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authorIngela Anderton Andin <[email protected]>2016-06-28 18:50:09 +0200
committerIngela Anderton Andin <[email protected]>2016-07-08 14:26:57 +0200
commitd7dcfb26c0b044015ac9acd688b4f7e2b57e00ea (patch)
treec01417b5ddd25753a2b2c625f7116f23bc4784d4 /lib
parentd24b133c5c48949048dc20c8a34b98b604a7bbc1 (diff)
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ssl: Correct handling of signature algorithm selection
In TLS-1.2 the selection of the servers algorithms and the the possible selection of algorithms for the client certificate verify message have different requirements.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl7
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl139
2 files changed, 120 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
index 53282998d0..adee59393e 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
@@ -528,13 +528,12 @@ certify(internal, #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys},
end
end;
-certify(internal, #certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = HashSigns},
+certify(internal, #certificate_request{} = CertRequest,
#state{session = #session{own_certificate = Cert},
- key_algorithm = KeyExAlg,
+ role = client,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns},
negotiated_version = Version} = State0, Connection) ->
-
- case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, Version) of
+ case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(CertRequest, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, Version) of
#alert {} = Alert ->
Connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0);
NegotiatedHashSign ->
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index 9c3fe9d73b..bca341c8bc 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
]).
%% MISC
--export([select_version/3, prf/6, select_hashsign/5,
+-export([select_version/3, prf/6, select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5,
select_hashsign_algs/3,
premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]).
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
{atom(), atom()} | undefined | #alert{}.
%%
-%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms extension
+%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms hello extension (server)
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
select_hashsign(_, undefined, _, _, _Version) ->
{null, anon};
@@ -593,14 +593,17 @@ select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo,
select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns,
{Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
- #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
- Sign = cert_sign(Algo),
- case lists:filter(fun({sha, dsa = S}) when S == Sign ->
- true;
- ({_, dsa}) ->
- false;
- ({_, _} = Algos) ->
- is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
+ #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert,
+ signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+ #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} =
+ TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+
+ Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
+ SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
+
+ case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign,
+ SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
(_) ->
false
end, HashSigns) of
@@ -613,6 +616,49 @@ select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) ->
#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, binary(),
+ [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+ {atom(), atom()} | #alert{}.
+
+%%
+%% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client)
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, undefined, _, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+ %% There client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail
+ %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is
+ %% no certificate to verify.
+ {undefined, undefined};
+
+select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns},
+ certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns,
+ {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+ #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+ #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert,
+ signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+ #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} =
+ TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+
+ Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
+ SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
+
+ case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of
+ true ->
+ case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+ (_) ->
+ false
+ end, HashSigns) of
+ [] ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
+ [HashSign | _] ->
+ HashSign
+ end;
+ false ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm)
+ end;
+select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) ->
+ select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, undefined, Version).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
@@ -648,6 +694,7 @@ select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) ->
select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) ->
{sha, dsa}.
+
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec master_secret(atom(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), #connection_states{},
client | server) -> {binary(), #connection_states{}} | #alert{}.
@@ -1143,11 +1190,13 @@ certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 ->
end;
certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa;
+ KeyExchange == dh_rsa;
KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa ->
<<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>;
-certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss;
+ KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
KeyExchange == srp_dss ->
<<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
@@ -2164,27 +2213,73 @@ distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) ->
[{DistPoint, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs]
end.
-cert_sign(?rsaEncryption) ->
+sign_algo(?rsaEncryption) ->
rsa;
-cert_sign(?'id-ecPublicKey') ->
+sign_algo(?'id-ecPublicKey') ->
ecdsa;
-cert_sign(?'id-dsa') ->
+sign_algo(?'id-dsa') ->
dsa;
-cert_sign(Alg) ->
+sign_algo(Alg) ->
{_, Sign} =public_key:pkix_sign_types(Alg),
Sign.
-is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, Sign} = Algos, Sign, _, SupportedHashSigns) ->
- is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
-is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos,_, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns) when KeyExAlgo == dh_ecdsa;
- KeyExAlgo == ecdh_rsa;
- KeyExAlgo == ecdh_ecdsa ->
+is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, _, _, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns) when
+ KeyExAlgo == dh_dss;
+ KeyExAlgo == dh_rsa;
+ KeyExAlgo == dh_ecdsa ->
+ %% dh_* could be called only dh in TLS-1.2
is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
-is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_,_,_) ->
- false.
+is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, rsa, ecdsa, ecdh_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, _, dhe_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, rsa, ecdhe_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, rsa, rsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, _, srp_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, _, rsa_psk, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, dsa} = Algos, dsa, _, dhe_dss, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, dsa} = Algos, dsa, _, srp_dss, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, ecdsa} = Algos, ecdsa, _, dhe_ecdsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, ecdsa} = Algos, ecdsa, ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when
+ KeyExAlgo == psk;
+ KeyExAlgo == dhe_psk;
+ KeyExAlgo == srp_anon;
+ KeyExAlgo == dh_anon;
+ KeyExAlgo == ecdhe_anon
+ ->
+ true;
+is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_, _,_,_) ->
+ false.
+
is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) ->
lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns).
+is_acceptable_cert_type(Sign, _HashSigns, Types) ->
+ lists:member(sign_type(Sign), binary_to_list(Types)).
+
+is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) ->
+ [] =/= lists:dropwhile(fun({_, S}) when S =/= Sign ->
+ true;
+ (_)->
+ false
+ end, HashSigns).
+sign_type(rsa) ->
+ ?RSA_SIGN;
+sign_type(dsa) ->
+ ?DSS_SIGN;
+sign_type(ecdsa) ->
+ ?ECDSA_SIGN.
+
+
bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
unacceptable_dsa_key;
bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) ->