Merge branch 'binarin/better-ssl-diagnostics/PR-1060/ERL-774/OTP-13632'

* binarin/better-ssl-diagnostics/PR-1060/ERL-774/OTP-13632:
  ssl: Remove error logger reports
  ssl: Better error handling of keys rejected by crypto
  Improve SSL diagnostics

6 files changed, 76 insertions, 57 deletions

diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl
index 3e35e24527..db71b16d80 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl
@@ -73,10 +73,14 @@ reason_code(#alert{description = Description}, _) ->
 %%
 %% Description: Returns the error string for given alert.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-alert_txt(#alert{level = Level, description = Description, where = {Mod,Line}}) ->
+alert_txt(#alert{level = Level, description = Description, where = {Mod,Line}, reason = undefined}) ->
     Mod ++ ":" ++ integer_to_list(Line) ++ ":" ++ 
-	level_txt(Level) ++" "++ description_txt(Description).
+        level_txt(Level) ++" "++ description_txt(Description);
+alert_txt(#alert{reason = Reason} = Alert) ->
+    BaseTxt = alert_txt(Alert#alert{reason = undefined}),
+    FormatDepth = 9, % Some limit on printed representation of an error
+    ReasonTxt = lists:flatten(io_lib:format("~P", [Reason, FormatDepth])),
+    BaseTxt ++ " - " ++ ReasonTxt.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 %%% Internal functions
@@ -85,7 +89,7 @@ alert_txt(#alert{level = Level, description = Description, where = {Mod,Line}})
 %% It is very unlikely that an correct implementation will send more than one alert at the time
 %% So it there is more than 10 warning alerts we consider it an error
 decode(<<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(_), _/binary>>, _, N) when Level == ?WARNING, N > ?MAX_ALERTS ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECODE_ERROR);
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECODE_ERROR, too_many_remote_alerts);
 decode(<<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description), Rest/binary>>, Acc, N) when Level == ?WARNING ->
     Alert = ?ALERT_REC(Level, Description),
     decode(Rest, [Alert | Acc], N + 1);
@@ -93,7 +97,7 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description), _Rest/binary>>, Acc, _) when Level ==
     Alert = ?ALERT_REC(Level, Description),
     lists:reverse([Alert | Acc]); %% No need to decode rest fatal alert will end the connection
 decode(<<?BYTE(_Level), _/binary>>, _, _) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, failed_to_decode_remote_alert);
 decode(<<>>, Acc, _) ->
     lists:reverse(Acc, []).
 
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl
index 8c4bd08d31..38facb964f 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@
 -define(NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, 120).
 
 -define(ALERT_REC(Level,Desc), #alert{level=Level,description=Desc,where={?FILE, ?LINE}}).
+-define(ALERT_REC(Level,Desc,Reason), #alert{level=Level,description=Desc,where={?FILE, ?LINE},reason=Reason}).
 
 -define(MAX_ALERTS, 10).
 
@@ -116,6 +117,7 @@
 -record(alert, {
 	  level,
 	  description,
-	  where = {?FILE, ?LINE}
+          where = {?FILE, ?LINE},
+          reason
 	 }).
 -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_alert).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
index dc0a0c2cc4..e935c033c7 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Fragment, _,
 	    %% alerts may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in
 	    %% TLS [CBCATT].  It is preferable to uniformly use the
 	    %% bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of the error."
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
     end;
 
 decipher(?DES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0,
 	    %% alerts may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in
 	    %% TLS [CBCATT].  It is preferable to uniformly use the
 	    %% bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of the error."
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
     end.
 
 aead_ciphertext_to_state(chacha20_poly1305, SeqNo, _IV, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) ->
@@ -296,11 +296,11 @@ aead_decipher(Type, #cipher_state{key = Key, iv = IV} = CipherState,
 	    Content when is_binary(Content) ->
 		{Content, CipherState};
 	    _ ->
-		?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+                ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
 	end
     catch
 	_:_ ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
     end.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
index 089b3615c6..22d107ff9c 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
@@ -1488,7 +1488,7 @@ rsa_key_exchange(Version, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _})
 			       {premaster_secret, PremasterSecret,
 				PublicKeyInfo});
 rsa_key_exchange(_, _, _) ->
-    throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+    throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, pub_key_is_not_rsa)).
 
 rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, 
 		     PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _})
@@ -1505,7 +1505,7 @@ rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret,
 			       {psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret,
 				PublicKeyInfo});
 rsa_psk_key_exchange(_, _, _, _) ->
-    throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+    throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, pub_key_is_not_rsa)).
 
 request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer, 
 						      signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns},
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index 598d4e4112..0787e151c0 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) ->
 	{ok, _, Chain} ->
 	    #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain};
 	{error, _} ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR)
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, server_has_no_suitable_certificates)
     end.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version,
 			  PrivateKey, {Handshake, _}) ->
     case public_key:pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(OwnCert) of
 	true ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, fixed_diffie_hellman_prohibited);
 	false ->
 	    Hashes =
 		calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake),
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams,
 %% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid.
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 certificate_verify(_, _, _, undefined, _, _) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, invalid_certificate_verify_message);
 
 certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo, Version,
 		   HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) ->
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
     catch
 	error:_ ->
 	    %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN)
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, failed_to_decode_certificate)
     end.
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo,
 			      false
 		      end, HashSigns) of
 	[] ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
 	[HashSign | _] ->
 	    HashSign
     end;
@@ -664,11 +664,8 @@ master_secret(RecordCB, Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret},
     try master_secret(RecordCB, Version, Mastersecret, SecParams,
 		      ConnectionStates, Role)
     catch
-	exit:Reason ->
-	    Report = io_lib:format("Key calculation failed due to ~p",
-				   [Reason]),
-	    error_logger:error_report(Report),
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+	exit:_ ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure)
     end;
 
 master_secret(RecordCB, Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
@@ -683,11 +680,8 @@ master_secret(RecordCB, Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
 					 ClientRandom, ServerRandom),
 		      SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role)
     catch
-	exit:Reason ->
-	    Report = io_lib:format("Master secret calculation failed"
-				   " due to ~p", [Reason]),
-	    error_logger:error_report(Report),
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+	exit:_ ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure)
     end.
 
 %%-------------Encode/Decode --------------------------------
@@ -958,8 +952,8 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, PKEPMS) ->
     #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = PKEPMS};
 decode_handshake(_Version, ?FINISHED, VerifyData) ->
     #finished{verify_data = VerifyData};
-decode_handshake(_, _, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+decode_handshake(_, Message, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_handshake, Message})).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec decode_hello_extensions({client, binary()} | binary()) -> #hello_extensions{}.
@@ -1031,8 +1025,8 @@ dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary,
 		       params_bin = BinMsg,
 		       hashsign = HashSign,
 		       signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(_, _, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) ->
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})).
 
 %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
 -spec decode_suites('2_bytes'|'3_bytes', binary()) -> list().
@@ -1253,8 +1247,12 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression,
                 Protocol ->
                     {ConnectionStates, npn, Protocol}
             end;
-        _ -> %% {error, _Reason} or a list of 0/2+ protocols.
-            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+        {error, Reason} ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason);
+        [] ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, no_protocols_in_server_hello);
+        [_|_] ->
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, too_many_protocols_in_server_hello)
     end.
 
 select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) ->
@@ -1316,14 +1314,14 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co
 	true ->
 	    {ok, ConnectionStates};
 	false ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation)
     end;
 handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify},
 			  ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) ->
 
       case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
 	  true ->
-	      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+              ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
 	  false ->
 	      CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
 	      Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
@@ -1331,7 +1329,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co
 		  true ->
 		      {ok, ConnectionStates};
 		  false ->
-		      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+                      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation)
 	      end
       end;
 
@@ -1341,7 +1339,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, S
 handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) ->
      case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
 	  true ->
-	     ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+             ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
 	 false ->
 	     handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation)
      end.
@@ -1350,7 +1348,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
     CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
     case {SecureRenegotation, CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation} of
 	{_, true} ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure);
 	{true, false} ->
 	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION);
 	{false, false} ->
@@ -1523,8 +1521,8 @@ path_validation_alert({bad_cert, selfsigned_peer}) ->
     ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
 path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) ->
      ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNKNOWN_CA);
-path_validation_alert(_) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE).
+path_validation_alert(Reason) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason).
 
 encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) ->
     try
@@ -1533,18 +1531,27 @@ encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) ->
 						      rsa_pkcs1_padding}]),
 	#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret}
     catch
-	_:_->
-	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE))
+        _:_->
+            throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed))
     end.
 
-digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) when Minor >= 3 ->
+digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) ->
+    try do_digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of
+	Signature ->
+	    Signature
+    catch
+	error:badkey->
+	    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, bad_key(PrivateKey)))
+    end.
+
+do_digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) when Minor >= 3 ->
     public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key);
-digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
+do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
     public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key);
-digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
+do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
     public_key:encrypt_private(Hash, Key,
 			       [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]);
-digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) ->
+do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) ->
     public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key).
 
 calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
@@ -1751,12 +1758,12 @@ dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) ->
 dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) ->
     #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS};
 dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE));
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, empty_dh_public));
 dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
 	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
     #client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y};
 dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE));
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, empty_dh_public));
 dec_client_key(<<?BYTE(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
 	       ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
     #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y};
@@ -1800,7 +1807,7 @@ dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(0)>>, _) ->
 dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, _) ->
     {Params, undefined, Signature};
 dec_server_key_signature(_, _, _) ->
-    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+    throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, failed_to_decrypt_server_key_sign)).
 
 dec_hello_extensions(<<>>, Acc) ->
     Acc;
@@ -1955,8 +1962,8 @@ key_exchange_alg(_) ->
 %%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
 
 %% Receive protocols, choose one from the list, return it.
-handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, _Reason}) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, Reason}) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason);
 handle_alpn_extension([], _) ->
 	?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
 handle_alpn_extension([ServerProtocol|Tail], ClientProtocols) ->
@@ -1976,7 +1983,7 @@ handle_next_protocol(#next_protocol_negotiation{} = NextProtocols,
         true ->
             select_next_protocol(decode_next_protocols(NextProtocols), NextProtocolSelector);
         false ->
-            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) % unexpected next protocol extension
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, unexpected_next_protocol_extension)
     end.
 
 
@@ -1996,17 +2003,17 @@ handle_next_protocol_on_server(#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<>>}
     Protocols;
 
 handle_next_protocol_on_server(_Hello, _Renegotiation, _SSLOpts) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE). % unexpected next protocol extension
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, unexpected_next_protocol_extension).
 
 next_protocol_extension_allowed(NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) ->
     NextProtocolSelector =/= undefined andalso not Renegotiating.
 
-select_next_protocol({error, _Reason}, _NextProtocolSelector) ->
-    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+select_next_protocol({error, Reason}, _NextProtocolSelector) ->
+    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason);
 select_next_protocol(Protocols, NextProtocolSelector) ->
     case NextProtocolSelector(Protocols) of
 	?NO_PROTOCOL ->
-	    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, no_next_protocol);
 	Protocol when is_binary(Protocol)  ->
 	    Protocol
     end.
@@ -2169,3 +2176,9 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_,_,_) ->
 is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) ->
     lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns).
 
+bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
+    unacceptable_dsa_key;
+bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
+    unacceptable_rsa_key;
+bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) ->
+    unacceptable_ecdsa_key.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
index f34eebb0e4..871eb970eb 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId,
 					       SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert),
 	    case CipherSuite of 
 		no_suite ->
-		    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+                    ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_ciphers);
 		_ ->
 		    {KeyExAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
 		    case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, Version) of