk;
+			Algo == rsa_psk;
+			Algo == srp_anon ->
+    true;
+is_anonymous(_) ->
+    false.
+
+get_current_prf(CStates, Direction) ->
+	CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(CStates, Direction),
+	CS#connection_state.security_parameters#security_parameters.prf_algorithm.
+get_pending_prf(CStates, Direction) ->
+	CS = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(CStates, Direction),
+	CS#connection_state.security_parameters#security_parameters.prf_algorithm.
+
+opposite_role(client) ->
+    server;
+opposite_role(server) ->
+    client.
+
+record_cb(tls_connection) ->
+    tls_record;
+record_cb(dtls_connection) ->
+    dtls_record.
+
+call(FsmPid, Event) ->
+    try gen_statem:call(FsmPid, Event)
+    catch
+ 	exit:{noproc, _} ->
+ 	    {error, closed};
+	exit:{normal, _} ->
+	    {error, closed};
+	exit:{{shutdown, _},_} ->
+	    {error, closed}
+    end.
+
+get_socket_opts(_,_,[], _, Acc) ->
+    {ok, Acc};
+get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [mode | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
+    get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, 
+		    [{mode, SockOpts#socket_options.mode} | Acc]);
+get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [packet | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
+    case SockOpts#socket_options.packet of
+	{Type, headers} ->
+	    get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{packet, Type} | Acc]);
+	Type ->
+	    get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{packet, Type} | Acc])
+    end;
+get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [header | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
+    get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, 
+		    [{header, SockOpts#socket_options.header} | Acc]);
+get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [active | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
+    get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, 
+		    [{active, SockOpts#socket_options.active} | Acc]);
+get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [Tag | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
+    try ssl_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, [Tag]) of
+	{ok, [Opt]} ->
+	    get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [Opt | Acc]);
+	{error, Error} ->
+	    {error, {options, {socket_options, Tag, Error}}}
+    catch
+	%% So that inet behavior does not crash our process
+	_:Error -> {error, {options, {socket_options, Tag, Error}}}
+    end;
+get_socket_opts(_, _,Opts, _,_) ->
+    {error, {options, {socket_options, Opts, function_clause}}}.
+
+set_socket_opts(_,_, [], SockOpts, []) ->
+    {ok, SockOpts};
+set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [], SockOpts, Other) ->
+    %% Set non emulated options 
+    try ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) of
+	ok ->
+	    {ok, SockOpts};
+	{error, InetError} ->
+	    {{error, {options, {socket_options, Other, InetError}}}, SockOpts}
+    catch
+	_:Error ->
+	    %% So that inet behavior does not crash our process
+	    {{error, {options, {socket_options, Other, Error}}}, SockOpts}
+    end;
+
+set_socket_opts(Transport,Socket, [{mode, Mode}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) 
+  when Mode == list; Mode == binary ->
+    set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, 
+		    SockOpts#socket_options{mode = Mode}, Other);
+set_socket_opts(_, _, [{mode, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) ->
+    {{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}}}, SockOpts};
+set_socket_opts(Transport,Socket, [{packet, Packet}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) 
+  when Packet == raw;
+       Packet == 0;
+       Packet == 1;
+       Packet == 2;
+       Packet == 4;
+       Packet == asn1;
+       Packet == cdr;
+       Packet == sunrm;
+       Packet == fcgi;
+       Packet == tpkt;
+       Packet == line;
+       Packet == http;
+       Packet == httph;
+       Packet == http_bin;
+       Packet == httph_bin ->
+    set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, 
+		    SockOpts#socket_options{packet = Packet}, Other);
+set_socket_opts(_, _, [{packet, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) ->
+    {{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}}}, SockOpts};
+set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [{header, Header}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) 
+  when is_integer(Header) ->
+    set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, 
+		    SockOpts#socket_options{header = Header}, Other);
+set_socket_opts(_, _, [{header, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) ->
+    {{error,{options, {socket_options, Opt}}}, SockOpts};
+set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [{active, Active}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) 
+  when Active == once;
+       Active == true;
+       Active == false ->
+    set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, 
+		    SockOpts#socket_options{active = Active}, Other);
+set_socket_opts(_, _, [{active, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) ->
+    {{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}} }, SockOpts};
+set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [Opt | Opts], SockOpts, Other) ->
+    set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, SockOpts, [Opt | Other]).
+
+start_or_recv_cancel_timer(infinity, _RecvFrom) ->
+    undefined;
+start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom) ->
+    erlang:send_after(Timeout, self(), {cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}).
+
+hibernate_after(connection = StateName, 
+		#state{ssl_options=#ssl_options{hibernate_after = HibernateAfter}} = State,
+		Actions) ->
+    {next_state, StateName, State, [{timeout, HibernateAfter, hibernate} | Actions]};
+hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions) ->
+    {next_state, StateName, State, Actions}.
+ 
+terminate_alert(normal, Version, ConnectionStates)  ->
+    ssl_alert:encode(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY),
+		     Version, ConnectionStates);
+terminate_alert({Reason, _}, Version, ConnectionStates) when Reason == close;
+							     Reason == shutdown ->
+    ssl_alert:encode(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY),
+		     Version, ConnectionStates);
+
+terminate_alert(_, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+    {BinAlert, _} = ssl_alert:encode(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR),
+				 Version, ConnectionStates),
+    BinAlert.
+
+handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{ssl_options = 
+				   #ssl_options{cacertfile = <<>>, cacerts = []}}) ->
+    %% No trusted certs specified
+    ok;
+handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref,
+			       cert_db = CertDb,
+			       ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = <<>>}}) when CertDb =/= undefined ->
+    %% Certs provided as DER directly can not be shared
+    %% with other connections and it is safe to delete them when the connection ends.
+    ssl_pkix_db:remove_trusted_certs(Ref, CertDb);
+handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{file_ref_db = undefined}) ->
+    %% Something went wrong early (typically cacertfile does not
+    %% exist) so there is nothing to handle
+    ok;
+handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref,
+			       file_ref_db = RefDb,
+			       ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = File}}) ->
+    case ssl_pkix_db:ref_count(Ref, RefDb, -1) of
+	0 ->
+	    ssl_manager:clean_cert_db(Ref, File);
+	_ ->
+	    ok
+    end.
+
+prepare_connection(#state{renegotiation = Renegotiate, 
+			  start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State0, Connection) 
+  when Renegotiate =/= {false, first}, 
+       RecvFrom =/= undefined ->
+    State1 = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State0),   
+    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State1),
+    {Record, ack_connection(State)};
+prepare_connection(State0, Connection) ->
+    State = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State0),
+    {no_record, ack_connection(State)}.
+
+ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {true, Initiater}} = State) 
+  when Initiater == internal;
+       Initiater == peer ->
+    State#state{renegotiation = undefined};
+ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {true, From}} = State) ->    
+    gen_statem:reply(From, ok),
+    State#state{renegotiation = undefined};
+ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {false, first}, 
+		      start_or_recv_from = StartFrom,
+		      timer = Timer} = State) when StartFrom =/= undefined ->
+    gen_statem:reply(StartFrom, connected),
+    cancel_timer(Timer),
+    State#state{renegotiation = undefined, 
+		start_or_recv_from = undefined, timer = undefined};
+ack_connection(State) ->
+    State.
+
+cancel_timer(undefined) ->
+    ok;
+cancel_timer(Timer) ->
+    erlang:cancel_timer(Timer),
+    ok.
+
+register_session(client, Host, Port, #session{is_resumable = new} = Session0) ->
+    Session = Session0#session{is_resumable = true},
+    ssl_manager:register_session(Host, Port, Session),
+    Session;
+register_session(server, _, Port, #session{is_resumable = new} = Session0) ->
+    Session = Session0#session{is_resumable = true},
+    ssl_manager:register_session(Port, Session),
+    Session;
+register_session(_, _, _, Session) ->
+    Session. %% Already registered
+
+handle_new_session(NewId, CipherSuite, Compression, 
+		   #state{session = Session0,
+			  protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) ->
+    Session = Session0#session{session_id = NewId,
+			       cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+			       compression_method = Compression},
+    {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{session = Session}),
+    Connection:next_event(certify, Record, State).
+
+handle_resumed_session(SessId, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+				      negotiated_version = Version,
+				      host = Host, port = Port,
+				      protocol_cb = Connection,
+				      session_cache = Cache,
+				      session_cache_cb = CacheCb} = State0) ->
+    Session = CacheCb:lookup(Cache, {{Host, Port}, SessId}),
+    case ssl_handshake:master_secret(tls_record, Version, Session,
+				     ConnectionStates0, client) of
+	{_, ConnectionStates} ->
+	    {Record, State} =
+		Connection:next_record(State0#state{
+			      connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+			      session = Session}),
+	    Connection:next_event(abbreviated, Record, State);
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0)
+    end.
+
+make_premaster_secret({MajVer, MinVer}, rsa) ->
+    Rand = ssl_cipher:random_bytes(?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES-2),
+    <<?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), Rand/binary>>;
+make_premaster_secret(_, _) ->
+    undefined.
+
+negotiated_hashsign(undefined, KexAlg, PubKeyInfo, Version) ->
+    %% Not negotiated choose default 
+    case is_anonymous(KexAlg) of
+	true ->
+	    {null, anon};
+	false ->
+	    {PubAlg, _, _} = PubKeyInfo,
+	    ssl_handshake:select_hashsign_algs(undefined, PubAlg, Version)
+    end;
+negotiated_hashsign(HashSign = {_, _}, _, _, _) ->
+    HashSign.
+
+ssl_options_list(SslOptions) ->
+    Fileds = record_info(fields, ssl_options),
+    Values = tl(tuple_to_list(SslOptions)),
+    ssl_options_list(Fileds, Values, []).
+
+ssl_options_list([],[], Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+%% Skip internal options, only return user options
+ssl_options_list([protocol | Keys], [_ | Values], Acc) ->
+    ssl_options_list(Keys, Values, Acc);
+ssl_options_list([erl_dist | Keys], [_ | Values], Acc) ->
+    ssl_options_list(Keys, Values, Acc);
+ssl_options_list([renegotiate_at | Keys], [_ | Values], Acc) ->
+    ssl_options_list(Keys, Values, Acc);
+ssl_options_list([ciphers = Key | Keys], [Value | Values], Acc) ->
+   ssl_options_list(Keys, Values, 
+		    [{Key, lists:map(
+			     fun(Suite) -> 
+				     ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(Suite) 
+			     end, Value)} 
+		     | Acc]);
+ssl_options_list([Key | Keys], [Value | Values], Acc) ->
+   ssl_options_list(Keys, Values, [{Key, Value} | Acc]).
+
+handle_active_option(false, connection = StateName, To, Reply, State) ->
+    hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply}]);
+
+handle_active_option(_, connection = StateName0, To, Reply, #state{protocol_cb = Connection,
+							      user_data_buffer = <<>>} = State0) ->
+    %% Need data, set active once
+    {Record, State1} = Connection:next_record_if_active(State0),
+    %% Note: Renogotiation may cause StateName0 =/= StateName
+    case Connection:next_event(StateName0, Record, State1) of
+	{next_state, StateName, State} ->
+	    hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply}]);
+	{next_state, StateName, State, Actions} -> 
+	    hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply} | Actions]);
+	{stop, Reason, State} ->
+	    {stop, Reason, State}
+    end;
+handle_active_option(_, StateName, To, Reply, #state{user_data_buffer = <<>>} = State) ->
+    %% Active once already set 
+    {next_state, StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply}]};
+
+%% user_data_buffer =/= <<>>
+handle_active_option(_, StateName0, To, Reply, #state{protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> 
+    case Connection:read_application_data(<<>>, State0) of
+	{stop, Reason, State} ->
+	    {stop, Reason, State};
+	{Record, State1} ->
+	    %% Note: Renogotiation may cause StateName0 =/= StateName
+	    case Connection:next_event(StateName0, Record, State1) of
+		{next_state, StateName, State} ->
+		    hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply}]);
+		{next_state, StateName, State, Actions} -> 
+		    hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply} | Actions]);
+		{stop, _, _} = Stop ->
+		    Stop
+	    end
+    end.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4b54943ddf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2015. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+
+%%
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: SSL/TLS specific state
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-ifndef(ssl_connection).
+-define(ssl_connection, true).
+
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_record.hrl").
+-include("ssl_handshake.hrl").
+-include("ssl_srp.hrl").
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
+
+-record(state, {
+          role                  :: client | server,
+	  user_application      :: {Monitor::reference(), User::pid()},
+          transport_cb          :: atom(),   % callback module
+	  protocol_cb           :: tls_connection | dtls_connection,
+          data_tag              :: atom(),   % ex tcp.
+	  close_tag             :: atom(),   % ex tcp_closed
+	  error_tag             :: atom(),   % ex tcp_error
+          host                  :: string() | inet:ip_address(),
+          port                  :: integer(),
+          socket                :: port(),
+          ssl_options           :: #ssl_options{},
+          socket_options        :: #socket_options{},
+          connection_states     :: #connection_states{} | secret_printout(),
+	  protocol_buffers      :: term() | secret_printout() , %% #protocol_buffers{} from tls_record.hrl or dtls_recor.hrl
+          tls_handshake_history :: ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake_history() | secret_printout()
+                                 | 'undefined',
+	  cert_db               :: reference() | 'undefined',
+          session               :: #session{} | secret_printout(),
+	  session_cache         :: db_handle(),
+	  session_cache_cb      :: atom(),
+	  crl_db                :: term(), 
+          negotiated_version    :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined',
+          client_certificate_requested = false :: boolean(),
+	  key_algorithm         :: ssl_cipher:key_algo(),
+	  hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined},
+	  cert_hashsign_algorithm,
+          public_key_info      :: ssl_handshake:public_key_info() | 'undefined',
+          private_key          :: public_key:private_key() | secret_printout() | 'undefined',
+	  diffie_hellman_params:: #'DHParameter'{} | undefined | secret_printout(),
+	  diffie_hellman_keys  :: {PublicKey :: binary(), PrivateKey :: binary()} | #'ECPrivateKey'{} |  undefined |  secret_printout(),  
+	  psk_identity         :: binary() | 'undefined', % server psk identity hint
+	  srp_params           :: #srp_user{} | secret_printout() | 'undefined',
+	  srp_keys             ::{PublicKey :: binary(), PrivateKey :: binary()} | secret_printout() | 'undefined',
+          premaster_secret     :: binary() | secret_printout() | 'undefined',
+	  file_ref_db          :: db_handle(),
+          cert_db_ref          :: certdb_ref() | 'undefined',
+          bytes_to_read        :: undefined | integer(), %% bytes to read in passive mode
+          user_data_buffer     :: undefined | binary() | secret_printout(), 
+	  renegotiation        :: undefined | {boolean(), From::term() | internal | peer},
+	  start_or_recv_from   :: term(),
+	  timer                :: undefined | reference(), % start_or_recive_timer
+	  %%send_queue           :: queue:queue(),
+	  terminated = false                          ::boolean(),
+	  allow_renegotiate = true                    ::boolean(),
+          expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false ::boolean(),
+	  expecting_finished =                  false ::boolean(),
+          negotiated_protocol = undefined             :: undefined | binary(),
+	  client_ecc,          % {Curves, PointFmt}
+	  tracker              :: pid() | 'undefined', %% Tracker process for listen socket
+	  sni_hostname = undefined,
+	  downgrade,
+	  flight_buffer = []   :: list()  %% Buffer of TLS/DTLS records, used during the TLS handshake
+				          %% to when possible pack more than on TLS record into the 
+                                          %% underlaying packet format. Introduced by DTLS - RFC 4347.
+				          %% The mecahnism is also usefull in TLS although we do not
+				          %% need to worry about packet loss in TLS.
+	 }).
+
+-define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS,
+	#'DHParameter'{prime = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME,
+		       base = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR}).
+-define(WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, 12000).
+
+-endif. % -ifdef(ssl_connection).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d9f21e04ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2015-2015. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+
+%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: CRL handling 
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-module(ssl_crl).
+
+-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). 
+
+-export([trusted_cert_and_path/3]).
+
+trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, {SerialNumber, Issuer},{Db, DbRef} = DbHandle) -> 
+    case ssl_pkix_db:lookup_trusted_cert(Db, DbRef, SerialNumber, Issuer) of
+	undefined ->
+	    trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, issuer_not_found, DbHandle);
+	{ok, {_, OtpCert}}  ->
+	    {ok, Root, Chain} = ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OtpCert, Db, DbRef),
+	    {ok, Root,  lists:reverse(Chain)}
+    end;
+
+trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, issuer_not_found, {Db, DbRef} = DbHandle) -> 
+    case find_issuer(CRL, DbHandle) of
+	{ok, OtpCert} ->
+	    {ok, Root, Chain} = ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OtpCert, Db, DbRef),
+	    {ok, Root, lists:reverse(Chain)};
+	{error, issuer_not_found} ->
+	    {ok, unknown_crl_ca, []}
+    end.
+
+find_issuer(CRL, {Db,_}) ->
+    Issuer = public_key:pkix_normalize_name(public_key:pkix_crl_issuer(CRL)),
+    IsIssuerFun =
+	fun({_Key, {_Der,ErlCertCandidate}}, Acc) ->
+		verify_crl_issuer(CRL, ErlCertCandidate, Issuer, Acc);
+	   (_, Acc) ->
+		Acc
+	end,
+    
+    try ssl_pkix_db:foldl(IsIssuerFun, issuer_not_found, Db) of
+	issuer_not_found ->
+	    {error, issuer_not_found}
+    catch 
+	{ok, _} = Result ->
+	    Result
+    end.
+
+verify_crl_issuer(CRL, ErlCertCandidate, Issuer, NotIssuer) ->
+    TBSCert =  ErlCertCandidate#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate,
+    case public_key:pkix_normalize_name(TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject) of
+	Issuer ->
+	    case public_key:pkix_crl_verify(CRL, ErlCertCandidate) of
+		true ->
+		    throw({ok, ErlCertCandidate});
+		false ->
+		    NotIssuer
+	    end;
+	_ ->
+	    NotIssuer
+    end.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..647e0465fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2015-2015. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+
+%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: Simple default CRL cache 
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-module(ssl_crl_cache).
+
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). 
+
+-behaviour(ssl_crl_cache_api).
+
+-export([lookup/3, select/2, fresh_crl/2]).
+-export([insert/1, insert/2, delete/1]).
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Cache callback API
+%%====================================================================
+
+lookup(#'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, Names}},
+       _Issuer,
+       CRLDbInfo) ->
+    get_crls(Names, CRLDbInfo);
+lookup(_,_,_) ->
+    not_available.
+
+select(Issuer, {{_Cache, Mapping},_}) ->
+    case ssl_pkix_db:lookup(Issuer, Mapping) of
+	undefined ->
+	    [];
+	CRLs ->
+	    CRLs
+    end.
+
+fresh_crl(#'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, Names}}, CRL) ->
+    case get_crls(Names, undefined) of
+	not_available ->
+	    CRL;
+	[NewCRL] ->
+	    NewCRL
+    end.
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% API 
+%%====================================================================
+
+insert(CRLs) ->
+    insert(?NO_DIST_POINT, CRLs).
+
+insert(URI, {file, File}) when is_list(URI) ->				     
+    case file:read_file(File) of
+	{ok, PemBin} ->
+	    PemEntries = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin),
+	    CRLs = [ CRL || {'CertificateList', CRL, not_encrypted} 
+				<- PemEntries],
+	    do_insert(URI, CRLs);
+	Error ->
+	    Error
+    end;
+insert(URI, {der, CRLs}) ->	
+    do_insert(URI, CRLs).
+
+delete({file, File}) ->
+    case file:read_file(File) of
+	{ok, PemBin} ->
+	    PemEntries = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin),
+	    CRLs = [ CRL || {'CertificateList', CRL, not_encrypted} 
+				<- PemEntries],
+	    ssl_manager:delete_crls({?NO_DIST_POINT, CRLs});
+	Error ->
+	    Error
+    end;
+delete({der, CRLs}) ->	
+    ssl_manager:delete_crls({?NO_DIST_POINT, CRLs});
+
+delete(URI) ->
+    case http_uri:parse(URI) of
+	{ok, {http, _, _ , _, Path,_}} -> 
+	    ssl_manager:delete_crls(string:strip(Path, left, $/));
+	_ ->
+	    {error, {only_http_distribution_points_supported, URI}}
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+do_insert(URI, CRLs) ->
+    case http_uri:parse(URI) of
+	{ok, {http, _, _ , _, Path,_}} -> 
+	    ssl_manager:insert_crls(string:strip(Path, left, $/), CRLs);
+	_ ->
+	    {error, {only_http_distribution_points_supported, URI}}
+    end.
+
+get_crls([], _) ->
+    not_available;
+get_crls([{uniformResourceIdentifier, "http"++_ = URL} | Rest], 
+	 CRLDbInfo) ->
+    case cache_lookup(URL, CRLDbInfo) of
+	[] ->
+	   handle_http(URL, Rest, CRLDbInfo);
+	CRLs ->
+	    CRLs
+    end;
+get_crls([ _| Rest], CRLDbInfo) ->
+    %% unsupported CRL location
+    get_crls(Rest, CRLDbInfo).
+
+http_lookup(URL, Rest, CRLDbInfo, Timeout) ->
+    case application:ensure_started(inets) of
+	ok ->
+	    http_get(URL, Rest, CRLDbInfo, Timeout);  
+	_ ->
+	    get_crls(Rest, CRLDbInfo)
+    end.
+
+http_get(URL, Rest, CRLDbInfo, Timeout) ->
+    case httpc:request(get, {URL, [{"connection", "close"}]}, 
+		       [{timeout, Timeout}], [{body_format, binary}]) of
+        {ok, {_Status, _Headers, Body}} ->
+            case Body of
+                <<"-----BEGIN", _/binary>> ->
+                    Pem = public_key:pem_decode(Body),
+		    lists:filtermap(fun({'CertificateList', 
+					 CRL, not_encrypted}) ->
+					    {true, CRL};
+				       (_) ->
+					    false
+				    end, Pem);
+		_ ->
+		    try public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', Body) of
+			_ ->
+			    [Body]
+		    catch
+			_:_ ->
+			    get_crls(Rest, CRLDbInfo)
+		    end   
+	    end;
+        {error, _Reason} ->
+            get_crls(Rest, CRLDbInfo)
+    end.
+
+cache_lookup(_, undefined) ->
+    [];
+cache_lookup(URL, {{Cache, _}, _}) ->
+    {ok, {_, _, _ , _, Path,_}} = http_uri:parse(URL), 
+    case ssl_pkix_db:lookup(string:strip(Path, left, $/), Cache) of
+	undefined ->
+	    [];
+	CRLs ->
+	    CRLs
+    end.
+
+handle_http(URI, Rest, {_,  [{http, Timeout}]} = CRLDbInfo) ->
+    CRLs = http_lookup(URI, Rest, CRLDbInfo, Timeout),
+    %% Uncomment to improve performance, but need to 
+    %% implement cache limit and or cleaning to prevent 
+    %% DoS attack possibilities
+    %%insert(URI, {der, CRLs}),
+    CRLs;
+handle_http(_, Rest, CRLDbInfo) ->
+    get_crls(Rest, CRLDbInfo).
+
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache_api.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache_api.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c3a57e2f49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache_api.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2015-2015. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+
+%%
+
+-module(ssl_crl_cache_api).
+
+-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). 
+
+-type db_handle() :: term().
+-type issuer_name() :: {rdnSequence, [#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}.
+
+-callback lookup(#'DistributionPoint'{}, issuer_name(), db_handle()) -> not_available | [public_key:der_encoded()].
+-callback select(issuer_name(), db_handle()) ->  [public_key:der_encoded()].
+-callback fresh_crl(#'DistributionPoint'{}, public_key:der_encoded()) -> public_key:der_encoded().
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_hash_dir.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_hash_dir.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bb62737232
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_hash_dir.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2016-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+
+-module(ssl_crl_hash_dir).
+
+-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
+
+-behaviour(ssl_crl_cache_api).
+
+-export([lookup/3, select/2, fresh_crl/2]).
+
+lookup(#'DistributionPoint'{cRLIssuer = CRLIssuer} = DP, CertIssuer, CRLDbInfo) ->
+    Issuer =
+	case CRLIssuer of
+	    asn1_NOVALUE ->
+		%% If the distribution point extension doesn't
+		%% indicate a CRL issuer, use the certificate issuer.
+		CertIssuer;
+	    _ ->
+		CRLIssuer
+	end,
+    %% Find all CRLs for this issuer, and return those that match the
+    %% given distribution point.
+    AllCRLs = select(Issuer, CRLDbInfo),
+    lists:filter(fun(DER) ->
+			 public_key:pkix_match_dist_point(DER, DP)
+		 end, AllCRLs).
+
+fresh_crl(#'DistributionPoint'{}, CurrentCRL) ->
+    CurrentCRL.
+
+select(Issuer, {_DbHandle, [{dir, Dir}]}) ->
+    case find_crls(Issuer, Dir) of
+        [_|_] = DERs ->
+	    DERs;
+        [] ->
+            %% That's okay, just report that we didn't find any CRL.
+            %% If the crl_check setting is best_effort, ssl_handshake
+            %% is happy with that, but if it's true, this is an error.
+            [];
+        {error, Error} ->
+            error_logger:error_report(
+              [{cannot_find_crl, Error},
+               {dir, Dir},
+               {module, ?MODULE},
+               {line, ?LINE}]),
+            []
+    end.
+
+find_crls(Issuer, Dir) ->
+    case filelib:is_dir(Dir) of
+        true ->
+	    Hash = public_key:short_name_hash(Issuer),
+	    find_crls(Issuer, Hash, Dir, 0, []);
+        false ->
+            {error, not_a_directory}
+    end.
+
+find_crls(Issuer, Hash, Dir, N, Acc) ->
+    Filename = filename:join(Dir, Hash ++ ".r" ++ integer_to_list(N)),
+    case file:read_file(Filename) of
+	{error, enoent} ->
+	    Acc;
+	{ok, Bin} ->
+	    try maybe_parse_pem(Bin) of
+		DER when is_binary(DER) ->
+		    %% Found one file.  Let's see if there are more.
+		    find_crls(Issuer, Hash, Dir, N + 1, [DER] ++ Acc)
+	    catch
+		error:Error ->
+		    %% Something is wrong with the file.  Report
+		    %% it, and try the next one.
+		    error_logger:error_report(
+		      [{crl_parse_error, Error},
+		       {filename, Filename},
+		       {module, ?MODULE},
+		       {line, ?LINE}]),
+		    find_crls(Issuer, Hash, Dir, N + 1, Acc)
+	    end
+    end.
+
+maybe_parse_pem(<<"-----BEGIN", _/binary>> = PEM) ->
+    %% It's a PEM encoded file.  Need to extract the DER
+    %% encoded data.
+    [{'CertificateList', DER, not_encrypted}] = public_key:pem_decode(PEM),
+    DER;
+maybe_parse_pem(DER) when is_binary(DER) ->
+    %% Let's assume it's DER-encoded.
+    DER.
+
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl
index 9d9afb7707..a6eb1be1f6 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2011. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -45,9 +46,11 @@ start_link() ->
 init([]) ->    
     SessionCertManager = session_and_cert_manager_child_spec(),
     ConnetionManager = connection_manager_child_spec(),
+    ListenOptionsTracker = listen_options_tracker_child_spec(), 
     ProxyServer = proxy_server_child_spec(),
 
-    {ok, {{one_for_all, 10, 3600}, [SessionCertManager, ConnetionManager,
+    {ok, {{one_for_all, 10, 3600}, [SessionCertManager, ConnetionManager, 
+				    ListenOptionsTracker,
 				    ProxyServer]}}.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -65,10 +68,10 @@ session_and_cert_manager_child_spec() ->
 
 connection_manager_child_spec() ->
     Name = ssl_connection_dist,  
-    StartFunc = {ssl_connection_sup, start_link_dist, []},
+    StartFunc = {tls_connection_sup, start_link_dist, []},
     Restart = permanent, 
-    Shutdown = 4000,
-    Modules = [ssl_connection],
+    Shutdown = infinity,
+    Modules = [tls_connection_sup],
     Type = supervisor,
     {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules}.
 
@@ -81,3 +84,11 @@ proxy_server_child_spec() ->
     Type = worker,
     {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules}.
 
+listen_options_tracker_child_spec() ->
+    Name = ssl_socket_dist,  
+    StartFunc = {ssl_listen_tracker_sup, start_link_dist, []},
+    Restart = permanent, 
+    Shutdown = 4000,
+    Modules = [ssl_socket],
+    Type = supervisor,
+    {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules}.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c3fe9d73b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,2204 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+
+%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: Help funtions for handling the SSL-handshake protocol (common
+%% to SSL/TLS and DTLS
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-module(ssl_handshake).
+
+-include("ssl_handshake.hrl").
+-include("ssl_record.hrl").
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_srp.hrl").
+-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
+
+-export_type([ssl_handshake/0, ssl_handshake_history/0,
+	      public_key_info/0, oid/0]).
+
+-type oid()               :: tuple().
+-type public_key_params() :: #'Dss-Parms'{} |  {namedCurve, oid()} | #'ECParameters'{} | term().
+-type public_key_info()   :: {oid(), #'RSAPublicKey'{} | integer() | #'ECPoint'{}, public_key_params()}.
+-type ssl_handshake_history() :: {[binary()], [binary()]}.
+
+-type ssl_handshake() :: #server_hello{} | #server_hello_done{} | #certificate{} | #certificate_request{} |
+			 #client_key_exchange{} | #finished{} | #certificate_verify{} |
+			 #hello_request{} | #next_protocol{}.
+
+%% Handshake messages
+-export([hello_request/0, server_hello/4, server_hello_done/0,
+	 certificate/4, certificate_request/5, key_exchange/3,
+	 finished/5,  next_protocol/1]).
+
+%% Handle handshake messages
+-export([certify/10, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5,
+	 master_secret/5, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6,
+	 init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/2, verify_server_key/5
+	]).
+
+%% Encode/Decode
+-export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/1,
+	 encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1,
+	 decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1,
+	 decode_server_key/3, decode_client_key/3,
+	 decode_suites/2
+	]).
+
+%% Cipher suites handling
+-export([available_suites/2, available_signature_algs/3, cipher_suites/2,
+	 select_session/11, supported_ecc/1, available_signature_algs/4]).
+
+%% Extensions handling
+-export([client_hello_extensions/6,
+	 handle_client_hello_extensions/9, %% Returns server hello extensions
+	 handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2
+	]).
+
+%% MISC
+-export([select_version/3, prf/6, select_hashsign/5,
+	 select_hashsign_algs/3,
+	 premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]).
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Internal application API
+%%====================================================================
+
+%% ---------- Create handshake messages  ----------
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec hello_request() -> #hello_request{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a hello request message sent by server to
+%% trigger renegotiation.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+hello_request() ->
+    #hello_request{}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec server_hello(#session{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), #connection_states{},
+		   #hello_extensions{}) -> #server_hello{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a server hello message.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Extensions) ->
+    Pending = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
+
+    #server_hello{server_version = Version,
+		  cipher_suite = SecParams#security_parameters.cipher_suite,
+                  compression_method =
+		  SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm,
+		  random = SecParams#security_parameters.server_random,
+		  session_id = SessionId,
+		  extensions = Extensions
+		 }.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec server_hello_done() ->  #server_hello_done{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a server hello done message.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+server_hello_done() ->
+    #server_hello_done{}.
+
+client_hello_extensions(Host, Version, CipherSuites, 
+			#ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, versions = AllVersions} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) ->
+    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} =
+	case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of
+	    true ->
+		client_ecc_extensions(tls_v1, Version);
+	    false ->
+		{undefined, undefined}
+	end,
+    SRP = srp_user(SslOpts),
+
+    #hello_extensions{
+       renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client,
+					       ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
+       srp = SRP,
+       signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version, AllVersions),
+       ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
+       elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
+       alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation),
+       next_protocol_negotiation =
+	   encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector,
+					      Renegotiation),
+       sni = sni(Host, SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec certificate(der_cert(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), client | server) -> #certificate{} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a certificate message.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client) ->
+    Chain =
+	case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of
+	    {ok, _,  CertChain} ->
+		CertChain;
+	    {error, _} ->
+		%% If no suitable certificate is available, the client
+		%% SHOULD send a certificate message containing no
+		%% certificates. (chapter 7.4.6. RFC 4346)
+		[]
+	end,
+    #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain};
+
+certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) ->
+    case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of
+	{ok, _, Chain} ->
+	    #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain};
+	{error, _} ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, server_has_no_suitable_certificates)
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a next protocol message
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) ->
+  #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec client_certificate_verify(undefined | der_cert(), binary(),
+				ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(), public_key:private_key(),
+				ssl_handshake_history()) ->
+    #certificate_verify{} | ignore | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a certificate_verify message, called by the client.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+client_certificate_verify(undefined, _, _, _, _, _) ->
+    ignore;
+client_certificate_verify(_, _, _, _, undefined, _) ->
+    ignore;
+client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version,
+			  {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
+			  PrivateKey, {Handshake, _}) ->
+    case public_key:pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(OwnCert) of
+	true ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, fixed_diffie_hellman_prohibited);
+	false ->
+	    Hashes =
+		calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake),
+	    Signed = digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey),
+	    #certificate_verify{signature = Signed, hashsign_algorithm = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}}
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec certificate_request(ssl_cipher:cipher_suite(), db_handle(), 
+			  certdb_ref(),  #hash_sign_algos{}, ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+				 #certificate_request{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a certificate_request message, called by the server.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+certificate_request(CipherSuite, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, HashSigns, Version) ->
+    Types = certificate_types(ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), Version),
+    Authorities = certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
+    #certificate_request{
+		    certificate_types = Types,
+		    hashsign_algorithms = HashSigns,
+		    certificate_authorities = Authorities
+		   }.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec key_exchange(client | server, ssl_record:ssl_version(),
+		   {premaster_secret, binary(), public_key_info()} |
+		   {dh, binary()} |
+		   {dh, {binary(), binary()}, #'DHParameter'{}, {HashAlgo::atom(), SignAlgo::atom()},
+		   binary(), binary(), public_key:private_key()} |
+		   {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{}} |
+		   {psk, binary()} |
+		   {dhe_psk, binary(), binary()} |
+		   {srp, {binary(), binary()}, #srp_user{}, {HashAlgo::atom(), SignAlgo::atom()},
+		   binary(), binary(), public_key:private_key()}) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{} | #server_key_exchange{}.
+
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a keyexchange message.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {premaster_secret, Secret, {_, PublicKey, _}}) ->
+    EncPremasterSecret =
+	encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, PublicKey),
+    #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = EncPremasterSecret};
+
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {dh, PublicKey}) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{
+	      exchange_keys = #client_diffie_hellman_public{
+		dh_public = PublicKey}
+	       };
+
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey =  ECPublicKey}}) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{
+	      exchange_keys = #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{
+		dh_public = ECPublicKey}
+	       };
+
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {psk, Identity}) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{
+       exchange_keys = #client_psk_identity{
+			  identity = Identity}
+      };
+
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {dhe_psk, Identity, PublicKey}) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{
+	      exchange_keys = #client_dhe_psk_identity{
+		identity = Identity,
+		dh_public = PublicKey}
+	       };
+
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, Secret, {_, PublicKey, _}}) ->
+    EncPremasterSecret =
+	encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, PublicKey),
+    #client_key_exchange{
+       exchange_keys = #client_rsa_psk_identity{
+			  identity = PskIdentity,
+			  exchange_keys = EncPremasterSecret}};
+
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {srp, PublicKey}) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{
+       exchange_keys = #client_srp_public{
+			  srp_a = PublicKey}
+      };
+
+key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, {PublicKey, _},
+			       #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G},
+			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
+    ServerDHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = int_to_bin(P),
+				       dh_g = int_to_bin(G), dh_y = PublicKey},
+    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerDHParams, HashSign,
+			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
+
+key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdh,  #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey =  ECPublicKey,
+						      parameters = ECCurve}, HashSign,
+			       ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
+    ServerECParams = #server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve, public = ECPublicKey},
+    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerECParams, HashSign,
+			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
+
+key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
+			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
+    ServerPSKParams = #server_psk_params{hint = PskIdentityHint},
+    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerPSKParams, HashSign,
+			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
+
+key_exchange(server, Version, {dhe_psk, PskIdentityHint, {PublicKey, _},
+			       #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G},
+			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
+    ServerEDHPSKParams = #server_dhe_psk_params{
+      hint = PskIdentityHint,
+      dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = int_to_bin(P),
+				    dh_g = int_to_bin(G), dh_y = PublicKey}
+     },
+    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerEDHPSKParams,
+			    HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
+
+key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, {PublicKey, _},
+			       #srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime,
+					 salt = Salt},
+			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
+    ServerSRPParams = #server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator,
+					 srp_s = Salt, srp_b = PublicKey},
+    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerSRPParams, HashSign,
+			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec finished(ssl_record:ssl_version(), client | server, integer(), binary(), ssl_handshake_history()) ->
+    #finished{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a handshake finished message
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {Handshake, _}) -> % use the current handshake
+    #finished{verify_data =
+	      calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake)}.
+
+%% ---------- Handle handshake messages  ----------
+
+verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams,
+				     signature = Signature},
+		  HashSign = {HashAlgo, _},
+		  ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) ->
+    ConnectionState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
+			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+    Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo,
+				    <<ClientRandom/binary,
+				      ServerRandom/binary,
+				      EncParams/binary>>),
+    verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(),
+			 binary(), ssl_handshake_history()) -> valid | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+certificate_verify(_, _, _, undefined, _, _) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, invalid_certificate_verify_message);
+
+certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo, Version,
+		   HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) ->
+    Hash = calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake),
+    case verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PublicKeyInfo) of
+	true ->
+	    valid;
+	_ ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE)
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec verify_signature(ssl_record:ssl_version(), binary(), {term(), term()}, binary(),
+				   public_key_info()) -> true | false.
+%%
+%% Description: Checks that a public_key signature is valid.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+verify_signature(_Version, _Hash, {_HashAlgo, anon}, _Signature, _) ->
+    true;
+verify_signature({3, Minor}, Hash, {HashAlgo, rsa}, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams})
+  when Minor >= 3 ->
+    public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, PubKey);
+verify_signature(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams}) ->
+    case public_key:decrypt_public(Signature, PubKey,
+				   [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) of
+	Hash -> true;
+	_    -> false
+    end;
+verify_signature(_Version, Hash, {HashAlgo, dsa}, Signature, {?'id-dsa', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) ->
+    public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams});
+verify_signature(_, Hash, {HashAlgo, _SignAlg}, Signature,
+		 {?'id-ecPublicKey', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) ->
+    public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}).
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), integer() | nolimit,
+	      verify_peer | verify_none, {fun(), term}, fun(), term(), term(),
+	      client | server) ->  {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
+	MaxPathLen, _Verify, ValidationFunAndState0, PartialChain, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, Role) ->
+    [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs,
+        
+    ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(ValidationFunAndState0, Role, 
+						     CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,  CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle),
+
+    try
+	{TrustedCert, CertPath}  =
+	    ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, PartialChain),
+	case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert,
+					     CertPath,
+					     [{max_path_length, MaxPathLen},
+					      {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of
+	    {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} ->
+		{PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo};
+	    {error, Reason} ->
+		path_validation_alert(Reason)
+	end
+    catch
+	error:_ ->
+	    %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, failed_to_decode_certificate)
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec verify_connection(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #finished{}, client | server, integer(), binary(),
+			ssl_handshake_history()) -> verified | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Checks the ssl handshake finished message to verify
+%%              the connection.
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+verify_connection(Version, #finished{verify_data = Data},
+		  Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) ->
+    %% use the previous hashes
+    case calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) of
+	Data ->
+	    verified;
+	_ ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec init_handshake_history() -> ssl_handshake_history().
+
+%%
+%% Description: Initialize the empty handshake history buffer.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+init_handshake_history() ->
+    {[], []}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec update_handshake_history(ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake_history(), Data ::term()) ->
+				      ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake_history().
+%%
+%% Description: Update the handshake history buffer with Data.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+update_handshake_history(Handshake, % special-case SSL2 client hello
+			 <<?CLIENT_HELLO, ?UINT24(_), ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
+			   ?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
+			   ?UINT16(CDLength),
+			   CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
+			   ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>) ->
+    update_handshake_history(Handshake,
+			     <<?CLIENT_HELLO, ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
+			       ?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
+			       ?UINT16(CDLength),
+			       CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
+			       ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>);
+update_handshake_history({Handshake0, _Prev}, Data) ->
+    {[Data|Handshake0], Handshake0}.
+
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% -spec decrypt_premaster_secret(binary(), #'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> binary().
+
+%% %%
+%% %% Description: Public key decryption using the private key.
+%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) ->
+%%     try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey,
+%% 				   [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
+%%     catch
+%% 	_:_ ->
+%% 	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR))
+%%     end.
+
+premaster_secret(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params) ->
+    try 
+	public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params)  
+    catch 
+	error:computation_failed -> 
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+    end;	   
+premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}) ->
+    try 
+	crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base])
+    catch 
+	error:computation_failed -> 
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+    end;
+premaster_secret(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, ServerKey, #srp_user{prime = Prime,
+										   verifier = Verifier}) ->
+    case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of
+	error ->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER));
+	PremasterSecret ->
+	    PremasterSecret
+    end;
+premaster_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator, srp_s = Salt, srp_b = Public},
+		 ClientKeys, {Username, Password}) ->
+    case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of
+	ok ->
+	    DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]),
+	    case crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of
+		error ->
+		    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER));
+		PremasterSecret ->
+		    PremasterSecret
+	    end;
+	_ ->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+    end;
+premaster_secret(#client_rsa_psk_identity{
+		    identity = PSKIdentity,
+		    exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = EncPMS}
+		   }, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key, PSKLookup) ->
+    PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
+    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret);
+premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{
+		    hint = IdentityHint,
+		    dh_params =  #server_dh_params{dh_y = PublicDhKey} = Params},
+		    PrivateDhKey,
+		    LookupFun) ->
+    PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params),
+    psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret);
+premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) ->
+    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret).
+
+premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{
+		    identity =  PSKIdentity,
+		    dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) ->
+    PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateKey, Params),
+    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret).
+premaster_secret(#client_psk_identity{identity = PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) ->
+    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup);
+premaster_secret({psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) ->
+    psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup);
+premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{} = ECPoint, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ECDHKeys) ->
+    public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys);
+premaster_secret(EncSecret, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = RSAPrivateKey) ->
+    try public_key:decrypt_private(EncSecret, RSAPrivateKey,
+				   [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
+    catch
+	_:_ ->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR))
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary().
+%%
+%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) ->
+    MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value),
+    SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value),
+    <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
+
+server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) ->
+    crypto:hash(Hash, Value).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), non_neg_integer(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) ->
+		 {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}.
+%%
+%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) ->
+    {error, undefined};
+prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
+    {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}.
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{} | undefined,  undefined | binary(), 
+		      atom(), [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+			     {atom(), atom()} | undefined  | #alert{}.
+
+%%
+%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms extension
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+select_hashsign(_, undefined, _,  _, _Version) ->
+    {null, anon};
+%% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have
+%% negotiated a lower version.
+select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, 
+		undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version)  when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+    select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version);
+select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns,
+		{Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
+    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+    #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+    Sign = cert_sign(Algo),
+    case lists:filter(fun({sha, dsa = S}) when S == Sign ->
+			      true;
+			 ({_, dsa}) ->
+			      false;
+			 ({_, _} = Algos) ->
+			      is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
+			 (_)  ->
+			      false
+		      end, HashSigns) of
+	[] ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
+	[HashSign | _] ->
+	    HashSign
+    end;
+select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) ->
+    #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+    #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+    select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+				  {atom(), atom()}.
+
+%% Description: For TLS 1.2 hash function and signature algorithm pairs can be
+%% negotiated with the signature_algorithms extension,
+%% for previous versions always use appropriate defaults.
+%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1.  Signature Algorithms
+%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
+%% server MUST do the following: (e.i defaults for TLS 1.2)
+%%
+%% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA,
+%%    DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had
+%%    sent the value {sha1,rsa}.
+%%
+%% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS,
+%%    DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}.
+%%
+%% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
+%%    ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+select_hashsign_algs(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso
+						       Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
+    HashSign;
+select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
+    {sha, rsa};
+select_hashsign_algs(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) ->
+    {sha, ecdsa};
+select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) -> 
+    {md5sha, rsa};
+select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) ->
+    {sha, dsa}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec master_secret(atom(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), #connection_states{},
+		   client | server) -> {binary(), #connection_states{}} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys,
+%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update
+%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails.
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+master_secret(RecordCB, Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret},
+	      ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+    ConnectionState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    try master_secret(RecordCB, Version, Mastersecret, SecParams,
+		      ConnectionStates, Role)
+    catch
+	exit:_ ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure)
+    end;
+
+master_secret(RecordCB, Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+    ConnectionState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
+			 client_random = ClientRandom,
+			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+    try master_secret(RecordCB, Version,
+		      calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret,
+					 ClientRandom, ServerRandom),
+		      SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role)
+    catch
+	exit:_ ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure)
+    end.
+
+%%-------------Encode/Decode --------------------------------
+encode_handshake(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, _Version) ->
+    PaddingLength = 32 - ((byte_size(SelectedProtocol) + 2) rem 32),
+    {?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE((byte_size(SelectedProtocol))), SelectedProtocol/binary,
+                         ?BYTE(PaddingLength), 0:(PaddingLength * 8)>>};
+
+encode_handshake(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor},
+			       random = Random,
+			       session_id = Session_ID,
+			       cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+			       compression_method = Comp_method,
+			       extensions = #hello_extensions{} = Extensions}, _Version) ->
+			SID_length = byte_size(Session_ID),
+    ExtensionsBin = encode_hello_extensions(Extensions),
+    {?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+		     ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID/binary,
+                     CipherSuite/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method), ExtensionsBin/binary>>};
+encode_handshake(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1CertList}, _Version) ->
+    ASN1Certs = certs_from_list(ASN1CertList),
+    ACLen = erlang:iolist_size(ASN1Certs),
+    {?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>};
+encode_handshake(#server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, _Version) ->
+    {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys};
+encode_handshake(#server_key_params{params_bin = Keys, hashsign = HashSign,
+			  signature = Signature}, Version) ->
+    EncSign = enc_sign(HashSign, Signature, Version),
+    {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<Keys/binary, EncSign/binary>>};
+encode_handshake(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
+			    hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos},
+			    certificate_authorities = CertAuths},
+       {Major, Minor})
+  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
+    HashSigns= << <<(ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash)):8, (ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)):8>> ||
+		   {Hash, Sign} <- HashSignAlgos >>,
+    CertTypesLen = byte_size(CertTypes),
+    HashSignsLen = byte_size(HashSigns),
+    CertAuthsLen = byte_size(CertAuths),
+    {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes/binary,
+	?UINT16(HashSignsLen), HashSigns/binary,
+	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths/binary>>
+    };
+encode_handshake(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
+			    certificate_authorities = CertAuths},
+       _Version) ->
+    CertTypesLen = byte_size(CertTypes),
+    CertAuthsLen = byte_size(CertAuths),
+    {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes/binary,
+	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths/binary>>
+    };
+encode_handshake(#server_hello_done{}, _Version) ->
+    {?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>};
+encode_handshake(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version) ->
+    {?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, encode_client_key(ExchangeKeys, Version)};
+encode_handshake(#certificate_verify{signature = BinSig, hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}, Version) ->
+    EncSig = enc_sign(HashSign, BinSig, Version),
+    {?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, EncSig};
+encode_handshake(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, _Version) ->
+    {?FINISHED, VerifyData}.
+
+encode_hello_extensions(#hello_extensions{} = Extensions) ->
+    encode_hello_extensions(hello_extensions_list(Extensions), <<>>).
+encode_hello_extensions([], <<>>) ->
+    <<>>;
+encode_hello_extensions([], Acc) ->
+    Size = byte_size(Acc),
+    <<?UINT16(Size), Acc/binary>>;
+
+encode_hello_extensions([#alpn{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) ->
+	Len = byte_size(ExtensionData),
+    ExtLen = Len + 2,
+	encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ALPN_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?UINT16(Len),
+					ExtensionData/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+encode_hello_extensions([#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    Len = byte_size(ExtensionData),
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
+				    ExtensionData/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+encode_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc);
+encode_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0) = Info} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    Len = byte_size(Info),
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+
+encode_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Info} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    InfoLen = byte_size(Info),
+    Len = InfoLen +1,
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(InfoLen),
+				    Info/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+encode_hello_extensions([#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = EllipticCurves} | Rest], Acc) ->
+
+    EllipticCurveList = << <<(tls_v1:oid_to_enum(X)):16>> || X <- EllipticCurves>>,
+    ListLen = byte_size(EllipticCurveList),
+    Len = ListLen + 2,
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT),
+				 ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), EllipticCurveList/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+encode_hello_extensions([#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = ECPointFormats} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    ECPointFormatList = list_to_binary(ECPointFormats),
+    ListLen = byte_size(ECPointFormatList),
+    Len = ListLen + 1,
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT),
+				 ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(ListLen), ECPointFormatList/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+encode_hello_extensions([#srp{username = UserName} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    SRPLen = byte_size(UserName),
+    Len = SRPLen + 2,
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen),
+				    UserName/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+encode_hello_extensions([#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    SignAlgoList = << <<(ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash)):8, (ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)):8>> ||
+		       {Hash, Sign} <- HashSignAlgos >>,
+    ListLen = byte_size(SignAlgoList),
+    Len = ListLen + 2,
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT),
+				 ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), SignAlgoList/binary, Acc/binary>>);
+encode_hello_extensions([#sni{hostname = Hostname} | Rest], Acc) ->
+    HostLen = length(Hostname),
+    HostnameBin = list_to_binary(Hostname),
+    % Hostname type (1 byte) + Hostname length (2 bytes) + Hostname (HostLen bytes)
+    ServerNameLength = 1 + 2 + HostLen,
+    % ServerNameListSize (2 bytes) + ServerNameLength
+    ExtLength = 2 + ServerNameLength,
+    encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLength),
+				    ?UINT16(ServerNameLength),
+				    ?BYTE(?SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME),
+				    ?UINT16(HostLen), HostnameBin/binary,
+				    Acc/binary>>).
+
+enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
+			ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) ->
+    EncParams = encode_server_key(Params),
+    case HashAlgo of
+	null ->
+	    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+			       params_bin = EncParams,
+			       hashsign = {null, anon},
+			       signature = <<>>};
+	_ ->
+	    Hash =
+		server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary,
+						     ServerRandom/binary,
+						     EncParams/binary>>),
+	    Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey),
+	    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+			       params_bin = EncParams,
+			       hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
+			       signature = Signature}
+    end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+			    #encrypted_premaster_secret{}
+			    | #client_diffie_hellman_public{}
+			    | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{}
+			    | #client_psk_identity{}
+			    | #client_dhe_psk_identity{}
+			    | #client_rsa_psk_identity{}
+			    | #client_srp_public{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) ->
+    dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+			       #server_key_params{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) ->
+    dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
+
+%%
+%% Description: Encode and decode functions for ALPN extension data.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+%% While the RFC opens the door to allow ALPN during renegotiation, in practice
+%% this does not work and it is recommended to ignore any ALPN extension during
+%% renegotiation, as done here.
+encode_alpn(_, true) ->
+    undefined;
+encode_alpn(undefined, _) ->
+    undefined;
+encode_alpn(Protocols, _) ->
+    #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}.
+
+decode_alpn(undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) ->
+    decode_protocols(Data, []).
+
+encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) ->
+    undefined;
+encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, false) ->
+	#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<>>};
+encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, _) ->
+	undefined.
+
+encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(undefined) ->
+	undefined;
+
+encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(Protocols) ->
+	#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}.
+
+decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) ->
+    #hello_request{};
+decode_handshake(_, ?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE(SelectedProtocolLength),
+				      SelectedProtocol:SelectedProtocolLength/binary,
+				      ?BYTE(PaddingLength), _Padding:PaddingLength/binary>>) ->
+    #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol};
+
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+					    ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
+					    Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method)>>) ->
+    #server_hello{
+       server_version = {Major,Minor},
+       random = Random,
+       session_id = Session_ID,
+       cipher_suite = Cipher_suite,
+       compression_method = Comp_method,
+       extensions = #hello_extensions{}};
+
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+		       ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
+		       Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method),
+		       ?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>) ->
+
+    HelloExtensions = decode_hello_extensions(Extensions),
+
+    #server_hello{
+       server_version = {Major,Minor},
+       random = Random,
+       session_id = Session_ID,
+       cipher_suite = Cipher_suite,
+       compression_method = Comp_method,
+       extensions = HelloExtensions};
+
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>) ->
+    #certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)};
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys) ->
+    #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys};
+decode_handshake({Major, Minor}, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes:CertTypesLen/binary,
+	?UINT16(HashSignsLen), HashSigns:HashSignsLen/binary,
+	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths:CertAuthsLen/binary>>)
+  when Major >= 3, Minor >= 3 ->
+    HashSignAlgos = [{ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)} ||
+			<<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>> <= HashSigns],
+    #certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
+			 hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos},
+			 certificate_authorities = CertAuths};
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes:CertTypesLen/binary,
+	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths:CertAuthsLen/binary>>) ->
+    #certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
+			 certificate_authorities = CertAuths};
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>) ->
+    #server_hello_done{};
+decode_handshake({Major, Minor}, ?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,<<HashSign:2/binary, ?UINT16(SignLen),
+						       Signature:SignLen/binary>>)
+  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
+    #certificate_verify{hashsign_algorithm = dec_hashsign(HashSign), signature = Signature};
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,<<?UINT16(SignLen), Signature:SignLen/binary>>)->
+    #certificate_verify{signature = Signature};
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, PKEPMS) ->
+    #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = PKEPMS};
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?FINISHED, VerifyData) ->
+    #finished{verify_data = VerifyData};
+decode_handshake(_, Message, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_handshake, Message})).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_hello_extensions({client, binary()} | binary()) -> #hello_extensions{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decodes TLS hello extensions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_hello_extensions({client, <<>>}) ->
+    #hello_extensions{};
+decode_hello_extensions({client, <<?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>}) ->
+    decode_hello_extensions(Extensions);
+decode_hello_extensions(Extensions) ->
+    dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, #hello_extensions{}).
+
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
+    Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+%% ECParameters with named_curve
+%% TODO: explicit curve
+dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID),
+		 ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary,
+		 _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
+    Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)},
+				 public = ECPoint},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       KeyExchange, Version)
+  when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ->
+    Params = #server_psk_params{
+		hint = PskIdentityHint},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) ->
+    DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
+    Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{
+      hint = IdentityHint,
+      dh_params = DHParams},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+		 ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) ->
+    Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B},
+    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version),
+    #server_key_params{params = Params,
+		       params_bin = BinMsg,
+		       hashsign = HashSign,
+		       signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_suites('2_bytes'|'3_bytes', binary()) -> list().
+%%
+%% Description:
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_suites('2_bytes', Dec) ->
+    from_2bytes(Dec);
+decode_suites('3_bytes', Dec) ->
+    from_3bytes(Dec).
+
+%%-------------Cipeher suite handling --------------------------------
+
+available_suites(UserSuites, Version) ->
+    lists:filtermap(fun(Suite) ->
+			    lists:member(Suite, ssl_cipher:all_suites(Version))
+		    end, UserSuites).
+
+available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) ->
+    ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version))
+	-- unavailable_ecc_suites(Curve);
+available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, Curve) ->
+    Suites = available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve),
+    filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, []).
+filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns,
+		 Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
+			   KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
+    do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
+
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns,
+		 Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa;
+			   KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
+			   KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa;
+			   KeyExchange == srp_rsa;
+			   KeyExchange == rsa_psk ->
+    do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when 
+      KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
+      KeyExchange == srp_dss ->							       
+    do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when 
+      KeyExchange == dh_dss; 
+      KeyExchange == dh_rsa; 
+      KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
+      KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa;    
+      KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa ->
+      %%  Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature
+      %%  algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension.  The names
+    %%  DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical.
+    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when 
+      KeyExchange == dh_anon;
+      KeyExchange == ecdh_anon;
+      KeyExchange == srp_anon;
+      KeyExchange == psk;
+      KeyExchange == dhe_psk ->
+    %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous
+    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]).
+
+do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) ->
+    case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of
+	true ->
+	    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
+	false ->
+	    filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc)
+    end.
+
+unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) ->
+    ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites();
+unavailable_ecc_suites(_) ->
+    [].
+
+cipher_suites(Suites, false) ->
+    [?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV | Suites];
+cipher_suites(Suites, true) ->
+    Suites.
+
+select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve} = 
+		   Session, Version,
+	       #ssl_options{ciphers = UserSuites, honor_cipher_order = HonorCipherOrder} = SslOpts,
+	       Cache, CacheCb, Cert) ->
+    {SessionId, Resumed} = ssl_session:server_id(Port, SuggestedSessionId,
+						 SslOpts, Cert,
+						 Cache, CacheCb),
+    case Resumed of
+        undefined ->
+	    Suites = available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, ECCCurve),
+	    CipherSuite = select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, HonorCipherOrder),
+	    Compression = select_compression(Compressions),
+	    {new, Session#session{session_id = SessionId,
+				  cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+				  compression_method = Compression}};
+	_ ->
+	    {resumed, Resumed}
+    end.
+
+supported_ecc({Major, Minor} = Version) when ((Major == 3) and (Minor >= 1)) orelse (Major > 3) ->
+    Curves = tls_v1:ecc_curves(Version),
+    #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = Curves};
+supported_ecc(_) ->
+    #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = []}.
+
+%%-------------certificate handling --------------------------------
+
+certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 ->
+    case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa,  
+			    proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of
+	true ->
+	    <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
+	false ->
+	    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>
+    end;
+
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa;
+						  KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
+						  KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa ->
+    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>;
+
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _)  when KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
+						   KeyExchange == srp_dss ->
+    <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
+
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
+						  KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
+						  KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa;
+						  KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
+    <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>;
+
+certificate_types(_, _) ->
+    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>.
+
+certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
+    Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
+    Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) ->
+		  OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject,
+		  DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp),
+		  DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin),
+		  <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>>
+	  end,
+    list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]).
+
+certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
+    ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref  == CertDbRef ->
+			      [Cert | Acc];
+			 (_, Acc) ->
+			      Acc
+		      end,
+    ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle).
+
+%%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
+
+handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, ClientCipherSuites,
+			       #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info,
+						 srp = SRP,
+						 ec_point_formats = ECCFormat,
+						 alpn = ALPN,
+						 next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, Version,
+			       #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation,
+                                            alpn_preferred_protocols = ALPNPreferredProtocols} = Opts,
+			       #session{cipher_suite = NegotiatedCipherSuite,
+					compression_method = Compression} = Session0,
+			       ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
+    Session = handle_srp_extension(SRP, Session0),
+    ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(server, RecordCB, Version, Info,
+						      Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, 
+						      ClientCipherSuites, Compression,
+						      ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation),
+
+    ServerHelloExtensions =  #hello_extensions{
+				renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server,
+									ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
+				ec_point_formats = server_ecc_extension(Version, ECCFormat)
+			       },
+
+    %% If we receive an ALPN extension and have ALPN configured for this connection,
+    %% we handle it. Otherwise we check for the NPN extension.
+    if
+        ALPN =/= undefined, ALPNPreferredProtocols =/= undefined ->
+			case handle_alpn_extension(ALPNPreferredProtocols, decode_alpn(ALPN)) of
+                #alert{} = Alert ->
+                    Alert;
+                Protocol ->
+                    {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol,
+                        ServerHelloExtensions#hello_extensions{alpn=encode_alpn([Protocol], Renegotiation)}}
+            end;
+        true ->
+            ProtocolsToAdvertise = handle_next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, Opts),
+            {Session, ConnectionStates, undefined,
+				ServerHelloExtensions#hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation=
+                	encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(ProtocolsToAdvertise)}}
+    end.
+
+handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression,
+			       #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info,
+                                                 alpn = ALPN,
+						 next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, Version,
+			       #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation,
+					    next_protocol_selector = NextProtoSelector},
+			       ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
+    ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(client, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, 
+						      CipherSuite, undefined,
+						      Compression, ConnectionStates0,
+						      Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation),
+
+    %% If we receive an ALPN extension then this is the protocol selected,
+    %% otherwise handle the NPN extension.
+    case decode_alpn(ALPN) of
+        %% ServerHello contains exactly one protocol: the one selected.
+        %% We also ignore the ALPN extension during renegotiation (see encode_alpn/2).
+        [Protocol] when not Renegotiation ->
+            {ConnectionStates, alpn, Protocol};
+        undefined ->
+            case handle_next_protocol(NextProtocolNegotiation, NextProtoSelector, Renegotiation) of
+                #alert{} = Alert ->
+                    Alert;
+                Protocol ->
+                    {ConnectionStates, npn, Protocol}
+            end;
+        {error, Reason} ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason);
+        [] ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, no_protocols_in_server_hello);
+        [_|_] ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, too_many_protocols_in_server_hello)
+    end.
+
+select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) ->
+    ServerVersion = RecordCB:highest_protocol_version(Versions),
+    RecordCB:lowest_protocol_version(ClientVersion, ServerVersion).
+
+renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) ->
+    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined};
+renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) ->
+    CS  = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
+	true ->
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)};
+	false ->
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+    end;
+renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) ->
+    CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
+	true ->
+	    Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data};
+	false ->
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+    end;
+
+renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) ->
+    CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
+	true ->
+	    CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
+	    SData  =CS#connection_state.server_verify_data,
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>};
+	false ->
+	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+    end.
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)},
+			  ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
+    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) ->
+    case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
+	true ->
+	    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
+	false ->
+	    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}
+    end;
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
+    {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)};
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify},
+			  ConnectionStates, true, _, _) ->
+    CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
+    SData = CS#connection_state.server_verify_data,
+    case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of
+	true ->
+	    {ok, ConnectionStates};
+	false ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation)
+    end;
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify},
+			  ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) ->
+
+      case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
+	  true ->
+              ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
+	  false ->
+	      CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+	      Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
+	      case Data == ClientVerify of
+		  true ->
+		      {ok, ConnectionStates};
+		  false ->
+                      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation)
+	      end
+      end;
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) ->
+    handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation);
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) ->
+     case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
+	  true ->
+             ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
+	 false ->
+	     handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation)
+     end.
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
+    CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    case {SecureRenegotation, CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation} of
+	{_, true} ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure);
+	{true, false} ->
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+	{false, false} ->
+	    {ok, ConnectionStates}
+    end.
+
+hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
+					srp = SRP,
+					signature_algs = HashSigns,
+					ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
+					elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
+                                        alpn = ALPN,
+					next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation,
+					sni = Sni}) ->
+    [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns,
+		    EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined].
+
+srp_user(#ssl_options{srp_identity = {UserName, _}}) ->
+    #srp{username = UserName};
+srp_user(_) ->
+    undefined.
+
+client_ecc_extensions(Module, Version) ->
+    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
+    case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
+	true ->
+	    EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]},
+	    EllipticCurves = #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = Module:ecc_curves(Version)},
+	    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves};
+	_ ->
+	    {undefined, undefined}
+    end.
+
+server_ecc_extension(_Version, EcPointFormats) ->
+    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
+    case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
+	true ->
+	    handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats);
+	false ->
+	    undefined
+    end.
+
+handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) ->
+    undefined;
+handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) ->
+    #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}.
+
+advertises_ec_ciphers([]) ->
+    false;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+    true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) ->
+    advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest).
+select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves}, 
+	     #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves}) -> 
+    select_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves);
+select_curve(undefined, _) ->
+    %% Client did not send ECC extension use default curve if 
+    %% ECC cipher is negotiated
+    {namedCurve, ?secp256r1};
+select_curve(_, []) ->
+    no_curve;
+select_curve(Curves, [Curve| Rest]) ->
+    case lists:member(Curve, Curves) of
+	true ->
+	    {namedCurve, Curve};
+	false ->
+	    select_curve(Curves, Rest)
+    end.
+%% RFC 6066, Section 3: Currently, the only server names supported are
+%% DNS hostnames
+sni(_, disable) ->
+    undefined;
+sni(Host, undefined) ->
+    sni1(Host);
+sni(_Host, SNIOption) ->
+    sni1(SNIOption).
+
+sni1(Hostname) ->
+    case inet_parse:domain(Hostname) of
+        false -> undefined;
+        true -> #sni{hostname = Hostname}
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+validation_fun_and_state({Fun, UserState0}, Role,  CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle) ->
+    {fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) ->
+	     case ssl_certificate:validate(OtpCert,
+					   Extension,
+					   SslState) of
+		 {valid, NewSslState} ->
+		     {valid, {NewSslState, UserState}};
+		 {fail, Reason} ->
+		     apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Reason, UserState,
+				    SslState);
+		 {unknown, _} ->
+		     apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert,
+				    Extension, UserState, SslState)
+	     end;
+	(OtpCert, VerifyResult, {SslState, UserState}) ->
+	     apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState,
+			    SslState)
+     end, {{Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle}, UserState0}};
+validation_fun_and_state(undefined, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle) ->
+    {fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, SslState) ->
+	     ssl_certificate:validate(OtpCert,
+				      Extension,
+				      SslState);
+	(OtpCert, VerifyResult, SslState) when (VerifyResult == valid) or (VerifyResult == valid_peer) -> 
+	     case crl_check(OtpCert, CRLCheck, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLDbHandle, VerifyResult) of
+		 valid ->
+		     {VerifyResult, SslState};
+		 Reason ->
+		     {fail, Reason}
+	     end;
+	(OtpCert, VerifyResult, SslState) ->
+	     ssl_certificate:validate(OtpCert,
+				      VerifyResult,
+				      SslState)
+     end, {Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle}}.
+
+apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState0, 
+	       {_, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle} = SslState) when
+      (VerifyResult == valid) or (VerifyResult == valid_peer) ->
+    case Fun(OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState0) of
+	{Valid, UserState} when (Valid == valid) or (Valid == valid_peer) ->
+	    case crl_check(OtpCert, CRLCheck, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLDbHandle, VerifyResult) of
+		valid ->
+		    {Valid, {SslState, UserState}};
+		Result ->
+		    apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Result, UserState, SslState)
+	    end;
+	{fail, _} = Fail ->
+	    Fail
+    end;
+apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0, SslState) ->
+    case Fun(OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0) of
+	{Valid, UserState} when (Valid == valid) or (Valid == valid_peer)->
+	    {Valid, {SslState, UserState}};
+	{fail, _} = Fail ->
+	    Fail;
+	{unknown, UserState} ->
+	    {unknown, {SslState, UserState}}
+    end.
+
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_expired}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_issuer}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_signature}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, name_not_permitted}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_critical_extension}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, {revoked, _}}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, selfsigned_peer}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) ->
+     ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNKNOWN_CA);
+path_validation_alert(Reason) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason).
+
+encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) ->
+    try
+	PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey,
+						    [{rsa_pad,
+						      rsa_pkcs1_padding}]),
+	#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret}
+    catch
+        _:_->
+            throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed))
+    end.
+
+digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) ->
+    try do_digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of
+	Signature ->
+	    Signature
+    catch
+	error:badkey->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, bad_key(PrivateKey)))
+    end.
+
+do_digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) when Minor >= 3 ->
+    public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key);
+do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
+    public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key);
+do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
+    public_key:encrypt_private(Hash, Key,
+			       [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]);
+do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) ->
+    public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key).
+
+calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
+    ssl_v3:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake));
+calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, HashAlgo, _MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
+    tls_v1:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, N, lists:reverse(Handshake)).
+
+calc_finished({3, 0}, Role, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
+    ssl_v3:finished(Role, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake));
+calc_finished({3, N}, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
+    tls_v1:finished(Role, N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)).
+
+master_secret(_RecordCB, Version, MasterSecret,
+	      #security_parameters{
+		 bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCA,
+		 client_random = ClientRandom,
+		 server_random = ServerRandom,
+		 hash_size = HashSize,
+		 prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
+		 key_material_length = KML,
+		 expanded_key_material_length = EKML,
+		 iv_size = IVS},
+	      ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+    {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey,
+     ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV} =
+	setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom,
+		   ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS),
+
+    ConnStates1 = ssl_record:set_master_secret(MasterSecret, ConnectionStates),
+    ConnStates2 =
+	ssl_record:set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret,
+				  Role, ConnStates1),
+
+    ClientCipherState = ssl_cipher:cipher_init(BCA, ClientIV, ClientWriteKey),
+    ServerCipherState = ssl_cipher:cipher_init(BCA, ServerIV, ServerWriteKey),
+    {MasterSecret,
+     ssl_record:set_pending_cipher_state(ConnStates2, ClientCipherState,
+					 ServerCipherState, Role)}.
+
+setup_keys({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret,
+	   ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS) ->
+    ssl_v3:setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom,
+			ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS);
+
+setup_keys({3,N}, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret,
+	   ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, _EKML, IVS) ->
+    tls_v1:setup_keys(N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize,
+			KML, IVS).
+
+calc_master_secret({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) ->
+    ssl_v3:master_secret(PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom);
+
+calc_master_secret({3,_}, PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) ->
+    tls_v1:master_secret(PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom).
+
+handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, 
+			       ClientCipherSuites, Compression,
+			       ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) ->
+    case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0,
+				   Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation,
+				   ClientCipherSuites) of
+	{ok, ConnectionStates} ->
+	    hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role,
+					    Version,
+					    NegotiatedCipherSuite,
+					    Random,
+					    Compression,
+					    ConnectionStates);
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    throw(Alert)
+    end.
+
+%% Update pending connection states with parameters exchanged via
+%% hello messages
+%% NOTE : Role is the role of the receiver of the hello message
+%%        currently being processed.
+hello_pending_connection_states(_RecordCB, Role, Version, CipherSuite, Random, Compression,
+				 ConnectionStates) ->
+    ReadState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    WriteState =
+	ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write),
+
+    NewReadSecParams =
+	hello_security_parameters(Role, Version, ReadState, CipherSuite,
+			    Random, Compression),
+
+    NewWriteSecParams =
+	hello_security_parameters(Role, Version, WriteState, CipherSuite,
+			    Random, Compression),
+
+    ssl_record:set_security_params(NewReadSecParams,
+				    NewWriteSecParams,
+				    ConnectionStates).
+
+hello_security_parameters(client, Version, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random,
+			  Compression) ->
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams),
+    NewSecParams#security_parameters{
+      server_random = Random,
+      compression_algorithm = Compression
+     };
+
+hello_security_parameters(server, Version, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random,
+			  Compression) ->
+    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams),
+    NewSecParams#security_parameters{
+      client_random = Random,
+      compression_algorithm = Compression
+     }.
+
+%%-------------Encode/Decode --------------------------------
+
+encode_server_key(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}) ->
+    PLen = byte_size(P),
+    GLen = byte_size(G),
+    YLen = byte_size(Y),
+    <<?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary>>;
+encode_server_key(#server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, ECCurve}, public = ECPubKey}) ->
+    %%TODO: support arbitrary keys
+    KLen = size(ECPubKey),
+    <<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16((tls_v1:oid_to_enum(ECCurve))),
+      ?BYTE(KLen), ECPubKey/binary>>;
+encode_server_key(#server_psk_params{hint = PskIdentityHint}) ->
+    Len = byte_size(PskIdentityHint),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint/binary>>;
+encode_server_key(Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{hint = undefined}) ->
+    encode_server_key(Params#server_dhe_psk_params{hint = <<>>});
+encode_server_key(#server_dhe_psk_params{
+		  hint = PskIdentityHint,
+		  dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}}) ->
+    Len = byte_size(PskIdentityHint),
+    PLen = byte_size(P),
+    GLen = byte_size(G),
+    YLen = byte_size(Y),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint/binary,
+      ?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary>>;
+encode_server_key(#server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G,	srp_s = S, srp_b = B}) ->
+    NLen = byte_size(N),
+    GLen = byte_size(G),
+    SLen = byte_size(S),
+    BLen = byte_size(B),
+    <<?UINT16(NLen), N/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary,
+      ?BYTE(SLen), S/binary, ?UINT16(BLen), B/binary>>.
+
+encode_client_key(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS},{3, 0}) ->
+    PKEPMS;
+encode_client_key(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}, _) ->
+    PKEPMSLen = byte_size(PKEPMS),
+    <<?UINT16(PKEPMSLen), PKEPMS/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
+    Len = byte_size(DHPublic),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), DHPublic/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
+    Len = byte_size(DHPublic),
+    <<?BYTE(Len), DHPublic/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(#client_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, _) ->
+    Id = <<"psk_identity">>,
+    Len = byte_size(Id),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(#client_psk_identity{identity = Id}, _) ->
+    Len = byte_size(Id),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(Identity = #client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, Version) ->
+    encode_client_key(Identity#client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = <<"psk_identity">>}, Version);
+encode_client_key(#client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
+    Len = byte_size(Id),
+    DHLen = byte_size(DHPublic),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary, ?UINT16(DHLen), DHPublic/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(Identity = #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, Version) ->
+    encode_client_key(Identity#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = <<"psk_identity">>}, Version);
+encode_client_key(#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id, exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version) ->
+    EncPMS = encode_client_key(ExchangeKeys, Version),
+    Len = byte_size(Id),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary, EncPMS/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(#client_srp_public{srp_a = A}, _) ->
+    Len = byte_size(A),
+    <<?UINT16(Len), A/binary>>.
+
+enc_sign({_, anon}, _Sign, _Version) ->
+    <<>>;
+enc_sign({HashAlg, SignAlg}, Signature, _Version = {Major, Minor})
+  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3->
+	SignLen = byte_size(Signature),
+	HashSign = enc_hashsign(HashAlg, SignAlg),
+	<<HashSign/binary, ?UINT16(SignLen), Signature/binary>>;
+enc_sign(_HashSign, Sign, _Version) ->
+	SignLen = byte_size(Sign),
+	<<?UINT16(SignLen), Sign/binary>>.
+
+enc_hashsign(HashAlgo, SignAlgo) ->
+    Hash = ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo),
+    Sign = ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo),
+    <<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>>.
+
+encode_protocol(Protocol, Acc) ->
+	Len = byte_size(Protocol),
+	<<Acc/binary, ?BYTE(Len), Protocol/binary>>.
+
+dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) ->
+    #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) ->
+    #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS};
+dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, empty_dh_public));
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
+    #client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y};
+dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, empty_dh_public));
+dec_client_key(<<?BYTE(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
+    #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, _) ->
+    #client_psk_identity{identity = Id};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary,
+		 ?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, _) ->
+    #client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DH_Y};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary, PKEPMS/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, {3, 0}) ->
+    #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id,
+			     exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary, ?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, _) ->
+    #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id,
+			     exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(ALen), A:ALen/binary>>,
+	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, _) ->
+    #client_srp_public{srp_a = A}.
+
+dec_server_key_params(Len, Keys, Version) ->
+    <<Params:Len/bytes, Signature/binary>> = Keys,
+    dec_server_key_signature(Params, Signature, Version).
+
+dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo),
+			    ?UINT16(0)>>, {Major, Minor})
+  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
+    HashSign = {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)},
+    {Params, HashSign, <<>>};
+dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo),
+			    ?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, {Major, Minor})
+  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
+    HashSign = {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)},
+    {Params, HashSign, Signature};
+dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<>>, _) ->
+    {Params, {null, anon}, <<>>};
+dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(0)>>, _) ->
+    {Params, {null, anon}, <<>>};
+dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, _) ->
+    {Params, undefined, Signature};
+dec_server_key_signature(_, _, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, failed_to_decrypt_server_key_sign)).
+
+dec_hello_extensions(<<>>, Acc) ->
+    Acc;
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ALPN_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc)
+        when Len + 2 =:= ExtLen ->
+    ALPN = #alpn{extension_data = ExtensionData},
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{alpn = ALPN});
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    NextP = #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData},
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextP});
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    RenegotiateInfo = case Len of
+			  1 ->  % Initial handshake
+			      Info; % should be <<0>> will be matched in handle_renegotiation_info
+			  _ ->
+			      VerifyLen = Len - 1,
+			      <<?BYTE(VerifyLen), VerifyInfo/binary>> = Info,
+			      VerifyInfo
+		      end,
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info =
+							#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection =
+										RenegotiateInfo}});
+
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), SRP:SRPLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc)
+  when Len == SRPLen + 2 ->
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest,  Acc#hello_extensions{srp = #srp{username = SRP}});
+
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
+		       ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    SignAlgoListLen = Len - 2,
+    <<?UINT16(SignAlgoListLen), SignAlgoList/binary>> = ExtData,
+    HashSignAlgos = [{ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)} ||
+			<<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>> <= SignAlgoList],
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{signature_algs =
+						    #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos}});
+
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
+		       ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    <<?UINT16(_), EllipticCurveList/binary>> = ExtData,
+    %% Ignore unknown curves
+    Pick = fun(Enum) ->
+		   case tls_v1:enum_to_oid(Enum) of
+		       undefined ->
+			   false;
+		       Oid ->
+			   {true, Oid}
+		   end
+	   end,
+    EllipticCurves = lists:filtermap(Pick, [ECC || <<ECC:16>> <= EllipticCurveList]),
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{elliptic_curves =
+							#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list =
+									     EllipticCurves}});
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
+		       ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    <<?BYTE(_), ECPointFormatList/binary>> = ExtData,
+    ECPointFormats = binary_to_list(ECPointFormatList),
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{ec_point_formats =
+							#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list =
+									      ECPointFormats}});
+
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Rest/binary>>, Acc) when Len == 0 ->
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{sni = ""}); %% Server may send an empy SNI
+
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
+                ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    <<?UINT16(_), NameList/binary>> = ExtData,
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{sni = dec_sni(NameList)});
+%% Ignore data following the ClientHello (i.e.,
+%% extensions) if not understood.
+
+dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(_), ?UINT16(Len), _Unknown:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc);
+%% This theoretically should not happen if the protocol is followed, but if it does it is ignored.
+dec_hello_extensions(_, Acc) ->
+    Acc.
+
+dec_hashsign(<<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo)>>) ->
+    {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)}.
+
+%% Ignore unknown names (only host_name is supported)
+dec_sni(<<?BYTE(?SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME), ?UINT16(Len),
+                HostName:Len/binary, _/binary>>) ->
+    #sni{hostname = binary_to_list(HostName)};
+dec_sni(<<?BYTE(_), ?UINT16(Len), _:Len, Rest/binary>>) -> dec_sni(Rest);
+dec_sni(_) -> undefined.
+
+decode_next_protocols({next_protocol_negotiation, Protocols}) ->
+    decode_protocols(Protocols, []).
+
+decode_protocols(<<>>, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+decode_protocols(<<?BYTE(Len), Protocol:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    case Len of
+        0 ->
+            {error, invalid_protocols};
+        _ ->
+            decode_protocols(Rest, [Protocol|Acc])
+    end;
+decode_protocols(_Bytes, _Acc) ->
+    {error, invalid_protocols}.
+
+%% encode/decode stream of certificate data to/from list of certificate data
+certs_to_list(ASN1Certs) ->
+    certs_to_list(ASN1Certs, []).
+
+certs_to_list(<<?UINT24(CertLen), Cert:CertLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    certs_to_list(Rest, [Cert | Acc]);
+certs_to_list(<<>>, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc, []).
+
+certs_from_list(ACList) ->
+    list_to_binary([begin
+			CertLen = byte_size(Cert),
+                        <<?UINT24(CertLen), Cert/binary>>
+		    end || Cert <- ACList]).
+from_3bytes(Bin3) ->
+    from_3bytes(Bin3, []).
+
+from_3bytes(<<>>, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+from_3bytes(<<?UINT24(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    from_3bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]).
+
+from_2bytes(Bin2) ->
+    from_2bytes(Bin2, []).
+
+from_2bytes(<<>>, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+from_2bytes(<<?UINT16(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
+    from_2bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]).
+key_exchange_alg(rsa) ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA;
+key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss;
+			   Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa; Alg == dh_anon ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN;
+key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == ecdhe_rsa; Alg == ecdh_rsa;
+			   Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa; Alg == ecdh_ecdsa;
+			   Alg == ecdh_anon ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN;
+key_exchange_alg(psk) ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK;
+key_exchange_alg(dhe_psk) ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK;
+key_exchange_alg(rsa_psk) ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK;
+key_exchange_alg(Alg)
+  when Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_anon ->
+    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP;
+key_exchange_alg(_) ->
+    ?NULL.
+
+%%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
+
+%% Receive protocols, choose one from the list, return it.
+handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, Reason}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason);
+handle_alpn_extension([], _) ->
+	?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
+handle_alpn_extension([ServerProtocol|Tail], ClientProtocols) ->
+	case lists:member(ServerProtocol, ClientProtocols) of
+		true -> ServerProtocol;
+		false -> handle_alpn_extension(Tail, ClientProtocols)
+	end.
+
+handle_next_protocol(undefined,
+		     _NextProtocolSelector, _Renegotiating) ->
+    undefined;
+
+handle_next_protocol(#next_protocol_negotiation{} = NextProtocols,
+    NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) ->
+
+    case next_protocol_extension_allowed(NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) of
+        true ->
+            select_next_protocol(decode_next_protocols(NextProtocols), NextProtocolSelector);
+        false ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, unexpected_next_protocol_extension)
+    end.
+
+
+handle_next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, SslOpts)->
+    case handle_next_protocol_on_server(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, SslOpts) of
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert;
+	ProtocolsToAdvertise ->
+	    ProtocolsToAdvertise
+    end.
+
+handle_next_protocol_on_server(undefined, _Renegotiation, _SslOpts) ->
+    undefined;
+
+handle_next_protocol_on_server(#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<>>},
+			       false, #ssl_options{next_protocols_advertised = Protocols}) ->
+    Protocols;
+
+handle_next_protocol_on_server(_Hello, _Renegotiation, _SSLOpts) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, unexpected_next_protocol_extension).
+
+next_protocol_extension_allowed(NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) ->
+    NextProtocolSelector =/= undefined andalso not Renegotiating.
+
+select_next_protocol({error, Reason}, _NextProtocolSelector) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason);
+select_next_protocol(Protocols, NextProtocolSelector) ->
+    case NextProtocolSelector(Protocols) of
+	?NO_PROTOCOL ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, no_next_protocol);
+	Protocol when is_binary(Protocol)  ->
+	    Protocol
+    end.
+
+handle_srp_extension(undefined, Session) ->
+    Session;
+handle_srp_extension(#srp{username = Username}, Session) ->
+    Session#session{srp_username = Username}.
+
+%%-------------Misc --------------------------------
+
+select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, false) ->
+    select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites);
+select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, true) ->
+    select_cipher_suite(Suites, CipherSuites).
+
+select_cipher_suite([], _) ->
+   no_suite;
+select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) ->
+    case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of
+	true ->
+	    Suite;
+        false ->
+	    select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites)
+    end.
+
+int_to_bin(I) ->
+    L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2,
+    <<I:(L*8)>>.
+
+is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) ->
+    lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites).
+
+select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) ->
+    ?NULL.
+
+available_signature_algs(undefined, _, _)  ->
+    undefined;
+available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, {Major, Minor}, AllVersions) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
+    case tls_record:lowest_protocol_version(AllVersions) of
+	{3, 3} ->
+	    #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = SupportedHashSigns};
+	_ ->
+	    undefined
+    end;	
+available_signature_algs(_, _, _) ->
+    undefined.
+
+psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) ->
+    case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of
+	{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
+	    Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK),
+	    <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>;
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert;
+	_ ->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+    end.
+
+psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret) ->
+    case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of
+	{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
+	    Len = erlang:byte_size(PremasterSecret),
+	    PSKLen = erlang:byte_size(PSK),
+	    <<?UINT16(Len), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(PSKLen), PSK/binary>>;
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert;
+	_ ->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+    end.
+
+handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun)
+  when LookupFun == undefined ->
+    error;
+handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) ->
+    Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState).
+
+crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _) ->
+    valid;
+crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option.
+    valid;
+crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _) ->
+    Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) ->
+				     ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, DBInfo)
+			     end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}}, 
+	       {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end}
+	      ],
+    case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of
+	no_dps ->
+	    crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check,
+				  dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer),
+				  Options);
+	DpsAndCRLs ->  %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed 
+	    %% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined}
+	    case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of
+		{bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} ->
+		    crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, 
+								       CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options);
+		Other ->
+		    Other
+	    end
+    end.
+
+crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) ->		
+    case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of 
+	{bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined}  ->
+	    valid;
+	Other ->
+	    Other
+    end;
+crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, _, Dps, Options) ->    
+    public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options).
+
+dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) ->
+    case public_key:pkix_dist_points(OtpCert) of
+	[] ->
+	    no_dps;
+	DistPoints ->
+	    Issuer = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer,
+	    distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle)
+    end;
+
+dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) ->    
+    DP = #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, GenNames}} = 
+	public_key:pkix_dist_point(OtpCert),
+    CRLs = lists:flatmap(fun({directoryName, Issuer}) -> 
+				 Callback:select(Issuer, CRLDbHandle);
+			    (_) ->
+				 []
+			 end, GenNames),
+    [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} ||  CRL <- CRLs].
+
+distpoints_lookup([], _, _, _) ->
+    [];
+distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) ->
+    Result =
+	try Callback:lookup(DistPoint, Issuer, CRLDbHandle)
+	catch
+	    error:undef ->
+		%% The callback module still uses the 2-argument
+		%% version of the lookup function.
+		Callback:lookup(DistPoint, CRLDbHandle)
+	end,
+    case Result of
+	not_available ->
+	    distpoints_lookup(Rest, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle);
+	CRLs ->
+	    [{DistPoint, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} ||  CRL <- CRLs]
+    end.	
+
+cert_sign(?rsaEncryption) ->
+    rsa;
+cert_sign(?'id-ecPublicKey') ->
+    ecdsa;
+cert_sign(?'id-dsa') ->
+    dsa;
+cert_sign(Alg) ->
+    {_, Sign} =public_key:pkix_sign_types(Alg),
+    Sign.
+
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, Sign} = Algos, Sign, _, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+    is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos,_, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns) when KeyExAlgo == dh_ecdsa;
+								     KeyExAlgo == ecdh_rsa;    
+								     KeyExAlgo == ecdh_ecdsa ->
+    is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); 
+is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_,_,_) ->
+    false.
+is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+    lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns).
+
+bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
+    unacceptable_dsa_key;
+bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
+    unacceptable_rsa_key;
+bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) ->
+    unacceptable_ecdsa_key.
+
+available_signature_algs(undefined, SupportedHashSigns, _, {Major, Minor}) when 
+      (Major >= 3) andalso (Minor >= 3) ->
+    SupportedHashSigns;
+available_signature_algs(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, SupportedHashSigns, 
+		     _, {Major, Minor}) when (Major >= 3) andalso (Minor >= 3) ->
+    sets:to_list(sets:intersection(sets:from_list(ClientHashSigns), 
+				   sets:from_list(SupportedHashSigns)));
+available_signature_algs(_, _, _, _) -> 
+    undefined.
+
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl
index eb1a1dbf62..fde92035a2 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -28,11 +29,6 @@
 
 -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
 
--type oid()               :: tuple().
--type public_key_params() :: #'Dss-Parms'{} |  {namedCurve, oid()} | #'ECParameters'{} | term().
--type public_key_info()   :: {oid(), #'RSAPublicKey'{} | integer() | #'ECPoint'{}, public_key_params()}.
--type tls_handshake_history() :: {[binary()], [binary()]}.
-
 -define(NO_PROTOCOL, <<>>).
 
 %% Signature algorithms
@@ -50,13 +46,15 @@
 	  master_secret,
 	  srp_username,
 	  is_resumable,
-	  time_stamp
+	  time_stamp,
+	  ecc
 	  }).
 
 -define(NUM_OF_SESSION_ID_BYTES, 32).  % TSL 1.1 & SSL 3
 -define(NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES, 48).
 -define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR, 2).
--define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME,  16#FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF).
+-define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME,
+	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
 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%% Handsake protocol - RFC 4346 section 7.4
@@ -96,17 +94,24 @@
 
 %% client_hello defined in tls_handshake.hrl and dtls_handshake.hrl
 
+-record(hello_extensions, {
+	  renegotiation_info,
+	  signature_algs,          % supported combinations of hashes/signature algos
+          alpn,
+	  next_protocol_negotiation = undefined, % [binary()]
+	  srp,
+	  ec_point_formats,
+	  elliptic_curves,
+	  sni
+	 }).
+
 -record(server_hello, {
 	  server_version,
 	  random,             
 	  session_id,         % opaque SessionID<0..32>
 	  cipher_suite,       % cipher_suites
 	  compression_method, % compression_method
-	  renegotiation_info,
-	  hash_signs,          % supported combinations of hashes/signature algos
-	  ec_point_formats,    % supported ec point formats
-	  elliptic_curves,     % supported elliptic curver
-	  next_protocol_negotiation = undefined % [binary()]
+	  extensions
 	 }).
 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
@@ -299,6 +304,14 @@
 	 }).
 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+%% Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation  RFC 7301
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+
+-define(ALPN_EXT, 16).
+
+-record(alpn, {extension_data}).
+
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %% Next Protocol Negotiation
 %% (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-02)
 %% (http://technotes.googlecode.com/git/nextprotoneg.html)
@@ -337,7 +350,17 @@
 -define(EXPLICIT_CHAR2, 2).
 -define(NAMED_CURVE, 3).
 
--endif. % -ifdef(ssl_handshake).
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+%% Server name indication RFC 6066 section 3
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+
+-define(SNI_EXT, 16#0000).
 
+%% enum { host_name(0), (255) } NameType;
+-define(SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME, 0).
 
-     
+-record(sni, {
+          hostname = undefined
+        }).
+
+-endif. % -ifdef(ssl_handshake).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
index 14db4a6067..c19c1787ff 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -24,8 +25,7 @@
 
 -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). 
 
-%% Looks like it does for backwards compatibility reasons
--record(sslsocket, {fd = nil, pid = nil}).
+-define(SECRET_PRINTOUT, "***").
 
 -type reason()            :: term().
 -type reply()             :: term().
@@ -33,16 +33,13 @@
 -type from()              :: term().
 -type host()		  :: inet:ip_address() | inet:hostname().
 -type session_id()        :: 0 | binary().
--type tls_version()       :: {integer(), integer()}.
--type tls_atom_version()  :: sslv3 | tlsv1 | 'tlsv1.1' | 'tlsv1.2'.
 -type certdb_ref()        :: reference().
 -type db_handle()         :: term().
--type key_algo()          :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon.
 -type der_cert()          :: binary().
--type private_key()       :: #'RSAPrivateKey'{} | #'DSAPrivateKey'{} | #'ECPrivateKey'{}.
 -type issuer()            :: tuple().
 -type serialnumber()      :: integer().
 -type cert_key()          :: {reference(), integer(), issuer()}.
+-type secret_printout()   :: list().
 
 %% basic binary constructors
 -define(BOOLEAN(X),  X:8/unsigned-big-integer).
@@ -50,6 +47,7 @@
 -define(UINT16(X),   X:16/unsigned-big-integer).
 -define(UINT24(X),   X:24/unsigned-big-integer).
 -define(UINT32(X),   X:32/unsigned-big-integer).
+-define(UINT48(X),   X:48/unsigned-big-integer).
 -define(UINT64(X),   X:64/unsigned-big-integer).
 -define(STRING(X),   ?UINT32((size(X))), (X)/binary).
 
@@ -57,41 +55,54 @@
 -define(uint16(X), << ?UINT16(X) >> ).
 -define(uint24(X), << ?UINT24(X) >> ).
 -define(uint32(X), << ?UINT32(X) >> ).
+-define(uint48(X), << ?UINT48(X) >> ).
 -define(uint64(X), << ?UINT64(X) >> ).
 
 -define(CDR_MAGIC, "GIOP").
 -define(CDR_HDR_SIZE, 12).
 
 -define(DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, 5000).
+-define(NO_DIST_POINT, "http://dummy/no_distribution_point").
+-define(NO_DIST_POINT_PATH, "dummy/no_distribution_point").
 
 %% Common enumerate values in for SSL-protocols 
 -define(NULL, 0).
 -define(TRUE, 0).
 -define(FALSE, 1).
 
--define(ALL_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1, sslv3]).
--define(MIN_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.1', tlsv1, sslv3]).
+%% sslv3 is considered insecure due to lack of padding check (Poodle attack)
+%% Keep as interop with legacy software but do not support as default 
+-define(ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1, sslv3]).
+-define(ALL_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1]).
+-define(MIN_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.1', tlsv1]).
+-define(ALL_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['dtlsv1.2', dtlsv1]).
+-define(MIN_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['dtlsv1.2', dtlsv1]).
+
+-define('24H_in_msec', 86400000).
+-define('24H_in_sec', 86400).
 
 -record(ssl_options, {
-	  versions,   % 'tlsv1.2' | 'tlsv1.1' | tlsv1 | sslv3
-	  verify,     %   verify_none | verify_peer
-	  verify_fun, % fun(CertVerifyErrors) -> boolean()
-	  fail_if_no_peer_cert, % boolean()
-	  verify_client_once,  % boolean()
+	  protocol    :: tls | dtls,
+	  versions    :: [ssl_record:ssl_version()], %% ssl_record:atom_version() in API
+	  verify      :: verify_none | verify_peer,
+	  verify_fun,  %%:: fun(CertVerifyErrors::term()) -> boolean(),
+	  partial_chain       :: fun(),
+	  fail_if_no_peer_cert ::  boolean(),
+	  verify_client_once   ::  boolean(),
 	  %% fun(Extensions, State, Verify, AccError) ->  {Extensions, State, AccError}
 	  validate_extensions_fun, 
-	  depth,      % integer()
-	  certfile,   % file()
-	  cert,       % der_encoded()
-	  keyfile,    % file()
-	  key,	      % der_encoded()
-	  password,   % 
-	  cacerts,    % [der_encoded()]
-	  cacertfile, % file()
-	  dh,         % der_encoded()
-	  dhfile,     % file()
+	  depth                :: integer(),
+	  certfile             :: binary(),
+	  cert                 :: public_key:der_encoded() | secret_printout() | 'undefined',
+	  keyfile              :: binary(),
+	  key	               :: {'RSAPrivateKey' | 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' | 'PrivateKeyInfo', public_key:der_encoded()} | secret_printout() | 'undefined',
+	  password	       :: string() | secret_printout() | 'undefined',
+	  cacerts              :: [public_key:der_encoded()] | secret_printout() | 'undefined',
+	  cacertfile           :: binary(),
+	  dh                   :: public_key:der_encoded() | secret_printout(),
+	  dhfile               :: binary() | secret_printout() | 'undefined',
 	  user_lookup_fun,  % server option, fun to lookup the user
-	  psk_identity,  % binary
+	  psk_identity         :: binary() | secret_printout() | 'undefined',
 	  srp_identity,  % client option {User, Password}
 	  ciphers,    % 
 	  %% Local policy for the server if it want's to reuse the session
@@ -100,18 +111,36 @@
 	  reuse_session,  
 	  %% If false sessions will never be reused, if true they
 	  %% will be reused if possible.
-	  reuse_sessions, % boolean()
+	  reuse_sessions       :: boolean(),
 	  renegotiate_at,
 	  secure_renegotiate,
-	  debug,
-	  hibernate_after,% undefined if not hibernating,
-                          % or number of ms of inactivity
-			  % after which ssl_connection will
-                          % go into hibernation
+	  client_renegotiation,
+	  %% undefined if not hibernating, or number of ms of
+	  %% inactivity after which ssl_connection will go into
+	  %% hibernation
+	  hibernate_after      :: timeout(),
 	  %% This option should only be set to true by inet_tls_dist
-	  erl_dist = false,
-	  next_protocols_advertised = undefined, %% [binary()],
-	  next_protocol_selector = undefined  %% fun([binary()]) -> binary())
+	  erl_dist = false     :: boolean(),
+          alpn_advertised_protocols = undefined :: [binary()] | undefined ,
+          alpn_preferred_protocols = undefined  :: [binary()] | undefined,
+	  next_protocols_advertised = undefined :: [binary()] | undefined,
+	  next_protocol_selector = undefined,  %% fun([binary()]) -> binary())
+	  log_alert             :: boolean(),
+	  server_name_indication = undefined,
+	  sni_hosts  :: [{inet:hostname(), [tuple()]}],
+	  sni_fun :: function() | undefined,
+	  %% Should the server prefer its own cipher order over the one provided by
+	  %% the client?
+	  honor_cipher_order = false :: boolean(),
+	  padding_check = true       :: boolean(),
+	  %%Should we use 1/n-1 or 0/n splitting to mitigate BEAST, or disable
+	  %%mitigation entirely?
+	  beast_mitigation = one_n_minus_one :: one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled,
+	  fallback = false           :: boolean(),
+	  crl_check                  :: boolean() | peer | best_effort, 
+	  crl_cache,
+	  signature_algs,
+	  v2_hello_compatible        :: boolean()
 	  }).
 
 -record(socket_options,
@@ -123,6 +152,19 @@
 	  active = true
 	 }).
 
+-record(config, {ssl,               %% SSL parameters
+		 inet_user,         %% User set inet options
+		 emulated,          %% Emulated option list or "inherit_tracker" pid 
+		 inet_ssl,          %% inet options for internal ssl socket
+		 transport_info,                 %% Callback info
+		 connection_cb
+		}).
+
+
+-type state_name()           :: hello | abbreviated | certify | cipher | connection.
+-type gen_fsm_state_return() :: {next_state, state_name(), term()} |
+				{next_state, state_name(), term(), timeout()} |
+				{stop, term(), term()}.
 -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_internal).
 
 
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_listen_tracker_sup.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_listen_tracker_sup.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f685a2ead
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_listen_tracker_sup.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%% 
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2014-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%% 
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%% 
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+
+%%
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: Supervisor for a listen options tracker
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+-module(ssl_listen_tracker_sup).
+
+-behaviour(supervisor).
+
+%% API
+-export([start_link/0, start_link_dist/0]).
+-export([start_child/1, start_child_dist/1]).
+
+%% Supervisor callback
+-export([init/1]).
+
+%%%=========================================================================
+%%%  API
+%%%=========================================================================
+start_link() ->
+    supervisor:start_link({local, tracker_name(normal)}, ?MODULE, []).
+
+start_link_dist() ->
+    supervisor:start_link({local, tracker_name(dist)}, ?MODULE, []).
+
+start_child(Args) ->
+    supervisor:start_child(tracker_name(normal), Args).
+
+start_child_dist(Args) ->
+    supervisor:start_child(tracker_name(dist), Args).
+  
+%%%=========================================================================
+%%%  Supervisor callback
+%%%=========================================================================
+init(_O) ->
+    RestartStrategy = simple_one_for_one,
+    MaxR = 0,
+    MaxT = 3600,
+   
+    Name = undefined, % As simple_one_for_one is used.
+    StartFunc = {ssl_socket, start_link, []},
+    Restart = temporary, % E.g. should not be restarted
+    Shutdown = 4000,
+    Modules = [ssl_socket],
+    Type = worker,
+    
+    ChildSpec = {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules},
+    {ok, {{RestartStrategy, MaxR, MaxT}, [ChildSpec]}}.
+
+tracker_name(normal) ->
+    ?MODULE;
+tracker_name(dist) ->
+    list_to_atom(atom_to_list(?MODULE) ++ "dist").
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
index 7af4a68461..c7dcbaabe9 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -26,14 +27,15 @@
 
 %% Internal application API
 -export([start_link/1, start_link_dist/1,
-	 connection_init/2, cache_pem_file/2,
+	 connection_init/3, cache_pem_file/2,
 	 lookup_trusted_cert/4,
 	 new_session_id/1, clean_cert_db/2,
 	 register_session/2, register_session/3, invalidate_session/2,
-	 invalidate_session/3, clear_pem_cache/0]).
+	 insert_crls/2, insert_crls/3, delete_crls/1, delete_crls/2, 
+	 invalidate_session/3, invalidate_pem/1, clear_pem_cache/0, manager_name/1]).
 
 % Spawn export
--export([init_session_validator/1]).
+-export([init_session_validator/1, init_pem_cache_validator/1]).
 
 %% gen_server callbacks
 -export([init/1, handle_call/3, handle_cast/2, handle_info/2,
@@ -44,26 +46,44 @@
 -include_lib("kernel/include/file.hrl").
 
 -record(state, {
-	  session_cache,
-	  session_cache_cb,
-	  session_lifetime,
-	  certificate_db,
-	  session_validation_timer,
-	  last_delay_timer  = {undefined, undefined}%% Keep for testing purposes
+	  session_cache_client    :: db_handle(),
+	  session_cache_server    :: db_handle(),
+	  session_cache_cb        :: atom(),
+	  session_lifetime        :: integer(),
+	  certificate_db          :: db_handle(),
+	  session_validation_timer :: reference(),
+	  last_delay_timer  = {undefined, undefined},%% Keep for testing purposes
+	  last_pem_check             :: erlang:timestamp(),
+	  clear_pem_cache            :: integer(),
+	  session_cache_client_max   :: integer(),
+	  session_cache_server_max   :: integer(),
+	  session_server_invalidator :: undefined | pid(),
+	  session_client_invalidator :: undefined | pid()
 	 }).
 
--define('24H_in_msec', 8640000).
--define('24H_in_sec', 8640).
 -define(GEN_UNIQUE_ID_MAX_TRIES, 10).
 -define(SESSION_VALIDATION_INTERVAL, 60000).
 -define(CLEAR_PEM_CACHE, 120000).
 -define(CLEAN_SESSION_DB, 60000).
 -define(CLEAN_CERT_DB, 500).
--define(NOT_TO_BIG, 10).
+-define(DEFAULT_MAX_SESSION_CACHE, 1000).
+-define(LOAD_MITIGATION, 10).
 
 %%====================================================================
 %% API
 %%====================================================================
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec manager_name(normal | dist) -> atom().
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the registered name of the ssl manager process
+%% in the operation modes 'normal' and 'dist'.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+manager_name(normal) ->
+    ?MODULE;
+manager_name(dist) ->
+    list_to_atom(atom_to_list(?MODULE) ++ "dist").
+
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec start_link(list()) -> {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, term()}.
 %%
@@ -71,7 +91,9 @@
 %% and certificate caching.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 start_link(Opts) ->
-    gen_server:start_link({local, ?MODULE}, ?MODULE, [?MODULE, Opts], []).
+    DistMangerName = manager_name(normal),
+    gen_server:start_link({local, DistMangerName}, 
+			  ?MODULE, [DistMangerName, Opts], []).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec start_link_dist(list()) -> {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, term()}.
@@ -80,37 +102,40 @@ start_link(Opts) ->
 %% be used by the erlang distribution. Note disables soft upgrade!
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 start_link_dist(Opts) ->
-    gen_server:start_link({local, ssl_manager_dist}, ?MODULE, [ssl_manager_dist, Opts], []).
+    DistMangerName = manager_name(dist),
+    gen_server:start_link({local, DistMangerName}, 
+			  ?MODULE, [DistMangerName, Opts], []).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec connection_init(binary()| {der, list()}, client | server) ->
-			     {ok, certdb_ref(), db_handle(), db_handle(), db_handle(), db_handle()}.
+-spec connection_init(binary()| {der, list()}, client | server, 
+		      {Cb :: atom(), Handle:: term()}) ->
+			     {ok, certdb_ref(), db_handle(), db_handle(), 
+			      db_handle(), db_handle(), CRLInfo::term()}.
 %%			     
 %% Description: Do necessary initializations for a new connection.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-connection_init({der, _} = Trustedcerts, Role) ->
-    call({connection_init, Trustedcerts, Role});
+connection_init({der, _} = Trustedcerts, Role, CRLCache) ->
+    call({connection_init, Trustedcerts, Role, CRLCache});
 
-connection_init(<<>> = Trustedcerts, Role) ->
-    call({connection_init, Trustedcerts, Role});
+connection_init(<<>> = Trustedcerts, Role, CRLCache) ->
+    call({connection_init, Trustedcerts, Role, CRLCache});
 
-connection_init(Trustedcerts, Role) ->
-    call({connection_init, Trustedcerts, Role}).
+connection_init(Trustedcerts, Role, CRLCache) ->
+    call({connection_init, Trustedcerts, Role, CRLCache}).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec cache_pem_file(binary(), term()) -> {ok, term()} | {error, reason()}.
 %%		    
-%% Description: Cach a pem file and return its content.
+%% Description: Cache a pem file and return its content.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 cache_pem_file(File, DbHandle) ->
-    MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, File),
-    case ssl_pkix_db:lookup_cached_pem(DbHandle, MD5) of
+    case ssl_pkix_db:lookup_cached_pem(DbHandle, File) of
 	[{Content,_}] ->
 	    {ok, Content};
 	[Content] ->
-	   {ok, Content};
+	    {ok, Content};
 	undefined ->
-	    call({cache_pem, {MD5, File}})
+	    call({cache_pem, File})
     end.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -120,7 +145,7 @@ cache_pem_file(File, DbHandle) ->
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 clear_pem_cache() ->
     %% Not supported for distribution at the moement, should it be?
-    put(ssl_manager, ssl_manager),
+    put(ssl_manager, manager_name(normal)),
     call(unconditionally_clear_pem_cache).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -149,34 +174,59 @@ new_session_id(Port) ->
 %% be called by ssl-connection processes. 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 clean_cert_db(Ref, File) ->
-    erlang:send_after(?CLEAN_CERT_DB, get(ssl_manager), {clean_cert_db, Ref, File}),
+    erlang:send_after(?CLEAN_CERT_DB, get(ssl_manager), 
+		      {clean_cert_db, Ref, File}),
     ok.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec register_session(inet:port_number(), #session{}) -> ok.
--spec register_session(host(), inet:port_number(), #session{}) -> ok.
 %%
 %% Description: Make the session available for reuse.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec register_session(host(), inet:port_number(), #session{}) -> ok.
 register_session(Host, Port, Session) ->
     cast({register_session, Host, Port, Session}).
 
+-spec register_session(inet:port_number(), #session{}) -> ok.
 register_session(Port, Session) ->
     cast({register_session, Port, Session}).
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec invalidate_session(inet:port_number(), #session{}) -> ok.
--spec invalidate_session(host(), inet:port_number(), #session{}) -> ok.
 %%
 %% Description: Make the session unavailable for reuse. After
 %% a the session has been marked "is_resumable = false" for some while
 %% it will be safe to remove the data from the session database.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec invalidate_session(host(), inet:port_number(), #session{}) -> ok.
 invalidate_session(Host, Port, Session) ->
+    load_mitigation(),
     cast({invalidate_session, Host, Port, Session}).
 
+-spec invalidate_session(inet:port_number(), #session{}) -> ok.
 invalidate_session(Port, Session) ->
+    load_mitigation(),
     cast({invalidate_session, Port, Session}).
 
+-spec invalidate_pem(File::binary()) -> ok.
+invalidate_pem(File) ->
+    cast({invalidate_pem, File}).
+
+insert_crls(Path, CRLs)->
+    insert_crls(Path, CRLs, normal).
+insert_crls(?NO_DIST_POINT_PATH = Path, CRLs, ManagerType)->
+    put(ssl_manager, manager_name(ManagerType)),
+    cast({insert_crls, Path, CRLs});
+insert_crls(Path, CRLs, ManagerType)->
+    put(ssl_manager, manager_name(ManagerType)),
+    call({insert_crls, Path, CRLs}).
+
+delete_crls(Path)->
+    delete_crls(Path, normal).
+delete_crls(?NO_DIST_POINT_PATH = Path, ManagerType)->
+    put(ssl_manager, manager_name(ManagerType)),
+    cast({delete_crls, Path});
+delete_crls(Path, ManagerType)->
+    put(ssl_manager, manager_name(ManagerType)),
+    call({delete_crls, Path}).
+
 %%====================================================================
 %% gen_server callbacks
 %%====================================================================
@@ -195,15 +245,31 @@ init([Name, Opts]) ->
     SessionLifeTime =  
 	proplists:get_value(session_lifetime, Opts, ?'24H_in_sec'),
     CertDb = ssl_pkix_db:create(),
-    SessionCache = CacheCb:init(proplists:get_value(session_cb_init_args, Opts, [])),
+    ClientSessionCache = 
+	CacheCb:init([{role, client} | 
+		      proplists:get_value(session_cb_init_args, Opts, [])]),
+    ServerSessionCache = 
+	CacheCb:init([{role, server} | 
+		      proplists:get_value(session_cb_init_args, Opts, [])]),
     Timer = erlang:send_after(SessionLifeTime * 1000 + 5000, 
 			      self(), validate_sessions),
-    erlang:send_after(?CLEAR_PEM_CACHE, self(), clear_pem_cache),
+    Interval = pem_check_interval(),
+    erlang:send_after(Interval, self(), clear_pem_cache),
     {ok, #state{certificate_db = CertDb,
-		session_cache = SessionCache,
+		session_cache_client = ClientSessionCache,
+		session_cache_server = ServerSessionCache,
 		session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
 		session_lifetime = SessionLifeTime,
-		session_validation_timer = Timer}}.
+		session_validation_timer = Timer,
+		last_pem_check =  os:timestamp(),
+		clear_pem_cache = Interval, 	
+		session_cache_client_max = 
+		    max_session_cache_size(session_cache_client_max),
+		session_cache_server_max = 
+		    max_session_cache_size(session_cache_server_max),
+		session_client_invalidator = undefined,
+		session_server_invalidator = undefined
+	       }}.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec handle_call(msg(), from(), #state{}) -> {reply, reply(), #state{}}. 
@@ -216,33 +282,40 @@ init([Name, Opts]) ->
 %%
 %% Description: Handling call messages
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-handle_call({{connection_init, <<>>, _Role}, _Pid}, _From,
-	    #state{certificate_db = [CertDb, FileRefDb, PemChace],
-		   session_cache = Cache} = State) ->
-    Result = {ok, make_ref(),CertDb, FileRefDb, PemChace, Cache},
-    {reply, Result, State};
-
-handle_call({{connection_init, Trustedcerts, _Role}, Pid}, _From,
-	    #state{certificate_db = [CertDb, FileRefDb, PemChace] = Db,
-		   session_cache = Cache} = State) ->
-    Result = 
-	try
-	    {ok, Ref} = ssl_pkix_db:add_trusted_certs(Pid, Trustedcerts, Db),
-	    {ok, Ref, CertDb, FileRefDb, PemChace, Cache}
-	catch
-	    _:Reason ->
-		{error, Reason}
-	end,
-    {reply, Result, State};
-
-handle_call({{new_session_id,Port}, _},
+handle_call({{connection_init, <<>>, Role, {CRLCb, UserCRLDb}}, _Pid}, _From,
+	    #state{certificate_db = [CertDb, FileRefDb, PemChace | _] = Db} = State) ->
+    Ref = make_ref(), 
+    Result = {ok, Ref, CertDb, FileRefDb, PemChace, 
+	      session_cache(Role, State), {CRLCb, crl_db_info(Db, UserCRLDb)}},
+    {reply, Result, State#state{certificate_db = Db}};
+
+handle_call({{connection_init, Trustedcerts, Role, {CRLCb, UserCRLDb}}, Pid}, _From,
+	    #state{certificate_db = [CertDb, FileRefDb, PemChace | _] = Db} = State) ->
+    case add_trusted_certs(Pid, Trustedcerts, Db) of
+	{ok, Ref} ->
+	    {reply, {ok, Ref, CertDb, FileRefDb, PemChace, session_cache(Role, State), 
+		     {CRLCb, crl_db_info(Db, UserCRLDb)}}, State};
+	{error, _} = Error ->
+	    {reply, Error, State}
+    end;
+
+handle_call({{insert_crls, Path, CRLs}, _}, _From,   
+	    #state{certificate_db = Db} = State) ->
+    ssl_pkix_db:add_crls(Db, Path, CRLs),
+    {reply, ok, State};
+
+handle_call({{delete_crls, CRLsOrPath}, _}, _From,   
+	    #state{certificate_db = Db} = State) ->
+    ssl_pkix_db:remove_crls(Db, CRLsOrPath),
+    {reply, ok, State};
+
+handle_call({{new_session_id, Port}, _},
 	    _, #state{session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
-		      session_cache = Cache} = State) ->
+		      session_cache_server = Cache} = State) ->
     Id = new_id(Port, ?GEN_UNIQUE_ID_MAX_TRIES, Cache, CacheCb),
     {reply, Id, State};
 
-
-handle_call({{cache_pem, File}, _Pid}, _,
+handle_call({{cache_pem,File}, _Pid}, _,
 	    #state{certificate_db = Db} = State) ->
     try ssl_pkix_db:cache_pem_file(File, Db) of
 	Result ->
@@ -251,7 +324,8 @@ handle_call({{cache_pem, File}, _Pid}, _,
 	_:Reason ->
 	    {reply, {error, Reason}, State}
     end;
-handle_call({unconditionally_clear_pem_cache, _},_, #state{certificate_db = [_,_,PemChace]} = State) ->
+handle_call({unconditionally_clear_pem_cache, _},_, 
+	    #state{certificate_db = [_,_,PemChace | _]} = State) ->
     ssl_pkix_db:clear(PemChace),
     {reply, ok,  State}.
 
@@ -263,33 +337,40 @@ handle_call({unconditionally_clear_pem_cache, _},_, #state{certificate_db = [_,_
 %%
 %% Description: Handling cast messages
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-handle_cast({register_session, Host, Port, Session}, 
-	    #state{session_cache = Cache,
-		   session_cache_cb = CacheCb} = State) ->
-    TimeStamp = calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds({date(), time()}),
-    NewSession = Session#session{time_stamp = TimeStamp},
-    CacheCb:update(Cache, {{Host, Port}, 
-		   NewSession#session.session_id}, NewSession),
+handle_cast({register_session, Host, Port, Session}, State0) ->
+    State = ssl_client_register_session(Host, Port, Session, State0), 
     {noreply, State};
 
-handle_cast({register_session, Port, Session},  
-	    #state{session_cache = Cache,
-		   session_cache_cb = CacheCb} = State) ->    
-    TimeStamp = calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds({date(), time()}),
-    NewSession = Session#session{time_stamp = TimeStamp},
-    CacheCb:update(Cache, {Port, NewSession#session.session_id}, NewSession),
+handle_cast({register_session, Port, Session}, State0) ->    
+    State = server_register_session(Port, Session, State0), 		       
     {noreply, State};
 
 handle_cast({invalidate_session, Host, Port,
 	     #session{session_id = ID} = Session},
-	    #state{session_cache = Cache,
+	    #state{session_cache_client = Cache,
 		   session_cache_cb = CacheCb} = State) ->
     invalidate_session(Cache, CacheCb, {{Host, Port}, ID}, Session, State);
 
 handle_cast({invalidate_session, Port, #session{session_id = ID} = Session},
-	    #state{session_cache = Cache,
+	    #state{session_cache_server = Cache,
 		   session_cache_cb = CacheCb} = State) ->
-    invalidate_session(Cache, CacheCb, {Port, ID}, Session, State).
+    invalidate_session(Cache, CacheCb, {Port, ID}, Session, State);
+
+
+handle_cast({insert_crls, Path, CRLs},   
+	    #state{certificate_db = Db} = State) ->
+    ssl_pkix_db:add_crls(Db, Path, CRLs),
+    {noreply, State};
+
+handle_cast({delete_crls, CRLsOrPath},   
+	    #state{certificate_db = Db} = State) ->
+    ssl_pkix_db:remove_crls(Db, CRLsOrPath),
+    {noreply, State};
+
+handle_cast({invalidate_pem, File},
+	    #state{certificate_db = [_, _, PemCache | _]} = State) ->
+    ssl_pkix_db:remove(File, PemCache),
+    {noreply, State}.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec handle_info(msg(), #state{}) -> {noreply, #state{}}.
@@ -300,33 +381,36 @@ handle_cast({invalidate_session, Port, #session{session_id = ID} = Session},
 %% Description: Handling all non call/cast messages
 %%-------------------------------------------------------------------
 handle_info(validate_sessions, #state{session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
-				      session_cache = Cache,
-				      session_lifetime = LifeTime
+				      session_cache_client = ClientCache,
+				      session_cache_server = ServerCache,
+				      session_lifetime = LifeTime,
+				      session_client_invalidator = Client,
+				      session_server_invalidator = Server				      
 				     } = State) ->
     Timer = erlang:send_after(?SESSION_VALIDATION_INTERVAL, 
 			      self(), validate_sessions),
-    start_session_validator(Cache, CacheCb, LifeTime),
-    {noreply, State#state{session_validation_timer = Timer}};
+    CPid = start_session_validator(ClientCache, CacheCb, LifeTime, Client),
+    SPid = start_session_validator(ServerCache, CacheCb, LifeTime, Server),
+    {noreply, State#state{session_validation_timer = Timer, 
+			  session_client_invalidator = CPid,
+			  session_server_invalidator = SPid}};
 
-handle_info({delayed_clean_session, Key}, #state{session_cache = Cache,
-                   session_cache_cb = CacheCb
-                   } = State) ->
-    CacheCb:delete(Cache, Key),
-    {noreply, State};
 
-handle_info(clear_pem_cache, #state{certificate_db = [_,_,PemChace]} = State) ->
-    case ssl_pkix_db:db_size(PemChace) of
-	N  when N < ?NOT_TO_BIG ->
-	    ok;
-	_ ->
-	    ssl_pkix_db:clear(PemChace)
-    end,
-    erlang:send_after(?CLEAR_PEM_CACHE, self(), clear_pem_cache),
+handle_info({delayed_clean_session, Key, Cache}, #state{session_cache_cb = CacheCb
+						       } = State) ->
+    CacheCb:delete(Cache, Key),
     {noreply, State};
 
+handle_info(clear_pem_cache, #state{certificate_db = [_,_,PemChace | _],
+				    clear_pem_cache = Interval,
+				    last_pem_check = CheckPoint} = State) ->
+    NewCheckPoint = os:timestamp(),
+    start_pem_cache_validator(PemChace, CheckPoint),
+    erlang:send_after(Interval, self(), clear_pem_cache),
+    {noreply, State#state{last_pem_check = NewCheckPoint}};
 
 handle_info({clean_cert_db, Ref, File},
-	    #state{certificate_db = [CertDb,RefDb, PemCache]} = State) ->
+	    #state{certificate_db = [CertDb,RefDb, PemCache | _]} = State) ->
     
     case ssl_pkix_db:lookup(Ref, RefDb) of
 	undefined -> %% Alredy cleaned
@@ -336,10 +420,10 @@ handle_info({clean_cert_db, Ref, File},
     end,
     {noreply, State};
 
-handle_info({'EXIT', _, _}, State) ->
-    %% Session validator died!! Do we need to take any action?
-    %% maybe error log
-    {noreply, State};
+handle_info({'EXIT', Pid, _}, #state{session_client_invalidator = Pid} = State) ->
+    {noreply, State#state{session_client_invalidator = undefined}};
+handle_info({'EXIT', Pid, _}, #state{session_server_invalidator = Pid} = State) ->
+    {noreply, State#state{session_server_invalidator = undefined}};
 
 handle_info(_Info, State) ->
     {noreply, State}.
@@ -353,12 +437,14 @@ handle_info(_Info, State) ->
 %% The return value is ignored.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 terminate(_Reason, #state{certificate_db = Db,
-			  session_cache = SessionCache,
+			  session_cache_client = ClientSessionCache,
+			  session_cache_server = ServerSessionCache,
 			  session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
 			  session_validation_timer = Timer}) ->
     erlang:cancel_timer(Timer),
     ssl_pkix_db:remove(Db),
-    CacheCb:terminate(SessionCache),
+    catch CacheCb:terminate(ClientSessionCache),
+    catch CacheCb:terminate(ServerSessionCache),
     ok.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -394,9 +480,11 @@ validate_session(Port, Session, LifeTime) ->
 	    invalidate_session(Port, Session)
     end.
 		    
-start_session_validator(Cache, CacheCb, LifeTime) ->
+start_session_validator(Cache, CacheCb, LifeTime, undefined) ->
     spawn_link(?MODULE, init_session_validator, 
-	       [[get(ssl_manager), Cache, CacheCb, LifeTime]]).
+	       [[get(ssl_manager), Cache, CacheCb, LifeTime]]);
+start_session_validator(_,_,_, Pid) ->
+    Pid.
 
 init_session_validator([SslManagerName, Cache, CacheCb, LifeTime]) ->
     put(ssl_manager, SslManagerName),
@@ -418,7 +506,15 @@ delay_time() ->
 	   ?CLEAN_SESSION_DB
     end.
 
-invalidate_session(Cache, CacheCb, Key, Session, #state{last_delay_timer = LastTimer} = State) ->
+max_session_cache_size(CacheType) ->
+    case application:get_env(ssl, CacheType) of
+	{ok, Size} when is_integer(Size) ->
+	    Size;
+	_ ->
+	   ?DEFAULT_MAX_SESSION_CACHE
+    end.
+
+invalidate_session(Cache, CacheCb, Key, Session, State) ->
     case CacheCb:lookup(Cache, Key) of
 	undefined -> %% Session is already invalidated
 	    {noreply, State};
@@ -426,15 +522,23 @@ invalidate_session(Cache, CacheCb, Key, Session, #state{last_delay_timer = LastT
 	    CacheCb:delete(Cache, Key),
 	    {noreply, State};
 	_ ->
-	    %% When a registered session is invalidated we need to wait a while before deleting
-	    %% it as there might be pending connections that rightfully needs to look
-	    %% up the session data but new connections should not get to use this session.
-	    CacheCb:update(Cache, Key, Session#session{is_resumable = false}),
-	    TRef =
-		erlang:send_after(delay_time(), self(), {delayed_clean_session, Key}),
-	    {noreply, State#state{last_delay_timer = last_delay_timer(Key, TRef, LastTimer)}}
+	    delayed_invalidate_session(CacheCb, Cache, Key, Session, State)
     end.
 
+delayed_invalidate_session(CacheCb, Cache, Key, Session, 
+			   #state{last_delay_timer = LastTimer} = State) ->
+    %% When a registered session is invalidated we need to
+    %% wait a while before deleting it as there might be
+    %% pending connections that rightfully needs to look up
+    %% the session data but new connections should not get to
+    %% use this session.
+    CacheCb:update(Cache, Key, Session#session{is_resumable = false}),
+    TRef =
+	erlang:send_after(delay_time(), self(), 
+			  {delayed_clean_session, Key, Cache}),
+    {noreply, State#state{last_delay_timer = 
+			      last_delay_timer(Key, TRef, LastTimer)}}.
+
 last_delay_timer({{_,_},_}, TRef, {LastServer, _}) ->
     {LastServer, TRef};
 last_delay_timer({_,_}, TRef, {_, LastClient}) ->
@@ -450,15 +554,15 @@ last_delay_timer({_,_}, TRef, {_, LastClient}) ->
 new_id(_, 0, _, _) ->
     <<>>;
 new_id(Port, Tries, Cache, CacheCb) ->
-    Id = crypto:rand_bytes(?NUM_OF_SESSION_ID_BYTES),
+    Id = ssl_cipher:random_bytes(?NUM_OF_SESSION_ID_BYTES),
     case CacheCb:lookup(Cache, {Port, Id}) of
 	undefined ->
-	    Now =  calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds({date(), time()}),
+	    Now = erlang:monotonic_time(),
 	    %% New sessions can not be set to resumable
 	    %% until handshake is compleate and the
 	    %% other session values are set.
 	    CacheCb:update(Cache, {Port, Id}, #session{session_id = Id,
-						       is_resumable = false,
+						       is_resumable = new,
 						       time_stamp = Now}),
 	    Id;
 	_ ->
@@ -468,10 +572,9 @@ new_id(Port, Tries, Cache, CacheCb) ->
 clean_cert_db(Ref, CertDb, RefDb, PemCache, File) ->
     case ssl_pkix_db:ref_count(Ref, RefDb, 0) of
 	0 ->	  
-	    MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, File),
-	    case ssl_pkix_db:lookup_cached_pem(PemCache, MD5) of
+	    case ssl_pkix_db:lookup_cached_pem(PemCache, File) of
 		[{Content, Ref}] ->
-		    ssl_pkix_db:insert(MD5, Content, PemCache);		
+		    ssl_pkix_db:insert(File, Content, PemCache);		
 		_ ->
 		    ok
 	    end,
@@ -480,3 +583,150 @@ clean_cert_db(Ref, CertDb, RefDb, PemCache, File) ->
 	_ ->
 	    ok
     end.
+
+ssl_client_register_session(Host, Port, Session, #state{session_cache_client = Cache,
+							session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
+							session_cache_client_max = Max,
+							session_client_invalidator = Pid0} = State) ->
+    TimeStamp = erlang:monotonic_time(),
+    NewSession = Session#session{time_stamp = TimeStamp},
+    
+    case CacheCb:select_session(Cache, {Host, Port}) of
+	no_session ->
+	    Pid = do_register_session({{Host, Port}, 
+				     NewSession#session.session_id}, 
+				      NewSession, Max, Pid0, Cache, CacheCb),
+	    State#state{session_client_invalidator = Pid};
+	Sessions ->
+	    register_unique_session(Sessions, NewSession, {Host, Port}, State)
+    end.
+
+server_register_session(Port, Session, #state{session_cache_server_max = Max,
+					      session_cache_server = Cache,
+					      session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
+					      session_server_invalidator = Pid0} = State) ->
+    TimeStamp =  erlang:monotonic_time(),
+    NewSession = Session#session{time_stamp = TimeStamp},
+    Pid = do_register_session({Port, NewSession#session.session_id}, 
+			      NewSession, Max, Pid0, Cache, CacheCb),
+    State#state{session_server_invalidator = Pid}.
+
+do_register_session(Key, Session, Max, Pid, Cache, CacheCb) ->
+    try CacheCb:size(Cache) of
+	Max ->
+	    invalidate_session_cache(Pid, CacheCb, Cache);
+	_ ->	
+	    CacheCb:update(Cache, Key, Session),
+	    Pid
+    catch 
+	error:undef ->
+	    CacheCb:update(Cache, Key, Session),
+            Pid		
+    end.
+
+
+%% Do not let dumb clients create a gigantic session table
+%% for itself creating big delays at connection time. 
+register_unique_session(Sessions, Session, PartialKey, 
+			#state{session_cache_client_max = Max,
+			       session_cache_client = Cache,
+			       session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
+			       session_client_invalidator = Pid0} = State) ->
+    case exists_equivalent(Session , Sessions) of
+	true ->
+	    State;
+	false ->
+	    Pid = do_register_session({PartialKey, 
+				       Session#session.session_id}, 
+				      Session, Max, Pid0, Cache, CacheCb),
+	    State#state{session_client_invalidator = Pid}
+    end.
+
+exists_equivalent(_, []) ->
+    false;
+exists_equivalent(#session{
+		     peer_certificate = PeerCert,
+		     own_certificate = OwnCert,
+		     compression_method = Compress,
+		     cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+		     srp_username = SRP,
+		     ecc = ECC} , 
+		  [#session{
+		      peer_certificate = PeerCert,
+		      own_certificate = OwnCert,
+		      compression_method = Compress,
+		      cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+		      srp_username = SRP,
+		      ecc = ECC} | _]) ->
+    true;
+exists_equivalent(Session, [ _ | Rest]) ->
+    exists_equivalent(Session, Rest).
+
+start_pem_cache_validator(PemCache, CheckPoint) ->
+    spawn_link(?MODULE, init_pem_cache_validator, 
+	       [[get(ssl_manager), PemCache, CheckPoint]]).
+
+init_pem_cache_validator([SslManagerName, PemCache, CheckPoint]) ->
+    put(ssl_manager, SslManagerName),
+    ssl_pkix_db:foldl(fun pem_cache_validate/2,
+		      CheckPoint, PemCache).
+
+pem_cache_validate({File, _}, CheckPoint) ->
+    case file:read_file_info(File, []) of
+	{ok, #file_info{mtime = Time}} ->
+	    case is_before_checkpoint(Time, CheckPoint) of
+		true ->
+		    ok;
+		false ->
+		    invalidate_pem(File)
+	    end;
+	_  ->
+	    invalidate_pem(File)
+    end,
+    CheckPoint.
+
+pem_check_interval() ->
+    case application:get_env(ssl, ssl_pem_cache_clean) of
+	{ok, Interval} when is_integer(Interval) ->
+	    Interval;
+	_  ->
+	    ?CLEAR_PEM_CACHE
+    end.
+	
+is_before_checkpoint(Time, CheckPoint) ->
+    calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds(
+      calendar:now_to_datetime(CheckPoint)) -
+    calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds(Time) > 0.
+
+add_trusted_certs(Pid, Trustedcerts, Db) ->
+    try
+	ssl_pkix_db:add_trusted_certs(Pid, Trustedcerts, Db) 	    
+    catch
+	_:Reason ->
+	    {error, Reason}
+    end.
+
+session_cache(client, #state{session_cache_client = Cache}) ->
+    Cache;
+session_cache(server, #state{session_cache_server = Cache}) ->
+    Cache.
+
+crl_db_info([_,_,_,Local], {internal, Info}) ->
+    {Local, Info};
+crl_db_info(_, UserCRLDb) ->
+    UserCRLDb.
+
+%% Only start a session invalidator if there is not
+%% one already active
+invalidate_session_cache(undefined, CacheCb, Cache) ->
+    start_session_validator(Cache, CacheCb, {invalidate_before, erlang:monotonic_time()}, undefined);
+invalidate_session_cache(Pid, _CacheCb, _Cache) ->
+    Pid.
+
+load_mitigation() ->
+    MSec = rand:uniform(?LOAD_MITIGATION),
+    receive 
+    after 
+	MSec ->
+	    continue
+    end.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl
index 9de50c8f26..b16903d7c7 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -27,9 +28,9 @@
 -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
 -include_lib("kernel/include/file.hrl").
 
--export([create/0, remove/1, add_trusted_certs/3, 
+-export([create/0, add_crls/3, remove_crls/2, remove/1, add_trusted_certs/3, 
 	 remove_trusted_certs/2, insert/3, remove/2, clear/1, db_size/1,
-	 ref_count/3, lookup_trusted_cert/4, foldl/3,
+	 ref_count/3, lookup_trusted_cert/4, foldl/3, select_cert_by_issuer/2,
 	 lookup_cached_pem/2, cache_pem_file/2, cache_pem_file/3,
 	 lookup/2]).
 
@@ -51,16 +52,24 @@ create() ->
      ets:new(ssl_otp_cacertificate_db, [set, public]),
      %% Let connection processes call ref_count/3 directly
      ets:new(ssl_otp_ca_file_ref, [set, public]),
-     ets:new(ssl_otp_pem_cache, [set, protected])
+     ets:new(ssl_otp_pem_cache, [set, protected]),
+     %% Default cache
+     {ets:new(ssl_otp_crl_cache, [set, protected]),
+      ets:new(ssl_otp_crl_issuer_mapping, [bag, protected])}
     ].
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec remove([db_handle()]) -> ok.
+-spec remove([db_handle()]) -> ok. 
 %%
 %% Description: Removes database db  
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 remove(Dbs) ->
-    lists:foreach(fun(Db) ->
+    lists:foreach(fun({Db0, Db1})  ->
+			  true = ets:delete(Db0),
+			  true = ets:delete(Db1);
+		     (undefined) -> 
+			  ok;
+		     (Db) ->
 			  true = ets:delete(Db)
 		  end, Dbs).
 
@@ -81,10 +90,10 @@ lookup_trusted_cert(DbHandle, Ref, SerialNumber, Issuer) ->
 	    {ok, Certs}
     end.
 
-lookup_cached_pem([_, _, PemChache], MD5) ->
-    lookup_cached_pem(PemChache, MD5);
-lookup_cached_pem(PemChache, MD5) ->
-    lookup(MD5, PemChache).
+lookup_cached_pem([_, _, PemChache | _], File) ->
+    lookup_cached_pem(PemChache, File);
+lookup_cached_pem(PemChache, File) ->
+    lookup(File, PemChache).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec add_trusted_certs(pid(), {erlang:timestamp(), string()} |
@@ -94,42 +103,42 @@ lookup_cached_pem(PemChache, MD5) ->
 %% runtime database. Returns Ref that should be handed to lookup_trusted_cert
 %% together with the cert serialnumber and issuer.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-add_trusted_certs(_Pid, {der, DerList}, [CerDb, _,_]) ->
+add_trusted_certs(_Pid, {der, DerList}, [CertDb, _,_ | _]) ->
     NewRef = make_ref(),
-    add_certs_from_der(DerList, NewRef, CerDb),
+    add_certs_from_der(DerList, NewRef, CertDb),
     {ok, NewRef};
 
-add_trusted_certs(_Pid, File, [CertsDb, RefDb, PemChache] = Db) ->
-    MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, File),
-    case lookup_cached_pem(Db, MD5) of
+add_trusted_certs(_Pid, File, [CertsDb, RefDb, PemChache | _] = Db) ->
+    case lookup_cached_pem(Db, File) of
 	[{_Content, Ref}] ->
 	    ref_count(Ref, RefDb, 1),
 	    {ok, Ref};
 	[Content] ->
 	    Ref = make_ref(),
 	    update_counter(Ref, 1, RefDb),
-	    insert(MD5, {Content, Ref}, PemChache),
+	    insert(File, {Content, Ref}, PemChache),
 	    add_certs_from_pem(Content, Ref, CertsDb),
 	    {ok, Ref};
 	undefined ->
-	    new_trusted_cert_entry({MD5, File}, Db)
+	    new_trusted_cert_entry(File, Db)
     end.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec cache_pem_file({binary(), binary()}, [db_handle()]) -> {ok, term()}.
--spec cache_pem_file(reference(), {binary(), binary()}, [db_handle()]) -> {ok, term()}.
 %%
 %% Description: Cache file as binary in DB
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-cache_pem_file({MD5, File}, [_CertsDb, _RefDb, PemChache]) ->
+-spec cache_pem_file(binary(), [db_handle()]) -> {ok, term()}.
+cache_pem_file(File, [_CertsDb, _RefDb, PemChache | _]) ->
     {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file(File),
     Content = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin),
-    insert(MD5, Content, PemChache),
+    insert(File, Content, PemChache),
     {ok, Content}.
 
-cache_pem_file(Ref, {MD5, File}, [_CertsDb, _RefDb, PemChache]) ->
+
+-spec cache_pem_file(reference(), binary(), [db_handle()]) -> {ok, term()}.
+cache_pem_file(Ref, File, [_CertsDb, _RefDb, PemChache| _]) ->
     {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file(File),
     Content = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin),
-    insert(MD5, {Content, Ref}, PemChache),
+    insert(File, {Content, Ref}, PemChache),
     {ok, Content}.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -150,6 +159,15 @@ remove(Key, Db) ->
     ok.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec remove(term(), term(), db_handle()) -> ok.
+%%
+%% Description: Removes an element in a <Db>.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+remove(Key, Data, Db) ->
+    ets:delete_object(Db, {Key, Data}),
+    ok.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec lookup(term(), db_handle()) -> [term()] | undefined.
 %%
 %% Description: Looks up an element in a <Db>.
@@ -176,6 +194,10 @@ lookup(Key, Db) ->
 foldl(Fun, Acc0, Cache) ->
     ets:foldl(Fun, Acc0, Cache).
 
+
+select_cert_by_issuer(Cache, Issuer) ->    
+    ets:select(Cache, [{{{'_','_', Issuer},{'_', '$1'}},[],['$$']}]).
+
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec ref_count(term(), db_handle(), integer()) -> integer().
 %%
@@ -245,9 +267,39 @@ add_certs(Cert, Ref, CertsDb) ->
 	    error_logger:info_report(Report)
     end.
 
-new_trusted_cert_entry(FileRef, [CertsDb, RefDb, _] = Db) ->
+new_trusted_cert_entry(File, [CertsDb, RefDb, _ | _] = Db) ->
     Ref = make_ref(),
     update_counter(Ref, 1, RefDb),
-    {ok, Content} = cache_pem_file(Ref, FileRef, Db),
+    {ok, Content} = cache_pem_file(Ref, File, Db),
     add_certs_from_pem(Content, Ref, CertsDb),
     {ok, Ref}.
+
+add_crls([_,_,_, {_, Mapping} | _], ?NO_DIST_POINT, CRLs) ->
+    [add_crls(CRL, Mapping) || CRL <- CRLs];
+add_crls([_,_,_, {Cache, Mapping} | _], Path, CRLs) ->
+    insert(Path, CRLs, Cache), 
+    [add_crls(CRL, Mapping) || CRL <- CRLs].
+
+add_crls(CRL, Mapping) ->
+    insert(crl_issuer(CRL), CRL, Mapping).
+
+remove_crls([_,_,_, {_, Mapping} | _], {?NO_DIST_POINT, CRLs}) ->
+    [rm_crls(CRL, Mapping) || CRL <- CRLs];
+	
+remove_crls([_,_,_, {Cache, Mapping} | _], Path) ->
+    case lookup(Path, Cache) of
+	undefined ->
+	    ok;
+	CRLs ->
+	    remove(Path, Cache),
+	    [rm_crls(CRL, Mapping) || CRL <- CRLs]
+    end.
+
+rm_crls(CRL, Mapping) ->
+   remove(crl_issuer(CRL), CRL, Mapping). 
+
+crl_issuer(DerCRL) ->
+    CRL = public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', DerCRL),
+    TBSCRL = CRL#'CertificateList'.tbsCertList,
+    TBSCRL#'TBSCertList'.issuer.
+
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5bb1c92c2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,554 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose:  Handle TLS/SSL/DTLS record protocol. Note epoch is only
+%% used by DTLS but handled here so we can avoid code duplication.
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-module(ssl_record).
+
+-include("ssl_record.hrl").
+-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
+
+%% Connection state handling
+-export([init_connection_states/2,
+	 current_connection_state/2, pending_connection_state/2,
+	 activate_pending_connection_state/2,
+	 set_security_params/3,
+         set_mac_secret/4,
+	 set_master_secret/2,
+         set_pending_cipher_state/4,
+	 set_renegotiation_flag/2,
+	 set_client_verify_data/3,
+	 set_server_verify_data/3]).
+
+%% Encoding records
+-export([encode_handshake/3, encode_alert_record/3,
+	 encode_change_cipher_spec/2, encode_data/3]).
+
+%% Compression
+-export([compress/3, uncompress/3, compressions/0]).
+
+%% Payload encryption/decryption
+-export([cipher/4, decipher/4, is_correct_mac/2,
+	 cipher_aead/4, decipher_aead/4]).
+
+-export_type([ssl_version/0, ssl_atom_version/0]).
+
+-type ssl_version()       :: {integer(), integer()}.
+-type ssl_atom_version() :: tls_record:tls_atom_version().
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Internal application API
+%%====================================================================
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec init_connection_states(client | server, one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled ) ->
+				      #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a connection_states record with appropriate
+%% values for the initial SSL connection setup.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation) ->
+    ConnectionEnd = record_protocol_role(Role),
+    Current = initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation),
+    Pending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation),
+    #connection_states{dtls_write_msg_seq = 1, % only used by dtls
+		       current_read = Current,
+		       pending_read = Pending,
+		       current_write = Current,
+		       pending_write = Pending
+                      }.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec current_connection_state(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
+				      #connection_state{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the instance of the connection_state record
+%% that is currently defined as the current conection state.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+current_connection_state(#connection_states{current_read = Current},
+			 read) ->
+    Current;
+current_connection_state(#connection_states{current_write = Current},
+			 write) ->
+    Current.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec pending_connection_state(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
+				      term().
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the instance of the connection_state record
+%% that is currently defined as the pending conection state.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+pending_connection_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Pending},
+			 read) ->
+    Pending;
+pending_connection_state(#connection_states{pending_write = Pending},
+			 write) ->
+    Pending.
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec activate_pending_connection_state(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
+					       #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a new instance of the connection_states record
+%% where the pending state of <Type> has been activated.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+activate_pending_connection_state(States =
+                                  #connection_states{current_read = Current,
+						     pending_read = Pending},
+                                  read) ->
+    NewCurrent = Pending#connection_state{epoch = dtls_next_epoch(Current),
+					  sequence_number = 0},
+    BeastMitigation = Pending#connection_state.beast_mitigation,
+    SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    ConnectionEnd = SecParams#security_parameters.connection_end,
+    EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation),
+    SecureRenegotation = NewCurrent#connection_state.secure_renegotiation,
+    NewPending = EmptyPending#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = SecureRenegotation},
+    States#connection_states{current_read = NewCurrent,
+                             pending_read = NewPending
+                            };
+
+activate_pending_connection_state(States =
+                                  #connection_states{current_write = Current,
+						     pending_write = Pending},
+                                  write) ->
+    NewCurrent = Pending#connection_state{epoch = dtls_next_epoch(Current),
+					  sequence_number = 0},
+    BeastMitigation = Pending#connection_state.beast_mitigation,
+    SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    ConnectionEnd = SecParams#security_parameters.connection_end,
+    EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation),
+    SecureRenegotation = NewCurrent#connection_state.secure_renegotiation,
+    NewPending = EmptyPending#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = SecureRenegotation},
+    States#connection_states{current_write = NewCurrent,
+                             pending_write = NewPending
+                            }.
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_security_params(#security_parameters{}, #security_parameters{},
+			     #connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a new instance of the connection_states record
+%% where the pending states gets its security parameters updated.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_security_params(ReadParams, WriteParams, States =
+		       #connection_states{pending_read = Read,
+					  pending_write = Write}) ->
+    States#connection_states{pending_read =
+                             Read#connection_state{security_parameters =
+                                                   ReadParams},
+                             pending_write =
+                             Write#connection_state{security_parameters =
+                                                    WriteParams}
+                            }.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_mac_secret(binary(), binary(), client | server,
+			#connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: update the mac_secret field in pending connection states
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, client, States) ->
+    set_mac_secret(ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteMacSecret, States);
+set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, server, States) ->
+    set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, States).
+
+set_mac_secret(ReadMacSecret, WriteMacSecret,
+	       States = #connection_states{pending_read = Read,
+					   pending_write = Write}) ->
+    States#connection_states{
+      pending_read = Read#connection_state{mac_secret = ReadMacSecret},
+      pending_write = Write#connection_state{mac_secret = WriteMacSecret}
+     }.
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_master_secret(binary(), #connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Set master_secret in pending connection states
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_master_secret(MasterSecret,
+                  States = #connection_states{pending_read = Read,
+                                              pending_write = Write}) ->
+    ReadSecPar = Read#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    Read1 = Read#connection_state{
+              security_parameters = ReadSecPar#security_parameters{
+                                      master_secret = MasterSecret}},
+    WriteSecPar = Write#connection_state.security_parameters,
+    Write1 = Write#connection_state{
+               security_parameters = WriteSecPar#security_parameters{
+                                       master_secret = MasterSecret}},
+    States#connection_states{pending_read = Read1, pending_write = Write1}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_renegotiation_flag(boolean(), #connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Set secure_renegotiation in pending connection states
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_renegotiation_flag(Flag, #connection_states{
+			 current_read = CurrentRead0,
+			 current_write = CurrentWrite0,
+			 pending_read = PendingRead0,
+			 pending_write = PendingWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
+    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
+    PendingRead = PendingRead0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
+    PendingWrite = PendingWrite0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
+				       current_write = CurrentWrite,
+				       pending_read = PendingRead,
+				       pending_write = PendingWrite}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_client_verify_data(current_read | current_write | current_both,
+			     binary(), #connection_states{})->
+				    #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Set verify data in connection states.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_client_verify_data(current_read, Data,
+		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
+					  pending_write = PendingWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
+    PendingWrite = PendingWrite0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
+				       pending_write = PendingWrite};
+set_client_verify_data(current_write, Data,
+		       #connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead0,
+					  current_write = CurrentWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    PendingRead = PendingRead0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
+    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead,
+				       current_write = CurrentWrite};
+set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data,
+		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
+					  current_write = CurrentWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
+    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
+				       current_write = CurrentWrite}.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_server_verify_data(current_read | current_write | current_both,
+			     binary(), #connection_states{})->
+				    #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Set verify data in pending connection states.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_server_verify_data(current_write, Data,
+		       #connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead0,
+					  current_write = CurrentWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    PendingRead = PendingRead0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
+    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead,
+				       current_write = CurrentWrite};
+
+set_server_verify_data(current_read, Data,
+		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
+					  pending_write = PendingWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
+    PendingWrite = PendingWrite0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
+				       pending_write = PendingWrite};
+
+set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data,
+		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
+					  current_write = CurrentWrite0}
+		       = ConnectionStates) ->
+    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
+    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
+    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
+				       current_write = CurrentWrite}.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{}, #cipher_state{},
+			       #cipher_state{}, client | server) ->
+				      #connection_states{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Set the cipher state in the specified pending connection state.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Read,
+                                            pending_write = Write} = States,
+                         ClientState, ServerState, server) ->
+    States#connection_states{
+        pending_read = Read#connection_state{cipher_state = ClientState},
+        pending_write = Write#connection_state{cipher_state = ServerState}};
+
+set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Read,
+                                            pending_write = Write} = States,
+                         ClientState, ServerState, client) ->
+    States#connection_states{
+        pending_read = Read#connection_state{cipher_state = ServerState},
+        pending_write = Write#connection_state{cipher_state = ClientState}}.
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_handshake(iolist(), ssl_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+			      {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes a handshake message to send on the ssl-socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_handshake(Frag, Version, 
+		 #connection_states{current_write = 
+					#connection_state{
+					   beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation,
+					   security_parameters =
+					       #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCA}}} = 
+		     ConnectionStates)
+when is_list(Frag) ->
+    case iolist_size(Frag) of
+	N  when N > ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH ->
+	    Data = split_bin(iolist_to_binary(Frag), ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA, BeastMitigation),
+	    encode_iolist(?HANDSHAKE, Data, Version, ConnectionStates);
+	_  ->
+	    encode_plain_text(?HANDSHAKE, Version, Frag, ConnectionStates)
+    end;
+%% TODO: this is a workarround for DTLS
+%%
+%% DTLS need to select the connection write state based on Epoch it wants to
+%% send this fragment in. That Epoch does not nessarily has to be the same
+%% as the current_write epoch.
+%% The right solution might be to pass the WriteState instead of the ConnectionStates,
+%% however, this will require substantion API changes.
+encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+    encode_plain_text(?HANDSHAKE, Version, Frag, ConnectionStates).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_alert_record(#alert{}, ssl_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+				 {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes an alert message to send on the ssl-socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_alert_record(#alert{level = Level, description = Description},
+                    Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+    encode_plain_text(?ALERT, Version, <<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description)>>,
+		      ConnectionStates).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_change_cipher_spec(ssl_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+				       {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes a change_cipher_spec-message to send on the ssl socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+    encode_plain_text(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, Version, <<1:8>>, ConnectionStates).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_data(binary(), ssl_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+			 {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes data to send on the ssl-socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_data(Frag, Version,
+	    #connection_states{current_write = #connection_state{
+				 beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation,
+				 security_parameters =
+				     #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCA}}} =
+		ConnectionStates) ->
+    Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA, BeastMitigation),
+    encode_iolist(?APPLICATION_DATA, Data, Version, ConnectionStates).
+
+uncompress(?NULL, Data, CS) ->
+    {Data, CS}.
+
+compress(?NULL, Data, CS) ->
+    {Data, CS}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec compressions() -> [binary()].
+%%
+%% Description: return a list of compressions supported (currently none)
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+compressions() ->
+    [?byte(?NULL)].
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec cipher(ssl_version(), iodata(), #connection_state{}, MacHash::binary()) ->
+		    {CipherFragment::binary(), #connection_state{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Payload encryption
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+cipher(Version, Fragment,
+       #connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS0,
+			 security_parameters=
+			     #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm =
+						      BulkCipherAlgo}
+			} = WriteState0, MacHash) ->
+
+    {CipherFragment, CipherS1} =
+	ssl_cipher:cipher(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, MacHash, Fragment, Version),
+    {CipherFragment,  WriteState0#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1}}.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec cipher_aead(ssl_version(), iodata(), #connection_state{}, MacHash::binary()) ->
+			 {CipherFragment::binary(), #connection_state{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Payload encryption
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+cipher_aead(Version, Fragment,
+       #connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS0,
+			 sequence_number = SeqNo,
+			 security_parameters=
+			     #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm =
+						      BulkCipherAlgo}
+			} = WriteState0, AAD) ->
+
+    {CipherFragment, CipherS1} =
+	ssl_cipher:cipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version),
+    {CipherFragment,  WriteState0#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1}}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decipher(ssl_version(), binary(), #connection_state{}, boolean()) -> {binary(), binary(), #connection_state{}} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Payload decryption
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decipher(Version, CipherFragment,
+	 #connection_state{security_parameters =
+			       #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm =
+							BulkCipherAlgo,
+						    hash_size = HashSz},
+			   cipher_state = CipherS0
+			  } = ReadState, PaddingCheck) ->
+    case ssl_cipher:decipher(BulkCipherAlgo, HashSz, CipherS0, CipherFragment, Version, PaddingCheck) of
+	{PlainFragment, Mac, CipherS1} ->
+	    CS1 = ReadState#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1},
+	    {PlainFragment, Mac, CS1};
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decipher_aead(ssl_version(), binary(), #connection_state{}, binary()) -> {binary(), binary(), #connection_state{}} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Payload decryption
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decipher_aead(Version, CipherFragment,
+	 #connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo,
+			   security_parameters =
+			       #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm =
+							BulkCipherAlgo},
+			   cipher_state = CipherS0
+			  } = ReadState, AAD) ->
+    case ssl_cipher:decipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, SeqNo, AAD, CipherFragment, Version) of
+	{PlainFragment, CipherS1} ->
+	    CS1 = ReadState#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1},
+	    {PlainFragment, CS1};
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert
+    end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) ->
+    SecParams = empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd),
+    #connection_state{security_parameters = SecParams,
+                      beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation}.
+
+empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd = ?CLIENT) ->
+    #security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
+                         client_random = random()};
+empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd = ?SERVER) ->
+    #security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
+                         server_random = random()}.
+random() ->
+    Secs_since_1970 = calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds(
+			calendar:universal_time()) - 62167219200,
+    Random_28_bytes = ssl_cipher:random_bytes(28),
+    <<?UINT32(Secs_since_1970), Random_28_bytes/binary>>.
+
+dtls_next_epoch(#connection_state{epoch = undefined}) -> %% SSL/TLS
+    undefined;
+dtls_next_epoch(#connection_state{epoch = Epoch}) -> %% DTLS
+    Epoch + 1.
+
+is_correct_mac(Mac, Mac) ->
+    true;
+is_correct_mac(_M,_H) ->
+    false.
+
+record_protocol_role(client) ->
+    ?CLIENT;
+record_protocol_role(server) ->
+    ?SERVER.
+
+initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) ->
+    #connection_state{security_parameters =
+			  initial_security_params(ConnectionEnd),
+                      sequence_number = 0,
+                      beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation
+                     }.
+
+initial_security_params(ConnectionEnd) ->
+    SecParams = #security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
+				     compression_algorithm = ?NULL},
+    ssl_cipher:security_parameters(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, SecParams).
+
+
+encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates) ->
+    RecordCB = protocol_module(Version),
+    RecordCB:encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates).
+
+encode_iolist(Type, Data, Version, ConnectionStates0) ->
+    RecordCB = protocol_module(Version),
+    {ConnectionStates, EncodedMsg} =
+        lists:foldl(fun(Text, {CS0, Encoded}) ->
+			    {Enc, CS1} =
+				RecordCB:encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Text, CS0),
+			    {CS1, [Enc | Encoded]}
+		    end, {ConnectionStates0, []}, Data),
+    {lists:reverse(EncodedMsg), ConnectionStates}.
+
+%% 1/n-1 splitting countermeasure Rizzo/Duong-Beast, RC4 chiphers are
+%% not vulnerable to this attack.
+split_bin(<<FirstByte:8, Rest/binary>>, ChunkSize, Version, BCA, one_n_minus_one) when
+      BCA =/= ?RC4 andalso ({3, 1} == Version orelse
+			    {3, 0} == Version) ->
+    do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [[FirstByte]]);
+%% 0/n splitting countermeasure for clients that are incompatible with 1/n-1
+%% splitting.
+split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Version, BCA, zero_n) when
+      BCA =/= ?RC4 andalso ({3, 1} == Version orelse
+			    {3, 0} == Version) ->
+    do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, [[<<>>]]);
+split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, _, _, _) ->
+    do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, []).
+
+do_split_bin(<<>>, _, Acc) ->
+    lists:reverse(Acc);
+do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Acc) ->
+    case Bin of
+        <<Chunk:ChunkSize/binary, Rest/binary>> ->
+            do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [Chunk | Acc]);
+        _ ->
+            lists:reverse(Acc, [Bin])
+    end.
+
+protocol_module({3, _}) ->
+    tls_record;
+protocol_module({254, _}) ->
+    dtls_record.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
index 2fd17f9c35..a41264ff9b 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@
 %%
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 %% Purpose: Record and constant defenitions for the SSL-record protocol
-%% see RFC 2246
+% see RFC 2246
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 -ifndef(ssl_record).
@@ -29,8 +30,24 @@
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%% Connection states - RFC 4346 section 6.1
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+-record(connection_state, {
+	  security_parameters,
+	  compression_state,
+	  cipher_state,
+	  mac_secret,
+	  epoch, %% Only used by DTLS
+	  sequence_number,
+	  %% RFC 5746
+	  secure_renegotiation,
+	  client_verify_data,
+	  server_verify_data,
+	  %% How to do BEAST mitigation?
+	  beast_mitigation
+	 }).
 
 -record(connection_states, {
+	  dtls_write_msg_seq, %% Only used by DTLS
+
 	  current_read,
 	  pending_read,
 	  current_write,
@@ -56,19 +73,9 @@
           exportable				% boolean
        }). 
 
--record(connection_state, {
-	  security_parameters,
-	  compression_state,
-	  cipher_state,
-	  mac_secret,
-	  sequence_number,
-	  %% RFC 5746
-	  secure_renegotiation,
-	  client_verify_data,
-	  server_verify_data
-	 }).
+-define(INITIAL_BYTES, 5).
 
--define(MAX_SEQENCE_NUMBER, 18446744073709552000). %% math:pow(2, 64) - 1 = 1.8446744073709552e19
+-define(MAX_SEQENCE_NUMBER, 18446744073709551615). %% (1 bsl 64) - 1 = 18446744073709551615
 %% Sequence numbers can not wrap so when max is about to be reached we should renegotiate.
 %% We will renegotiate a little before so that there will be sequence numbers left
 %% for the rehandshake and a little data. Currently we decided to renegotiate a little more
@@ -88,11 +95,14 @@
 -define('3DES', 4).
 -define(DES40, 5).
 -define(IDEA, 6).
--define(AES, 7). 
+-define(AES_CBC, 7).
+-define(AES_GCM, 8).
+-define(CHACHA20_POLY1305, 9).
 
 %% CipherType
 -define(STREAM, 0).
 -define(BLOCK, 1).
+-define(AEAD, 2).
 
 %% IsExportable
 %-define(TRUE, 0).  %% Already defined by ssl_internal.hrl
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session.erl
index a24b2d9444..c9607489e9 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %% 
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2012. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %% 
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%% 
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %% 
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -30,8 +31,6 @@
 %% Internal application API
 -export([is_new/2, client_id/4, server_id/6, valid_session/2]).
 
--define('24H_in_sec', 8640).
-
 -type seconds()   :: integer(). 
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -62,13 +61,16 @@ client_id(ClientInfo, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert) ->
 	    SessionId
     end.
 
--spec valid_session(#session{}, seconds()) -> boolean().
+-spec valid_session(#session{}, seconds() | {invalidate_before, integer()}) -> boolean().
 %%
 %% Description: Check that the session has not expired
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+valid_session(#session{time_stamp = TimeStamp}, {invalidate_before, Before}) ->
+    TimeStamp > Before;
 valid_session(#session{time_stamp = TimeStamp}, LifeTime) ->
-    Now =  calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds({date(), time()}),
-    Now - TimeStamp < LifeTime.
+    Now = erlang:monotonic_time(),
+    Lived = erlang:convert_time_unit(Now-TimeStamp, native, seconds),
+    Lived < LifeTime.
 
 server_id(Port, <<>>, _SslOpts, _Cert, _, _) ->
     {ssl_manager:new_session_id(Port), undefined};
@@ -99,14 +101,14 @@ select_session([], _, _) ->
     no_session;
 select_session(Sessions, #ssl_options{ciphers = Ciphers}, OwnCert) ->
     IsNotResumable =
-	fun([_Id, Session]) ->
+	fun(Session) ->
 		not (resumable(Session#session.is_resumable) andalso
 		     lists:member(Session#session.cipher_suite, Ciphers)
 		     andalso (OwnCert == Session#session.own_certificate))
  	end,
     case lists:dropwhile(IsNotResumable, Sessions) of
 	[] ->   no_session;
-	[[Id, _]|_] -> Id
+	[Session | _] -> Session#session.session_id
     end.
 
 is_resumable(_, _, #ssl_options{reuse_sessions = false}, _, _, _, _) ->
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session_cache.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session_cache.erl
index 5c6ee3c54c..c79ad1523b 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session_cache.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session_cache.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2008-2012. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2008-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -26,13 +27,13 @@
 -include("ssl_internal.hrl").
 
 -export([init/1, terminate/1, lookup/2, update/3, delete/2, foldl/3, 
-	 select_session/2]). 
+	 select_session/2, size/1]). 
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %% Description: Return table reference. Called by ssl_manager process. 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-init(_) ->
-    ets:new(cache_name(), [ordered_set, protected]).
+init(Options) ->
+    ets:new(cache_name(proplists:get_value(role, Options)), [ordered_set, protected]).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %% Description: Handles cache table at termination of ssl manager. 
@@ -82,10 +83,16 @@ foldl(Fun, Acc0, Cache) ->
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 select_session(Cache, PartialKey) ->    
     ets:select(Cache, 
-	       [{{{PartialKey,'$1'}, '$2'},[],['$$']}]).
+	       [{{{PartialKey,'_'}, '$1'},[],['$1']}]).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Description: Returns the cache size
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+size(Cache) ->
+    ets:info(Cache, size).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %%% Internal functions
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-cache_name() ->
-    ssl_otp_session_cache.
+cache_name(Name) ->
+    list_to_atom(atom_to_list(Name) ++ "_ssl_otp_session_cache").
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session_cache_api.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session_cache_api.erl
index f2b22b0f1b..b68c75a09b 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session_cache_api.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session_cache_api.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2008-2011. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2008-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -32,3 +33,4 @@
 -callback delete(db_handle(), key()) -> any().
 -callback foldl(fun(), term(), db_handle()) -> term().
 -callback select_session(db_handle(), {host(), inet:port_number()} | inet:port_number()) -> [#session{}].
+-callback size(db_handle()) -> integer().
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_socket.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_socket.erl
index 4778db2333..b2aea2ba9c 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_socket.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_socket.erl
@@ -1,24 +1,84 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1998-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
 -module(ssl_socket).
 
+-behaviour(gen_server).
+
 -include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_api.hrl").
+
+-export([socket/5, setopts/3, getopts/3, getstat/3, peername/2, sockname/2, port/2]).
+-export([emulated_options/0, internal_inet_values/0, default_inet_values/0,
+	 init/1, start_link/3, terminate/2, inherit_tracker/3, get_emulated_opts/1, 
+	 set_emulated_opts/2, get_all_opts/1, handle_call/3, handle_cast/2,
+	 handle_info/2, code_change/3]).
 
--export([socket/3, setopts/3, getopts/3, peername/2, sockname/2, port/2]).
+-record(state, {
+	  emulated_opts,
+	  port,
+	  ssl_opts
+	 }).
 
-socket(Pid, Transport, Socket) ->
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal API
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, ConnectionCb, Tracker) ->
     #sslsocket{pid = Pid, 
 	       %% "The name "fd" is keept for backwards compatibility
-	       fd = {Transport, Socket}}.
-
+	       fd = {Transport, Socket, ConnectionCb, Tracker}}.
+setopts(gen_tcp, #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{emulated = Tracker}}}, Options) ->
+    {SockOpts, EmulatedOpts} = split_options(Options),
+    ok = set_emulated_opts(Tracker, EmulatedOpts),
+    inet:setopts(ListenSocket, SockOpts);
+setopts(_, #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_},
+						  emulated = Tracker}}}, Options) ->
+    {SockOpts, EmulatedOpts} = split_options(Options),
+    ok = set_emulated_opts(Tracker, EmulatedOpts),
+    Transport:setopts(ListenSocket, SockOpts);
+%%% Following clauses will not be called for emulated options, they are  handled in the connection process
 setopts(gen_tcp, Socket, Options) ->
     inet:setopts(Socket, Options);
 setopts(Transport, Socket, Options) ->
     Transport:setopts(Socket, Options).
 
+getopts(gen_tcp,  #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{emulated = Tracker}}}, Options) ->
+    {SockOptNames, EmulatedOptNames} = split_options(Options),
+    EmulatedOpts = get_emulated_opts(Tracker, EmulatedOptNames),
+    SocketOpts = get_socket_opts(ListenSocket, SockOptNames, inet),
+    {ok, EmulatedOpts ++ SocketOpts}; 
+getopts(Transport,  #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{emulated = Tracker}}}, Options) ->
+    {SockOptNames, EmulatedOptNames} = split_options(Options),
+    EmulatedOpts = get_emulated_opts(Tracker, EmulatedOptNames),
+    SocketOpts = get_socket_opts(ListenSocket, SockOptNames, Transport),
+    {ok, EmulatedOpts ++ SocketOpts}; 
+%%% Following clauses will not be called for emulated options, they are  handled in the connection process
 getopts(gen_tcp, Socket, Options) ->
     inet:getopts(Socket, Options);
 getopts(Transport, Socket, Options) ->
     Transport:getopts(Socket, Options).
 
+getstat(gen_tcp, Socket, Options) ->
+	inet:getstat(Socket, Options);
+getstat(Transport, Socket, Options) ->
+	Transport:getstat(Socket, Options).
+
 peername(gen_tcp, Socket) ->
     inet:peername(Socket);
 peername(Transport, Socket) ->
@@ -33,3 +93,151 @@ port(gen_tcp, Socket) ->
     inet:port(Socket);
 port(Transport, Socket) ->
     Transport:port(Socket).
+
+emulated_options() ->
+    [mode, packet, active, header, packet_size].
+
+internal_inet_values() ->
+    [{packet_size,0}, {packet, 0}, {header, 0}, {active, false}, {mode,binary}].
+
+default_inet_values() ->
+    [{packet_size, 0}, {packet,0}, {header, 0}, {active, true}, {mode, list}].
+
+inherit_tracker(ListenSocket, EmOpts, #ssl_options{erl_dist = false} = SslOpts) ->
+    ssl_listen_tracker_sup:start_child([ListenSocket, EmOpts, SslOpts]);
+inherit_tracker(ListenSocket, EmOpts, #ssl_options{erl_dist = true} = SslOpts) ->
+    ssl_listen_tracker_sup:start_child_dist([ListenSocket, EmOpts, SslOpts]).
+
+get_emulated_opts(TrackerPid) -> 
+    call(TrackerPid, get_emulated_opts).
+set_emulated_opts(TrackerPid, InetValues) -> 
+    call(TrackerPid, {set_emulated_opts, InetValues}).
+get_all_opts(TrackerPid) -> 
+    call(TrackerPid, get_all_opts).
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% ssl_listen_tracker_sup API
+%%====================================================================
+
+start_link(Port, SockOpts, SslOpts) ->
+    gen_server:start_link(?MODULE, [Port, SockOpts, SslOpts], []).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec init(list()) -> {ok, #state{}}.
+%% Possible return values not used now. 
+%% |  {ok, #state{}, timeout()} | ignore | {stop, term()}.		  
+%%
+%% Description: Initiates the server
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+init([Port, Opts, SslOpts]) ->
+    process_flag(trap_exit, true),
+    true = link(Port),
+    {ok, #state{emulated_opts = Opts, port = Port, ssl_opts = SslOpts}}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec handle_call(msg(), from(), #state{}) -> {reply, reply(), #state{}}. 
+%% Possible return values not used now.  
+%%					      {reply, reply(), #state{}, timeout()} |
+%%					      {noreply, #state{}} |
+%%					      {noreply, #state{}, timeout()} |
+%%					      {stop, reason(), reply(), #state{}} |
+%%					      {stop, reason(), #state{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Handling call messages
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+handle_call({set_emulated_opts, Opts0}, _From,
+	    #state{emulated_opts = Opts1} = State) ->
+    Opts = do_set_emulated_opts(Opts0, Opts1),
+    {reply, ok, State#state{emulated_opts = Opts}};
+handle_call(get_emulated_opts, _From,
+	    #state{emulated_opts = Opts} = State) ->
+    {reply, {ok, Opts}, State};
+handle_call(get_all_opts, _From,
+	    #state{emulated_opts = EmOpts,
+		   ssl_opts = SslOpts} = State) ->
+    {reply, {ok, EmOpts, SslOpts}, State}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec  handle_cast(msg(), #state{}) -> {noreply, #state{}}.
+%% Possible return values not used now.  
+%%				      | {noreply, #state{}, timeout()} |
+%%				       {stop, reason(), #state{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Handling cast messages
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+handle_cast(_, State)-> 
+    {noreply, State}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec handle_info(msg(), #state{}) ->  {stop, reason(), #state{}}. 
+%% Possible return values not used now.
+%%			              {noreply, #state{}}.
+%%				      |{noreply, #state{}, timeout()} |
+%%				     
+%%
+%% Description: Handling all non call/cast messages
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+handle_info({'EXIT', Port, _}, #state{port = Port} = State) ->
+    {stop, normal, State}.
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec terminate(reason(), #state{}) -> ok.
+%%		       
+%% Description: This function is called by a gen_server when it is about to
+%% terminate. It should be the opposite of Module:init/1 and do any necessary
+%% cleaning up. When it returns, the gen_server terminates with Reason.
+%% The return value is ignored.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+terminate(_Reason, _State) ->
+    ok.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec code_change(term(), #state{}, list()) -> {ok, #state{}}.			 
+%%
+%% Description: Convert process state when code is changed
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+code_change(_OldVsn, State, _Extra) ->
+    {ok, State}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+call(Pid, Msg) ->
+    gen_server:call(Pid, Msg, infinity).
+
+split_options(Opts) ->
+    split_options(Opts, emulated_options(), [], []).
+split_options([], _, SocketOpts, EmuOpts) ->
+    {SocketOpts, EmuOpts};
+split_options([{Name, _} = Opt | Opts], Emu, SocketOpts, EmuOpts) ->
+    case lists:member(Name, Emu) of
+	true ->
+	    split_options(Opts, Emu, SocketOpts, [Opt | EmuOpts]);
+	false ->
+	    split_options(Opts, Emu, [Opt | SocketOpts], EmuOpts)
+    end;
+split_options([Name | Opts], Emu, SocketOptNames, EmuOptNames) ->
+    case lists:member(Name, Emu) of
+	true ->
+	    split_options(Opts, Emu, SocketOptNames, [Name | EmuOptNames]);
+	false ->
+	    split_options(Opts, Emu, [Name | SocketOptNames], EmuOptNames)
+    end.
+
+do_set_emulated_opts([], Opts) ->
+    Opts;
+do_set_emulated_opts([{Name,_} = Opt | Rest], Opts) ->
+    do_set_emulated_opts(Rest, [Opt | proplists:delete(Name, Opts)]).
+
+get_socket_opts(_, [], _) ->
+    [];
+get_socket_opts(ListenSocket, SockOptNames, Cb) ->
+    {ok, Opts} = Cb:getopts(ListenSocket, SockOptNames),
+    Opts.
+
+get_emulated_opts(TrackerPid, EmOptNames) -> 
+    {ok, EmOpts} = get_emulated_opts(TrackerPid),
+    lists:map(fun(Name) -> {value, Value} = lists:keysearch(Name, 1, EmOpts),
+			   Value end,
+	      EmOptNames).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_srp.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_srp.hrl
index ab2be33ab2..d6e45adeee 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_srp.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_srp.hrl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2012. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -23,9 +24,14 @@
 %% see RFC 5054
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
+-ifndef(ssl_srp).
+-define(ssl_srp, true).
+
 -record(srp_user, {
 	  generator :: binary(),
 	  prime     :: binary(),
 	  salt      :: binary(),
 	  verifier  :: binary()
 	 }).
+
+-endif. % -ifdef(ssl_srp).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl2.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl2.erl
deleted file mode 100644
index a9ab6a2678..0000000000
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl2.erl
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-%%
-%% %CopyrightBegin%
-%% 
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2011. All Rights Reserved.
-%% 
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%% 
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
-%% 
-%% %CopyrightEnd%
-%%
-
-%%
-%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Purpose: Handles sslv2 hello as clients supporting sslv2 and higher 
-%% will send an sslv2 hello.
-%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
--module(ssl_ssl2).
-             
--export([client_random/2]).
-
-client_random(ChallengeData, 32) ->
-    ChallengeData;
-client_random(ChallengeData, N) when N > 32 ->
-    <<NewChallengeData:32/binary, _/binary>> = ChallengeData,
-    NewChallengeData;
-client_random(ChallengeData, N) ->
-    Pad = list_to_binary(lists:duplicate(N, 0)),
-    <<Pad/binary, ChallengeData/binary>>.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_sup.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_sup.erl
index 59039a6e0a..7fa1f7dc9e 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_sup.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_sup.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1998-2011. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1998-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -43,22 +44,14 @@ start_link() ->
 %%%=========================================================================
 
 init([]) ->    
-    %% OLD ssl - moved start to ssl.erl only if old
-    %% ssl is acctualy run!
-    %%Child1 = {ssl_server, {ssl_server, start_link, []},
-    %%	       permanent, 2000, worker, [ssl_server]},
-
-    %% Does not start any port programs so it does matter
-    %% so much if it is not used!
-    %% Child2 = {ssl_broker_sup, {ssl_broker_sup, start_link, []},
-    %% 	      permanent, 2000, supervisor, [ssl_broker_sup]},
-
-
-    %% New ssl
     SessionCertManager = session_and_cert_manager_child_spec(),
-    ConnetionManager = connection_manager_child_spec(),
-
-    {ok, {{one_for_all, 10, 3600}, [SessionCertManager, ConnetionManager]}}.
+    TLSConnetionManager = tls_connection_manager_child_spec(),
+    %% Not supported yet
+    %%DTLSConnetionManager = tls_connection_manager_child_spec(),
+    %% Handles emulated options so that they inherited by the accept socket, even when setopts is performed on 
+    %% the listen socket
+    ListenOptionsTracker = listen_options_tracker_child_spec(), 
+    {ok, {{one_for_all, 10, 3600}, [SessionCertManager, TLSConnetionManager, ListenOptionsTracker]}}.
 
 
 manager_opts() ->
@@ -90,12 +83,31 @@ session_and_cert_manager_child_spec() ->
     Type = worker,
     {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules}.
 
-connection_manager_child_spec() ->
-    Name = ssl_connection,  
-    StartFunc = {ssl_connection_sup, start_link, []},
+tls_connection_manager_child_spec() ->
+    Name = tls_connection,  
+    StartFunc = {tls_connection_sup, start_link, []},
+    Restart = permanent, 
+    Shutdown = 4000,
+    Modules = [tls_connection_sup],
+    Type = supervisor,
+    {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules}.
+
+%% dtls_connection_manager_child_spec() ->
+%%     Name = dtls_connection,  
+%%     StartFunc = {dtls_connection_sup, start_link, []},
+%%     Restart = permanent, 
+%%     Shutdown = 4000,
+%%     Modules = [dtls_connection, ssl_connection],
+%%     Type = supervisor,
+%%     {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules}.
+
+
+listen_options_tracker_child_spec() ->
+    Name = ssl_socket,  
+    StartFunc = {ssl_listen_tracker_sup, start_link, []},
     Restart = permanent, 
     Shutdown = 4000,
-    Modules = [ssl_connection],
+    Modules = [ssl_socket],
     Type = supervisor,
     {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules}.
 
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls_dist_proxy.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls_dist_proxy.erl
index a22af6b960..a920f54ed2 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls_dist_proxy.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls_dist_proxy.erl
@@ -1,25 +1,26 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
 -module(ssl_tls_dist_proxy).
 
 
--export([listen/1, accept/1, connect/2, get_tcp_address/1]).
+-export([listen/2, accept/2, connect/3, get_tcp_address/1]).
 -export([init/1, start_link/0, handle_call/3, handle_cast/2, handle_info/2, 
 	 terminate/2, code_change/3, ssl_options/2]).
 
@@ -38,14 +39,63 @@
 %% Internal application API
 %%====================================================================
 
-listen(Name) ->
-    gen_server:call(?MODULE, {listen, Name}, infinity). 
+listen(Driver, Name) ->
+    gen_server:call(?MODULE, {listen, Driver, Name}, infinity).
+
+accept(Driver, Listen) ->
+    gen_server:call(?MODULE, {accept, Driver, Listen}, infinity).
+
+connect(Driver, Ip, Port) ->
+    gen_server:call(?MODULE, {connect, Driver, Ip, Port}, infinity).
+
+
+do_listen(Options) ->
+    {First,Last} = case application:get_env(kernel,inet_dist_listen_min) of
+                        {ok,N} when is_integer(N) ->
+                            case application:get_env(kernel,
+                                                    inet_dist_listen_max) of
+                               {ok,M} when is_integer(M) ->
+                                   {N,M};
+                               _ ->
+                                   {N,N}
+                            end;
+                        _ ->
+                            {0,0}
+                   end,
+    do_listen(First, Last, listen_options([{backlog,128}|Options])).
+
+do_listen(First,Last,_) when First > Last ->
+    {error,eaddrinuse};
+do_listen(First,Last,Options) ->
+    case gen_tcp:listen(First, Options) of
+        {error, eaddrinuse} ->
+            do_listen(First+1,Last,Options);
+        Other ->
+            Other
+    end.
 
-accept(Listen) ->
-    gen_server:call(?MODULE, {accept, Listen}, infinity).
+listen_options(Opts0) ->
+    Opts1 =
+        case application:get_env(kernel, inet_dist_use_interface) of
+            {ok, Ip} ->
+                [{ip, Ip} | Opts0];
+            _ ->
+                Opts0
+        end,
+    case application:get_env(kernel, inet_dist_listen_options) of
+        {ok,ListenOpts} ->
+            ListenOpts ++ Opts1;
+        _ ->
+            Opts1
+    end.
 
-connect(Ip, Port) ->
-    gen_server:call(?MODULE, {connect, Ip, Port}, infinity).
+connect_options(Opts) ->
+    case application:get_env(kernel, inet_dist_connect_options) of
+	{ok,ConnectOpts} ->
+	    lists:ukeysort(1, ConnectOpts ++ Opts);
+	_ ->
+	    Opts
+    end.
 
 %%====================================================================
 %% gen_server callbacks
@@ -58,29 +108,35 @@ init([]) ->
     process_flag(priority, max),
     {ok, #state{}}.
 
-handle_call({listen, Name}, _From, State) ->
-    case gen_tcp:listen(0, [{active, false}, {packet,?PPRE}]) of
+handle_call({listen, Driver, Name}, _From, State) ->
+    case gen_tcp:listen(0, [{active, false}, {packet,?PPRE}, {ip, loopback}]) of
 	{ok, Socket} ->
-	    {ok, World} = gen_tcp:listen(0, [{active, false}, binary, {packet,?PPRE}]),
+	    {ok, World} = do_listen([{active, false}, binary, {packet,?PPRE}, {reuseaddr, true},
+                                     Driver:family()]),
 	    {ok, TcpAddress} = get_tcp_address(Socket),
 	    {ok, WorldTcpAddress} = get_tcp_address(World),
 	    {_,Port} = WorldTcpAddress#net_address.address,
-	    {ok, Creation} = erl_epmd:register_node(Name, Port),
-	    {reply, {ok, {Socket, TcpAddress, Creation}},
-	     State#state{listen={Socket, World}}};
+	    ErlEpmd = net_kernel:epmd_module(),
+	    case ErlEpmd:register_node(Name, Port) of
+		{ok, Creation} ->
+		    {reply, {ok, {Socket, TcpAddress, Creation}},
+		     State#state{listen={Socket, World}}};
+		{error, _} = Error ->
+		    {reply, Error, State}
+	    end;
 	Error ->
 	    {reply, Error, State}
     end;
 
-handle_call({accept, Listen}, {From, _}, State = #state{listen={_, World}}) ->
+handle_call({accept, _Driver, Listen}, {From, _}, State = #state{listen={_, World}}) ->
     Self = self(),
     ErtsPid = spawn_link(fun() -> accept_loop(Self, erts, Listen, From) end),
     WorldPid = spawn_link(fun() -> accept_loop(Self, world, World, Listen) end),
     {reply, ErtsPid, State#state{accept_loop={ErtsPid, WorldPid}}};
 
-handle_call({connect, Ip, Port}, {From, _}, State) ->
+handle_call({connect, Driver, Ip, Port}, {From, _}, State) ->
     Me = self(),
-    Pid = spawn_link(fun() -> setup_proxy(Ip, Port, Me) end),
+    Pid = spawn_link(fun() -> setup_proxy(Driver, Ip, Port, Me) end),
     receive 
 	{Pid, go_ahead, LPort} -> 
 	    Res = {ok, Socket} = try_connect(LPort),
@@ -133,12 +189,18 @@ accept_loop(Proxy, erts = Type, Listen, Extra) ->
 	    Extra ! {accept,self(),Socket,inet,proxy},
 	    receive 
 		{_Kernel, controller, Pid} ->
+		    inet:setopts(Socket, [nodelay()]),
 		    ok = gen_tcp:controlling_process(Socket, Pid),
 		    flush_old_controller(Pid, Socket),
 		    Pid ! {self(), controller};
 		{_Kernel, unsupported_protocol} ->
 		    exit(unsupported_protocol)
 	    end;
+	{error, closed} ->
+	    %% The listening socket is closed: the proxy process is
+	    %% shutting down.  Exit normally, to avoid generating a
+	    %% spurious error report.
+	    exit(normal);
 	Error ->
 	    exit(Error)
     end,
@@ -149,6 +211,7 @@ accept_loop(Proxy, world = Type, Listen, Extra) ->
     case gen_tcp:accept(Listen) of
 	{ok, Socket} ->
 	    Opts = get_ssl_options(server),
+	    wait_for_code_server(),
 	    case ssl:ssl_accept(Socket, Opts) of
 		{ok, SslSocket} ->
 		    PairHandler =
@@ -157,6 +220,11 @@ accept_loop(Proxy, world = Type, Listen, Extra) ->
 				   end),
 		    ok = ssl:controlling_process(SslSocket, PairHandler),
 		    flush_old_controller(PairHandler, SslSocket);
+		{error, {options, _}} = Error ->
+		    %% Bad options: that's probably our fault.  Let's log that.
+		    error_logger:error_msg("Cannot accept TLS distribution connection: ~s~n",
+					   [ssl:format_error(Error)]),
+		    gen_tcp:close(Socket);
 		_ ->
 		    gen_tcp:close(Socket)
 	    end;
@@ -165,20 +233,50 @@ accept_loop(Proxy, world = Type, Listen, Extra) ->
     end,
     accept_loop(Proxy, Type, Listen, Extra).
 
+wait_for_code_server() ->
+    %% This is an ugly hack.  Upgrading a socket to TLS requires the
+    %% crypto module to be loaded.  Loading the crypto module triggers
+    %% its on_load function, which calls code:priv_dir/1 to find the
+    %% directory where its NIF library is.  However, distribution is
+    %% started earlier than the code server, so the code server is not
+    %% necessarily started yet, and code:priv_dir/1 might fail because
+    %% of that, if we receive an incoming connection on the
+    %% distribution port early enough.
+    %%
+    %% If the on_load function of a module fails, the module is
+    %% unloaded, and the function call that triggered loading it fails
+    %% with 'undef', which is rather confusing.
+    %%
+    %% Thus, the ssl_tls_dist_proxy process will terminate, and be
+    %% restarted by ssl_dist_sup.  However, it won't have any memory
+    %% of being asked by net_kernel to listen for incoming
+    %% connections.  Hence, the node will believe that it's open for
+    %% distribution, but it actually isn't.
+    %%
+    %% So let's avoid that by waiting for the code server to start.
+    case whereis(code_server) of
+	undefined ->
+	    timer:sleep(10),
+	    wait_for_code_server();
+	Pid when is_pid(Pid) ->
+	    ok
+    end.
+
 try_connect(Port) ->
-    case gen_tcp:connect({127,0,0,1}, Port, [{active, false}, {packet,?PPRE}]) of
+    case gen_tcp:connect({127,0,0,1}, Port, [{active, false}, {packet,?PPRE}, nodelay()]) of
 	R = {ok, _S} ->
 	    R;
 	{error, _R} ->
 	    try_connect(Port)
     end.
 
-setup_proxy(Ip, Port, Parent) ->
+setup_proxy(Driver, Ip, Port, Parent) ->
     process_flag(trap_exit, true),
-    Opts = get_ssl_options(client),
-    case ssl:connect(Ip, Port, [{active, true}, binary, {packet,?PPRE}] ++ Opts) of
+    Opts = connect_options(get_ssl_options(client)),
+    case ssl:connect(Ip, Port, [{active, true}, binary, {packet,?PPRE}, nodelay(),
+                                Driver:family()] ++ Opts) of
 	{ok, World} ->
-	    {ok, ErtsL} = gen_tcp:listen(0, [{active, true}, {ip, {127,0,0,1}}, binary, {packet,?PPRE}]),
+	    {ok, ErtsL} = gen_tcp:listen(0, [{active, true}, {ip, loopback}, binary, {packet,?PPRE}]),
 	    {ok, #net_address{address={_,LPort}}} = get_tcp_address(ErtsL),
 	    Parent ! {self(), go_ahead, LPort},
 	    case gen_tcp:accept(ErtsL) of
@@ -188,29 +286,50 @@ setup_proxy(Ip, Port, Parent) ->
 		Err ->
 		    Parent ! {self(), Err}
 	    end;
+	{error, {options, _}} = Err ->
+	    %% Bad options: that's probably our fault.  Let's log that.
+	    error_logger:error_msg("Cannot open TLS distribution connection: ~s~n",
+				   [ssl:format_error(Err)]),
+	    Parent ! {self(), Err};
 	Err ->
 	    Parent ! {self(), Err}
     end.
 
+
+%% we may not always want the nodelay behaviour
+%% %% for performance reasons
+
+nodelay() ->
+    case application:get_env(kernel, dist_nodelay) of
+  undefined ->
+      {nodelay, true};
+  {ok, true} ->
+      {nodelay, true};
+  {ok, false} ->
+      {nodelay, false};
+  _ ->
+      {nodelay, true}
+    end.
+
 setup_connection(World, ErtsListen) ->
     process_flag(trap_exit, true),
     {ok, TcpAddress} = get_tcp_address(ErtsListen),
     {_Addr,Port} = TcpAddress#net_address.address,
-    {ok, Erts} = gen_tcp:connect({127,0,0,1}, Port, [{active, true}, binary, {packet,?PPRE}]),
-    ssl:setopts(World, [{active,true}, {packet,?PPRE}]),
+    {ok, Erts} = gen_tcp:connect({127,0,0,1}, Port, [{active, true}, binary, {packet,?PPRE}, nodelay()]),
+    ssl:setopts(World, [{active,true}, {packet,?PPRE}, nodelay()]),
     loop_conn_setup(World, Erts).
 
 loop_conn_setup(World, Erts) ->
     receive 
 	{ssl, World, Data = <<$a, _/binary>>} ->
 	    gen_tcp:send(Erts, Data),
-	    ssl:setopts(World, [{packet,?PPOST}]),
-	    inet:setopts(Erts, [{packet,?PPOST}]),
+	    ssl:setopts(World, [{packet,?PPOST}, nodelay()]),
+	    inet:setopts(Erts, [{packet,?PPOST}, nodelay()]),
 	    loop_conn(World, Erts);
 	{tcp, Erts, Data = <<$a, _/binary>>} ->
 	    ssl:send(World, Data),
-	    ssl:setopts(World, [{packet,?PPOST}]),
-	    inet:setopts(Erts, [{packet,?PPOST}]),
+	    ssl:setopts(World, [{packet,?PPOST}, nodelay()]),
+	    inet:setopts(Erts, [{packet,?PPOST}, nodelay()]),
 	    loop_conn(World, Erts);
 	{ssl, World, Data = <<_, _/binary>>} ->
 	    gen_tcp:send(Erts, Data),
@@ -227,7 +346,10 @@ loop_conn_setup(World, Erts) ->
 	{tcp_closed, Erts} ->
 	    ssl:close(World);
 	{ssl_closed,  World} ->
-	    gen_tcp:close(Erts)
+	    gen_tcp:close(Erts);
+	{ssl_error, World, _} ->
+
+	    ssl:close(World)
     end.
 
 loop_conn(World, Erts) ->
@@ -241,7 +363,9 @@ loop_conn(World, Erts) ->
 	{tcp_closed, Erts} ->
 	    ssl:close(World);
 	{ssl_closed,  World} ->
-	    gen_tcp:close(Erts)
+	    gen_tcp:close(Erts);
+	{ssl_error, World, _} ->
+	    ssl:close(World)
     end.
 
 get_ssl_options(Type) ->
@@ -278,6 +402,18 @@ ssl_options(server, ["server_verify", Value|T]) ->
     [{verify, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)];
 ssl_options(client, ["client_verify", Value|T]) ->
     [{verify, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)];
+ssl_options(server, ["server_verify_fun", Value|T]) ->
+    [{verify_fun, verify_fun(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)];
+ssl_options(client, ["client_verify_fun", Value|T]) ->
+    [{verify_fun, verify_fun(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)];
+ssl_options(server, ["server_crl_check", Value|T]) ->
+    [{crl_check, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)];
+ssl_options(client, ["client_crl_check", Value|T]) ->
+    [{crl_check, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)];
+ssl_options(server, ["server_crl_cache", Value|T]) ->
+    [{crl_cache, termify(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)];
+ssl_options(client, ["client_crl_cache", Value|T]) ->
+    [{crl_cache, termify(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)];
 ssl_options(server, ["server_reuse_sessions", Value|T]) ->
     [{reuse_sessions, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)];
 ssl_options(client, ["client_reuse_sessions", Value|T]) ->
@@ -302,14 +438,28 @@ ssl_options(server, ["server_dhfile", Value|T]) ->
     [{dhfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)];
 ssl_options(server, ["server_fail_if_no_peer_cert", Value|T]) ->
     [{fail_if_no_peer_cert, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)];
-ssl_options(_,_) ->
-    exit(malformed_ssl_dist_opt).
+ssl_options(Type, Opts) ->
+    error(malformed_ssl_dist_opt, [Type, Opts]).
 
 atomize(List) when is_list(List) ->
     list_to_atom(List);
 atomize(Atom) when is_atom(Atom) ->
     Atom.
 
+termify(String) when is_list(String) ->
+    {ok, Tokens, _} = erl_scan:string(String ++ "."),
+    {ok, Term} = erl_parse:parse_term(Tokens),
+    Term.
+
+verify_fun(Value) ->
+    case termify(Value) of
+	{Mod, Func, State} when is_atom(Mod), is_atom(Func) ->
+	    Fun = fun Mod:Func/3,
+	    {Fun, State};
+	_ ->
+	    error(malformed_ssl_dist_opt, [Value])
+    end.
+
 flush_old_controller(Pid, Socket) ->
     receive
 	{tcp, Socket, Data} ->
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v2.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v2.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..37134cbe5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v2.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+
+%%
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: Handles sslv2 hello as clients supporting sslv2 and higher
+%% will send an sslv2 hello.
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-module(ssl_v2).
+
+-export([client_random/2]).
+
+client_random(ChallengeData, 32) ->
+    ChallengeData;
+client_random(ChallengeData, N) when N > 32 ->
+    <<NewChallengeData:32/binary, _/binary>> = ChallengeData,
+    NewChallengeData;
+client_random(ChallengeData, N) ->
+    Pad = list_to_binary(lists:duplicate(N, 0)),
+    <<Pad/binary, ChallengeData/binary>>.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v3.erl
index 013c27ebb5..82d165f995 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v3.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -22,14 +23,14 @@
 %% Purpose: Handles sslv3 encryption.
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--module(ssl_ssl3).
+-module(ssl_v3).
 
 -include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
 -include("ssl_internal.hrl").
 -include("ssl_record.hrl"). 			% MD5 and SHA
 
 -export([master_secret/3, finished/3, certificate_verify/3,
-	 mac_hash/6, setup_keys/7, 
+	 mac_hash/6, setup_keys/7,
 	 suites/0]).
 -compile(inline).
 
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@
 -spec master_secret(binary(), binary(), binary()) -> binary().
 
 master_secret(PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) ->
-    %%  draft-ietf-tls-ssl-version3-00 - 6.2.2 
+    %%  draft-ietf-tls-ssl-version3-00 - 6.2.2
     %% key_block =
     %%   MD5(master_secret + SHA(`A' + master_secret +
     %%                           ServerHello.random +
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ finished(Role, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
    %%      opaque md5_hash[16];
    %%      opaque sha_hash[20];
    %%  } Finished;
-   %% 
+   %%
    %%   md5_hash       MD5(master_secret + pad2 +
    %%                     MD5(handshake_messages + Sender +
    %%                         master_secret + pad1));
@@ -95,23 +96,23 @@ certificate_verify(sha, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
 
     handshake_hash(?SHA, MasterSecret, undefined, Handshake).
 
--spec mac_hash(integer(), binary(), integer(), integer(), integer(), binary()) -> binary(). 
+-spec mac_hash(integer(), binary(), integer(), integer(), integer(), binary()) -> binary().
 
 mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, Length, Fragment) ->
-    %% draft-ietf-tls-ssl-version3-00 - 5.2.3.1 
+    %% draft-ietf-tls-ssl-version3-00 - 5.2.3.1
     %% hash(MAC_write_secret + pad_2 +
     %%      hash(MAC_write_secret + pad_1 + seq_num +
     %%           SSLCompressed.type + SSLCompressed.length +
     %%           SSLCompressed.fragment));
-    Mac = mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, 
-		   [<<?UINT64(Seq_num), ?BYTE(Type), 
+    Mac = mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret,
+		   [<<?UINT64(Seq_num), ?BYTE(Type),
 		     ?UINT16(Length)>>, Fragment]),
     Mac.
 
--spec setup_keys(binary(), binary(), binary(),  
-		 integer(), integer(), term(), integer()) -> 
-			{binary(), binary(), binary(), 
-			 binary(), binary(), binary()}.  
+-spec setup_keys(binary(), binary(), binary(),
+		 integer(), integer(), term(), integer()) ->
+			{binary(), binary(), binary(),
+			 binary(), binary(), binary()}.
 
 setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HS, KML, _EKML, IVS) ->
     KeyBlock = generate_keyblock(MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom,
@@ -130,10 +131,10 @@ setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HS, KML, _EKML, IVS) ->
     {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey,
      ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}.
 
--spec suites() -> [cipher_suite()].
+-spec suites() -> [ssl_cipher:cipher_suite()].
 
 suites() ->
-    [ 
+    [
       ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
@@ -142,11 +143,7 @@ suites() ->
       ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-      %%?TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA, 
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
+      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
      ].
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls.erl
index bb02695c12..aa41cd1ba6 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls.erl
@@ -1,165 +1,62 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
 
 %%
 
-%%% Purpose : Main API module for SSL.
+%%% Purpose : Reflect TLS specific API options (fairly simple wrapper at the moment)
 
 -module(tls).
 
--export([start/0, start/1, stop/0, transport_accept/1,
-	 transport_accept/2, ssl_accept/1, ssl_accept/2, ssl_accept/3,
-	 cipher_suites/0, cipher_suites/1, suite_definition/1,
-	 close/1, shutdown/2,
-	 connect/3, connect/2, connect/4, connection_info/1,
-	 controlling_process/2, listen/2, peername/1, peercert/1,
-	 recv/2, recv/3, send/2, getopts/2, setopts/2, sockname/1,
-	 versions/0, session_info/1, format_error/1,
-	 renegotiate/1, prf/5, clear_pem_cache/0, random_bytes/1, negotiated_next_protocol/1]).
-
+-include("ssl_api.hrl").
 -include("ssl_internal.hrl").
--include("ssl_record.hrl").
--include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
--include("ssl_handshake.hrl").
--include("ssl_srp.hrl").
-
--include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). 
-
-%% Visible in API
--export_type([connect_option/0, listen_option/0, ssl_option/0, transport_option/0,
-	      erl_cipher_suite/0, %% From ssl_cipher.hrl 
-	      tls_atom_version/0, %% From ssl_internal.hrl
-	      prf_random/0, sslsocket/0]).
-
--record(config, {ssl,               %% SSL parameters
-		 inet_user,         %% User set inet options
-		 emulated,          %% #socket_option{} emulated
-		 inet_ssl,          %% inet options for internal ssl socket 
-		 cb                 %% Callback info
-		}).
 
--type sslsocket()                :: #sslsocket{}.
--type connect_option()           :: socket_connect_option() | ssl_option() | transport_option().
--type socket_connect_option()    :: gen_tcp:connect_option().
--type listen_option()            :: socket_listen_option() | ssl_option() | transport_option().
--type socket_listen_option()     :: gen_tcp:listen_option().
-
--type ssl_option()    :: {verify, verify_type()} |
-			{verify_fun, {fun(), InitialUserState::term()}} |
-                        {fail_if_no_peer_cert, boolean()} | {depth, integer()} |
-                        {cert, Der::binary()} | {certfile, path()} | {key, Der::binary()} |
-                        {keyfile, path()} | {password, string()} | {cacerts, [Der::binary()]} |
-                        {cacertfile, path()} | {dh, Der::binary()} | {dhfile, path()} |
-                        {user_lookup_fun, {fun(), InitialUserState::term()}} |
-                        {psk_identity, string()} |
-                        {srp_identity, {string(), string()}} |
-                        {ciphers, ciphers()} | {ssl_imp, ssl_imp()} | {reuse_sessions, boolean()} |
-                        {reuse_session, fun()} | {hibernate_after, integer()|undefined} |
-                        {next_protocols_advertised, list(binary())} |
-                        {client_preferred_next_protocols, binary(), client | server, list(binary())}.
-
--type verify_type()  :: verify_none | verify_peer.
--type path()         :: string().
--type ciphers()      :: [erl_cipher_suite()] |
-			string(). % (according to old API)
--type ssl_imp()      :: new | old.
-
--type transport_option() :: {cb_info, {CallbackModule::atom(), DataTag::atom(), 
-				       ClosedTag::atom(), ErrTag::atom()}}.
--type prf_random() :: client_random | server_random.
+-export([connect/2, connect/3, listen/2, accept/1, accept/2,
+	 handshake/1, handshake/2, handshake/3]).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec start() -> ok  | {error, reason()}.
--spec start(permanent | transient | temporary) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
 %%
-%% Description: Utility function that starts the ssl, 
-%% crypto and public_key applications. Default type
-%% is temporary. see application(3)
+%% Description: Connect to an TLS server.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-start() ->
-    application:start(crypto),
-    application:start(asn1),
-    application:start(public_key),
-    application:start(ssl).
 
-start(Type) ->
-    application:start(crypto, Type),
-    application:start(asn1),
-    application:start(public_key, Type),
-    application:start(ssl, Type).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec stop() -> ok.
-%%
-%% Description: Stops the ssl application.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-stop() ->
-    application:stop(ssl).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()]) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} |
 					      {error, reason()}.
--spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()] | inet:port_number(), 
-	      timeout() | list()) ->
-		     {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
--spec connect(host() | port(), inet:port_number(), list(), timeout()) ->
-		     {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
 
-%%
-%% Description: Connect to an ssl server.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-connect(Socket, SslOptions) when is_port(Socket) ->
-    connect(Socket, SslOptions, infinity).
+connect(Socket, Options) when is_port(Socket) ->
+    connect(Socket, Options, infinity).
 
-connect(Socket, SslOptions0, Timeout) when is_port(Socket) ->
-    {Transport,_,_,_} = proplists:get_value(cb_info, SslOptions0, 
-					      {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}),    
-    EmulatedOptions = emulated_options(),
-    {ok, SocketValues} = ssl_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, EmulatedOptions),
-    try handle_options(SslOptions0 ++ SocketValues, client) of
-	{ok, #config{cb = CbInfo, ssl = SslOptions, emulated = EmOpts}} ->
-	   
-	    ok = ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, internal_inet_values()),
-	    case ssl_socket:peername(Transport, Socket) of
-		{ok, {Address, Port}} ->
-		    tls_connection:connect(Address, Port, Socket, 
-					   {SslOptions, EmOpts},
-					   self(), CbInfo, Timeout);
-		{error, Error} ->
-		    {error, Error}
-	    end
-    catch 
-	_:{error, Reason} ->
-            {error, Reason}
-    end;
+-spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()] | inet:port_number(),
+	      timeout() | list()) ->
+		     {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
 
+connect(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout)  when is_port(Socket) ->
+    TLSOpts = [{protocol, tls} | SslOptions],
+    ssl:connect(Socket, TLSOpts, Timeout);
 connect(Host, Port, Options) ->
     connect(Host, Port, Options, infinity).
 
+-spec connect(host() | port(), inet:port_number(), list(), timeout()) ->
+		     {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+
 connect(Host, Port, Options, Timeout) ->
-    try handle_options(Options, client) of
-	{ok, Config} ->
-	    do_connect(Host,Port,Config,Timeout)
-    catch
-	throw:Error ->
-	    Error
-    end.
+    TLSOpts = [{protocol, tls} | Options],
+    ssl:connect(Host, Port, TLSOpts, Timeout).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec listen(inet:port_number(), [listen_option()]) ->{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
@@ -167,873 +64,49 @@ connect(Host, Port, Options, Timeout) ->
 %%
 %% Description: Creates an ssl listen socket.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-listen(_Port, []) ->
-    {error, nooptions};
-listen(Port, Options0) ->
-    try
-	{ok, Config} = handle_options(Options0, server),
-	#config{cb = {Transport, _, _, _}, inet_user = Options} = Config,
-	case Transport:listen(Port, Options) of
-	    {ok, ListenSocket} ->
-		{ok, #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, Config}}};
-	    Err = {error, _} ->
-		Err
-	end
-    catch
-	Error = {error, _} ->
-	    Error
-    end.
+listen(Port, Options) ->
+    TLSOpts = [{protocol, tls} | Options],
+    ssl:listen(Port, TLSOpts).
+
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec transport_accept(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} |
-					{error, reason()}.
--spec transport_accept(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} |
-						   {error, reason()}.
 %%
 %% Description: Performs transport accept on an ssl listen socket
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-transport_accept(ListenSocket) ->
-    transport_accept(ListenSocket, infinity).
+-spec accept(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} |
+					{error, reason()}.
+accept(ListenSocket) ->
+    accept(ListenSocket, infinity).
 
-transport_accept(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{cb = CbInfo, ssl = SslOpts}}}, Timeout) ->
-    
-    %% The setopt could have been invoked on the listen socket
-    %% and options should be inherited.
-    EmOptions = emulated_options(),
-    {Transport,_,_, _} = CbInfo,    
-    {ok, SocketValues} = ssl_socket:getopts(Transport, ListenSocket, EmOptions),
-    ok = ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, ListenSocket, internal_inet_values()),
-    case Transport:accept(ListenSocket, Timeout) of
-	{ok, Socket} ->
-	    ok = ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, ListenSocket, SocketValues),
-	    {ok, Port} = ssl_socket:port(Transport, Socket),
-	    ConnArgs = [server, "localhost", Port, Socket,
-			{SslOpts, socket_options(SocketValues)}, self(), CbInfo],
-	    case ssl_connection_sup:start_child(ConnArgs) of
-		{ok, Pid} ->
-		    tls_connection:socket_control(Socket, Pid, Transport);
-		{error, Reason} ->
-		    {error, Reason}
-	    end;
-	{error, Reason} ->
-	    {error, Reason}
-    end.
+-spec accept(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} |
+						   {error, reason()}.
+accept(Socket, Timeout) ->
+    ssl:transport_accept(Socket, Timeout).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec ssl_accept(#sslsocket{}) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
--spec ssl_accept(#sslsocket{} | port(), timeout()| [ssl_option() 
-						    | transport_option()]) ->
-			ok | {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
--spec ssl_accept(port(), [ssl_option()| transport_option()], timeout()) -> 
-			{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
 %%
 %% Description: Performs accept on an ssl listen socket. e.i. performs
 %%              ssl handshake. 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-ssl_accept(ListenSocket) ->
-    ssl_accept(ListenSocket, infinity).
-
-ssl_accept(#sslsocket{} = Socket, Timeout) ->
-    tls_connection:handshake(Socket, Timeout);
-    
-ssl_accept(ListenSocket, SslOptions)  when is_port(ListenSocket) -> 
-    ssl_accept(ListenSocket, SslOptions, infinity).
-
-ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket) -> 
-    {Transport,_,_,_} = 
-	proplists:get_value(cb_info, SslOptions, {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}),    
-    EmulatedOptions = emulated_options(),
-    {ok, SocketValues} = ssl_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, EmulatedOptions),
-    try handle_options(SslOptions ++ SocketValues, server) of
-	{ok, #config{cb = CbInfo, ssl = SslOpts, emulated = EmOpts}} ->
-	    ok = ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, internal_inet_values()),
-	    {ok, Port} = ssl_socket:port(Transport, Socket),
-	    tls_connection:ssl_accept(Port, Socket,
-				      {SslOpts, EmOpts},
-				      self(), CbInfo, Timeout)
-    catch 
-	Error = {error, _Reason} -> Error
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec  close(#sslsocket{}) -> term().
-%%
-%% Description: Close an ssl connection
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------  
-close(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) ->
-    tls_connection:close(Pid);
-close(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{cb={Transport,_, _, _}}}}) ->
-    Transport:close(ListenSocket).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec send(#sslsocket{}, iodata()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
-%% 
-%% Description: Sends data over the ssl connection
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-send(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Data) when is_pid(Pid) ->
-    tls_connection:send(Pid, Data);
-send(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{cb={Transport, _, _, _}}}}, Data) ->
-    Transport:send(ListenSocket, Data). %% {error,enotconn}
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec recv(#sslsocket{}, integer()) -> {ok, binary()| list()} | {error, reason()}.
--spec recv(#sslsocket{}, integer(), timeout()) -> {ok, binary()| list()} | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description: Receives data when active = false
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-recv(Socket, Length) ->
-    recv(Socket, Length, infinity).
-recv(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Length, Timeout) when is_pid(Pid) ->
-    tls_connection:recv(Pid, Length, Timeout);
-recv(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, 
-		       #config{cb={Transport, _, _, _}}}}, _,_) when is_port(Listen)->
-    Transport:recv(Listen, 0). %% {error,enotconn}
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec controlling_process(#sslsocket{}, pid()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
-%%				 
-%% Description: Changes process that receives the messages when active = true
-%% or once. 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-controlling_process(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, NewOwner) when is_pid(Pid), is_pid(NewOwner) ->
-    tls_connection:new_user(Pid, NewOwner);
-controlling_process(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,
-				      #config{cb={Transport, _, _, _}}}}, 
-		    NewOwner) when is_port(Listen),
-				   is_pid(NewOwner) ->
-    Transport:controlling_process(Listen, NewOwner).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec connection_info(#sslsocket{}) -> 	{ok, {tls_atom_version(), erl_cipher_suite()}} | 
-					{error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description: Returns ssl protocol and cipher used for the connection
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-connection_info(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) ->
-    tls_connection:info(Pid);
-connection_info(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, _}}) when is_port(Listen) ->
-    {error, enotconn}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec peername(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, {inet:ip_address(), inet:port_number()}} | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description: same as inet:peername/1.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-peername(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {Transport, Socket}}) when is_pid(Pid)->
-    ssl_socket:peername(Transport, Socket);
-peername(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket,  #config{cb = {Transport,_,_,_}}}}) ->
-    ssl_socket:peername(Transport, ListenSocket). %% Will return {error, enotconn}
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec peercert(#sslsocket{}) ->{ok, DerCert::binary()} | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description: Returns the peercert.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-peercert(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) ->
-    case tls_connection:peer_certificate(Pid) of
-	{ok, undefined} ->
-	    {error, no_peercert};
-        Result ->
-	    Result
-    end;
-peercert(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, _}}) when is_port(Listen) ->
-    {error, enotconn}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> erl_cipher_suite().
-%%
-%% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-suite_definition(S) ->
-    {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, _} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(S),
-    {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec negotiated_next_protocol(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description: Returns the next protocol that has been negotiated. If no
-%% protocol has been negotiated will return {error, next_protocol_not_negotiated}
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-negotiated_next_protocol(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) ->
-    tls_connection:negotiated_next_protocol(Pid).
-
--spec cipher_suites() -> [erl_cipher_suite()].
--spec cipher_suites(erlang | openssl | all) -> [erl_cipher_suite()] | [string()].
-			   
-%% Description: Returns all supported cipher suites.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-cipher_suites() ->
-    cipher_suites(erlang).
-  
-cipher_suites(erlang) ->
-    Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]),
-    [suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:suites(Version)];
 
-cipher_suites(openssl) ->
-    Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]),
-    [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite_name(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:suites(Version)];
-cipher_suites(all) ->
-    Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]),
-    Supported = ssl_cipher:suites(Version)
-	++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites()
-	++ ssl_cipher:psk_suites(Version)
-	++ ssl_cipher:srp_suites(),
-    [suite_definition(S) || S <- Supported].
+-spec handshake(#sslsocket{}) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec getopts(#sslsocket{}, [gen_tcp:option_name()]) ->
-		     {ok, [gen_tcp:option()]} | {error, reason()}.
-%% 
-%% Description: Gets options
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-getopts(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, OptionTags) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(OptionTags) ->
-    tls_connection:get_opts(Pid, OptionTags);
-getopts(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket,  #config{cb = {Transport,_,_,_}}}}, 
-	OptionTags) when is_list(OptionTags) ->
-    try ssl_socket:getopts(Transport, ListenSocket, OptionTags) of
-	{ok, _} = Result ->
-	    Result;
-	{error, InetError} ->
-	    {error, {options, {socket_options, OptionTags, InetError}}}
-    catch
-	_:_ ->
-	    {error, {options, {socket_options, OptionTags}}}
-    end;
-getopts(#sslsocket{}, OptionTags) ->
-    {error, {options, {socket_options, OptionTags}}}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec setopts(#sslsocket{},  [gen_tcp:option()]) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
-%% 
-%% Description: Sets options
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-setopts(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Options0) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(Options0)  ->
-    try proplists:expand([{binary, [{mode, binary}]},
-			  {list, [{mode, list}]}], Options0) of
-	Options ->
-	    tls_connection:set_opts(Pid, Options)
-    catch
-	_:_ ->
-	    {error, {options, {not_a_proplist, Options0}}}
-    end;
-
-setopts(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{cb = {Transport,_,_,_}}}}, Options) when is_list(Options) ->
-    try ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, ListenSocket, Options) of
-	ok ->
-	    ok;
-	{error, InetError} ->
-	    {error, {options, {socket_options, Options, InetError}}}
-    catch
-	_:Error ->
-	    {error, {options, {socket_options, Options, Error}}}
-    end;
-setopts(#sslsocket{}, Options) ->
-    {error, {options,{not_a_proplist, Options}}}.
-
-%%---------------------------------------------------------------
--spec shutdown(#sslsocket{}, read | write | read_write) ->  ok | {error, reason()}.
-%%		      
-%% Description: Same as gen_tcp:shutdown/2
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-shutdown(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, #config{cb={Transport,_, _, _}}}},
-	 How) when is_port(Listen) ->
-    Transport:shutdown(Listen, How);
-shutdown(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, How) ->
-    tls_connection:shutdown(Pid, How).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec sockname(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, {inet:ip_address(), inet:port_number()}} | {error, reason()}.
-%%		     
-%% Description: Same as inet:sockname/1
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-sockname(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,  #config{cb={Transport,_, _, _}}}}) when is_port(Listen) ->
-    ssl_socket:sockname(Transport, Listen);
-
-sockname(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {Transport, Socket}}) when is_pid(Pid) ->
-    ssl_socket:sockname(Transport, Socket).
-
-%%---------------------------------------------------------------
--spec session_info(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}.
-%% 
-%% Description: Returns list of session info currently [{session_id, session_id(),
-%% {cipher_suite, cipher_suite()}]
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-session_info(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) ->
-    tls_connection:session_info(Pid);
-session_info(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,_}}) when is_port(Listen) ->
-    {error, enotconn}.
-
-%%---------------------------------------------------------------
--spec versions() -> [{ssl_app, string()} | {supported, [tls_atom_version()]} | 
-		     {available, [tls_atom_version()]}].
-%%
-%% Description: Returns a list of relevant versions.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-versions() ->
-    Vsns = tls_record:supported_protocol_versions(),
-    SupportedVsns = [tls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Vsns],
-    AvailableVsns = ?ALL_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
-    [{ssl_app, ?VSN}, {supported, SupportedVsns}, {available, AvailableVsns}].
-
-
-%%---------------------------------------------------------------
--spec renegotiate(#sslsocket{}) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
-%% 
-%% Description: Initiates a renegotiation.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-renegotiate(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) ->
-    tls_connection:renegotiation(Pid);
-renegotiate(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,_}}) when is_port(Listen) ->
-    {error, enotconn}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec prf(#sslsocket{}, binary() | 'master_secret', binary(),
-	  binary() | prf_random(), non_neg_integer()) ->
-		 {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description: use a ssl sessions TLS PRF to generate key material
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-prf(#sslsocket{pid = Pid},
-    Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) when is_pid(Pid) ->
-    tls_connection:prf(Pid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength);
-prf(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,_}}, _,_,_,_) when is_port(Listen) ->
-    {error, enotconn}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec clear_pem_cache() -> ok.
-%%
-%% Description: Clear the PEM cache
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-clear_pem_cache() ->
-    ssl_manager:clear_pem_cache().
-
-%%---------------------------------------------------------------
--spec format_error({error, term()}) -> list().
-%%
-%% Description: Creates error string.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-format_error({error, Reason}) ->
-    format_error(Reason);
-format_error(Reason) when is_list(Reason) ->
-    Reason;
-format_error(closed) ->
-    "TLS connection is closed";
-format_error({tls_alert, Description}) ->
-    "TLS Alert: " ++ Description;
-format_error({options,{FileType, File, Reason}}) when FileType == cacertfile;
-						      FileType == certfile;
-						      FileType == keyfile;
-						      FileType == dhfile ->
-    Error = file_error_format(Reason),
-    file_desc(FileType) ++ File ++ ": " ++ Error;
-format_error({options, {socket_options, Option, Error}}) ->
-    lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Invalid transport socket option ~p: ~s", [Option, format_error(Error)]));
-format_error({options, {socket_options, Option}}) ->
-    lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Invalid socket option: ~p", [Option]));
-format_error({options, Options}) ->
-    lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Invalid TLS option: ~p", [Options]));
-
-format_error(Error) ->
-    case inet:format_error(Error) of
-        "unknown POSIX" ++ _ ->
-            unexpected_format(Error);
-        Other ->
-            Other
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec random_bytes(integer()) -> binary().
-
-%%
-%% Description: Generates cryptographically secure random sequence if possible
-%% fallbacks on pseudo random function
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-random_bytes(N) ->
-    try crypto:strong_rand_bytes(N) of
-	RandBytes ->
-	    RandBytes
-    catch
-	error:low_entropy ->
-	    crypto:rand_bytes(N)
-    end.
+handshake(ListenSocket) ->
+    handshake(ListenSocket, infinity).
 
-%%%--------------------------------------------------------------
-%%% Internal functions
-%%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-do_connect(Address, Port,
-	       #config{cb=CbInfo, inet_user=UserOpts, ssl=SslOpts,
-		       emulated=EmOpts,inet_ssl=SocketOpts},
-	       Timeout) ->
-    {Transport, _, _, _} = CbInfo,    
-    try Transport:connect(Address, Port,  SocketOpts, Timeout) of
-	{ok, Socket} ->
-	    tls_connection:connect(Address, Port, Socket, {SslOpts,EmOpts},
-				   self(), CbInfo, Timeout);
-	{error, Reason} ->
-	    {error, Reason}
-    catch
-	exit:{function_clause, _} ->
-	    {error, {options, {cb_info, CbInfo}}};
-	exit:badarg ->
-	    {error, {options, {socket_options, UserOpts}}};
-	exit:{badarg, _} ->
-	    {error, {options, {socket_options, UserOpts}}}
-    end.
 
-handle_options(Opts0, _Role) ->
-    Opts = proplists:expand([{binary, [{mode, binary}]},
-			     {list, [{mode, list}]}], Opts0),
-    ReuseSessionFun = fun(_, _, _, _) -> true end,
-
-    DefaultVerifyNoneFun =
-	{fun(_,{bad_cert, _}, UserState) ->
-		 {valid, UserState};
-	    (_,{extension, _}, UserState) ->
-		 {unknown, UserState};
-	    (_, valid, UserState) ->
-		 {valid, UserState};
-	    (_, valid_peer, UserState) ->
-		 {valid, UserState}
-	 end, []},
-
-    VerifyNoneFun = handle_option(verify_fun, Opts, DefaultVerifyNoneFun),
-
-    UserFailIfNoPeerCert = handle_option(fail_if_no_peer_cert, Opts, false),
-    UserVerifyFun = handle_option(verify_fun, Opts, undefined),
-    CaCerts = handle_option(cacerts, Opts, undefined),
-
-    {Verify, FailIfNoPeerCert, CaCertDefault, VerifyFun} =
-	%% Handle 0, 1, 2 for backwards compatibility
-	case proplists:get_value(verify, Opts, verify_none) of
-	    0 ->
-		{verify_none, false,
-		 ca_cert_default(verify_none, VerifyNoneFun, CaCerts), VerifyNoneFun};
-	    1  ->
-		{verify_peer, false,
-		 ca_cert_default(verify_peer, UserVerifyFun, CaCerts), UserVerifyFun};
-	    2 ->
-		{verify_peer, true,
-		 ca_cert_default(verify_peer, UserVerifyFun, CaCerts), UserVerifyFun};
-	    verify_none ->
-		{verify_none, false,
-		 ca_cert_default(verify_none, VerifyNoneFun, CaCerts), VerifyNoneFun};
-	    verify_peer ->
-		{verify_peer, UserFailIfNoPeerCert,
-		 ca_cert_default(verify_peer, UserVerifyFun, CaCerts), UserVerifyFun};
-	    Value ->
-		throw({error, {options, {verify, Value}}})
-	end,
-
-    CertFile = handle_option(certfile, Opts, <<>>),
-    
-    Versions = case handle_option(versions, Opts, []) of
-		   [] ->
-		       tls_record:supported_protocol_versions();  
-		   Vsns  ->
-		       [tls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Vsns]
-	       end,  
-
-    SSLOptions = #ssl_options{
-      versions   = Versions,
-      verify     = validate_option(verify, Verify),
-      verify_fun = VerifyFun,
-      fail_if_no_peer_cert = FailIfNoPeerCert,
-      verify_client_once =  handle_option(verify_client_once, Opts, false),
-      depth      = handle_option(depth,  Opts, 1),
-      cert       = handle_option(cert, Opts, undefined),
-      certfile   = CertFile,
-      key        = handle_option(key, Opts, undefined),
-      keyfile    = handle_option(keyfile,  Opts, CertFile),
-      password   = handle_option(password, Opts, ""),
-      cacerts    = CaCerts,
-      cacertfile = handle_option(cacertfile, Opts, CaCertDefault),
-      dh         = handle_option(dh, Opts, undefined),
-      dhfile     = handle_option(dhfile, Opts, undefined),
-      user_lookup_fun = handle_option(user_lookup_fun, Opts, undefined),
-      psk_identity = handle_option(psk_identity, Opts, undefined),
-      srp_identity = handle_option(srp_identity, Opts, undefined),
-      ciphers    = handle_option(ciphers, Opts, []),
-      %% Server side option
-      reuse_session = handle_option(reuse_session, Opts, ReuseSessionFun),
-      reuse_sessions = handle_option(reuse_sessions, Opts, true),
-      secure_renegotiate = handle_option(secure_renegotiate, Opts, false),
-      renegotiate_at = handle_option(renegotiate_at, Opts, ?DEFAULT_RENEGOTIATE_AT),
-      hibernate_after = handle_option(hibernate_after, Opts, undefined),
-      erl_dist = handle_option(erl_dist, Opts, false),
-      next_protocols_advertised = 
-			handle_option(next_protocols_advertised, Opts, undefined),
-      next_protocol_selector = 
-			make_next_protocol_selector(
-			  handle_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, Opts, undefined))
-     },
-
-    CbInfo  = proplists:get_value(cb_info, Opts, {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}),    
-    SslOptions = [versions, verify, verify_fun,
-		  fail_if_no_peer_cert, verify_client_once,
-		  depth, cert, certfile, key, keyfile,
-		  password, cacerts, cacertfile, dh, dhfile, 
-		  user_lookup_fun, psk_identity, srp_identity, ciphers,
-		  reuse_session, reuse_sessions, ssl_imp,
-		  cb_info, renegotiate_at, secure_renegotiate, hibernate_after, 
-		  erl_dist, next_protocols_advertised,
-		  client_preferred_next_protocols],
-    
-    SockOpts = lists:foldl(fun(Key, PropList) -> 
-				   proplists:delete(Key, PropList)
-			   end, Opts, SslOptions),
-    
-    {SSLsock, Emulated} = emulated_options(SockOpts),
-    {ok, #config{ssl=SSLOptions, emulated=Emulated, inet_ssl=SSLsock,
-		 inet_user=SockOpts, cb=CbInfo}}.
-
-handle_option(OptionName, Opts, Default) ->
-    validate_option(OptionName, 
-		    proplists:get_value(OptionName, Opts, Default)).
-
-
-validate_option(versions, Versions)  ->
-    validate_versions(Versions, Versions);
-validate_option(verify, Value) 
-  when Value == verify_none; Value == verify_peer ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(verify_fun, undefined)  ->
-    undefined;
-%% Backwards compatibility
-validate_option(verify_fun, Fun) when is_function(Fun) ->
-    {fun(_,{bad_cert, _} = Reason, OldFun) ->
-	     case OldFun([Reason]) of
-		 true ->
-		     {valid, OldFun};
-		 false ->
-		     {fail, Reason}
-	     end;
-	(_,{extension, _}, UserState) ->
-	     {unknown, UserState};
-	(_, valid, UserState) ->
-	     {valid, UserState};
-	(_, valid_peer, UserState) ->
-	     {valid, UserState}
-     end, Fun};
-validate_option(verify_fun, {Fun, _} = Value) when is_function(Fun) ->
-   Value;
-validate_option(fail_if_no_peer_cert, Value) 
-  when Value == true; Value == false ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(verify_client_once, Value) 
-  when Value == true; Value == false ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(depth, Value) when is_integer(Value), 
-                                   Value >= 0, Value =< 255->
-    Value;
-validate_option(cert, Value) when Value == undefined;
-                                 is_binary(Value) ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(certfile, undefined = Value) ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(certfile, Value) when is_binary(Value) ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(certfile, Value) when is_list(Value) ->
-    list_to_binary(Value);
-
-validate_option(key, undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-validate_option(key, {KeyType, Value}) when is_binary(Value),
-					    KeyType == rsa; %% Backwards compatibility
-					    KeyType == dsa; %% Backwards compatibility
-					    KeyType == 'RSAPrivateKey';
-					    KeyType == 'DSAPrivateKey';
-					    KeyType == 'PrivateKeyInfo' ->
-    {KeyType, Value};
-
-validate_option(keyfile, undefined) ->
-   <<>>;
-validate_option(keyfile, Value) when is_binary(Value) ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(keyfile, Value) when is_list(Value), Value =/= "" ->
-    list_to_binary(Value);
-validate_option(password, Value) when is_list(Value) ->
-    Value;
-
-validate_option(cacerts, Value) when Value == undefined;
-				     is_list(Value) ->
-    Value;
-%% certfile must be present in some cases otherwhise it can be set
-%% to the empty string.
-validate_option(cacertfile, undefined) ->
-   <<>>;
-validate_option(cacertfile, Value) when is_binary(Value) ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(cacertfile, Value) when is_list(Value), Value =/= ""->
-    list_to_binary(Value);
-validate_option(dh, Value) when Value == undefined;
-				is_binary(Value) ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(dhfile, undefined = Value)  ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(dhfile, Value) when is_binary(Value) ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(dhfile, Value) when is_list(Value), Value =/= "" ->
-    list_to_binary(Value);
-validate_option(psk_identity, undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-validate_option(psk_identity, Identity)
-  when is_list(Identity), Identity =/= "", length(Identity) =< 65535 ->
-    list_to_binary(Identity);
-validate_option(user_lookup_fun, undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-validate_option(user_lookup_fun, {Fun, _} = Value) when is_function(Fun, 3) ->
-   Value;
-validate_option(srp_identity, undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-validate_option(srp_identity, {Username, Password})
-  when is_list(Username), is_list(Password), Username =/= "", length(Username) =< 255 ->
-    {list_to_binary(Username), list_to_binary(Password)};
-
-validate_option(ciphers, Value)  when is_list(Value) ->
-    Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]),
-    try cipher_suites(Version, Value)
-    catch
-	exit:_ ->
-	    throw({error, {options, {ciphers, Value}}});
-	error:_->
-	    throw({error, {options, {ciphers, Value}}})
-    end;
-validate_option(reuse_session, Value) when is_function(Value) ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(reuse_sessions, Value) when Value == true; 
-					    Value == false ->
-    Value;
-
-validate_option(secure_renegotiate, Value) when Value == true; 
-						Value == false ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(renegotiate_at, Value) when is_integer(Value) ->
-    erlang:min(Value, ?DEFAULT_RENEGOTIATE_AT);
-
-validate_option(hibernate_after, undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-validate_option(hibernate_after, Value) when is_integer(Value), Value >= 0 ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(erl_dist,Value) when Value == true;
-				     Value == false ->
-    Value;
-validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols = Opt, {Precedence, PreferredProtocols} = Value)
-  when is_list(PreferredProtocols) ->
-    case tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]) of
-	{3,0} ->
-	    throw({error, {options, {not_supported_in_sslv3, {Opt, Value}}}});
-	_ ->
-	    validate_binary_list(client_preferred_next_protocols, PreferredProtocols),
-	    validate_npn_ordering(Precedence),
-	    {Precedence, PreferredProtocols, ?NO_PROTOCOL}
-    end;
-validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols = Opt, {Precedence, PreferredProtocols, Default} = Value)
-      when is_list(PreferredProtocols), is_binary(Default),
-           byte_size(Default) > 0, byte_size(Default) < 256 ->
-    case tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]) of
-	{3,0} ->
-	    throw({error, {options, {not_supported_in_sslv3, {Opt, Value}}}});
-	_ ->
-	    validate_binary_list(client_preferred_next_protocols, PreferredProtocols),
-	    validate_npn_ordering(Precedence),
-	    Value
-    end;
-	
-validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-validate_option(next_protocols_advertised = Opt, Value) when is_list(Value) ->
-    case tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]) of
-	{3,0} ->
-	    throw({error, {options, {not_supported_in_sslv3, {Opt, Value}}}});
-	_ ->
-	    validate_binary_list(next_protocols_advertised, Value),
-	    Value
-    end;
-
-validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-validate_option(Opt, Value) ->
-    throw({error, {options, {Opt, Value}}}).
-
-validate_npn_ordering(client) ->
-    ok;
-validate_npn_ordering(server) ->
-    ok;
-validate_npn_ordering(Value) ->
-    throw({error, {options, {client_preferred_next_protocols, {invalid_precedence, Value}}}}).
-
-validate_binary_list(Opt, List) ->
-    lists:foreach(
-        fun(Bin) when is_binary(Bin),
-                      byte_size(Bin) > 0,
-                      byte_size(Bin) < 256 ->
-            ok;
-           (Bin) ->
-            throw({error, {options, {Opt, {invalid_protocol, Bin}}}})
-        end, List).
-
-validate_versions([], Versions) ->
-    Versions;
-validate_versions([Version | Rest], Versions) when Version == 'tlsv1.2';
-                                                   Version == 'tlsv1.1';
-                                                   Version == tlsv1; 
-                                                   Version == sslv3 ->
-    validate_versions(Rest, Versions);					   
-validate_versions([Ver| _], Versions) ->
-    throw({error, {options, {Ver, {versions, Versions}}}}).
-
-validate_inet_option(mode, Value)
-  when Value =/= list, Value =/= binary ->
-    throw({error, {options, {mode,Value}}});
-validate_inet_option(packet, Value)
-  when not (is_atom(Value) orelse is_integer(Value)) ->
-    throw({error, {options, {packet,Value}}});
-validate_inet_option(packet_size, Value)
-  when not is_integer(Value) ->
-    throw({error, {options, {packet_size,Value}}});
-validate_inet_option(header, Value)
-  when not is_integer(Value) ->
-    throw({error, {options, {header,Value}}});
-validate_inet_option(active, Value)
-  when Value =/= true, Value =/= false, Value =/= once ->
-    throw({error, {options, {active,Value}}});
-validate_inet_option(_, _) ->
-    ok.
-
-%% The option cacerts overrides cacertsfile
-ca_cert_default(_,_, [_|_]) ->
-    undefined;
-ca_cert_default(verify_none, _, _) ->
-    undefined;
-ca_cert_default(verify_peer, {Fun,_}, _) when is_function(Fun) ->
-    undefined;
-%% Server that wants to verify_peer and has no verify_fun must have
-%% some trusted certs.
-ca_cert_default(verify_peer, undefined, _) ->
-    "".
-
-emulated_options() ->
-    [mode, packet, active, header, packet_size].
-
-internal_inet_values() ->
-    [{packet_size,0},{packet, 0},{header, 0},{active, false},{mode,binary}].
-
-socket_options(InetValues) ->
-    #socket_options{
-		mode   = proplists:get_value(mode, InetValues, lists),
-		header = proplists:get_value(header, InetValues, 0),
-		active = proplists:get_value(active, InetValues, active),
-		packet = proplists:get_value(packet, InetValues, 0),
-		packet_size = proplists:get_value(packet_size, InetValues)	     
-	       }.
-
-emulated_options(Opts) ->
-    emulated_options(Opts, internal_inet_values(), #socket_options{}).
-
-emulated_options([{mode,Opt}|Opts], Inet, Emulated) ->
-    validate_inet_option(mode,Opt),
-    emulated_options(Opts, Inet, Emulated#socket_options{mode=Opt});
-emulated_options([{header,Opt}|Opts], Inet, Emulated) ->
-    validate_inet_option(header,Opt),
-    emulated_options(Opts, Inet, Emulated#socket_options{header=Opt});
-emulated_options([{active,Opt}|Opts], Inet, Emulated) ->
-    validate_inet_option(active,Opt),
-    emulated_options(Opts, Inet, Emulated#socket_options{active=Opt});
-emulated_options([{packet,Opt}|Opts], Inet, Emulated) ->
-    validate_inet_option(packet,Opt),
-    emulated_options(Opts, Inet, Emulated#socket_options{packet=Opt});
-emulated_options([{packet_size,Opt}|Opts], Inet, Emulated) ->
-    validate_inet_option(packet_size,Opt),
-    emulated_options(Opts, Inet, Emulated#socket_options{packet_size=Opt});
-emulated_options([Opt|Opts], Inet, Emulated) ->
-    emulated_options(Opts, [Opt|Inet], Emulated);
-emulated_options([], Inet,Emulated) ->
-    {Inet, Emulated}.
-
-cipher_suites(Version, []) ->
-    ssl_cipher:suites(Version);
-cipher_suites(Version, [{_,_,_,_}| _] = Ciphers0) -> %% Backwards compatibility
-    Ciphers = [{KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash} || {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, _} <- Ciphers0],
-    cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers);
-cipher_suites(Version, [{_,_,_}| _] = Ciphers0) ->
-    Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0],
-    cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers);
-
-cipher_suites(Version, [Cipher0 | _] = Ciphers0) when is_binary(Cipher0) ->
-    Supported0 = ssl_cipher:suites(Version)  
-	++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites() 
-	++ ssl_cipher:psk_suites(Version)
-	++ ssl_cipher:srp_suites(),
-    Supported = ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Supported0),
-    case [Cipher || Cipher <- Ciphers0, lists:member(Cipher, Supported)] of
-	[] ->
-	    Supported;
-	Ciphers ->
-	    Ciphers
-    end;
-cipher_suites(Version, [Head | _] = Ciphers0) when is_list(Head) ->
-    %% Format: ["RC4-SHA","RC4-MD5"]
-    Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0],
-    cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers); 
-cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers0)  ->
-    %% Format: "RC4-SHA:RC4-MD5"
-    Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite(C) || C <- string:tokens(Ciphers0, ":")],
-    cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers).
-
-unexpected_format(Error) ->    
-    lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Unexpected error: ~p", [Error])).
+-spec handshake(#sslsocket{} | port(), timeout()| [ssl_option()
+						    | transport_option()]) ->
+			ok | {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
 
-file_error_format({error, Error})->
-    case file:format_error(Error) of 
-	"unknown POSIX error" ->
-	    "decoding error";
-	Str ->
-	    Str
-    end;
-file_error_format(_) ->
-    "decoding error".
+handshake(#sslsocket{} = Socket, Timeout) ->
+    ssl:ssl_accept(Socket, Timeout);
     
-file_desc(cacertfile) ->
-    "Invalid CA certificate file ";
-file_desc(certfile) ->
-    "Invalid certificate file ";
-file_desc(keyfile) ->
-    "Invalid key file "; 
-file_desc(dhfile) ->
-    "Invalid DH params file ".
+handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions)  when is_port(ListenSocket) ->
+    handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions, infinity).
 
-detect(_Pred, []) ->
-    undefined;
-detect(Pred, [H|T]) ->
-    case Pred(H) of
-        true ->
-            H;
-        _ ->
-            detect(Pred, T)
-    end.
 
-make_next_protocol_selector(undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-make_next_protocol_selector({client, AllProtocols, DefaultProtocol}) ->
-    fun(AdvertisedProtocols) ->
-        case detect(fun(PreferredProtocol) -> 
-			    lists:member(PreferredProtocol, AdvertisedProtocols) 
-		    end, AllProtocols) of
-            undefined -> 
-		DefaultProtocol;
-            PreferredProtocol -> 
-		PreferredProtocol
-        end
-    end;
+-spec handshake(port(), [ssl_option()| transport_option()], timeout()) ->
+			{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
 
-make_next_protocol_selector({server, AllProtocols, DefaultProtocol}) ->
-    fun(AdvertisedProtocols) ->
-	    case detect(fun(PreferredProtocol) -> 
-				lists:member(PreferredProtocol, AllProtocols) 
-			end, 
-			AdvertisedProtocols) of
-		undefined -> 
-		    DefaultProtocol;
-            PreferredProtocol -> 
-		    PreferredProtocol
-	    end
-    end.
+handshake(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket) ->
+    ssl:ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
index 246fecf34a..9880befa94 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -27,266 +28,129 @@
 
 -module(tls_connection).
 
--behaviour(gen_fsm).
+-behaviour(gen_statem).
 
+-include("tls_connection.hrl").
 -include("tls_handshake.hrl").
 -include("ssl_alert.hrl").
 -include("tls_record.hrl").
--include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). 
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
+-include("ssl_api.hrl").
 -include("ssl_internal.hrl").
 -include("ssl_srp.hrl").
 -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). 
 
 %% Internal application API
--export([send/2, recv/3, connect/7, ssl_accept/6, handshake/2,
-	 socket_control/3, close/1, shutdown/2,
-	 new_user/2, get_opts/2, set_opts/2, info/1, session_info/1, 
-	 peer_certificate/1, renegotiation/1, negotiated_next_protocol/1, prf/5]).
-
-%% Called by ssl_connection_sup
--export([start_link/7]). 
-
-%% gen_fsm callbacks
--export([init/1, hello/2, certify/2, cipher/2,
-	 abbreviated/2, connection/2, handle_event/3,
-         handle_sync_event/4, handle_info/3, terminate/3, code_change/4]).
-
--record(state, {
-          role,               % client | server
-          user_application,   % {MonitorRef, pid()} 
-          transport_cb,       % atom() - callback module 
-          data_tag,           % atom()  - ex tcp.
-	  close_tag,          % atom()  - ex tcp_closed
-	  error_tag,          % atom() - ex  tcp_error
-          host,               % string() | ipadress()
-          port,               % integer()
-          socket,             % socket() 
-          ssl_options,        % #ssl_options{}
-          socket_options,     % #socket_options{}
-          connection_states,  % #connection_states{} from ssl_record.hrl
-	  tls_packets = [],        % Not yet handled decode ssl/tls packets.
-          tls_record_buffer,  % binary() buffer of incomplete records
-          tls_handshake_buffer, % binary() buffer of incomplete handshakes
-          tls_handshake_history, % tls_handshake_history()
-          tls_cipher_texts,     % list() received but not deciphered yet
-	  cert_db,              %
-          session,              % #session{} from tls_handshake.hrl
-	  session_cache,        % 
-	  session_cache_cb,     %
-          negotiated_version,   % tls_version()
-          client_certificate_requested = false,
-	  key_algorithm,       % atom as defined by cipher_suite
-	  hashsign_algorithm,  % atom as defined by cipher_suite
-          public_key_info,     % PKIX: {Algorithm, PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}
-          private_key,         % PKIX: #'RSAPrivateKey'{}
-	  diffie_hellman_params, % PKIX: #'DHParameter'{} relevant for server side
-	  diffie_hellman_keys, % {PublicKey, PrivateKey}
-	  psk_identity,        % binary() - server psk identity hint
-	  srp_params,          % #srp_user{}
-	  srp_keys,            % {PublicKey, PrivateKey}
-          premaster_secret,    %
-	  file_ref_db,         % ets()
-          cert_db_ref,         % ref()
-          bytes_to_read,       % integer(), # bytes to read in passive mode
-          user_data_buffer,    % binary()
-	  log_alert,           % boolean() 
-	  renegotiation,       % {boolean(), From | internal | peer}
-	  start_or_recv_from,  % "gen_fsm From"
-	  timer,               % start_or_recv_timer
-	  send_queue,          % queue()
-	  terminated = false,  %
-	  allow_renegotiate = true,
-          expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false :: boolean(),
-          next_protocol = undefined :: undefined | binary(),
-	  client_ecc          % {Curves, PointFmt}
-	 }).
-
--define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS, 
-	#'DHParameter'{prime = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME,
-		       base = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR}).
--define(WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, 12000).
-
--type state_name()           :: hello | abbreviated | certify | cipher | connection.
--type gen_fsm_state_return() :: {next_state, state_name(), #state{}} |
-				{next_state, state_name(), #state{}, timeout()} |
-				{stop, term(), #state{}}.
-
-%%====================================================================
-%% Internal application API
-%%====================================================================	     
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec send(pid(), iodata()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description: Sends data over the ssl connection
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-send(Pid, Data) -> 
-    sync_send_all_state_event(Pid, {application_data, 
-				    %% iolist_to_binary should really
-				    %% be called iodata_to_binary()
-				    erlang:iolist_to_binary(Data)}).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec recv(pid(), integer(), timeout()) ->  
-    {ok, binary() | list()} | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description:  Receives data when active = false
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-recv(Pid, Length, Timeout) -> 
-    sync_send_all_state_event(Pid, {recv, Length, Timeout}).
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec connect(host(), inet:port_number(), port(), {#ssl_options{}, #socket_options{}},
-	      pid(), tuple(), timeout()) ->
-		     {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description: Connect to an ssl server.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-connect(Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo, Timeout) ->
-    try start_fsm(client, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo,
-		  Timeout)
-    catch
-	exit:{noproc, _} ->
-	    {error, ssl_not_started}
-    end.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec ssl_accept(inet:port_number(), port(), {#ssl_options{}, #socket_options{}},
-				      pid(), tuple(), timeout()) ->
-    {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description: Performs accept on an ssl listen socket. e.i. performs
-%%              ssl handshake. 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-ssl_accept(Port, Socket, Opts, User, CbInfo, Timeout) ->
-    try start_fsm(server, "localhost", Port, Socket, Opts, User, 
-		  CbInfo, Timeout)
-    catch
-	exit:{noproc, _} ->
-	    {error, ssl_not_started}
-    end.	
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec handshake(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) ->  ok | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description: Starts ssl handshake. 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-handshake(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Timeout) ->  
-    case sync_send_all_state_event(Pid, {start, Timeout}) of
-	connected ->
-	    ok;
- 	Error ->
-	    Error
-    end.
-%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec socket_control(port(), pid(), atom()) -> 
-    {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.  
-%%
-%% Description: Set the ssl process to own the accept socket
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------	    
-socket_control(Socket, Pid, Transport) ->
-    case Transport:controlling_process(Socket, Pid) of
-	ok ->
-	    {ok, ssl_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket)};
-	{error, Reason}	->
-	    {error, Reason}
-    end.
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec close(pid()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.  
-%%
-%% Description:  Close an ssl connection
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-close(ConnectionPid) ->
-    case sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, close) of
-	{error, closed} ->
-	    ok;
-	Other ->
-	    Other
-    end.
+%% Setup
+-export([start_fsm/8, start_link/7, init/1]).
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec shutdown(pid(), atom()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.  
-%%
-%% Description: Same as gen_tcp:shutdown/2
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-shutdown(ConnectionPid, How) ->
-    sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {shutdown, How}).
+%% State transition handling	 
+-export([next_record/1, next_event/3]).
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec new_user(pid(), pid()) ->  ok | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description:  Changes process that receives the messages when active = true
-%% or once. 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-new_user(ConnectionPid, User) ->
-    sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {new_user, User}).
+%% Handshake handling
+-export([renegotiate/2, send_handshake/2, 
+	 queue_handshake/2, queue_change_cipher/2,
+	 reinit_handshake_data/1,  handle_sni_extension/2]).
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec negotiated_next_protocol(pid()) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description:  Returns the negotiated protocol
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-negotiated_next_protocol(ConnectionPid) ->
-    sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, negotiated_next_protocol).
+%% Alert and close handling
+-export([send_alert/2, handle_own_alert/4, handle_close_alert/3,
+	 handle_normal_shutdown/3, 
+	 close/5, alert_user/6, alert_user/9
+	]).
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec get_opts(pid(), list()) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}.    
-%%
-%% Description: Same as inet:getopts/2
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-get_opts(ConnectionPid, OptTags) ->
-    sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {get_opts, OptTags}).
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_opts(pid(), list()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. 
-%%
-%% Description:  Same as inet:setopts/2
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_opts(ConnectionPid, Options) ->
-    sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {set_opts, Options}).
+%% Data handling
+-export([write_application_data/3, read_application_data/2,
+	 passive_receive/2,  next_record_if_active/1, handle_common_event/4]).
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec info(pid()) ->  {ok, {atom(), tuple()}} | {error, reason()}. 
-%%
-%% Description:  Returns ssl protocol and cipher used for the connection
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-info(ConnectionPid) ->
-    sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, info). 
+%% gen_statem state functions
+-export([init/3, error/3, downgrade/3, %% Initiation and take down states
+	 hello/3, certify/3, cipher/3, abbreviated/3, %% Handshake states 
+	 connection/3]). 
+%% gen_statem callbacks
+-export([terminate/3, code_change/4, format_status/2]).
+ 
+-define(GEN_STATEM_CB_MODE, state_functions).
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec session_info(pid()) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}. 
-%%
-%% Description:  Returns info about the ssl session
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-session_info(ConnectionPid) ->
-    sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, session_info). 
+%%====================================================================
+%% Internal application API
+%%====================================================================	     
+start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} = Opts,
+	  User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, 
+	  Timeout) -> 
+    try 
+	{ok, Pid} = tls_connection_sup:start_child([Role, Host, Port, Socket, 
+						    Opts, User, CbInfo]), 
+	{ok, SslSocket} = ssl_connection:socket_control(?MODULE, Socket, Pid, CbModule, Tracker),
+	ok = ssl_connection:handshake(SslSocket, Timeout),
+	{ok, SslSocket} 
+    catch
+	error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} ->
+	    Error
+    end;
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec peer_certificate(pid()) -> {ok, binary()| undefined} | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description: Returns the peer cert
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-peer_certificate(ConnectionPid) ->
-    sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, peer_certificate). 
+start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = true},_, Tracker} = Opts,
+	  User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, 
+	  Timeout) -> 
+    try 
+	{ok, Pid} = tls_connection_sup:start_child_dist([Role, Host, Port, Socket, 
+							 Opts, User, CbInfo]), 
+	{ok, SslSocket} = ssl_connection:socket_control(?MODULE, Socket, Pid, CbModule, Tracker),
+	ok = ssl_connection:handshake(SslSocket, Timeout),
+	{ok, SslSocket} 
+    catch
+	error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} ->
+	    Error
+    end.
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec renegotiation(pid()) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
-%%
-%% Description: Starts a renegotiation of the ssl session.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-renegotiation(ConnectionPid) ->
-    sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, renegotiate). 
+send_handshake(Handshake, State) ->
+    send_handshake_flight(queue_handshake(Handshake, State)).
+
+queue_handshake(Handshake, #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+				  tls_handshake_history = Hist0,
+				  flight_buffer = Flight0,
+				  connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
+    {BinHandshake, ConnectionStates, Hist} =
+	encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hist0),
+    State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+		 tls_handshake_history = Hist,
+		 flight_buffer = Flight0 ++ [BinHandshake]}.
+
+send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket,
+			     transport_cb = Transport,
+			     flight_buffer = Flight} = State0) ->
+    Transport:send(Socket, Flight),
+    State0#state{flight_buffer = []}.
+
+queue_change_cipher(Msg, #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+				  flight_buffer = Flight0,
+				  connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
+    {BinChangeCipher, ConnectionStates} =
+	encode_change_cipher(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+    State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+		 flight_buffer = Flight0 ++ [BinChangeCipher]}.
 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec prf(pid(), binary() | 'master_secret', binary(),
-	  binary() | ssl:prf_random(), non_neg_integer()) ->
-		 {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()} | {'EXIT', term()}.
-%%
-%% Description: use a ssl sessions TLS PRF to generate key material
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-prf(ConnectionPid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
-    sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, {prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}).
+send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+			 socket = Socket,
+			 transport_cb = Transport,
+			 connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
+    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} =
+	ssl_alert:encode(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
+    State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}.
+
+reinit_handshake_data(State) ->
+    %% premaster_secret, public_key_info and tls_handshake_info 
+    %% are only needed during the handshake phase. 
+    %% To reduce memory foot print of a connection reinitialize them.
+     State#state{
+       premaster_secret = undefined,
+       public_key_info = undefined,
+       tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history()
+     }.
 
 %%====================================================================
-%% ssl_connection_sup API
+%% tls_connection_sup API
 %%====================================================================
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -300,789 +164,218 @@ prf(ConnectionPid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
 start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) ->
     {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}.
 
-init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOpts0, _} = Options,  User, CbInfo]) ->
+init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options,  User, CbInfo]) ->
+    process_flag(trap_exit, true),
     State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo),
-    Handshake = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
-    TimeStamp = calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds({date(), time()}),
-    try ssl_init(SSLOpts0, Role) of
-	{ok, Ref, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, CacheHandle, OwnCert, Key, DHParams} ->
-	    Session = State0#state.session,
-	    State = State0#state{
-				 tls_handshake_history = Handshake,
-				 session = Session#session{own_certificate = OwnCert,
-							   time_stamp = TimeStamp},
-				 file_ref_db = FileRefHandle,
-				 cert_db_ref = Ref,
-				 cert_db = CertDbHandle,
-				 session_cache = CacheHandle,
-				 private_key = Key,
-				 diffie_hellman_params = DHParams},
-	    gen_fsm:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], hello, State, get_timeout(State))
-    catch
-	throw:Error ->
-	    gen_fsm:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error,State0}, get_timeout(State0))
+    try 
+	State = ssl_connection:ssl_config(State0#state.ssl_options, Role, State0),
+	gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], ?GEN_STATEM_CB_MODE, init, State)
+    catch throw:Error ->
+	gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], ?GEN_STATEM_CB_MODE, error, {Error, State0}) 
     end.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Description:There should be one instance of this function for each
-%% possible state name. Whenever a gen_fsm receives an event sent
-%% using gen_fsm:send_event/2, the instance of this function with the
-%% same name as the current state name StateName is called to handle
-%% the event. It is also called if a timeout occurs.
-%%
-
+%% State functions
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec hello(start | #hello_request{} | #client_hello{} | #server_hello{} | term(),
-	    #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().    
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-hello(start, #state{host = Host, port = Port, role = client,
-			      ssl_options = SslOpts, 
-			      session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
-			      session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
-			      transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket,
-			      connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-			      renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = State0) ->
+-spec init(gen_statem:event_type(),
+	   {start, timeout()} | term(), #state{}) ->
+		   gen_statem:state_function_result().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, 
+     #state{host = Host, port = Port, role = client,
+	    ssl_options = SslOpts,
+	    session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
+	    transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket,
+	    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+	    renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
+	    session_cache = Cache,
+	    session_cache_cb = CacheCb
+	   } = State0) ->
+    Timer = ssl_connection:start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, From),
     Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts,
 				       Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert),
     
     Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version,
-    Handshake0 = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
+    HelloVersion = tls_record:lowest_protocol_version(SslOpts#ssl_options.versions),
+    Handshake0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
     {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Hello, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
+        encode_handshake(Hello,  HelloVersion, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
     Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
     State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
 			  negotiated_version = Version, %% Requested version
 			  session =
 			      Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id},
-			  tls_handshake_history = Handshake},
+			  tls_handshake_history = Handshake,
+			  start_or_recv_from = From,
+			  timer = Timer},
     {Record, State} = next_record(State1),
-    next_state(hello, hello, Record, State);
-
-hello(start, #state{role = server} = State0) ->
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
-    next_state(hello, hello, Record, State);
+    next_event(hello, Record, State);
+init(Type, Event, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:init(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
+ 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec error(gen_statem:event_type(),
+	   {start, timeout()} | term(), #state{}) ->
+		   gen_statem:state_function_result().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-hello(#hello_request{}, #state{role = client} = State0) ->
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
-    next_state(hello, hello, Record, State);
+error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, {Error, State}) ->
+    {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State};
+error({call, From}, Msg, State) ->
+    handle_call(Msg, From, error, State);
+error(_, _, _) ->
+     {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}.
+ 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec hello(gen_statem:event_type(),
+	    #hello_request{} | #client_hello{} | #server_hello{} | term(),
+	    #state{}) ->
+		   gen_statem:state_function_result().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+hello(internal, #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion,
+			       extensions = #hello_extensions{ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
+							      elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves}} = Hello,
+      #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+	     port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
+	     renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
+	     session_cache = Cache,
+	     session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
+	     negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol,
+	     key_algorithm = KeyExAlg,
+	     ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) ->
 
-hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
-		    compression_method = Compression} = Hello,
-      #state{session = #session{session_id = OldId},
-	     connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-	     role = client,
+    case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb,
+					      ConnectionStates0, Cert, KeyExAlg}, Renegotiation) of
+        #alert{} = Alert ->
+            handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State);
+        {Version, {Type, Session},
+	 ConnectionStates, Protocol0, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} ->
+	    Protocol = case Protocol0 of
+			   undefined -> CurrentProtocol;
+			   _ -> Protocol0
+		       end,
+	    
+	    ssl_connection:hello(internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt},
+				 State#state{connection_states  = ConnectionStates,
+					     negotiated_version = Version,
+					     hashsign_algorithm = HashSign,
+					     session = Session,
+					     client_ecc = {EllipticCurves, EcPointFormats},
+					     negotiated_protocol = Protocol}, ?MODULE)
+    end;
+hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello,
+      #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
 	     negotiated_version = ReqVersion,
+	     role = client,
 	     renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
-	     ssl_options = SslOptions} = State0) ->
+	     ssl_options = SslOptions} = State) ->
     case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOptions, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
 	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, hello, State0);
-	{Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, NextProtocol} ->
-	    {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} =
-		ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
-
-	    PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion, KeyAlgorithm),
-	    
-	    NewNextProtocol = case NextProtocol of
-				  undefined ->
-				      State0#state.next_protocol;
-				  _ ->
-				      NextProtocol
-			      end,
-	    
-	    State = State0#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm,
-				 hashsign_algorithm = default_hashsign(Version, KeyAlgorithm),
-				 negotiated_version = Version,
-				 connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-				 premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
-				 expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocol =/= undefined,
-				 next_protocol = NewNextProtocol},
-	    
-	    case ssl_session:is_new(OldId, NewId) of
-		true ->
-		    handle_new_session(NewId, CipherSuite, Compression,
-				       State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates});
-		false ->
-		    handle_resumed_session(NewId, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) 
-	    end
+	    handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, hello, State);
+	{Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} ->
+	    ssl_connection:handle_session(Hello, 
+					  Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol, State)
     end;
+hello(info, Event, State) ->
+    handle_info(Event, hello, State);
+hello(Type, Event, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:hello(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
 
-hello(Hello = #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion},
-      State = #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		     port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
-		     renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
-		     session_cache = Cache,		  
-		     session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
-		     ssl_options = SslOpts}) ->
-    case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb,
-				     ConnectionStates0, Cert}, Renegotiation) of
-        {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, ProtocolsToAdvertise,
-	 EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} ->
-            do_server_hello(Type, ProtocolsToAdvertise,
-			    EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves,
-			    State#state{connection_states  = ConnectionStates,
-					negotiated_version = Version,
-					session = Session,
-					client_ecc = {EllipticCurves, EcPointFormats}});
-        #alert{} = Alert ->
-            handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State)
-    end;
-
-hello(timeout, State) ->
-    { next_state, hello, State, hibernate };
-
-hello(Msg, State) ->
-    handle_unexpected_message(Msg, hello, State).
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec abbreviated(#hello_request{} | #finished{} | term(),
-		  #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().   
+-spec abbreviated(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) ->
+			 gen_statem:state_function_result().
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-abbreviated(#hello_request{}, State0) ->
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
-    next_state(abbreviated, hello, Record, State);
-
-abbreviated(#finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished,
-	    #state{role = server,
-		   negotiated_version = Version,
-		   tls_handshake_history = Handshake,
-		   session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
-		  connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = 
-	    State) ->
-    case tls_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, client,
-					 get_current_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, write),
-					 MasterSecret, Handshake) of
-        verified ->  
-	    ConnectionStates = tls_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0),
-	    next_state_connection(abbreviated, 
-				  ack_connection(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}));
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, abbreviated, State)
-    end;
-
-abbreviated(#finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished,
-	    #state{role = client, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
-		   session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
-		   negotiated_version = Version,
-		   connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
-    case tls_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, server,
-					 get_pending_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, write),
-					 MasterSecret, Handshake0) of
-        verified ->
-	    ConnectionStates1 = tls_record:set_server_verify_data(current_read, Data, ConnectionStates0),
-	    {ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-		finalize_handshake(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}, abbreviated),
-	    next_state_connection(abbreviated, 
-				  ack_connection(State#state{tls_handshake_history = Handshake,
-							     connection_states = 
-							     ConnectionStates}));
-        #alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, abbreviated, State)
-    end;
-
-%% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec
-%% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation
-abbreviated(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol},
-	    #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = State0) ->
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{next_protocol = SelectedProtocol}),
-    next_state(abbreviated, abbreviated, Record, State);
-
-abbreviated(timeout, State) ->
-    { next_state, abbreviated, State, hibernate };
-
-abbreviated(Msg, State) ->
-    handle_unexpected_message(Msg, abbreviated, State).
+abbreviated(info, Event, State) ->
+    handle_info(Event, abbreviated, State);
+abbreviated(Type, Event, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:abbreviated(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec certify(#hello_request{} | #certificate{} |  #server_key_exchange{} |
-	      #certificate_request{} | #server_hello_done{} | #client_key_exchange{} | term(),
-	      #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().   
+-spec certify(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) ->
+		     gen_statem:state_function_result().
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certify(#hello_request{}, State0) ->
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
-    next_state(certify, hello, Record, State);
-
-certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, 
-	#state{role = server, negotiated_version = Version,
-	       ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer,
-					  fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} = 
-	State) ->
-    Alert =  ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE),
-    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State);
-
-certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, 
-	#state{role = server,
-	       ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer,
-					  fail_if_no_peer_cert = false}} = 
-	State0) ->
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = false}),
-    next_state(certify, certify, Record, State);
-
-certify(#certificate{} = Cert, 
-        #state{negotiated_version = Version,
-	       role = Role,
-	       cert_db = CertDbHandle,
-	       cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
-	       ssl_options = Opts} = State) ->
-    case tls_handshake:certify(Cert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Opts#ssl_options.depth,
-			       Opts#ssl_options.verify,
-			       Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role) of
-        {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo} ->
-	    handle_peer_cert(PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, 
-			     State#state{client_certificate_requested = false});
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-            handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State)
-    end;
-
-certify(#server_key_exchange{} = KeyExchangeMsg, 
-        #state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version,
-	       key_algorithm = Alg} = State0) 
-  when Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dhe_rsa;
-       Alg == ecdhe_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa;
-       Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon;
-       Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk;
-       Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon ->
-    case handle_server_key(KeyExchangeMsg, State0) of
-	#state{} = State1 ->
-	    {Record, State} = next_record(State1),
-	    next_state(certify, certify, Record, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
-    end;
-
-certify(#server_key_exchange{} = Msg, 
-        #state{role = client, key_algorithm = rsa} = State) -> 
-    handle_unexpected_message(Msg, certify_server_keyexchange, State);
-
-certify(#certificate_request{}, State0) ->
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = true}),
-    next_state(certify, certify, Record, State);
-
-%% PSK and RSA_PSK might bypass the Server-Key-Exchange
-certify(#server_hello_done{},
-	#state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined},
-	       negotiated_version = Version,
-	       psk_identity = PSKIdentity,
-	       premaster_secret = undefined,
-	       role = client,
-	       key_algorithm = Alg} = State0)
-  when Alg == psk ->
-    case server_psk_master_secret(PSKIdentity, State0) of
-	#state{} = State ->
-	    client_certify_and_key_exchange(State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
-    end;
-
-certify(#server_hello_done{},
-	#state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined},
-	       ssl_options = SslOpts,
-	       negotiated_version = Version,
-	       psk_identity = PSKIdentity,
-	       premaster_secret = undefined,
-	       role = client,
-	       key_algorithm = Alg} = State0)
-  when Alg == rsa_psk ->
-    case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, SslOpts#ssl_options.user_lookup_fun) of
-	{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
-	    PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa),
-	    Len = byte_size(PSK),
-	    RealPMS = <<?UINT16(48), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>,
-	    State1 = State0#state{premaster_secret = PremasterSecret},
-	    State = master_from_premaster_secret(RealPMS, State1),
-	    client_certify_and_key_exchange(State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    Alert;
-	_ ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)
-    end;
-
-%% Master secret was determined with help of server-key exchange msg
-certify(#server_hello_done{},
-	#state{session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} = Session,
-	       connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-	       negotiated_version = Version,
-	       premaster_secret = undefined,
-	       role = client} = State0) ->
-    case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session, 
-				     ConnectionStates0, client) of
-	{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
-	    State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates},
-	    client_certify_and_key_exchange(State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
-    end;
-
-%% Master secret is calculated from premaster_secret
-certify(#server_hello_done{},
-	#state{session = Session0,
-	       connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-	       negotiated_version = Version,
-	       premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
-	       role = client} = State0) ->    
-    case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, 
-				     ConnectionStates0, client) of
-	{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
-	    Session = Session0#session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
-	    State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-				 session = Session},
-	    client_certify_and_key_exchange(State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
-    end;
-
-certify(#client_key_exchange{} = Msg,
-	#state{role = server,
-	       client_certificate_requested = true,
-	       ssl_options = #ssl_options{fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} = State) ->
-    %% We expect a certificate here
-    handle_unexpected_message(Msg, certify_client_key_exchange, State);
-
-certify(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys},
-	State = #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg, negotiated_version = Version}) ->
-    try
-	certify_client_key_exchange(tls_handshake:decode_client_key(Keys, KeyAlg, Version), State)
-    catch 
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State)
-    end;
-
-
-certify(timeout, State) ->
-    { next_state, certify, State, hibernate };
-
-certify(Msg, State) ->
-    handle_unexpected_message(Msg, certify, State).
-
-certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS},
-			    #state{negotiated_version = Version,
-				   connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-				   session = Session0,
-				   private_key = Key} = State0) ->
-    PremasterSecret = tls_handshake:decrypt_premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
-    case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret,
-				     ConnectionStates0, server) of
-	{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
-	    Session = Session0#session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
-	    State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-				  session = Session},
-	    {Record, State} = next_record(State1),
-	    next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
-    end;
-
-certify_client_key_exchange(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey},
-			    #state{negotiated_version = Version,
-				   diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params,
-				   diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} = State0) ->
-    case dh_master_secret(Params, ClientPublicDhKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, State0) of
-	#state{} = State1 ->
-	    {Record, State} = next_record(State1),
-	    next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
-    end;
-
-certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicEcDhPoint},
-			    #state{negotiated_version = Version,
-				   diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey} = State0) ->
-    case ec_dh_master_secret(ECDHKey, #'ECPoint'{point = ClientPublicEcDhPoint}, State0) of
-	#state{} = State1 ->
-	    {Record, State} = next_record(State1),
-	    next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
-    end;
-
-certify_client_key_exchange(#client_psk_identity{identity = ClientPSKIdentity},
-			    #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State0) ->
-    case server_psk_master_secret(ClientPSKIdentity, State0) of
-	#state{} = State1 ->
-	    {Record, State} = next_record(State1),
-	    next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
-    end;
-
-certify_client_key_exchange(#client_dhe_psk_identity{
-			       identity =  ClientPSKIdentity,
-			       dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey},
-			    #state{negotiated_version = Version,
-				   diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{prime = P,
-									  base = G},
-				   diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} = State0) ->
-    case dhe_psk_master_secret(ClientPSKIdentity, P, G, ClientPublicDhKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, State0) of
-	#state{} = State1 ->
-	    {Record, State} = next_record(State1),
-	    next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
-    end;
-
-certify_client_key_exchange(#client_rsa_psk_identity{
-			       identity = PskIdentity,
-			       exchange_keys =
-				   #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS}},
-			    #state{negotiated_version = Version,
-				   private_key = Key} = State0) ->
-    PremasterSecret = tls_handshake:decrypt_premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
-    case server_rsa_psk_master_secret(PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, State0) of
-	#state{} = State1 ->
-	    {Record, State} = next_record(State1),
-	    next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
-    end;
-
-certify_client_key_exchange(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey},
-			    #state{negotiated_version = Version,
-				   srp_params =
-				       #srp_user{prime = Prime,
-						 verifier = Verifier}
-				  } = State0) ->
-    case server_srp_master_secret(Verifier, Prime, ClientPublicKey, State0) of
-	#state{} = State1 ->
-	    {Record, State} = next_record(State1),
-	    next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
-    end.
+certify(info, Event, State) ->
+    handle_info(Event, certify, State);
+certify(Type, Event, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:certify(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec cipher(#hello_request{} | #certificate_verify{} | #finished{} | term(),
-	     #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().  
+-spec cipher(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) ->
+		    gen_statem:state_function_result().
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-cipher(#hello_request{}, State0) ->
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
-    next_state(cipher, hello, Record, State);
-
-cipher(#certificate_verify{signature = Signature, hashsign_algorithm = CertHashSign},
-       #state{role = server, 
-	      public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo,
-	      negotiated_version = Version,
-	      session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
-	      hashsign_algorithm = ConnectionHashSign,
-	      tls_handshake_history = Handshake
-	     } = State0) -> 
-    HashSign = case CertHashSign of
-		   {_, _} -> CertHashSign;
-		   _      -> ConnectionHashSign
-	       end,
-    case tls_handshake:certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo,
-					  Version, HashSign, MasterSecret, Handshake) of
-	valid ->
-	    {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
-	    next_state(cipher, cipher, Record, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, cipher, State0)
-    end;
-
-%% client must send a next protocol message if we are expecting it
-cipher(#finished{}, #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true,
-			   next_protocol = undefined, negotiated_version = Version} = State0) ->
-       handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), Version, cipher, State0);
-
-cipher(#finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, 
-       #state{negotiated_version = Version,
-	      host = Host,
-	      port = Port,
-	      role = Role,
-	      session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} 
-	      = Session0,
-		  connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-	      tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    case tls_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, 
-					 opposite_role(Role), 
-					 get_current_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, read),
-					 MasterSecret, Handshake0) of
-        verified ->
-	    Session = register_session(Role, Host, Port, Session0),
-	    cipher_role(Role, Data, Session, State);
-        #alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, cipher, State)
-    end;
-
-%% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec
-%% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation
-cipher(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol},
-       #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = State0) ->
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{next_protocol = SelectedProtocol}),
-    next_state(cipher, cipher, Record, State);
-
-cipher(timeout, State) ->
-    { next_state, cipher, State, hibernate };
-
-cipher(Msg, State) ->
-    handle_unexpected_message(Msg, cipher, State).
+cipher(info, Event, State) ->
+    handle_info(Event, cipher, State);
+cipher(Type, Event, State) ->
+     ssl_connection:cipher(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec connection(#hello_request{} | #client_hello{} | term(),
-		 #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().  
+-spec connection(gen_statem:event_type(),  
+		 #hello_request{} | #client_hello{}| term(), #state{}) ->
+			gen_statem:state_function_result().
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-connection(#hello_request{}, #state{host = Host, port = Port,
-				    socket = Socket,
-				    session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
-				    session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
-				    ssl_options = SslOpts,
-				    negotiated_version = Version,
-				    transport_cb = Transport,
-				    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-				    renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _},
-				    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State0) ->
+connection(info, Event, State) ->
+    handle_info(Event, connection, State);
+connection(internal, #hello_request{},
+	   #state{role = client, host = Host, port = Port,
+		  session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0,
+		  session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb,
+		  ssl_options = SslOpts,
+		  connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+		  renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = State0) ->
     Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts,
 				       Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert),
-  
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Hello, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{connection_states =  
-						   ConnectionStates,
-					       session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id},
-					       tls_handshake_history = Handshake}),
-    next_state(connection, hello, Record, State);
-connection(#client_hello{} = Hello, #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = true} = State) ->
+    State1 = send_handshake(Hello, State0),
+    {Record, State} =
+	next_record(
+	  State1#state{session = Session0#session{session_id
+						  = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}),
+    next_event(hello, Record, State);
+connection(internal, #client_hello{} = Hello, 
+	   #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = true} = State0) ->
     %% Mitigate Computational DoS attack
     %% http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2011/10/ssltls_and_computational_dos.html
     %% http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/ Rather than disabling client
     %% initiated renegotiation we will disallow many client initiated
     %% renegotiations immediately after each other.
     erlang:send_after(?WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, self(), allow_renegotiate),
-    hello(Hello, State#state{allow_renegotiate = false});
-
-connection(#client_hello{}, #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = false,
-				   connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-				   socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
-				   negotiated_version = Version} = State0) ->
+    {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{allow_renegotiate = false,
+					       renegotiation = {true, peer}}),
+    next_event(hello, Record, State,  [{next_event, internal, Hello}]);
+connection(internal, #client_hello{}, 
+	   #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = false} = State0) ->
     Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} =
-	encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    next_state_connection(connection, State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates});
-  
-connection(timeout, State) ->
-    {next_state, connection, State, hibernate};
+    State1 = send_alert(Alert, State0),
+    {Record, State} = ssl_connection:prepare_connection(State1, ?MODULE),
+    next_event(connection, Record, State);
+connection(Type, Event, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:connection(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
 
-connection(Msg, State) ->
-    handle_unexpected_message(Msg, connection, State).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Description: Whenever a gen_fsm receives an event sent using
-%% gen_fsm:send_all_state_event/2, this function is called to handle
-%% the event. Not currently used!
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-handle_event(_Event, StateName, State) ->
-    {next_state, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}.
-
+-spec downgrade(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) ->
+		       gen_statem:state_function_result().
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Description: Whenever a gen_fsm receives an event sent using
-%% gen_fsm:sync_send_all_state_event/2,3, this function is called to handle
-%% the event.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-handle_sync_event({application_data, Data}, From, connection, State) ->
-    %% We should look into having a worker process to do this to 
-    %% parallize send and receive decoding and not block the receiver
-    %% if sending is overloading the socket.
-    try
-	write_application_data(Data, From, State)
-    catch throw:Error ->
-	    {reply, Error, connection, State, get_timeout(State)}
-    end;
-handle_sync_event({application_data, Data}, From, StateName, 
-		  #state{send_queue = Queue} = State) ->
-    %% In renegotiation priorities handshake, send data when handshake is finished
-    {next_state, StateName,
-     State#state{send_queue = queue:in({From, Data}, Queue)},
-     get_timeout(State)};
-
-handle_sync_event({start, Timeout}, StartFrom, hello, State) ->
-    Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, StartFrom),
-    hello(start, State#state{start_or_recv_from = StartFrom,
-			     timer = Timer});
-
-%% The two clauses below could happen if a server upgrades a socket in
-%% active mode. Note that in this case we are lucky that
-%% controlling_process has been evalueated before receiving handshake
-%% messages from client. The server should put the socket in passive
-%% mode before telling the client that it is willing to upgrade
-%% and before calling ssl:ssl_accept/2. These clauses are 
-%% here to make sure it is the users problem and not owers if
-%% they upgrade an active socket. 
-handle_sync_event({start,_}, _, connection, State) ->
-    {reply, connected, connection, State, get_timeout(State)};
-handle_sync_event({start,_}, _From, error, {Error, State = #state{}}) ->
-    {stop, {shutdown, Error}, {error, Error}, State};
-
-handle_sync_event({start, Timeout}, StartFrom, StateName, State) ->
-    Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, StartFrom),
-    {next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = StartFrom,
-					timer = Timer}, get_timeout(State)};
-
-handle_sync_event(close, _, StateName, State) ->
-    %% Run terminate before returning
-    %% so that the reuseaddr inet-option will work
-    %% as intended.
-    (catch terminate(user_close, StateName, State)),
-    {stop, normal, ok, State#state{terminated = true}};
-
-handle_sync_event({shutdown, How0}, _, StateName,
-		  #state{transport_cb = Transport,
-			 negotiated_version = Version,
-			 connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-			 socket = Socket} = State) ->
-    case How0 of
-	How when How == write; How == both ->	    
-	    Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY),
-	    {BinMsg, _} =
-		encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates),
-	    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg);
-	_ ->
-	    ok
-    end,
-    
-    case Transport:shutdown(Socket, How0) of
-	ok ->
-	    {reply, ok, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
-	Error ->
-	    {stop, normal, Error, State}
-    end;
-    
-handle_sync_event({recv, N, Timeout}, RecvFrom, connection = StateName, State0) ->
-    Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom),
-    passive_receive(State0#state{bytes_to_read = N,
-				 start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, timer = Timer}, StateName);
-
-%% Doing renegotiate wait with handling request until renegotiate is
-%% finished. Will be handled by next_state_is_connection/2.
-handle_sync_event({recv, N, Timeout}, RecvFrom, StateName, State) ->
-    Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom),
-    {next_state, StateName, State#state{bytes_to_read = N, start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom,
-					timer = Timer},
-     get_timeout(State)};
-
-handle_sync_event({new_user, User}, _From, StateName, 
-		  State =#state{user_application = {OldMon, _}}) ->
-    NewMon = erlang:monitor(process, User),
-    erlang:demonitor(OldMon, [flush]),
-    {reply, ok, StateName, State#state{user_application = {NewMon,User}},
-     get_timeout(State)};
-
-handle_sync_event({get_opts, OptTags}, _From, StateName,
-		  #state{socket = Socket,
-			 transport_cb = Transport,
-			 socket_options = SockOpts} = State) ->
-    OptsReply = get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, OptTags, SockOpts, []),
-    {reply, OptsReply, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
-
-handle_sync_event(negotiated_next_protocol, _From, StateName, #state{next_protocol = undefined} = State) ->
-    {reply, {error, next_protocol_not_negotiated}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
-handle_sync_event(negotiated_next_protocol, _From, StateName, #state{next_protocol = NextProtocol} = State) ->
-    {reply, {ok, NextProtocol}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
-
-handle_sync_event({set_opts, Opts0}, _From, StateName, 
-		  #state{socket_options = Opts1, 
-			 socket = Socket,
-			 transport_cb = Transport,
-			 user_data_buffer = Buffer} = State0) ->
-    {Reply, Opts} = set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts0, Opts1, []),
-    State1 = State0#state{socket_options = Opts},
-    if 
-	Opts#socket_options.active =:= false ->
-	    {reply, Reply, StateName, State1, get_timeout(State1)};
-	Buffer =:= <<>>, Opts1#socket_options.active =:= false ->
-            %% Need data, set active once
-	    {Record, State2} = next_record_if_active(State1),
-	    case next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State2) of
-		{next_state, StateName, State, Timeout} ->
-		    {reply, Reply, StateName, State, Timeout};
-		{stop, Reason, State} ->
-		    {stop, Reason, State}
-	    end;
-	Buffer =:= <<>> ->
-            %% Active once already set 
-	    {reply, Reply, StateName, State1, get_timeout(State1)};
-	true ->
-	    case read_application_data(<<>>, State1) of
-		Stop = {stop,_,_} ->
-		    Stop;
-		{Record, State2} ->
-		    case next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State2) of
-			{next_state, StateName, State, Timeout} ->
-			    {reply, Reply, StateName, State, Timeout};
-			{stop, Reason, State} ->
-			    {stop, Reason, State}
-		    end
-	    end
-    end;
-
-handle_sync_event(renegotiate, From, connection, State) ->
-    renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, From}});
-
-handle_sync_event(renegotiate, _, StateName, State) ->
-    {reply, {error, already_renegotiating}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
-
-handle_sync_event({prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}, _, StateName,
-		  #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-			 negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
-    ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    #security_parameters{master_secret = MasterSecret,
-			 client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    Reply = try
-		SecretToUse = case Secret of
-				  _ when is_binary(Secret) -> Secret;
-				  master_secret -> MasterSecret
-			      end,
-		SeedToUse = lists:reverse(
-			      lists:foldl(fun(X, Acc) when is_binary(X) -> [X|Acc];
-					     (client_random, Acc) -> [ClientRandom|Acc];
-					     (server_random, Acc) -> [ServerRandom|Acc]
-					  end, [], Seed)),
-		tls_handshake:prf(Version, SecretToUse, Label, SeedToUse, WantedLength)
-	    catch
-		exit:_ -> {error, badarg};
-		error:Reason -> {error, Reason}
-	    end,
-    {reply, Reply, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
-
-handle_sync_event(info, _, StateName, 
-		  #state{negotiated_version = Version,
-			 session = #session{cipher_suite = Suite}} = State) ->
-    
-    AtomVersion = tls_record:protocol_version(Version),
-    {reply, {ok, {AtomVersion, ssl:suite_definition(Suite)}},
-     StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
-
-handle_sync_event(session_info, _, StateName, 
-		  #state{session = #session{session_id = Id,
-					    cipher_suite = Suite}} = State) ->
-    {reply, [{session_id, Id}, 
-	     {cipher_suite, ssl:suite_definition(Suite)}],
-     StateName, State, get_timeout(State)};
-
-handle_sync_event(peer_certificate, _, StateName, 
-		  #state{session = #session{peer_certificate = Cert}} 
-		  = State) ->
-    {reply, {ok, Cert}, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}.
+downgrade(Type, Event, State) ->
+     ssl_connection:downgrade(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Description: This function is called by a gen_fsm when it receives any
-%% other message than a synchronous or asynchronous event
-%% (or a system message).
+%% Event handling functions called by state functions to handle
+%% common or unexpected events for the state.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-%% raw data from TCP, unpack records
+handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State, ?MODULE).
+ 
+%% raw data from socket, unpack records
 handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName,
             #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) ->
     case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of
 	{Record, State} ->
-	    next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State);
+	    next_event(StateName, Record, State);
 	#alert{} = Alert ->
 	    handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), 
-	    {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State0}
+	    {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}}
     end;
-
 handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName,
             #state{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag,
 		   negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
@@ -1101,1194 +394,215 @@ handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName,
 	    ok
     end,
     handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State),
-    {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State};
-
-handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, econnaborted}, StateName,  
-	    #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
-		   start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, role = Role,
-		   error_tag = ErrorTag} = State)  when StateName =/= connection ->
-    alert_user(Transport, Socket, StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role),
-    {stop, normal, State};
-
-handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket,
-							  error_tag = ErrorTag} = State)  ->
-    Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Reason]),
-    error_logger:info_report(Report),
-    handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State),
-    {stop, normal, State};
-
-handle_info({'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, _}, _, 
-	    State = #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid}}) ->
-    {stop, normal, State};   
-
-handle_info(allow_renegotiate, StateName, State) ->
-    {next_state, StateName, State#state{allow_renegotiate = true}, get_timeout(State)};
-
-handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, StartFrom}, StateName,
-	    #state{renegotiation = {false, first}} = State) when StateName =/= connection ->
-    gen_fsm:reply(StartFrom, {error, timeout}),
-    {stop, {shutdown, user_timeout}, State#state{timer = undefined}};
-
-handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}, StateName, #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State) ->
-    gen_fsm:reply(RecvFrom, {error, timeout}),
-    {next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined,
-					bytes_to_read = undefined,
-					timer = undefined}, get_timeout(State)};
+    {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}};
+handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) ->
+    ssl_connection:handle_info(Msg, StateName, State).
 
-handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, _RecvFrom}, StateName, State) ->
-    {next_state, StateName, State#state{timer = undefined}, get_timeout(State)};
+handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName, 
+		    #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
+    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State);
 
-handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) ->
-    Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Got unexpected info: ~p ~n", [Msg]),
-    error_logger:info_report(Report),
-    {next_state, StateName, State, get_timeout(State)}.
+%%% TLS record protocol level handshake messages 
+handle_common_event(internal,  #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, 
+		    StateName, #state{protocol_buffers =
+					  #protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf0} = Buffers,
+				      negotiated_version = Version,
+				      ssl_options = Options} = State0) ->
+    try
+	{Packets, Buf} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version,Data,Buf0, Options),
+	State =
+	    State0#state{protocol_buffers =
+			     Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf}},
+	Events = tls_handshake_events(Packets),
+	case StateName of
+	    connection ->
+		ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Events);
+	    _ ->
+		{next_state, StateName, State, Events}
+	end
+    catch throw:#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0)
+    end;
+%%% TLS record protocol level application data messages 
+handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) ->
+    {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {application_data, Data}}]};
+%%% TLS record protocol level change cipher messages
+handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) ->
+    {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = Data}}]};
+%%% TLS record protocol level Alert messages
+handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName,
+		    #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
+    case decode_alerts(EncAlerts) of
+	Alerts = [_|_] ->
+	    handle_alerts(Alerts,  {next_state, StateName, State});
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State)
+    end;
+%% Ignore unknown TLS record level protocol messages
+handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) ->
+    {next_state, StateName, State}.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Description:This function is called by a gen_fsm when it is about
-%% to terminate. It should be the opposite of Module:init/1 and do any
-%% necessary cleaning up. When it returns, the gen_fsm terminates with
-%% Reason. The return value is ignored.
+%% gen_statem callbacks
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-terminate(_, _, #state{terminated = true}) ->
-    %% Happens when user closes the connection using ssl:close/1
-    %% we want to guarantee that Transport:close has been called
-    %% when ssl:close/1 returns.
-    ok;
+terminate(Reason, StateName, State) ->
+    catch ssl_connection:terminate(Reason, StateName, State).
 
-terminate({shutdown, transport_closed}, StateName, #state{send_queue = SendQueue,
-							  renegotiation = Renegotiate} = State) ->
-    handle_unrecv_data(StateName, State),
-    handle_trusted_certs_db(State),
-    notify_senders(SendQueue),
-    notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate);
-
-terminate({shutdown, own_alert}, _StateName, #state{send_queue = SendQueue,
-				      renegotiation = Renegotiate} = State) ->
-    handle_trusted_certs_db(State),
-    notify_senders(SendQueue),
-    notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate);
-
-terminate(Reason, connection, #state{negotiated_version = Version,
-				      connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-				      transport_cb = Transport,
-				      socket = Socket, send_queue = SendQueue,
-				      renegotiation = Renegotiate} = State) ->
-    handle_trusted_certs_db(State),
-    notify_senders(SendQueue),
-    notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate),
-    BinAlert = terminate_alert(Reason, Version, ConnectionStates),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinAlert),
-    workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, Transport);
-
-terminate(_Reason, _StateName, #state{transport_cb = Transport,
-				      socket = Socket, send_queue = SendQueue,
-				      renegotiation = Renegotiate} = State) ->
-    handle_trusted_certs_db(State),
-    notify_senders(SendQueue),
-    notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate),
-    Transport:close(Socket).
+format_status(Type, Data) ->
+    ssl_connection:format_status(Type, Data).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %% code_change(OldVsn, StateName, State, Extra) -> {ok, StateName, NewState}
 %% Description: Convert process state when code is changed
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _Extra) ->
-    {ok, StateName, State}.
+code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State0, {Direction, From, To}) ->
+    State = convert_state(State0, Direction, From, To),
+    {?GEN_STATEM_CB_MODE, StateName, State};
+code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _) ->
+    {?GEN_STATEM_CB_MODE, StateName, State}.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %%% Internal functions
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_} = Opts,
-	  User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, 
-	  Timeout) -> 
-    try 
-	{ok, Pid} = ssl_connection_sup:start_child([Role, Host, Port, Socket, 
-						    Opts, User, CbInfo]), 
-	{ok, SslSocket} = socket_control(Socket, Pid, CbModule),
-	ok = handshake(SslSocket, Timeout),
-	{ok, SslSocket} 
-    catch
-	error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} ->
-	    Error
-    end;
-
-start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = true},_} = Opts,
-	  User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, 
-	  Timeout) -> 
-    try 
-	{ok, Pid} = ssl_connection_sup:start_child_dist([Role, Host, Port, Socket, 
-							 Opts, User, CbInfo]), 
-	{ok, SslSocket} = socket_control(Socket, Pid, CbModule),
-	ok = handshake(SslSocket, Timeout),
-	{ok, SslSocket} 
-    catch
-	error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} ->
-	    Error
-    end.
-
-ssl_init(SslOpts, Role) ->
-    
-    init_manager_name(SslOpts#ssl_options.erl_dist),
-
-    {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, OwnCert} = init_certificates(SslOpts, Role),
-    PrivateKey =
-	init_private_key(PemCacheHandle, SslOpts#ssl_options.key, SslOpts#ssl_options.keyfile,
-			 SslOpts#ssl_options.password, Role),
-    DHParams = init_diffie_hellman(PemCacheHandle, SslOpts#ssl_options.dh, SslOpts#ssl_options.dhfile, Role),
-    {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, CacheHandle, OwnCert, PrivateKey, DHParams}.
-
-init_manager_name(false) ->
-    put(ssl_manager, ssl_manager);
-init_manager_name(true) ->
-    put(ssl_manager, ssl_manager_dist).
-
-init_certificates(#ssl_options{cacerts = CaCerts,
-			       cacertfile = CACertFile,
-			       certfile = CertFile,
-			       cert = Cert}, Role) ->
-    {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle} =
-	try 
-	    Certs = case CaCerts of
-			undefined ->
-			    CACertFile;
-			_ ->
-			    {der, CaCerts}
-		    end,
-	    {ok, _, _, _, _, _} = ssl_manager:connection_init(Certs, Role)
-	catch
-	    _:Reason ->
-		file_error(CACertFile, {cacertfile, Reason})
-	end,
-    init_certificates(Cert, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, CertFile, Role).
-
-init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, <<>>, _) ->
-    {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, undefined};
-
-init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, CertFile, client) ->
-    try 
-	%% Ignoring potential proxy-certificates see: 
-	%% http://dev.globus.org/wiki/Security/ProxyFileFormat
-	[OwnCert|_] = ssl_certificate:file_to_certificats(CertFile, PemCacheHandle),
-	{ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, OwnCert}
-    catch _Error:_Reason  ->
-	    {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheHandle, undefined}
-    end;
-
-init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, CertFile, server) ->
-    try
-	[OwnCert|_] = ssl_certificate:file_to_certificats(CertFile, PemCacheHandle),
-	{ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, OwnCert}
-    catch
-	_:Reason ->
-	    file_error(CertFile, {certfile, Reason})	    
-    end;
-init_certificates(Cert, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, _, _) ->
-    {ok, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, PemCacheHandle, CacheRef, Cert}.
-
-init_private_key(_, undefined, <<>>, _Password, _Client) ->
-    undefined;
-init_private_key(DbHandle, undefined, KeyFile, Password, _) ->
-    try
-	{ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(KeyFile, DbHandle),
-	[PemEntry] = [PemEntry || PemEntry = {PKey, _ , _} <- List,
-				  PKey =:= 'RSAPrivateKey' orelse
-				      PKey =:= 'DSAPrivateKey' orelse
-				      PKey =:= 'ECPrivateKey' orelse
-				      PKey =:= 'PrivateKeyInfo'
-		     ],
-	private_key(public_key:pem_entry_decode(PemEntry, Password))
-    catch 
-	_:Reason ->
-	    file_error(KeyFile, {keyfile, Reason}) 
-    end;
+encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hist0) ->
+    Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(Handshake, Version),
+    Hist = ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hist0, Frag),
+    {Encoded, ConnectionStates} =
+        ssl_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+    {Encoded, ConnectionStates, Hist}.
 
-%% First two clauses are for backwards compatibility
-init_private_key(_,{rsa, PrivateKey}, _, _,_) ->
-    init_private_key('RSAPrivateKey', PrivateKey);
-init_private_key(_,{dsa, PrivateKey},_,_,_) ->
-    init_private_key('DSAPrivateKey', PrivateKey);
-init_private_key(_,{ec, PrivateKey},_,_,_) ->
-    init_private_key('ECPrivateKey', PrivateKey);
-init_private_key(_,{Asn1Type, PrivateKey},_,_,_) ->
-    private_key(init_private_key(Asn1Type, PrivateKey)).
-
-init_private_key(Asn1Type, PrivateKey) ->
-    public_key:der_decode(Asn1Type, PrivateKey).
-
-private_key(#'PrivateKeyInfo'{privateKeyAlgorithm =
-				 #'PrivateKeyInfo_privateKeyAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'rsaEncryption'},
-			     privateKey = Key}) ->
-    public_key:der_decode('RSAPrivateKey', iolist_to_binary(Key));
-
-private_key(#'PrivateKeyInfo'{privateKeyAlgorithm =
-				 #'PrivateKeyInfo_privateKeyAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'id-dsa'},
-			     privateKey = Key}) ->
-    public_key:der_decode('DSAPrivateKey', iolist_to_binary(Key));
-
-private_key(Key) ->
-    Key.
-
--spec(file_error(_,_) -> no_return()).
-file_error(File, Throw) ->
-    case Throw of
-	{Opt,{badmatch, {error, {badmatch, Error}}}} ->
-	    throw({options, {Opt, binary_to_list(File), Error}});
-	_ ->
-	    throw(Throw)
-    end.
-
-init_diffie_hellman(_,Params, _,_) when is_binary(Params)->
-    public_key:der_decode('DHParameter', Params);
-init_diffie_hellman(_,_,_, client) ->
-    undefined;
-init_diffie_hellman(_,_,undefined, _) ->
-    ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS;
-init_diffie_hellman(DbHandle,_, DHParamFile, server) ->
-    try
-	{ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(DHParamFile,DbHandle),
-	case [Entry || Entry = {'DHParameter', _ , _} <- List] of
-	    [Entry] ->
-		public_key:pem_entry_decode(Entry);
-	    [] ->
-		?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS
-	end
-    catch
-	_:Reason ->
-	    file_error(DHParamFile, {dhfile, Reason}) 
-    end.
-
-sync_send_all_state_event(FsmPid, Event) ->
-    try gen_fsm:sync_send_all_state_event(FsmPid, Event, infinity)
-    catch
- 	exit:{noproc, _} ->
- 	    {error, closed};
-	exit:{normal, _} ->
-	    {error, closed};
-	exit:{{shutdown, _},_} ->
-	    {error, closed}
-    end.
-
-%% We do currently not support cipher suites that use fixed DH.
-%% If we want to implement that we should add a code
-%% here to extract DH parameters form cert.
-handle_peer_cert(PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, 
-		 #state{session = Session} = State0) ->
-    State1 = State0#state{session = 
-			 Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert},
-			 public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo},
-    State2 = case PublicKeyInfo of
-		 {?'id-ecPublicKey',  #'ECPoint'{point = _ECPoint} = PublicKey, PublicKeyParams} ->
-		     ECDHKey = public_key:generate_key(PublicKeyParams),
-		     State3 = State1#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey},
-		     ec_dh_master_secret(ECDHKey, PublicKey, State3);
-
-		 _ -> State1
-	     end,
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State2),
-    next_state(certify, certify, Record, State).
-
-certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client,
-                      connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-                      transport_cb = Transport,
-                      negotiated_version = Version,
-		      cert_db = CertDbHandle,
-                      cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
-		      session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert},
-                      socket = Socket,
-                      tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    Certificate = tls_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client),
-    {BinCert, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Certificate, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinCert),
-            State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-                        tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State) ->
-    State.
-
-verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client,
-			  connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-			  transport_cb = Transport,
-			  negotiated_version = Version,
-			  socket = Socket,
-			  private_key = PrivateKey,
-			  session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret,
-					     own_certificate = OwnCert},
-			  hashsign_algorithm = HashSign,
-			  tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-
-    %%TODO: for TLS 1.2 we can choose a different/stronger HashSign combination for this.
-    case tls_handshake:client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, 
-						 Version, HashSign, PrivateKey, Handshake0) of
-        #certificate_verify{} = Verified ->
-            {BinVerified, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-                encode_handshake(Verified, Version,
-                                 ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-            Transport:send(Socket, BinVerified),
-            State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-                        tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-	ignore ->
-	    State;
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    throw(Alert)	    
-    end;
-verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State) ->
-    State.
-
-do_server_hello(Type, NextProtocolsToSend,
-		EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves,
-		#state{negotiated_version = Version,
-		       session = #session{session_id = SessId},
-		       connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		       renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}}
-		= State0) when is_atom(Type) ->
-
-    ServerHello = 
-	tls_handshake:server_hello(SessId, Version, 
-                                   ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation,
-				   NextProtocolsToSend, EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves),
-    State = server_hello(ServerHello,
-			 State0#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation =
-					  NextProtocolsToSend =/= undefined}),
-    case Type of	
-	new ->
-	    new_server_hello(ServerHello, State);
-	resumed ->
-	    resumed_server_hello(State)
-    end.
-
-new_server_hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
-			      compression_method = Compression,
-			      session_id = SessionId}, 
-		#state{session = Session0,
-		       negotiated_version = Version} = State0) ->
-    try server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0) of 
-        #state{} = State1 ->
-            State2 = server_hello_done(State1),
-	    Session = 
-		Session0#session{session_id = SessionId,
-				 cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
-				 compression_method = Compression},
-	    {Record, State} = next_record(State2#state{session = Session}),
-	    next_state(hello, certify, Record, State)
-    catch        
-        #alert{} = Alert ->  
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0)
-    end.
-
-resumed_server_hello(#state{session = Session,
-			    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-			    negotiated_version = Version} = State0) ->
-
-    case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session,
-				     ConnectionStates0, server) of
-	{_, ConnectionStates1} ->
-	    State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
-				  session = Session},
-	    {ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-		finalize_handshake(State1, abbreviated),
-	    State2 = State1#state{connection_states =
-				      ConnectionStates,
-				  tls_handshake_history = Handshake},
-	    {Record, State} = next_record(State2),
-	    next_state(hello, abbreviated, Record, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0)
-    end.
-
-handle_new_session(NewId, CipherSuite, Compression, #state{session = Session0} = State0) ->
-    Session = Session0#session{session_id = NewId,
-			       cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
-			       compression_method = Compression}, 
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{session = Session}),
-    next_state(hello, certify, Record, State).
-
-handle_resumed_session(SessId, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-				      negotiated_version = Version,
-				      host = Host, port = Port,
-				      session_cache = Cache,
-				      session_cache_cb = CacheCb} = State0) ->
-    Session = CacheCb:lookup(Cache, {{Host, Port}, SessId}),
-    case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session, 
-				     ConnectionStates0, client) of
-	{_, ConnectionStates} ->
-	    {Record, State} = 
-		next_record(State0#state{
-			      connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-			      session = Session}),
-	    next_state(hello, abbreviated, Record, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0)
-    end.
-
-
-client_certify_and_key_exchange(#state{negotiated_version = Version} = 
-				State0) ->
-    try do_client_certify_and_key_exchange(State0) of 
-        State1 = #state{} ->
-	    {ConnectionStates, Handshake} = finalize_handshake(State1, certify),
-            State2 = State1#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-				 %% Reinitialize 
-				 client_certificate_requested = false,
-				 tls_handshake_history = Handshake},
-	    {Record, State} = next_record(State2),
-	    next_state(certify, cipher, Record, State)
-    catch        
-        throw:#alert{} = Alert ->  
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0)
-    end.
+encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+    ssl_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates).
 
-do_client_certify_and_key_exchange(State0) ->
-    State1 = certify_client(State0), 
-    State2 = key_exchange(State1),
-    verify_client_cert(State2).
+decode_alerts(Bin) ->
+    ssl_alert:decode(Bin).
 
-server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0) ->
-    State1 = certify_server(State0), 
-    State2 = key_exchange(State1),
-    request_client_cert(State2).
-    
-server_hello(ServerHello, #state{transport_cb = Transport,
-                                 socket = Socket,
-                                 negotiated_version = Version,
-                                 connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-                                 tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    CipherSuite = ServerHello#server_hello.cipher_suite,
-    {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates1, Handshake1} =
-        encode_handshake(ServerHello, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake1,
-                key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm,
-                hashsign_algorithm = default_hashsign(Version, KeyAlgorithm)}.
-   
-server_hello_done(#state{transport_cb = Transport,
-                         socket = Socket,
-                         negotiated_version = Version,
-                         connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-                         tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
+initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, Tracker}, User,
+	      {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) ->
+    #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation} = SSLOptions,
+    ConnectionStates = ssl_record:init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation),
     
-    HelloDone = tls_handshake:server_hello_done(),
+    SessionCacheCb = case application:get_env(ssl, session_cb) of
+			 {ok, Cb} when is_atom(Cb) ->
+			    Cb;
+			 _  ->
+			     ssl_session_cache
+		     end,
     
-    {BinHelloDone, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(HelloDone, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinHelloDone),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-		tls_handshake_history = Handshake}.
-
-certify_server(#state{key_algorithm = Algo} = State)
-  when Algo == dh_anon; Algo == ecdh_anon; Algo == psk; Algo == dhe_psk; Algo == srp_anon  ->
-    State;
-
-certify_server(#state{transport_cb = Transport,
-		      socket = Socket,
-		      negotiated_version = Version,
-		      connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		      tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
-		      cert_db = CertDbHandle,
-		      cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
-		      session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert}} = State) ->
-    case tls_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) of
-	CertMsg = #certificate{} ->
-	    {BinCertMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-		encode_handshake(CertMsg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-	    Transport:send(Socket, BinCertMsg),
-	    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-			tls_handshake_history = Handshake
-		       };
-	Alert = #alert{} ->
-	    throw(Alert)
-    end.
-
-key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa} = State) ->
-    State;
-key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
-		    hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
-		    diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params,
-		    private_key = PrivateKey,
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
-		    socket = Socket,
-		    transport_cb = Transport
-		   } = State) 
-  when Algo == dhe_dss;
-       Algo == dhe_rsa;
-       Algo == dh_anon ->
-    DHKeys = public_key:generate_key(Params),
-    ConnectionState = 
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, 
-    Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, DHKeys, Params,
-					       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
-					       ServerRandom,
-					       PrivateKey}),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-		diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-
-key_exchange(#state{role = server, private_key = Key, key_algorithm = Algo} = State)
-  when Algo == ecdh_ecdsa; Algo == ecdh_rsa ->
-    State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Key};
-key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
-		    hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
-		    private_key = PrivateKey,
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
-		    socket = Socket,
-		    transport_cb = Transport
-		   } = State)
-  when Algo == ecdhe_ecdsa; Algo == ecdhe_rsa;
-       Algo == ecdh_anon ->
-
-    ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(select_curve(State)),
-    ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdh, ECDHKeys,
-							HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
-							ServerRandom,
-							PrivateKey}),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake1} =
-	encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-		diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys,
-		tls_handshake_history = Handshake1};
-
-key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk,
-		    ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State) ->
-    State;
-key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk,
-		    ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint},
-		    hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
-		    private_key = PrivateKey,
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
-		    socket = Socket,
-		    transport_cb = Transport
-		   } = State) ->
-    ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
-						       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
-						       ServerRandom,
-						       PrivateKey}),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-
-key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk,
-		    ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint},
-		    hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
-		    diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params,
-		    private_key = PrivateKey,
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
-		    socket = Socket,
-		    transport_cb = Transport
-		   } = State) ->
-    DHKeys = public_key:generate_key(Params),
-    ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {dhe_psk, PskIdentityHint, DHKeys, Params,
-					       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
-					       ServerRandom,
-					       PrivateKey}),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-		diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-
-key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk,
-		    ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State) ->
-    State;
-key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk,
-		    ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint},
-		    hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
-		    private_key = PrivateKey,
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
-		    socket = Socket,
-		    transport_cb = Transport
-		   } = State) ->
-    ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
-					       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
-					       ServerRandom,
-					       PrivateKey}),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-
-key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
-		    ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = LookupFun},
-		    hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
-		    session = #session{srp_username = Username},
-		    private_key = PrivateKey,
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
-		    socket = Socket,
-		    transport_cb = Transport
-		   } = State)
-  when Algo == srp_dss;
-       Algo == srp_rsa;
-       Algo == srp_anon ->
-    SrpParams = handle_srp_identity(Username, LookupFun),
-    Keys = case generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams, 0) of
-	       Alert = #alert{} ->
-		   throw(Alert);
-	       Keys0 = {_,_} ->
-		   Keys0
-	   end,
-    ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, Keys, SrpParams,
-					       HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
-					       ServerRandom,
-					       PrivateKey}),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-		srp_params = SrpParams,
-		srp_keys = Keys,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-
-key_exchange(#state{role = client, 
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    key_algorithm = rsa,
-		    public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
-		    socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    Msg = rsa_key_exchange(Version, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-key_exchange(#state{role = client, 
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    key_algorithm = Algorithm,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    diffie_hellman_keys = {DhPubKey, _},
-		    socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State)
-  when Algorithm == dhe_dss;
-       Algorithm == dhe_rsa;
-       Algorithm == dh_anon ->
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {dh, DhPubKey}),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-
-key_exchange(#state{role = client,
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    key_algorithm = Algorithm,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    diffie_hellman_keys = Keys,
-		    socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State)
-  when Algorithm == ecdhe_ecdsa; Algorithm == ecdhe_rsa;
-       Algorithm == ecdh_ecdsa; Algorithm == ecdh_rsa;
-       Algorithm == ecdh_anon ->
-    Msg = tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {ecdh, Keys}),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-
-key_exchange(#state{role = client,
-		    ssl_options = SslOpts,
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    key_algorithm = psk,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity}),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-
-key_exchange(#state{role = client,
-		    ssl_options = SslOpts,
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    key_algorithm = dhe_psk,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    diffie_hellman_keys = {DhPubKey, _},
-		    socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {dhe_psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, DhPubKey}),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-
-key_exchange(#state{role = client,
-		    ssl_options = SslOpts,
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    key_algorithm = rsa_psk,
-		    public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    premaster_secret = PremasterSecret,
-		    socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    Msg = rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-
-key_exchange(#state{role = client,
-		    connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		    key_algorithm = Algorithm,
-		    negotiated_version = Version,
-		    srp_keys = {ClientPubKey, _},
-		    socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
-		    tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State)
-  when Algorithm == srp_dss;
-       Algorithm == srp_rsa;
-       Algorithm == srp_anon ->
-    Msg =  tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version, {srp, ClientPubKey}),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake}.
-
-rsa_key_exchange(Version, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _})
-  when Algorithm == ?rsaEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?md2WithRSAEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?md5WithRSAEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?sha1WithRSAEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?sha224WithRSAEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?sha256WithRSAEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?sha384WithRSAEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?sha512WithRSAEncryption
-       ->
-    tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version,
-			       {premaster_secret, PremasterSecret,
-				PublicKeyInfo});
-rsa_key_exchange(_, _, _) ->
-    throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
-
-rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _})
-  when Algorithm == ?rsaEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?md2WithRSAEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?md5WithRSAEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?sha1WithRSAEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?sha224WithRSAEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?sha256WithRSAEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?sha384WithRSAEncryption;
-       Algorithm == ?sha512WithRSAEncryption
-       ->
-    tls_handshake:key_exchange(client, Version,
-			       {psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret,
-				PublicKeyInfo});
-rsa_psk_key_exchange(_, _, _, _) ->
-    throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
-
-request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer},
-			   connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-			   cert_db = CertDbHandle,
-			   cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
-			   tls_handshake_history = Handshake0,
-			   negotiated_version = Version,
-			   socket = Socket,
-			   transport_cb = Transport} = State) ->
-    Msg = tls_handshake:certificate_request(ConnectionStates0, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{client_certificate_requested = true,
-		connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-		tls_handshake_history = Handshake};
-request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_none}} =
-		    State) ->
-    State.
+    Monitor = erlang:monitor(process, User),
 
-finalize_handshake(State, StateName) ->
-    ConnectionStates0 = cipher_protocol(State),
-
-    ConnectionStates =
-        tls_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0,
-                                                     write),
-
-    State1 = State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates},
-    State2 = next_protocol(State1),
-    finished(State2, StateName).
-
-next_protocol(#state{role = server} = State) ->
-    State;
-next_protocol(#state{next_protocol = undefined} = State) ->
-    State;
-next_protocol(#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false} = State) ->
-    State;
-next_protocol(#state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket,
-		     negotiated_version = Version,
-		     next_protocol = NextProtocol,
-		     connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-		     tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State) ->
-    NextProtocolMessage = tls_handshake:next_protocol(NextProtocol),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(NextProtocolMessage, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake}.
+    #state{socket_options = SocketOptions,
+	   ssl_options = SSLOptions,	   
+	   session = #session{is_resumable = new},
+	   transport_cb = CbModule,
+	   data_tag = DataTag,
+	   close_tag = CloseTag,
+	   error_tag = ErrorTag,
+	   role = Role,
+	   host = Host,
+	   port = Port,
+	   socket = Socket,
+	   connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+	   protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{},
+	   user_application = {Monitor, User},
+	   user_data_buffer = <<>>,
+	   session_cache_cb = SessionCacheCb,
+	   renegotiation = {false, first},
+	   allow_renegotiate = SSLOptions#ssl_options.client_renegotiation,
+	   start_or_recv_from = undefined,
+	   protocol_cb = ?MODULE,
+	   tracker = Tracker,
+	   flight_buffer = []
+	  }.
 
-cipher_protocol(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-                       socket = Socket,
-                       negotiated_version = Version,
-                       transport_cb = Transport}) ->
-    {BinChangeCipher, ConnectionStates} =
-        encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, 
-			     Version, ConnectionStates0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinChangeCipher),
-    ConnectionStates.
-   
-finished(#state{role = Role, socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version,
-                transport_cb = Transport,
-		session = Session,
-                connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-                tls_handshake_history = Handshake0}, StateName) ->
-    MasterSecret = Session#session.master_secret,
-    Finished = tls_handshake:finished(Version, Role,
-				       get_current_connection_state_prf(ConnectionStates0, write),
-				       MasterSecret, Handshake0),
-    ConnectionStates1 = save_verify_data(Role, Finished, ConnectionStates0, StateName),
-    {BinFinished, ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-        encode_handshake(Finished, Version, ConnectionStates1, Handshake0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinFinished),
-    {ConnectionStates, Handshake}.
-
-save_verify_data(client, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, certify) ->
-    tls_record:set_client_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates);
-save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, cipher) ->
-    tls_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates);
-save_verify_data(client, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbreviated) ->
-    tls_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates);
-save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbreviated) ->
-    tls_record:set_server_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates).
-
-handle_server_key(#server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys},
-		  #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg,
-			 negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
-    Params = tls_handshake:decode_server_key(Keys, KeyAlg, Version),
-    HashSign = connection_hashsign(Params#server_key_params.hashsign, State),
-    case HashSign of
-	{_, SignAlgo} when SignAlgo == anon; SignAlgo == ecdh_anon ->
-	    server_master_secret(Params#server_key_params.params, State);
-	_ ->
-	    verify_server_key(Params, HashSign, State)
-    end.
 
-verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params = Params,
-				     params_bin = EncParams,
-				     signature = Signature},
-		  HashSign = {HashAlgo, _},
-		  #state{negotiated_version = Version,
-			 public_key_info = PubKeyInfo,
-			 connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) ->
-    ConnectionState =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, 
-    Hash = tls_handshake:server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo,
-						  <<ClientRandom/binary,
-						    ServerRandom/binary,
-						    EncParams/binary>>),
-    case tls_handshake:verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo) of
-	true ->
-	    server_master_secret(Params, State);
-	false ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)
+update_ssl_options_from_sni(OrigSSLOptions, SNIHostname) ->
+    SSLOption = 
+	case OrigSSLOptions#ssl_options.sni_fun of
+	    undefined ->
+		proplists:get_value(SNIHostname, 
+				    OrigSSLOptions#ssl_options.sni_hosts);
+	    SNIFun ->
+		SNIFun(SNIHostname)
+	end,
+    case SSLOption of
+        undefined ->
+            undefined;
+        _ ->
+            ssl:handle_options(SSLOption, OrigSSLOptions)
     end.
 
-server_master_secret(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey},
-		     State) ->
-    dh_master_secret(P, G, ServerPublicDhKey, undefined, State);
-
-server_master_secret(#server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve, public = ECServerPubKey},
-		     State) ->
-    ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(ECCurve),
-    ec_dh_master_secret(ECDHKeys, #'ECPoint'{point = ECServerPubKey}, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys});
-
-server_master_secret(#server_psk_params{
-			hint = IdentityHint},
-		     State) ->
-    %% store for later use
-    State#state{psk_identity = IdentityHint};
-
-server_master_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{
-			hint = IdentityHint,
-			dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey}},
-		     State) ->
-    dhe_psk_master_secret(IdentityHint, P, G, ServerPublicDhKey, undefined, State);
-
-server_master_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B},
-		     State) ->
-    client_srp_master_secret(G, N, S, B, undefined, State).
-
-master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret,
-			     #state{session = Session,
-				    negotiated_version = Version, role = Role,
-				    connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
-    case tls_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret,
-				     ConnectionStates0, Role) of
-	{MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
-	    State#state{
-	      session =
-		  Session#session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
-	      connection_states = ConnectionStates};
+next_tls_record(Data, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_record_buffer = Buf0,
+						tls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers} = State0) ->
+    case tls_record:get_tls_records(Data, Buf0) of
+	{Records, Buf1} ->
+	    CT1 = CT0 ++ Records,
+	    next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers =
+					 Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_record_buffer = Buf1,
+								  tls_cipher_texts = CT1}});
 	#alert{} = Alert ->
 	    Alert
     end.
 
-dh_master_secret(#'DHParameter'{} = Params, OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, State) ->
-    PremasterSecret =
-	public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params),
-    master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State).
-
-dh_master_secret(Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, undefined, State) ->
-    Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} = crypto:generate_key(dh, [Prime, Base]),
-    dh_master_secret(Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys});
-
-dh_master_secret(Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, State) ->
-    PremasterSecret =
-	crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base]),
-    master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State).
-
-ec_dh_master_secret(ECDHKeys, ECPoint, State) ->
-    PremasterSecret =
-	public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys),
-    master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State).
-
-handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun)
-  when LookupFun == undefined ->
-    error;
-handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) ->
-    Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState).
-
-server_psk_master_secret(ClientPSKIdentity,
-			 #state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) ->
-    case handle_psk_identity(ClientPSKIdentity, SslOpts#ssl_options.user_lookup_fun) of
-	{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
-	    Len = byte_size(PSK),
-	    PremasterSecret = <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>,
-	    master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    Alert;
-	_ ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)
-    end.
-
-dhe_psk_master_secret(PSKIdentity, Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, undefined, State) ->
-    Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} =
-	crypto:generate_key(dh, [Prime, Base]),
-    dhe_psk_master_secret(PSKIdentity, Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey,
-			  State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys});
-
-dhe_psk_master_secret(PSKIdentity, Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey,
-			     #state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) ->
-    case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, SslOpts#ssl_options.user_lookup_fun) of
-	{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
-	    DHSecret =
-		crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey,
-				   [Prime, Base]),
-	    DHLen = erlang:byte_size(DHSecret),
-	    Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK),
-	    PremasterSecret = <<?UINT16(DHLen), DHSecret/binary, ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>,
-	    master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    Alert;
-	_ ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)
-    end.
-
-server_rsa_psk_master_secret(PskIdentity, PremasterSecret,
-			     #state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) ->
-    case handle_psk_identity(PskIdentity, SslOpts#ssl_options.user_lookup_fun) of
-	{ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
-	    Len = byte_size(PSK),
-	    RealPMS = <<?UINT16(48), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>,
-	    master_from_premaster_secret(RealPMS, State);
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    Alert;
-	_ ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)
-    end.
-
-generate_srp_server_keys(_SrpParams, 10) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams =
-			     #srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime,
-				       verifier = Verifier}, N) ->
-    case crypto:generate_key(srp, {host, [Verifier, Generator, Prime, '6a']}) of
-	error ->
-	    generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams, N+1);
-	Keys ->
-	    Keys
-    end.
-
-generate_srp_client_keys(_Generator, _Prime, 10) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, N) ->
-
-    case crypto:generate_key(srp, {user, [Generator, Prime, '6a']}) of
-	error ->
-	    generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, N+1);
-	Keys ->
-	    Keys
-    end.
-
-handle_srp_identity(Username, {Fun, UserState}) ->
-    case Fun(srp, Username, UserState) of
-	{ok, {SRPParams, Salt, DerivedKey}}
-	  when is_atom(SRPParams), is_binary(Salt), is_binary(DerivedKey) ->
-	    {Generator, Prime} = ssl_srp_primes:get_srp_params(SRPParams),
-	    Verifier = crypto:mod_pow(Generator, DerivedKey, Prime),
-	    #srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime,
-		      salt = Salt, verifier = Verifier};
+next_record(#state{protocol_buffers =
+		       #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest]}
+		   = Buffers,
+		   connection_states = ConnStates0,
+		   ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) ->
+    case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0, Check) of
+	{Plain, ConnStates} ->		      
+	    {Plain, State#state{protocol_buffers =
+				    Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = Rest},
+				connection_states = ConnStates}};
 	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    throw(Alert);
-	_ ->
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
-    end.
-
-server_srp_master_secret(Verifier, Prime, ClientPub, State = #state{srp_keys = ServerKeys}) ->
-    case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPub, ServerKeys, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of
-	error ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-	PremasterSecret ->
-	    master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State)
-    end.
-
-client_srp_master_secret(_Generator, _Prime, _Salt, _ServerPub, #alert{} = Alert, _State) ->
-    Alert;
-client_srp_master_secret(Generator, Prime, Salt, ServerPub, undefined, State) ->
-    Keys = generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, 0),
-    client_srp_master_secret(Generator, Prime, Salt, ServerPub, Keys, State#state{srp_keys = Keys});
-
-client_srp_master_secret(Generator, Prime, Salt, ServerPub, ClientKeys,
-			 #state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) ->
-    case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of
-	ok ->
-	    {Username, Password} = SslOpts#ssl_options.srp_identity,
-	    DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]),
-	    case crypto:compute_key(srp, ServerPub, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of
-		error ->
-		    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-		PremasterSecret ->
-		    master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State)
-	    end;
-	_ ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)
-    end.
-
-cipher_role(client, Data, Session, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> 
-    ConnectionStates = tls_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0),
-    next_state_connection(cipher, ack_connection(State#state{session = Session,
-							     connection_states = ConnectionStates}));
-     
-cipher_role(server, Data, Session,  #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> 
-    ConnectionStates1 = tls_record:set_client_verify_data(current_read, Data, ConnectionStates0),
-    {ConnectionStates, Handshake} =
-	finalize_handshake(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
-				       session = Session}, cipher),
-    next_state_connection(cipher, ack_connection(State#state{connection_states = 
-							     ConnectionStates,
-							     session = Session,
-							     tls_handshake_history =
-								 Handshake})).
-encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
-    tls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates).
-
-encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
-    tls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates).
-
-encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0) ->
-    Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version),
-    Handshake1 = tls_handshake:update_handshake_history(Handshake0, Frag),
-    {E, ConnectionStates1} =
-        tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
-    {E, ConnectionStates1, Handshake1}.
-
-encode_packet(Data, #socket_options{packet=Packet}) ->
-    case Packet of
-	1 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 8,  (1 bsl 8) - 1);
-	2 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 16, (1 bsl 16) - 1);
-	4 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 32, (1 bsl 32) - 1);
-	_ -> Data
-    end.
-
-encode_size_packet(Bin, Size, Max) ->
-    Len = erlang:byte_size(Bin),
-    case Len > Max of
-	true  -> throw({error, {badarg, {packet_to_large, Len, Max}}});
-	false -> <<Len:Size, Bin/binary>>
-    end.
+	    {Alert, State}
+    end;
+next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = []},
+		   socket = Socket,
+		   transport_cb = Transport} = State) ->
+    ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]),
+    {no_record, State};
+next_record(State) ->
+    {no_record, State}.
 
-decode_alerts(Bin) ->
-    decode_alerts(Bin, []).
+next_record_if_active(State = 
+		      #state{socket_options = 
+			     #socket_options{active = false}}) -> 
+    {no_record ,State};
 
-decode_alerts(<<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    A = ?ALERT_REC(Level, Description),
-    decode_alerts(Rest, [A | Acc]);
-decode_alerts(<<>>, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc, []).
+next_record_if_active(State) ->
+    next_record(State).
 
 passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) -> 
     case Buffer of
 	<<>> ->
 	    {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
-	    next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State);
+	    next_event(StateName, Record, State);
 	_ ->
-	    case read_application_data(<<>>, State0) of
-		Stop = {stop, _, _} ->
-		    Stop;
-		{Record, State} ->
-		    next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State)
-	    end
+	    {Record, State} = read_application_data(<<>>, State0),
+	    next_event(StateName, Record, State)
+    end.
+
+next_event(StateName, Record, State) ->
+    next_event(StateName, Record, State, []).
+
+next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) ->
+    case next_record_if_active(State0) of
+	{no_record, State} ->
+	    ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions);
+	{#ssl_tls{} = Record, State} ->
+	    {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {tls_record, Record}} | Actions]};
+	{#alert{} = Alert, State} ->
+	    {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]}
+    end;
+next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions) ->
+    case Record of
+	no_record ->
+	    {next_state, StateName, State, Actions};
+	#ssl_tls{} = Record ->
+	    {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {tls_record, Record}} | Actions]};
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]}
     end.
 
 read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid},
@@ -2298,7 +612,8 @@ read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid},
 				   bytes_to_read = BytesToRead,
 				   start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom,
 				   timer = Timer,
-				   user_data_buffer = Buffer0} = State0) ->
+				   user_data_buffer = Buffer0,
+				   tracker = Tracker} = State0) ->
     Buffer1 = if 
 		  Buffer0 =:= <<>> -> Data;
 		  Data =:= <<>> -> Buffer0;
@@ -2306,7 +621,7 @@ read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid},
 	      end,
     case get_data(SOpts, BytesToRead, Buffer1) of
 	{ok, ClientData, Buffer} -> % Send data
-	    SocketOpt = deliver_app_data(Transport, Socket, SOpts, ClientData, Pid, RecvFrom),
+	    SocketOpt = deliver_app_data(Transport, Socket, SOpts, ClientData, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker),
 	    cancel_timer(Timer),
 	    State = State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer,
 				 start_or_recv_from = undefined,
@@ -2327,43 +642,10 @@ read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid},
 	{passive, Buffer} ->
 	    next_record_if_active(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer});
 	{error,_Reason} -> %% Invalid packet in packet mode
-	    deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Buffer1, Pid, RecvFrom),
+	    deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Buffer1, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker),
 	    {stop, normal, State0}
     end.
 
-write_application_data(Data0, From, #state{socket = Socket,
-					   negotiated_version = Version,
-					   transport_cb = Transport,
-					   connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
-					   send_queue = SendQueue,
-					   socket_options = SockOpts,
-					   ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}} = State) ->
-    Data = encode_packet(Data0, SockOpts),
-    
-    case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of
-	true ->
-	    renegotiate(State#state{send_queue = queue:in_r({From, Data}, SendQueue),
-				    renegotiation = {true, internal}});
-	false ->
-	    {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0),
-	    Result = Transport:send(Socket, Msgs),
-	    {reply, Result,
-	     connection, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, get_timeout(State)}
-    end.
-
-time_to_renegotiate(_Data, #connection_states{current_write = 
-						    #connection_state{sequence_number = Num}}, RenegotiateAt) ->
-    
-    %% We could do test:
-    %% is_time_to_renegotiate((erlang:byte_size(_Data) div ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH) + 1, RenegotiateAt),
-    %% but we chose to have a some what lower renegotiateAt and a much cheaper test 
-    is_time_to_renegotiate(Num, RenegotiateAt).
-
-is_time_to_renegotiate(N, M) when N < M->
-    false;
-is_time_to_renegotiate(_,_) ->
-    true.
-
 %% Picks ClientData 
 get_data(_, _, <<>>) ->
     {more, <<>>};
@@ -2410,8 +692,8 @@ decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts) ->
 %% HTTP headers using the {packet, httph} option, we don't do any automatic
 %% switching of states.
 deliver_app_data(Transport, Socket, SOpts = #socket_options{active=Active, packet=Type},
-		 Data, Pid, From) ->
-    send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_reply(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Data)),
+		 Data, Pid, From, Tracker) ->
+    send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_reply(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Data, Tracker)),
     SO = case Data of
 	     {P, _, _, _} when ((P =:= http_request) or (P =:= http_response)),
 			       ((Type =:= http) or (Type =:= http_bin)) ->
@@ -2431,19 +713,21 @@ deliver_app_data(Transport, Socket, SOpts = #socket_options{active=Active, packe
     end.
 
 format_reply(_, _,#socket_options{active = false, mode = Mode, packet = Packet,
-			     header = Header}, Data) ->
+				  header = Header}, Data, _) ->
     {ok, do_format_reply(Mode, Packet, Header, Data)};
 format_reply(Transport, Socket, #socket_options{active = _, mode = Mode, packet = Packet,
-						header = Header}, Data) ->
-    {ssl, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket), do_format_reply(Mode, Packet, Header, Data)}.
+						header = Header}, Data, Tracker) ->
+    {ssl, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket, ?MODULE, Tracker), 
+     do_format_reply(Mode, Packet, Header, Data)}.
 
-deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SO= #socket_options{active = Active}, Data, Pid, From) ->
-    send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SO, Data)).
+deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SO= #socket_options{active = Active}, Data, Pid, From, Tracker) ->
+    send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SO, Data, Tracker)).
 
-format_packet_error(_, _,#socket_options{active = false, mode = Mode}, Data) ->
+format_packet_error(_, _,#socket_options{active = false, mode = Mode}, Data, _) ->
     {error, {invalid_packet, do_format_reply(Mode, raw, 0, Data)}};
-format_packet_error(Transport, Socket, #socket_options{active = _, mode = Mode}, Data) ->
-    {ssl_error, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket), {invalid_packet, do_format_reply(Mode, raw, 0, Data)}}.
+format_packet_error(Transport, Socket, #socket_options{active = _, mode = Mode}, Data, Tracker) ->
+    {ssl_error, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket, ?MODULE, Tracker), 
+     {invalid_packet, do_format_reply(Mode, raw, 0, Data)}}.
 
 do_format_reply(binary, _, N, Data) when N > 0 ->  % Header mode
     header(N, Data);
@@ -2458,7 +742,7 @@ do_format_reply(list, _,_, Data) ->
     binary_to_list(Data).
 
 header(0, <<>>) ->
-    [];
+    <<>>;
 header(_, <<>>) ->
     [];
 header(0, Binary) ->
@@ -2468,7 +752,7 @@ header(N, Binary) ->
     [ByteN | header(N-1, NewBinary)].
 
 send_or_reply(false, _Pid, From, Data) when From =/= undefined ->
-    gen_fsm:reply(From, Data);
+    gen_statem:reply(From, Data);
 %% Can happen when handling own alert or tcp error/close and there is
 %% no outstanding gen_fsm sync events
 send_or_reply(false, no_pid, _, _) ->
@@ -2476,363 +760,157 @@ send_or_reply(false, no_pid, _, _) ->
 send_or_reply(_, Pid, _From, Data) ->
     send_user(Pid, Data).
 
-opposite_role(client) ->
-    server;
-opposite_role(server) ->
-    client.
-
 send_user(Pid, Msg) ->
     Pid ! Msg.
 
-handle_tls_handshake(Handle, StateName, #state{tls_packets = [Packet]} = State) ->
-    FsmReturn = {next_state, StateName, State#state{tls_packets = []}},
-    Handle(Packet, FsmReturn);
-
-handle_tls_handshake(Handle, StateName, #state{tls_packets = [Packet | Packets]} = State0) ->
-    FsmReturn = {next_state, StateName, State0#state{tls_packets = Packets}},
-    case Handle(Packet, FsmReturn) of
-	{next_state, NextStateName, State, _Timeout} ->
-	    handle_tls_handshake(Handle, NextStateName, State);
-	{stop, _,_} = Stop ->
-	    Stop
+tls_handshake_events([]) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, malformed_handshake));
+tls_handshake_events(Packets) ->
+    lists:map(fun(Packet) ->
+		      {next_event, internal, {handshake, Packet}}
+	      end, Packets).
+
+write_application_data(Data0, From, 
+		       #state{socket = Socket,
+			      negotiated_version = Version,
+			      transport_cb = Transport,
+			      connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+			      socket_options = SockOpts,
+			      ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}} = State) ->
+    Data = encode_packet(Data0, SockOpts),
+    
+    case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of
+	true ->
+	    renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, internal}}, 
+			[{next_event, {call, From}, {application_data, Data0}}]);
+	false ->
+	    {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = ssl_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+	    Result = Transport:send(Socket, Msgs),
+	        ssl_connection:hibernate_after(connection, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, 
+					       [{reply, From, Result}])
     end.
 
-next_state(Current,_, #alert{} = Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
-    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, Current, State);
-
-next_state(_,Next, no_record, State) ->
-    {next_state, Next, State, get_timeout(State)};
-
-next_state(_,Next, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, State) ->
-    Alerts = decode_alerts(EncAlerts),
-    handle_alerts(Alerts,  {next_state, Next, State, get_timeout(State)});
-
-next_state(Current, Next, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data},
-	   State0 = #state{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf0, negotiated_version = Version}) ->
-    Handle = 
-   	fun({#hello_request{} = Packet, _}, {next_state, connection = SName, State}) ->
-   		%% This message should not be included in handshake
-   		%% message hashes. Starts new handshake (renegotiation)
-		Hs0 = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
-		?MODULE:SName(Packet, State#state{tls_handshake_history=Hs0,
-   						  renegotiation = {true, peer}});
-   	   ({#hello_request{} = Packet, _}, {next_state, SName, State}) ->
-   		%% This message should not be included in handshake
-   		%% message hashes. Already in negotiation so it will be ignored!
-   		?MODULE:SName(Packet, State);
-	   ({#client_hello{} = Packet, Raw}, {next_state, connection = SName, State}) ->
-		Version = Packet#client_hello.client_version,
-		Hs0 = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
-		Hs1 = tls_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hs0, Raw),
-		?MODULE:SName(Packet, State#state{tls_handshake_history=Hs1,
-   						  renegotiation = {true, peer}});
-	   ({Packet, Raw}, {next_state, SName, State = #state{tls_handshake_history=Hs0}}) ->
-		Hs1 = tls_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hs0, Raw),
-		?MODULE:SName(Packet, State#state{tls_handshake_history=Hs1});
-   	   (_, StopState) -> StopState
-   	end,
-    try
-	{Packets, Buf} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version,Data,Buf0),
-	State = State0#state{tls_packets = Packets, tls_handshake_buffer = Buf},
-	handle_tls_handshake(Handle, Next, State)
-    catch throw:#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, Current, State0)
-    end;
-
-next_state(_, StateName, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, State0) ->
-    case read_application_data(Data, State0) of
-	Stop = {stop,_,_} ->
-   	    Stop;
-	{Record, State} ->
-   	    next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State)
-    end;
-next_state(Current, Next, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = <<1>>} = 
- 	   _ChangeCipher, 
- 	   #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
-    ConnectionStates1 =
- 	tls_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}),
-    next_state(Current, Next, Record, State);
-next_state(Current, Next, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, State0) ->
-    %% Ignore unknown type 
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
-    next_state(Current, Next, Record, State).
-
-next_tls_record(Data, #state{tls_record_buffer = Buf0,
-		       tls_cipher_texts = CT0} = State0) ->
-    case tls_record:get_tls_records(Data, Buf0) of
-	{Records, Buf1} ->
-	    CT1 = CT0 ++ Records,
-	    next_record(State0#state{tls_record_buffer = Buf1,
-				     tls_cipher_texts = CT1});
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    Alert
+encode_packet(Data, #socket_options{packet=Packet}) ->
+    case Packet of
+	1 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 8,  (1 bsl 8) - 1);
+	2 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 16, (1 bsl 16) - 1);
+	4 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 32, (1 bsl 32) - 1);
+	_ -> Data
     end.
 
-next_record(#state{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [], socket = Socket,
-		   transport_cb = Transport} = State) ->
-    ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]),
-    {no_record, State};
-next_record(#state{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest],
-		   connection_states = ConnStates0} = State) ->
-    case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0) of
-	{Plain, ConnStates} ->		      
-	    {Plain, State#state{tls_cipher_texts = Rest, connection_states = ConnStates}};
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    {Alert, State}
-    end;
-next_record(State) ->
-    {no_record, State}.
-
-next_record_if_active(State = 
-		      #state{socket_options = 
-			     #socket_options{active = false}}) ->    
-    {no_record ,State};
-
-next_record_if_active(State) ->
-    next_record(State).
-
-next_state_connection(StateName, #state{send_queue = Queue0,
-					negotiated_version = Version,
-					socket = Socket,
-					transport_cb = Transport,
-					connection_states = ConnectionStates0
-				       } = State) ->     
-    %% Send queued up data that was queued while renegotiating
-    case queue:out(Queue0) of
-	{{value, {From, Data}}, Queue} ->
-	    {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = 
-		tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0),
-	    Result = Transport:send(Socket, Msgs),
-	    gen_fsm:reply(From, Result),
-	    next_state_connection(StateName,
-				  State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-						      send_queue = Queue});		
-	{empty, Queue0} ->
-	    next_state_is_connection(StateName, State)
+encode_size_packet(Bin, Size, Max) ->
+    Len = erlang:byte_size(Bin),
+    case Len > Max of
+	true  -> throw({error, {badarg, {packet_to_large, Len, Max}}});
+	false -> <<Len:Size, Bin/binary>>
     end.
 
-%% In next_state_is_connection/1: clear tls_handshake,
-%% premaster_secret and public_key_info (only needed during handshake)
-%% to reduce memory foot print of a connection.
-next_state_is_connection(_, State = 
-		      #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom,
-			     socket_options =
-			     #socket_options{active = false}}) when RecvFrom =/= undefined ->
-    passive_receive(State#state{premaster_secret = undefined,
-				public_key_info = undefined,
-				tls_handshake_history = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history()}, connection);
-
-next_state_is_connection(StateName, State0) ->
-    {Record, State} = next_record_if_active(State0),
-    next_state(StateName, connection, Record, State#state{premaster_secret = undefined,
-							  public_key_info = undefined,
-							  tls_handshake_history = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history()}).
-
-register_session(client, Host, Port, #session{is_resumable = new} = Session0) ->
-    Session = Session0#session{is_resumable = true},
-    ssl_manager:register_session(Host, Port, Session),
-    Session;
-register_session(server, _, Port, #session{is_resumable = new} = Session0) ->
-    Session = Session0#session{is_resumable = true},
-    ssl_manager:register_session(Port, Session),
-    Session;
-register_session(_, _, _, Session) ->
-    Session. %% Already registered
-
-invalidate_session(client, Host, Port, Session) ->
-    ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Host, Port, Session);
-invalidate_session(server, _, Port, Session) ->
-    ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Port, Session).
-
-initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions}, User,
-	      {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) ->
-    ConnectionStates = tls_record:init_connection_states(Role),
-    
-    SessionCacheCb = case application:get_env(ssl, session_cb) of
-			 {ok, Cb} when is_atom(Cb) ->
-			    Cb;
-			 _  ->
-			     ssl_session_cache
-		     end,
+time_to_renegotiate(_Data, 
+		    #connection_states{current_write = 
+					   #connection_state{sequence_number = Num}}, 
+		    RenegotiateAt) ->
     
-    Monitor = erlang:monitor(process, User),
-
-    #state{socket_options = SocketOptions,
-	   %% We do not want to save the password in the state so that
-	   %% could be written in the clear into error logs.
-	   ssl_options = SSLOptions#ssl_options{password = undefined},	   
-	   session = #session{is_resumable = new},
-	   transport_cb = CbModule,
-	   data_tag = DataTag,
-	   close_tag = CloseTag,
-	   error_tag = ErrorTag,
-	   role = Role,
-	   host = Host,
-	   port = Port,
-	   socket = Socket,
-	   connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-	   tls_handshake_buffer = <<>>,
-	   tls_record_buffer = <<>>,
-	   tls_cipher_texts = [],
-	   user_application = {Monitor, User},
-	   user_data_buffer = <<>>,
-	   log_alert = true,
-	   session_cache_cb = SessionCacheCb,
-	   renegotiation = {false, first},
-	   start_or_recv_from = undefined,
-	   send_queue = queue:new()
-	  }.
+    %% We could do test:
+    %% is_time_to_renegotiate((erlang:byte_size(_Data) div ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH) + 1, RenegotiateAt),
+    %% but we chose to have a some what lower renegotiateAt and a much cheaper test 
+    is_time_to_renegotiate(Num, RenegotiateAt).
 
-get_socket_opts(_,_,[], _, Acc) ->
-    {ok, Acc};
-get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [mode | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
-    get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, 
-		    [{mode, SockOpts#socket_options.mode} | Acc]);
-get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [packet | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
-    case SockOpts#socket_options.packet of
-	{Type, headers} ->
-	    get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{packet, Type} | Acc]);
-	Type ->
-	    get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{packet, Type} | Acc])
-    end;
-get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [header | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
-    get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, 
-		    [{header, SockOpts#socket_options.header} | Acc]);
-get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [active | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
-    get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, 
-		    [{active, SockOpts#socket_options.active} | Acc]);
-get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [Tag | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
-    try ssl_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, [Tag]) of
-	{ok, [Opt]} ->
-	    get_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [Opt | Acc]);
-	{error, Error} ->
-	    {error, {options, {socket_options, Tag, Error}}}
-    catch
-	%% So that inet behavior does not crash our process
-	_:Error -> {error, {options, {socket_options, Tag, Error}}}
-    end;
-get_socket_opts(_, _,Opts, _,_) ->
-    {error, {options, {socket_options, Opts, function_clause}}}.
-
-set_socket_opts(_,_, [], SockOpts, []) ->
-    {ok, SockOpts};
-set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [], SockOpts, Other) ->
-    %% Set non emulated options 
-    try ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) of
-	ok ->
-	    {ok, SockOpts};
-	{error, InetError} ->
-	    {{error, {options, {socket_options, Other, InetError}}}, SockOpts}
-    catch
-	_:Error ->
-	    %% So that inet behavior does not crash our process
-	    {{error, {options, {socket_options, Other, Error}}}, SockOpts}
-    end;
+is_time_to_renegotiate(N, M) when N < M->
+    false;
+is_time_to_renegotiate(_,_) ->
+    true.
+renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State, Actions) ->
+    %% Handle same way as if server requested
+    %% the renegotiation
+    Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
+    {next_state, connection, State#state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0}, 
+     [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]};
 
-set_socket_opts(Transport,Socket, [{mode, Mode}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) when Mode == list; Mode == binary ->
-    set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, 
-		    SockOpts#socket_options{mode = Mode}, Other);
-set_socket_opts(_, _, [{mode, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) ->
-    {{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}}}, SockOpts};
-set_socket_opts(Transport,Socket, [{packet, Packet}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) when Packet == raw;
-									Packet == 0;
-									Packet == 1;
-									Packet == 2;
-									Packet == 4;
-									Packet == asn1;
-									Packet == cdr;
-									Packet == sunrm;
-									Packet == fcgi;
-									Packet == tpkt;
-									Packet == line;
-									Packet == http;
-									Packet == httph;
-									Packet == http_bin;
-									Packet == httph_bin ->
-    set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, 
-		    SockOpts#socket_options{packet = Packet}, Other);
-set_socket_opts(_, _, [{packet, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) ->
-    {{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}}}, SockOpts};
-set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [{header, Header}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) when is_integer(Header) ->
-    set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, 
-		    SockOpts#socket_options{header = Header}, Other);
-set_socket_opts(_, _, [{header, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) ->
-    {{error,{options, {socket_options, Opt}}}, SockOpts};
-set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [{active, Active}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) when Active == once;
-										   Active == true;
-										   Active == false ->
-    set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, 
-		    SockOpts#socket_options{active = Active}, Other);
-set_socket_opts(_, _, [{active, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) ->
-    {{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}} }, SockOpts};
-set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, [Opt | Opts], SockOpts, Other) ->
-    set_socket_opts(Transport, Socket, Opts, SockOpts, [Opt | Other]).
+renegotiate(#state{role = server,
+		   socket = Socket,
+		   transport_cb = Transport,
+		   negotiated_version = Version,
+		   connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Actions) ->
+    HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(),
+    Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version),
+    Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
+    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = 
+	ssl_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
+    State1 = State0#state{connection_states = 
+			     ConnectionStates,
+			 tls_handshake_history = Hs0},
+    {Record, State} = next_record(State1),
+    next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions).
 
 handle_alerts([], Result) ->
     Result;
-handle_alerts(_, {stop, _, _} = Stop) ->
-    %% If it is a fatal alert immediately close 
+handle_alerts(_, {stop,_} = Stop) ->
     Stop;
-handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State, _Timeout}) ->
-    handle_alerts(Alerts, handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)).
-
+handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) ->
+     handle_alerts(Alerts, handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State));
+handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State, _Actions}) ->
+     handle_alerts(Alerts, handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)).
 handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName,
 	     #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, 
-		    start_or_recv_from = From, host = Host,
+		    ssl_options = SslOpts, start_or_recv_from = From, host = Host,
 		    port = Port, session = Session, user_application = {_Mon, Pid},
-		    log_alert = Log, role = Role, socket_options = Opts} = State) ->
+		    role = Role, socket_options = Opts, tracker = Tracker}) ->
     invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session),
-    log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
-    alert_user(Transport, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role),
-    {stop, normal, State};
+    log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert),
+    alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role),
+    {stop, normal};
 
 handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, 
 	     StateName, State) -> 
     handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State),
-    {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}, State};
+    {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}};
 
 handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, 
-	     #state{log_alert = Log, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) ->
-    log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
+	     #state{ssl_options = SslOpts, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) ->
+    log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert),
     handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State),
-    {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}, State};
+    {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}};
 
 handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, 
-	     #state{log_alert = Log, renegotiation = {true, From}} = State0) ->
-    log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
-    gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}),
+	     #state{ssl_options = SslOpts, renegotiation = {true, From}} = State0) ->
+    log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert),
+    gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}),
     {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
-    next_state(StateName, connection, Record, State);
+    %% Go back to connection!
+    next_event(connection, Record, State);
 
-handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?USER_CANCELED} = Alert, StateName, 
-	     #state{log_alert = Log} = State0) ->
-    log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
+%% Gracefully log and ignore all other warning alerts
+handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName,
+	     #state{ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) ->
+    log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert),
     {Record, State} = next_record(State0),
-    next_state(StateName, StateName, Record, State).
+    next_event(StateName, Record, State).
 
-alert_user(Transport, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role) ->
-    alert_user(Transport,Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role);
-alert_user(Transport, Socket,_, _, _, From, Alert, Role) ->
-    alert_user(Transport, Socket, From, Alert, Role).
+alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role) ->
+    alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role);
+alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket,_, _, _, From, Alert, Role) ->
+    alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role).
 
-alert_user(Transport, Socket, From, Alert, Role) ->
-    alert_user(Transport, Socket, false, no_pid, From, Alert, Role).
+alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role) ->
+    alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, false, no_pid, From, Alert, Role).
 
-alert_user(_,_, false = Active, Pid, From,  Alert, Role) ->
+alert_user(_, _, _, false = Active, Pid, From,  Alert, Role) when From =/= undefined ->
     %% If there is an outstanding ssl_accept | recv
     %% From will be defined and send_or_reply will
     %% send the appropriate error message.
     ReasonCode = ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role),
     send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, {error, ReasonCode});
-alert_user(Transport, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role) ->
+alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role) ->
     case ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role) of
 	closed ->
 	    send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From,
-			  {ssl_closed, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket)});
+			  {ssl_closed, ssl_socket:socket(self(), 
+							 Transport, Socket, ?MODULE, Tracker)});
 	ReasonCode ->
 	    send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From,
-			  {ssl_error, ssl_socket:socket(self(), Transport, Socket), ReasonCode})
+			  {ssl_error, ssl_socket:socket(self(), 
+							Transport, Socket, ?MODULE, Tracker), ReasonCode})
     end.
 
 log_alert(true, Info, Alert) ->
@@ -2845,240 +923,119 @@ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName,
 		 #state{transport_cb = Transport,
 			socket = Socket,
 			connection_states = ConnectionStates,
-			log_alert = Log} = State) ->
+			ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) ->
     try %% Try to tell the other side
 	{BinMsg, _} =
-	encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates),
-	Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-	workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, Transport)
+	ssl_alert:encode(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates),
+	Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg)
     catch _:_ ->  %% Can crash if we are in a uninitialized state
 	    ignore
     end,
     try %% Try to tell the local user
-	log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
+	log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert),
 	handle_normal_shutdown(Alert,StateName, State)
     catch _:_ ->
 	    ok
     end,
-    {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State}.
+    {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}}.
 
 handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, _, #state{socket = Socket,
 					transport_cb = Transport,
 					start_or_recv_from = StartFrom,
+					tracker = Tracker,
 					role = Role, renegotiation = {false, first}}) ->
-    alert_user(Transport, Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role);
+    alert_user(Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role);
 
 handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{socket = Socket,
 						socket_options = Opts,
 						transport_cb = Transport,
 						user_application = {_Mon, Pid},
+						tracker = Tracker,
 						start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, role = Role}) ->
-    alert_user(Transport, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role).
-
-handle_unexpected_message(Msg, Info, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
-    Alert =  ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE),
-    handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, {Info, Msg}, State).
-
-make_premaster_secret({MajVer, MinVer}, rsa) ->
-    Rand = ssl:random_bytes(?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES-2),
-    <<?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), Rand/binary>>;
-make_premaster_secret(_, _) ->
-    undefined.
-
-ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {true, Initiater}} = State) 
-  when Initiater == internal;
-       Initiater == peer ->
-    State#state{renegotiation = undefined};
-ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {true, From}} = State) ->    
-    gen_fsm:reply(From, ok),
-    State#state{renegotiation = undefined};
-ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {false, first}, 
-		      start_or_recv_from = StartFrom,
-		      timer = Timer} = State) when StartFrom =/= undefined ->
-    gen_fsm:reply(StartFrom, connected),
-    cancel_timer(Timer),
-    State#state{renegotiation = undefined, start_or_recv_from = undefined, timer = undefined};
-ack_connection(State) ->
-    State.
-
-renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State) ->
-    %% Handle same way as if server requested
-    %% the renegotiation
-    Hs0 = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
-    connection(#hello_request{}, State#state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0});
-renegotiate(#state{role = server,
-		   socket = Socket,
-		   transport_cb = Transport,
-		   negotiated_version = Version,
-		   connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
-    HelloRequest = tls_handshake:hello_request(),
-    Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version),
-    Hs0 = tls_handshake:init_handshake_history(),
-    {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = 
-	tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
-    Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
-    {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{connection_states = 
-					       ConnectionStates,
-					       tls_handshake_history = Hs0}),
-    next_state(connection, hello, Record, State#state{allow_renegotiate = true}).
-
-notify_senders(SendQueue) -> 
-    lists:foreach(fun({From, _}) ->
- 			  gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, closed})
- 		  end, queue:to_list(SendQueue)).
-
-notify_renegotiater({true, From}) when not is_atom(From)  ->
-    gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, closed});
-notify_renegotiater(_) ->
-    ok.
-
-terminate_alert(Reason, Version, ConnectionStates) when Reason == normal;
-							Reason == user_close ->
-    {BinAlert, _} = encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY),
-				 Version, ConnectionStates),
-    BinAlert;
-terminate_alert({shutdown, _}, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
-    {BinAlert, _} = encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY),
-				 Version, ConnectionStates),
-    BinAlert;
-
-terminate_alert(_, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
-    {BinAlert, _} = encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR),
-				 Version, ConnectionStates),
-    BinAlert.
-
-workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, gen_tcp = Transport) ->
-    %% Standard trick to try to make sure all
-    %% data sent to the tcp port is really delivered to the
-    %% peer application before tcp port is closed so that the peer will
-    %% get the correct TLS alert message and not only a transport close.
-    ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]),
-    Transport:shutdown(Socket, write),
-    %% Will return when other side has closed or after 30 s
-    %% e.g. we do not want to hang if something goes wrong
-    %% with the network but we want to maximise the odds that
-    %% peer application gets all data sent on the tcp connection.
-    Transport:recv(Socket, 0, 30000);
-workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, Transport) ->
-    Transport:close(Socket).
+    alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role).
 
-get_timeout(#state{ssl_options=#ssl_options{hibernate_after = undefined}}) ->
-    infinity;
-get_timeout(#state{ssl_options=#ssl_options{hibernate_after = HibernateAfter}}) ->
-    HibernateAfter.
-
-handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = <<>>}}) ->
-    %% No trusted certs specified
-    ok;
-handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref,
-			       cert_db = CertDb,
-			       ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = undefined}}) ->
-    %% Certs provided as DER directly can not be shared
-    %% with other connections and it is safe to delete them when the connection ends.
-    ssl_pkix_db:remove_trusted_certs(Ref, CertDb);
-handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{file_ref_db = undefined}) ->
-    %% Something went wrong early (typically cacertfile does not exist) so there is nothing to handle
-    ok;
-handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref,
-			       file_ref_db = RefDb,
-			       ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = File}}) ->
-    case ssl_pkix_db:ref_count(Ref, RefDb, -1) of
-	0 ->
-	    ssl_manager:clean_cert_db(Ref, File);
+handle_close_alert(Data, StateName, State0) ->
+    case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of
+	{#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, State} ->
+	    [Alert|_] = decode_alerts(EncAlerts),
+	    handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State);
 	_ ->
 	    ok
     end.
 
-get_current_connection_state_prf(CStates, Direction) ->
-	CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(CStates, Direction),
-	CS#connection_state.security_parameters#security_parameters.prf_algorithm.
-get_pending_connection_state_prf(CStates, Direction) ->
-	CS = tls_record:pending_connection_state(CStates, Direction),
-	CS#connection_state.security_parameters#security_parameters.prf_algorithm.
-
-connection_hashsign(HashSign = {_, _}, _State) ->
-    HashSign;
-connection_hashsign(_, #state{hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}) ->
-    HashSign.
-
-%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1.  Signature Algorithms
-%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
-%% server MUST do the following:
-%%
-%% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA,
-%%    DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had
-%%    sent the value {sha1,rsa}.
-%%
-%% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS,
-%%    DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}.
-%%
-%% -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
-%%    ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}.
-
-default_hashsign(_Version = {Major, Minor}, KeyExchange)
-  when Major == 3 andalso Minor >= 3 andalso
-       (KeyExchange == rsa orelse
-	KeyExchange == dhe_rsa orelse
-	KeyExchange == dh_rsa orelse
-	KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa orelse
-	KeyExchange == srp_rsa) ->
-    {sha, rsa};
-default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange)
-  when KeyExchange == rsa;
-       KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
-       KeyExchange == dh_rsa;
-       KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa;
-       KeyExchange == srp_rsa ->
-    {md5sha, rsa};
-default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange)
-  when KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa;
-       KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa;
-       KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa ->
-    {sha, ecdsa};
-default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange)
-  when KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
-       KeyExchange == dh_dss;
-       KeyExchange == srp_dss ->
-    {sha, dsa};
-default_hashsign(_Version, KeyExchange)
-  when KeyExchange == dh_anon;
-       KeyExchange == ecdh_anon;
-       KeyExchange == psk;
-       KeyExchange == dhe_psk;
-       KeyExchange == rsa_psk;
-       KeyExchange == srp_anon ->
-    {null, anon}.
-
-start_or_recv_cancel_timer(infinity, _RecvFrom) ->
-    undefined;
-start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom) ->
-    erlang:send_after(Timeout, self(), {cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}).
-
 cancel_timer(undefined) ->
     ok;
 cancel_timer(Timer) ->
     erlang:cancel_timer(Timer),
     ok.
 
-handle_unrecv_data(StateName, #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport} = State) ->
-    ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]),
-    case Transport:recv(Socket, 0, 0) of
-	{error, closed} ->
-	    ok;
-	{ok, Data} ->
-	    handle_close_alert(Data, StateName, State)
-    end.
-
-handle_close_alert(Data, StateName, State0) ->
-    case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of
-	{#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, State} ->
-	    [Alert|_] = decode_alerts(EncAlerts),
-	    handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State);
-	_ ->
-	    ok
-    end.
+invalidate_session(client, Host, Port, Session) ->
+    ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Host, Port, Session);
+invalidate_session(server, _, Port, Session) ->
+    ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Port, Session).
 
-select_curve(#state{client_ecc = {[Curve|_], _}}) ->
-    {namedCurve, Curve};
-select_curve(_) ->
-    {namedCurve, ?secp256k1}.
+%% User closes or recursive call!
+close({close, Timeout}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, _,_) ->
+    ssl_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]),
+    Transport:shutdown(Socket, write),
+    _ = Transport:recv(Socket, 0, Timeout),
+    ok;
+%% Peer closed socket
+close({shutdown, transport_closed}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, ConnectionStates, Check) ->
+    close({close, 0}, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check);
+%% We generate fatal alert
+close({shutdown, own_alert}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, ConnectionStates, Check) ->
+    %% Standard trick to try to make sure all
+    %% data sent to the tcp port is really delivered to the
+    %% peer application before tcp port is closed so that the peer will
+    %% get the correct TLS alert message and not only a transport close.
+    %% Will return when other side has closed or after timout millisec
+    %% e.g. we do not want to hang if something goes wrong
+    %% with the network but we want to maximise the odds that
+    %% peer application gets all data sent on the tcp connection.
+    close({close, ?DEFAULT_TIMEOUT}, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check);
+close(downgrade, _,_,_,_) ->
+    ok;
+%% Other
+close(_, Socket, Transport, _,_) -> 
+    Transport:close(Socket).
+	       
+convert_state(#state{ssl_options = Options} = State, up, "5.3.5", "5.3.6") ->
+    State#state{ssl_options = convert_options_partial_chain(Options, up)};
+convert_state(#state{ssl_options = Options} = State, down, "5.3.6", "5.3.5") ->
+    State#state{ssl_options = convert_options_partial_chain(Options, down)}.
+
+convert_options_partial_chain(Options, up) ->
+    {Head, Tail} = lists:split(5, tuple_to_list(Options)),
+    list_to_tuple(Head ++ [{partial_chain, fun(_) -> unknown_ca end}] ++ Tail);
+convert_options_partial_chain(Options, down) ->
+    list_to_tuple(proplists:delete(partial_chain, tuple_to_list(Options))).
+
+handle_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = HelloExtensions}, State0) ->
+    case HelloExtensions#hello_extensions.sni of
+	undefined ->
+	    State0;
+	#sni{hostname = Hostname} ->
+	    NewOptions = update_ssl_options_from_sni(State0#state.ssl_options, Hostname),
+	    case NewOptions of
+		undefined ->
+		    State0;
+		_ ->
+		    {ok, Ref, CertDbHandle, FileRefHandle, CacheHandle, CRLDbHandle, OwnCert, Key, DHParams} = 
+			ssl_config:init(NewOptions, State0#state.role),
+		    State0#state{
+		      session = State0#state.session#session{own_certificate = OwnCert},
+		      file_ref_db = FileRefHandle,
+		      cert_db_ref = Ref,
+		      cert_db = CertDbHandle,
+		      crl_db = CRLDbHandle,
+		      session_cache = CacheHandle,
+		      private_key = Key,
+		      diffie_hellman_params = DHParams,
+		      ssl_options = NewOptions,
+		      sni_hostname = Hostname
+		     }
+	    end
+    end;
+handle_sni_extension(_, State) ->
+    State.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.hrl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0af2258932
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.hrl
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+%%
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+
+%%
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Purpose: SSL/TLS specific state
+%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-ifndef(tls_connection).
+-define(tls_connection, true).
+
+-include("ssl_connection.hrl").
+-include("tls_record.hrl").
+
+-record(protocol_buffers, {
+	  tls_packets = [], %%           :: [#ssl_tls{}],  % Not yet handled decode SSL/TLS packets.
+          tls_record_buffer = <<>>, %%    :: binary(),  % Buffer of incomplete records
+          tls_handshake_buffer = <<>>, %% :: binary(),  % Buffer of incomplete handshakes
+	  tls_cipher_texts = []       %%:: [binary()]
+	 }).
+
+-endif. % -ifdef(tls_connection).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection_sup.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_sup.erl
index fb1c6e11a6..d5b228dc94 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection_sup.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_sup.erl
@@ -1,27 +1,28 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %% 
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %% 
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%% 
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
+%%
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %% 
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
 
 %%
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Purpose: The top supervisor for the ftp hangs under inets_sup.
+%% Purpose: Supervisor for a SSL/TLS connection
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
--module(ssl_connection_sup).
+-module(tls_connection_sup).
 
 -behaviour(supervisor).
 
@@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ init(_O) ->
     StartFunc = {tls_connection, start_link, []},
     Restart = temporary, % E.g. should not be restarted
     Shutdown = 4000,
-    Modules = [tls_connection],
+    Modules = [tls_connection, ssl_connection],
     Type = worker,
     
     ChildSpec = {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules},
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
index 51fd2e1dc9..566b7db332 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
@@ -1,53 +1,41 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
 
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Purpose: Help funtions for handling the SSL-handshake protocol
+%% Purpose: Help funtions for handling the TLS (specific parts of)
+%%% SSL/TLS/DTLS handshake protocol
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 -module(tls_handshake).
 
 -include("tls_handshake.hrl").
 -include("tls_record.hrl").
--include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
 -include("ssl_alert.hrl").
 -include("ssl_internal.hrl").
--include("ssl_srp.hrl").
+-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
 -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
 
--export([master_secret/4, client_hello/8, server_hello/7, hello/4,
-	 hello_request/0, certify/7, certificate/4,
-	 client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5,
-	 certificate_request/3, key_exchange/3, server_key_exchange_hash/2,
-	 finished/5, verify_connection/6, get_tls_handshake/3,
-	 decode_client_key/3, decode_server_key/3, server_hello_done/0,
-	 encode_handshake/2, init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/2,
-	 decrypt_premaster_secret/2, prf/5, next_protocol/1]).
-
--export([dec_hello_extensions/2]).
-
--type tls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | #server_hello{} |
-			 #server_hello_done{} | #certificate{} | #certificate_request{} |
-			 #client_key_exchange{} | #finished{} | #certificate_verify{} |
-			 #hello_request{} | #next_protocol{}.
+-export([client_hello/8, hello/4,
+	 get_tls_handshake/4, encode_handshake/2, decode_handshake/4]).
 
--define(NAMED_CURVE_TYPE, 3).
+-type tls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake().
 
 %%====================================================================
 %% Internal application API
@@ -61,1767 +49,239 @@
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates,
 	     #ssl_options{versions = Versions,
-			  ciphers = UserSuites
+			  ciphers = UserSuites,
+			  fallback = Fallback
 			 } = SslOpts,
 	     Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert) ->
     Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions),
-    Pending = tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+    Pending = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
     SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    Ciphers = available_suites(UserSuites, Version),
-    SRP = srp_user(SslOpts),
-    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = default_ecc_extensions(Version),
-
-    Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert),
-
+    AvailableCipherSuites = ssl_handshake:available_suites(UserSuites, Version),     
+    Extensions = ssl_handshake:client_hello_extensions(Host, Version, 
+						       AvailableCipherSuites,
+						       SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
+    CipherSuites = 
+	case Fallback of
+	    true ->
+	        [?TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV | ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(AvailableCipherSuites, Renegotiation)];
+	    false ->
+		ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(AvailableCipherSuites, Renegotiation)
+	end,
+    Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert),    
     #client_hello{session_id = Id,
 		  client_version = Version,
-		  cipher_suites = cipher_suites(Ciphers, Renegotiation),
-		  compression_methods = tls_record:compressions(),
+		  cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
+		  compression_methods = ssl_record:compressions(),
 		  random = SecParams#security_parameters.client_random,
-
-		  renegotiation_info =
-		      renegotiation_info(client, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
-		  srp = SRP,
-		  hash_signs = default_hash_signs(),
-		  ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
-		  elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-		  next_protocol_negotiation =
-		      encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, Renegotiation)
-		 }.
-
-encode_protocol(Protocol, Acc) ->
-	Len = byte_size(Protocol),
-	<<Acc/binary, ?BYTE(Len), Protocol/binary>>.
-
-encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(undefined) ->
-	undefined;
-
-encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(Protocols) ->
-	#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec server_hello(session_id(), tls_version(), #connection_states{}, 
-		   boolean(), [binary()] | undefined,
-		   #ec_point_formats{} | undefined,
-		   #elliptic_curves{} | undefined) -> #server_hello{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a server hello message.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation,
-	     ProtocolsAdvertisedOnServer, EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves) ->
-    Pending = tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    #server_hello{server_version = Version,
-		  cipher_suite = SecParams#security_parameters.cipher_suite,
-                  compression_method = 
-		  SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm,
-		  random = SecParams#security_parameters.server_random,
-		  session_id = SessionId,
-		  renegotiation_info = 
-		  renegotiation_info(server, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
-		  ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
-		  elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-		  next_protocol_negotiation = encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(ProtocolsAdvertisedOnServer)
+		  extensions = Extensions
 		 }.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec hello_request() -> #hello_request{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a hello request message sent by server to 
-%% trigger renegotiation.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-hello_request() ->
-    #hello_request{}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec hello(#server_hello{} | #client_hello{}, #ssl_options{},
 	    #connection_states{} | {inet:port_number(), #session{}, db_handle(),
-				    atom(), #connection_states{}, binary()},
+				    atom(), #connection_states{}, 
+				    binary() | undefined, ssl_cipher:key_algo()},
 	    boolean()) ->
-			  {tls_version(), session_id(), #connection_states{}, binary() | undefined}|
-			  {tls_version(), {resumed | new, #session{}}, #connection_states{}, [binary()] | undefined,
-			  [oid()] | undefined, [oid()] | undefined} |
-			  #alert{}.
+		   {tls_record:tls_version(), session_id(), 
+		    #connection_states{}, alpn | npn, binary() | undefined}|
+		   {tls_record:tls_version(), {resumed | new, #session{}}, 
+		    #connection_states{}, binary() | undefined, 
+		    #hello_extensions{}, {ssl_cipher:hash(), ssl_cipher:sign_algo()} | undefined} |
+		   #alert{}.
 %%
 %% Description: Handles a recieved hello message
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, server_version = Version,
-		    compression_method = Compression, random = Random,
-		    session_id = SessionId, renegotiation_info = Info,
-		    hash_signs = _HashSigns} = Hello,
-      #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation, next_protocol_selector = NextProtocolSelector,
-		   versions = SupportedVersions},
+hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, random = Random,
+		    cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
+		    compression_method = Compression,
+		    session_id = SessionId, extensions = HelloExt},
+      #ssl_options{versions = SupportedVersions} = SslOpt,
       ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
-    %%TODO: select hash and signature algorigthm
     case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, SupportedVersions) of
 	true ->
-	    case handle_renegotiation_info(client, Info, ConnectionStates0, 
-					   Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, []) of
-		{ok, ConnectionStates1} ->
-		    ConnectionStates =
-			hello_pending_connection_states(client, Version, CipherSuite, Random,
-							Compression, ConnectionStates1),
-		    case handle_next_protocol(Hello, NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiation) of
-			#alert{} = Alert ->
-			    Alert;
-			    Protocol ->
-			    {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates, Protocol}
-		    end;
-		#alert{} = Alert ->
-		    Alert
-	    end;
+	    handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite,
+					   Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation);
 	false ->
 	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION)
     end;
 			       
-hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello,
+hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion,
+		    cipher_suites = CipherSuites} = Hello,
       #ssl_options{versions = Versions} = SslOpts,
-      {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert}, Renegotiation) ->
-    %% TODO: select hash and signature algorithm
-    Version = select_version(ClientVersion, Versions),
-    case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of
-	true ->
-	    %% TODO: need to take supported Curves into Account when selecting the CipherSuite....
-	    %%       if whe have an ECDSA cert with an unsupported curve, we need to drop ECDSA ciphers
-	    {Type, #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session1}
-		= select_session(Hello, Port, Session0, Version, 
-				 SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert),
-	    case CipherSuite of 
-		no_suite ->
-		    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
-		_ ->
-		    try handle_hello_extensions(Hello, Version, SslOpts, Session1, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
-			{Session, ConnectionStates, ProtocolsToAdvertise, ECPointFormats, EllipticCurves} ->
-			    {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates,
-			     ProtocolsToAdvertise, ECPointFormats, EllipticCurves}
-		    catch throw:Alert ->
-			    Alert
-		    end
+      Info, Renegotiation) ->
+    Version = ssl_handshake:select_version(tls_record, ClientVersion, Versions),
+    case ssl_cipher:is_fallback(CipherSuites) of
+	true -> 
+	    Highest = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions),
+	    case tls_record:is_higher(Highest, Version) of
+		true ->
+		    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+		false ->				     
+		    handle_client_hello(Version, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation)
 	    end;
 	false ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION)
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), integer() | nolimit,
-	      verify_peer | verify_none, {fun(), term},
-	      client | server) ->  {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
-	MaxPathLen, _Verify, VerifyFunAndState, Role) ->
-    [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs,
-      
-    ValidationFunAndState =
-	case VerifyFunAndState of
-	    undefined ->
-		{fun(OtpCert, ExtensionOrVerifyResult, SslState) ->
-			 ssl_certificate:validate_extension(OtpCert,
-							    ExtensionOrVerifyResult, SslState)
-		 end, Role};
-	    {Fun, UserState0} ->
-		{fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) ->
-			 case ssl_certificate:validate_extension(OtpCert,
-								 Extension,
-								 SslState) of
-			     {valid, NewSslState} ->
-				 {valid, {NewSslState, UserState}};
-			     {fail, Reason} ->
-				 apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Reason, UserState,
-						SslState);
-			     {unknown, _} ->
-				 apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert,
-						Extension, UserState, SslState)
-			 end;
-		    (OtpCert, VerifyResult, {SslState, UserState}) ->
-			 apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState,
-					SslState)
-		 end, {Role, UserState0}}
-	end,
-
-    try
-	{TrustedErlCert, CertPath}  =
-	    ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
-	case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedErlCert,
-					      CertPath,
-					     [{max_path_length,
-					       MaxPathLen},
-					      {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of
-	    {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} ->
-		{PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo};
-	    {error, Reason} ->
-		path_validation_alert(Reason)
-	end
-    catch
-	error:_ ->
-	    %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN)
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec certificate(der_cert(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), client | server) -> #certificate{} | #alert{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a certificate message.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client) ->
-    Chain =
-	case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of
-	    {ok, CertChain} ->
-		CertChain;
-	    {error, _} -> 
-		%% If no suitable certificate is available, the client
-		%% SHOULD send a certificate message containing no
-		%% certificates. (chapter 7.4.6. RFC 4346)
-		[]	 
-	end,
-    #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain};
-
-certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) ->
-    case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of
-	{ok, Chain} ->
-	    #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain};
-	{error, _} ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR)
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec client_certificate_verify(undefined | der_cert(), binary(),
-				tls_version(), term(), private_key(),
-				tls_handshake_history()) ->
-    #certificate_verify{} | ignore | #alert{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a certificate_verify message, called by the client.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-client_certificate_verify(undefined, _, _, _, _, _) ->
-    ignore;
-client_certificate_verify(_, _, _, _, undefined, _) ->
-    ignore;
-client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version,
-			  {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
-			  PrivateKey, {Handshake, _}) ->
-    case public_key:pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(OwnCert) of
-	true ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
-	false ->
-	    Hashes =
-		calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake),
-	    Signed = digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey),
-	    #certificate_verify{signature = Signed, hashsign_algorithm = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}}
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), tls_version(), term(),
-			 binary(), tls_handshake_history()) -> valid | #alert{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo, Version,
-		   HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) ->
-    Hash = calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake),
-    case verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PublicKeyInfo) of
-	true ->
-	    valid;
-	_ ->
-    	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE)
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec verify_signature(tls_version(), binary(), {term(), term()}, binary(),
-				   public_key_info()) -> true | false.
-%%
-%% Description: Checks that a public_key signature is valid.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-verify_signature(_Version, _Hash, {_HashAlgo, anon}, _Signature, _) ->
-    true;
-verify_signature({3, Minor}, Hash, {HashAlgo, rsa}, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams})
-  when Minor >= 3 ->
-    public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, PubKey);
-verify_signature(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams}) ->
-    case public_key:decrypt_public(Signature, PubKey,
-				   [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) of
-	Hash -> true;
-	_    -> false
-    end;
-verify_signature(_Version, Hash, {HashAlgo, dsa}, Signature, {?'id-dsa', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) ->
-    public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams});
-verify_signature(_Version, Hash, {HashAlgo, ecdsa}, Signature, {?'id-ecPublicKey', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) ->
-    public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec certificate_request(#connection_states{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref()) ->
-    #certificate_request{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a certificate_request message, called by the server.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certificate_request(ConnectionStates, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
-    #connection_state{security_parameters = 
-		      #security_parameters{cipher_suite = CipherSuite}} =
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    Types = certificate_types(CipherSuite),
-    HashSigns = default_hash_signs(),
-    Authorities = certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
-    #certificate_request{
-		    certificate_types = Types,
-		    hashsign_algorithms = HashSigns,
-		    certificate_authorities = Authorities
-		   }.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec key_exchange(client | server, tls_version(),
-		   {premaster_secret, binary(), public_key_info()} |
-		   {dh, binary()} |
-		   {dh, {binary(), binary()}, #'DHParameter'{}, {HashAlgo::atom(), SignAlgo::atom()},
-		   binary(), binary(), private_key()} |
-		   {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{}} |
-		   {psk, binary()} |
-		   {dhe_psk, binary(), binary()} |
-		   {srp, {binary(), binary()}, #srp_user{}, {HashAlgo::atom(), SignAlgo::atom()},
-		   binary(), binary(), private_key()}) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{} | #server_key_exchange{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a keyexchange message.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {premaster_secret, Secret, {_, PublicKey, _}}) ->
-    EncPremasterSecret =
-	encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, PublicKey),
-    #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = EncPremasterSecret};
-
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {dh, PublicKey}) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{
-	      exchange_keys = #client_diffie_hellman_public{
-		dh_public = PublicKey}
-	       };
-
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = {0, ECPublicKey}}}) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{
-	      exchange_keys = #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{
-		dh_public = ECPublicKey}
-	       };
-
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {psk, Identity}) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{
-	      exchange_keys = #client_psk_identity{
-		identity = Identity}
-	       };
-
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {dhe_psk, Identity, PublicKey}) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{
-	      exchange_keys = #client_dhe_psk_identity{
-		identity = Identity,
-		dh_public = PublicKey}
-	       };
-
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, Secret, {_, PublicKey, _}}) ->
-    EncPremasterSecret =
-	encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, PublicKey),
-    #client_key_exchange{
-		exchange_keys = #client_rsa_psk_identity{
-				   identity = PskIdentity,
-		  exchange_keys = EncPremasterSecret}};
-
-key_exchange(client, _Version, {srp, PublicKey}) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{
-	      exchange_keys = #client_srp_public{
-		srp_a = PublicKey}
-	       };
-
-key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, {PublicKey, _},
-			       #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G},
-			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
-    ServerDHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = int_to_bin(P),
-				       dh_g = int_to_bin(G), dh_y = PublicKey},
-    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerDHParams, HashSign,
-			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
-
-key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdh,  #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey =  {0, ECPublicKey},
-						      parameters = ECCurve}, HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom,
-	     PrivateKey}) ->
-    ServerECParams = #server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve, public = ECPublicKey},
-    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerECParams, HashSign,
-			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
-
-key_exchange(server, Version, {psk, PskIdentityHint,
-			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
-    ServerPSKParams = #server_psk_params{hint = PskIdentityHint},
-    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerPSKParams, HashSign,
-			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
-
-key_exchange(server, Version, {dhe_psk, PskIdentityHint, {PublicKey, _},
-			       #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G},
-			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
-    ServerEDHPSKParams = #server_dhe_psk_params{
-      hint = PskIdentityHint,
-      dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = int_to_bin(P),
-				    dh_g = int_to_bin(G), dh_y = PublicKey}
-     },
-    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerEDHPSKParams,
-			    HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
-
-key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, {PublicKey, _},
-			       #srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime,
-					 salt = Salt},
-			       HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
-    ServerSRPParams = #server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator,
-					 srp_s = Salt, srp_b = PublicKey},
-    enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerSRPParams, HashSign,
-			    ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey).
-
-enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
-			ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) ->
-    EncParams = enc_server_key(Params),
-    case HashAlgo of
-	null ->
-	    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-			       params_bin = EncParams,
-			       hashsign = {null, anon},
-			       signature = <<>>};
-	_ ->
-	    Hash =
-		server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary,
-						     ServerRandom/binary,
-						     EncParams/binary>>),
-	    Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey),
-	    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-			       params_bin = EncParams,
-			       hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
-			       signature = Signature}
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec master_secret(tls_version(), #session{} | binary(), #connection_states{},
-		   client | server) -> {binary(), #connection_states{}} | #alert{}.
-%%    
-%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys,
-%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update
-%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails.
-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret}, 
-	      ConnectionStates, Role) ->
-    ConnectionState = 
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams, 
-		      ConnectionStates, Role)
-    catch
-	exit:Reason ->
-	    Report = io_lib:format("Key calculation failed due to ~p",
-				   [Reason]),
-	    error_logger:error_report(Report),
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
-    end;
-
-master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
-    ConnectionState = 
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
-			 client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, 
-    try master_secret(Version, 
-		      calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret,
-				       ClientRandom, ServerRandom),
-		      SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role) 
-    catch
-	exit:Reason ->
-	    Report = io_lib:format("Master secret calculation failed"
-				   " due to ~p", [Reason]),
-	    error_logger:error_report(Report),
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
-    end.
-
--spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}.
-
-next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) ->
-  #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec finished(tls_version(), client | server, integer(), binary(), tls_handshake_history()) ->
-    #finished{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a handshake finished message
-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {Handshake, _}) -> % use the current handshake
-    #finished{verify_data = 
-	      calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake)}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec verify_connection(tls_version(), #finished{}, client | server, integer(), binary(),
-			tls_handshake_history()) -> verified | #alert{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Checks the ssl handshake finished message to verify
-%%              the connection.
-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-verify_connection(Version, #finished{verify_data = Data}, 
-		  Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) ->
-    %% use the previous hashes
-    case calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) of
-	Data ->
-	    verified;
-	_ ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)
+	    handle_client_hello(Version, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation)
     end.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec server_hello_done() ->  #server_hello_done{}.
+-spec encode_handshake(tls_handshake(), tls_record:tls_version()) -> iolist().
 %%     
-%% Description: Creates a server hello done message.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------	    
-server_hello_done() ->
-    #server_hello_done{}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec encode_handshake(tls_handshake(), tls_version()) -> iolist().
-%%     
-%% Description: Encode a handshake packet to binary
+%% Description: Encode a handshake packet
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------x
 encode_handshake(Package, Version) ->
-    {MsgType, Bin} = enc_hs(Package, Version),
+    {MsgType, Bin} = enc_handshake(Package, Version),
     Len = byte_size(Bin),
     [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), Bin].
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec get_tls_handshake(tls_version(), binary(), binary() | iolist()) ->
+-spec get_tls_handshake(tls_record:tls_version(), binary(), binary() | iolist(), #ssl_options{}) ->
      {[tls_handshake()], binary()}.
 %%
 %% Description: Given buffered and new data from ssl_record, collects
 %% and returns it as a list of handshake messages, also returns leftover
 %% data.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-get_tls_handshake(Version, Data, <<>>) ->
-    get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, Data, []);
-get_tls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffer) ->
-    get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), []).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decode_client_key(binary(), key_algo(), tls_version()) ->
-			    #encrypted_premaster_secret{}
-			    | #client_diffie_hellman_public{}
-			    | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{}
-			    | #client_psk_identity{}
-			    | #client_dhe_psk_identity{}
-			    | #client_rsa_psk_identity{}
-			    | #client_srp_public{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) ->
-    dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decode_server_key(binary(), key_algo(), tls_version()) ->
-			       #server_key_params{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) ->
-    dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec init_handshake_history() -> tls_handshake_history().
-
-%%
-%% Description: Initialize the empty handshake history buffer.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-init_handshake_history() ->
-    {[], []}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec update_handshake_history(tls_handshake_history(), Data ::term()) ->
-				      tls_handshake_history().
-%%
-%% Description: Update the handshake history buffer with Data.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-update_handshake_history(Handshake, % special-case SSL2 client hello
-			 <<?CLIENT_HELLO, ?UINT24(_), ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
-			   ?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
-			   ?UINT16(CDLength),
-			   CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
-			   ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>) ->
-    update_handshake_history(Handshake,
-			     <<?CLIENT_HELLO, ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
-			       ?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
-			       ?UINT16(CDLength),
-			       CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
-			       ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>);
-update_handshake_history({Handshake0, _Prev}, Data) ->
-    {[Data|Handshake0], Handshake0}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decrypt_premaster_secret(binary(), #'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> binary().
-
-%%
-%% Description: Public key decryption using the private key.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) ->
-    try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey,
-				   [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
-    catch
-	_:_ ->
-			io:format("decrypt_premaster_secret error"),
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR))
-    end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary().
-%%
-%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) ->
-    MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value),
-    SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value),
-    <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
-
-server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) ->
-    crypto:hash(Hash, Value).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec prf(tls_version(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) ->
-		 {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}.
-%%
-%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _) ->
-    {error, undefined};
-prf({3,1}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
-    {ok, ssl_tls1:prf(?MD5SHA, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)};
-prf({3,_N}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
-    {ok, ssl_tls1:prf(?SHA256, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}.
+get_tls_handshake(Version, Data, <<>>, Options) ->
+    get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, Data, Options, []);
+get_tls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffer, Options) ->
+    get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), Options, []).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %%% Internal functions
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length),
-			Body:Length/binary,Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    Raw = <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), Body/binary>>,
-    H = dec_hs(Version, Type, Body),
-    get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, Rest, [{H,Raw} | Acc]);
-get_tls_handshake_aux(_Version, Data, Acc) ->
-    {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}.
-
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_expired}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_issuer}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_signature}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, name_not_permitted}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_critical_extension}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_revoked}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, selfsigned_peer}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) ->
-     ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNKNOWN_CA);
-path_validation_alert(_) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE).
-
-select_session(Hello, Port, Session, Version,
-	       #ssl_options{ciphers = UserSuites} = SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert) ->
-    SuggestedSessionId = Hello#client_hello.session_id,
-    {SessionId, Resumed} = ssl_session:server_id(Port, SuggestedSessionId,
-						 SslOpts, Cert,
-						 Cache, CacheCb),
-    Suites = available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version),
-    case Resumed of
-        undefined ->
-	    CipherSuite = select_cipher_suite(Hello#client_hello.cipher_suites, Suites),
-	    Compressions = Hello#client_hello.compression_methods,
-	    Compression = select_compression(Compressions),
-	    {new, Session#session{session_id = SessionId,
-				  cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
-				  compression_method = Compression}};
-	_ ->
-	    {resumed, Resumed}
-    end.
-
-available_suites(UserSuites, Version) ->
-    case UserSuites of
-	[] ->
-	    ssl_cipher:suites(Version);
-	_ ->
-	    UserSuites
-    end.
-
-available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version) ->
-    ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version)).
- 
-cipher_suites(Suites, false) ->
-    [?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV | Suites];
-cipher_suites(Suites, true) ->
-    Suites.
-
-srp_user(#ssl_options{srp_identity = {UserName, _}}) ->
-    #srp{username = UserName};
-srp_user(_) ->
-    undefined.
-
-renegotiation_info(client, _, false) ->
-    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined};
-renegotiation_info(server, ConnectionStates, false) ->
-    CS  = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
-	true ->
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)};
-	false ->
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
-    end;
-renegotiation_info(client, ConnectionStates, true) ->
-    CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
-	true ->
-	    Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data};
-	false ->
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
-    end;
-
-renegotiation_info(server, ConnectionStates, true) ->
-    CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
-	true ->
-	    CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
-	    SData  =CS#connection_state.server_verify_data,
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>};
-	false ->
-	    #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
-    end. 
-
-decode_next_protocols({next_protocol_negotiation, Protocols}) ->
-    decode_next_protocols(Protocols, []).
-decode_next_protocols(<<>>, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc);
-decode_next_protocols(<<?BYTE(Len), Protocol:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    case Len of
-        0 ->
-            {error, invalid_next_protocols};
-        _ ->
-            decode_next_protocols(Rest, [Protocol|Acc])
-    end;
-decode_next_protocols(_Bytes, _Acc) ->
-    {error, invalid_next_protocols}.
-
-next_protocol_extension_allowed(NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) ->
-    NextProtocolSelector =/= undefined andalso not Renegotiating.
-
-handle_next_protocol_on_server(#client_hello{next_protocol_negotiation = undefined}, _Renegotiation, _SslOpts) ->
-    undefined;
-
-handle_next_protocol_on_server(#client_hello{next_protocol_negotiation = {next_protocol_negotiation, <<>>}},
-			       false, #ssl_options{next_protocols_advertised = Protocols}) ->
-    Protocols;
-
-handle_next_protocol_on_server(_Hello, _Renegotiation, _SSLOpts) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE). % unexpected next protocol extension
-
-handle_next_protocol(#server_hello{next_protocol_negotiation = undefined},
-    _NextProtocolSelector, _Renegotiating) ->
-    undefined;
-
-handle_next_protocol(#server_hello{next_protocol_negotiation = Protocols},
-    NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) ->
-
-    case next_protocol_extension_allowed(NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) of
-        true ->
-            select_next_protocol(decode_next_protocols(Protocols), NextProtocolSelector);
-        false ->
-            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) % unexpected next protocol extension
-    end.
-
-select_next_protocol({error, _Reason}, _NextProtocolSelector) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-select_next_protocol(Protocols, NextProtocolSelector) ->
-    case NextProtocolSelector(Protocols) of
-	?NO_PROTOCOL ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	Protocol when is_binary(Protocol)  ->
-	    Protocol
-    end.
-
-default_ecc_extensions(Version) ->
-    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
-    case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
-	true ->
-	    EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]},
-	    EllipticCurves = #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ssl_tls1:ecc_curves(Version)},
-	    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves};
-	_ ->
-	    {undefined, undefined}
-    end.
-
-handle_ecc_extensions(Version, EcPointFormats0, EllipticCurves0) ->
-    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
-    case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
-	true ->
-	    EcPointFormats1 = handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats0),
-	    EllipticCurves1 = handle_ecc_curves_extension(Version, EllipticCurves0),
-	    {EcPointFormats1, EllipticCurves1};
-	_ ->
-	    {undefined, undefined}
-    end.
-
-handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) ->
-    #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}.
-
-handle_ecc_curves_extension(_Version, undefined) ->
-    undefined;
-handle_ecc_curves_extension(Version, _) ->
-    #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ssl_tls1:ecc_curves(Version)}.
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(_, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, 
-			  ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
-    {ok, tls_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> 
-    case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
-	true ->
-	    {ok, tls_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
-	false ->
-	    {ok, tls_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}
-    end;
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(_, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
-    {ok, tls_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)};
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, 
-			  ConnectionStates, true, _, _) ->
-    CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
-    SData = CS#connection_state.server_verify_data,    
-    case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of
+handle_client_hello(Version, #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId,
+					   cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
+					   compression_methods = Compressions,
+					   random = Random,
+					   extensions = #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves,
+									  signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} = HelloExt},
+		    #ssl_options{versions = Versions,
+				 signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns} = SslOpts,
+		    {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert, _}, Renegotiation) ->
+    case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of
 	true ->
-	    {ok, ConnectionStates};
+	    AvailableHashSigns = ssl_handshake:available_signature_algs(
+				   ClientHashSigns, SupportedHashSigns, Cert, Version),
+	    ECCCurve = ssl_handshake:select_curve(Curves, ssl_handshake:supported_ecc(Version)),
+	    {Type, #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session1}
+		= ssl_handshake:select_session(SugesstedId, CipherSuites, AvailableHashSigns, Compressions,
+					       Port, Session0#session{ecc = ECCCurve}, Version,
+					       SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert),
+	    case CipherSuite of 
+		no_suite ->
+                    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_ciphers);
+		_ ->
+		    {KeyExAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
+		    case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, Version) of
+			#alert{} = Alert ->
+			    Alert;
+			HashSign ->
+			    handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, HelloExt,
+							   SslOpts, Session1, ConnectionStates0,
+							   Renegotiation, HashSign)
+		    end
+	    end;
 	false ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
-    end;
-handle_renegotiation_info(server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, 
-			  ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) ->
-    
-      case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
-	  true ->
-	      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	  false ->	
-	      CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-	      Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
-	      case Data == ClientVerify of
-		  true ->
-		      {ok, ConnectionStates};
-		  false ->
-		      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
-	      end
-      end;
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) ->
-    handle_renegotiation_info(ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation);
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) ->
-     case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
-	  true ->
-	     ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	 false ->
-	     handle_renegotiation_info(ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation)
-     end.
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
-    CS = tls_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    case {SecureRenegotation, CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation} of
-	{_, true} ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	{true, false} ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION);
-	{false, false} ->
-	    {ok, ConnectionStates}
-    end.
-
-%% Update pending connection states with parameters exchanged via 
-%% hello messages
-%% NOTE : Role is the role of the receiver of the hello message
-%%        currently being processed.
-hello_pending_connection_states(Role, Version, CipherSuite, Random, Compression,
-				 ConnectionStates) ->    
-    ReadState =  
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-    WriteState = 
-	tls_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write),
-    
-    NewReadSecParams = 
-	hello_security_parameters(Role, Version, ReadState, CipherSuite,
-			    Random, Compression),
-    
-    NewWriteSecParams =
-	hello_security_parameters(Role, Version, WriteState, CipherSuite,
-			    Random, Compression),
- 
-    tls_record:update_security_params(NewReadSecParams,
-				    NewWriteSecParams,
-				    ConnectionStates).
-
-hello_security_parameters(client, Version, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random,
-			  Compression) ->   
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams),
-    NewSecParams#security_parameters{
-      server_random = Random,
-      compression_algorithm = Compression
-     };
-
-hello_security_parameters(server, Version, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random,
-			  Compression) ->
-    SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams),
-    NewSecParams#security_parameters{
-      client_random = Random,
-      compression_algorithm = Compression
-     }.
-
-select_version(ClientVersion, Versions) ->   
-    ServerVersion = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions),
-    tls_record:lowest_protocol_version(ClientVersion, ServerVersion).
-
-select_cipher_suite([], _) ->
-   no_suite;
-select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) ->
-    case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of
-	true ->
-	    Suite;
-        false ->
-	    select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites)
+	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION)
     end.
 
-is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) ->
-    lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites).
-
-select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) ->
-    ?NULL.
-
-master_secret(Version, MasterSecret, #security_parameters{
-			 client_random = ClientRandom,
-			 server_random = ServerRandom,
-			 hash_size = HashSize,
-			 prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
-			 key_material_length = KML,
-			 expanded_key_material_length = EKML,
-			 iv_size = IVS},
-	      ConnectionStates, Role) ->
-    {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey,
-     ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV} =
-	setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom,
-		   ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS),
-
-    ConnStates1 = tls_record:set_master_secret(MasterSecret, ConnectionStates),
-    ConnStates2 =
-	tls_record:set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret,
-				  Role, ConnStates1),
-
-    ClientCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ClientIV, key = ClientWriteKey},
-    ServerCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ServerIV, key = ServerWriteKey}, 
-    {MasterSecret, 
-     tls_record:set_pending_cipher_state(ConnStates2, ClientCipherState, 
-					 ServerCipherState, Role)}.
-
-
-dec_hs(_, ?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE(SelectedProtocolLength), SelectedProtocol:SelectedProtocolLength/binary,
-                         ?BYTE(PaddingLength), _Padding:PaddingLength/binary>>) ->
-	#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol};
+get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length),
+				 Body:Length/binary,Rest/binary>>, #ssl_options{v2_hello_compatible = V2Hello} = Opts,  Acc) ->
+    Raw = <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), Body/binary>>,
+    Handshake = decode_handshake(Version, Type, Body, V2Hello),
+    get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, Rest, Opts, [{Handshake,Raw} | Acc]);
+get_tls_handshake_aux(_Version, Data, _, Acc) ->
+    {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}.
 
-dec_hs(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) ->
+decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>, _) ->
     #hello_request{};
 
 %% Client hello v2.
 %% The server must be able to receive such messages, from clients that
 %% are willing to use ssl v3 or higher, but have ssl v2 compatibility.
-dec_hs(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
-				  ?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
-				  ?UINT16(CDLength),
-				  CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
-				  ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>) ->
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
+					    ?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
+					    ?UINT16(CDLength),
+					    CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
+					    ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>, true) ->
     #client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor},
-		  random = ssl_ssl2:client_random(ChallengeData, CDLength),
+		  random = ssl_v2:client_random(ChallengeData, CDLength),
 		  session_id = 0,
-		  cipher_suites = from_3bytes(CipherSuites),
+		  cipher_suites =  ssl_handshake:decode_suites('3_bytes', CipherSuites),
 		  compression_methods = [?NULL],
-		  renegotiation_info = undefined
+		  extensions = #hello_extensions{}
 		 };
-dec_hs(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
-		       ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
-		       ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary,
-		       ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary,
-		       Extensions/binary>>) ->
-
-    DecodedExtensions = dec_hello_extensions(Extensions),
-    RenegotiationInfo = proplists:get_value(renegotiation_info, DecodedExtensions, undefined),
-    SRP = proplists:get_value(srp, DecodedExtensions, undefined),
-    HashSigns = proplists:get_value(hash_signs, DecodedExtensions, undefined),
-    EllipticCurves = proplists:get_value(elliptic_curves, DecodedExtensions,
-					 undefined),
-    NextProtocolNegotiation = proplists:get_value(next_protocol_negotiation, DecodedExtensions, undefined),
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(_),
+					    ?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
+					    ?UINT16(CDLength),
+					    _CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
+					    _ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>, false) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION, ssl_v2_client_hello_no_supported));
+decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+					    ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
+					    ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary,
+					    ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary,
+					    Extensions/binary>>, _) ->
+    
+    DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions({client, Extensions}),
 
     #client_hello{
        client_version = {Major,Minor},
        random = Random,
        session_id = Session_ID,
-       cipher_suites = from_2bytes(CipherSuites),
+       cipher_suites = ssl_handshake:decode_suites('2_bytes', CipherSuites),
        compression_methods = Comp_methods,
-       renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
-	srp = SRP,
-       hash_signs = HashSigns,
-       elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-       next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation
+       extensions = DecodedExtensions
       };
 
-dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
-		       ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
-		       Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method)>>) ->
-    #server_hello{
-	server_version = {Major,Minor},
-	random = Random,
-	session_id = Session_ID,
-	cipher_suite = Cipher_suite,
-	compression_method = Comp_method,
-	renegotiation_info = undefined,
-	hash_signs = undefined,
-	elliptic_curves = undefined};
-
-dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
-		       ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary,
-		       Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method),
-		       ?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>) ->
-    
-    HelloExtensions = dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, []),
-    RenegotiationInfo = proplists:get_value(renegotiation_info, HelloExtensions,
-					   undefined),
-    HashSigns = proplists:get_value(hash_signs, HelloExtensions,
-					   undefined),
-    EllipticCurves = proplists:get_value(elliptic_curves, HelloExtensions,
-					   undefined),
-    NextProtocolNegotiation = proplists:get_value(next_protocol_negotiation, HelloExtensions, undefined),
-
-    #server_hello{
-	server_version = {Major,Minor},
-	random = Random,
-	session_id = Session_ID,
-	cipher_suite = Cipher_suite,
-	compression_method = Comp_method,
-	renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
-	hash_signs = HashSigns,
-	elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-       next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>) ->
-    #certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys) ->
-    #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys};
-dec_hs({Major, Minor}, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
-       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes:CertTypesLen/binary,
-	?UINT16(HashSignsLen), HashSigns:HashSignsLen/binary,
-	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths:CertAuthsLen/binary>>)
-  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
-    HashSignAlgos = [{ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)} ||
-			<<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>> <= HashSigns],
-    #certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
-			 hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos},
-			 certificate_authorities = CertAuths};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
-       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes:CertTypesLen/binary,
-	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths:CertAuthsLen/binary>>) ->
-    #certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
-			 certificate_authorities = CertAuths};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>) ->
-    #server_hello_done{};
-dec_hs({Major, Minor}, ?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,<<HashSign:2/binary, ?UINT16(SignLen), Signature:SignLen/binary>>)
-  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
-    #certificate_verify{hashsign_algorithm = hashsign_dec(HashSign), signature = Signature};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,<<?UINT16(SignLen), Signature:SignLen/binary>>)->
-    #certificate_verify{signature = Signature};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, PKEPMS) ->
-    #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = PKEPMS};
-dec_hs(_Version, ?FINISHED, VerifyData) ->
-    #finished{verify_data = VerifyData};
-dec_hs(_, _, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
-
-dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) ->
-    #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS};
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) ->
-    #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS};
-dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE));
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
-    #client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y};
-dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE));
-dec_client_key(<<?BYTE(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
-    #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y};
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, _) ->
-    #client_psk_identity{identity = Id};
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, _) ->
-    #client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DH_Y};
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary, PKEPMS/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, {3, 0}) ->
-    #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id, exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}};
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary, ?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, _) ->
-    #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id, exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}};
-dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(ALen), A:ALen/binary>>,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, _) ->
-    #client_srp_public{srp_a = A}.
-
-dec_ske_params(Len, Keys, Version) ->
-    <<Params:Len/bytes, Signature/binary>> = Keys,
-    dec_ske_signature(Params, Signature, Version).
-
-dec_ske_signature(Params, <<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo),
-			    ?UINT16(0)>>, {Major, Minor})
-  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
-    HashSign = {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)},
-    {Params, HashSign, <<>>};
-dec_ske_signature(Params, <<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo),
-			    ?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, {Major, Minor})
-  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
-    HashSign = {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)},
-    {Params, HashSign, Signature};
-dec_ske_signature(Params, <<>>, _) ->
-    {Params, {null, anon}, <<>>};
-dec_ske_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(0)>>, _) ->
-    {Params, {null, anon}, <<>>};
-dec_ske_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, _) ->
-    {Params, undefined, Signature};
-dec_ske_signature(_, _, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
-
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
-    Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_ske_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-%% ECParameters with named_curve
-%% TODO: explicit curve
-dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID),
-		 ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary,
-		 _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
-    Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, ssl_tls1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)},
-				 public = ECPoint},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_ske_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       KeyExchange, Version)
-  when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ->
-    Params = #server_psk_params{
-      hint = PskIdentityHint},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_ske_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) ->
-    DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
-    Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{
-      hint = IdentityHint,
-      dh_params = DHParams},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_ske_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
-		 ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary,
-		 ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
-	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) ->
-    Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B},
-    {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_ske_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version),
-    #server_key_params{params = Params,
-		       params_bin = BinMsg,
-		       hashsign = HashSign,
-		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(_, _, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<>>) ->
-    [];
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>) ->
-    dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, []);
-dec_hello_extensions(_) ->
-    [].
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<>>, Acc) ->
-    Acc;
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    Prop = {next_protocol_negotiation, #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData}},
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [Prop | Acc]);
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    RenegotiateInfo = case Len of
-			  1 ->  % Initial handshake
-			      Info; % should be <<0>> will be matched in handle_renegotiation_info
-			  _ ->
-			      VerifyLen = Len - 1,
-			      <<?BYTE(VerifyLen), VerifyInfo/binary>> = Info,
-			      VerifyInfo
-		      end,	    
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{renegotiation_info, 
-			   #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = RenegotiateInfo}} | Acc]);
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), SRP:SRPLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc)
-  when Len == SRPLen + 2 ->
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{srp,
-			   #srp{username = SRP}} | Acc]);
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
-		       ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    SignAlgoListLen = Len - 2,
-    <<?UINT16(SignAlgoListLen), SignAlgoList/binary>> = ExtData,
-    HashSignAlgos = [{ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)} ||
-			<<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>> <= SignAlgoList],
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{hash_signs,
-				 #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos}} | Acc]);
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
-		       ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    EllipticCurveListLen = Len - 2,
-    <<?UINT16(EllipticCurveListLen), EllipticCurveList/binary>> = ExtData,
-    EllipticCurves = [ssl_tls1:enum_to_oid(X) || <<X:16>> <= EllipticCurveList],
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{elliptic_curves,
-				 #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = EllipticCurves}} | Acc]);
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len),
-		       ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    ECPointFormatListLen = Len - 1,
-    <<?BYTE(ECPointFormatListLen), ECPointFormatList/binary>> = ExtData,
-    ECPointFormats = binary_to_list(ECPointFormatList),
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, [{ec_point_formats,
-				 #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = ECPointFormats}} | Acc]);
-
-%% Ignore data following the ClientHello (i.e.,
-%% extensions) if not understood.
-
-dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(_), ?UINT16(Len), _Unknown:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc);
-%% This theoretically should not happen if the protocol is followed, but if it does it is ignored.
-dec_hello_extensions(_, Acc) ->
-    Acc.
-
-encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) -> 
-    try 
-	PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey, 
-						    [{rsa_pad, 
-						      rsa_pkcs1_padding}]),
-	#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret}
-    catch
-	_:_->
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE))
-    end.
-
-%% encode/decode stream of certificate data to/from list of certificate data 
-certs_to_list(ASN1Certs) ->
-    certs_to_list(ASN1Certs, []).
-
-certs_to_list(<<?UINT24(CertLen), Cert:CertLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    certs_to_list(Rest, [Cert | Acc]);
-certs_to_list(<<>>, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc, []).
-
-certs_from_list(ACList) ->
-    list_to_binary([begin
-			CertLen = byte_size(Cert),
-                        <<?UINT24(CertLen), Cert/binary>>
-		    end || Cert <- ACList]).
+decode_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg, _) ->
+    ssl_handshake:decode_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg).
 
-enc_hs(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, _Version) ->
-    PaddingLength = 32 - ((byte_size(SelectedProtocol) + 2) rem 32),
-
-    {?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE((byte_size(SelectedProtocol))), SelectedProtocol/binary,
-                         ?BYTE(PaddingLength), 0:(PaddingLength * 8)>>};
-enc_hs(#hello_request{}, _Version) ->
+enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, _Version) ->
     {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>};
-enc_hs(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor},
+enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor},
 		     random = Random,
 		     session_id = SessionID,
 		     cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
 		     compression_methods = CompMethods, 
-		     renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
-		     srp = SRP,
-		     hash_signs = HashSigns,
-		     ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
-		     elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-		     next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, _Version) ->
+		     extensions = HelloExtensions}, _Version) ->
     SIDLength = byte_size(SessionID),
     BinCompMethods = list_to_binary(CompMethods),
     CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods),
     BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites),
     CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites),
-    Extensions0 = hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo, SRP, NextProtocolNegotiation)
-	++ ec_hello_extensions(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites), EcPointFormats)
-	++ ec_hello_extensions(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites), EllipticCurves),
-    Extensions1 = if
-		      Major == 3, Minor >=3 -> Extensions0 ++ hello_extensions(HashSigns);
-		      true -> Extensions0
-		  end,
-    ExtensionsBin = enc_hello_extensions(Extensions1),
-
- {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
-		     ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary,
-		     ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary,
-		     ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>};
-
-enc_hs(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor},
-		     random = Random,
-		     session_id = Session_ID,
-		     cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
-		     compression_method = Comp_method,
-		     renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
-		     ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
-		     elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
-		     next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, _Version) ->
-    SID_length = byte_size(Session_ID),
-    CipherSuites = [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite)],
-    Extensions  = hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo, NextProtocolNegotiation)
-	++ ec_hello_extensions(CipherSuites, EcPointFormats)
-	++ ec_hello_extensions(CipherSuites, EllipticCurves),
-    ExtensionsBin = enc_hello_extensions(Extensions),
-    {?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
-		     ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID/binary,
-                     CipherSuite/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method), ExtensionsBin/binary>>};
-enc_hs(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1CertList}, _Version) ->
-    ASN1Certs = certs_from_list(ASN1CertList),
-    ACLen = erlang:iolist_size(ASN1Certs),
-    {?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>};
-enc_hs(#server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, _Version) ->
-    {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys};
-enc_hs(#server_key_params{params_bin = Keys, hashsign = HashSign,
-			  signature = Signature}, Version) ->
-    EncSign = enc_sign(HashSign, Signature, Version),
-    {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<Keys/binary, EncSign/binary>>};
-enc_hs(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
-			    hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos},
-			    certificate_authorities = CertAuths},
-       {Major, Minor})
-  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 ->
-    HashSigns= << <<(ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash)):8, (ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)):8>> ||
-		   {Hash, Sign} <- HashSignAlgos >>,
-    CertTypesLen = byte_size(CertTypes),
-    HashSignsLen = byte_size(HashSigns),
-    CertAuthsLen = byte_size(CertAuths),
-    {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
-       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes/binary,
-	?UINT16(HashSignsLen), HashSigns/binary,
-	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths/binary>>
-    };
-enc_hs(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
-			    certificate_authorities = CertAuths}, 
-       _Version) ->
-    CertTypesLen = byte_size(CertTypes),
-    CertAuthsLen = byte_size(CertAuths),
-    {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
-       <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes/binary,
-	?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths/binary>>
-    };
-enc_hs(#server_hello_done{}, _Version) ->
-    {?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>};
-enc_hs(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version) ->
-    {?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, enc_cke(ExchangeKeys, Version)};
-enc_hs(#certificate_verify{signature = BinSig, hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}, Version) ->
-    EncSig = enc_sign(HashSign, BinSig, Version),
-    {?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, EncSig};
-enc_hs(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, _Version) ->
-    {?FINISHED, VerifyData}.
-
-enc_cke(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS},{3, 0}) ->
-    PKEPMS;
-enc_cke(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}, _) ->
-    PKEPMSLen = byte_size(PKEPMS),
-    <<?UINT16(PKEPMSLen), PKEPMS/binary>>;
-enc_cke(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
-    Len = byte_size(DHPublic),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), DHPublic/binary>>;
-enc_cke(#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
-    Len = byte_size(DHPublic),
-    <<?BYTE(Len), DHPublic/binary>>;
-enc_cke(#client_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, _) ->
-    Id = <<"psk_identity">>,
-    Len = byte_size(Id),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary>>;
-enc_cke(#client_psk_identity{identity = Id}, _) ->
-    Len = byte_size(Id),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary>>;
-enc_cke(Identity = #client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, Version) ->
-    enc_cke(Identity#client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = <<"psk_identity">>}, Version);
-enc_cke(#client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
-    Len = byte_size(Id),
-    DHLen = byte_size(DHPublic),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary, ?UINT16(DHLen), DHPublic/binary>>;
-enc_cke(Identity = #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, Version) ->
-    enc_cke(Identity#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = <<"psk_identity">>}, Version);
-enc_cke(#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id, exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version) ->
-    EncPMS = enc_cke(ExchangeKeys, Version),
-    Len = byte_size(Id),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary, EncPMS/binary>>;
-enc_cke(#client_srp_public{srp_a = A}, _) ->
-    Len = byte_size(A),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), A/binary>>.
-
-enc_server_key(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}) ->
-    PLen = byte_size(P),
-    GLen = byte_size(G),
-    YLen = byte_size(Y),
-    <<?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary>>;
-enc_server_key(#server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, ECCurve}, public = ECPubKey}) ->
-    %%TODO: support arbitrary keys
-    KLen = size(ECPubKey),
-    <<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE_TYPE), ?UINT16((ssl_tls1:oid_to_enum(ECCurve))),
-      ?BYTE(KLen), ECPubKey/binary>>;
-enc_server_key(#server_psk_params{hint = PskIdentityHint}) ->
-    Len = byte_size(PskIdentityHint),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint/binary>>;
-enc_server_key(Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{hint = undefined}) ->
-    enc_server_key(Params#server_dhe_psk_params{hint = <<>>});
-enc_server_key(#server_dhe_psk_params{
-		  hint = PskIdentityHint,
-		  dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}}) ->
-    Len = byte_size(PskIdentityHint),
-    PLen = byte_size(P),
-    GLen = byte_size(G),
-    YLen = byte_size(Y),
-    <<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint/binary,
-      ?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary>>;
-enc_server_key(#server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G,	srp_s = S, srp_b = B}) ->
-    NLen = byte_size(N),
-    GLen = byte_size(G),
-    SLen = byte_size(S),
-    BLen = byte_size(B),
-    <<?UINT16(NLen), N/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary,
-      ?BYTE(SLen), S/binary, ?UINT16(BLen), B/binary>>.
-
-enc_sign({_, anon}, _Sign, _Version) ->
-    <<>>;
-enc_sign({HashAlg, SignAlg}, Signature, _Version = {Major, Minor})
-  when Major == 3, Minor >= 3->
-	SignLen = byte_size(Signature),
-	HashSign = hashsign_enc(HashAlg, SignAlg),
-	<<HashSign/binary, ?UINT16(SignLen), Signature/binary>>;
-enc_sign(_HashSign, Sign, _Version) ->
-	SignLen = byte_size(Sign),
-	<<?UINT16(SignLen), Sign/binary>>.
-
-
-ec_hello_extensions(CipherSuites, #elliptic_curves{} = Info) ->
-    case advertises_ec_ciphers(CipherSuites) of
-	true ->
-	    [Info];
-	false ->
-	    []
-    end;
-ec_hello_extensions(CipherSuites, #ec_point_formats{} = Info) ->
-    case advertises_ec_ciphers(CipherSuites) of
-	true ->
-	    [Info];
-	false ->
-	    []
-    end;
-ec_hello_extensions(_, undefined) ->
-    [].
+    ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions),
 
-hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo, NextProtocolNegotiation) ->
-    hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo) ++ next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation).
+    {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
+		      ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary,
+		      ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary,
+		      ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>};
 
-hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo, SRP, NextProtocolNegotiation) ->
-    hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo)
-	++ hello_extensions(SRP)
-	++ next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation).
+enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version) ->
+    ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version).
 
-advertises_ec_ciphers([]) ->
-    false;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) ->
-    true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) ->
-    advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest).
 
-%% Renegotiation info
-hello_extensions(#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}) ->
-    [];
-hello_extensions(#renegotiation_info{} = Info) ->
-    [Info];
-hello_extensions(#srp{} = Info) ->
-    [Info];
-hello_extensions(#hash_sign_algos{} = Info) ->
-    [Info];
-hello_extensions(undefined) ->
-    [].
-
-next_protocol_extension(undefined) ->
-    [];
-next_protocol_extension(#next_protocol_negotiation{} = Info) ->
-    [Info].
-
-enc_hello_extensions(Extensions) ->
-    enc_hello_extensions(Extensions, <<>>).
-enc_hello_extensions([], <<>>) ->
-    <<>>;
-enc_hello_extensions([], Acc) ->
-    Size = byte_size(Acc),
-    <<?UINT16(Size), Acc/binary>>;
-
-enc_hello_extensions([#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    Len = byte_size(ExtensionData),
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData/binary, Acc/binary>>);
-enc_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0) = Info} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    Len = byte_size(Info),
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>);
-
-enc_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Info} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    InfoLen = byte_size(Info),
-    Len = InfoLen +1,
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(InfoLen), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>);
-enc_hello_extensions([#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = EllipticCurves} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    EllipticCurveList = << <<(ssl_tls1:oid_to_enum(X)):16>> || X <- EllipticCurves>>,
-    ListLen = byte_size(EllipticCurveList),
-    Len = ListLen + 2,
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT),
-				 ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), EllipticCurveList/binary, Acc/binary>>);
-enc_hello_extensions([#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = ECPointFormats} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    ECPointFormatList = list_to_binary(ECPointFormats),
-    ListLen = byte_size(ECPointFormatList),
-    Len = ListLen + 1,
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT),
-				 ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(ListLen), ECPointFormatList/binary, Acc/binary>>);
-enc_hello_extensions([#srp{username = UserName} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    SRPLen = byte_size(UserName),
-    Len = SRPLen + 2,
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), UserName/binary, Acc/binary>>);
-enc_hello_extensions([#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos} | Rest], Acc) ->
-    SignAlgoList = << <<(ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash)):8, (ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)):8>> ||
-		       {Hash, Sign} <- HashSignAlgos >>,
-    ListLen = byte_size(SignAlgoList),
-    Len = ListLen + 2,
-    enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), 
-				 ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), SignAlgoList/binary, Acc/binary>>).
-
-encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) ->
-    undefined;
-encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, false) ->
-	#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<>>};
-encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, _) ->
-	undefined.
-
-from_3bytes(Bin3) ->
-    from_3bytes(Bin3, []).
-
-from_3bytes(<<>>, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc);
-from_3bytes(<<?UINT24(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    from_3bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]).
-
-from_2bytes(Bin2) ->
-    from_2bytes(Bin2, []).
-
-from_2bytes(<<>>, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc);
-from_2bytes(<<?UINT16(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
-    from_2bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]).
-
-certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _})  
-  when KeyExchange == rsa;
-       KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
-       KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
-       KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa ->
-    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
-
-certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _})
-  when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
-       KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa ->
-    <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>;
-
-certificate_types(_) ->
-    <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>.
-
-hashsign_dec(<<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo)>>) ->
-    {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)}.
-
-hashsign_enc(HashAlgo, SignAlgo) ->
-    Hash = ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo),
-    Sign = ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo),
-    <<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>>.
-
-certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
-    Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
-    Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) ->
-		  OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject,
-		  DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp),
-		  DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin),
-		  <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>>
-	  end,
-    list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]).
-
-certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
-    ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref  == CertDbRef ->
-			      [Cert | Acc];
-			 (_, Acc) ->
-			      Acc
-		      end,
-    ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle).
-
-
-digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) when Minor >= 3 ->
-    public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key);
-digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
-    public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key);
-digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
-    public_key:encrypt_private(Hash, Key,
-			       [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]);
-digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) ->
-    public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key).
-
-calc_master_secret({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) ->
-    ssl_ssl3:master_secret(PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom);
-
-calc_master_secret({3,_}, PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) ->
-    ssl_tls1:master_secret(PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom).
-
-setup_keys({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret,
-	   ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS) ->
-    ssl_ssl3:setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom,
-			ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS);
-
-setup_keys({3,N}, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret,
-	   ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, _EKML, IVS) ->
-    ssl_tls1:setup_keys(N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize,
-			KML, IVS).
-
-calc_finished({3, 0}, Role, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
-    ssl_ssl3:finished(Role, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake));
-calc_finished({3, N}, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
-    ssl_tls1:finished(Role, N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)).
-
-calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
-    ssl_ssl3:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake));
-calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, HashAlgo, _MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
-    ssl_tls1:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, N, lists:reverse(Handshake)).
-
-key_exchange_alg(rsa) ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA;
-key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss;
-			    Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa; Alg == dh_anon ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN;
-key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == ecdhe_rsa; Alg == ecdh_rsa;
-			   Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa; Alg == ecdh_ecdsa;
-			   Alg == ecdh_anon ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN;
-key_exchange_alg(psk) ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK;
-key_exchange_alg(dhe_psk) ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK;
-key_exchange_alg(rsa_psk) ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK;
-key_exchange_alg(Alg)
-  when Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_anon ->
-    ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP;
-key_exchange_alg(_) ->
-    ?NULL.
-
-apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0, SslState) ->
-    case Fun(OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0) of
-	{valid, UserState} ->
-	    {valid, {SslState, UserState}};
-	{fail, _} = Fail ->
-	    Fail;
-	{unknown, UserState} ->
-	    {unknown, {SslState, UserState}}
-    end.
-
--define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(MD), {MD, rsa}).
--define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_DSA(MD), {MD, dsa}).
--define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_ECDSA(MD), {MD, ecdsa}).
-
--define(TLSEXT_SIGALG(MD), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_ECDSA(MD), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(MD)).
-
-default_hash_signs() ->
-    HashSigns = [?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha512),
-		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha384),
-		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha256),
-		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha224),
-		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha),
-		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_DSA(sha),
-		 ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(md5)],
-    CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
-    HasECC = proplists:get_bool(ecdsa, CryptoSupport),
-    #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos =
-			 lists:filter(fun({_, ecdsa}) -> HasECC;
-					 (_) -> true end, HashSigns)}.
-
-handle_hello_extensions(#client_hello{random = Random,
-				      cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
-				      renegotiation_info = Info,
-				      srp = SRP,
-				      ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats0,
-				      elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves0} = Hello, Version,
-			#ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation} = Opts,
-			Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
-    Session = handle_srp_extension(SRP, Session0),
-    ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(Version, Info, Random, Session, ConnectionStates0,
-						      Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites),
-    ProtocolsToAdvertise = handle_next_protocol_extension(Hello, Renegotiation, Opts),
-    {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = handle_ecc_extensions(Version, EcPointFormats0, EllipticCurves0),
-    %%TODO make extensions compund data structure
-    {Session, ConnectionStates, ProtocolsToAdvertise, EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves}.
-
-
-handle_renegotiation_extension(Version, Info, Random, #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
-							       compression_method = Compression},
-			       ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) ->
-    case handle_renegotiation_info(server, Info, ConnectionStates0,
-				   Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation,
-				   CipherSuites) of
-	{ok, ConnectionStates1} ->
-	    hello_pending_connection_states(server,
-					    Version,
-					    CipherSuite,
-					    Random,
-					    Compression,
-					    ConnectionStates1);
+handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites,
+			HelloExt, SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, HashSign) ->
+    try ssl_handshake:handle_client_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuites,
+						     HelloExt, Version, SslOpts,
+						     Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
 	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    throw(Alert)
+	    Alert;
+	{Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt} ->
+	    {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt, HashSign}
+    catch throw:Alert ->
+	    Alert
     end.
 
-handle_next_protocol_extension(Hello, Renegotiation, SslOpts)->
-    case handle_next_protocol_on_server(Hello, Renegotiation, SslOpts) of
+
+handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite,
+			Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) ->
+    case ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuite,
+						      Compression, HelloExt, Version,
+						      SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
 	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    throw(Alert);
-	ProtocolsToAdvertise ->
-	    ProtocolsToAdvertise
+	    Alert;
+	{ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} ->
+	    {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol}
     end.
 
-handle_srp_extension(undefined, Session) ->
-    Session;
-handle_srp_extension(#srp{username = Username}, Session) ->
-    Session#session{srp_username = Username}.
-
-int_to_bin(I) ->
-    L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2,
-    <<I:(L*8)>>.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl
index abf1b5abb6..f6644f64af 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -34,12 +35,7 @@
 	  cipher_suites,       % cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>
 	  compression_methods, % compression_methods<1..2^8-1>,
 	  %% Extensions
-	  renegotiation_info,
-	  hash_signs,          % supported combinations of hashes/signature algos
-	  next_protocol_negotiation = undefined, % [binary()]
-	  srp,
-	  ec_point_formats,
-	  elliptic_curves
+	  extensions
 	 }).
 
 -endif. % -ifdef(tls_handshake).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
index 1409a04763..9348c8bbdd 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
 
 %%
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Purpose: Help functions for handling the SSL-Record protocol 
-%% 
+%% Purpose: Handle TLS/SSL record protocol. (Parts that are not shared with DTLS)
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 -module(tls_record).
@@ -31,282 +31,33 @@
 -include("tls_handshake.hrl").
 -include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
 
-%% Connection state handling
--export([init_connection_states/1, 
-         current_connection_state/2, pending_connection_state/2,
-         update_security_params/3,
-         set_mac_secret/4,
-	 set_master_secret/2, 
-         activate_pending_connection_state/2,
-         set_pending_cipher_state/4,
-	 set_renegotiation_flag/2,
-	 set_client_verify_data/3,
-	 set_server_verify_data/3]).
-
 %% Handling of incoming data
 -export([get_tls_records/2]).
 
-%% Encoding records
--export([encode_handshake/3, encode_alert_record/3,
-	 encode_change_cipher_spec/2, encode_data/3]).
-
 %% Decoding
--export([decode_cipher_text/2]).
+-export([decode_cipher_text/3]).
+
+%% Encoding
+-export([encode_plain_text/4]).
 
-%% Misc.
--export([protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/2,
-	 highest_protocol_version/1, supported_protocol_versions/0,
+%% Protocol version handling
+-export([protocol_version/1,  lowest_protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/2,
+	 highest_protocol_version/1, highest_protocol_version/2,
+	 is_higher/2, supported_protocol_versions/0,
 	 is_acceptable_version/1, is_acceptable_version/2]).
 
--export([compressions/0]).
+-export_type([tls_version/0, tls_atom_version/0]).
 
--compile(inline).
+-type tls_version()       :: ssl_record:ssl_version().
+-type tls_atom_version()  :: sslv3 | tlsv1 | 'tlsv1.1' | 'tlsv1.2'.
 
--define(INITIAL_BYTES, 5).
+-compile(inline).
 
 %%====================================================================
 %% Internal application API
 %%====================================================================
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec init_connection_states(client | server) -> #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a connection_states record with appropriate
-%% values for the initial SSL connection setup. 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-init_connection_states(Role) ->
-    ConnectionEnd = record_protocol_role(Role),
-    Current = initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
-    Pending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
-    #connection_states{current_read = Current,
-		       pending_read = Pending,
-		       current_write = Current,
-		       pending_write = Pending
-                      }.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec current_connection_state(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
-				      #connection_state{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Returns the instance of the connection_state record
-%% that is currently defined as the current conection state.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------  
-current_connection_state(#connection_states{current_read = Current},
-			 read) ->
-    Current;
-current_connection_state(#connection_states{current_write = Current},
-			 write) ->
-    Current.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec pending_connection_state(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
-				      #connection_state{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Returns the instance of the connection_state record
-%% that is currently defined as the pending conection state.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------  
-pending_connection_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Pending},    
-			 read) ->
-    Pending;
-pending_connection_state(#connection_states{pending_write = Pending},
-			 write) ->
-    Pending.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec update_security_params(#security_parameters{}, #security_parameters{},
-			     #connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a new instance of the connection_states record
-%% where the pending states gets its security parameters updated.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------  
-update_security_params(ReadParams, WriteParams, States = 
-		       #connection_states{pending_read = Read,
-					  pending_write = Write}) -> 
-    States#connection_states{pending_read =
-                             Read#connection_state{security_parameters = 
-                                                   ReadParams},
-                             pending_write = 
-                             Write#connection_state{security_parameters = 
-                                                    WriteParams}
-                            }.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_mac_secret(binary(), binary(), client | server, 
-			#connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.			       
-%%
-%% Description: update the mac_secret field in pending connection states
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, client, States) ->
-    set_mac_secret(ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteMacSecret, States);
-set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, server, States) ->
-    set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, States).
-
-set_mac_secret(ReadMacSecret, WriteMacSecret,
-	       States = #connection_states{pending_read = Read,
-					   pending_write = Write}) ->
-    States#connection_states{
-      pending_read = Read#connection_state{mac_secret = ReadMacSecret},
-      pending_write = Write#connection_state{mac_secret = WriteMacSecret}
-     }.
-
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_master_secret(binary(), #connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Set master_secret in pending connection states
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_master_secret(MasterSecret,
-                  States = #connection_states{pending_read = Read,
-                                              pending_write = Write}) -> 
-    ReadSecPar = Read#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    Read1 = Read#connection_state{
-              security_parameters = ReadSecPar#security_parameters{
-                                      master_secret = MasterSecret}},
-    WriteSecPar = Write#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    Write1 = Write#connection_state{
-               security_parameters = WriteSecPar#security_parameters{
-                                       master_secret = MasterSecret}},
-    States#connection_states{pending_read = Read1, pending_write = Write1}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_renegotiation_flag(boolean(), #connection_states{}) -> #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Set secure_renegotiation in pending connection states
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_renegotiation_flag(Flag, #connection_states{
-			 current_read = CurrentRead0,
-			 current_write = CurrentWrite0,
-			 pending_read = PendingRead0,
-			 pending_write = PendingWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
-    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
-    PendingRead = PendingRead0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
-    PendingWrite = PendingWrite0#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = Flag},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead, 
-				       current_write = CurrentWrite, 
-				       pending_read = PendingRead, 
-				       pending_write = PendingWrite}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_client_verify_data(current_read | current_write | current_both,
-			     binary(), #connection_states{})->
-				    #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Set verify data in connection states.                 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_client_verify_data(current_read, Data, 
-		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
-					  pending_write = PendingWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
-    PendingWrite = PendingWrite0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
-				       pending_write = PendingWrite};
-set_client_verify_data(current_write, Data, 
-		       #connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead0,
-					  current_write = CurrentWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    PendingRead = PendingRead0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
-    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead,
-				       current_write = CurrentWrite};
-set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, 
-		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
-					  current_write = CurrentWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
-    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{client_verify_data = Data},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
-				       current_write = CurrentWrite}.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_server_verify_data(current_read | current_write | current_both,
-			     binary(), #connection_states{})->
-				    #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Set verify data in pending connection states.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_server_verify_data(current_write, Data, 
-		       #connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead0,
-					  current_write = CurrentWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    PendingRead = PendingRead0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
-    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{pending_read = PendingRead,
-				       current_write = CurrentWrite};
-
-set_server_verify_data(current_read, Data, 
-		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
-					  pending_write = PendingWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
-    PendingWrite = PendingWrite0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
-				       pending_write = PendingWrite};
-
-set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, 
-		       #connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead0,
-					  current_write = CurrentWrite0} 
-		       = ConnectionStates) ->
-    CurrentRead = CurrentRead0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
-    CurrentWrite = CurrentWrite0#connection_state{server_verify_data = Data},
-    ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_read = CurrentRead,
-				       current_write = CurrentWrite}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec activate_pending_connection_state(#connection_states{}, read | write) ->
-					       #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a new instance of the connection_states record
-%% where the pending state of <Type> has been activated. 
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-activate_pending_connection_state(States = 
-                                  #connection_states{pending_read = Pending},
-                                  read) ->
-    NewCurrent = Pending#connection_state{sequence_number = 0},
-    SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    ConnectionEnd = SecParams#security_parameters.connection_end,
-    EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
-    SecureRenegotation = NewCurrent#connection_state.secure_renegotiation,
-    NewPending = EmptyPending#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = SecureRenegotation},
-    States#connection_states{current_read = NewCurrent,
-                             pending_read = NewPending
-                            };
-
-activate_pending_connection_state(States = 
-                                  #connection_states{pending_write = Pending},
-                                  write) ->
-    NewCurrent = Pending#connection_state{sequence_number = 0},
-    SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    ConnectionEnd = SecParams#security_parameters.connection_end,
-    EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
-    SecureRenegotation = NewCurrent#connection_state.secure_renegotiation,
-    NewPending = EmptyPending#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = SecureRenegotation},
-    States#connection_states{current_write = NewCurrent,
-                             pending_write = NewPending
-                            }.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{}, #cipher_state{},
-			       #cipher_state{}, client | server) ->
-				      #connection_states{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Set the cipher state in the specified pending connection state.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Read,
-                                            pending_write = Write} = States,
-                         ClientState, ServerState, server) ->
-    States#connection_states{
-        pending_read = Read#connection_state{cipher_state = ClientState},
-        pending_write = Write#connection_state{cipher_state = ServerState}};
-
-set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Read,
-                                            pending_write = Write} = States,
-                         ClientState, ServerState, client) ->
-    States#connection_states{
-        pending_read = Read#connection_state{cipher_state = ServerState},
-        pending_write = Write#connection_state{cipher_state = ClientState}}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec get_tls_records(binary(), binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}.
 %%			     
 %% Description: Given old buffer and new data from TCP, packs up a records
@@ -376,6 +127,97 @@ get_tls_records_aux(Data, Acc) ->
 	false ->
 	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE)
 	end.
+
+encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data,
+		  #connection_states{current_write =
+					 #connection_state{
+					    sequence_number = Seq,
+					    compression_state=CompS0,
+					    security_parameters=
+						#security_parameters{
+						   cipher_type = ?AEAD,
+						   compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+					   }= WriteState0} = ConnectionStates) ->
+    {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0),
+    WriteState1 = WriteState0#connection_state{compression_state = CompS1},
+    AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, WriteState1),
+    {CipherFragment, WriteState} = ssl_record:cipher_aead(Version, Comp, WriteState1, AAD),
+    CipherText = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, CipherFragment),
+    {CipherText, ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_write = WriteState#connection_state{sequence_number = Seq +1}}};
+
+encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data,
+		  #connection_states{current_write =
+					 #connection_state{
+					    sequence_number = Seq,
+					    compression_state=CompS0,
+					    security_parameters=
+						#security_parameters{compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+					   }= WriteState0} = ConnectionStates) ->
+    {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0),
+    WriteState1 = WriteState0#connection_state{compression_state = CompS1},
+    MacHash = calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, Comp, WriteState1),
+    {CipherFragment, WriteState} = ssl_record:cipher(Version, Comp, WriteState1, MacHash),
+    CipherText = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, CipherFragment),
+    {CipherText, ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_write = WriteState#connection_state{sequence_number = Seq +1}}}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}, boolean()) ->
+				{#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}}| #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decode cipher text
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version,
+			    fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText,
+		   #connection_states{current_read =
+					  #connection_state{
+					     compression_state = CompressionS0,
+					     sequence_number = Seq,
+					     security_parameters=
+						 #security_parameters{
+						    cipher_type = ?AEAD,
+						    compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+					    } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, _) ->
+    AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, ReadState0),
+    case ssl_record:decipher_aead(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0, AAD) of
+	{PlainFragment, ReadState1} ->
+	    {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg,
+							   PlainFragment, CompressionS0),
+	    ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states{
+				  current_read = ReadState1#connection_state{
+						   sequence_number = Seq + 1,
+						   compression_state = CompressionS1}},
+	    {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates};
+	#alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert
+    end;
+
+decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version,
+			    fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText,
+		   #connection_states{current_read =
+					  #connection_state{
+					     compression_state = CompressionS0,
+					     sequence_number = Seq,
+					     security_parameters=
+						 #security_parameters{compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+					    } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, PaddingCheck) ->
+    case ssl_record:decipher(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0, PaddingCheck) of
+	{PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} ->
+	    MacHash = calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState1),
+	    case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of
+		true ->
+		    {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg,
+								   PlainFragment, CompressionS0),
+		    ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states{
+					  current_read = ReadState1#connection_state{
+							   sequence_number = Seq + 1,
+							   compression_state = CompressionS1}},
+		    {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates};
+		false ->
+			?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+	    end;
+	    #alert{} = Alert ->
+	    Alert
+    end. 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec protocol_version(tls_atom_version() | tls_version()) -> 
 			      tls_version() | tls_atom_version().		      
@@ -416,6 +258,18 @@ lowest_protocol_version(Version = {M,_},
     Version;
 lowest_protocol_version(_,Version) ->
     Version.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec lowest_protocol_version([tls_version()]) -> tls_version().
+%%     
+%% Description: Lowest protocol version present in a list
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+lowest_protocol_version([]) ->
+    lowest_protocol_version();
+lowest_protocol_version(Versions) ->
+    [Ver | Vers] = Versions,
+    lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, Vers).
+
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec highest_protocol_version([tls_version()]) -> tls_version().
 %%     
@@ -425,18 +279,35 @@ highest_protocol_version([]) ->
     highest_protocol_version();
 highest_protocol_version(Versions) ->
     [Ver | Vers] = Versions,
-    highest_protocol_version(Ver, Vers).
+    highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, Vers).
 
-highest_protocol_version(Version, []) ->
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec highest_protocol_version(tls_version(), tls_version()) -> tls_version().
+%%     
+%% Description: Highest protocol version of two given versions 
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+highest_protocol_version(Version = {M, N}, {M, O})   when N > O ->
     Version;
-highest_protocol_version(Version = {N, M}, [{N, O} | Rest])   when M > O ->
-    highest_protocol_version(Version, Rest);
-highest_protocol_version({M, _}, [Version = {M, _} | Rest]) ->
-    highest_protocol_version(Version, Rest);
-highest_protocol_version(Version = {M,_}, [{N,_} | Rest])  when M > N ->
-    highest_protocol_version(Version, Rest);
-highest_protocol_version(_, [Version | Rest]) ->
-    highest_protocol_version(Version, Rest).
+highest_protocol_version({M, _}, 
+			Version = {M, _}) ->
+    Version;
+highest_protocol_version(Version = {M,_}, 
+			{N, _}) when M > N ->
+    Version;
+highest_protocol_version(_,Version) ->
+    Version.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec is_higher(V1 :: tls_version(), V2::tls_version()) -> boolean().
+%%     
+%% Description: Is V1 > V2
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+is_higher({M, N}, {M, O}) when N > O ->
+    true;
+is_higher({M, _}, {N, _}) when M > N ->
+    true; 
+is_higher(_, _) ->
+    false.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec supported_protocol_versions() -> [tls_version()].					 
@@ -471,21 +342,30 @@ supported_protocol_versions([]) ->
     Vsns;
 
 supported_protocol_versions([_|_] = Vsns) ->
-    Vsns.
-
+    case sufficient_tlsv1_2_crypto_support() of
+	true -> 
+	    Vsns;
+	false ->
+	    case Vsns -- ['tlsv1.2'] of
+		[] ->
+		    ?MIN_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS;
+		NewVsns ->
+		    NewVsns
+	    end
+    end.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec is_acceptable_version(tls_version()) -> boolean().
--spec is_acceptable_version(tls_version(), Supported :: [tls_version()]) -> boolean().
 %%     
 %% Description: ssl version 2 is not acceptable security risks are too big.
 %% 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec is_acceptable_version(tls_version()) -> boolean().
 is_acceptable_version({N,_}) 
   when N >= ?LOWEST_MAJOR_SUPPORTED_VERSION ->
     true;
 is_acceptable_version(_) ->
     false.
 
+-spec is_acceptable_version(tls_version(), Supported :: [tls_version()]) -> boolean().
 is_acceptable_version({N,_} = Version, Versions)   
   when N >= ?LOWEST_MAJOR_SUPPORTED_VERSION ->
     lists:member(Version, Versions);
@@ -493,224 +373,55 @@ is_acceptable_version(_,_) ->
     false.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec compressions() -> [binary()].
-%%     
-%% Description: return a list of compressions supported (currently none)
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-compressions() ->
-    [?byte(?NULL)].
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}) ->
-				{#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}}| #alert{}.
-%%     
-%% Description: Decode cipher text
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-decode_cipher_text(CipherText, ConnnectionStates0) ->
-    ReadState0 = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states.current_read,
-    #connection_state{compression_state = CompressionS0,
-		      security_parameters = SecParams} = ReadState0,
-    CompressAlg = SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm,
-   case decipher(CipherText, ReadState0) of
-       {Compressed, ReadState1} ->
-	   {Plain, CompressionS1} = uncompress(CompressAlg, 
-					       Compressed, CompressionS0),
-	   ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states{
-				 current_read = ReadState1#connection_state{
-						  compression_state = CompressionS1}},
-	   {Plain, ConnnectionStates};
-       #alert{} = Alert ->
-	   Alert
-   end.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec encode_data(binary(), tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
-			 {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
-%%
-%% Description: Encodes data to send on the ssl-socket.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-encode_data(Frag, Version,
-	    #connection_states{current_write = #connection_state{
-				 security_parameters =
-				     #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCA}}} =
-		ConnectionStates) ->
-    Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA),
-    encode_iolist(?APPLICATION_DATA, Data, Version, ConnectionStates).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec encode_handshake(iolist(), tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
-			      {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
-%%
-%% Description: Encodes a handshake message to send on the ssl-socket.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
-    encode_plain_text(?HANDSHAKE, Version, Frag, ConnectionStates).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec encode_alert_record(#alert{}, tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
-				 {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
-%%
-%% Description: Encodes an alert message to send on the ssl-socket.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-encode_alert_record(#alert{level = Level, description = Description},
-                    Version, ConnectionStates) ->
-    encode_plain_text(?ALERT, Version, <<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description)>>,
-		      ConnectionStates).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec encode_change_cipher_spec(tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
-				       {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
-%%
-%% Description: Encodes a change_cipher_spec-message to send on the ssl socket.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates) ->
-    encode_plain_text(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, Version, <<1:8>>, ConnectionStates).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %%% Internal functions
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-encode_iolist(Type, Data, Version, ConnectionStates0) ->
-    {ConnectionStates, EncodedMsg} =
-        lists:foldl(fun(Text, {CS0, Encoded}) ->
-			    {Enc, CS1} = encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Text, CS0),
-			    {CS1, [Enc | Encoded]}
-		    end, {ConnectionStates0, []}, Data),
-    {lists:reverse(EncodedMsg), ConnectionStates}.
-
-highest_protocol_version() ->
-    highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()).
 
-initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd) ->
-    #connection_state{security_parameters =
-			  initial_security_params(ConnectionEnd),
-                      sequence_number = 0
-                     }.
-
-initial_security_params(ConnectionEnd) ->
-    SecParams = #security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
-				     compression_algorithm = ?NULL},
-    ssl_cipher:security_parameters(highest_protocol_version(), ?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL,
-				   SecParams).
-
-empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd) ->
-    SecParams = empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd),
-    #connection_state{security_parameters = SecParams}.
-
-empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd = ?CLIENT) ->
-    #security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
-                         client_random = random()};
-empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd = ?SERVER) ->
-    #security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
-                         server_random = random()}.
-random() ->
-    Secs_since_1970 = calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds(
-			calendar:universal_time()) - 62167219200,
-    Random_28_bytes = crypto:rand_bytes(28),
-    <<?UINT32(Secs_since_1970), Random_28_bytes/binary>>.
-
-record_protocol_role(client) ->
-    ?CLIENT;
-record_protocol_role(server) ->
-    ?SERVER.
-
-%% 1/n-1 splitting countermeasure Rizzo/Duong-Beast, RC4 chiphers are not vulnerable to this attack.
-split_bin(<<FirstByte:8, Rest/binary>>, ChunkSize, Version, BCA) when BCA =/= ?RC4 andalso ({3, 1} == Version orelse
-											    {3, 0} == Version) ->
-    do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [[FirstByte]]);
-split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, _, _) ->
-    do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, []).
-
-do_split_bin(<<>>, _, Acc) ->
-    lists:reverse(Acc);
-do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Acc) ->
-    case Bin of
-        <<Chunk:ChunkSize/binary, Rest/binary>> ->
-            do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [Chunk | Acc]);
-        _ ->
-            lists:reverse(Acc, [Bin])
-    end.
+lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) ->
+    Ver;
+lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver1,  [Ver2 | Rest]) ->
+    lowest_list_protocol_version(lowest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest).
 
-encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates) ->
-    #connection_states{current_write=#connection_state{
-			 compression_state=CompS0,
-			 security_parameters=
-			 #security_parameters{compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
-			}=CS0} = ConnectionStates,
-    {Comp, CompS1} = compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0),
-    CS1 = CS0#connection_state{compression_state = CompS1},
-    {CipherText, CS2} = cipher(Type, Version, Comp, CS1),
-    CTBin = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, CipherText),
-    {CTBin, ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_write = CS2}}.
+highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) ->
+    Ver;
+highest_list_protocol_version(Ver1,  [Ver2 | Rest]) ->
+    highest_list_protocol_version(highest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest).
 
 encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Fragment) ->
     Length = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
     [<<?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Fragment].
 
-cipher(Type, Version, Fragment, CS0) ->
-    Length = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
-    {MacHash, CS1=#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS0,
-				 security_parameters=
-				 #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = 
-						      BCA}
-				}} = 
-	hash_and_bump_seqno(CS0, Type, Version, Length, Fragment),
-    {Ciphered, CipherS1} = ssl_cipher:cipher(BCA, CipherS0, MacHash, Fragment, Version),
-    CS2 = CS1#connection_state{cipher_state=CipherS1},
-    {Ciphered, CS2}.
-
-decipher(TLS=#ssl_tls{type=Type, version=Version, fragment=Fragment}, CS0) ->
-    SP = CS0#connection_state.security_parameters,
-    BCA = SP#security_parameters.bulk_cipher_algorithm, 
-    HashSz = SP#security_parameters.hash_size,
-    CipherS0 = CS0#connection_state.cipher_state,
-    case ssl_cipher:decipher(BCA, HashSz, CipherS0, Fragment, Version) of
-	{T, Mac, CipherS1} ->
-	    CS1 = CS0#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1},
-	    TLength = size(T),
-	    {MacHash, CS2} = hash_and_bump_seqno(CS1, Type, Version, TLength, T),
-	    case is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of
-		true ->		  
-		    {TLS#ssl_tls{fragment = T}, CS2};
-		false ->
-		    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
-	    end;
-	#alert{} = Alert ->
-	    Alert
-    end.
-
-uncompress(?NULL, Data = #ssl_tls{type = _Type,
-				  version = _Version,
-				  fragment = _Fragment}, CS) ->
-    {Data, CS}.
-
-compress(?NULL, Data, CS) ->
-    {Data, CS}.
-
-hash_and_bump_seqno(#connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo,
-				      mac_secret = MacSecret,
-				      security_parameters = 
-				      SecPars} = CS0,
-		    Type, Version, Length, Fragment) ->
-    Hash = mac_hash(Version, 
-		    SecPars#security_parameters.mac_algorithm,
-		    MacSecret, SeqNo, Type,
-		    Length, Fragment),
-    {Hash, CS0#connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo+1}}.
-
-is_correct_mac(Mac, Mac) ->
-    true;
-is_correct_mac(_M,_H) ->
-    false.
 
 mac_hash({_,_}, ?NULL, _MacSecret, _SeqNo, _Type,
 	 _Length, _Fragment) ->
     <<>>;
 mac_hash({3, 0}, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) ->
-    ssl_ssl3:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment);
+    ssl_v3:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment);
 mac_hash({3, N} = Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment)  
   when N =:= 1; N =:= 2; N =:= 3 ->
-    ssl_tls1:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Version, 
+    tls_v1:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Version,
 		      Length, Fragment).
 
+highest_protocol_version() ->
+    highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()).
+
+lowest_protocol_version() ->
+    lowest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()).
+
+
 sufficient_tlsv1_2_crypto_support() ->
     CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(),
     proplists:get_bool(sha256, proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport)).
+
+calc_mac_hash(Type, Version,
+	      PlainFragment, #connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo,
+					       mac_secret = MacSecret,
+					       security_parameters =
+						   SecPars}) ->
+    Length = erlang:iolist_size(PlainFragment),
+    mac_hash(Version, SecPars#security_parameters.mac_algorithm,
+	     MacSecret, SeqNo, Type,
+	     Length, PlainFragment).
+
+calc_aad(Type, {MajVer, MinVer},
+	 #connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo}) ->
+    <<SeqNo:64/integer, ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.hrl
index c9350fa137..e296f23673 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.hrl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -29,7 +30,6 @@
 -include("ssl_record.hrl"). %% Common TLS and DTLS records and Constantes
 
 %% Used to handle tls_plain_text, tls_compressed and tls_cipher_text
-
 -record(ssl_tls, {   
 	  type,
 	  version, 
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl
index 8ab66d0627..711db77708 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 %%
 %% %CopyrightBegin%
 %%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved.
 %%
-%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
-%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
-%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
-%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
-%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
+%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
 %%
-%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
-%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
-%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
-%% under the License.
+%%     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+%%
+%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+%% limitations under the License.
 %%
 %% %CopyrightEnd%
 %%
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@
 %% Purpose: Handles tls1 encryption.
 %%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--module(ssl_tls1).
+-module(tls_v1).
 
 -include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
 -include("ssl_internal.hrl").
@@ -30,7 +31,8 @@
 
 -export([master_secret/4, finished/5, certificate_verify/3, mac_hash/7,
 	 setup_keys/8, suites/1, prf/5,
-	 ecc_curves/1, oid_to_enum/1, enum_to_oid/1]).
+	 ecc_curves/1, oid_to_enum/1, enum_to_oid/1, 
+	 default_signature_algs/1, signature_algs/2]).
 
 %%====================================================================
 %% Internal application API
@@ -86,7 +88,7 @@ certificate_verify(HashAlgo, _Version, Handshake) ->
 
 -spec setup_keys(integer(), integer(), binary(), binary(), binary(), integer(),
 		 integer(), integer()) -> {binary(), binary(), binary(),
-					  binary(), binary(), binary()}.  
+					  binary(), binary(), binary()}.
 
 setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize,
 	   KeyMatLen, IVSize)
@@ -106,7 +108,7 @@ setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize
     WantedLength = 2 * (HashSize + KeyMatLen + IVSize),
     KeyBlock = prf(?MD5SHA, MasterSecret, "key expansion",
 		   [ServerRandom, ClientRandom], WantedLength),
-    <<ClientWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, 
+    <<ClientWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary,
      ServerWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary,
      ClientWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, ServerWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary,
      ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock,
@@ -166,41 +168,25 @@ setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize,
     {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey,
      ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}.
 
--spec mac_hash(integer(), binary(), integer(), integer(), tls_version(),
-	       integer(), binary()) -> binary(). 
+-spec mac_hash(integer(), binary(), integer(), integer(), tls_record:tls_version(),
+	       integer(), binary()) -> binary().
 
-mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, {Major, Minor}, 
+mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, {Major, Minor},
 	 Length, Fragment) ->
     %% RFC 2246 & 4346 - 6.2.3.1.
     %% HMAC_hash(MAC_write_secret, seq_num + TLSCompressed.type +
     %%              TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length +
     %%              TLSCompressed.fragment));
-    Mac = hmac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, 
-		    [<<?UINT64(Seq_num), ?BYTE(Type), 
-		      ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), ?UINT16(Length)>>, 
+    Mac = hmac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret,
+		    [<<?UINT64(Seq_num), ?BYTE(Type),
+		      ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), ?UINT16(Length)>>,
 		     Fragment]),
     Mac.
 
--spec suites(1|2|3) -> [cipher_suite()].
-    
-suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2->
-    case sufficent_ec_support() of
-	true ->
-	    all_suites(Minor);
-	false ->
-	    no_ec_suites(Minor)
-    end;
-
-suites(Minor) when Minor == 3 ->
-    case sufficent_ec_support() of
-	true ->
-	    all_suites(3) ++ all_suites(2);
-	false ->
-	    no_ec_suites(3) ++ no_ec_suites(2)
-    end.
-
-all_suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2->		
-    [ 
+-spec suites(1|2|3) -> [ssl_cipher:cipher_suite()].
+
+suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2 ->
+    [
       ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
@@ -223,64 +209,99 @@ all_suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2->
       ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
       ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-      
-      ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-      ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
-      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-      ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-      
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
+      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
     ];
-all_suites(3) ->	
+suites(3) ->
     [
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
      ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
      ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
      ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
      ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
-     
+
+     ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
-     
+
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
      ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
      ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
-     
-     ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
-     ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
-     ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
-    ].
 
-no_ec_suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2->		
-    [ 
-      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
-      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
-      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
-    ];
-no_ec_suites(3) ->	
-    [
-     ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
-     ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
-     ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
      ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
      ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
      ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
-    ].
+
+     %% not supported
+     %% ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     %% ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     %% ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     %% ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+    ] ++ suites(2).
+
+
+
+signature_algs({3, 3}, HashSigns) ->
+    CryptoSupports =  crypto:supports(),
+    Hashes = proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupports),
+    PubKeys = proplists:get_value(public_keys, CryptoSupports),
+    Supported = lists:foldl(fun({Hash, dsa = Sign} = Alg, Acc) ->
+				    case proplists:get_bool(dss, PubKeys) 
+					andalso proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashes)
+					andalso is_pair(Hash, Sign, Hashes)
+				    of
+					true ->
+					    [Alg | Acc];
+					false ->
+					    Acc
+				    end;
+			       ({Hash, Sign} = Alg, Acc) -> 
+				    case proplists:get_bool(Sign, PubKeys) 
+					andalso proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashes) 
+					andalso is_pair(Hash, Sign, Hashes)
+				    of
+					true ->
+					    [Alg | Acc];
+					false ->
+					    Acc
+				    end
+			    end, [], HashSigns),
+    lists:reverse(Supported).
+
+default_signature_algs({3, 3} = Version) ->
+    Default = [%% SHA2
+	       {sha512, ecdsa},
+	       {sha512, rsa},
+	       {sha384, ecdsa},
+	       {sha384, rsa},
+	       {sha256, ecdsa},
+	       {sha256, rsa},
+	       {sha224, ecdsa},
+	       {sha224, rsa},
+	       %% SHA
+	       {sha, ecdsa},
+	       {sha, rsa},
+	       {sha, dsa}],
+    signature_algs(Version, Default);
+default_signature_algs(_) ->
+    undefined.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %%% Internal functions
@@ -323,7 +344,7 @@ p_hash(Secret, Seed, WantedLength, Method, N, Acc) ->
 
 %% ... Where  A(0) = seed
 %%            A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1))
-%% a(0, _Secret, Seed, _Method) -> 
+%% a(0, _Secret, Seed, _Method) ->
 %%     Seed.
 %% a(N, Secret, Seed, Method) ->
 %%     hmac_hash(Method, Secret, a(N-1, Secret, Seed, Method)).
@@ -366,13 +387,32 @@ finished_label(client) ->
 finished_label(server) ->
     <<"server finished">>.
 
+is_pair(sha, dsa, _) ->
+    true;
+is_pair(_, dsa, _) ->
+    false;
+is_pair(Hash, ecdsa, Hashs) ->
+    AtLeastSha = Hashs -- [md2,md4,md5],
+    lists:member(Hash, AtLeastSha);
+is_pair(Hash, rsa, Hashs) ->
+    AtLeastMd5 = Hashs -- [md2,md4],
+    lists:member(Hash, AtLeastMd5).
+
 %% list ECC curves in prefered order
 ecc_curves(_Minor) ->
-    [?sect571r1,?sect571k1,?secp521r1,?sect409k1,?sect409r1,
-     ?secp384r1,?sect283k1,?sect283r1,?secp256k1,?secp256r1,
-     ?sect239k1,?sect233k1,?sect233r1,?secp224k1,?secp224r1,
-     ?sect193r1,?sect193r2,?secp192k1,?secp192r1,?sect163k1,
-     ?sect163r1,?sect163r2,?secp160k1,?secp160r1,?secp160r2].
+    TLSCurves = [sect571r1,sect571k1,secp521r1,brainpoolP512r1,
+		 sect409k1,sect409r1,brainpoolP384r1,secp384r1,
+		 sect283k1,sect283r1,brainpoolP256r1,secp256k1,secp256r1,
+		 sect239k1,sect233k1,sect233r1,secp224k1,secp224r1,
+		 sect193r1,sect193r2,secp192k1,secp192r1,sect163k1,
+		 sect163r1,sect163r2,secp160k1,secp160r1,secp160r2],
+    CryptoCurves = crypto:ec_curves(),
+    lists:foldr(fun(Curve, Curves) ->
+			case proplists:get_bool(Curve, CryptoCurves) of
+			    true ->  [pubkey_cert_records:namedCurves(Curve)|Curves];
+			    false -> Curves
+			end
+		end, [], TLSCurves).
 
 %% ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005)
 oid_to_enum(?sect163k1) -> 1;
@@ -399,7 +439,10 @@ oid_to_enum(?secp224r1) -> 21;
 oid_to_enum(?secp256k1) -> 22;
 oid_to_enum(?secp256r1) -> 23;
 oid_to_enum(?secp384r1) -> 24;
-oid_to_enum(?secp521r1) -> 25.
+oid_to_enum(?secp521r1) -> 25;
+oid_to_enum(?brainpoolP256r1) -> 26;
+oid_to_enum(?brainpoolP384r1) -> 27;
+oid_to_enum(?brainpoolP512r1) -> 28.
 
 enum_to_oid(1) -> ?sect163k1;
 enum_to_oid(2) -> ?sect163r1;
@@ -425,8 +468,9 @@ enum_to_oid(21) -> ?secp224r1;
 enum_to_oid(22) -> ?secp256k1;
 enum_to_oid(23) -> ?secp256r1;
 enum_to_oid(24) -> ?secp384r1;
-enum_to_oid(25) -> ?secp521r1.
-
-sufficent_ec_support() ->
-    CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(),
-    proplists:get_bool(ecdh, proplists:get_value(public_keys, CryptoSupport)).
+enum_to_oid(25) -> ?secp521r1;
+enum_to_oid(26) -> ?brainpoolP256r1;
+enum_to_oid(27) -> ?brainpoolP384r1;
+enum_to_oid(28) -> ?brainpoolP512r1;
+enum_to_oid(_) ->
+    undefined.