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authorIngela Anderton Andin <[email protected]>2018-04-17 16:43:28 +0200
committerIngela Anderton Andin <[email protected]>2018-04-30 07:30:35 +0200
commita34cb1484224134c6e02ce033459523d2333f430 (patch)
tree253c39f53ee6d2b5d9ce7ce4c66743c1a52ab433 /lib
parent6f4139977174602a558e98f09d96295122bc3d7f (diff)
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ssl: Avoid hardcoding of cipher suites and fix ECDH suite handling
ECDH suite handling did not use the EC parameters form the certs as expected.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl331
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl11
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl106
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl29
4 files changed, 283 insertions, 194 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
index 28b26fd358..0956d3501d 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
@@ -37,10 +37,10 @@
erl_suite_definition/1,
cipher_init/3, decipher/6, cipher/5, decipher_aead/6, cipher_aead/6,
suite/1, suites/1, all_suites/1, crypto_support_filters/0,
- ec_keyed_suites/0, chacha_suites/1, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, psk_suites_anon/1,
+ chacha_suites/1, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, psk_suites_anon/1,
srp_suites/0, srp_suites_anon/0,
rc4_suites/1, des_suites/1, rsa_suites/1, openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1,
- filter/2, filter_suites/1, filter_suites/2,
+ filter/3, filter_suites/1, filter_suites/2,
hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1, is_acceptable_hash/2, is_fallback/1,
random_bytes/1, calc_mac_hash/4,
is_stream_ciphersuite/1]).
@@ -2212,39 +2212,25 @@ openssl_suite_name(Cipher) ->
suite_definition(Cipher).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec filter(undefined | binary(), [cipher_suite()]) -> [cipher_suite()].
+-spec filter(undefined | binary(), [cipher_suite()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Select the cipher suites that can be used together with the
%% supplied certificate. (Server side functionality)
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-filter(undefined, Ciphers) ->
+filter(undefined, Ciphers, _) ->
Ciphers;
-filter(DerCert, Ciphers) ->
+filter(DerCert, Ciphers0, Version) ->
OtpCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(DerCert, otp),
SigAlg = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.signatureAlgorithm,
PubKeyInfo = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
PubKeyAlg = PubKeyInfo#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'.algorithm,
- Ciphers1 =
- case ssl_certificate:public_key_type(PubKeyAlg#'PublicKeyAlgorithm'.algorithm) of
- rsa ->
- filter_keyuse(OtpCert, ((Ciphers -- dsa_signed_suites()) -- ec_keyed_suites()) -- ecdh_suites(),
- rsa_suites(), dhe_rsa_suites() ++ ecdhe_rsa_suites());
- dsa ->
- (Ciphers -- rsa_keyed_suites()) -- ec_keyed_suites();
- ec ->
- filter_keyuse(OtpCert, (Ciphers -- rsa_keyed_suites()) -- dsa_signed_suites(),
- [], ecdhe_ecdsa_suites())
- end,
-
- case public_key:pkix_sign_types(SigAlg#'SignatureAlgorithm'.algorithm) of
- {_, rsa} ->
- Ciphers1 -- ecdsa_signed_suites();
- {_, dsa} ->
- Ciphers1;
- {_, ecdsa} ->
- Ciphers1 -- rsa_signed_suites()
- end.
+ Ciphers = filter_suites_pubkey(
+ ssl_certificate:public_key_type(PubKeyAlg#'PublicKeyAlgorithm'.algorithm),
+ Ciphers0, Version, OtpCert),
+ {_, Sign} = public_key:pkix_sign_types(SigAlg#'SignatureAlgorithm'.algorithm),
+ filter_suites_signature(Sign, Ciphers, Version).
+
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec filter_suites([erl_cipher_suite()] | [cipher_suite()], map()) ->
[erl_cipher_suite()] | [cipher_suite()].
@@ -2676,141 +2662,184 @@ next_iv(Bin, IV) ->
<<_:FirstPart/binary, NextIV:IVSz/binary>> = Bin,
NextIV.
-rsa_signed_suites() ->
- dhe_rsa_suites() ++ rsa_suites() ++
- psk_rsa_suites() ++ srp_rsa_suites() ++
- ecdh_rsa_suites() ++ ecdhe_rsa_suites().
-
-rsa_keyed_suites() ->
- dhe_rsa_suites() ++ rsa_suites() ++
- psk_rsa_suites() ++ srp_rsa_suites() ++
- ecdhe_rsa_suites().
-
-dhe_rsa_suites() ->
- [?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
- ].
-
-psk_rsa_suites() ->
- [?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
- ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA].
-srp_rsa_suites() ->
- [?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA].
-
-rsa_suites() ->
- [?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
- ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384].
-
-ecdh_rsa_suites() ->
- [?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
- ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384].
-
-ecdhe_rsa_suites() ->
- [?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256].
-
-dsa_signed_suites() ->
- dhe_dss_suites() ++ srp_dss_suites().
-
-dhe_dss_suites() ->
- [?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384].
-
-srp_dss_suites() ->
- [?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA].
-
-ec_keyed_suites() ->
- ecdh_ecdsa_suites() ++ ecdhe_ecdsa_suites()
- ++ ecdh_rsa_suites().
+filter_suites_pubkey(rsa, CiphersSuites0, Version, OtpCert) ->
+ KeyUses = key_uses(OtpCert),
+ CiphersSuites = filter_keyuse_suites(keyEncipherment, KeyUses,
+ (CiphersSuites0 -- ec_keyed_suites(CiphersSuites0))
+ -- dss_keyed_suites(CiphersSuites0),
+ rsa_suites_encipher(CiphersSuites0)),
+ filter_keyuse_suites(digitalSignature, KeyUses, CiphersSuites,
+ rsa_signed_suites(CiphersSuites, Version));
+filter_suites_pubkey(dsa, Ciphers, _, _OtpCert) ->
+ (Ciphers -- rsa_keyed_suites(Ciphers)) -- ec_keyed_suites(Ciphers);
+filter_suites_pubkey(ec, Ciphers, _, OtpCert) ->
+ Uses = key_uses(OtpCert),
+ filter_keyuse_suites(digitalSignature, Uses,
+ (Ciphers -- rsa_keyed_suites(Ciphers)) -- dss_keyed_suites(Ciphers),
+ ecdsa_sign_suites(Ciphers)).
+
+filter_suites_signature(rsa, Ciphers, Version) ->
+ Ciphers -- ecdsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version) -- dsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version);
+filter_suites_signature(dsa, Ciphers, Version) ->
+ Ciphers -- ecdsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version) -- rsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version);
+filter_suites_signature(ecdsa, Ciphers, Version) ->
+ Ciphers -- rsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version) -- dsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version).
+
+
+%% From RFC 5246 - Section 7.4.2. Server Certificate
+%% If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all
+%% certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a
+%% hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension. Note
+%% that this implies that a certificate containing a key for one
+%% signature algorithm MAY be signed using a different signature
+%% algorithm (for instance, an RSA key signed with a DSA key). This is
+%% a departure from TLS 1.1, which required that the algorithms be the
+%% same.
+%% Note that this also implies that the DH_DSS, DH_RSA,
+%% ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA key exchange algorithms do not restrict the
+%% algorithm used to sign the certificate. Fixed DH certificates MAY be
+%% signed with any hash/signature algorithm pair appearing in the
+%% extension. The names DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are
+%% historical.
+%% Note: DH_DSS and DH_RSA is not supported
+rsa_signed({3,N}) when N >= 3 ->
+ fun(rsa) -> true;
+ (dhe_rsa) -> true;
+ (ecdhe_rsa) -> true;
+ (rsa_psk) -> true;
+ (srp_rsa) -> true;
+ (_) -> false
+ end;
+rsa_signed(_) ->
+ fun(rsa) -> true;
+ (dhe_rsa) -> true;
+ (ecdhe_rsa) -> true;
+ (ecdh_rsa) -> true;
+ (rsa_psk) -> true;
+ (srp_rsa) -> true;
+ (_) -> false
+ end.
+%% Cert should be signed by RSA
+rsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version) ->
+ filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [rsa_signed(Version)],
+ cipher_filters => [],
+ mac_filters => [],
+ prf_filters => []}).
+ecdsa_signed({3,N}) when N >= 3 ->
+ fun(ecdhe_ecdsa) -> true;
+ (_) -> false
+ end;
+ecdsa_signed(_) ->
+ fun(ecdhe_ecdsa) -> true;
+ (ecdh_ecdsa) -> true;
+ (_) -> false
+ end.
+
+%% Cert should be signed by ECDSA
+ecdsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version) ->
+ filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [ecdsa_signed(Version)],
+ cipher_filters => [],
+ mac_filters => [],
+ prf_filters => []}).
+
+rsa_keyed(dhe_rsa) ->
+ true;
+rsa_keyed(rsa) ->
+ true;
+rsa_keyed(rsa_psk) ->
+ true;
+rsa_keyed(srp_rsa) ->
+ true;
+rsa_keyed(ecdhe_rsa) ->
+ true;
+rsa_keyed(_) ->
+ false.
-ecdsa_signed_suites() ->
- ecdh_ecdsa_suites() ++ ecdhe_ecdsa_suites().
+%% Certs key is an RSA key
+rsa_keyed_suites(Ciphers) ->
+ filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(Kex) -> rsa_keyed(Kex) end],
+ cipher_filters => [],
+ mac_filters => [],
+ prf_filters => []}).
+
+%% RSA Certs key can be used for encipherment
+rsa_suites_encipher(Ciphers) ->
+ filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(rsa) -> true;
+ (rsa_psk) -> true;
+ (_) -> false
+ end],
+ cipher_filters => [],
+ mac_filters => [],
+ prf_filters => []}).
+
+dss_keyed(dhe_dss) ->
+ true;
+dss_keyed(spr_dss) ->
+ true;
+dss_keyed(_) ->
+ false.
+
+%% Cert should be have DSS key (DSA)
+dss_keyed_suites(Ciphers) ->
+ filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(Kex) -> dss_keyed(Kex) end],
+ cipher_filters => [],
+ mac_filters => [],
+ prf_filters => []}).
+
+%% Cert should be signed by DSS (DSA)
+dsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version) ->
+ filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [dsa_signed(Version)],
+ cipher_filters => [],
+ mac_filters => [],
+ prf_filters => []}).
+
+dsa_signed({3,N}) when N >= 3 ->
+ fun(dhe_dss) -> true;
+ (ecdhe_dss) -> true;
+ (_) -> false
+ end;
+dsa_signed(_) ->
+ fun(dhe_dss) -> true;
+ (ecdh_dss) -> true;
+ (ecdhe_dss) -> true;
+ (_) -> false
+ end.
-ecdh_suites() ->
- ecdh_rsa_suites() ++ ecdh_ecdsa_suites().
+ec_keyed(ecdh_ecdsa) ->
+ true;
+ec_keyed(ecdhe_ecdsa) ->
+ true;
+ec_keyed(ecdh_rsa) ->
+ true;
+ec_keyed(_) ->
+ false.
-ecdh_ecdsa_suites() ->
- [?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
- ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384].
-
-ecdhe_ecdsa_suites() ->
- [?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256].
-
-filter_keyuse(OtpCert, Ciphers, Suites, SignSuites) ->
+%% Certs key is an ECC key
+ec_keyed_suites(Ciphers) ->
+ filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(Kex) -> ec_keyed(Kex) end],
+ cipher_filters => [],
+ mac_filters => [],
+ prf_filters => []}).
+
+%% EC Certs key can be used for signing
+ecdsa_sign_suites(Ciphers)->
+ filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(ecdhe_ecdsa) -> true;
+ (_) -> false
+ end],
+ cipher_filters => [],
+ mac_filters => [],
+ prf_filters => []}).
+
+key_uses(OtpCert) ->
TBSCert = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate,
TBSExtensions = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.extensions,
Extensions = ssl_certificate:extensions_list(TBSExtensions),
case ssl_certificate:select_extension(?'id-ce-keyUsage', Extensions) of
undefined ->
- Ciphers;
- #'Extension'{extnValue = KeyUse} ->
- Result = filter_keyuse_suites(keyEncipherment,
- KeyUse, Ciphers, Suites),
- filter_keyuse_suites(digitalSignature,
- KeyUse, Result, SignSuites)
+ undefined;
+ #'Extension'{extnValue = KeyUses} ->
+ KeyUses
end.
filter_keyuse_suites(Use, KeyUse, CipherSuits, Suites) ->
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
index 3f8c1f97f9..ec034af44c 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
@@ -1472,7 +1472,7 @@ connection_info(#state{sni_hostname = SNIHostname,
RecordCB = record_cb(Connection),
CipherSuiteDef = #{key_exchange := KexAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
IsNamedCurveSuite = lists:member(KexAlg,
- [ecdh_ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdh_anon]),
+ [ecdh_ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdh_rsa, ecdh_anon]),
CurveInfo = case ECCCurve of
{namedCurve, Curve} when IsNamedCurveSuite ->
[{ecc, {named_curve, pubkey_cert_records:namedCurves(Curve)}}];
@@ -1572,11 +1572,14 @@ handle_peer_cert(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo,
handle_peer_cert_key(client, _,
{?'id-ecPublicKey', #'ECPoint'{point = _ECPoint} = PublicKey,
PublicKeyParams},
- KeyAlg, State) when KeyAlg == ecdh_rsa;
- KeyAlg == ecdh_ecdsa ->
+ KeyAlg, #state{session = Session} = State) when KeyAlg == ecdh_rsa;
+ KeyAlg == ecdh_ecdsa ->
ECDHKey = public_key:generate_key(PublicKeyParams),
+ {namedCurve, Oid} = PublicKeyParams,
+ Curve = pubkey_cert_records:namedCurves(Oid), %% Need API function
PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(PublicKey, ECDHKey),
- master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey});
+ master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey,
+ session = Session#session{ecc = {named_curve, Curve}}});
%% We do currently not support cipher suites that use fixed DH.
%% If we want to implement that the following clause can be used
%% to extract DH parameters form cert.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index 8ddd4623c1..090e7b69b7 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -772,11 +772,12 @@ available_suites(UserSuites, Version) ->
lists:filtermap(fun(Suite) -> lists:member(Suite, VersionSuites) end, UserSuites).
available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) ->
- ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version))
- -- unavailable_ecc_suites(Curve);
+ Suites = ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version), Version),
+ filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(Curve, Suites);
available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, Curve) ->
Suites = available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve),
- filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, []).
+ filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns,
+ Version, []).
available_signature_algs(undefined, _) ->
undefined;
@@ -814,7 +815,7 @@ prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) ->
prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
{ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}.
-select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve} =
+select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve0} =
Session, Version,
#ssl_options{ciphers = UserSuites, honor_cipher_order = HonorCipherOrder} = SslOpts,
Cache, CacheCb, Cert) ->
@@ -823,10 +824,12 @@ select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port,
Cache, CacheCb),
case Resumed of
undefined ->
- Suites = available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, ECCCurve),
- CipherSuite = select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, HonorCipherOrder),
+ Suites = available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, ECCCurve0),
+ CipherSuite0 = select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, HonorCipherOrder),
+ {ECCCurve, CipherSuite} = cert_curve(Cert, ECCCurve0, CipherSuite0),
Compression = select_compression(Compressions),
{new, Session#session{session_id = SessionId,
+ ecc = ECCCurve,
cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
compression_method = Compression}};
_ ->
@@ -1066,11 +1069,11 @@ select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo,
TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
- SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
-
- case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign ->
+ SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
+
+ case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign ->
is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign,
- SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
+ SubSign, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
(_) ->
false
end, HashSigns) of
@@ -2075,25 +2078,26 @@ handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun)
handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) ->
Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState).
-filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) ->
- lists:reverse(Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns,
- Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
- KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
- do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns,
+filter_hashsigns([], [], _, _, Acc) ->
+ lists:reverse(Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Version,
+ Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
+ KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
+ do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Version,
Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa;
KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa;
KeyExchange == srp_rsa;
KeyExchange == rsa_psk ->
- do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when
+ do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Version, Acc) when
KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
KeyExchange == srp_dss ->
- do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when
+ do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Verion,
+ Acc) when
KeyExchange == dh_dss;
KeyExchange == dh_rsa;
KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
@@ -2102,8 +2106,9 @@ filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], Has
%% Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature
%% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names
%% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical.
- filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when
+ filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Verion, [Suite| Acc]);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Version,
+ Acc) when
KeyExchange == dh_anon;
KeyExchange == ecdh_anon;
KeyExchange == srp_anon;
@@ -2111,20 +2116,28 @@ filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], Has
KeyExchange == dhe_psk;
KeyExchange == ecdhe_psk ->
%% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous
- filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]).
+ filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, [Suite| Acc]).
-do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) ->
+do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc) ->
case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of
true ->
- filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
+ filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, [Suite| Acc]);
false ->
- filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc)
+ filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc)
end.
-unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) ->
- ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites();
-unavailable_ecc_suites(_) ->
- [].
+filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve, Suites) ->
+ ECCSuites = ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(ecdh_ecdsa) -> true;
+ (ecdhe_ecdsa) -> true;
+ (ecdh_rsa) -> true;
+ (_) -> false
+ end],
+ cipher_filters => [],
+ mac_filters => [],
+ prf_filters => []}),
+ Suites -- ECCSuites;
+filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(_, Suites) ->
+ Suites.
%%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite,
@@ -2220,8 +2233,11 @@ sign_algo(Alg) ->
is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, _, _, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns) when
KeyExAlgo == dh_dss;
KeyExAlgo == dh_rsa;
- KeyExAlgo == dh_ecdsa ->
- %% dh_* could be called only dh in TLS-1.2
+ KeyExAlgo == ecdh_ecdsa;
+ KeyExAlgo == ecdh_rsa;
+ KeyExAlgo == ecdh_ecdsa
+ ->
+ %% *dh_* could be called only *dh in TLS-1.2
is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, rsa, ecdsa, ecdh_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
@@ -2436,3 +2452,27 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
{false, false} ->
{ok, ConnectionStates}
end.
+
+cert_curve(_, _, no_suite) ->
+ {no_curve, no_suite};
+cert_curve(Cert, ECCCurve0, CipherSuite) ->
+ case ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite) of
+ #{key_exchange := Kex} when Kex == ecdh_ecdsa;
+ Kex == ecdh_rsa ->
+ OtpCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+ TBSCert = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate,
+ #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = AlgInfo}
+ = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+ {namedCurve, Oid} = AlgInfo#'PublicKeyAlgorithm'.parameters,
+ try pubkey_cert_records:namedCurves(Oid) of
+ Curve ->
+ {{named_curve, Curve}, CipherSuite}
+ catch
+ _:_ ->
+ {no_curve, no_suite}
+ end;
+ _ ->
+ {ECCCurve0, CipherSuite}
+ end.
+
+
diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl
index a45249b75e..4022f49077 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl
@@ -1434,16 +1434,33 @@ sufficient_crypto_support(_) ->
check_key_exchange_send_active(Socket, false) ->
send_recv_result_active(Socket);
check_key_exchange_send_active(Socket, KeyEx) ->
- {ok, [{cipher_suite, Suite}]} = ssl:connection_information(Socket, [cipher_suite]),
- true = check_key_exchange(Suite, KeyEx),
+ {ok, Info} =
+ ssl:connection_information(Socket, [cipher_suite, protocol]),
+ Suite = proplists:get_value(cipher_suite, Info),
+ Version = proplists:get_value(protocol, Info),
+ true = check_key_exchange(Suite, KeyEx, Version),
send_recv_result_active(Socket).
-check_key_exchange({KeyEx,_, _}, KeyEx) ->
+check_key_exchange({KeyEx,_, _}, KeyEx, _) ->
true;
-check_key_exchange({KeyEx,_,_,_}, KeyEx) ->
+check_key_exchange({KeyEx,_,_,_}, KeyEx, _) ->
true;
-check_key_exchange(KeyEx1, KeyEx2) ->
- ct:pal("Negotiated ~p Expected ~p", [KeyEx1, KeyEx2]),
+check_key_exchange(KeyEx1, KeyEx2, Version) ->
+ case Version of
+ 'tlsv1.2' ->
+ v_1_2_check(element(1, KeyEx1), KeyEx2);
+ 'dtlsv1.2' ->
+ v_1_2_check(element(1, KeyEx1), KeyEx2);
+ _ ->
+ ct:pal("Negotiated ~p Expected ~p", [KeyEx1, KeyEx2]),
+ false
+ end.
+
+v_1_2_check(ecdh_ecdsa, ecdh_rsa) ->
+ true;
+v_1_2_check(ecdh_rsa, ecdh_ecdsa) ->
+ true;
+v_1_2_check(_, _) ->
false.
send_recv_result_active(Socket) ->