diff options
author | Andreas Schultz <[email protected]> | 2012-04-08 03:19:43 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ingela Anderton Andin <[email protected]> | 2012-08-22 14:00:44 +0200 |
commit | 5f81b3f94f82107bf830b46ee643787b774d8634 (patch) | |
tree | 1206b4291e850ed8969d90d39e438dc25be239aa /lib | |
parent | d848984efd05314abf2de8da6ddd4ee651f0da35 (diff) | |
download | otp-5f81b3f94f82107bf830b46ee643787b774d8634.tar.gz otp-5f81b3f94f82107bf830b46ee643787b774d8634.tar.bz2 otp-5f81b3f94f82107bf830b46ee643787b774d8634.zip |
ssl: Implement and activate PRFs for TLS 1.1 and 1.2
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl | 25 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl | 111 |
2 files changed, 107 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index 1759c920cc..1b83293730 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -549,9 +549,10 @@ server_key_exchange_hash(dhe_dss, Value) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _) -> {error, undefined}; -prf({3,N}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) - when N == 1; N == 2 -> - {ok, ssl_tls1:prf(Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}. +prf({3,1}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> + {ok, ssl_tls1:prf(?MD5SHA, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}; +prf({3,N}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> + {ok, ssl_tls1:prf(?SHA256, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions @@ -1124,7 +1125,12 @@ calc_master_secret({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) calc_master_secret({3,N}, _PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) when N == 1; N == 2 -> - ssl_tls1:master_secret(?MD5SHA, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom). + ssl_tls1:master_secret(?MD5SHA, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom); + +calc_master_secret({3,N}, PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) + when N == 3 -> + %% only from TLS 1.2 onwards the selection of a PrfAlgo is supported + ssl_tls1:master_secret(PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom). setup_keys({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, EKML, IVS) -> @@ -1135,13 +1141,22 @@ setup_keys({3,N}, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, _EKML, IVS) when N == 1; N == 2 -> ssl_tls1:setup_keys(N, ?MD5SHA, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, + KML, IVS); + +setup_keys({3,N}, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, + ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, _EKML, IVS) + when N == 3 -> + ssl_tls1:setup_keys(N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KML, IVS). calc_finished({3, 0}, Role, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) -> ssl_ssl3:finished(Role, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)); calc_finished({3, N}, Role, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) when N == 1; N == 2 -> - ssl_tls1:finished(Role, N, ?MD5SHA, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)). + ssl_tls1:finished(Role, N, ?MD5SHA, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)); +calc_finished({3, N}, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) + when N == 3 -> + ssl_tls1:finished(Role, N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)). calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) -> ssl_ssl3:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)); diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl index dc3d9774c2..9569cef8d1 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl @@ -61,6 +61,18 @@ finished(Role, Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) SHA = crypto:sha(Handshake), prf(?MD5SHA, MasterSecret, finished_label(Role), [MD5, SHA], 12); +finished(Role, Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) + when Version == 3 -> + %% RFC 5246 - 7.4.9. Finished + %% struct { + %% opaque verify_data[12]; + %% } Finished; + %% + %% verify_data + %% PRF(master_secret, finished_label, Hash(handshake_messages)) [0..11]; + Hash = crypto:hash(mac_algo(PrfAlgo), Handshake), + prf(PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, finished_label(Role), Hash, 12). + -spec certificate_verify(OID::tuple(), [binary()]) -> binary(). certificate_verify(?'rsaEncryption', Handshake) -> @@ -98,29 +110,60 @@ setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize ClientWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, ServerWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock, {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, - ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}. + ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}; + +%% TLS v1.1 +setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, + KeyMatLen, IVSize) + when Version == 2 -> + %% RFC 4346 - 6.3. Key calculation + %% key_block = PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, + %% "key expansion", + %% SecurityParameters.server_random + + %% SecurityParameters.client_random); + %% Then the key_block is partitioned as follows: + %% client_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size] + %% server_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size] + %% client_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length] + %% server_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length] + %% + %% RFC 4346 is incomplete, the client and server IVs have to + %% be generated just like for TLS 1.0 + WantedLength = 2 * (HashSize + KeyMatLen + IVSize), + KeyBlock = prf(?MD5SHA, MasterSecret, "key expansion", + [ServerRandom, ClientRandom], WantedLength), + <<ClientWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, + ServerWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, + ClientWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, ServerWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, + ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock, + {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, + ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}; -%% TLS v1.1 uncomment when supported. -%% setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KeyMatLen) -> -%% %% RFC 4346 - 6.3. Key calculation -%% %% key_block = PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, -%% %% "key expansion", -%% %% SecurityParameters.server_random + -%% %% SecurityParameters.client_random); -%% %% Then the key_block is partitioned as follows: -%% %% client_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size] -%% %% server_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size] -%% %% client_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length] -%% %% server_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length] -%% WantedLength = 2 * (HashSize + KeyMatLen), -%% KeyBlock = prf(MasterSecret, "key expansion", -%% [ServerRandom, ClientRandom], WantedLength), -%% <<ClientWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, -%% ServerWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, -%% ClientWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, ServerWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary>> -%% = KeyBlock, -%% {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, -%% ServerWriteKey, undefined, undefined}. +%% TLS v1.2 +setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, + KeyMatLen, IVSize) + when Version == 3 -> + %% RFC 5246 - 6.3. Key calculation + %% key_block = PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, + %% "key expansion", + %% SecurityParameters.server_random + + %% SecurityParameters.client_random); + %% Then the key_block is partitioned as follows: + %% client_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size] + %% server_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size] + %% client_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length] + %% server_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length] + %% client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length] + %% server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length] + WantedLength = 2 * (HashSize + KeyMatLen + IVSize), + KeyBlock = prf(PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, "key expansion", + [ServerRandom, ClientRandom], WantedLength), + <<ClientWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, + ServerWriteMacSecret:HashSize/binary, + ClientWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, ServerWriteKey:KeyMatLen/binary, + ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock, + {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, + ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}. -spec mac_hash(integer(), binary(), integer(), integer(), tls_version(), integer(), binary()) -> binary(). @@ -166,7 +209,22 @@ hmac_hash(?NULL, _, _) -> hmac_hash(?MD5, Key, Value) -> crypto:md5_mac(Key, Value); hmac_hash(?SHA, Key, Value) -> - crypto:sha_mac(Key, Value). + crypto:sha_mac(Key, Value); +hmac_hash(?MD5SHA, Key, Value) -> + crypto:sha256_mac(Key, Value); +hmac_hash(?SHA256, Key, Value) -> + crypto:sha256_mac(Key, Value); +hmac_hash(?SHA384, Key, Value) -> + crypto:sha384_mac(Key, Value); +hmac_hash(?SHA512, Key, Value) -> + crypto:sha512_mac(Key, Value). + +mac_algo(?MD5) -> md5; +mac_algo(?SHA) -> sha; +mac_algo(?MD5SHA) -> sha256; %% RFC 5246 defines minimum hash for TLS 1.2 +mac_algo(?SHA256) -> sha256; +mac_algo(?SHA384) -> sha384; +mac_algo(?SHA512) -> sha512. % First, we define a data expansion function, P_hash(secret, data) that % uses a single hash function to expand a secret and seed into an @@ -224,7 +282,12 @@ prf(MAC, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) {S1, S2} = split_secret(Secret), LS = list_to_binary([Label, Seed]), crypto:exor(p_hash(S1, LS, WantedLength, ?MD5), - p_hash(S2, LS, WantedLength, ?SHA)). + p_hash(S2, LS, WantedLength, ?SHA)); + +prf(MAC, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> + %% PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_SHA256(secret, label + seed); + LS = list_to_binary([Label, Seed]), + p_hash(Secret, LS, WantedLength, MAC). %%%% Misc help functions %%%% |