Merge branch 'maint'

1 files changed, 106 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
index 3357204612..df6de08b9b 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
+++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
@@ -681,6 +681,60 @@
 
 </section>
 
+ <section><title>SSL 7.3.3.2</title>
+
+      <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title>
+      <list>
+	<item>
+	  <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites
+	  using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive
+	  Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack)
+	  against RSA, which when exploited, may result in
+	  plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a
+	  Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not
+	  having gained access to the server’s private key
+	  itself. <url
+	  href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url>
+	  </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform
+	  plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most
+	  practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext
+	  only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions
+	  established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this
+	  attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct
+	  a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the
+	  initial attack, which may require thousands of server
+	  requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted
+	  session within the window of the configured handshake
+	  timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS
+	  session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites
+	  using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server.
+	  The limited window of opportunity, limitations in
+	  bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly
+	  more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is
+	  enabled by default although least prioritized if server
+	  order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it
+	  must also be supported by the client and probably the
+	  only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions
+	  encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are
+	  not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this
+	  vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher
+	  suite configuration was used you can configure the server
+	  to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like
+	  this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite &lt;-
+	  ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p>
+	  that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p>
+	  <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite &lt;-
+	  ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]).
+	  </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and
+	  Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p>
+	  <p>
+	  Own Id: OTP-14748</p>
+	</item>
+	    </list>
+      </section>
+      
+  </section>
+
 <section><title>SSL 7.3.3</title>
 
     <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title>
@@ -710,7 +764,59 @@
       </list>
     </section>
 
+ <section><title>SSL 7.3.3.0.1</title>
 
+      <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title>
+      <list>
+	<item>
+	  <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites
+	  using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive
+	  Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack)
+	  against RSA, which when exploited, may result in
+	  plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a
+	  Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not
+	  having gained access to the server’s private key
+	  itself. <url
+	  href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url>
+	  </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform
+	  plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most
+	  practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext
+	  only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions
+	  established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this
+	  attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct
+	  a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the
+	  initial attack, which may require thousands of server
+	  requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted
+	  session within the window of the configured handshake
+	  timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS
+	  session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites
+	  using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server.
+	  The limited window of opportunity, limitations in
+	  bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly
+	  more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is
+	  enabled by default although least prioritized if server
+	  order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it
+	  must also be supported by the client and probably the
+	  only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions
+	  encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are
+	  not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this
+	  vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher
+	  suite configuration was used you can configure the server
+	  to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like
+	  this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite &lt;-
+	  ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p>
+	  that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p>
+	  <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite &lt;-
+	  ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]).
+	  </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and
+	  Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p>
+	  <p>
+	  Own Id: OTP-14748</p>
+	</item>
+	    </list>
+      </section>
+      
+  </section>
     <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title>
       <list>
         <item>