diff options
115 files changed, 4916 insertions, 3299 deletions
diff --git a/HOWTO/INSTALL.md b/HOWTO/INSTALL.md index 36365799e3..53f2dd26e2 100644 --- a/HOWTO/INSTALL.md +++ b/HOWTO/INSTALL.md @@ -18,9 +18,6 @@ Required Utilities These are the tools you need in order to unpack and build Erlang/OTP. -> *WARNING*: Please have a look at the [Known platform issues][] chapter -> before you start. - ### Unpacking ### * GNU unzip, or a modern uncompress. @@ -520,12 +517,26 @@ If you have Xcode 4.3, or later, you will also need to download #### Building with wxErlang #### If you want to build the `wx` application, you will need to get wxWidgets-3.0 -(`wxWidgets-3.0.0.tar.bz2` from <http://sourceforge.net/projects/wxwindows/files/3.0.0/>) or get it from github with bug fixes: +(`wxWidgets-3.0.3.tar.bz2` from <https://github.com/wxWidgets/wxWidgets/releases/download/v3.0.3/wxWidgets-3.0.3.tar.bz2>) or get it from github with bug fixes: $ git clone --branch WX_3_0_BRANCH [email protected]:wxWidgets/wxWidgets.git -Be aware that the wxWidgets-3.0 is a new release of wxWidgets, it is not as -mature as the old releases and the OS X port still lags behind the other ports. +The wxWidgets-3.1 version should also work if 2.8 compatibility is enabled, +add `--enable-compat28` to configure commands below. + +Configure and build wxWidgets (shared library on linux): + + $ ./configure --prefix=/usr/local + $ make && sudo make install + $ export PATH=/usr/local/bin:$PATH + +Configure and build wxWidgets (static library on linux): + + $ export CFLAGS=-fPIC + $ export CXXFLAGS=-fPIC + $ ./configure --prefix=/usr/local --disable-shared + $ make && sudo make install + $ export PATH=/usr/local/bin:$PATH Configure and build wxWidgets (on Mavericks - 10.9): @@ -794,7 +805,6 @@ Use `hipe:help_options/0` to print out the available options. [man pages]: http://www.erlang.org/download/otp_doc_man_%OTP-VSN%.tar.gz [the released source tar ball]: http://www.erlang.org/download/otp_src_%OTP-VSN%.tar.gz [System Principles]: ../system_principles/system_principles - [Known platform issues]: #Known-platform-issues [native build]: #How-to-Build-and-Install-ErlangOTP [cross build]: INSTALL-CROSS.md [Required Utilities]: #Required-Utilities diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in index 6b5ce8c53f..3dce72ba78 100644 --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -427,6 +427,18 @@ ifneq ($(OTP_SMALL_BUILD),true) echo "OTP doc built" > $(ERL_TOP)/make/otp_doc_built endif +xmllint: docs + PATH=$(BOOT_PREFIX)"$${PATH}" ERL_TOP=$(ERL_TOP) \ + $(MAKE) -C erts/ $@ +ifeq ($(OTP_SMALL_BUILD),true) + PATH=$(BOOT_PREFIX)"$${PATH}" ERL_TOP=$(ERL_TOP) \ + $(MAKE) -C lib/ $@ +else + PATH=$(BOOT_PREFIX)"$${PATH}" ERL_TOP=$(ERL_TOP) \ + $(MAKE) BUILD_ALL=1 -C lib/ $@ + PATH=$(BOOT_PREFIX)"$${PATH}" ERL_TOP=$(ERL_TOP) \ + $(MAKE) -C system/doc $@ +endif mod2app: PATH=$(BOOT_PREFIX)"$${PATH}" escript $(BOOTSTRAP_ROOT)/bootstrap/lib/erl_docgen/priv/bin/xref_mod_app.escript -topdir $(ERL_TOP) -outfile $(ERL_TOP)/make/$(TARGET)/mod2app.xml diff --git a/OTP_VERSION b/OTP_VERSION index 0d9f38d420..bf8f7ca9a2 100644 --- a/OTP_VERSION +++ b/OTP_VERSION @@ -1 +1 @@ -20.1.5 +20.1.7 diff --git a/erts/Makefile b/erts/Makefile index 12d2ec57a8..ffada839a7 100644 --- a/erts/Makefile +++ b/erts/Makefile @@ -147,3 +147,7 @@ release: .PHONY: release_docs release_docs: $(V_at)( cd doc/src && $(MAKE) $@ ) + +.PHONY: xmllint +xmllint: + $(MAKE) -C doc/src $@ diff --git a/erts/doc/src/Makefile b/erts/doc/src/Makefile index 1f591a5cff..18c5490d7b 100644 --- a/erts/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/erts/doc/src/Makefile @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ XML_PART_FILES = \ part.xml XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ + introduction.xml \ tty.xml \ match_spec.xml \ crash_dump.xml \ @@ -80,8 +81,7 @@ XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ erl_dist_protocol.xml \ communication.xml \ time_correction.xml \ - notes.xml \ - notes_history.xml + notes.xml TOPDOCDIR=../../../doc diff --git a/erts/doc/src/erl_nif.xml b/erts/doc/src/erl_nif.xml index 419e41693e..ef3cdb89e9 100644 --- a/erts/doc/src/erl_nif.xml +++ b/erts/doc/src/erl_nif.xml @@ -952,6 +952,8 @@ typedef struct { <desc> <p>Allocates memory of <c>size</c> bytes.</p> <p>Returns <c>NULL</c> if the allocation fails.</p> + <p>The returned pointer is suitably aligned for any built-in type that + fit in the allocated memory.</p> </desc> </func> @@ -2760,6 +2762,20 @@ enif_map_iterator_destroy(env, &iter);</code> </func> <func> + <name><ret>void *</ret> + <nametext>enif_realloc(void* ptr, size_t size)</nametext></name> + <fsummary>Reallocate dynamic memory.</fsummary> + <desc> + <p>Reallocates memory allocated by + <seealso marker="#enif_alloc"><c>enif_alloc</c></seealso> to + <c>size</c> bytes.</p> + <p>Returns <c>NULL</c> if the reallocation fails.</p> + <p>The returned pointer is suitably aligned for any built-in type that + fit in the allocated memory.</p> + </desc> + </func> + + <func> <name><ret>int</ret> <nametext>enif_realloc_binary(ErlNifBinary* bin, size_t size)</nametext> </name> diff --git a/erts/doc/src/erlang.xml b/erts/doc/src/erlang.xml index 2465f49581..b04f2b008e 100644 --- a/erts/doc/src/erlang.xml +++ b/erts/doc/src/erlang.xml @@ -2955,7 +2955,10 @@ os_prompt%</pre> <p>The total amount of memory currently allocated for the emulator that is not directly related to any Erlang process. Memory presented as <c>processes</c> is not - included in this memory.</p> + included in this memory. <seealso marker="tools:instrument"> + <c>instrument(3)</c></seealso> can be used to + get a more detailed breakdown of what memory is part + of this type.</p> </item> <tag><c>atom</c></tag> <item> @@ -4687,7 +4690,7 @@ RealSystem = system + MissedSystem</code> <p>The default <c>message_queue_data</c> process flag is determined by command-line argument <seealso marker="erl#+hmqd"> <c>+hmqd</c></seealso> in <c>erl(1)</c>.</p> - <p>If the process potentially can get many messages, + <p>If the process potentially can get many messages in its queue, you are advised to set the flag to <c>off_heap</c>. This because a garbage collection with many messages placed on the heap can become extremely expensive and the process can @@ -4960,11 +4963,15 @@ RealSystem = system + MissedSystem</code> <tag><c>{binary, <anno>BinInfo</anno>}</c></tag> <item> <p><c><anno>BinInfo</anno></c> is a list containing miscellaneous - information about binaries currently referred to by this - process. This <c><anno>InfoTuple</anno></c> can be changed or + information about binaries on the heap of this + process. + This <c><anno>InfoTuple</anno></c> can be changed or removed without prior notice. In the current implementation <c><anno>BinInfo</anno></c> is a list of tuples. The tuples contain; <c>BinaryId</c>, <c>BinarySize</c>, <c>BinaryRefcCount</c>.</p> + <p>The message queue is on the heap depending on the + process flag <seealso marker="#process_flag_message_queue_data"> + <c>message_queue_data</c></seealso>.</p> </item> <tag><c>{catchlevel, <anno>CatchLevel</anno>}</c></tag> <item> @@ -8869,6 +8876,10 @@ hello </pre> <p>See also <seealso marker="#binary_to_term/1"> <c>binary_to_term/1</c></seealso>.</p> + <note> + <p>There is no guarantee that this function will return + the same encoded representation for the same term.</p> + </note> </desc> </func> diff --git a/erts/doc/src/notes.xml b/erts/doc/src/notes.xml index b1d2fd7be7..91eabb5607 100644 --- a/erts/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/erts/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -31,6 +31,32 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the ERTS application.</p> +<section><title>Erts 9.1.5</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p>Fixed a bug in file closure on Unix; close(2) was + retried on EINTR which could cause a different (recently + opened) file to be closed as well.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14775</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + A race-condition when tearing down a connection with + active node monitors could cause the runtime system to + crash.</p> + <p> + This bug was introduced in ERTS version 8.0 (OTP 19.0).</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14781 Aux Id: OTP-13047 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Erts 9.1.4</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> @@ -2893,6 +2919,58 @@ </section> +<section><title>Erts 7.3.1.4</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Fix performance bug in pre-allocators that could cause + them to permanently fall back on normal more expensive + memory allocation. Pre-allocators are used for quick + allocation of short lived meta data used by messages and + other scheduled tasks. Bug exists since OTP_R15B02.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14491</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fixed bug in operator <c>bxor</c> causing erroneuos + result when one operand is a big <em>negative</em> + integer with the lowest <c>N*W</c> bits as zero and the + other operand not larger than <c>N*W</c> bits. <c>N</c> + is an integer of 1 or larger and <c>W</c> is 32 or 64 + depending on word size.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14514</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + A timer internal bit-field used for storing scheduler id + was too small. As a result, VM internal timer data + structures could become inconsistent when using 1024 + schedulers on the system. Note that systems with less + than 1024 schedulers are not effected by this bug.</p> + <p> + This bug was introduced in ERTS version 7.0 (OTP 18.0).</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14548 Aux Id: OTP-11997, ERL-468 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fixed bug in <c>binary_to_term</c> and + <c>binary_to_atom</c> that could cause VM crash. + Typically happens when the last character of an UTF8 + string is in the range 128 to 255, but truncated to only + one byte. Bug exists in <c>binary_to_term</c> since ERTS + version 5.10.2 (OTP_R16B01) and <c>binary_to_atom</c> + since ERTS version 9.0 (OTP-20.0).</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14590 Aux Id: ERL-474 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> +</section> + <section><title>Erts 7.3.1.3</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/erts/doc/src/run_erl.xml b/erts/doc/src/run_erl.xml index a9b6a7e2c6..e4c1b943c4 100644 --- a/erts/doc/src/run_erl.xml +++ b/erts/doc/src/run_erl.xml @@ -181,6 +181,12 @@ <item> <p>Controls the number of log files written before older files are reused. Defaults to 5, minimum is 2, maximum is 1000.</p> + <p>Note that, as a way to indicate the newest file, <c>run_erl</c> will + delete the oldest log file to maintain a "hole" in the file + sequences. For example, if log files #1, #2, #4 and #5 exists, that + means #2 is the latest and #4 is the oldest. You will therefore at most + get one less log file than the value set by + <c>RUN_ERL_LOG_GENERATIONS</c>.</p> </item> <tag><c>RUN_ERL_LOG_MAXSIZE</c></tag> <item> diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/atom.h b/erts/emulator/beam/atom.h index be998a46bd..385120a8d9 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/atom.h +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/atom.h @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ /* Internal atom cache needs MAX_ATOM_TABLE_SIZE to be less than an unsigned 32 bit integer. See external.c(erts_encode_ext_dist_header_setup) for more details. */ -#define MAX_ATOM_TABLE_SIZE ((MAX_ATOM_INDEX + 1 < (UWORD_CONSTANT(1) << 32)) ? MAX_ATOM_INDEX + 1 : (UWORD_CONSTANT(1) << 32)) +#define MAX_ATOM_TABLE_SIZE ((MAX_ATOM_INDEX + 1 < (UWORD_CONSTANT(1) << 32)) ? MAX_ATOM_INDEX + 1 : ((UWORD_CONSTANT(1) << 31) - 1)) /* Here we use maximum signed interger value to avoid integer overflow */ #else #define MAX_ATOM_TABLE_SIZE (MAX_ATOM_INDEX + 1) #endif diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/beam_load.c b/erts/emulator/beam/beam_load.c index 23258dbe9c..adf8779f11 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/beam_load.c +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/beam_load.c @@ -5665,13 +5665,36 @@ erts_release_literal_area(ErtsLiteralArea* literal_area) return; oh = literal_area->off_heap; - + while (oh) { - Binary* bptr; - ASSERT(thing_subtag(oh->thing_word) == REFC_BINARY_SUBTAG); - bptr = ((ProcBin*)oh)->val; - erts_bin_release(bptr); - oh = oh->next; + switch (thing_subtag(oh->thing_word)) { + case REFC_BINARY_SUBTAG: + { + Binary* bptr = ((ProcBin*)oh)->val; + erts_bin_release(bptr); + break; + } + case FUN_SUBTAG: + { + ErlFunEntry* fe = ((ErlFunThing*)oh)->fe; + if (erts_smp_refc_dectest(&fe->refc, 0) == 0) { + erts_erase_fun_entry(fe); + } + break; + } + case REF_SUBTAG: + { + ErtsMagicBinary *bptr; + ASSERT(is_magic_ref_thing(oh)); + bptr = ((ErtsMRefThing *) oh)->mb; + erts_bin_release((Binary *) bptr); + break; + } + default: + ASSERT(is_external_header(oh->thing_word)); + erts_deref_node_entry(((ExternalThing*)oh)->node); + } + oh = oh->next; } erts_free(ERTS_ALC_T_LITERAL, literal_area); } diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/break.c b/erts/emulator/beam/break.c index e57be5a595..e4c2801ea2 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/break.c +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/break.c @@ -492,9 +492,7 @@ loaded(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg) static void dump_attributes(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, byte* ptr, int size) { - while (size-- > 0) { - erts_print(to, to_arg, "%02X", *ptr++); - } + erts_print_base64(to, to_arg, ptr, size); erts_print(to, to_arg, "\n"); } @@ -858,7 +856,7 @@ erl_crash_dump_v(char *file, int line, char* fmt, va_list args) } time(&now); - erts_cbprintf(to, to_arg, "=erl_crash_dump:0.4\n%s", ctime(&now)); + erts_cbprintf(to, to_arg, "=erl_crash_dump:0.5\n%s", ctime(&now)); if (file != NULL) erts_cbprintf(to, to_arg, "The error occurred in file %s, line %d\n", file, line); @@ -975,3 +973,28 @@ erl_crash_dump_v(char *file, int line, char* fmt, va_list args) erts_fprintf(stderr,"done\n"); } +void +erts_print_base64(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, byte* src, Uint size) +{ + static const byte base64_chars[] = + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; + + while (size >= 3) { + erts_putc(to, to_arg, base64_chars[src[0] >> 2]); + erts_putc(to, to_arg, base64_chars[((src[0] & 0x03) << 4) | (src[1] >> 4)]); + erts_putc(to, to_arg, base64_chars[((src[1] & 0x0f) << 2) | (src[2] >> 6)]); + erts_putc(to, to_arg, base64_chars[src[2] & 0x3f]); + size -= 3; + src += 3; + } + if (size == 1) { + erts_putc(to, to_arg, base64_chars[src[0] >> 2]); + erts_putc(to, to_arg, base64_chars[(src[0] & 0x03) << 4]); + erts_print(to, to_arg, "=="); + } else if (size == 2) { + erts_putc(to, to_arg, base64_chars[src[0] >> 2]); + erts_putc(to, to_arg, base64_chars[((src[0] & 0x03) << 4) | (src[1] >> 4)]); + erts_putc(to, to_arg, base64_chars[(src[1] & 0x0f) << 2]); + erts_putc(to, to_arg, '='); + } +} diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/dist.c b/erts/emulator/beam/dist.c index 09fdb897f5..9fddac8980 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/dist.c +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/dist.c @@ -385,22 +385,24 @@ static void doit_node_link_net_exits(ErtsLink *lnk, void *vnecp) if (!rp) goto done; erts_smp_proc_lock(rp, rp_locks); - rlnk = erts_remove_link(&ERTS_P_LINKS(rp), name); - if (rlnk != NULL) { - ASSERT(is_atom(rlnk->pid) && (rlnk->type == LINK_NODE)); - erts_destroy_link(rlnk); - } - n = ERTS_LINK_REFC(lnk); - for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { - Eterm tup; - Eterm *hp; - ErtsMessage *msgp; - - msgp = erts_alloc_message_heap(rp, &rp_locks, - 3, &hp, &ohp); - tup = TUPLE2(hp, am_nodedown, name); - erts_queue_message(rp, rp_locks, msgp, tup, am_system); - } + if (!ERTS_PROC_IS_EXITING(rp)) { + rlnk = erts_remove_link(&ERTS_P_LINKS(rp), name); + if (rlnk != NULL) { + ASSERT(is_atom(rlnk->pid) && (rlnk->type == LINK_NODE)); + erts_destroy_link(rlnk); + } + n = ERTS_LINK_REFC(lnk); + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + Eterm tup; + Eterm *hp; + ErtsMessage *msgp; + + msgp = erts_alloc_message_heap(rp, &rp_locks, + 3, &hp, &ohp); + tup = TUPLE2(hp, am_nodedown, name); + erts_queue_message(rp, rp_locks, msgp, tup, am_system); + } + } erts_smp_proc_unlock(rp, rp_locks); } done: diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_gc.c b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_gc.c index 8cb977a7f3..6a87136463 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_gc.c +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_gc.c @@ -1234,8 +1234,8 @@ erts_garbage_collect_literals(Process* p, Eterm* literals, p->old_htop = old_htop; /* - * Prepare to sweep binaries. Since all MSOs on the new heap - * must be come before MSOs on the old heap, find the end of + * Prepare to sweep off-heap objects. Since all MSOs on the new + * heap must be come before MSOs on the old heap, find the end of * current MSO list and use that as a starting point. */ @@ -1247,25 +1247,50 @@ erts_garbage_collect_literals(Process* p, Eterm* literals, } /* - * Sweep through all binaries in the temporary literal area. + * Sweep through all off-heap objects in the temporary literal area. */ while (oh) { if (IS_MOVED_BOXED(oh->thing_word)) { - Binary* bptr; struct erl_off_heap_header* ptr; - ptr = (struct erl_off_heap_header*) boxed_val(oh->thing_word); - ASSERT(thing_subtag(ptr->thing_word) == REFC_BINARY_SUBTAG); - bptr = ((ProcBin*)ptr)->val; - - /* - * This binary has been copied to the heap. + /* + * This off-heap object has been copied to the heap. * We must increment its reference count and * link it into the MSO list for the process. */ - erts_refc_inc(&bptr->intern.refc, 1); + ptr = (struct erl_off_heap_header*) boxed_val(oh->thing_word); + switch (thing_subtag(ptr->thing_word)) { + case REFC_BINARY_SUBTAG: + { + Binary* bptr = ((ProcBin*)ptr)->val; + erts_refc_inc(&bptr->intern.refc, 1); + break; + } + case FUN_SUBTAG: + { + ErlFunEntry* fe = ((ErlFunThing*)ptr)->fe; + erts_refc_inc(&fe->refc, 1); + break; + } + case REF_SUBTAG: + { + ErtsMagicBinary *bptr; + ASSERT(is_magic_ref_thing(ptr)); + bptr = ((ErtsMRefThing *) ptr)->mb; + erts_refc_inc(&bptr->intern.refc, 1); + break; + } + default: + { + ExternalThing *etp; + ASSERT(is_external_header(ptr->thing_word)); + etp = (ExternalThing *) ptr; + erts_smp_refc_inc(&etp->node->refc, 1); + break; + } + } *prev = ptr; prev = &ptr->next; } diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_nif.c b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_nif.c index 3ade17b10d..f67b67325d 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_nif.c +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_nif.c @@ -550,6 +550,9 @@ void enif_clear_env(ErlNifEnv* env) ASSERT(p == menv->env.proc); ASSERT(p->common.id == ERTS_INVALID_PID); ASSERT(MBUF(p) == menv->env.heap_frag); + + free_tmp_objs(env); + if (MBUF(p) != NULL) { erts_cleanup_offheap(&MSO(p)); clear_offheap(&MSO(p)); @@ -561,7 +564,6 @@ void enif_clear_env(ErlNifEnv* env) menv->env.hp = menv->env.hp_end = HEAP_TOP(p); ASSERT(!is_offheap(&MSO(p))); - free_tmp_objs(env); } #ifdef ERTS_SMP diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_nif.h b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_nif.h index d195721054..7fb447e4a8 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_nif.h +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_nif.h @@ -50,10 +50,11 @@ ** 2.9: 18.2 enif_getenv ** 2.10: Time API ** 2.11: 19.0 enif_snprintf -** 2.12: 20.0 add enif_queue +** 2.12: 20.0 add enif_select, enif_open_resource_type_x +** 2.13: 20.1 add enif_ioq */ #define ERL_NIF_MAJOR_VERSION 2 -#define ERL_NIF_MINOR_VERSION 12 +#define ERL_NIF_MINOR_VERSION 13 /* * The emulator will refuse to load a nif-lib with a major version diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_process_dump.c b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_process_dump.c index 5641195458..e0b795fbf3 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_process_dump.c +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_process_dump.c @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ static void stack_trace_dump(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, Eterm* sp); static void print_function_from_pc(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, BeamInstr* x); static void heap_dump(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, Eterm x); static void dump_binaries(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, Binary* root); +void erts_print_base64(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, + byte* src, Uint size); static void dump_externally(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, Eterm term); static void mark_literal(Eterm* ptr); static void init_literal_areas(void); @@ -193,6 +195,7 @@ dump_dist_ext(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, ErtsDistExternal *edep) else { byte *e; size_t sz; + if (!(edep->flags & ERTS_DIST_EXT_ATOM_TRANS_TAB)) erts_print(to, to_arg, "D0:"); else { @@ -210,12 +213,18 @@ dump_dist_ext(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, ErtsDistExternal *edep) else { ASSERT(*e == VERSION_MAGIC); } - erts_print(to, to_arg, "E%X:", sz); - if (edep->flags & ERTS_DIST_EXT_DFLAG_HDR) - erts_print(to, to_arg, "%02X", VERSION_MAGIC); - while (e < edep->ext_endp) - erts_print(to, to_arg, "%02X", *e++); + if (edep->flags & ERTS_DIST_EXT_DFLAG_HDR) { + byte sbuf[3]; + int i = 0; + + sbuf[i++] = VERSION_MAGIC; + while (i < sizeof(sbuf) && e < edep->ext_endp) { + sbuf[i++] = *e++; + } + erts_print_base64(to, to_arg, sbuf, i); + } + erts_print_base64(to, to_arg, e, edep->ext_endp - e); } } @@ -444,16 +453,13 @@ heap_dump(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, Eterm x) } else if (is_binary_header(hdr)) { Uint tag = thing_subtag(hdr); Uint size = binary_size(x); - Uint i; if (tag == HEAP_BINARY_SUBTAG) { byte* p; erts_print(to, to_arg, "Yh%X:", size); p = binary_bytes(x); - for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { - erts_print(to, to_arg, "%02X", p[i]); - } + erts_print_base64(to, to_arg, p, size); } else if (tag == REFC_BINARY_SUBTAG) { ProcBin* pb = (ProcBin *) binary_val(x); Binary* val = pb->val; @@ -596,16 +602,13 @@ static void dump_binaries(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, Binary* current) { while (current) { - long i; - long size = current->orig_size; + SWord size = current->orig_size; byte* bytes = (byte*) current->orig_bytes; erts_print(to, to_arg, "=binary:" PTR_FMT "\n", current); erts_print(to, to_arg, "%X:", size); - for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { - erts_print(to, to_arg, "%02X", bytes[i]); - } - erts_putc(to, to_arg, '\n'); + erts_print_base64(to, to_arg, bytes, size); + erts_putc(to, to_arg, '\n'); current = (Binary *) current->intern.flags; } } @@ -644,9 +647,7 @@ dump_externally(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, Eterm term) s = p = sbuf; erts_encode_ext(term, &p); erts_print(to, to_arg, "E%X:", p-s); - while (s < p) { - erts_print(to, to_arg, "%02X", *s++); - } + erts_print_base64(to, to_arg, sbuf, p-s); } /* @@ -802,16 +803,13 @@ dump_module_literals(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, ErtsLiteralArea* lit_area) } else if (is_binary_header(w)) { Uint tag = thing_subtag(w); Uint size = binary_size(term); - Uint i; if (tag == HEAP_BINARY_SUBTAG) { byte* p; erts_print(to, to_arg, "Yh%X:", size); p = binary_bytes(term); - for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { - erts_print(to, to_arg, "%02X", p[i]); - } + erts_print_base64(to, to_arg, p, size); } else if (tag == REFC_BINARY_SUBTAG) { ProcBin* pb = (ProcBin *) binary_val(term); Binary* val = pb->val; diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/global.h b/erts/emulator/beam/global.h index 440723aea6..9505942307 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/global.h +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/global.h @@ -966,6 +966,7 @@ void process_info(fmtfn_t, void *); void print_process_info(fmtfn_t, void *, Process*); void info(fmtfn_t, void *); void loaded(fmtfn_t, void *); +void erts_print_base64(fmtfn_t to, void *to_arg, byte* src, Uint size); /* sighandler sys.c */ int erts_set_signal(Eterm signal, Eterm type); diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/index.c b/erts/emulator/beam/index.c index a1f6f54543..7bf1a032c1 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/index.c +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/index.c @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ IndexTable* erts_index_init(ErtsAlcType_t type, IndexTable* t, char* name, int size, int limit, HashFunctions fun) { - Uint base_size = ((limit+INDEX_PAGE_SIZE-1)/INDEX_PAGE_SIZE)*sizeof(IndexSlot*); + Uint base_size = (((Uint)limit+INDEX_PAGE_SIZE-1)/INDEX_PAGE_SIZE)*sizeof(IndexSlot*); hash_init(type, &t->htable, name, 3*size/4, fun); t->size = 0; diff --git a/erts/emulator/drivers/unix/unix_efile.c b/erts/emulator/drivers/unix/unix_efile.c index f8341f788a..33e4d75ef7 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/drivers/unix/unix_efile.c +++ b/erts/emulator/drivers/unix/unix_efile.c @@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ efile_may_openfile(Efile_error* errInfo, char *name) { void efile_closefile(int fd) { - while((close(fd) < 0) && (errno == EINTR)); + close(fd); } int diff --git a/erts/emulator/test/code_SUITE.erl b/erts/emulator/test/code_SUITE.erl index 77321aa50f..dca600bc7b 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/test/code_SUITE.erl +++ b/erts/emulator/test/code_SUITE.erl @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ multi_proc_purge/1, t_check_old_code/1, external_fun/1,get_chunk/1,module_md5/1, constant_pools/1,constant_refc_binaries/1, + fake_literals/1, false_dependency/1,coverage/1,fun_confusion/1, t_copy_literals/1, t_copy_literals_frags/1]). @@ -38,7 +39,8 @@ all() -> call_purged_fun_code_reload, call_purged_fun_code_there, multi_proc_purge, t_check_old_code, external_fun, get_chunk, module_md5, - constant_pools, constant_refc_binaries, false_dependency, + constant_pools, constant_refc_binaries, fake_literals, + false_dependency, coverage, fun_confusion, t_copy_literals, t_copy_literals_frags]. init_per_suite(Config) -> @@ -554,6 +556,62 @@ wait_for_memory_deallocations() -> wait_for_memory_deallocations() end. +fake_literals(_Config) -> + Mod = fake__literals__module, + try + do_fake_literals(Mod) + after + _ = code:purge(Mod), + _ = code:delete(Mod), + _ = code:purge(Mod), + _ = code:delete(Mod) + end, + ok. + +do_fake_literals(Mod) -> + Tid = ets:new(test, []), + ExtTerms = get_external_terms(), + Term0 = {self(),make_ref(),Tid,fun() -> ok end,ExtTerms}, + Terms = [begin + make_literal_module(Mod, Term0), + Mod:term() + end || _ <- lists:seq(1, 10)], + verify_lit_terms(Terms, Term0), + true = ets:delete(Tid), + ok. + +make_literal_module(Mod, Term) -> + Exp = [{term,0}], + Attr = [], + Fs = [{function,term,0,2, + [{label,1}, + {line,[]}, + {func_info,{atom,Mod},{atom,term},0}, + {label,2}, + {move,{literal,Term},{x,0}}, + return]}], + Asm = {Mod,Exp,Attr,Fs,2}, + {ok,Mod,Beam} = compile:forms(Asm, [from_asm,binary,report]), + code:load_binary(Mod, atom_to_list(Mod), Beam). + +verify_lit_terms([H|T], Term) -> + case H =:= Term of + true -> + verify_lit_terms(T, Term); + false -> + error({bad_term,H}) + end; +verify_lit_terms([], _) -> + ok. + +get_external_terms() -> + {ok,Node} = test_server:start_node(?FUNCTION_NAME, slave, []), + Ref = rpc:call(Node, erlang, make_ref, []), + Ports = rpc:call(Node, erlang, ports, []), + Pid = rpc:call(Node, erlang, self, []), + _ = test_server:stop_node(Node), + {Ref,hd(Ports),Pid}. + %% OTP-7559: c_p->cp could contain garbage and create a false dependency %% to a module in a process. (Thanks to Richard Carlsson.) false_dependency(Config) when is_list(Config) -> diff --git a/erts/emulator/test/distribution_SUITE.erl b/erts/emulator/test/distribution_SUITE.erl index 4a0b299e03..e731b68f2f 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/test/distribution_SUITE.erl +++ b/erts/emulator/test/distribution_SUITE.erl @@ -1363,81 +1363,59 @@ bad_dist_structure(Config) when is_list(Config) -> start_monitor(Offender,P), P ! one, send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_MONITOR_P_EXIT,'replace',P,normal},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), + start_monitor(Offender,P), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_MONITOR_P_EXIT,'replace',P,normal,normal},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), + start_link(Offender,P), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_LINK},0), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), + start_link(Offender,P), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_UNLINK,'replace'},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), + start_link(Offender,P), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_UNLINK,'replace',make_ref()},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), + start_link(Offender,P), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_UNLINK,make_ref(),P},0), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), + start_link(Offender,P), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_UNLINK,normal,normal},0), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), + start_monitor(Offender,P), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_MONITOR_P,'replace',P},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), + start_monitor(Offender,P), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_MONITOR_P,'replace',P,normal},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), + start_monitor(Offender,P), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_DEMONITOR_P,'replace',P},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), + start_monitor(Offender,P), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_DEMONITOR_P,'replace',P,normal},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), + send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_EXIT,'replace',P},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_EXIT,make_ref(),normal,normal},0), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_EXIT_TT,'replace',token,P},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_EXIT_TT,make_ref(),token,normal,normal},0), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_EXIT2,'replace',P},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_EXIT2,make_ref(),normal,normal},0), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_EXIT2_TT,'replace',token,P},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_EXIT2_TT,make_ref(),token,normal,normal},0), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_GROUP_LEADER,'replace'},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_GROUP_LEADER,'replace','atomic'},2), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_GROUP_LEADER,'replace',P},0), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_REG_SEND_TT,'replace','',name},2,{message}), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_REG_SEND_TT,'replace','',name,token},0,{message}), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_REG_SEND,'replace',''},2,{message}), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_REG_SEND,'replace','',P},0,{message}), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_REG_SEND,'replace','',name},0,{message}), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_REG_SEND,'replace','',name,{token}},2,{message}), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_SEND_TT,'',P},0,{message}), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_SEND_TT,'',name,token},0,{message}), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_SEND,''},0,{message}), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_SEND,'',name},0,{message}), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), send_bad_structure(Offender, P,{?DOP_SEND,'',P,{token}},0,{message}), - pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), P ! two, P ! check_msgs, receive @@ -1683,13 +1661,16 @@ bad_dist_ext_size(Config) when is_list(Config) -> start_node_monitors([Offender,Victim]), Parent = self(), - P = spawn_link(Victim, + P = spawn_opt(Victim, fun () -> Parent ! {self(), started}, receive check_msgs -> ok end, %% DID CRASH HERE bad_dist_ext_check_msgs([one]), Parent ! {self(), messages_checked} - end), + end, + [link, + %% on_heap to force total_heap_size to inspect msg queue + {message_queue_data, on_heap}]), receive {P, started} -> ok end, P ! one, @@ -1712,6 +1693,7 @@ bad_dist_ext_size(Config) when is_list(Config) -> verify_still_up(Offender, Victim), + %% Let process_info(P, total_heap_size) find bad msg and disconnect rpc:call(Victim, erlang, process_info, [P, total_heap_size]), verify_down(Offender, connection_closed, Victim, killed), @@ -1792,10 +1774,11 @@ send_bad_structure(Offender,Victim,Bad,WhereToPutSelf) -> send_bad_structure(Offender,Victim,Bad,WhereToPutSelf,PayLoad) -> Parent = self(), Done = make_ref(), - spawn(Offender, + spawn_link(Offender, fun () -> Node = node(Victim), pong = net_adm:ping(Node), + erlang:monitor_node(Node, true), DPrt = dport(Node), Bad1 = case WhereToPutSelf of 0 -> @@ -1809,7 +1792,16 @@ send_bad_structure(Offender,Victim,Bad,WhereToPutSelf,PayLoad) -> [] -> []; _Other -> [dmsg_ext(PayLoad)] end, + + receive {nodedown, Node} -> exit("premature nodedown") + after 10 -> ok + end, + port_command(DPrt, DData), + + receive {nodedown, Node} -> ok + after 5000 -> exit("missing nodedown") + end, Parent ! {DData,Done} end), receive diff --git a/erts/etc/unix/run_erl.c b/erts/etc/unix/run_erl.c index f05c729eeb..81a0036c99 100644 --- a/erts/etc/unix/run_erl.c +++ b/erts/etc/unix/run_erl.c @@ -1343,11 +1343,8 @@ static int sf_open(const char *path, int type, mode_t mode) { return fd; } static int sf_close(int fd) { - int res = 0; - - do { res = close(fd); } while(fd < 0 && errno == EINTR); - - return res; + /* "close() should not be retried after an EINTR" */ + return close(fd); } /* Extract any control sequences that are ment only for run_erl * and should not be forwarded to the pty. diff --git a/erts/vsn.mk b/erts/vsn.mk index 220c3b5f6c..8cb891e384 100644 --- a/erts/vsn.mk +++ b/erts/vsn.mk @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ # %CopyrightEnd% # -VSN = 9.1.4 +VSN = 9.1.5 # Port number 4365 in 4.2 # Port number 4366 in 4.3 diff --git a/lib/asn1/src/asn1ct.erl b/lib/asn1/src/asn1ct.erl index f36d71a601..81a2735a0d 100644 --- a/lib/asn1/src/asn1ct.erl +++ b/lib/asn1/src/asn1ct.erl @@ -1335,25 +1335,39 @@ test_value(Module, Type, Value) -> in_process(fun() -> case catch Module:encode(Type, Value) of {ok, Bytes} -> - NewBytes = prepare_bytes(Bytes), - case Module:decode(Type, NewBytes) of - {ok, Value} -> - {ok, {Module, Type, Value}}; - {ok, Res} -> - {error, {asn1, - {encode_decode_mismatch, - {{Module, Type, Value}, Res}}}}; - Error -> - {error, {asn1, - {{decode, - {Module, Type, Value}, Error}}}} - end; + test_value_decode(Module, Type, Value, Bytes); + Bytes when is_binary(Bytes) -> + test_value_decode(Module, Type, Value, Bytes); Error -> {error, {asn1, {encode, {{Module, Type, Value}, Error}}}} end end). + +test_value_decode(Module, Type, Value, Bytes) -> + NewBytes = prepare_bytes(Bytes), + case Module:decode(Type, NewBytes) of + {ok,Value} -> {ok, {Module,Type,Value}}; + {ok,Value,<<>>} -> {ok, {Module,Type,Value}}; + Value -> {ok, {Module,Type,Value}}; + {Value,<<>>} -> {ok, {Module,Type,Value}}; + + %% Errors: + {ok, Res} -> + {error, {asn1, + {encode_decode_mismatch, + {{Module, Type, Value}, Res}}}}; + {ok, Res, Rest} -> + {error, {asn1, + {encode_decode_mismatch, + {{Module, Type, Value}, {Res,Rest}}}}}; + Error -> + {error, {asn1, + {{decode, + {Module, Type, Value}, Error}}}} + end. + value(Module, Type) -> value(Module, Type, []). value(Module, Type, Includes) -> diff --git a/lib/asn1/src/asn1ct_gen.erl b/lib/asn1/src/asn1ct_gen.erl index 806f8420ec..da9f6ac559 100644 --- a/lib/asn1/src/asn1ct_gen.erl +++ b/lib/asn1/src/asn1ct_gen.erl @@ -707,6 +707,7 @@ gen_exports([_|_]=L0, Prefix, Arity) -> pgen_dispatcher(Erules, []) -> gen_info_functions(Erules); pgen_dispatcher(Gen, Types) -> + %% MODULE HEAD emit(["-export([encode/2,decode/2]).",nl,nl]), gen_info_functions(Gen), @@ -714,6 +715,7 @@ pgen_dispatcher(Gen, Types) -> NoFinalPadding = lists:member(no_final_padding, Options), NoOkWrapper = proplists:get_bool(no_ok_wrapper, Options), + %% ENCODER Call = case Gen of #gen{erule=per,aligned=true} -> asn1ct_func:need({per,complete,1}), @@ -740,6 +742,7 @@ pgen_dispatcher(Gen, Types) -> end, emit([nl,nl]), + %% DECODER ReturnRest = proplists:get_bool(undec_rest, Gen#gen.options), Data = case Gen#gen.erule =:= ber andalso ReturnRest of true -> "Data0"; @@ -747,6 +750,12 @@ pgen_dispatcher(Gen, Types) -> end, emit(["decode(Type, ",Data,") ->",nl]), + + case NoOkWrapper of + false -> emit(["try",nl]); + true -> ok + end, + DecWrap = case {Gen,ReturnRest} of {#gen{erule=ber},false} -> @@ -754,32 +763,38 @@ pgen_dispatcher(Gen, Types) -> "element(1, ber_decode_nif(Data))"; {#gen{erule=ber},true} -> asn1ct_func:need({ber,ber_decode_nif,1}), - emit(["{Data,Rest} = ber_decode_nif(Data0),",nl]), + emit([" {Data,Rest} = ber_decode_nif(Data0),",nl]), "Data"; {_,_} -> "Data" end, - emit([case NoOkWrapper of - false -> "try"; - true -> "case" - end, " decode_disp(Type, ",DecWrap,") of",nl]), - case Gen of - #gen{erule=ber} -> - emit([" Result ->",nl]); - #gen{erule=per} -> - emit([" {Result,Rest} ->",nl]) - end, - case ReturnRest of - false -> result_line(NoOkWrapper, ["Result"]); - true -> result_line(NoOkWrapper, ["Result","Rest"]) + + DecodeDisp = ["decode_disp(Type, ",DecWrap,")"], + case {Gen,ReturnRest} of + {#gen{erule=ber},true} -> + emit([" Result = ",DecodeDisp,",",nl]), + result_line(NoOkWrapper, ["Result","Rest"]); + {#gen{erule=ber},false} -> + emit([" Result = ",DecodeDisp,",",nl]), + result_line(NoOkWrapper, ["Result"]); + + + {#gen{erule=per},true} -> + emit([" {Result,Rest} = ",DecodeDisp,",",nl]), + result_line(NoOkWrapper, ["Result","Rest"]); + {#gen{erule=per},false} -> + emit([" {Result,_Rest} = ",DecodeDisp,",",nl]), + result_line(NoOkWrapper, ["Result"]) end, + case NoOkWrapper of false -> emit([nl,try_catch(),nl,nl]); true -> - emit([nl,"end.",nl,nl]) + emit([".",nl,nl]) end, + %% REST of MODULE gen_decode_partial_incomplete(Gen), gen_partial_inc_dispatcher(Gen), @@ -787,7 +802,7 @@ pgen_dispatcher(Gen, Types) -> gen_dispatcher(Types, "decode_disp", "dec_"). result_line(NoOkWrapper, Items) -> - S = [" "|case NoOkWrapper of + S = [" "|case NoOkWrapper of false -> result_line_1(["ok"|Items]); true -> result_line_1(Items) end], diff --git a/lib/common_test/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/common_test/doc/src/Makefile index b60b04c4ae..293ef591cb 100644 --- a/lib/common_test/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/common_test/doc/src/Makefile @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ XML_REF6_FILES = common_test_app.xml XML_PART_FILES = part.xml XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ + introduction.xml \ basics_chapter.xml \ getting_started_chapter.xml \ install_chapter.xml \ @@ -74,8 +75,7 @@ XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ event_handler_chapter.xml \ ct_hooks_chapter.xml \ dependencies_chapter.xml \ - notes.xml \ - notes_history.xml + notes.xml BOOK_FILES = book.xml diff --git a/lib/compiler/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/compiler/doc/src/Makefile index 254445c111..13210de040 100644 --- a/lib/compiler/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/compiler/doc/src/Makefile @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ XML_APPLICATION_FILES = ref_man.xml XML_REF3_FILES = compile.xml XML_PART_FILES = -XML_CHAPTER_FILES = notes.xml notes_history.xml +XML_CHAPTER_FILES = notes.xml BOOK_FILES = book.xml diff --git a/lib/compiler/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/compiler/doc/src/notes.xml index 433fc3b86e..2aec75a2aa 100644 --- a/lib/compiler/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/compiler/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -510,6 +510,22 @@ </section> + +<section><title>Compiler 6.0.3.1</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p>Fail labels on guard BIFs weren't taken into account + during an optimization pass, and a bug in the validation + pass sometimes prevented this from being noticed when a + fault occurred.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14522 Aux Id: ERIERL-48 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> +</section> + <section><title>Compiler 6.0.3</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/compiler/src/beam_asm.erl b/lib/compiler/src/beam_asm.erl index c35efdfc9d..f7c838e392 100644 --- a/lib/compiler/src/beam_asm.erl +++ b/lib/compiler/src/beam_asm.erl @@ -182,7 +182,8 @@ build_file(Code, Attr, Dict, NumLabels, NumFuncs, ExtraChunks, SourceFile, Opts, Essentials1 = [iolist_to_binary(C) || C <- Essentials0], MD5 = module_md5(Essentials1), Essentials = finalize_fun_table(Essentials1, MD5), - {Attributes,Compile} = build_attributes(Opts, SourceFile, Attr, MD5), + {Attributes,Compile} = build_attributes(Opts, CompilerOpts, SourceFile, + Attr, MD5), AttrChunk = chunk(<<"Attr">>, Attributes), CompileChunk = chunk(<<"CInf">>, Compile), @@ -264,16 +265,16 @@ flatten_exports(Exps) -> flatten_imports(Imps) -> list_to_binary(map(fun({M,F,A}) -> <<M:32,F:32,A:32>> end, Imps)). -build_attributes(Opts, SourceFile, Attr, MD5) -> +build_attributes(Opts, CompilerOpts, SourceFile, Attr, MD5) -> Misc0 = case SourceFile of [] -> []; [_|_] -> [{source,SourceFile}] end, - Misc = case member(slim, Opts) of + Misc = case member(slim, CompilerOpts) of false -> Misc0; true -> [] end, - Compile = case member(deterministic, Opts) of + Compile = case member(deterministic, CompilerOpts) of false -> [{options,Opts},{version,?COMPILER_VSN}|Misc]; true -> diff --git a/lib/compiler/src/beam_listing.erl b/lib/compiler/src/beam_listing.erl index 94b47cf568..836378727b 100644 --- a/lib/compiler/src/beam_listing.erl +++ b/lib/compiler/src/beam_listing.erl @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ -include("core_parse.hrl"). -include("v3_kernel.hrl"). -include("v3_life.hrl"). +-include("beam_disasm.hrl"). -import(lists, [foreach/2]). @@ -59,6 +60,19 @@ module(Stream, {Mod,Exp,Attr,Code,NumLabels}) -> [Name, Arity, Entry]), io:put_chars(Stream, format_asm(Asm)) end, Code); +module(Stream, Code) when is_binary(Code) -> + #beam_file{ module = Module, compile_info = CInfo } = beam_disasm:file(Code), + Loaded = code:is_loaded(Module), + Sticky = code:is_sticky(Module), + [code:unstick_mod(Module) || Sticky], + + {module, Module} = code:load_binary(Module, proplists:get_value(source, CInfo), Code), + ok = erts_debug:df(Stream, Module), + + %% Restore loaded module + _ = [{module, Module} = code:load_file(Module) || Loaded =/= false], + [code:stick_mod(Module) || Sticky], + ok; module(Stream, [_|_]=Fs) -> %% Form-based abstract format. foreach(fun (F) -> io:format(Stream, "~p.\n", [F]) end, Fs). diff --git a/lib/compiler/src/compile.erl b/lib/compiler/src/compile.erl index aa2d224bb4..50b0ba76f8 100644 --- a/lib/compiler/src/compile.erl +++ b/lib/compiler/src/compile.erl @@ -787,8 +787,10 @@ asm_passes() -> | binary_passes()]. binary_passes() -> - [{native_compile,fun test_native/1,fun native_compile/2}, - {unless,binary,?pass(save_binary,not_werror)}]. + [{iff,'to_dis',{listing,"dis"}}, + {native_compile,fun test_native/1,fun native_compile/2}, + {unless,binary,?pass(save_binary,not_werror)} + ]. %%% %%% Compiler passes. diff --git a/lib/compiler/test/compile_SUITE.erl b/lib/compiler/test/compile_SUITE.erl index f647a4030d..96897d612d 100644 --- a/lib/compiler/test/compile_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/compiler/test/compile_SUITE.erl @@ -119,9 +119,19 @@ file_1(Config) when is_list(Config) -> true = exists(Target), passed = run(Target, test, []), + %% Test option 'deterministic' as a compiler attribute. + Det = deterministic_module, + {DetPath, DetTarget} = get_files(Config, Det, "det_target"), + {ok,Det,DetCode} = compile:file(DetPath, [binary]), + {module,Det} = code:load_binary(Det, "", DetCode), + [{version,_}] = Det:module_info(compile), + true = code:delete(Det), + false = code:purge(Det), + %% Cleanup. ok = file:delete(Target), ok = file:del_dir(filename:dirname(Target)), + ok = file:del_dir(filename:dirname(DetTarget)), %% There should not be any messages in the messages. receive @@ -398,6 +408,7 @@ do_file_listings(DataDir, PrivDir, [File|Files]) -> ok = file:delete(filename:join(Listings, File ++ ".core")), do_listing(Simple, TargetDir, to_core, ".core"), do_listing(Simple, TargetDir, to_kernel, ".kernel"), + do_listing(Simple, TargetDir, to_dis, ".dis"), %% Final clean up. lists:foreach(fun(F) -> ok = file:delete(F) end, @@ -413,6 +424,7 @@ listings_big(Config) when is_list(Config) -> do_listing(Big, TargetDir, 'E'), do_listing(Big, TargetDir, 'P'), do_listing(Big, TargetDir, dkern, ".kernel"), + do_listing(Big, TargetDir, to_dis, ".dis"), TargetNoext = filename:rootname(Target, code:objfile_extension()), {ok,big} = compile:file(TargetNoext, [from_asm,{outdir,TargetDir}]), diff --git a/lib/compiler/test/compile_SUITE_data/deterministic_module.erl b/lib/compiler/test/compile_SUITE_data/deterministic_module.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5e0e29c25e --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/compiler/test/compile_SUITE_data/deterministic_module.erl @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% +-module(deterministic_module). +-compile([deterministic]). diff --git a/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c b/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c index b29c5082ba..3914a48679 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c +++ b/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c @@ -4011,7 +4011,7 @@ static int get_pkey_private_key(ErlNifEnv *env, ERL_NIF_TERM algorithm, ERL_NIF_ return PKEY_BADARG; password = get_key_password(env, key); *pkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, id, NULL, password); - if (!pkey) + if (!*pkey) return PKEY_BADARG; enif_free(id); #else @@ -4657,7 +4657,6 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM pkey_crypt_nif(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM enif_alloc_binary(outlen, &out_bin); - ERL_VALGRIND_ASSERT_MEM_DEFINED(out_bin.data, out_bin.size); if (is_private) { if (is_encrypt) { /* private_encrypt */ @@ -4795,7 +4794,6 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM privkey_to_pubkey_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NI EVP_PKEY *pkey; ERL_NIF_TERM alg = argv[0]; ERL_NIF_TERM result[8]; - if (get_pkey_private_key(env, alg, argv[1], &pkey) != PKEY_OK) { return enif_make_badarg(env); } @@ -4827,9 +4825,10 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM privkey_to_pubkey_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NI } else if (argv[0] == atom_ecdsa) { #if defined(HAVE_EC) - EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey); - if (ec) { - /* Example of result: + /* not yet implemented + EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey); + if (ec) { + / * Example of result: { Curve = {Field, Prime, Point, Order, CoFactor} = { @@ -4843,7 +4842,7 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM privkey_to_pubkey_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NI CoFactor = <<1>> }, Key = <<151,...,62>> - } + } or { Curve = @@ -4854,16 +4853,13 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM privkey_to_pubkey_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NI }, Key } - */ + * / EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - return atom_notsup; - } -#else - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - return atom_notsup; + return enif_make_list_from_array(env, ..., ...); + */ #endif } - + if (pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return enif_make_badarg(env); } @@ -4888,7 +4884,6 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM engine_by_id_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TER #ifdef HAS_ENGINE_SUPPORT ERL_NIF_TERM ret; ErlNifBinary engine_id_bin; - unsigned int engine_id_len = 0; char *engine_id; ENGINE *engine; struct engine_ctx *ctx; @@ -4898,14 +4893,14 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM engine_by_id_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TER PRINTF_ERR0("engine_by_id_nif Leaved: badarg"); return enif_make_badarg(env); } else { - engine_id_len = engine_id_bin.size+1; - engine_id = enif_alloc(engine_id_len); - (void) memcpy(engine_id, engine_id_bin.data, engine_id_len); - engine_id[engine_id_len-1] = '\0'; + engine_id = enif_alloc(engine_id_bin.size+1); + (void) memcpy(engine_id, engine_id_bin.data, engine_id_bin.size); + engine_id[engine_id_bin.size] = '\0'; } engine = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id); if(!engine) { + enif_free(engine_id); PRINTF_ERR0("engine_by_id_nif Leaved: {error, bad_engine_id}"); return enif_make_tuple2(env, atom_error, atom_bad_engine_id); } @@ -5040,7 +5035,8 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM engine_ctrl_cmd_strings_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const error: for(i = 0; cmds != NULL && cmds[i] != NULL; i++) - enif_free(cmds[i]); + enif_free(cmds[i]); + enif_free(cmds); return ret; #else return atom_notsup; @@ -5379,7 +5375,6 @@ static int get_engine_load_cmd_list(ErlNifEnv* env, const ERL_NIF_TERM term, cha ErlNifBinary tmpbin; int arity; char* tmpstr; - int tmplen = 0; if(!enif_is_empty_list(env, term)) { if(!enif_get_list_cell(env, term, &head, &tail)) { @@ -5394,10 +5389,9 @@ static int get_engine_load_cmd_list(ErlNifEnv* env, const ERL_NIF_TERM term, cha cmds[i] = NULL; return -1; } else { - tmplen = tmpbin.size+1; - tmpstr = enif_alloc(tmplen); - (void) memcpy(tmpstr, tmpbin.data, tmplen); - tmpstr[tmplen-1] = '\0'; + tmpstr = enif_alloc(tmpbin.size+1); + (void) memcpy(tmpstr, tmpbin.data, tmpbin.size); + tmpstr[tmpbin.size] = '\0'; cmds[i++] = tmpstr; } if(!enif_inspect_binary(env, tmp_tuple[1], &tmpbin)) { @@ -5407,10 +5401,9 @@ static int get_engine_load_cmd_list(ErlNifEnv* env, const ERL_NIF_TERM term, cha if(tmpbin.size == 0) cmds[i++] = NULL; else { - tmplen = tmpbin.size+1; - tmpstr = enif_alloc(tmplen); - (void) memcpy(tmpstr, tmpbin.data, tmplen); - tmpstr[tmplen-1] = '\0'; + tmpstr = enif_alloc(tmpbin.size+1); + (void) memcpy(tmpstr, tmpbin.data, tmpbin.size); + tmpstr[tmpbin.size] = '\0'; cmds[i++] = tmpstr; } } diff --git a/lib/crypto/c_src/otp_test_engine.c b/lib/crypto/c_src/otp_test_engine.c index a66bee2ddf..5c6122c06a 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/c_src/otp_test_engine.c +++ b/lib/crypto/c_src/otp_test_engine.c @@ -218,9 +218,9 @@ EVP_PKEY* test_key_load(ENGINE *er, const char *id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void * fclose(f); if (!pkey) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d Key read from file failed. ", __FILE__,__LINE__); + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d Key read from file %s failed.\r\n", __FILE__,__LINE__,id); if (callback_data) - fprintf(stderr, "Pwd = \"%s\". ", (char *)callback_data); + fprintf(stderr, "Pwd = \"%s\".\r\n", (char *)callback_data); fprintf(stderr, "Contents of file \"%s\":\r\n",id); f = fopen(id, "r"); { /* Print the contents of the key file */ @@ -228,12 +228,14 @@ EVP_PKEY* test_key_load(ENGINE *er, const char *id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void * while (!feof(f)) { switch (c=fgetc(f)) { case '\n': - case '\r': putc('\r',stdout); putc('\n',stdout); break; - default: putc(c, stdout); + case '\r': putc('\r',stderr); putc('\n',stderr); break; + default: putc(c, stderr); } } } + fprintf(stderr, "File contents printed.\r\n"); fclose(f); + return NULL; } return pkey; diff --git a/lib/crypto/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/crypto/doc/src/Makefile index a902779383..aa987d2b39 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/crypto/doc/src/Makefile @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ XML_REF3_FILES = crypto.xml XML_REF6_FILES = crypto_app.xml XML_PART_FILES = usersguide.xml -XML_CHAPTER_FILES = notes.xml licenses.xml fips.xml engine_load.xml +XML_CHAPTER_FILES = notes.xml licenses.xml fips.xml engine_load.xml engine_keys.xml BOOK_FILES = book.xml diff --git a/lib/crypto/doc/src/crypto.xml b/lib/crypto/doc/src/crypto.xml index 8e2d33c928..dbc42812a8 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/doc/src/crypto.xml +++ b/lib/crypto/doc/src/crypto.xml @@ -136,11 +136,12 @@ See also <seealso marker="#supports-0">crypto:supports/0</seealso> </p> + <marker id="engine_key_ref_type"/> <code>engine_key_ref() = #{engine := engine_ref(), key_id := key_id(), password => password()}</code> - <code>engine_key_ref() = term()</code> + <code>engine_ref() = term()</code> <p>The result of a call to <seealso marker="#engine_load-3">engine_load/3</seealso>. </p> diff --git a/lib/crypto/doc/src/engine_keys.xml b/lib/crypto/doc/src/engine_keys.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..38714fed8a --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/crypto/doc/src/engine_keys.xml @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> +<!DOCTYPE chapter SYSTEM "chapter.dtd"> + +<chapter> + <header> + <copyright> + <year>2017</year><year>2017</year> + <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> + </copyright> + <legalnotice> + The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, + Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in + compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the + Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be + retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/. + + Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" + basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See + the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations + under the License. + </legalnotice> + <title>Engine Stored Keys</title> + <prepared>Hans Nilsson</prepared> + <date>2017-11-10</date> + <file>engine_keys.xml</file> + </header> + <p> + <marker id="engine_key"></marker> + This chapter describes the support in the crypto application for using public and private keys stored in encryption engines. + </p> + + <section> + <title>Background</title> + <p> + <url href="https://www.openssl.org/">OpenSSL</url> exposes an Engine API, which makes + it possible to plug in alternative implementations for some of the cryptographic + operations implemented by OpenSSL. + See the chapter <seealso marker="crypto:engine_load#engine_load">Engine Load</seealso> + for details and how to load an Engine. + </p> + <p> + An engine could among other tasks provide a storage for + private or public keys. Such a storage could be made safer than the normal file system. Thoose techniques are not + described in this User's Guide. Here we concentrate on how to use private or public keys stored in + such an engine. + </p> + <p> + The storage engine must call <c>ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function</c> and <c>ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function</c>. + See the OpenSSL cryptolib's <url href="https://www.openssl.org/docs/manpages.html">manpages</url>. + </p> + <p> + OTP/Crypto requires that the user provides two or three items of information about the key. The application used + by the user is usually on a higher level, for example in + <seealso marker="ssl:ssl#key_option_def">SSL</seealso>. If using + the crypto application directly, it is required that: + </p> + <list> + <item>an Engine is loaded, see the chapter on <seealso marker="crypto:engine_load#engine_load">Engine Load</seealso> + or the <seealso marker="crypto:crypto#engine_load-3">Reference Manual</seealso> + </item> + <item>a reference to a key in the Engine is available. This should be an Erlang string or binary and depends + on the Engine loaded + </item> + <item>an Erlang map is constructed with the Engine reference, the key reference and possibly a key passphrase if + needed by the Engine. See the <seealso marker="crypto:crypto#engine_key_ref_type">Reference Manual</seealso> for + details of the map. + </item> + </list> + </section> + + <section> + <title>Use Cases</title> + <section> + <title>Sign with an engine stored private key</title> + <p> + This example shows how to construct a key reference that is used in a sign operation. + The actual key is stored in the engine that is loaded at prompt 1. + </p> + <code> +1> {ok, EngineRef} = crypto:engine_load(....). +... +{ok,#Ref<0.2399045421.3028942852.173962>} +2> PrivKey = #{engine => EngineRef, + key_id => "id of the private key in Engine"}. +... +3> Signature = crypto:sign(rsa, sha, <<"The message">>, PrivKey). +<<65,6,125,254,54,233,84,77,83,63,168,28,169,214,121,76, + 207,177,124,183,156,185,160,243,36,79,125,230,231,...>> + </code> + </section> + + <section> + <title>Verify with an engine stored public key</title> + <p> + Here the signature and message in the last example is verifyed using the public key. + The public key is stored in an engine, only to exemplify that it is possible. The public + key could of course be handled openly as usual. + </p> + <code> +4> PublicKey = #{engine => EngineRef, + key_id => "id of the public key in Engine"}. +... +5> crypto:verify(rsa, sha, <<"The message">>, Signature, PublicKey). +true +6> + </code> + </section> + + <section> + <title>Using a password protected private key</title> + <p> + The same example as the first sign example, except that a password protects the key down in the Engine. + </p> + <code> +6> PrivKeyPwd = #{engine => EngineRef, + key_id => "id of the pwd protected private key in Engine", + password => "password"}. +... +7> crypto:sign(rsa, sha, <<"The message">>, PrivKeyPwd). +<<140,80,168,101,234,211,146,183,231,190,160,82,85,163, + 175,106,77,241,141,120,72,149,181,181,194,154,175,76, + 223,...>> +8> + </code> + + </section> + + </section> +</chapter> diff --git a/lib/crypto/doc/src/usersguide.xml b/lib/crypto/doc/src/usersguide.xml index f637a1db79..e2ba1fe160 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/doc/src/usersguide.xml +++ b/lib/crypto/doc/src/usersguide.xml @@ -49,4 +49,5 @@ <xi:include href="licenses.xml"/> <xi:include href="fips.xml"/> <xi:include href="engine_load.xml"/> + <xi:include href="engine_keys.xml"/> </part> diff --git a/lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl b/lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl index 0d39dcc76e..641e526537 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl +++ b/lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl @@ -1061,9 +1061,17 @@ ec_curve(X) -> privkey_to_pubkey(Alg, EngineMap) when Alg == rsa; Alg == dss; Alg == ecdsa -> - case privkey_to_pubkey_nif(Alg, format_pkey(Alg,EngineMap)) of + try privkey_to_pubkey_nif(Alg, format_pkey(Alg,EngineMap)) + of [_|_]=L -> map_ensure_bin_as_int(L); X -> X + catch + error:badarg when Alg==ecdsa -> + {error, notsup}; + error:badarg -> + {error, not_found}; + error:notsup -> + {error, notsup} end. privkey_to_pubkey_nif(_Alg, _EngineMap) -> ?nif_stub. diff --git a/lib/crypto/test/engine_SUITE.erl b/lib/crypto/test/engine_SUITE.erl index 72bd59f8ab..06cce832ac 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/test/engine_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/crypto/test/engine_SUITE.erl @@ -53,10 +53,15 @@ groups() -> sign_verify_dsa, sign_verify_ecdsa, sign_verify_rsa_pwd, + sign_verify_rsa_pwd_bad_pwd, priv_encrypt_pub_decrypt_rsa, priv_encrypt_pub_decrypt_rsa_pwd, pub_encrypt_priv_decrypt_rsa, pub_encrypt_priv_decrypt_rsa_pwd, + get_pub_from_priv_key_rsa, + get_pub_from_priv_key_rsa_pwd, + get_pub_from_priv_key_rsa_pwd_no_pwd, + get_pub_from_priv_key_rsa_pwd_bad_pwd, get_pub_from_priv_key_dsa, get_pub_from_priv_key_ecdsa ]}]. @@ -382,6 +387,18 @@ sign_verify_rsa_pwd(Config) -> key_id => key_id(Config, "rsa_public_key_pwd.pem")}, sign_verify(rsa, sha, Priv, Pub). +sign_verify_rsa_pwd_bad_pwd(Config) -> + Priv = #{engine => engine_ref(Config), + key_id => key_id(Config, "rsa_private_key_pwd.pem"), + password => "Bad password"}, + Pub = #{engine => engine_ref(Config), + key_id => key_id(Config, "rsa_public_key_pwd.pem")}, + try sign_verify(rsa, sha, Priv, Pub) of + _ -> {fail, "PWD prot pubkey sign succeded with no pwd!"} + catch + error:badarg -> ok + end. + priv_encrypt_pub_decrypt_rsa(Config) -> Priv = #{engine => engine_ref(Config), key_id => key_id(Config, "rsa_private_key.pem")}, @@ -406,33 +423,100 @@ pub_encrypt_priv_decrypt_rsa(Config) -> pub_encrypt_priv_decrypt_rsa_pwd(Config) -> Priv = #{engine => engine_ref(Config), - key_id => key_id(Config, "rsa_private_key.pem"), + key_id => key_id(Config, "rsa_private_key_pwd.pem"), password => "password"}, Pub = #{engine => engine_ref(Config), - key_id => key_id(Config, "rsa_public_key.pem")}, + key_id => key_id(Config, "rsa_public_key_pwd.pem")}, pub_enc_priv_dec(rsa, Pub, Priv, rsa_pkcs1_padding). get_pub_from_priv_key_rsa(Config) -> Priv = #{engine => engine_ref(Config), key_id => key_id(Config, "rsa_private_key.pem")}, - Pub = crypto:privkey_to_pubkey(rsa, Priv), - ct:log("rsa Pub = ~p",[Pub]), - sign_verify(rsa, sha, Priv, Pub). + case crypto:privkey_to_pubkey(rsa, Priv) of + {error, not_found} -> + {fail, "Key not found"}; + {error, notsup} -> + {skip, "RSA not supported"}; + {error, Error} -> + {fail, {wrong_error,Error}}; + Pub -> + ct:log("rsa Pub = ~p",[Pub]), + sign_verify(rsa, sha, Priv, Pub) + end. + +get_pub_from_priv_key_rsa_pwd(Config) -> + Priv = #{engine => engine_ref(Config), + key_id => key_id(Config, "rsa_private_key_pwd.pem"), + password => "password"}, + case crypto:privkey_to_pubkey(rsa, Priv) of + {error, not_found} -> + {fail, "Key not found"}; + {error, notsup} -> + {skip, "RSA not supported"}; + {error, Error} -> + {fail, {wrong_error,Error}}; + Pub -> + ct:log("rsa Pub = ~p",[Pub]), + sign_verify(rsa, sha, Priv, Pub) + end. + +get_pub_from_priv_key_rsa_pwd_no_pwd(Config) -> + Priv = #{engine => engine_ref(Config), + key_id => key_id(Config, "rsa_private_key_pwd.pem")}, + case crypto:privkey_to_pubkey(rsa, Priv) of + {error, not_found} -> + ok; + {error, notsup} -> + {skip, "RSA not supported"}; + {error, Error} -> + {fail, {wrong_error,Error}}; + Pub -> + ct:log("rsa Pub = ~p",[Pub]), + {fail, "PWD prot pubkey fetch succeded although no pwd!"} + end. + +get_pub_from_priv_key_rsa_pwd_bad_pwd(Config) -> + Priv = #{engine => engine_ref(Config), + key_id => key_id(Config, "rsa_private_key_pwd.pem"), + password => "Bad password"}, + case crypto:privkey_to_pubkey(rsa, Priv) of + {error, not_found} -> + ok; + {error, notsup} -> + {skip, "RSA not supported"}; + {error, Error} -> + {fail, {wrong_error,Error}}; + Pub -> + ct:log("rsa Pub = ~p",[Pub]), + {fail, "PWD prot pubkey fetch succeded with bad pwd!"} + end. get_pub_from_priv_key_dsa(Config) -> Priv = #{engine => engine_ref(Config), key_id => key_id(Config, "dsa_private_key.pem")}, - Pub = crypto:privkey_to_pubkey(dss, Priv), - ct:log("dsa Pub = ~p",[Pub]), - sign_verify(dss, sha, Priv, Pub). + case crypto:privkey_to_pubkey(dss, Priv) of + {error, not_found} -> + {fail, "Key not found"}; + {error, notsup} -> + {skip, "DSA not supported"}; + {error, Error} -> + {fail, {wrong_error,Error}}; + Pub -> + ct:log("dsa Pub = ~p",[Pub]), + sign_verify(dss, sha, Priv, Pub) + end. get_pub_from_priv_key_ecdsa(Config) -> Priv = #{engine => engine_ref(Config), key_id => key_id(Config, "ecdsa_private_key.pem")}, - Pub = crypto:privkey_to_pubkey(ecdsa, Priv), - case Pub of - notsup -> {skip, "ECDSA not implemented"}; - _ -> + case crypto:privkey_to_pubkey(ecdsa, Priv) of + {error, not_found} -> + {fail, "Key not found"}; + {error, notsup} -> + {skip, "ECDSA not supported"}; + {error, Error} -> + {fail, {wrong_error,Error}}; + Pub -> ct:log("ecdsa Pub = ~p",[Pub]), sign_verify(ecdsa, sha, Priv, Pub) end. diff --git a/lib/debugger/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/debugger/doc/src/Makefile index 0f724b6f17..cc0b8861d3 100644 --- a/lib/debugger/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/debugger/doc/src/Makefile @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ XML_APPLICATION_FILES = ref_man.xml XML_REF3_FILES = debugger.xml i.xml int.xml XML_PART_FILES = part.xml -XML_CHAPTER_FILES = debugger_chapter.xml notes.xml +XML_CHAPTER_FILES = introduction.xml debugger_chapter.xml notes.xml BOOK_FILES = book.xml diff --git a/lib/dialyzer/src/dialyzer_analysis_callgraph.erl b/lib/dialyzer/src/dialyzer_analysis_callgraph.erl index a4b42c9367..9993c68fed 100644 --- a/lib/dialyzer/src/dialyzer_analysis_callgraph.erl +++ b/lib/dialyzer/src/dialyzer_analysis_callgraph.erl @@ -165,7 +165,11 @@ analysis_start(Parent, Analysis, LegalWarnings) -> remote_type_postprocessing(TmpCServer, Args) -> Fun = fun() -> - exit(remote_type_postproc(TmpCServer, Args)) + exit(try remote_type_postproc(TmpCServer, Args) of + R -> R + catch + throw:{error,_}=Error -> Error + end) end, {Pid, Ref} = erlang:spawn_monitor(Fun), dialyzer_codeserver:give_away(TmpCServer, Pid), diff --git a/lib/dialyzer/src/dialyzer_typesig.erl b/lib/dialyzer/src/dialyzer_typesig.erl index c4d8f45447..d03326ec97 100644 --- a/lib/dialyzer/src/dialyzer_typesig.erl +++ b/lib/dialyzer/src/dialyzer_typesig.erl @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ t_is_float/1, t_is_fun/1, t_is_integer/1, t_non_neg_integer/0, t_is_list/1, t_is_nil/1, t_is_none/1, t_is_number/1, - t_is_singleton/1, + t_is_singleton/1, t_is_none_or_unit/1, t_limit/2, t_list/0, t_list/1, t_list_elements/1, t_nonempty_list/1, t_maybe_improper_list/0, @@ -528,13 +528,14 @@ traverse(Tree, DefinedVars, State) -> false -> t_any(); true -> MT = t_inf(lookup_type(MapVar, Map), t_map()), - case t_is_none(MT) of + case t_is_none_or_unit(MT) of true -> t_none(); false -> DisjointFromKeyType = fun(ShadowKey) -> - t_is_none(t_inf(lookup_type(ShadowKey, Map), - KeyType)) + ST = t_inf(lookup_type(ShadowKey, Map), + KeyType), + t_is_none_or_unit(ST) end, case lists:all(DisjointFromKeyType, ShadowKeys) of true -> t_map_get(KeyType, MT); @@ -567,7 +568,8 @@ traverse(Tree, DefinedVars, State) -> case cerl:is_literal(OpTree) andalso cerl:concrete(OpTree) =:= exact of true -> - case t_is_none(t_inf(ShadowedKeys, KeyType)) of + ST = t_inf(ShadowedKeys, KeyType), + case t_is_none_or_unit(ST) of true -> t_map_put({KeyType, t_any()}, AccType); false -> diff --git a/lib/dialyzer/test/map_SUITE_data/results/map_anon_fun b/lib/dialyzer/test/map_SUITE_data/results/map_anon_fun new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cfca5b1407 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/dialyzer/test/map_SUITE_data/results/map_anon_fun @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ + +map_anon_fun.erl:4: Function g/1 will never be called diff --git a/lib/dialyzer/test/map_SUITE_data/src/map_anon_fun.erl b/lib/dialyzer/test/map_SUITE_data/src/map_anon_fun.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e77016d68a --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/dialyzer/test/map_SUITE_data/src/map_anon_fun.erl @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +-module(map_anon_fun). + +%% Not exported. +g(A) -> + maps:map(fun F(K, {V, _C}) -> + F(K, V); + F(_K, _V) -> + #{ system => {A} } + end, #{}). diff --git a/lib/dialyzer/test/plt_SUITE.erl b/lib/dialyzer/test/plt_SUITE.erl index ebe79b2a6d..680f5b5088 100644 --- a/lib/dialyzer/test/plt_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/dialyzer/test/plt_SUITE.erl @@ -9,14 +9,14 @@ -export([suite/0, all/0, build_plt/1, beam_tests/1, update_plt/1, local_fun_same_as_callback/1, remove_plt/1, run_plt_check/1, run_succ_typings/1, - bad_dialyzer_attr/1, merge_plts/1]). + bad_dialyzer_attr/1, merge_plts/1, bad_record_type/1]). suite() -> [{timetrap, ?plt_timeout}]. all() -> [build_plt, beam_tests, update_plt, run_plt_check, remove_plt, run_succ_typings, local_fun_same_as_callback, - bad_dialyzer_attr, merge_plts]. + bad_dialyzer_attr, merge_plts, bad_record_type]. build_plt(Config) -> OutDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config), @@ -283,8 +283,8 @@ bad_dialyzer_attr(Config) -> {dialyzer_error, "Analysis failed with error:\n" ++ Str1} = (catch dialyzer:run(Opts)), - P1 = string:str(Str1, "dial.erl:2: function undef/0 undefined"), - true = P1 > 0, + S1 = string:find(Str1, "dial.erl:2: function undef/0 undefined"), + true = is_list(S1), Prog2 = <<"-module(dial). -dialyzer({no_return, [{undef,1,2}]}).">>, @@ -292,9 +292,9 @@ bad_dialyzer_attr(Config) -> {dialyzer_error, "Analysis failed with error:\n" ++ Str2} = (catch dialyzer:run(Opts)), - P2 = string:str(Str2, "dial.erl:2: badly formed dialyzer " - "attribute: {no_return,{undef,1,2}}"), - true = P2 > 0, + S2 = string:find(Str2, "dial.erl:2: badly formed dialyzer " + "attribute: {no_return,{undef,1,2}}"), + true = is_list(S2), ok. @@ -369,6 +369,32 @@ create_plts(Mod1, Mod2, Config) -> %% End of merge_plts(). +bad_record_type(Config) -> + PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config), + Source = lists:concat([bad_record_type, ".erl"]), + Filename = filename:join(PrivDir, Source), + PltFilename = dialyzer_common:plt_file(PrivDir), + + Opts = [{files, [Filename]}, + {check_plt, false}, + {from, src_code}, + {init_plt, PltFilename}], + + Prog = <<"-module(bad_record_type). + -export([r/0]). + -record(r, {f = 3 :: integer()}). + -spec r() -> #r{f :: atom()}. + r() -> + #r{}.">>, + ok = file:write_file(Filename, Prog), + {dialyzer_error, + "Analysis failed with error:\n" ++ Str} = + (catch dialyzer:run(Opts)), + P = string:str(Str, + "bad_record_type.erl:4: Illegal declaration of #r{f}"), + true = P > 0, + ok. + erlang_beam() -> case code:where_is_file("erlang.beam") of non_existing -> diff --git a/lib/edoc/src/edoc_specs.erl b/lib/edoc/src/edoc_specs.erl index fb04bfce0e..4e45e42f20 100644 --- a/lib/edoc/src/edoc_specs.erl +++ b/lib/edoc/src/edoc_specs.erl @@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ d2e({type,_,binary,[Base,Unit]}, _Prec) -> {integer,_,U} = erl_eval:partial_eval(Unit), #t_binary{base_size = B, unit_size = U}; d2e({type,_,map,any}, _Prec) -> - #t_map{types = []}; + #t_type{name = #t_name{name = map}, args = []}; d2e({type,_,map,Es}, _Prec) -> #t_map{types = d2e(Es) }; d2e({type,_,map_field_assoc,[K,V]}, Prec) -> diff --git a/lib/eldap/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/eldap/doc/src/Makefile index ac869e446f..aff1da4a9a 100644 --- a/lib/eldap/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/eldap/doc/src/Makefile @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ RELSYSDIR = $(RELEASE_PATH)/lib/$(APPLICATION)-$(VSN) XML_APPLICATION_FILES = ref_man.xml XML_REF3_FILES = eldap.xml -XML_PART_FILES = release_notes.xml usersguide.xml +XML_PART_FILES = usersguide.xml XML_CHAPTER_FILES = notes.xml BOOK_FILES = book.xml diff --git a/lib/erl_docgen/src/docgen_edoc_xml_cb.erl b/lib/erl_docgen/src/docgen_edoc_xml_cb.erl index 7cdbb502d9..91422c8910 100644 --- a/lib/erl_docgen/src/docgen_edoc_xml_cb.erl +++ b/lib/erl_docgen/src/docgen_edoc_xml_cb.erl @@ -489,6 +489,8 @@ otp_xmlify_a_href("#"++_ = Marker, Es0) -> % <seealso marker="#what"> {Marker, Es0}; otp_xmlify_a_href("http:"++_ = URL, Es0) -> % external URL {URL, Es0}; +otp_xmlify_a_href("https:"++_ = URL, Es0) -> % external URL + {URL, Es0}; otp_xmlify_a_href("OTPROOT"++AppRef, Es0) -> % <.. marker="App:FileRef [AppS, "doc", FileRef1] = split(AppRef, "/"), FileRef = AppS++":"++otp_xmlify_a_fileref(FileRef1, AppS), diff --git a/lib/erl_interface/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/erl_interface/doc/src/Makefile index a96ef62786..8ef7e9648c 100644 --- a/lib/erl_interface/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/erl_interface/doc/src/Makefile @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ XML_APPLICATION_FILES = ref_man.xml #ref_man_ei.xml ref_man_erl_interface.xml XML_PART_FILES = \ part.xml -XML_CHAPTER_FILES = ei_users_guide.xml notes.xml notes_history.xml +XML_CHAPTER_FILES = ei_users_guide.xml notes.xml XML_FILES = $(XML_REF1_FILES) $(XML_REF3_FILES) $(BOOK_FILES) \ $(XML_APPLICATION_FILES) $(XML_PART_FILES) $(XML_CHAPTER_FILES) diff --git a/lib/erl_interface/src/Makefile b/lib/erl_interface/src/Makefile index 31f34d4bba..135522397b 100644 --- a/lib/erl_interface/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/erl_interface/src/Makefile @@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ include $(ERL_TOP)/make/target.mk debug opt shared purify quantify purecov gcov: $(make_verbose)$(MAKE) -f $(TARGET)/Makefile TYPE=$@ -clean depend docs release release_docs tests release_tests check: +clean depend docs release release_docs tests release_tests check xmllint: $(make_verbose)$(MAKE) -f $(TARGET)/Makefile $@ diff --git a/lib/erl_interface/src/Makefile.in b/lib/erl_interface/src/Makefile.in index 4f393e952c..69b5b6003d 100644 --- a/lib/erl_interface/src/Makefile.in +++ b/lib/erl_interface/src/Makefile.in @@ -854,3 +854,5 @@ endif release_docs: release_tests: + +xmllint: diff --git a/lib/hipe/cerl/erl_types.erl b/lib/hipe/cerl/erl_types.erl index abb6c259f6..4e0f93212d 100644 --- a/lib/hipe/cerl/erl_types.erl +++ b/lib/hipe/cerl/erl_types.erl @@ -1877,6 +1877,7 @@ t_map_put(KV, Map, Opaques) -> %% Key and Value are *not* unopaqued, but the map is map_put(_, ?none, _) -> ?none; +map_put(_, ?unit, _) -> ?none; map_put({Key, Value}, ?map(Pairs,DefK,DefV), Opaques) -> case t_is_none_or_unit(Key) orelse t_is_none_or_unit(Value) of true -> ?none; @@ -1902,6 +1903,7 @@ t_map_update(KV, Map) -> -spec t_map_update({erl_type(), erl_type()}, erl_type(), opaques()) -> erl_type(). t_map_update(_, ?none, _) -> ?none; +t_map_update(_, ?unit, _) -> ?none; t_map_update(KV={Key, _}, M, Opaques) -> case t_is_subtype(t_atom('true'), t_map_is_key(Key, M, Opaques)) of false -> ?none; @@ -1922,6 +1924,7 @@ t_map_get(Key, Map, Opaques) -> end). map_get(_, ?none) -> ?none; +map_get(_, ?unit) -> ?none; map_get(Key, ?map(Pairs, DefK, DefV)) -> DefRes = case t_do_overlap(DefK, Key) of @@ -1957,6 +1960,7 @@ t_map_is_key(Key, Map, Opaques) -> end). map_is_key(_, ?none) -> ?none; +map_is_key(_, ?unit) -> ?none; map_is_key(Key, ?map(Pairs, DefK, _DefV)) -> case is_singleton_type(Key) of true -> diff --git a/lib/hipe/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/hipe/doc/src/Makefile index 63154abd6a..1c774d3357 100644 --- a/lib/hipe/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/hipe/doc/src/Makefile @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ RELSYSDIR = $(RELEASE_PATH)/lib/$(APPLICATION)-$(VSN) XML_APPLICATION_FILES = ref_man.xml XML_REF3_FILES = -XML_PART_FILES = +XML_PART_FILES = hipe_app.xml XML_CHAPTER_FILES = notes.xml BOOK_FILES = book.xml diff --git a/lib/inets/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/inets/doc/src/Makefile index 14f12ee949..cbfa5c9e30 100644 --- a/lib/inets/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/inets/doc/src/Makefile @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ RELSYSDIR = $(RELEASE_PATH)/lib/$(APPLICATION)-$(VSN) XML_APPLICATION_FILES = ref_man.xml XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ + introduction.xml \ inets_services.xml \ http_client.xml \ http_server.xml \ diff --git a/lib/inets/src/http_client/httpc_handler.erl b/lib/inets/src/http_client/httpc_handler.erl index 6907bf5262..1482f4f922 100644 --- a/lib/inets/src/http_client/httpc_handler.erl +++ b/lib/inets/src/http_client/httpc_handler.erl @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ start_link(Parent, Request, Options, ProfileName) -> %% to be called by the httpc manager process. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- send(Request, Pid) -> - call(Request, Pid, 5000). + call(Request, Pid). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -712,12 +712,16 @@ do_handle_info({'EXIT', _, _}, State = #state{request = undefined}) -> do_handle_info({'EXIT', _, _}, State) -> {noreply, State#state{status = close}}. - call(Msg, Pid) -> - call(Msg, Pid, infinity). - -call(Msg, Pid, Timeout) -> - gen_server:call(Pid, Msg, Timeout). + try gen_server:call(Pid, Msg) + catch + exit:{noproc, _} -> + {error, closed}; + exit:{normal, _} -> + {error, closed}; + exit:{{shutdown, _},_} -> + {error, closed} + end. cast(Msg, Pid) -> gen_server:cast(Pid, Msg). diff --git a/lib/inets/src/http_client/httpc_manager.erl b/lib/inets/src/http_client/httpc_manager.erl index a63864493f..ffdf1603b3 100644 --- a/lib/inets/src/http_client/httpc_manager.erl +++ b/lib/inets/src/http_client/httpc_manager.erl @@ -849,11 +849,11 @@ pipeline_or_keep_alive(#request{id = Id, from = From} = Request, HandlerPid, #state{handler_db = HandlerDb} = State) -> - case (catch httpc_handler:send(Request, HandlerPid)) of + case httpc_handler:send(Request, HandlerPid) of ok -> HandlerInfo = {Id, HandlerPid, From}, ets:insert(HandlerDb, HandlerInfo); - _ -> % timeout pipelining failed + {error, closed} -> % timeout pipelining failed start_handler(Request, State) end. diff --git a/lib/inets/test/httpc_SUITE.erl b/lib/inets/test/httpc_SUITE.erl index cc166d522e..75b50f3420 100644 --- a/lib/inets/test/httpc_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/inets/test/httpc_SUITE.erl @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ all() -> groups() -> [ {http, [], real_requests()}, - {sim_http, [], only_simulated()}, + {sim_http, [], only_simulated() ++ [process_leak_on_keepalive]}, {https, [], real_requests()}, {sim_https, [], only_simulated()}, {misc, [], misc()} @@ -119,7 +119,6 @@ only_simulated() -> empty_response_header, remote_socket_close, remote_socket_close_async, - process_leak_on_keepalive, transfer_encoding, transfer_encoding_identity, redirect_loop, diff --git a/lib/jinterface/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/jinterface/doc/src/Makefile index 7eb0e20b4d..37de0a35c5 100644 --- a/lib/jinterface/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/jinterface/doc/src/Makefile @@ -46,12 +46,11 @@ XML_PART_FILES = \ part.xml XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ notes.xml \ - notes_history.xml \ jinterface_users_guide.xml BOOK_FILES = book.xml -XML_FILES = $(BOOK_FILES) $(XML_APPLICATION_FILES) $(XML_REF3_FILES) \ +XML_FILES = $(BOOK_FILES) $(XML_APP_FILES) $(XML_REF3_FILES) \ $(XML_PART_FILES) $(XML_CHAPTER_FILES) GIF_FILES = diff --git a/lib/jinterface/java_src/com/ericsson/otp/erlang/Makefile b/lib/jinterface/java_src/com/ericsson/otp/erlang/Makefile index e55cfa62ea..001acfdd2e 100644 --- a/lib/jinterface/java_src/com/ericsson/otp/erlang/Makefile +++ b/lib/jinterface/java_src/com/ericsson/otp/erlang/Makefile @@ -130,7 +130,6 @@ release_spec: opt release_docs_spec: - - +xmllint: # ---------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/lib/kernel/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/kernel/doc/src/Makefile index c9d23ac4c4..0759f362d4 100644 --- a/lib/kernel/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/kernel/doc/src/Makefile @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ XML_REF4_FILES = app.xml config.xml XML_REF6_FILES = kernel_app.xml XML_PART_FILES = -XML_CHAPTER_FILES = notes.xml notes_history.xml +XML_CHAPTER_FILES = notes.xml BOOK_FILES = book.xml diff --git a/lib/kernel/doc/src/gen_tcp.xml b/lib/kernel/doc/src/gen_tcp.xml index 070782e1f3..e6104b0c76 100644 --- a/lib/kernel/doc/src/gen_tcp.xml +++ b/lib/kernel/doc/src/gen_tcp.xml @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ server() -> {ok, Sock} = gen_tcp:accept(LSock), {ok, Bin} = do_recv(Sock, []), ok = gen_tcp:close(Sock), + ok = gen_tcp:close(LSock), Bin. do_recv(Sock, Bs) -> @@ -309,9 +310,9 @@ do_recv(Sock, Bs) -> <seealso marker="inet#setopts/2"><c>inet:setopts/2</c></seealso>. </p></item> </taglist> - <p>The returned socket <c><anno>ListenSocket</anno></c> can only be - used in calls to - <seealso marker="#accept/1"><c>accept/1,2</c></seealso>.</p> + <p>The returned socket <c><anno>ListenSocket</anno></c> should be used + in calls to <seealso marker="#accept/1"><c>accept/1,2</c></seealso> to + accept incoming connection requests.</p> <note> <p>The default values for options specified to <c>listen</c> can be affected by the Kernel configuration parameter diff --git a/lib/kernel/src/erts_debug.erl b/lib/kernel/src/erts_debug.erl index 480db6814e..9662f8fa90 100644 --- a/lib/kernel/src/erts_debug.erl +++ b/lib/kernel/src/erts_debug.erl @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ %% Low-level debugging support. EXPERIMENTAL! --export([size/1,df/1,df/2,df/3,ic/1]). +-export([size/1,df/1,df/2,df/3,df/4,ic/1]). %% This module contains the following *experimental* BIFs: %% disassemble/1 @@ -347,31 +347,39 @@ is_term_seen(_, []) -> false. -spec df(module()) -> df_ret(). df(Mod) when is_atom(Mod) -> + df(lists:concat([Mod, ".dis"]), Mod). + +-spec df(module(), atom()) -> df_ret(); + (file:io_device() | file:filename(), module()) -> df_ret(). + +df(Mod, Func) when is_atom(Mod), is_atom(Func) -> + df(lists:concat([Mod, "_", Func, ".dis"]), Mod, Func); +df(Name, Mod) when is_atom(Mod) -> try Mod:module_info(functions) of Fs0 when is_list(Fs0) -> - Name = lists:concat([Mod, ".dis"]), Fs = [{Mod,Func,Arity} || {Func,Arity} <- Fs0], dff(Name, Fs) catch _:_ -> {undef,Mod} end. --spec df(module(), atom()) -> df_ret(). -df(Mod, Func) when is_atom(Mod), is_atom(Func) -> +-spec df(module(), atom(), arity()) -> df_ret(); + (file:io_device() | file:filename(), module(), atom()) -> df_ret(). + +df(Mod, Func, Arity) when is_atom(Mod), is_atom(Func), is_integer(Arity) -> + df(lists:concat([Mod, "_", Func, "_", Arity, ".dis"]), Mod, Func, Arity); +df(Name, Mod, Func) when is_atom(Mod), is_atom(Func) -> try Mod:module_info(functions) of Fs0 when is_list(Fs0) -> - Name = lists:concat([Mod, "_", Func, ".dis"]), Fs = [{Mod,Func1,Arity} || {Func1,Arity} <- Fs0, Func1 =:= Func], dff(Name, Fs) catch _:_ -> {undef,Mod} end. --spec df(module(), atom(), arity()) -> df_ret(). - -df(Mod, Func, Arity) when is_atom(Mod), is_atom(Func) -> +-spec df(file:io_device() | file:filename(), module(), atom(), arity()) -> df_ret(). +df(Name, Mod, Func, Arity) when is_atom(Mod), is_atom(Func), is_integer(Arity) -> try Mod:module_info(functions) of Fs0 when is_list(Fs0) -> - Name = lists:concat([Mod, "_", Func, "_", Arity, ".dis"]), Fs = [{Mod,Func1,Arity1} || {Func1,Arity1} <- Fs0, Func1 =:= Func, Arity1 =:= Arity], dff(Name, Fs) diff --git a/lib/kernel/src/kernel.appup.src b/lib/kernel/src/kernel.appup.src index f1ef70a373..4ee497bbbd 100644 --- a/lib/kernel/src/kernel.appup.src +++ b/lib/kernel/src/kernel.appup.src @@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ %% %CopyrightEnd% {"%VSN%", %% Up from - max one major revision back - [{<<"5\\.[0-3](\\.[0-9]+)*">>,[restart_new_emulator]}], % OTP-19.*, OTP-20.0 + [{<<"5\\.[0-3](\\.[0-9]+)*">>,[restart_new_emulator]}, % OTP-19.*, OTP-20.0 + {<<"5\\.4(\\.[0-9]+)*">>,[restart_new_emulator]}], % OTP-20.1+ %% Down to - max one major revision back - [{<<"5\\.[0-3](\\.[0-9]+)*">>,[restart_new_emulator]}] % OTP-19.*, OTP-20.0 + [{<<"5\\.[0-3](\\.[0-9]+)*">>,[restart_new_emulator]}, % OTP-19.*, OTP-20.0 + {<<"5\\.4(\\.[0-9]+)*">>,[restart_new_emulator]}] % OTP-20.1+ }. diff --git a/lib/mnesia/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/mnesia/doc/src/Makefile index da7a9e9516..82fcf66256 100644 --- a/lib/mnesia/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/mnesia/doc/src/Makefile @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ XML_PART_FILES = \ XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ Mnesia_chap1.xml \ + Mnesia_overview.xml \ Mnesia_chap2.xml \ Mnesia_chap3.xml \ Mnesia_chap4.xml \ diff --git a/lib/mnesia/src/mnesia.erl b/lib/mnesia/src/mnesia.erl index b68b2de028..1842769778 100644 --- a/lib/mnesia/src/mnesia.erl +++ b/lib/mnesia/src/mnesia.erl @@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ {'snmp', SnmpStruct::term()} | {'storage_properties', [{Backend::module(), [BackendProp::_]}]} | {'type', 'set' | 'ordered_set' | 'bag'} | - {'local_content', boolean()}. + {'local_content', boolean()} | + {'user_properties', proplists:proplist()}. -type t_result(Res) :: {'atomic', Res} | {'aborted', Reason::term()}. -type activity() :: 'ets' | 'async_dirty' | 'sync_dirty' | 'transaction' | 'sync_transaction' | diff --git a/lib/observer/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/observer/doc/src/Makefile index a3b0663041..11bfee1bdb 100644 --- a/lib/observer/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/observer/doc/src/Makefile @@ -48,12 +48,12 @@ XML_PART_FILES = \ part.xml XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ + introduction_ug.xml \ crashdump_ug.xml \ etop_ug.xml \ observer_ug.xml \ ttb_ug.xml \ - notes.xml \ - notes_history.xml + notes.xml BOOK_FILES = book.xml diff --git a/lib/observer/src/crashdump_viewer.erl b/lib/observer/src/crashdump_viewer.erl index 40450a2873..feaec5c678 100644 --- a/lib/observer/src/crashdump_viewer.erl +++ b/lib/observer/src/crashdump_viewer.erl @@ -105,8 +105,10 @@ % line_head/1 function can return -define(not_available,"N/A"). -define(binary_size_progress_limit,10000). --define(max_dump_version,[0,4]). +-define(max_dump_version,[0,5]). +%% The value of the next define must be divisible by 4. +-define(base64_chunk_size, (4*256)). %% All possible tags - use macros in order to avoid misspelling in the code -define(abort,abort). @@ -145,6 +147,7 @@ -record(state,{file,dump_vsn,wordsize=4,num_atoms="unknown"}). +-record(dec_opts, {bin_addr_adj=0,base64=true}). %%%----------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Debugging @@ -367,10 +370,12 @@ handle_call(general_info,_From,State=#state{file=File}) -> ets:insert(cdv_reg_proc_table, {cdv_dump_node_name,GenInfo#general_info.node_name}), {reply,{ok,GenInfo,TW},State#state{wordsize=WS, num_atoms=NumAtoms}}; -handle_call({expand_binary,{Offset,Size,Pos}},_From,State=#state{file=File}) -> +handle_call({expand_binary,{Offset,Size,Pos}},_From, + #state{file=File,dump_vsn=DumpVsn}=State) -> Fd = open(File), pos_bof(Fd,Pos), - {Bin,_Line} = get_binary(Offset,Size,bytes(Fd)), + DecodeOpts = get_decode_opts(DumpVsn), + {Bin,_Line} = get_binary(Offset,Size,bytes(Fd),DecodeOpts), close(Fd), {reply,{ok,Bin},State}; handle_call(procs_summary,_From,State=#state{file=File,wordsize=WS}) -> @@ -443,9 +448,11 @@ handle_call(loaded_mods,_From,State=#state{file=File}) -> TW = truncated_warning([?mod]), {_CC,_OC,Mods} = loaded_mods(File), {reply,{ok,Mods,TW},State}; -handle_call({loaded_mod_details,Mod},_From,State=#state{file=File}) -> +handle_call({loaded_mod_details,Mod},_From, + #state{dump_vsn=DumpVsn,file=File}=State) -> TW = truncated_warning([{?mod,Mod}]), - ModInfo = get_loaded_mod_details(File,Mod), + DecodeOpts = get_decode_opts(DumpVsn), + ModInfo = get_loaded_mod_details(File,Mod,DecodeOpts), {reply,{ok,ModInfo,TW},State}; handle_call(funs,_From,State=#state{file=File}) -> TW = truncated_warning([?fu]), @@ -828,8 +835,8 @@ do_read_file(File) -> reset_tables(), insert_index(Tag,Id,N1+1), put_last_tag(Tag,""), - AddrAdj = get_bin_addr_adj(DumpVsn), - indexify(Fd,AddrAdj,Rest,N1), + DecodeOpts = get_decode_opts(DumpVsn), + indexify(Fd,DecodeOpts,Rest,N1), end_progress(), check_if_truncated(), close(Fd), @@ -877,7 +884,7 @@ check_dump_version(Vsn) -> {ok,DumpVsn} end. -indexify(Fd,AddrAdj,Bin,N) -> +indexify(Fd,DecodeOpts,Bin,N) -> case binary:match(Bin,<<"\n=">>) of {Start,Len} -> Pos = Start+Len, @@ -890,7 +897,7 @@ indexify(Fd,AddrAdj,Bin,N) -> %% order to minimize lookup time. Key is the %% translated address. {HexAddr,_} = get_hex(Id), - Addr = HexAddr bor AddrAdj, + Addr = HexAddr bor DecodeOpts#dec_opts.bin_addr_adj, insert_binary_index(Addr,NewPos); _ -> insert_index(Tag,Id,NewPos) @@ -914,7 +921,7 @@ indexify(Fd,AddrAdj,Bin,N) -> end; _ -> ok end, - indexify(Fd,AddrAdj,Rest,N1); + indexify(Fd,DecodeOpts,Rest,N1); nomatch -> case progress_read(Fd) of {ok,Chunk0} when is_binary(Chunk0) -> @@ -925,7 +932,7 @@ indexify(Fd,AddrAdj,Bin,N) -> _ -> {Chunk0,N+byte_size(Bin)} end, - indexify(Fd,AddrAdj,Chunk,N1); + indexify(Fd,DecodeOpts,Chunk,N1); eof -> eof end @@ -1441,21 +1448,21 @@ maybe_other_node2(Channel) -> expand_memory(Fd,Pid,DumpVsn) -> - BinAddrAdj = get_bin_addr_adj(DumpVsn), + DecodeOpts = get_decode_opts(DumpVsn), put(fd,Fd), Dict0 = case get(?literals) of undefined -> - Literals = read_literals(Fd), + Literals = read_literals(Fd,DecodeOpts), put(?literals,Literals), put(fd,Fd), Literals; Literals -> Literals end, - Dict = read_heap(Fd,Pid,BinAddrAdj,Dict0), - Expanded = {read_stack_dump(Fd,Pid,BinAddrAdj,Dict), - read_messages(Fd,Pid,BinAddrAdj,Dict), - read_dictionary(Fd,Pid,BinAddrAdj,Dict)}, + Dict = read_heap(Fd,Pid,DecodeOpts,Dict0), + Expanded = {read_stack_dump(Fd,Pid,DecodeOpts,Dict), + read_messages(Fd,Pid,DecodeOpts,Dict), + read_dictionary(Fd,Pid,DecodeOpts,Dict)}, erase(fd), IncompleteWarning = case erase(incomplete_heap) of @@ -1467,52 +1474,59 @@ expand_memory(Fd,Pid,DumpVsn) -> end, {Expanded,IncompleteWarning}. -read_literals(Fd) -> +read_literals(Fd,DecodeOpts) -> case lookup_index(?literals,[]) of [{_,Start}] -> [{_,Chars}] = ets:lookup(cdv_heap_file_chars,literals), init_progress("Reading literals",Chars), pos_bof(Fd,Start), - read_heap(0,gb_trees:empty()); + read_heap(DecodeOpts,gb_trees:empty()); [] -> gb_trees:empty() end. -%%%----------------------------------------------------------------- -%%% This is a workaround for a bug in dump versions prior to 0.3: -%%% Addresses were truncated to 32 bits. This could cause binaries to -%%% get the same address as heap terms in the dump. To work around it -%%% we always store binaries on very high addresses in the gb_tree. -get_bin_addr_adj(DumpVsn) when DumpVsn < [0,3] -> - 16#f bsl 64; -get_bin_addr_adj(_) -> - 0. +get_decode_opts(DumpVsn) -> + BinAddrAdj = if + DumpVsn < [0,3] -> + %% This is a workaround for a bug in dump + %% versions prior to 0.3: Addresses were + %% truncated to 32 bits. This could cause + %% binaries to get the same address as heap + %% terms in the dump. To work around it we + %% always store binaries on very high + %% addresses in the gb_tree. + 16#f bsl 64; + true -> + 0 + end, + Base64 = DumpVsn >= [0,5], + #dec_opts{bin_addr_adj=BinAddrAdj,base64=Base64}. %%% %%% Read top level section. %%% -read_stack_dump(Fd,Pid,BinAddrAdj,Dict) -> +read_stack_dump(Fd,Pid,DecodeOpts,Dict) -> case lookup_index(?proc_stack,Pid) of [{_,Start}] -> pos_bof(Fd,Start), - read_stack_dump1(Fd,BinAddrAdj,Dict,[]); + read_stack_dump1(Fd,DecodeOpts,Dict,[]); [] -> [] end. -read_stack_dump1(Fd,BinAddrAdj,Dict,Acc) -> +read_stack_dump1(Fd,DecodeOpts,Dict,Acc) -> %% This function is never called if the dump is truncated in {?proc_heap,Pid} case bytes(Fd) of "=" ++ _next_tag -> lists:reverse(Acc); Line -> - Stack = parse_top(Line,BinAddrAdj,Dict), - read_stack_dump1(Fd,BinAddrAdj,Dict,[Stack|Acc]) + Stack = parse_top(Line,DecodeOpts,Dict), + read_stack_dump1(Fd,DecodeOpts,Dict,[Stack|Acc]) end. -parse_top(Line0, BinAddrAdj, D) -> +parse_top(Line0, DecodeOpts, D) -> {Label,Line1} = get_label(Line0), - {Term,Line,D} = parse_term(Line1, BinAddrAdj, D), + {Term,Line,D} = parse_term(Line1, DecodeOpts, D), [] = skip_blanks(Line), {Label,Term}. @@ -1520,27 +1534,27 @@ parse_top(Line0, BinAddrAdj, D) -> %%% Read message queue. %%% -read_messages(Fd,Pid,BinAddrAdj,Dict) -> +read_messages(Fd,Pid,DecodeOpts,Dict) -> case lookup_index(?proc_messages,Pid) of [{_,Start}] -> pos_bof(Fd,Start), - read_messages1(Fd,BinAddrAdj,Dict,[]); + read_messages1(Fd,DecodeOpts,Dict,[]); [] -> [] end. -read_messages1(Fd,BinAddrAdj,Dict,Acc) -> +read_messages1(Fd,DecodeOpts,Dict,Acc) -> %% This function is never called if the dump is truncated in {?proc_heap,Pid} case bytes(Fd) of "=" ++ _next_tag -> lists:reverse(Acc); Line -> - Msg = parse_message(Line,BinAddrAdj,Dict), - read_messages1(Fd,BinAddrAdj,Dict,[Msg|Acc]) + Msg = parse_message(Line,DecodeOpts,Dict), + read_messages1(Fd,DecodeOpts,Dict,[Msg|Acc]) end. -parse_message(Line0, BinAddrAdj, D) -> - {Msg,":"++Line1,_} = parse_term(Line0, BinAddrAdj, D), - {Token,Line,_} = parse_term(Line1, BinAddrAdj, D), +parse_message(Line0, DecodeOpts, D) -> + {Msg,":"++Line1,_} = parse_term(Line0, DecodeOpts, D), + {Token,Line,_} = parse_term(Line1, DecodeOpts, D), [] = skip_blanks(Line), {Msg,Token}. @@ -1548,26 +1562,26 @@ parse_message(Line0, BinAddrAdj, D) -> %%% Read process dictionary %%% -read_dictionary(Fd,Pid,BinAddrAdj,Dict) -> +read_dictionary(Fd,Pid,DecodeOpts,Dict) -> case lookup_index(?proc_dictionary,Pid) of [{_,Start}] -> pos_bof(Fd,Start), - read_dictionary1(Fd,BinAddrAdj,Dict,[]); + read_dictionary1(Fd,DecodeOpts,Dict,[]); [] -> [] end. -read_dictionary1(Fd,BinAddrAdj,Dict,Acc) -> +read_dictionary1(Fd,DecodeOpts,Dict,Acc) -> %% This function is never called if the dump is truncated in {?proc_heap,Pid} case bytes(Fd) of "=" ++ _next_tag -> lists:reverse(Acc); Line -> - Msg = parse_dictionary(Line,BinAddrAdj,Dict), - read_dictionary1(Fd,BinAddrAdj,Dict,[Msg|Acc]) + Msg = parse_dictionary(Line,DecodeOpts,Dict), + read_dictionary1(Fd,DecodeOpts,Dict,[Msg|Acc]) end. -parse_dictionary(Line0, BinAddrAdj, D) -> - {Entry,Line,_} = parse_term(Line0, BinAddrAdj, D), +parse_dictionary(Line0, DecodeOpts, D) -> + {Entry,Line,_} = parse_term(Line0, DecodeOpts, D), [] = skip_blanks(Line), Entry. @@ -1575,18 +1589,18 @@ parse_dictionary(Line0, BinAddrAdj, D) -> %%% Read heap data. %%% -read_heap(Fd,Pid,BinAddrAdj,Dict0) -> +read_heap(Fd,Pid,DecodeOpts,Dict0) -> case lookup_index(?proc_heap,Pid) of [{_,Pos}] -> [{_,Chars}] = ets:lookup(cdv_heap_file_chars,Pid), init_progress("Reading process heap",Chars), pos_bof(Fd,Pos), - read_heap(BinAddrAdj,Dict0); + read_heap(DecodeOpts,Dict0); [] -> Dict0 end. -read_heap(BinAddrAdj,Dict0) -> +read_heap(DecodeOpts,Dict0) -> %% This function is never called if the dump is truncated in {?proc_heap,Pid} case get(fd) of end_of_heap -> @@ -1600,14 +1614,14 @@ read_heap(BinAddrAdj,Dict0) -> Dict0; Line -> update_progress(length(Line)+1), - Dict = parse(Line,BinAddrAdj,Dict0), - read_heap(BinAddrAdj,Dict) + Dict = parse(Line,DecodeOpts,Dict0), + read_heap(DecodeOpts,Dict) end end. -parse(Line0, BinAddrAdj, Dict0) -> +parse(Line0, DecodeOpts, Dict0) -> {Addr,":"++Line1} = get_hex(Line0), - {_Term,Line,Dict} = parse_heap_term(Line1, Addr, BinAddrAdj, Dict0), + {_Term,Line,Dict} = parse_heap_term(Line1, Addr, DecodeOpts, Dict0), [] = skip_blanks(Line), Dict. @@ -1927,12 +1941,15 @@ get_nodeinfo(Fd,Nod) -> %%----------------------------------------------------------------- %% Page with details about one loaded modules -get_loaded_mod_details(File,Mod) -> +get_loaded_mod_details(File,Mod,DecodeOpts) -> [{_,Start}] = lookup_index(?mod,Mod), Fd = open(File), pos_bof(Fd,Start), InitLM = #loaded_mod{mod=Mod,old_size="No old code exists"}, - ModInfo = get_loaded_mod_info(Fd,InitLM,fun all_modinfo/3), + Fun = fun(F, LM, LineHead) -> + all_modinfo(F, LM, LineHead, DecodeOpts) + end, + ModInfo = get_loaded_mod_info(Fd,InitLM,Fun), close(Fd), ModInfo. @@ -1990,59 +2007,44 @@ get_loaded_mod_info(Fd,LM,Fun) -> main_modinfo(_Fd,LM,_LineHead) -> LM. -all_modinfo(Fd,LM,LineHead) -> +all_modinfo(Fd,LM,LineHead,DecodeOpts) -> case LineHead of "Current attributes" -> - Str = hex_to_str(bytes(Fd,"")), + Str = get_attribute(Fd, DecodeOpts), LM#loaded_mod{current_attrib=Str}; "Current compilation info" -> - Str = hex_to_str(bytes(Fd,"")), + Str = get_attribute(Fd, DecodeOpts), LM#loaded_mod{current_comp_info=Str}; "Old attributes" -> - Str = hex_to_str(bytes(Fd,"")), + Str = get_attribute(Fd, DecodeOpts), LM#loaded_mod{old_attrib=Str}; "Old compilation info" -> - Str = hex_to_str(bytes(Fd,"")), + Str = get_attribute(Fd, DecodeOpts), LM#loaded_mod{old_comp_info=Str}; Other -> unexpected(Fd,Other,"loaded modules info"), LM end. - -hex_to_str(Hex) -> - Term = hex_to_term(Hex,[]), - io_lib:format("~tp~n",[Term]). - -hex_to_term([X,Y|Hex],Acc) -> - MS = hex_to_dec([X]), - LS = hex_to_dec([Y]), - Z = 16*MS+LS, - hex_to_term(Hex,[Z|Acc]); -hex_to_term([],Acc) -> - Bin = list_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc)), - case catch binary_to_term(Bin) of - {'EXIT',_Reason} -> - {"WARNING: The term is probably truncated!", - "I can not do binary_to_term.", - Bin}; - Term -> - Term - end; -hex_to_term(Rest,Acc) -> - {"WARNING: The term is probably truncated!", - "I can not convert hex to term.", - Rest,list_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc))}. - - -hex_to_dec("F") -> 15; -hex_to_dec("E") -> 14; -hex_to_dec("D") -> 13; -hex_to_dec("C") -> 12; -hex_to_dec("B") -> 11; -hex_to_dec("A") -> 10; -hex_to_dec(N) -> list_to_integer(N). - +get_attribute(Fd, DecodeOpts) -> + Bytes = bytes(Fd, ""), + try get_binary(Bytes, DecodeOpts) of + {Bin,_} -> + try binary_to_term(Bin) of + Term -> + io_lib:format("~tp~n",[Term]) + catch + _:_ -> + {"WARNING: The term is probably truncated!", + "I cannot do binary_to_term/1.", + Bin} + end + catch + _:_ -> + {"WARNING: The term is probably truncated!", + "I cannot convert to binary.", + Bytes} + end. %%----------------------------------------------------------------- %% Page with list of all funs @@ -2599,112 +2601,110 @@ get_limited_stack(Fd, N, Ds) -> %%%----------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Parse memory in crashdump version 0.1 and newer %%% -parse_heap_term([$l|Line0], Addr, BinAddrAdj, D0) -> %Cons cell. - {H,"|"++Line1,D1} = parse_term(Line0, BinAddrAdj, D0), - {T,Line,D2} = parse_term(Line1, BinAddrAdj, D1), +parse_heap_term([$l|Line0], Addr, DecodeOpts, D0) -> %Cons cell. + {H,"|"++Line1,D1} = parse_term(Line0, DecodeOpts, D0), + {T,Line,D2} = parse_term(Line1, DecodeOpts, D1), Term = [H|T], D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Term, D2), {Term,Line,D}; -parse_heap_term([$t|Line0], Addr, BinAddrAdj, D) -> %Tuple +parse_heap_term([$t|Line0], Addr, DecodeOpts, D) -> %Tuple {N,":"++Line} = get_hex(Line0), - parse_tuple(N, Line, Addr, BinAddrAdj, D, []); -parse_heap_term([$F|Line0], Addr, _BinAddrAdj, D0) -> %Float + parse_tuple(N, Line, Addr, DecodeOpts, D, []); +parse_heap_term([$F|Line0], Addr, _DecodeOpts, D0) -> %Float {N,":"++Line1} = get_hex(Line0), {Chars,Line} = get_chars(N, Line1), Term = list_to_float(Chars), D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Term, D0), {Term,Line,D}; -parse_heap_term("B16#"++Line0, Addr, _BinAddrAdj, D0) -> %Positive big number. +parse_heap_term("B16#"++Line0, Addr, _DecodeOpts, D0) -> %Positive big number. {Term,Line} = get_hex(Line0), D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Term, D0), {Term,Line,D}; -parse_heap_term("B-16#"++Line0, Addr, _BinAddrAdj, D0) -> %Negative big number +parse_heap_term("B-16#"++Line0, Addr, _DecodeOpts, D0) -> %Negative big number {Term0,Line} = get_hex(Line0), Term = -Term0, D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Term, D0), {Term,Line,D}; -parse_heap_term("B"++Line0, Addr, _BinAddrAdj, D0) -> %Decimal big num +parse_heap_term("B"++Line0, Addr, _DecodeOpts, D0) -> %Decimal big num case string:to_integer(Line0) of {Int,Line} when is_integer(Int) -> D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Int, D0), {Int,Line,D} end; -parse_heap_term([$P|Line0], Addr, _BinAddrAdj, D0) -> % External Pid. +parse_heap_term([$P|Line0], Addr, _DecodeOpts, D0) -> % External Pid. {Pid0,Line} = get_id(Line0), Pid = ['#CDVPid'|Pid0], D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Pid, D0), {Pid,Line,D}; -parse_heap_term([$p|Line0], Addr, _BinAddrAdj, D0) -> % External Port. +parse_heap_term([$p|Line0], Addr, _DecodeOpts, D0) -> % External Port. {Port0,Line} = get_id(Line0), Port = ['#CDVPort'|Port0], D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Port, D0), {Port,Line,D}; -parse_heap_term("E"++Line0, Addr, _BinAddrAdj, D0) -> %Term encoded in external format. - {Bin,Line} = get_binary(Line0), +parse_heap_term("E"++Line0, Addr, DecodeOpts, D0) -> %Term encoded in external format. + {Bin,Line} = get_binary(Line0, DecodeOpts), Term = binary_to_term(Bin), D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Term, D0), {Term,Line,D}; -parse_heap_term("Yh"++Line0, Addr, _BinAddrAdj, D0) -> %Heap binary. - {Term,Line} = get_binary(Line0), +parse_heap_term("Yh"++Line0, Addr, DecodeOpts, D0) -> %Heap binary. + {Term,Line} = get_binary(Line0, DecodeOpts), D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Term, D0), {Term,Line,D}; -parse_heap_term("Yc"++Line0, Addr, BinAddrAdj, D0) -> %Reference-counted binary. +parse_heap_term("Yc"++Line0, Addr, DecodeOpts, D0) -> %Reference-counted binary. {Binp0,":"++Line1} = get_hex(Line0), {Offset,":"++Line2} = get_hex(Line1), {Sz,Line} = get_hex(Line2), - Binp = Binp0 bor BinAddrAdj, - Term = case lookup_binary_index(Binp) of - [{_,Start}] -> cdvbin(Offset,Sz,{'#CDVBin',Start}); - [] -> '#CDVNonexistingBinary' - end, - D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Term, D0), - {Term,Line,D}; -parse_heap_term("Ys"++Line0, Addr, BinAddrAdj, D0) -> %Sub binary. + Binp = Binp0 bor DecodeOpts#dec_opts.bin_addr_adj, + case lookup_binary_index(Binp) of + [{_,Start}] -> + SymbolicBin = {'#CDVBin',Start}, + Term = cdvbin(Offset, Sz, SymbolicBin), + D1 = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Term, D0), + D = gb_trees:insert(Binp, SymbolicBin, D1), + {Term,Line,D}; + [] -> + Term = '#CDVNonexistingBinary', + D1 = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Term, D0), + D = gb_trees:insert(Binp, Term, D1), + {Term,Line,D} + end; +parse_heap_term("Ys"++Line0, Addr, DecodeOpts, D0) -> %Sub binary. {Binp0,":"++Line1} = get_hex(Line0), {Offset,":"++Line2} = get_hex(Line1), - {Sz,Line} = get_hex(Line2), - Binp = Binp0 bor BinAddrAdj, - Term = case lookup_binary_index(Binp) of - [{_,Start}] -> cdvbin(Offset,Sz,{'#CDVBin',Start}); - [] -> - %% Might it be on the heap? - case gb_trees:lookup(Binp, D0) of - {value,Bin} -> cdvbin(Offset,Sz,Bin); - none -> '#CDVNonexistingBinary' - end - end, - D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Term, D0), + {Sz,Line3} = get_hex(Line2), + {Term,Line,D1} = deref_bin(Binp0, Offset, Sz, Line3, DecodeOpts, D0), + D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Term, D1), {Term,Line,D}; -parse_heap_term("Mf"++Line0, Addr, BinAddrAdj, D0) -> %Flatmap. +parse_heap_term("Mf"++Line0, Addr, DecodeOpts, D0) -> %Flatmap. {Size,":"++Line1} = get_hex(Line0), - {Keys,":"++Line2,D1} = parse_term(Line1, BinAddrAdj, D0), - {Values,Line,D2} = parse_tuple(Size, Line2, Addr,BinAddrAdj, D1, []), + {Keys,":"++Line2,D1} = parse_term(Line1, DecodeOpts, D0), + {Values,Line,D2} = parse_tuple(Size, Line2, Addr,DecodeOpts, D1, []), Pairs = zip_tuples(tuple_size(Keys), Keys, Values, []), Map = maps:from_list(Pairs), D = gb_trees:update(Addr, Map, D2), {Map,Line,D}; -parse_heap_term("Mh"++Line0, Addr, BinAddrAdj, D0) -> %Head node in a hashmap. +parse_heap_term("Mh"++Line0, Addr, DecodeOpts, D0) -> %Head node in a hashmap. {MapSize,":"++Line1} = get_hex(Line0), {N,":"++Line2} = get_hex(Line1), - {Nodes,Line,D1} = parse_tuple(N, Line2, Addr, BinAddrAdj, D0, []), + {Nodes,Line,D1} = parse_tuple(N, Line2, Addr, DecodeOpts, D0, []), Map = maps:from_list(flatten_hashmap_nodes(Nodes)), MapSize = maps:size(Map), %Assertion. D = gb_trees:update(Addr, Map, D1), {Map,Line,D}; -parse_heap_term("Mn"++Line0, Addr, BinAddrAdj, D) -> %Interior node in a hashmap. +parse_heap_term("Mn"++Line0, Addr, DecodeOpts, D) -> %Interior node in a hashmap. {N,":"++Line} = get_hex(Line0), - parse_tuple(N, Line, Addr, BinAddrAdj, D, []). + parse_tuple(N, Line, Addr, DecodeOpts, D, []). parse_tuple(0, Line, Addr, _, D0, Acc) -> Tuple = list_to_tuple(lists:reverse(Acc)), D = gb_trees:insert(Addr, Tuple, D0), {Tuple,Line,D}; -parse_tuple(N, Line0, Addr, BinAddrAdj, D0, Acc) -> - case parse_term(Line0, BinAddrAdj, D0) of +parse_tuple(N, Line0, Addr, DecodeOpts, D0, Acc) -> + case parse_term(Line0, DecodeOpts, D0) of {Term,[$,|Line],D} when N > 1 -> - parse_tuple(N-1, Line, Addr, BinAddrAdj, D, [Term|Acc]); + parse_tuple(N-1, Line, Addr, DecodeOpts, D, [Term|Acc]); {Term,Line,D}-> - parse_tuple(N-1, Line, Addr, BinAddrAdj, D, [Term|Acc]) + parse_tuple(N-1, Line, Addr, DecodeOpts, D, [Term|Acc]) end. zip_tuples(0, _T1, _T2, Acc) -> @@ -2726,9 +2726,9 @@ flatten_hashmap_nodes_1(N, Tuple0, Acc0) -> flatten_hashmap_nodes_1(tuple_size(Tuple), Tuple, Acc) end. -parse_term([$H|Line0], BinAddrAdj, D) -> %Pointer to heap term. +parse_term([$H|Line0], DecodeOpts, D) -> %Pointer to heap term. {Ptr,Line} = get_hex(Line0), - deref_ptr(Ptr, Line, BinAddrAdj, D); + deref_ptr(Ptr, Line, DecodeOpts, D); parse_term([$N|Line], _, D) -> %[] (nil). {[],Line,D}; parse_term([$I|Line0], _, D) -> %Small. @@ -2745,11 +2745,11 @@ parse_term([$p|Line0], _, D) -> %Port. parse_term([$S|Str0], _, D) -> %Information string. Str = lists:reverse(skip_blanks(lists:reverse(Str0))), {Str,[],D}; -parse_term([$D|Line0], _, D) -> %DistExternal +parse_term([$D|Line0], DecodeOpts, D) -> %DistExternal try {AttabSize,":"++Line1} = get_hex(Line0), {Attab, "E"++Line2} = parse_atom_translation_table(AttabSize, Line1, []), - {Bin,Line3} = get_binary(Line2), + {Bin,Line3} = get_binary(Line2, DecodeOpts), {try erts_debug:dist_ext_to_term(Attab, Bin) catch @@ -2782,11 +2782,39 @@ parse_atom_translation_table(0, Line0, As) -> parse_atom_translation_table(N, Line0, As) -> {A, Line1, _} = parse_atom(Line0, []), parse_atom_translation_table(N-1, Line1, [A|As]). - - -deref_ptr(Ptr, Line, BinAddrAdj, D0) -> - case gb_trees:lookup(Ptr, D0) of + +deref_ptr(Ptr, Line, DecodeOpts, D) -> + Lookup = fun(D0) -> + gb_trees:lookup(Ptr, D0) + end, + do_deref_ptr(Lookup, Line, DecodeOpts, D). + +deref_bin(Binp0, Offset, Sz, Line, DecodeOpts, D) -> + Binp = Binp0 bor DecodeOpts#dec_opts.bin_addr_adj, + Lookup = fun(D0) -> + lookup_binary(Binp, Offset, Sz, D0) + end, + do_deref_ptr(Lookup, Line, DecodeOpts, D). + +lookup_binary(Binp, Offset, Sz, D) -> + case lookup_binary_index(Binp) of + [{_,Start}] -> + Term = cdvbin(Offset, Sz, {'#CDVBin',Start}), + {value,Term}; + [] -> + case gb_trees:lookup(Binp, D) of + {value,<<_:Offset/bytes,Sub:Sz/bytes,_/bytes>>} -> + {value,Sub}; + {value,SymbolicBin} -> + {value,cdvbin(Offset, Sz, SymbolicBin)}; + none -> + none + end + end. + +do_deref_ptr(Lookup, Line, DecodeOpts, D0) -> + case Lookup(D0) of {value,Term} -> {Term,Line,D0}; none -> @@ -2798,11 +2826,11 @@ deref_ptr(Ptr, Line, BinAddrAdj, D0) -> case bytes(Fd) of "="++_ -> put(fd, end_of_heap), - deref_ptr(Ptr, Line, BinAddrAdj, D0); + do_deref_ptr(Lookup, Line, DecodeOpts, D0); L -> update_progress(length(L)+1), - D = parse(L, BinAddrAdj, D0), - deref_ptr(Ptr, Line, BinAddrAdj, D) + D = parse(L, DecodeOpts, D0), + do_deref_ptr(Lookup, Line, DecodeOpts, D) end end end. @@ -2865,36 +2893,80 @@ get_label([$:|Line], Acc) -> get_label([H|T], Acc) -> get_label(T, [H|Acc]). -get_binary(Line0) -> +get_binary(Line0,DecodeOpts) -> case get_hex(Line0) of {N,":"++Line} -> - do_get_binary(N, Line, [], false); + get_binary_1(N, Line, DecodeOpts); _ -> {'#CDVTruncatedBinary',[]} end. -get_binary(Offset,Size,Line0) -> +get_binary_1(N,Line,#dec_opts{base64=false}) -> + get_binary_hex(N, Line, [], false); +get_binary_1(N,Line0,#dec_opts{base64=true}) -> + NumBytes = ((N+2) div 3) * 4, + {Base64,Line} = lists:split(NumBytes, Line0), + Bin = get_binary_base64(list_to_binary(Base64), <<>>, false), + {Bin,Line}. + +get_binary(Offset,Size,Line0,DecodeOpts) -> case get_hex(Line0) of {_N,":"++Line} -> - Progress = Size>?binary_size_progress_limit, - Progress andalso init_progress("Reading binary",Size), - do_get_binary(Size, lists:sublist(Line,(Offset*2)+1,Size*2), [], - Progress); - _ -> - {'#CDVTruncatedBinary',[]} - end. - -do_get_binary(0, Line, Acc, Progress) -> + get_binary_1(Offset,Size,Line,DecodeOpts); + _ -> + {'#CDVTruncatedBinary',[]} + end. + +get_binary_1(Offset,Size,Line,#dec_opts{base64=false}) -> + Progress = Size > ?binary_size_progress_limit, + Progress andalso init_progress("Reading binary",Size), + get_binary_hex(Size, lists:sublist(Line,(Offset*2)+1,Size*2), [], + Progress); +get_binary_1(StartOffset,Size,Line,#dec_opts{base64=true}) -> + Progress = Size > ?binary_size_progress_limit, + Progress andalso init_progress("Reading binary",Size), + EndOffset = StartOffset + Size, + StartByte = (StartOffset div 3) * 4, + EndByte = ((EndOffset + 2) div 3) * 4, + NumBytes = EndByte - StartByte, + case list_to_binary(Line) of + <<_:StartByte/bytes,Base64:NumBytes/bytes,_/bytes>> -> + Bin0 = get_binary_base64(Base64, <<>>, Progress), + Skip = StartOffset - (StartOffset div 3) * 3, + <<_:Skip/bytes,Bin:Size/bytes,_/bytes>> = Bin0, + {Bin,[]}; + _ -> + {'#CDVTruncatedBinary',[]} + end. + +get_binary_hex(0, Line, Acc, Progress) -> Progress andalso end_progress(), {list_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc)),Line}; -do_get_binary(N, [A,B|Line], Acc, Progress) -> +get_binary_hex(N, [A,B|Line], Acc, Progress) -> Byte = (get_hex_digit(A) bsl 4) bor get_hex_digit(B), Progress andalso update_progress(), - do_get_binary(N-1, Line, [Byte|Acc], Progress); -do_get_binary(_N, [], _Acc, Progress) -> + get_binary_hex(N-1, Line, [Byte|Acc], Progress); +get_binary_hex(_N, [], _Acc, Progress) -> Progress andalso end_progress(), {'#CDVTruncatedBinary',[]}. +get_binary_base64(<<Chunk0:?base64_chunk_size/bytes,T/bytes>>, + Acc0, Progress) -> + Chunk = base64:decode(Chunk0), + Acc = <<Acc0/binary,Chunk/binary>>, + Progress andalso update_progress(?base64_chunk_size * 3 div 4), + get_binary_base64(T, Acc, Progress); +get_binary_base64(Chunk0, Acc, Progress) -> + case Progress of + true -> + update_progress(?base64_chunk_size * 3 div 4), + end_progress(); + false -> + ok + end, + Chunk = base64:decode(Chunk0), + <<Acc/binary,Chunk/binary>>. + cdvbin(Offset,Size,{'#CDVBin',Pos}) -> ['#CDVBin',Offset,Size,Pos]; cdvbin(Offset,Size,['#CDVBin',_,_,Pos]) -> diff --git a/lib/observer/test/crashdump_helper.erl b/lib/observer/test/crashdump_helper.erl index 41041682c2..bb1755f530 100644 --- a/lib/observer/test/crashdump_helper.erl +++ b/lib/observer/test/crashdump_helper.erl @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ -module(crashdump_helper). -export([n1_proc/2,remote_proc/2, dump_maps/0,create_maps/0, - create_binaries/0]). + create_binaries/0,create_sub_binaries/1]). -compile(r18). -include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl"). @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ n1_proc(Creator,_N2,Pid2,Port2,_L) -> put(bin,Bin), put(bins,create_binaries()), put(sub_bin,SubBin), + put(sub_bins,create_sub_binaries(get(bins))), put(bignum,83974938738373873), put(neg_bignum,-38748762783736367), put(ext_pid,Pid2), @@ -104,6 +105,17 @@ create_binaries() -> <<Data:Size/unit:8>> end || Size <- Sizes]. +create_sub_binaries(Bins) -> + [create_sub_binary(Bin, Start, LenSub) || + Bin <- Bins, + Start <- [0,1,2,3,4,5,10,22], + LenSub <- [0,1,2,3,4,6,9]]. + +create_sub_binary(Bin, Start, LenSub) -> + Len = byte_size(Bin) - LenSub - Start, + <<_:Start/bytes,Sub:Len/bytes,_/bytes>> = Bin, + Sub. + %%% %%% Test dumping of maps. Dumping of maps only from OTP 20.2. %%% diff --git a/lib/observer/test/crashdump_viewer_SUITE.erl b/lib/observer/test/crashdump_viewer_SUITE.erl index 29b9e406ae..9fbd1a62a4 100644 --- a/lib/observer/test/crashdump_viewer_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/observer/test/crashdump_viewer_SUITE.erl @@ -403,6 +403,10 @@ special(File,Procs) -> verify_binaries(Binaries, proplists:get_value(bins,Dict)), io:format(" binaries ok",[]), + SubBinaries = crashdump_helper:create_sub_binaries(Binaries), + verify_binaries(SubBinaries, proplists:get_value(sub_bins,Dict)), + io:format(" sub binaries ok",[]), + #proc{last_calls=LastCalls} = ProcDetails, true = length(LastCalls) =< 4, @@ -461,7 +465,9 @@ special(File,Procs) -> %% i.e. no binary exist in the dump [#proc{pid=Pid0}|_Rest] = lists:keysort(#proc.name,Procs), Pid = pid_to_list(Pid0), - {ok,ProcDetails=#proc{},[]} = crashdump_viewer:proc_details(Pid), + %%WarnIncompleteHeap = ["WARNING: This process has an incomplete heap. Some information might be missing."], + {ok,ProcDetails=#proc{},[]} = + crashdump_viewer:proc_details(Pid), io:format(" process details ok",[]), #proc{dict=Dict} = ProcDetails, @@ -668,7 +674,7 @@ truncate_dump(File) -> end, %% Split after "our binary" created by crashdump_helper %% (it may not be the first binary). - RE = <<"\n=binary:(?=[0-9A-Z]+",NewLine/binary,"FF:010203)">>, + RE = <<"\n=binary:(?=[0-9A-Z]+",NewLine/binary,"FF:AQID)">>, [StartBin,AfterTag] = re:split(Bin,RE,[{parts,2}]), [AddrAndSize,BinaryAndRest] = binary:split(AfterTag,Colon), [Binary,_Rest] = binary:split(BinaryAndRest,NewLine), diff --git a/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml index 7a7c828760..a4c0194328 100644 --- a/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -35,6 +35,30 @@ <file>notes.xml</file> </header> +<section><title>Public_Key 1.5.1</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Hostname verification: Add handling of the general name + <c>iPAddress</c> in certificate's subject alternative + name extension (<c>subjAltName</c>).</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14653</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Correct key handling in pkix_test_data/1 and use a + generic example mail address instead of an existing one.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14766</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Public_Key 1.5</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl index 38e8f30a25..449d1fc040 100644 --- a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl @@ -64,7 +64,9 @@ all() -> groups() -> [{pem_decode_encode, [], [dsa_pem, rsa_pem, ec_pem, encrypted_pem, dh_pem, cert_pem, pkcs7_pem, pkcs10_pem, ec_pem2, - ec_pem_encode_generated, gen_ec_param]}, + ec_pem_encode_generated, + gen_ec_param_prime_field, gen_ec_param_char_2_field + ]}, {ssh_public_key_decode_encode, [], [ssh_rsa_public_key, ssh_dsa_public_key, ssh_ecdsa_public_key, ssh_rfc4716_rsa_comment, ssh_rfc4716_dsa_comment, @@ -105,18 +107,11 @@ init_per_testcase(pkix_test_data_all_default, Config) -> init_common_per_testcase(Config) end; -init_per_testcase(gen_ec_param, Config) -> - case crypto:ec_curves() of - [] -> - {skip, missing_ecc_support}; - Curves -> - case lists:member(secp521r1, Curves) of - true -> - init_common_per_testcase(Config); - false -> - {skip, missing_ecc_secp52r1_support} - end - end; +init_per_testcase(gen_ec_param_prime_field=TC, Config) -> + init_per_testcase_gen_ec_param(TC, secp521r1, Config); + +init_per_testcase(gen_ec_param_char_2_field=TC, Config) -> + init_per_testcase_gen_ec_param(TC, sect571r1, Config); init_per_testcase(TestCase, Config) -> case TestCase of @@ -1034,8 +1029,6 @@ pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP(Config) -> true = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{ip, {10,67,16,75}}]), false = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{ip, {1,2,3,4}}]), false = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{ip, {10,11,12,13}}]). - - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- pkix_iso_rsa_oid() -> [{doc, "Test workaround for supporting certs that use ISO oids" @@ -1220,12 +1213,19 @@ short_crl_issuer_hash(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Issuer = public_key:pkix_crl_issuer(CrlDER), CrlIssuerHash = public_key:short_name_hash(Issuer). + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -gen_ec_param() -> - [{doc, "Generate key with EC parameters"}]. -gen_ec_param(Config) when is_list(Config) -> +gen_ec_param_prime_field() -> + [{doc, "Generate key with EC prime_field parameters"}]. +gen_ec_param_prime_field(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + Datadir = proplists:get_value(data_dir, Config), + do_gen_ec_param(filename:join(Datadir, "ec_key_param0.pem")). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +gen_ec_param_char_2_field() -> + [{doc, "Generate key with EC characteristic_two_field parameters"}]. +gen_ec_param_char_2_field(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Datadir = proplists:get_value(data_dir, Config), - do_gen_ec_param(filename:join(Datadir, "ec_key_param0.pem")), do_gen_ec_param(filename:join(Datadir, "ec_key_param1.pem")). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -1312,6 +1312,30 @@ do_gen_ec_param(File) -> ct:fail({key_gen_fail, File}) end. +init_per_testcase_gen_ec_param(TC, Curve, Config) -> + case crypto:ec_curves() of + [] -> + {skip, missing_ec_support}; + Curves -> + case lists:member(Curve, Curves) + andalso crypto_supported_curve(Curve, Curves) + of + true -> + init_common_per_testcase(Config); + false -> + {skip, {missing_ec_support, Curve}} + end + end. + + +crypto_supported_curve(Curve, Curves) -> + try crypto:generate_key(ecdh, Curve) of + {error,_} -> false; % Just in case crypto is changed in the future... + _-> true + catch + _:_-> false + end. + incorrect_countryname_pkix_cert() -> <<48,130,5,186,48,130,4,162,160,3,2,1,2,2,7,7,250,61,63,6,140,137,48,13,6,9,42, 134,72,134,247,13,1,1,5,5,0,48,129,220,49,11,48,9,6,3,85,4,6,19,2,85,83,49, 16,48,14,6,3,85,4,8,19,7,65,114,105,122,111,110,97,49,19,48,17,6,3,85,4,7,19, 10,83,99,111,116,116,115,100,97,108,101,49,37,48,35,6,3,85,4,10,19,28,83,116, 97,114,102,105,101,108,100,32,84,101,99,104,110,111,108,111,103,105,101,115, 44,32,73,110,99,46,49,57,48,55,6,3,85,4,11,19,48,104,116,116,112,58,47,47,99, 101,114,116,105,102,105,99,97,116,101,115,46,115,116,97,114,102,105,101,108, 100,116,101,99,104,46,99,111,109,47,114,101,112,111,115,105,116,111,114,121, 49,49,48,47,6,3,85,4,3,19,40,83,116,97,114,102,105,101,108,100,32,83,101,99, 117,114,101,32,67,101,114,116,105,102,105,99,97,116,105,111,110,32,65,117, 116,104,111,114,105,116,121,49,17,48,15,6,3,85,4,5,19,8,49,48,54,56,56,52,51, 53,48,30,23,13,49,48,49,48,50,51,48,49,51,50,48,53,90,23,13,49,50,49,48,50, 51,48,49,51,50,48,53,90,48,122,49,11,48,9,6,3,85,4,6,12,2,85,83,49,11,48,9,6, 3,85,4,8,12,2,65,90,49,19,48,17,6,3,85,4,7,12,10,83,99,111,116,116,115,100, 97,108,101,49,38,48,36,6,3,85,4,10,12,29,83,112,101,99,105,97,108,32,68,111, 109,97,105,110,32,83,101,114,118,105,99,101,115,44,32,73,110,99,46,49,33,48, 31,6,3,85,4,3,12,24,42,46,108,111,103,105,110,46,115,101,99,117,114,101,115, 101,114,118,101,114,46,110,101,116,48,130,1,34,48,13,6,9,42,134,72,134,247, 13,1,1,1,5,0,3,130,1,15,0,48,130,1,10,2,130,1,1,0,185,136,240,80,141,36,124, 245,182,130,73,19,188,74,166,117,72,228,185,209,43,129,244,40,44,193,231,11, 209,12,234,88,43,142,1,162,48,122,17,95,230,105,171,131,12,147,46,204,36,80, 250,171,33,253,35,62,83,22,71,212,186,141,14,198,89,89,121,204,224,122,246, 127,110,188,229,162,67,95,6,74,231,127,99,131,7,240,85,102,203,251,50,58,58, 104,245,103,181,183,134,32,203,121,232,54,32,188,139,136,112,166,126,14,91, 223,153,172,164,14,61,38,163,208,215,186,210,136,213,143,70,147,173,109,217, 250,169,108,31,211,104,238,103,93,182,59,165,43,196,189,218,241,30,148,240, 109,90,69,176,194,52,116,173,151,135,239,10,209,179,129,192,102,75,11,25,168, 223,32,174,84,223,134,70,167,55,172,143,27,130,123,226,226,7,34,142,166,39, 48,246,96,231,150,84,220,106,133,193,55,95,159,227,24,249,64,36,1,142,171,16, 202,55,126,7,156,15,194,22,116,53,113,174,104,239,203,120,45,131,57,87,84, 163,184,27,83,57,199,91,200,34,43,98,61,180,144,76,65,170,177,2,3,1,0,1,163, 130,1,224,48,130,1,220,48,15,6,3,85,29,19,1,1,255,4,5,48,3,1,1,0,48,29,6,3, 85,29,37,4,22,48,20,6,8,43,6,1,5,5,7,3,1,6,8,43,6,1,5,5,7,3,2,48,14,6,3,85, 29,15,1,1,255,4,4,3,2,5,160,48,56,6,3,85,29,31,4,49,48,47,48,45,160,43,160, 41,134,39,104,116,116,112,58,47,47,99,114,108,46,115,116,97,114,102,105,101, 108,100,116,101,99,104,46,99,111,109,47,115,102,115,50,45,48,46,99,114,108, 48,83,6,3,85,29,32,4,76,48,74,48,72,6,11,96,134,72,1,134,253,110,1,7,23,2,48, 57,48,55,6,8,43,6,1,5,5,7,2,1,22,43,104,116,116,112,115,58,47,47,99,101,114, 116,115,46,115,116,97,114,102,105,101,108,100,116,101,99,104,46,99,111,109, 47,114,101,112,111,115,105,116,111,114,121,47,48,129,141,6,8,43,6,1,5,5,7,1, 1,4,129,128,48,126,48,42,6,8,43,6,1,5,5,7,48,1,134,30,104,116,116,112,58,47, 47,111,99,115,112,46,115,116,97,114,102,105,101,108,100,116,101,99,104,46,99, 111,109,47,48,80,6,8,43,6,1,5,5,7,48,2,134,68,104,116,116,112,58,47,47,99, 101,114,116,105,102,105,99,97,116,101,115,46,115,116,97,114,102,105,101,108, 100,116,101,99,104,46,99,111,109,47,114,101,112,111,115,105,116,111,114,121, 47,115,102,95,105,110,116,101,114,109,101,100,105,97,116,101,46,99,114,116, 48,31,6,3,85,29,35,4,24,48,22,128,20,73,75,82,39,209,27,188,242,161,33,106, 98,123,81,66,122,138,215,213,86,48,59,6,3,85,29,17,4,52,48,50,130,24,42,46, 108,111,103,105,110,46,115,101,99,117,114,101,115,101,114,118,101,114,46,110, 101,116,130,22,108,111,103,105,110,46,115,101,99,117,114,101,115,101,114,118, 101,114,46,110,101,116,48,29,6,3,85,29,14,4,22,4,20,138,233,191,208,157,203, 249,85,242,239,20,195,48,10,148,49,144,101,255,116,48,13,6,9,42,134,72,134, 247,13,1,1,5,5,0,3,130,1,1,0,82,31,121,162,49,50,143,26,167,202,143,61,71, 189,201,199,57,81,122,116,90,192,88,24,102,194,174,48,157,74,27,87,210,223, 253,93,3,91,150,109,120,1,110,27,11,200,198,141,222,246,14,200,71,105,41,138, 13,114,122,106,63,17,197,181,234,121,61,89,74,65,41,231,248,219,129,83,176, 219,55,107,55,211,112,98,38,49,69,77,96,221,108,123,152,12,210,159,157,141, 43,226,55,187,129,3,82,49,136,66,81,196,91,234,196,10,82,48,6,80,163,83,71, 127,102,177,93,209,129,26,104,2,84,24,255,248,161,3,244,169,234,92,122,110, 43,4,17,113,185,235,108,219,210,236,132,216,177,227,17,169,58,162,159,182, 162,93,160,229,200,9,163,229,110,121,240,168,232,14,91,214,188,196,109,210, 164,222,0,109,139,132,113,91,16,118,173,178,176,80,132,34,41,199,51,206,250, 224,132,60,115,192,94,107,163,219,212,226,225,65,169,148,108,213,46,174,173, 103,110,189,229,166,149,254,31,51,44,144,108,187,182,11,251,201,206,86,138, 208,59,51,86,132,235,81,225,88,34,190,8,184>>. diff --git a/lib/public_key/vsn.mk b/lib/public_key/vsn.mk index bb96c2237d..c01d8820f2 100644 --- a/lib/public_key/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/public_key/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -PUBLIC_KEY_VSN = 1.5 +PUBLIC_KEY_VSN = 1.5.1 diff --git a/lib/runtime_tools/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/runtime_tools/doc/src/Makefile index dad229e193..ec19a4ce59 100644 --- a/lib/runtime_tools/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/runtime_tools/doc/src/Makefile @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ XML_REF3_FILES = dbg.xml dyntrace.xml erts_alloc_config.xml system_information.x XML_REF6_FILES = runtime_tools_app.xml XML_PART_FILES = part.xml -XML_CHAPTER_FILES = notes.xml notes_history.xml LTTng.xml +XML_CHAPTER_FILES = notes.xml LTTng.xml GENERATED_XML_FILES = DTRACE.xml SYSTEMTAP.xml @@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ BOOK_FILES = book.xml XML_FILES = \ $(BOOK_FILES) $(XML_CHAPTER_FILES) \ $(XML_PART_FILES) $(XML_REF3_FILES) \ - $(XML_REF6_FILES) $(XML_APPLICATION_FILES) + $(XML_REF6_FILES) $(XML_APPLICATION_FILES) \ + $(GENERATED_XML_FILES) GIF_FILES = @@ -89,7 +90,6 @@ SPECS_FLAGS = -I../../include -I../../../kernel/src # ---------------------------------------------------- # Targets # ---------------------------------------------------- -$(XML_FILES): $(GENERATED_XML_FILES) %.xml: $(ERL_TOP)/HOWTO/%.md $(ERL_TOP)/make/emd2exml $(ERL_TOP)/make/emd2exml $< $@ diff --git a/lib/sasl/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/sasl/doc/src/Makefile index 76746e44e7..baf563ca62 100644 --- a/lib/sasl/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/sasl/doc/src/Makefile @@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ XML_REF6_FILES = sasl_app.xml XML_PART_FILES = part.xml XML_CHAPTER_FILES = sasl_intro.xml \ error_logging.xml \ - notes.xml \ - notes_history.xml + notes.xml BOOK_FILES = book.xml diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/ssh/doc/src/Makefile index e066b787f3..f54f5e0708 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/ssh/doc/src/Makefile @@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ XML_PART_FILES = \ usersguide.xml XML_CHAPTER_FILES = notes.xml \ introduction.xml \ - ssh_protocol.xml \ using_ssh.xml \ configure_algos.xml +# ssh_protocol.xml \ BOOK_FILES = book.xml diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml index ef3e94a1e1..c9e153f30c 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -30,12 +30,37 @@ <file>notes.xml</file> </header> -<section><title>Ssh 4.6.1</title> +<section><title>Ssh 4.6.2</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> <list> <item> <p> + Trailing white space was removed at end of the + hello-string. This caused interoperability problems with + some other ssh-implementations (e.g OpenSSH 7.3p1 on + Solaris 11)</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14763 Aux Id: ERIERL-74 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fixes that tcp connections that was immediately closed + (SYN, SYNACK, ACK, RST) by a client could be left in a + zombie state.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14778 Aux Id: ERIERL-104 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>Ssh 4.6.1</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> Fixed broken printout</p> <p> Own Id: OTP-14645</p> diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl index d6d412db43..3dee1c5521 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl +++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl @@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ -define(uint16(X), << ?UINT16(X) >> ). -define(uint32(X), << ?UINT32(X) >> ). -define(uint64(X), << ?UINT64(X) >> ). --define(string(X), << ?STRING(list_to_binary(X)) >> ). -define(string_utf8(X), << ?STRING(unicode:characters_to_binary(X)) >> ). +-define(string(X), ?string_utf8(X)). -define(binary(X), << ?STRING(X) >>). %% Cipher details diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl index 802bf62570..0ca960ef96 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl +++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl @@ -325,23 +325,32 @@ renegotiate_data(ConnectionHandler) -> %% Internal process state %%==================================================================== -record(data, { - starter :: pid(), + starter :: pid() + | undefined, auth_user :: string() | undefined, connection_state :: #connection{}, - latest_channel_id = 0 :: non_neg_integer(), + latest_channel_id = 0 :: non_neg_integer() + | undefined, idle_timer_ref :: undefined | infinity | reference(), idle_timer_value = infinity :: infinity | pos_integer(), - transport_protocol :: atom(), % ex: tcp - transport_cb :: atom(), % ex: gen_tcp - transport_close_tag :: atom(), % ex: tcp_closed - ssh_params :: #ssh{}, - socket :: inet:socket(), - decrypted_data_buffer = <<>> :: binary(), - encrypted_data_buffer = <<>> :: binary(), + transport_protocol :: atom() + | undefined, % ex: tcp + transport_cb :: atom() + | undefined, % ex: gen_tcp + transport_close_tag :: atom() + | undefined, % ex: tcp_closed + ssh_params :: #ssh{} + | undefined, + socket :: inet:socket() + | undefined, + decrypted_data_buffer = <<>> :: binary() + | undefined, + encrypted_data_buffer = <<>> :: binary() + | undefined, undecrypted_packet_length :: undefined | non_neg_integer(), key_exchange_init_msg :: #ssh_msg_kexinit{} | undefined, @@ -370,16 +379,17 @@ init_connection_handler(Role, Socket, Opts) -> StartState, D); - {stop, enotconn} -> - %% Handles the abnormal sequence: - %% SYN-> - %% <-SYNACK - %% ACK-> - %% RST-> - exit({shutdown, "TCP connection to server was prematurely closed by the client"}); - - {stop, OtherError} -> - exit({shutdown, {init,OtherError}}) + {stop, Error} -> + Sups = ?GET_INTERNAL_OPT(supervisors, Opts), + C = #connection{system_supervisor = proplists:get_value(system_sup, Sups), + sub_system_supervisor = proplists:get_value(subsystem_sup, Sups), + connection_supervisor = proplists:get_value(connection_sup, Sups) + }, + gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, + [], + {init_error,Error}, + #data{connection_state=C, + socket=Socket}) end. @@ -531,6 +541,21 @@ renegotiation(_) -> false. callback_mode() -> handle_event_function. + +handle_event(_, _Event, {init_error,Error}, _) -> + case Error of + enotconn -> + %% Handles the abnormal sequence: + %% SYN-> + %% <-SYNACK + %% ACK-> + %% RST-> + {stop, {shutdown,"TCP connenction to server was prematurely closed by the client"}}; + + OtherError -> + {stop, {shutdown,{init,OtherError}}} + end; + %%% ######## {hello, client|server} #### %% The very first event that is sent when the we are set as controlling process of Socket handle_event(_, socket_control, {hello,_}, D) -> diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl index 892db6b64f..90a94a7e86 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl +++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl @@ -2027,12 +2027,6 @@ same(Algs) -> [{client2server,Algs}, {server2client,Algs}]. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% trim_tail(Str) -> - lists:reverse(trim_head(lists:reverse(Str))). - -trim_head([$\s|Cs]) -> trim_head(Cs); -trim_head([$\t|Cs]) -> trim_head(Cs); -trim_head([$\n|Cs]) -> trim_head(Cs); -trim_head([$\r|Cs]) -> trim_head(Cs); -trim_head(Cs) -> Cs. - - + lists:takewhile(fun(C) -> + C=/=$\r andalso C=/=$\n + end, Str). diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_engine_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_engine_SUITE.erl index 035446932b..daf93891e9 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_engine_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_engine_SUITE.erl @@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ init_per_suite(Config) -> ?CHECK_CRYPTO( case load_engine() of {ok,E} -> - ssh_dbg:messages(fun ct:pal/2), [{engine,E}|Config]; {error, notsup} -> {skip, "Engine not supported on this OpenSSL version"}; diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_options_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_options_SUITE.erl index 8b454ffe5d..144ec7f8fd 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_options_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_options_SUITE.erl @@ -36,7 +36,9 @@ id_string_no_opt_client/1, id_string_no_opt_server/1, id_string_own_string_client/1, + id_string_own_string_client_trail_space/1, id_string_own_string_server/1, + id_string_own_string_server_trail_space/1, id_string_random_client/1, id_string_random_server/1, max_sessions_sftp_start_channel_parallel/1, @@ -116,9 +118,11 @@ all() -> hostkey_fingerprint_check_list, id_string_no_opt_client, id_string_own_string_client, + id_string_own_string_client_trail_space, id_string_random_client, id_string_no_opt_server, id_string_own_string_server, + id_string_own_string_server_trail_space, id_string_random_server, {group, hardening_tests} ]. @@ -1035,6 +1039,19 @@ id_string_own_string_client(Config) -> end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +id_string_own_string_client_trail_space(Config) -> + {Server, _Host, Port} = fake_daemon(Config), + {error,_} = ssh:connect("localhost", Port, [{id_string,"Pelle "}], 1000), + receive + {id,Server,"SSH-2.0-Pelle \r\n"} -> + ok; + {id,Server,Other} -> + ct:fail("Unexpected id: ~s.",[Other]) + after 5000 -> + {fail,timeout} + end. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- id_string_random_client(Config) -> {Server, _Host, Port} = fake_daemon(Config), {error,_} = ssh:connect("localhost", Port, [{id_string,random}], 1000), @@ -1063,6 +1080,12 @@ id_string_own_string_server(Config) -> {ok,"SSH-2.0-Olle\r\n"} = gen_tcp:recv(S1, 0, 2000). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +id_string_own_string_server_trail_space(Config) -> + {_Server, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:std_daemon(Config, [{id_string,"Olle "}]), + {ok,S1}=ssh_test_lib:gen_tcp_connect(Host,Port,[{active,false},{packet,line}]), + {ok,"SSH-2.0-Olle \r\n"} = gen_tcp:recv(S1, 0, 2000). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- id_string_random_server(Config) -> {_Server, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:std_daemon(Config, [{id_string,random}]), {ok,S1}=ssh_test_lib:gen_tcp_connect(Host,Port,[{active,false},{packet,line}]), diff --git a/lib/ssh/vsn.mk b/lib/ssh/vsn.mk index 5154658e8a..59775d2d7f 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/ssh/vsn.mk @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #-*-makefile-*- ; force emacs to enter makefile-mode -SSH_VSN = 4.6.1 +SSH_VSN = 4.6.2 APP_VSN = "ssh-$(SSH_VSN)" diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/ssl/doc/src/Makefile index d54ef47461..f9128e8e45 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/Makefile @@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ XML_REF6_FILES = ssl_app.xml XML_PART_FILES = usersguide.xml XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ + ssl_introduction.xml \ ssl_protocol.xml \ using_ssl.xml \ - pkix_certs.xml \ ssl_distribution.xml \ notes.xml diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml index 4c6a204e63..37c916e585 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -27,6 +27,81 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the SSL application.</p> +<section><title>SSL 8.2.2</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + TLS sessions must be registered with SNI if provided, so + that sessions where client hostname verification would + fail can not connect reusing a session created when the + server name verification succeeded.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14632</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + If no SNI is available and the hostname is an IP-address + also check for IP-address match. This check is not as + good as a DNS hostname check and certificates using + IP-address are not recommended.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14655</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> <section><title>SSL 8.2.1</title> @@ -175,9 +250,59 @@ </item> </list> </section> - </section> +<section><title>SSL 8.1.3.1</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> +</section> <section><title>SSL 8.1.3</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> @@ -556,6 +681,60 @@ </section> + <section><title>SSL 7.3.3.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + </section> + <section><title>SSL 7.3.3</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> @@ -585,7 +764,59 @@ </list> </section> + <section><title>SSL 7.3.3.0.1</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + </section> <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> <list> <item> diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/pkix_certs.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/pkix_certs.xml deleted file mode 100644 index f365acef4d..0000000000 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/pkix_certs.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> -<!DOCTYPE chapter SYSTEM "chapter.dtd"> - -<chapter> - <header> - <copyright> - <year>2003</year><year>2016</year> - <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> - </copyright> - <legalnotice> - Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); - you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. - You may obtain a copy of the License at - - http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - - Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, - WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - limitations under the License. - - </legalnotice> - - <title>PKIX Certificates</title> - <prepared>UAB/F/P Peter Högfeldt</prepared> - <docno></docno> - <date>2003-06-09</date> - <rev>A</rev> - <file>pkix_certs.xml</file> - </header> - - <section> - <title>Introduction to Certificates</title> - <p>Certificates were originally defined by ITU (CCITT) and the latest - definitions are described in <cite id="X.509"></cite>, but those definitions - are (as always) not working. - </p> - <p>Working certificate definitions for the Internet Community are found - in the the PKIX RFCs <cite id="rfc3279"></cite> and <cite id="rfc3280"></cite>. - The parsing of certificates in the Erlang/OTP SSL application is - based on those RFCS. - </p> - <p>Certificates are defined in terms of ASN.1 (<cite id="X.680"></cite>). - For an introduction to ASN.1 see <url href="http://asn1.elibel.tm.fr/">ASN.1 Information Site</url>. - </p> - </section> - - <section> - <title>PKIX Certificates</title> - <p>Certificate handling is now handled by the <c>public_key</c> application.</p> - <p> - DER encoded certificates returned by <c>ssl:peercert/1</c> can for example - be decoded by the <c>public_key:pkix_decode_cert/2</c> function. - </p> - </section> -</chapter> - - diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml index bda8e8ec7d..8fcda78ed5 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml @@ -203,12 +203,14 @@ <tag><c>{certfile, path()}</c></tag> <item><p>Path to a file containing the user certificate.</p></item> - <tag><c>{key, {'RSAPrivateKey'| 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' + <tag> + <marker id="key_option_def"/> + <c>{key, {'RSAPrivateKey'| 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' |'PrivateKeyInfo', public_key:der_encoded()} | #{algorithm := rsa | dss | ecdsa, engine := crypto:engine_ref(), key_id := crypto:key_id(), password => crypto:password()}</c></tag> <item><p>The DER-encoded user's private key or a map refering to a crypto engine and its key reference that optionally can be password protected, - seealso <seealso marker="crypto:engine_load-4"> crypto:engine_load/4 + seealso <seealso marker="crypto:crypto#engine_load-4"> crypto:engine_load/4 </seealso> and <seealso marker="crypto:engine_load"> Crypto's Users Guide</seealso>. If this option is supplied, it overrides option <c>keyfile</c>.</p></item> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl index 7d2605e013..073cb4009b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl @@ -39,20 +39,18 @@ -export([start_fsm/8, start_link/7, init/1]). %% State transition handling --export([next_record/1, next_event/3, next_event/4]). +-export([next_record/1, next_event/3, next_event/4, handle_common_event/4]). %% Handshake handling --export([renegotiate/2, - reinit_handshake_data/1, - send_handshake/2, queue_handshake/2, queue_change_cipher/2, - select_sni_extension/1, empty_connection_state/2]). +-export([renegotiate/2, send_handshake/2, + queue_handshake/2, queue_change_cipher/2, + reinit_handshake_data/1, select_sni_extension/1, empty_connection_state/2]). %% Alert and close handling -export([encode_alert/3,send_alert/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). %% Data handling - --export([encode_data/3, passive_receive/2, next_record_if_active/1, handle_common_event/4, +-export([encode_data/3, passive_receive/2, next_record_if_active/1, send/3, socket/5, setopts/3, getopts/3]). %% gen_statem state functions @@ -64,6 +62,9 @@ %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API +%%==================================================================== +%%==================================================================== +%% Setup %%==================================================================== start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} = Opts, User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, @@ -79,6 +80,218 @@ start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} Error end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> + {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, reason()}. +%% +%% Description: Creates a gen_statem process which calls Module:init/1 to +%% initialize. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) -> + {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}. + +init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]) -> + process_flag(trap_exit, true), + State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), + try + State = ssl_connection:ssl_config(State0#state.ssl_options, Role, State0), + gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], init, State) + catch + throw:Error -> + gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error,State0}) + end. +%%==================================================================== +%% State transition handling +%%==================================================================== +next_record(#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = State) when N > 0 -> + {no_record, State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}; + +next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch} = CT | Rest]} + = Buffers, + connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := Epoch}} = ConnectionStates} = State) -> + CurrentRead = dtls_record:get_connection_state_by_epoch(Epoch, ConnectionStates, read), + case dtls_record:replay_detect(CT, CurrentRead) of + false -> + decode_cipher_text(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) ; + true -> + %% Ignore replayed record + next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = + Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates}) + end; +next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch} | Rest]} + = Buffers, + connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}} = ConnectionStates} = State) + when Epoch > CurrentEpoch -> + %% TODO Buffer later Epoch message, drop it for now + next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = + Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates}); +next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [ _ | Rest]} + = Buffers, + connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> + %% Drop old epoch message + next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = + Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates}); +next_record(#state{role = server, + socket = {Listener, {Client, _}}, + transport_cb = gen_udp} = State) -> + dtls_udp_listener:active_once(Listener, Client, self()), + {no_record, State}; +next_record(#state{role = client, + socket = {_Server, Socket}, + transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> + dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]), + {no_record, State}; +next_record(State) -> + {no_record, State}. + +next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> + next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). + +next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, + #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> + case next_record_if_active(State0) of + {no_record, State} -> + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); + {#ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, + type = ?HANDSHAKE, + version = Version} = Record, State1} -> + State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State1), + {next_state, StateName, State, + [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + {#ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch} = Record, State} -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + {#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, + type = ?HANDSHAKE, + version = _Version}, State1} = _Record when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> + {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State1, CurrentEpoch), + {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State2), + next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); + %% From FLIGHT perspective CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC is treated as a handshake + {#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, + type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + version = _Version}, State1} = _Record when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> + {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State1, CurrentEpoch), + {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State2), + next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); + {#ssl_tls{epoch = _Epoch, + version = _Version}, State1} -> + %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch + {Record, State} = next_record(State1), + next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions); + {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} + end; +next_event(connection = StateName, Record, + #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> + case Record of + #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, + type = ?HANDSHAKE, + version = Version} = Record -> + State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State0), + {next_state, StateName, State, + [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch} -> + {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + #ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, + type = ?HANDSHAKE, + version = _Version} when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> + {State1, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State0, CurrentEpoch), + {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State1), + next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); + %% From FLIGHT perspective CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC is treated as a handshake + #ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, + type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + version = _Version} when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> + {State1, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State0, CurrentEpoch), + {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State1), + next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); + _ -> + next_event(StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) + end; +next_event(StateName, Record, + #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> + case Record of + no_record -> + {next_state, StateName, State0, Actions}; + #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, + version = Version} = Record -> + State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State0), + {next_state, StateName, State, + [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + #ssl_tls{epoch = _Epoch, + version = _Version} = _Record -> + %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch + {Record, State} = next_record(State0), + next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions); + #alert{} = Alert -> + {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} + end. + +handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName, + #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State); +%%% DTLS record protocol level handshake messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, + fragment = Data}, + StateName, + #state{protocol_buffers = Buffers0, + negotiated_version = Version} = State0) -> + try + case dtls_handshake:get_dtls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffers0) of + {[], Buffers} -> + {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers}), + next_event(StateName, Record, State); + {Packets, Buffers} -> + State = State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers}, + Events = dtls_handshake_events(Packets), + {next_state, StateName, + State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}, Events} + end + catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0) + end; +%%% DTLS record protocol level application data messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {application_data, Data}}]}; +%%% DTLS record protocol level change cipher messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = Data}}]}; +%%% DTLS record protocol level Alert messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, + #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + case decode_alerts(EncAlerts) of + Alerts = [_|_] -> + handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, StateName, State}); + #alert{} = Alert -> + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) + end; +%% Ignore unknown TLS record level protocol messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State}. + +%%==================================================================== +%% Handshake handling +%%==================================================================== + +renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State, Actions) -> + %% Handle same way as if server requested + %% the renegotiation + {next_state, connection, State, + [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]}; + +renegotiate(#state{role = server} = State0, Actions) -> + HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(), + State1 = prepare_flight(State0), + {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake(HelloRequest, State1), + {Record, State} = next_record(State2), + next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions ++ MoreActions). + send_handshake(Handshake, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> #{epoch := Epoch} = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), send_handshake_flight(queue_handshake(Handshake, State), Epoch). @@ -104,85 +317,12 @@ queue_handshake(Handshake0, #state{tls_handshake_history = Hist0, next_sequence => Seq +1}, tls_handshake_history = Hist}. - -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - flight_buffer = #{handshakes := Flight, - change_cipher_spec := undefined}, - negotiated_version = Version, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> - %% TODO remove hardcoded Max size - {Encoded, ConnectionStates} = - encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates0), - send(Transport, Socket, Encoded), - {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; - -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [_|_] = Flight0, - change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, - handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := []}, - negotiated_version = Version, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> - {HsBefore, ConnectionStates1} = - encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight0), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates0), - {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates} = encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates1), - - send(Transport, Socket, [HsBefore, EncChangeCipher]), - {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; - -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [_|_] = Flight0, - change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, - handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Flight1}, - negotiated_version = Version, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> - {HsBefore, ConnectionStates1} = - encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight0), Version, 1400, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates0), - {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates2} = - encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates1), - {HsAfter, ConnectionStates} = - encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight1), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates2), - send(Transport, Socket, [HsBefore, EncChangeCipher, HsAfter]), - {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; - -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [], - change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, - handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Flight1}, - negotiated_version = Version, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> - {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates1} = - encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates0), - {HsAfter, ConnectionStates} = - encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight1), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates1), - send(Transport, Socket, [EncChangeCipher, HsAfter]), - {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}. - queue_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, #state{flight_buffer = Flight, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> ConnectionStates = dtls_record:next_epoch(ConnectionStates0, write), State#state{flight_buffer = Flight#{change_cipher_spec => ChangeCipher}, connection_states = ConnectionStates}. - -send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> - {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = - encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), - send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), - State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. - -close(downgrade, _,_,_,_) -> - ok; -%% Other -close(_, Socket, Transport, _,_) -> - dtls_socket:close(Transport,Socket). - reinit_handshake_data(#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers} = State) -> State#state{premaster_secret = undefined, public_key_info = undefined, @@ -200,54 +340,81 @@ select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = HelloExtensions}) -> HelloExtensions#hello_extensions.sni; select_sni_extension(_) -> undefined. + empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> Empty = ssl_record:empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation), dtls_record:empty_connection_state(Empty). -socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, _) -> - dtls_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection). +%%==================================================================== +%% Alert and close handling +%%==================================================================== +encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) -> + dtls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates). -setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) -> - dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, Other). -getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag) -> - dtls_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag). +send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> + {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = + encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), + send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. + +close(downgrade, _,_,_,_) -> + ok; +%% Other +close(_, Socket, Transport, _,_) -> + dtls_socket:close(Transport,Socket). protocol_name() -> "DTLS". %%==================================================================== -%% tls_connection_sup API -%%==================================================================== +%% Data handling +%%==================================================================== -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> - {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, reason()}. -%% -%% Description: Creates a gen_fsm process which calls Module:init/1 to -%% initialize. To ensure a synchronized start-up procedure, this function -%% does not return until Module:init/1 has returned. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) -> - {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}. +encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> + dtls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0). -init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]) -> - process_flag(trap_exit, true), - State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), - try - State = ssl_connection:ssl_config(State0#state.ssl_options, Role, State0), - gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], init, State) - catch - throw:Error -> - gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error,State0}) +passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) -> + case Buffer of + <<>> -> + {Record, State} = next_record(State0), + next_event(StateName, Record, State); + _ -> + {Record, State} = ssl_connection:read_application_data(<<>>, State0), + next_event(StateName, Record, State) end. +next_record_if_active(State = + #state{socket_options = + #socket_options{active = false}}) -> + {no_record ,State}; -callback_mode() -> - [state_functions, state_enter]. +next_record_if_active(State) -> + next_record(State). + +send(Transport, {_, {{_,_}, _} = Socket}, Data) -> + send(Transport, Socket, Data); +send(Transport, Socket, Data) -> + dtls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Data). + +socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, _) -> + dtls_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection). + +setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) -> + dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, Other). + +getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag) -> + dtls_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% State functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec init(gen_statem:event_type(), + {start, timeout()} | term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- init(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, @@ -277,28 +444,32 @@ init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, {Record, State} = next_record(State3), next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions); init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{role = server, transport_cb = gen_udp} = State) -> - Result = ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, - State#state{flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT}, - protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), - previous_cookie_secret => <<>>, - ignored_alerts => 0, - max_ignored_alerts => 10}}, - ?MODULE), + Result = gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, + State#state{flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT}, + protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), + previous_cookie_secret => <<>>, + ignored_alerts => 0, + max_ignored_alerts => 10}}), erlang:send_after(dtls_v1:cookie_timeout(), self(), new_cookie_secret), Result; init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{role = server} = State) -> %% I.E. DTLS over sctp - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State#state{flight_state = reliable}, ?MODULE); + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State#state{flight_state = reliable}); init(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). - + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec error(gen_statem:event_type(), + {start, timeout()} | term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- error(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, {Error, State}) -> {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State}; -error({call, From}, Msg, State) -> - handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +error({call, _} = Call, Msg, State) -> + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Call, Msg, State); error(_, _, _) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. @@ -393,49 +564,60 @@ hello(internal, {handshake, {#hello_verify_request{} = Handshake, _}}, State) -> %% hello_verify should not be in handshake history {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{next_event, internal, Handshake}]}; hello(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); hello(state_timeout, Event, State) -> handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); hello(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec abbreviated(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- abbreviated(enter, _, State0) -> {State, Actions} = handle_flight_timer(State0), {keep_state, State, Actions}; abbreviated(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); abbreviated(internal = Type, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> ConnectionStates1 = dtls_record:save_current_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), ConnectionStates = dtls_record:next_epoch(ConnectionStates1, read), - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, ?MODULE); + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}); abbreviated(internal = Type, #finished{} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, - prepare_flight(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - flight_state = connection}), ?MODULE); + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, + prepare_flight(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + flight_state = connection})); abbreviated(state_timeout, Event, State) -> handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); abbreviated(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). - + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec certify(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certify(enter, _, State0) -> {State, Actions} = handle_flight_timer(State0), {keep_state, State, Actions}; certify(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(internal = Type, #server_hello_done{} = Event, State) -> ssl_connection:certify(Type, Event, prepare_flight(State), ?MODULE); certify(state_timeout, Event, State) -> handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec cipher(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher(enter, _, State0) -> {State, Actions} = handle_flight_timer(State0), {keep_state, State, Actions}; cipher(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); cipher(internal = Type, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> ConnectionStates1 = dtls_record:save_current_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), @@ -451,10 +633,15 @@ cipher(state_timeout, Event, State) -> cipher(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec connection(gen_statem:event_type(), + #hello_request{} | #client_hello{}| term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- connection(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; connection(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); connection(internal, #hello_request{}, #state{host = Host, port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb, @@ -492,136 +679,24 @@ connection(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). %%TODO does this make sense for DTLS ? +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec downgrade(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- downgrade(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; downgrade(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% Description: This function is called by a gen_fsm when it receives any -%% other message than a synchronous or asynchronous event -%% (or a system message). +%% gen_statem callbacks %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +callback_mode() -> + [state_functions, state_enter]. -%% raw data from socket, unpack records -handle_info({Protocol, _, _, _, Data}, StateName, - #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) -> - case next_dtls_record(Data, State0) of - {Record, State} -> - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - #alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), - {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}} - end; -handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, - #state{socket = Socket, - socket_options = #socket_options{active = Active}, - protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = CTs}, - close_tag = CloseTag, - negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - %% Note that as of DTLS 1.2 (TLS 1.1), - %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a - %% session not be resumed. This is a change from DTLS 1.0 to conform - %% with widespread implementation practice. - case (Active == false) andalso (CTs =/= []) of - false -> - case Version of - {254, N} when N =< 253 -> - ok; - _ -> - %% As invalidate_sessions here causes performance issues, - %% we will conform to the widespread implementation - %% practice and go aginst the spec - %%invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session) - ok - end, - ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}}; - true -> - %% Fixes non-delivery of final DTLS record in {active, once}. - %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again - %% and then receive the final message. - next_event(StateName, no_record, State) - end; - -handle_info(new_cookie_secret, StateName, - #state{protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret := Secret} = CookieInfo} = State) -> - erlang:send_after(dtls_v1:cookie_timeout(), self(), new_cookie_secret), - {next_state, StateName, State#state{protocol_specific = - CookieInfo#{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), - previous_cookie_secret => Secret}}}; -handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_info(Msg, StateName, State). - -handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State, ?MODULE). - -handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State); -%%% DTLS record protocol level handshake messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, - fragment = Data}, - StateName, - #state{protocol_buffers = Buffers0, - negotiated_version = Version} = State0) -> - try - case dtls_handshake:get_dtls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffers0) of - {[], Buffers} -> - {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers}), - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - {Packets, Buffers} -> - State = State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers}, - Events = dtls_handshake_events(Packets), - {next_state, StateName, - State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}, Events} - end - catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0) - end; -%%% DTLS record protocol level application data messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {application_data, Data}}]}; -%%% DTLS record protocol level change cipher messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = Data}}]}; -%%% DTLS record protocol level Alert messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - case decode_alerts(EncAlerts) of - Alerts = [_|_] -> - handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, StateName, State}); - #alert{} = Alert -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) - end; -%% Ignore unknown TLS record level protocol messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State}. - -handle_state_timeout(flight_retransmission_timeout, StateName, - #state{flight_state = {retransmit, NextTimeout}} = State0) -> - {State1, Actions} = send_handshake_flight(State0#state{flight_state = {retransmit, NextTimeout}}, - retransmit_epoch(StateName, State0)), - {Record, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions). - -send(Transport, {_, {{_,_}, _} = Socket}, Data) -> - send(Transport, Socket, Data); -send(Transport, Socket, Data) -> - dtls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Data). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% Description:This function is called by a gen_fsm when it is about -%% to terminate. It should be the opposite of Module:init/1 and do any -%% necessary cleaning up. When it returns, the gen_fsm terminates with -%% Reason. The return value is ignored. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- terminate(Reason, StateName, State) -> ssl_connection:terminate(Reason, StateName, State). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% code_change(OldVsn, StateName, State, Extra) -> {ok, StateName, NewState} -%% Description: Convert process state when code is changed -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _Extra) -> {ok, StateName, State}. @@ -631,55 +706,6 @@ format_status(Type, Data) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handle_client_hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, - #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, - renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, - session_cache = Cache, - session_cache_cb = CacheCb, - negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol, - key_algorithm = KeyExAlg, - ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) -> - - case dtls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, - ConnectionStates0, Cert, KeyExAlg}, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State0); - {Version, {Type, Session}, - ConnectionStates, Protocol0, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} -> - Protocol = case Protocol0 of - undefined -> CurrentProtocol; - _ -> Protocol0 - end, - - State = prepare_flight(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - negotiated_version = Version, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, - session = Session, - negotiated_protocol = Protocol}), - - ssl_connection:hello(internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, - State, ?MODULE) - end. - -encode_handshake_flight(Flight, Version, MaxFragmentSize, Epoch, ConnectionStates) -> - Fragments = lists:map(fun(Handshake) -> - dtls_handshake:fragment_handshake(Handshake, MaxFragmentSize) - end, Flight), - dtls_record:encode_handshake(Fragments, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates). - -encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates) -> - dtls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates). - -encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> - dtls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0). - -encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) -> - dtls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates). - -decode_alerts(Bin) -> - ssl_alert:decode(Bin). - initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, _}, User, {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) -> #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation} = SSLOptions, @@ -733,153 +759,10 @@ next_dtls_record(Data, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{ Alert end. -next_record(#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = State) when N > 0 -> - {no_record, State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}; - -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch} = CT | Rest]} - = Buffers, - connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := Epoch}} = ConnectionStates} = State) -> - CurrentRead = dtls_record:get_connection_state_by_epoch(Epoch, ConnectionStates, read), - case dtls_record:replay_detect(CT, CurrentRead) of - false -> - decode_cipher_text(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) ; - true -> - %% Ignore replayed record - next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = - Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates}) - end; -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch} | Rest]} - = Buffers, - connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}} = ConnectionStates} = State) - when Epoch > CurrentEpoch -> - %% TODO Buffer later Epoch message, drop it for now - next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = - Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates}); -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [ _ | Rest]} - = Buffers, - connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> - %% Drop old epoch message - next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = - Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates}); -next_record(#state{role = server, - socket = {Listener, {Client, _}}, - transport_cb = gen_udp} = State) -> - dtls_udp_listener:active_once(Listener, Client, self()), - {no_record, State}; -next_record(#state{role = client, - socket = {_Server, Socket}, - transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> - dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]), - {no_record, State}; -next_record(State) -> - {no_record, State}. - -next_record_if_active(State = - #state{socket_options = - #socket_options{active = false}}) -> - {no_record ,State}; - -next_record_if_active(State) -> - next_record(State). - -passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) -> - case Buffer of - <<>> -> - {Record, State} = next_record(State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - _ -> - {Record, State} = ssl_connection:read_application_data(<<>>, State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State) - end. - -next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> - next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). - -next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, - #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> - case next_record_if_active(State0) of - {no_record, State} -> - ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); - {#ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, - type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = Version} = Record, State1} -> - State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State1), - {next_state, StateName, State, - [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - {#ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch} = Record, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - {#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, - type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = _Version}, State1} = _Record when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> - {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State1, CurrentEpoch), - {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State2), - next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); - %% From FLIGHT perspective CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC is treated as a handshake - {#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, - type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - version = _Version}, State1} = _Record when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> - {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State1, CurrentEpoch), - {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State2), - next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); - {#ssl_tls{epoch = _Epoch, - version = _Version}, State1} -> - %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch - {Record, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions); - {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} - end; -next_event(connection = StateName, Record, - #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> - case Record of - #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, - type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = Version} = Record -> - State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State0), - {next_state, StateName, State, - [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch} -> - {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, - type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = _Version} when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> - {State1, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State0, CurrentEpoch), - {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); - %% From FLIGHT perspective CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC is treated as a handshake - #ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, - type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - version = _Version} when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> - {State1, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State0, CurrentEpoch), - {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); - _ -> - next_event(StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) - end; -next_event(StateName, Record, - #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> - case Record of - no_record -> - {next_state, StateName, State0, Actions}; - #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, - version = Version} = Record -> - State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State0), - {next_state, StateName, State, - [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #ssl_tls{epoch = _Epoch, - version = _Version} = _Record -> - %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch - {Record, State} = next_record(State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions); - #alert{} = Alert -> - {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} - end. +dtls_handshake_events(Packets) -> + lists:map(fun(Packet) -> + {next_event, internal, {handshake, Packet}} + end, Packets). decode_cipher_text(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [ CT | Rest]} = Buffers, connection_states = ConnStates0} = State) -> @@ -897,6 +780,176 @@ dtls_version(hello, Version, #state{role = server} = State) -> dtls_version(_,_, State) -> State. +handle_client_hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, + #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, + renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb, + negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol, + key_algorithm = KeyExAlg, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) -> + + case dtls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, + ConnectionStates0, Cert, KeyExAlg}, Renegotiation) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State0); + {Version, {Type, Session}, + ConnectionStates, Protocol0, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} -> + Protocol = case Protocol0 of + undefined -> CurrentProtocol; + _ -> Protocol0 + end, + + State = prepare_flight(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + negotiated_version = Version, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, + client_hello_version = ClientVersion, + session = Session, + negotiated_protocol = Protocol}), + + ssl_connection:hello(internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, + State, ?MODULE) + end. + + +%% raw data from socket, unpack records +handle_info({Protocol, _, _, _, Data}, StateName, + #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) -> + case next_dtls_record(Data, State0) of + {Record, State} -> + next_event(StateName, Record, State); + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), + {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}} + end; +handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, + #state{socket = Socket, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = Active}, + protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = CTs}, + close_tag = CloseTag, + negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + %% Note that as of DTLS 1.2 (TLS 1.1), + %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a + %% session not be resumed. This is a change from DTLS 1.0 to conform + %% with widespread implementation practice. + case (Active == false) andalso (CTs =/= []) of + false -> + case Version of + {254, N} when N =< 253 -> + ok; + _ -> + %% As invalidate_sessions here causes performance issues, + %% we will conform to the widespread implementation + %% practice and go aginst the spec + %%invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session) + ok + end, + ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), + {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}}; + true -> + %% Fixes non-delivery of final DTLS record in {active, once}. + %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again + %% and then receive the final message. + next_event(StateName, no_record, State) + end; + +handle_info(new_cookie_secret, StateName, + #state{protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret := Secret} = CookieInfo} = State) -> + erlang:send_after(dtls_v1:cookie_timeout(), self(), new_cookie_secret), + {next_state, StateName, State#state{protocol_specific = + CookieInfo#{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), + previous_cookie_secret => Secret}}}; +handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> + ssl_connection:StateName(info, Msg, State, ?MODULE). + +handle_state_timeout(flight_retransmission_timeout, StateName, + #state{flight_state = {retransmit, NextTimeout}} = State0) -> + {State1, Actions} = send_handshake_flight(State0#state{flight_state = {retransmit, NextTimeout}}, + retransmit_epoch(StateName, State0)), + {Record, State} = next_record(State1), + next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions). + +handle_alerts([], Result) -> + Result; +handle_alerts(_, {stop,_} = Stop) -> + Stop; +handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) -> + handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)); +handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State, _Actions}) -> + handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)). + +handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, #state{transport_cb = gen_udp, + role = Role, + ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> + case ignore_alert(Alert, State0) of + {true, State} -> + log_ignore_alert(Options#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert, Role), + {next_state, StateName, State}; + {false, State} -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) + end; +handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State). + +encode_handshake_flight(Flight, Version, MaxFragmentSize, Epoch, ConnectionStates) -> + Fragments = lists:map(fun(Handshake) -> + dtls_handshake:fragment_handshake(Handshake, MaxFragmentSize) + end, Flight), + dtls_record:encode_handshake(Fragments, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates). + +encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates) -> + dtls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates). + +decode_alerts(Bin) -> + ssl_alert:decode(Bin). + +gen_handshake(StateName, Type, Event, + #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try ssl_connection:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + malformed_handshake_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end. + +gen_info(Event, connection = StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, + malformed_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end; + +gen_info(Event, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + malformed_handshake_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end. +unprocessed_events(Events) -> + %% The first handshake event will be processed immediately + %% as it is entered first in the event queue and + %% when it is processed there will be length(Events)-1 + %% handshake events left to process before we should + %% process more TLS-records received on the socket. + erlang:length(Events)-1. + +update_handshake_history(#hello_verify_request{}, _, Hist) -> + Hist; +update_handshake_history(_, Handshake, Hist) -> + %% DTLS never needs option "v2_hello_compatible" to be true + ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hist, iolist_to_binary(Handshake), false). prepare_flight(#state{flight_buffer = Flight, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, protocol_buffers = @@ -937,67 +990,67 @@ new_timeout(N) when N =< 30 -> new_timeout(_) -> 60. -dtls_handshake_events(Packets) -> - lists:map(fun(Packet) -> - {next_event, internal, {handshake, Packet}} - end, Packets). +send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + flight_buffer = #{handshakes := Flight, + change_cipher_spec := undefined}, + negotiated_version = Version, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> + %% TODO remove hardcoded Max size + {Encoded, ConnectionStates} = + encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates0), + send(Transport, Socket, Encoded), + {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; -renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State, Actions) -> - %% Handle same way as if server requested - %% the renegotiation - %% Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), - {next_state, connection, State, - [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]}; +send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [_|_] = Flight0, + change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, + handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := []}, + negotiated_version = Version, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> + {HsBefore, ConnectionStates1} = + encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight0), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates0), + {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates} = encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates1), -renegotiate(#state{role = server} = State0, Actions) -> - HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(), - State1 = prepare_flight(State0), - {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake(HelloRequest, State1), - {Record, State} = next_record(State2), - next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions ++ MoreActions). + send(Transport, Socket, [HsBefore, EncChangeCipher]), + {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; -handle_alerts([], Result) -> - Result; -handle_alerts(_, {stop,_} = Stop) -> - Stop; -handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) -> - handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)); -handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State, _Actions}) -> - handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)). +send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [_|_] = Flight0, + change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, + handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Flight1}, + negotiated_version = Version, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> + {HsBefore, ConnectionStates1} = + encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight0), Version, 1400, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates0), + {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates2} = + encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates1), + {HsAfter, ConnectionStates} = + encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight1), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates2), + send(Transport, Socket, [HsBefore, EncChangeCipher, HsAfter]), + {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; + +send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [], + change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, + handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Flight1}, + negotiated_version = Version, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> + {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates1} = + encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates0), + {HsAfter, ConnectionStates} = + encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight1), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates1), + send(Transport, Socket, [EncChangeCipher, HsAfter]), + {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}. retransmit_epoch(_StateName, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) -> #{epoch := Epoch} = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), Epoch. -update_handshake_history(#hello_verify_request{}, _, Hist) -> - Hist; -update_handshake_history(_, Handshake, Hist) -> - %% DTLS never needs option "v2_hello_compatible" to be true - ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hist, iolist_to_binary(Handshake), false). - -unprocessed_events(Events) -> - %% The first handshake event will be processed immediately - %% as it is entered first in the event queue and - %% when it is processed there will be length(Events)-1 - %% handshake events left to process before we should - %% process more TLS-records received on the socket. - erlang:length(Events)-1. - -handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, #state{transport_cb = gen_udp, - role = Role, - ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> - case ignore_alert(Alert, State0) of - {true, State} -> - log_ignore_alert(Options#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert, Role), - {next_state, StateName, State}; - {false, State} -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) - end; -handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State). - - ignore_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL}, #state{protocol_specific = #{ignored_alerts := N, max_ignored_alerts := N}} = State) -> {false, State}; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl index 37a46b862e..1d6f0a42c8 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl @@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ %% limitations under the License. %% %% %CopyrightEnd% + +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Purpose: Help funtions for handling the DTLS (specific parts of) +%%% SSL/TLS/DTLS handshake protocol +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- -module(dtls_handshake). -include("dtls_connection.hrl"). @@ -24,15 +29,21 @@ -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). +%% Handshake handling -export([client_hello/8, client_hello/9, cookie/4, hello/4, - hello_verify_request/2, get_dtls_handshake/3, fragment_handshake/2, - handshake_bin/2, encode_handshake/3]). + hello_verify_request/2]). + +%% Handshake encoding +-export([fragment_handshake/2, encode_handshake/3]). + +%% Handshake decodeing +-export([get_dtls_handshake/3]). -type dtls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | #hello_verify_request{} | ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake(). %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Handshake handling %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec client_hello(host(), inet:port_number(), ssl_record:connection_states(), @@ -66,7 +77,8 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, Cookie, ConnectionStates, CipherSuites = ssl_handshake:available_suites(UserSuites, TLSVersion), Extensions = ssl_handshake:client_hello_extensions(TLSVersion, CipherSuites, - SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), + SslOpts, ConnectionStates, + Renegotiation), Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert), #client_hello{session_id = Id, @@ -87,11 +99,11 @@ hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, random = Random, case dtls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, SupportedVersions) of true -> handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, - Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation); + Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation); false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION) end; - hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, #ssl_options{versions = Versions} = SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) -> @@ -107,7 +119,7 @@ cookie(Key, Address, Port, #client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor)>>, Random, SessionId, CipherSuites, CompressionMethods], crypto:hmac(sha, Key, CookieData). - +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec hello_verify_request(binary(), dtls_record:dtls_version()) -> #hello_verify_request{}. %% %% Description: Creates a hello verify request message sent by server to @@ -117,11 +129,8 @@ hello_verify_request(Cookie, Version) -> #hello_verify_request{protocol_version = Version, cookie = Cookie}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - -encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, Seq) -> - {MsgType, Bin} = enc_handshake(Handshake, Version), - Len = byte_size(Bin), - [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), ?uint16(Seq), ?uint24(0), ?uint24(Len), Bin]. +%%% Handshake encoding +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- fragment_handshake(Bin, _) when is_binary(Bin)-> %% This is the change_cipher_spec not a "real handshake" but part of the flight @@ -129,10 +138,15 @@ fragment_handshake(Bin, _) when is_binary(Bin)-> fragment_handshake([MsgType, Len, Seq, _, Len, Bin], Size) -> Bins = bin_fragments(Bin, Size), handshake_fragments(MsgType, Seq, Len, Bins, []). +encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, Seq) -> + {MsgType, Bin} = enc_handshake(Handshake, Version), + Len = byte_size(Bin), + [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), ?uint16(Seq), ?uint24(0), ?uint24(Len), Bin]. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Handshake decodeing +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handshake_bin([Type, Length, Data], Seq) -> - handshake_bin(Type, Length, Seq, Data). - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec get_dtls_handshake(dtls_record:dtls_version(), binary(), #protocol_buffers{}) -> {[dtls_handshake()], #protocol_buffers{}}. @@ -147,16 +161,19 @@ get_dtls_handshake(Version, Fragment, ProtocolBuffers) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handle_client_hello(Version, #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId, - cipher_suites = CipherSuites, - compression_methods = Compressions, - random = Random, - extensions = - #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves, - signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} = HelloExt}, +handle_client_hello(Version, + #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId, + cipher_suites = CipherSuites, + compression_methods = Compressions, + random = Random, + extensions = + #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves, + signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} + = HelloExt}, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns} = SslOpts, - {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert, _}, Renegotiation) -> + {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert, _}, + Renegotiation) -> case dtls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of true -> TLSVersion = dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), @@ -164,7 +181,8 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId, ClientHashSigns, SupportedHashSigns, Cert,TLSVersion), ECCCurve = ssl_handshake:select_curve(Curves, ssl_handshake:supported_ecc(TLSVersion)), {Type, #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session1} - = ssl_handshake:select_session(SugesstedId, CipherSuites, AvailableHashSigns, Compressions, + = ssl_handshake:select_session(SugesstedId, CipherSuites, + AvailableHashSigns, Compressions, Port, Session0#session{ecc = ECCCurve}, TLSVersion, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert), case CipherSuite of @@ -190,7 +208,8 @@ handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, HelloExt, SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, HashSign) -> try ssl_handshake:handle_client_hello_extensions(dtls_record, Random, CipherSuites, HelloExt, dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), - SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of + SslOpts, Session0, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt} -> @@ -212,7 +231,7 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, end. -%%%%%%% Encodeing %%%%%%%%%%%%% +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- enc_handshake(#hello_verify_request{protocol_version = {Major, Minor}, cookie = Cookie}, _Version) -> @@ -220,7 +239,6 @@ enc_handshake(#hello_verify_request{protocol_version = {Major, Minor}, {?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), ?BYTE(CookieLength), Cookie:CookieLength/binary>>}; - enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, _Version) -> {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>}; enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, @@ -243,19 +261,29 @@ enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, ?BYTE(CookieLength), Cookie/binary, ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary, ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>}; - enc_handshake(#server_hello{} = HandshakeMsg, Version) -> {Type, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>>} = ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version), {DTLSMajor, DTLSMinor} = dtls_v1:corresponding_dtls_version({Major, Minor}), {Type, <<?BYTE(DTLSMajor), ?BYTE(DTLSMinor), Rest/binary>>}; - enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version) -> ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version)). +handshake_bin(#handshake_fragment{ + type = Type, + length = Len, + message_seq = Seq, + fragment_length = Len, + fragment_offset = 0, + fragment = Fragment}) -> + handshake_bin(Type, Len, Seq, Fragment). +handshake_bin(Type, Length, Seq, FragmentData) -> + <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), + ?UINT16(Seq), ?UINT24(0), ?UINT24(Length), + FragmentData:Length/binary>>. + bin_fragments(Bin, Size) -> bin_fragments(Bin, size(Bin), Size, 0, []). - bin_fragments(Bin, BinSize, FragSize, Offset, Fragments) -> case (BinSize - Offset - FragSize) > 0 of true -> @@ -279,7 +307,7 @@ address_to_bin({A,B,C,D}, Port) -> address_to_bin({A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H}, Port) -> <<A:16,B:16,C:16,D:16,E:16,F:16,G:16,H:16,Port:16>>. -%%%%%%% Decodeing %%%%%%%%%%%%% +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- handle_fragments(Version, FragmentData, Buffers0, Acc) -> Fragments = decode_handshake_fragments(FragmentData), @@ -322,7 +350,6 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), compression_methods = Comp_methods, extensions = DecodedExtensions }; - decode_handshake(_Version, ?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), ?UINT24(_), ?UINT24(_), ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), @@ -330,7 +357,6 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), Cookie:CookieLength/binary>>) -> #hello_verify_request{protocol_version = {Major, Minor}, cookie = Cookie}; - decode_handshake(Version, Tag, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), ?UINT24(_), ?UINT24(_), Msg/binary>>) -> %% DTLS specifics stripped @@ -370,9 +396,10 @@ reassemble(Version, #handshake_fragment{message_seq = Seq} = Fragment, end; reassemble(_, #handshake_fragment{message_seq = FragSeq} = Fragment, #protocol_buffers{dtls_handshake_next_seq = Seq, - dtls_handshake_later_fragments = LaterFragments} = Buffers0) when FragSeq > Seq-> - {more_data, - Buffers0#protocol_buffers{dtls_handshake_later_fragments = [Fragment | LaterFragments]}}; + dtls_handshake_later_fragments = LaterFragments} + = Buffers0) when FragSeq > Seq-> + {more_data, + Buffers0#protocol_buffers{dtls_handshake_later_fragments = [Fragment | LaterFragments]}}; reassemble(_, _, Buffers) -> %% Disregard fragments FragSeq < Seq {more_data, Buffers}. @@ -396,26 +423,6 @@ merge_fragment(Frag0, [Frag1 | Rest]) -> Frag -> merge_fragment(Frag, Rest) end. - -is_complete_handshake(#handshake_fragment{length = Length, fragment_length = Length}) -> - true; -is_complete_handshake(_) -> - false. - -next_fragments(LaterFragments) -> - case lists:keysort(#handshake_fragment.message_seq, LaterFragments) of - [] -> - {[], []}; - [#handshake_fragment{message_seq = Seq} | _] = Fragments -> - split_frags(Fragments, Seq, []) - end. - -split_frags([#handshake_fragment{message_seq = Seq} = Frag | Rest], Seq, Acc) -> - split_frags(Rest, Seq, [Frag | Acc]); -split_frags(Frags, _, Acc) -> - {lists:reverse(Acc), Frags}. - - %% Duplicate merge_fragments(#handshake_fragment{ fragment_offset = PreviousOffSet, @@ -486,17 +493,26 @@ merge_fragments(#handshake_fragment{ %% No merge there is a gap merge_fragments(Previous, Current) -> [Previous, Current]. - -handshake_bin(#handshake_fragment{ - type = Type, - length = Len, - message_seq = Seq, - fragment_length = Len, - fragment_offset = 0, - fragment = Fragment}) -> - handshake_bin(Type, Len, Seq, Fragment). -handshake_bin(Type, Length, Seq, FragmentData) -> - <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), - ?UINT16(Seq), ?UINT24(0), ?UINT24(Length), - FragmentData:Length/binary>>. +next_fragments(LaterFragments) -> + case lists:keysort(#handshake_fragment.message_seq, LaterFragments) of + [] -> + {[], []}; + [#handshake_fragment{message_seq = Seq} | _] = Fragments -> + split_frags(Fragments, Seq, []) + end. + +split_frags([#handshake_fragment{message_seq = Seq} = Frag | Rest], Seq, Acc) -> + split_frags(Rest, Seq, [Frag | Acc]); +split_frags(Frags, _, Acc) -> + {lists:reverse(Acc), Frags}. + +is_complete_handshake(#handshake_fragment{length = Length, fragment_length = Length}) -> + true; +is_complete_handshake(_) -> + false. + + + + + diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl index a8520717e5..2dcc6efc91 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl @@ -32,13 +32,15 @@ %% Handling of incoming data -export([get_dtls_records/2, init_connection_states/2, empty_connection_state/1]). -%% Decoding --export([decode_cipher_text/2]). +-export([save_current_connection_state/2, next_epoch/2, get_connection_state_by_epoch/3, replay_detect/2, + init_connection_state_seq/2, current_connection_state_epoch/2]). %% Encoding -export([encode_handshake/4, encode_alert_record/3, - encode_change_cipher_spec/3, encode_data/3]). --export([encode_plain_text/5]). + encode_change_cipher_spec/3, encode_data/3, encode_plain_text/5]). + +%% Decoding +-export([decode_cipher_text/2]). %% Protocol version handling -export([protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/2, @@ -46,9 +48,6 @@ is_higher/2, supported_protocol_versions/0, is_acceptable_version/2, hello_version/2]). --export([save_current_connection_state/2, next_epoch/2, get_connection_state_by_epoch/3, replay_detect/2]). - --export([init_connection_state_seq/2, current_connection_state_epoch/2]). -export_type([dtls_version/0, dtls_atom_version/0]). @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ -compile(inline). %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Handling of incoming data %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec init_connection_states(client | server, one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled) -> @@ -86,7 +85,6 @@ init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation) -> empty_connection_state(Empty) -> Empty#{epoch => undefined, replay_window => init_replay_window(?REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE)}. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec save_current_connection_state(ssl_record:connection_states(), read | write) -> ssl_record:connection_states(). @@ -137,6 +135,34 @@ set_connection_state_by_epoch(ReadState, Epoch, #{saved_read := #{epoch := Epoch States#{saved_read := ReadState}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec init_connection_state_seq(dtls_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> + ssl_record:connection_state(). +%% +%% Description: Copy the read sequence number to the write sequence number +%% This is only valid for DTLS in the first client_hello +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +init_connection_state_seq({254, _}, + #{current_read := #{epoch := 0, sequence_number := Seq}, + current_write := #{epoch := 0} = Write} = ConnnectionStates0) -> + ConnnectionStates0#{current_write => Write#{sequence_number => Seq}}; +init_connection_state_seq(_, ConnnectionStates) -> + ConnnectionStates. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------- +-spec current_connection_state_epoch(ssl_record:connection_states(), read | write) -> + integer(). +%% +%% Description: Returns the epoch the connection_state record +%% that is currently defined as the current connection state. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +current_connection_state_epoch(#{current_read := #{epoch := Epoch}}, + read) -> + Epoch; +current_connection_state_epoch(#{current_write := #{epoch := Epoch}}, + write) -> + Epoch. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec get_dtls_records(binary(), binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Given old buffer and new data from UDP/SCTP, packs up a records @@ -148,55 +174,10 @@ get_dtls_records(Data, <<>>) -> get_dtls_records(Data, Buffer) -> get_dtls_records_aux(list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), []). -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?APPLICATION_DATA),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, - Acc) -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?HANDSHAKE),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), - Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) when MajVer >= 128 -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?ALERT),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, - Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, - Acc) -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<0:1, _CT:7, ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer), - ?UINT16(Length), _/binary>>, - _Acc) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); - -get_dtls_records_aux(<<1:1, Length0:15, _/binary>>,_Acc) - when Length0 > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); - -get_dtls_records_aux(Data, Acc) -> - case size(Data) =< ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH + ?INITIAL_BYTES of - true -> - {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}; - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) - end. +%%==================================================================== +%% Encoding DTLS records +%%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec encode_handshake(iolist(), dtls_version(), integer(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> @@ -245,11 +226,19 @@ encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Epoch, Data, ConnectionStates) -> {CipherText, Write} = encode_dtls_cipher_text(Type, Version, CipherFragment, Write1), {CipherText, set_connection_state_by_epoch(Write, Epoch, ConnectionStates, write)}. +%%==================================================================== +%% Decoding +%%==================================================================== decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch} = CipherText, ConnnectionStates0) -> ReadState = get_connection_state_by_epoch(Epoch, ConnnectionStates0, read), decode_cipher_text(CipherText, ReadState, ConnnectionStates0). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Protocol version handling +%%==================================================================== + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec protocol_version(dtls_atom_version() | dtls_version()) -> dtls_version() | dtls_atom_version(). @@ -381,35 +370,6 @@ supported_protocol_versions([_|_] = Vsns) -> is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) -> lists:member(Version, Versions). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec init_connection_state_seq(dtls_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> - ssl_record:connection_state(). -%% -%% Description: Copy the read sequence number to the write sequence number -%% This is only valid for DTLS in the first client_hello -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -init_connection_state_seq({254, _}, - #{current_read := #{epoch := 0, sequence_number := Seq}, - current_write := #{epoch := 0} = Write} = ConnnectionStates0) -> - ConnnectionStates0#{current_write => Write#{sequence_number => Seq}}; -init_connection_state_seq(_, ConnnectionStates) -> - ConnnectionStates. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------- --spec current_connection_state_epoch(ssl_record:connection_states(), read | write) -> - integer(). -%% -%% Description: Returns the epoch the connection_state record -%% that is currently defined as the current connection state. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -current_connection_state_epoch(#{current_read := #{epoch := Epoch}}, - read) -> - Epoch; -current_connection_state_epoch(#{current_write := #{epoch := Epoch}}, - write) -> - Epoch. - -spec hello_version(dtls_version(), [dtls_version()]) -> dtls_version(). hello_version(Version, Versions) -> case dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version) of @@ -438,15 +398,93 @@ initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> server_verify_data => undefined }. -lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> - Ver; -lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> - lowest_list_protocol_version(lowest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). +get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?APPLICATION_DATA),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Acc) -> + get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, + version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, + fragment = Data} | Acc]); +get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?HANDSHAKE),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), + ?UINT16(Length), + Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) when MajVer >= 128 -> + get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, + version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, + fragment = Data} | Acc]); +get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?ALERT),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, + Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, + version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, + fragment = Data} | Acc]); +get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Acc) -> + get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, + fragment = Data} | Acc]); -highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> - Ver; -highest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> - highest_list_protocol_version(highest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). +get_dtls_records_aux(<<0:1, _CT:7, ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer), + ?UINT16(Length), _/binary>>, + _Acc) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); + +get_dtls_records_aux(<<1:1, Length0:15, _/binary>>,_Acc) + when Length0 > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); + +get_dtls_records_aux(Data, Acc) -> + case size(Data) =< ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH + ?INITIAL_BYTES of + true -> + {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) + end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +init_replay_window(Size) -> + #{size => Size, + top => Size, + bottom => 0, + mask => 0 bsl 64 + }. + +replay_detect(#ssl_tls{sequence_number = SequenceNumber}, #{replay_window := Window}) -> + is_replay(SequenceNumber, Window). + + +is_replay(SequenceNumber, #{bottom := Bottom}) when SequenceNumber < Bottom -> + true; +is_replay(SequenceNumber, #{size := Size, + top := Top, + bottom := Bottom, + mask := Mask}) when (SequenceNumber >= Bottom) andalso (SequenceNumber =< Top) -> + Index = (SequenceNumber rem Size), + (Index band Mask) == 1; + +is_replay(_, _) -> + false. + +update_replay_window(SequenceNumber, #{replay_window := #{size := Size, + top := Top, + bottom := Bottom, + mask := Mask0} = Window0} = ConnectionStates) -> + NoNewBits = SequenceNumber - Top, + Index = SequenceNumber rem Size, + Mask = (Mask0 bsl NoNewBits) bor Index, + Window = Window0#{top => SequenceNumber, + bottom => Bottom + NoNewBits, + mask => Mask}, + ConnectionStates#{replay_window := Window}. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_dtls_cipher_text(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Fragment, #{epoch := Epoch, sequence_number := Seq} = WriteState) -> @@ -490,6 +528,7 @@ encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Fragment, #{compression_state := CompS0, ssl_cipher:cipher(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, MAC, Fragment, TLSVersion), {CipherFragment, WriteState0#{cipher_state => CipherS1}}. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = Seq, @@ -541,6 +580,7 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, #{mac_secret := MacSecret, security_parameters := #security_parameters{mac_algorithm = MacAlg}}, @@ -549,16 +589,6 @@ calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, #{mac_secret := MacSecret, mac_hash(Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, Epoch, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment). -highest_protocol_version() -> - highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). - -lowest_protocol_version() -> - lowest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). - -sufficient_dtlsv1_2_crypto_support() -> - CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(), - proplists:get_bool(sha256, proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport)). - mac_hash({Major, Minor}, MacAlg, MacSecret, Epoch, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) -> Value = [<<?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SeqNo), ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), ?UINT16(Length)>>, @@ -568,37 +598,25 @@ mac_hash({Major, Minor}, MacAlg, MacSecret, Epoch, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment calc_aad(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Epoch, SeqNo) -> <<?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SeqNo), ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>. -init_replay_window(Size) -> - #{size => Size, - top => Size, - bottom => 0, - mask => 0 bsl 64 - }. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -replay_detect(#ssl_tls{sequence_number = SequenceNumber}, #{replay_window := Window}) -> - is_replay(SequenceNumber, Window). +lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> + Ver; +lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> + lowest_list_protocol_version(lowest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). +highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> + Ver; +highest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> + highest_list_protocol_version(highest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). -is_replay(SequenceNumber, #{bottom := Bottom}) when SequenceNumber < Bottom -> - true; -is_replay(SequenceNumber, #{size := Size, - top := Top, - bottom := Bottom, - mask := Mask}) when (SequenceNumber >= Bottom) andalso (SequenceNumber =< Top) -> - Index = (SequenceNumber rem Size), - (Index band Mask) == 1; +highest_protocol_version() -> + highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). -is_replay(_, _) -> - false. +lowest_protocol_version() -> + lowest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). + +sufficient_dtlsv1_2_crypto_support() -> + CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(), + proplists:get_bool(sha256, proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport)). -update_replay_window(SequenceNumber, #{replay_window := #{size := Size, - top := Top, - bottom := Bottom, - mask := Mask0} = Window0} = ConnectionStates) -> - NoNewBits = SequenceNumber - Top, - Index = SequenceNumber rem Size, - Mask = (Mask0 bsl NoNewBits) bor Index, - Window = Window0#{top => SequenceNumber, - bottom => Bottom + NoNewBits, - mask => Mask}, - ConnectionStates#{replay_window := Window}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl index 2146a9272e..3531cdda11 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl @@ -44,31 +44,31 @@ -export([send/2, recv/3, close/2, shutdown/2, new_user/2, get_opts/2, set_opts/2, peer_certificate/1, renegotiation/1, negotiated_protocol/1, prf/5, - connection_information/2, handle_common_event/5 + connection_information/2 ]). -%% General gen_statem state functions with extra callback argument -%% to determine if it is an SSL/TLS or DTLS gen_statem machine --export([init/4, hello/4, abbreviated/4, certify/4, cipher/4, connection/4, downgrade/4]). - -%% gen_statem callbacks --export([terminate/3, format_status/2]). - -%% --export([handle_info/3, handle_call/5, handle_session/7, ssl_config/3, - prepare_connection/2, hibernate_after/3]). - %% Alert and close handling --export([handle_own_alert/4,handle_alert/3, +-export([handle_own_alert/4, handle_alert/3, handle_normal_shutdown/3 ]). %% Data handling -export([write_application_data/3, read_application_data/2]). +%% Help functions for tls|dtls_connection.erl +-export([handle_session/7, ssl_config/3, + prepare_connection/2, hibernate_after/3]). + +%% General gen_statem state functions with extra callback argument +%% to determine if it is an SSL/TLS or DTLS gen_statem machine +-export([init/4, error/4, hello/4, abbreviated/4, certify/4, cipher/4, connection/4, downgrade/4]). + +%% gen_statem callbacks +-export([terminate/3, format_status/2]). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Setup %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API -%%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec connect(tls_connection | dtls_connection, host(), inet:port_number(), @@ -164,6 +164,16 @@ socket_control(dtls_connection = Connection, {_, Socket}, Pid, Transport, Listen {error, Reason} -> {error, Reason} end. + +start_or_recv_cancel_timer(infinity, _RecvFrom) -> + undefined; +start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom) -> + erlang:send_after(Timeout, self(), {cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}). + +%%==================================================================== +%% User events +%%==================================================================== + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec send(pid(), iodata()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. %% @@ -272,6 +282,161 @@ renegotiation(ConnectionPid) -> prf(ConnectionPid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> call(ConnectionPid, {prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}). +%%==================================================================== +%% Alert and close handling +%%==================================================================== +handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, + #state{role = Role, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket, + protocol_cb = Connection, + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> + try %% Try to tell the other side + {BinMsg, _} = + Connection:encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates), + Connection:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg) + catch _:_ -> %% Can crash if we are in a uninitialized state + ignore + end, + try %% Try to tell the local user + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = Role}), + handle_normal_shutdown(Alert,StateName, State) + catch _:_ -> + ok + end, + {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}}. + +handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, _, #state{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + protocol_cb = Connection, + start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, + tracker = Tracker, + role = Role, renegotiation = {false, first}}) -> + alert_user(Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role, Connection); + +handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, + socket_options = Opts, + transport_cb = Transport, + protocol_cb = Connection, + user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, + tracker = Tracker, + start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, role = Role}) -> + alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role, Connection). + +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, + #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, + protocol_cb = Connection, + ssl_options = SslOpts, start_or_recv_from = From, host = Host, + port = Port, session = Session, user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, + role = Role, socket_options = Opts, tracker = Tracker}) -> + invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session), + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), + StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection), + {stop, normal}; + +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, + StateName, State) -> + handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), + {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}}; + +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, + #state{role = Role, ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) -> + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), + {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}}; + +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, + #state{role = Role, + ssl_options = SslOpts, renegotiation = {true, From}, + protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}), + {Record, State1} = Connection:next_record(State0), + %% Go back to connection! + State = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State1#state{renegotiation = undefined}), + Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State); + +%% Gracefully log and ignore all other warning alerts +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName, + #state{ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, role = Role} = State0) -> + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0), + Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Data handling +%%==================================================================== +write_application_data(Data0, From, + #state{socket = Socket, + negotiated_version = Version, + protocol_cb = Connection, + transport_cb = Transport, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + socket_options = SockOpts, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}} = State) -> + Data = encode_packet(Data0, SockOpts), + + case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of + true -> + Connection:renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, internal}}, + [{next_event, {call, From}, {application_data, Data0}}]); + false -> + {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = Connection:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0), + Result = Connection:send(Transport, Socket, Msgs), + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(connection, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, + [{reply, From, Result}]) + end. + +read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, + socket = Socket, + protocol_cb = Connection, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket_options = SOpts, + bytes_to_read = BytesToRead, + start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, + timer = Timer, + user_data_buffer = Buffer0, + tracker = Tracker} = State0) -> + Buffer1 = if + Buffer0 =:= <<>> -> Data; + Data =:= <<>> -> Buffer0; + true -> <<Buffer0/binary, Data/binary>> + end, + case get_data(SOpts, BytesToRead, Buffer1) of + {ok, ClientData, Buffer} -> % Send data + SocketOpt = deliver_app_data(Transport, Socket, SOpts, + ClientData, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), + cancel_timer(Timer), + State = State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer, + start_or_recv_from = undefined, + timer = undefined, + bytes_to_read = undefined, + socket_options = SocketOpt + }, + if + SocketOpt#socket_options.active =:= false; Buffer =:= <<>> -> + %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv + %% Active and empty, get more data + Connection:next_record_if_active(State); + true -> %% We have more data + read_application_data(<<>>, State) + end; + {more, Buffer} -> % no reply, we need more data + Connection:next_record(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); + {passive, Buffer} -> + Connection:next_record_if_active(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); + {error,_Reason} -> %% Invalid packet in packet mode + deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Buffer1, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), + {stop, normal, State0} + end. +%%==================================================================== +%% Help functions for tls|dtls_connection.erl +%%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec handle_session(#server_hello{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(), _,_, #state{}) -> @@ -340,7 +505,7 @@ ssl_config(Opts, Role, State) -> ssl_options = Opts}. %%==================================================================== -%% gen_statem state functions +%% gen_statem general state functions with connection cb argument %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec init(gen_statem:event_type(), @@ -371,6 +536,15 @@ init(_Type, _Event, _State, _Connection) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec error(gen_statem:event_type(), + {start, timeout()} | term(), #state{}, + tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +error({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> + handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec hello(gen_statem:event_type(), #hello_request{} | #server_hello{} | term(), #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> @@ -393,7 +567,6 @@ hello(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- abbreviated({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); - abbreviated(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #state{role = server, negotiated_version = Version, @@ -414,7 +587,6 @@ abbreviated(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; - abbreviated(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #state{role = client, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0, session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}, @@ -434,7 +606,6 @@ abbreviated(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; - %% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec %% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation abbreviated(internal, #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, @@ -475,7 +646,6 @@ certify(internal, #certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, State, _) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); - certify(internal, #certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, #state{role = server, ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer, @@ -484,7 +654,6 @@ certify(internal, #certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = false}), Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State); - certify(internal, #certificate{}, #state{role = server, negotiated_version = Version, @@ -492,7 +661,6 @@ certify(internal, #certificate{}, State, _) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, unrequested_certificate), handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); - certify(internal, #certificate{} = Cert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, role = Role, @@ -509,7 +677,6 @@ certify(internal, #certificate{} = Cert, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end; - certify(internal, #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, #state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version, key_algorithm = Alg, @@ -542,7 +709,6 @@ certify(internal, #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end end; - certify(internal, #certificate_request{} = CertRequest, #state{session = #session{own_certificate = Cert}, role = client, @@ -556,7 +722,6 @@ certify(internal, #certificate_request{} = CertRequest, Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State#state{cert_hashsign_algorithm = NegotiatedHashSign}) end; - %% PSK and RSA_PSK might bypass the Server-Key-Exchange certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, #state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined}, @@ -575,7 +740,6 @@ certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, State0#state{premaster_secret = PremasterSecret}), client_certify_and_key_exchange(State, Connection) end; - certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, #state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}, @@ -596,7 +760,6 @@ certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, State0#state{premaster_secret = RSAPremasterSecret}), client_certify_and_key_exchange(State, Connection) end; - %% Master secret was determined with help of server-key exchange msg certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, #state{session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} = Session, @@ -612,7 +775,6 @@ certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; - %% Master secret is calculated from premaster_secret certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, #state{session = Session0, @@ -630,7 +792,6 @@ certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; - certify(internal = Type, #client_key_exchange{} = Msg, #state{role = server, client_certificate_requested = true, @@ -638,7 +799,6 @@ certify(internal = Type, #client_key_exchange{} = Msg, Connection) -> %% We expect a certificate here handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); - certify(internal, #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, State = #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg, negotiated_version = Version}, Connection) -> try @@ -648,7 +808,6 @@ certify(internal, #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end; - certify(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). @@ -660,10 +819,8 @@ certify(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); - cipher(info, Msg, State, _) -> handle_info(Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); - cipher(internal, #certificate_verify{signature = Signature, hashsign_algorithm = CertHashSign}, #state{role = server, @@ -686,14 +843,12 @@ cipher(internal, #certificate_verify{signature = Signature, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; - %% client must send a next protocol message if we are expecting it cipher(internal, #finished{}, #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true, negotiated_protocol = undefined, negotiated_version = Version} = State0, _Connection) -> handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0); - cipher(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #state{negotiated_version = Version, host = Host, @@ -716,7 +871,6 @@ cipher(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end; - %% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec %% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation cipher(internal, #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, @@ -958,25 +1112,21 @@ handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, econnaborted}, StateName, alert_user(Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role, Connection), {stop, normal, State}; - handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, error_tag = ErrorTag} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Reason]), error_logger:info_report(Report), handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), {stop, normal, State}; - handle_info({'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, _}, _, State = #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid}}) -> {stop, normal, State}; - %%% So that terminate will be run when supervisor issues shutdown handle_info({'EXIT', _Sup, shutdown}, _StateName, State) -> {stop, shutdown, State}; handle_info({'EXIT', Socket, normal}, _StateName, #state{socket = Socket} = State) -> %% Handle as transport close" {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State}; - handle_info(allow_renegotiate, StateName, State) -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{allow_renegotiate = true}}; @@ -984,13 +1134,11 @@ handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, StartFrom}, StateName, #state{renegotiation = {false, first}} = State) when StateName =/= connection -> {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, user_timeout}, {reply, StartFrom, {error, timeout}}, State#state{timer = undefined}}; - handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}, StateName, #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State) when RecvFrom =/= undefined -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, bytes_to_read = undefined, timer = undefined}, [{reply, RecvFrom, {error, timeout}}]}; - handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, _RecvFrom}, StateName, State) -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{timer = undefined}}; @@ -999,9 +1147,9 @@ handle_info(Msg, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, error_tag = Tag} = State) -> error_logger:info_report(Report), {next_state, StateName, State}. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% gen_statem callbacks -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%==================================================================== +%% general gen_statem callbacks +%%==================================================================== terminate(_, _, #state{terminated = true}) -> %% Happens when user closes the connection using ssl:close/1 %% we want to guarantee that Transport:close has been called @@ -1010,7 +1158,6 @@ terminate(_, _, #state{terminated = true}) -> %% returning. In both cases terminate has been run manually %% before run by gen_statem which will end up here ok; - terminate({shutdown, transport_closed} = Reason, _StateName, #state{protocol_cb = Connection, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> @@ -1037,7 +1184,6 @@ terminate(Reason, connection, #state{negotiated_version = Version, {BinAlert, ConnectionStates} = terminate_alert(Reason, Version, ConnectionStates0, Connection), Connection:send(Transport, Socket, BinAlert), Connection:close(Reason, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check); - terminate(Reason, _StateName, #state{transport_cb = Transport, protocol_cb = Connection, socket = Socket } = State) -> @@ -1071,119 +1217,6 @@ format_status(terminate, [_, StateName, State]) -> }}]}]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%%% -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -write_application_data(Data0, From, - #state{socket = Socket, - negotiated_version = Version, - protocol_cb = Connection, - transport_cb = Transport, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - socket_options = SockOpts, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}} = State) -> - Data = encode_packet(Data0, SockOpts), - - case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of - true -> - Connection:renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, internal}}, - [{next_event, {call, From}, {application_data, Data0}}]); - false -> - {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = Connection:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0), - Result = Connection:send(Transport, Socket, Msgs), - ssl_connection:hibernate_after(connection, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, - [{reply, From, Result}]) - end. - -read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, - socket = Socket, - protocol_cb = Connection, - transport_cb = Transport, - socket_options = SOpts, - bytes_to_read = BytesToRead, - start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, - timer = Timer, - user_data_buffer = Buffer0, - tracker = Tracker} = State0) -> - Buffer1 = if - Buffer0 =:= <<>> -> Data; - Data =:= <<>> -> Buffer0; - true -> <<Buffer0/binary, Data/binary>> - end, - case get_data(SOpts, BytesToRead, Buffer1) of - {ok, ClientData, Buffer} -> % Send data - SocketOpt = deliver_app_data(Transport, Socket, SOpts, - ClientData, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), - cancel_timer(Timer), - State = State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer, - start_or_recv_from = undefined, - timer = undefined, - bytes_to_read = undefined, - socket_options = SocketOpt - }, - if - SocketOpt#socket_options.active =:= false; Buffer =:= <<>> -> - %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv - %% Active and empty, get more data - Connection:next_record_if_active(State); - true -> %% We have more data - read_application_data(<<>>, State) - end; - {more, Buffer} -> % no reply, we need more data - Connection:next_record(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); - {passive, Buffer} -> - Connection:next_record_if_active(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); - {error,_Reason} -> %% Invalid packet in packet mode - deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Buffer1, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), - {stop, normal, State0} - end. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%%% -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, - #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, - protocol_cb = Connection, - ssl_options = SslOpts, start_or_recv_from = From, host = Host, - port = Port, session = Session, user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, - role = Role, socket_options = Opts, tracker = Tracker}) -> - invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session), - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), - StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), - alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection), - {stop, normal}; - -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, - StateName, State) -> - handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}}; - -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, - #state{role = Role, ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), - handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}}; - -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, - #state{role = Role, - ssl_options = SslOpts, renegotiation = {true, From}, - protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), - gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}), - {Record, State1} = Connection:next_record(State0), - %% Go back to connection! - State = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State1#state{renegotiation = undefined}), - Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State); - -%% Gracefully log and ignore all other warning alerts -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName, - #state{ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, role = Role} = State0) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0), - Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- connection_info(#state{sni_hostname = SNIHostname, @@ -1300,7 +1333,6 @@ handle_peer_cert_key(client, _, ECDHKey = public_key:generate_key(PublicKeyParams), PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(PublicKey, ECDHKey), master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey}); - %% We do currently not support cipher suites that use fixed DH. %% If we want to implement that the following clause can be used %% to extract DH parameters form cert. @@ -1320,7 +1352,6 @@ certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client, = State, Connection) -> Certificate = ssl_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client), Connection:queue_handshake(Certificate, State); - certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State, _) -> State. @@ -1370,10 +1401,26 @@ server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) -> request_client_cert(State2, Connection). certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS}, - #state{private_key = Key} = State, Connection) -> - PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key), + #state{private_key = Key, client_hello_version = {Major, Minor} = Version} = State, Connection) -> + FakeSecret = make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa), + %% Countermeasure for Bleichenbacher attack always provide some kind of premaster secret + %% and fail handshake later.RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1. + PremasterSecret = + try ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key) of + Secret when erlang:byte_size(Secret) == ?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES -> + case Secret of + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>> -> %% Correct + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>>; + <<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(_), Rest/binary>> -> %% Version mismatch + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>> + end; + _ -> %% erlang:byte_size(Secret) =/= ?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES + FakeSecret + catch + #alert{description = ?DECRYPT_ERROR} -> + FakeSecret + end, calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); - certify_client_key_exchange(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey}, #state{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} = State, @@ -1385,14 +1432,12 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientP #state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey} = State, Connection) -> PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ClientPublicEcDhPoint}, ECDHKey), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); - certify_client_key_exchange(#client_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State0, Connection) -> PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, PSKLookup), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher); - certify_client_key_exchange(#client_dhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, #state{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}, @@ -1409,7 +1454,6 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_rsa_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, Connection) -> PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, Key, PSKLookup), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher); - certify_client_key_exchange(#client_srp_public{} = ClientKey, #state{srp_params = Params, srp_keys = Key @@ -1423,7 +1467,6 @@ certify_server(#state{key_algorithm = Algo} = State, _) when Algo == dh_anon; Algo == dhe_psk; Algo == srp_anon -> State; - certify_server(#state{cert_db = CertDbHandle, cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert}} = State, Connection) -> @@ -1457,7 +1500,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, PrivateKey}), State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys}; - key_exchange(#state{role = server, private_key = Key, key_algorithm = Algo} = State, _) when Algo == ecdh_ecdsa; Algo == ecdh_rsa -> State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Key}; @@ -1483,7 +1525,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, PrivateKey}), State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys}; - key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State, _) -> State; @@ -1504,7 +1545,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); - key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint}, hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, @@ -1526,7 +1566,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk, PrivateKey}), State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys}; - key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State, _) -> State; @@ -1547,7 +1586,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); - key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = LookupFun}, hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, @@ -1578,7 +1616,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), State#state{srp_params = SrpParams, srp_keys = Keys}; - key_exchange(#state{role = client, key_algorithm = rsa, public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, @@ -1586,7 +1623,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client, premaster_secret = PremasterSecret} = State0, Connection) -> Msg = rsa_key_exchange(ssl:tls_version(Version), PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); - key_exchange(#state{role = client, key_algorithm = Algorithm, negotiated_version = Version, @@ -1607,7 +1643,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client, Algorithm == ecdh_anon -> Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version), {ecdh, Keys}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); - key_exchange(#state{role = client, ssl_options = SslOpts, key_algorithm = psk, @@ -1615,7 +1650,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client, Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version), {psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); - key_exchange(#state{role = client, ssl_options = SslOpts, key_algorithm = dhe_psk, @@ -1635,7 +1669,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client, Msg = rsa_psk_key_exchange(ssl:tls_version(Version), SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); - key_exchange(#state{role = client, key_algorithm = Algorithm, negotiated_version = Version, @@ -2005,10 +2038,7 @@ set_socket_opts(_,_, _, [{active, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) -> set_socket_opts(ConnectionCb, Transport, Socket, [Opt | Opts], SockOpts, Other) -> set_socket_opts(ConnectionCb, Transport, Socket, Opts, SockOpts, [Opt | Other]). -start_or_recv_cancel_timer(infinity, _RecvFrom) -> - undefined; -start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom) -> - erlang:send_after(Timeout, self(), {cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}). + hibernate_after(connection = StateName, #state{ssl_options=#ssl_options{hibernate_after = HibernateAfter}} = State, @@ -2393,45 +2423,6 @@ log_alert(true, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, Alert) -> log_alert(false, _, _, _, _) -> ok. -handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, - #state{role = Role, - transport_cb = Transport, - socket = Socket, - protocol_cb = Connection, - connection_states = ConnectionStates, - ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> - try %% Try to tell the other side - {BinMsg, _} = - Connection:encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates), - Connection:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg) - catch _:_ -> %% Can crash if we are in a uninitialized state - ignore - end, - try %% Try to tell the local user - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = Role}), - handle_normal_shutdown(Alert,StateName, State) - catch _:_ -> - ok - end, - {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}}. - -handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, _, #state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - protocol_cb = Connection, - start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, - tracker = Tracker, - role = Role, renegotiation = {false, first}}) -> - alert_user(Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role, Connection); - -handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, - socket_options = Opts, - transport_cb = Transport, - protocol_cb = Connection, - user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, - tracker = Tracker, - start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, role = Role}) -> - alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role, Connection). - invalidate_session(client, Host, Port, Session) -> ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Host, Port, Session); invalidate_session(server, _, Port, Session) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl index 3e26f67de1..f9d2149170 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ session_cache_cb :: atom(), crl_db :: term(), negotiated_version :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined', + client_hello_version :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined', client_certificate_requested = false :: boolean(), key_algorithm :: ssl_cipher:key_algo(), hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined}, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index b47a11dc0d..17bc407d26 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -44,46 +44,44 @@ #client_key_exchange{} | #finished{} | #certificate_verify{} | #hello_request{} | #next_protocol{}. -%% Handshake messages +%% Create handshake messages -export([hello_request/0, server_hello/4, server_hello_done/0, - certificate/4, certificate_request/5, key_exchange/3, + certificate/4, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_request/5, key_exchange/3, finished/5, next_protocol/1]). %% Handle handshake messages --export([certify/7, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5, +-export([certify/7, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5, master_secret/4, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6, - init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/3, verify_server_key/5 + init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/3, verify_server_key/5, + select_version/3 ]). -%% Encode/Decode +%% Encode -export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/1, - encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1, - decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1, + encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1]). +%% Decode +-export([decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1, decode_server_key/3, decode_client_key/3, decode_suites/2 ]). %% Cipher suites handling --export([available_suites/2, available_signature_algs/2, cipher_suites/2, - select_session/11, supported_ecc/1, available_signature_algs/4]). +-export([available_suites/2, available_signature_algs/2, available_signature_algs/4, + cipher_suites/2, prf/6, select_session/11, supported_ecc/1, + premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]). %% Extensions handling -export([client_hello_extensions/5, handle_client_hello_extensions/9, %% Returns server hello extensions - handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3 + handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3, + select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5, + select_hashsign_algs/3 ]). -%% MISC --export([select_version/3, prf/6, select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5, - select_hashsign_algs/3, - premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]). - %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Create handshake messages %%==================================================================== -%% ---------- Create handshake messages ---------- - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec hello_request() -> #hello_request{}. %% @@ -119,31 +117,6 @@ server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Extensions) -> server_hello_done() -> #server_hello_done{}. -client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, - #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, - eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> - {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = - case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of - true -> - client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs); - false -> - {undefined, undefined} - end, - SRP = srp_user(SslOpts), - - #hello_extensions{ - renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client, - ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), - srp = SRP, - signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version), - ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, - elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, - alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation), - next_protocol_negotiation = - encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, - Renegotiation), - sni = sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certificate(der_cert(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), client | server) -> #certificate{} | #alert{}. %% @@ -171,14 +144,6 @@ certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) -> end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}. -%% -%% Description: Creates a next protocol message -%%------------------------------------------------------------------- -next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) -> - #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec client_certificate_verify(undefined | der_cert(), binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(), public_key:private_key(), ssl_handshake_history()) -> @@ -328,22 +293,51 @@ key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, {PublicKey, _}, finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {Handshake, _}) -> % use the current handshake #finished{verify_data = calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake)}. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}. +%% +%% Description: Creates a next protocol message +%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) -> + #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}. -%% ---------- Handle handshake messages ---------- +%%==================================================================== +%% Handle handshake messages +%%==================================================================== +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), #ssl_options{}, term(), + client | server, inet:hostname() | inet:ip_address()) -> {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}. +%% +%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, + Opts, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) -> -verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams, - signature = Signature}, - HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, - ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) -> - #{security_parameters := SecParams} = - ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, - server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, - Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, - <<ClientRandom/binary, - ServerRandom/binary, - EncParams/binary>>), - verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo). + ServerName = server_name(Opts#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role), + [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs, + try + {TrustedCert, CertPath} = + ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, + Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain), + ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role, + CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerName, + Opts#ssl_options.crl_check, CRLDbHandle, CertPath), + case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, + CertPath, + [{max_path_length, Opts#ssl_options.depth}, + {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of + {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> + {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; + {error, Reason} -> + path_validation_alert(Reason) + end + catch + error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> + %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason}); + error:OtherReason -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {unexpected_error, OtherReason}) + end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(), @@ -386,43 +380,55 @@ verify_signature(_, Hash, {HashAlgo, _SignAlg}, Signature, {?'id-ecPublicKey', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) -> public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}). - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), #ssl_options{}, term(), - client | server, inet:hostname() | inet:ip_address()) -> {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}. +-spec master_secret(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(), + client | server) -> {binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()} | #alert{}. %% -%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, - Opts, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) -> +%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys, +%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update +%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails. +%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret}, + ConnectionStates, Role) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParams} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams, + ConnectionStates, Role) + catch + exit:_ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure) + end; - ServerName = server_name(Opts#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role), - [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs, - try - {TrustedCert, CertPath} = - ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, - Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain), - ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role, - CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerName, - Opts#ssl_options.crl_check, CRLDbHandle, CertPath), - case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, - CertPath, - [{max_path_length, Opts#ssl_options.depth}, - {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of - {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> - {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; - {error, Reason} -> - path_validation_alert(Reason) - end +master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParams} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + + #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo, + client_random = ClientRandom, + server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, + try master_secret(Version, + calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret, + ClientRandom, ServerRandom), + SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role) catch - error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> - %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason}); - error:OtherReason -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {unexpected_error, OtherReason}) + exit:_ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary(). +%% +%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) -> + MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value), + SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value), + <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>; + +server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) -> + crypto:hash(Hash, Value). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec verify_connection(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #finished{}, client | server, integer(), binary(), ssl_handshake_history()) -> verified | #alert{}. %% @@ -469,275 +475,31 @@ update_handshake_history(Handshake, % special-case SSL2 client hello update_handshake_history({Handshake0, _Prev}, Data, _) -> {[Data|Handshake0], Handshake0}. -%% %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -spec decrypt_premaster_secret(binary(), #'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> binary(). - -%% %% -%% %% Description: Public key decryption using the private key. -%% %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) -> -%% try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey, -%% [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) -%% catch -%% _:_ -> -%% throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)) -%% end. - -premaster_secret(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params) -> - try - public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params) - catch - error:computation_failed -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end; -premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}) -> - try - crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base]) - catch - error:computation_failed -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end; -premaster_secret(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, ServerKey, #srp_user{prime = Prime, - verifier = Verifier}) -> - case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of - error -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); - PremasterSecret -> - PremasterSecret - end; -premaster_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator, srp_s = Salt, srp_b = Public}, - ClientKeys, {Username, Password}) -> - case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of - ok -> - DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]), - case crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of - error -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); - PremasterSecret -> - PremasterSecret - end; - _ -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end; -premaster_secret(#client_rsa_psk_identity{ - identity = PSKIdentity, - exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = EncPMS} - }, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key, PSKLookup) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key), - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret); -premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{ - hint = IdentityHint, - dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_y = PublicDhKey} = Params}, - PrivateDhKey, - LookupFun) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params), - psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret); -premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) -> - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret). - -premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{ - identity = PSKIdentity, - dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateKey, Params), - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret). -premaster_secret(#client_psk_identity{identity = PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) -> - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup); -premaster_secret({psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) -> - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup); -premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{} = ECPoint, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ECDHKeys) -> - public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys); -premaster_secret(EncSecret, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = RSAPrivateKey) -> - try public_key:decrypt_private(EncSecret, RSAPrivateKey, - [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) - catch - _:_ -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)) - end. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary(). -%% -%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) -> - MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value), - SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value), - <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>; - -server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) -> - crypto:hash(Hash, Value). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), non_neg_integer(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) -> - {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}. -%% -%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) -> - {error, undefined}; -prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> - {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}. - - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{} | undefined, undefined | binary(), - atom(), [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {atom(), atom()} | undefined | #alert{}. - -%% -%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms hello extension (server) -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_hashsign(_, undefined, _, _, _Version) -> - {null, anon}; -%% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have -%% negotiated a lower version. -select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, - undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); -select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, - {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, - signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = - TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - - Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), - SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), - - case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign, - SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); - (_) -> - false - end, HashSigns) of - [] -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); - [HashSign | _] -> - HashSign - end; -select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) -> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, binary(), - [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {atom(), atom()} | #alert{}. - -%% -%% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client) -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, undefined, _, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - %% There client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail - %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is - %% no certificate to verify. - {undefined, undefined}; - -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, - certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, - {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, - signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = - TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - - Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), - SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), - - case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of - true -> - case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); - (_) -> - false - end, HashSigns) of - [] -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); - [HashSign | _] -> - HashSign - end; - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm) - end; -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) -> - select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {atom(), atom()}. - -%% Description: For TLS 1.2 hash function and signature algorithm pairs can be -%% negotiated with the signature_algorithms extension, -%% for previous versions always use appropriate defaults. -%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1. Signature Algorithms -%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the -%% server MUST do the following: (e.i defaults for TLS 1.2) -%% -%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA, -%% DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had -%% sent the value {sha1,rsa}. -%% -%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS, -%% DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}. -%% -%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA, -%% ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_hashsign_algs(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso - Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - HashSign; -select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - {sha, rsa}; -select_hashsign_algs(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) -> - {sha, ecdsa}; -select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) -> - {md5sha, rsa}; -select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) -> - {sha, dsa}. - - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec master_secret(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(), - client | server) -> {binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()} | #alert{}. -%% -%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys, -%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update -%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails. -%%------------------------------------------------------------------- -master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret}, - ConnectionStates, Role) -> - #{security_parameters := SecParams} = - ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams, - ConnectionStates, Role) - catch - exit:_ -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure) - end; - -master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) -> +verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams, + signature = Signature}, + HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, + ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) -> #{security_parameters := SecParams} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - - #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo, - client_random = ClientRandom, + #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, - try master_secret(Version, - calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret, - ClientRandom, ServerRandom), - SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role) - catch - exit:_ -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure) - end. + Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, + <<ClientRandom/binary, + ServerRandom/binary, + EncParams/binary>>), + verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo). + +select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) -> + do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Encode handshake +%%==================================================================== -%%-------------Encode/Decode -------------------------------- encode_handshake(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, _Version) -> PaddingLength = 32 - ((byte_size(SelectedProtocol) + 2) rem 32), {?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE((byte_size(SelectedProtocol))), SelectedProtocol/binary, ?BYTE(PaddingLength), 0:(PaddingLength * 8)>>}; - encode_handshake(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, @@ -859,70 +621,6 @@ encode_hello_extensions([#sni{hostname = Hostname} | Rest], Acc) -> ?UINT16(HostLen), HostnameBin/binary, Acc/binary>>). -enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, - ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) -> - EncParams = encode_server_key(Params), - case HashAlgo of - null -> - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = EncParams, - hashsign = {null, anon}, - signature = <<>>}; - _ -> - Hash = - server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary, - ServerRandom/binary, - EncParams/binary>>), - Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = EncParams, - hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, - signature = Signature} - end. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - #encrypted_premaster_secret{} - | #client_diffie_hellman_public{} - | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{} - | #client_psk_identity{} - | #client_dhe_psk_identity{} - | #client_rsa_psk_identity{} - | #client_srp_public{}. -%% -%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) -> - dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - #server_key_params{}. -%% -%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) -> - dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). - -%% -%% Description: Encode and decode functions for ALPN extension data. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - -%% While the RFC opens the door to allow ALPN during renegotiation, in practice -%% this does not work and it is recommended to ignore any ALPN extension during -%% renegotiation, as done here. -encode_alpn(_, true) -> - undefined; -encode_alpn(undefined, _) -> - undefined; -encode_alpn(Protocols, _) -> - #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}. - -decode_alpn(undefined) -> - undefined; -decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) -> - decode_protocols(Data, []). - encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) -> undefined; encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, false) -> @@ -936,6 +634,10 @@ encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(undefined) -> encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(Protocols) -> #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}. +%%==================================================================== +%% Decode handshake +%%==================================================================== + decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) -> #hello_request{}; decode_handshake(_, ?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE(SelectedProtocolLength), @@ -968,7 +670,6 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:3 cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, compression_method = Comp_method, extensions = HelloExtensions}; - decode_handshake(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>) -> #certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)}; decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys) -> @@ -1015,66 +716,29 @@ decode_hello_extensions({client, <<?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>}) decode_hello_extensions(Extensions) -> dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, #hello_extensions{}). -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, - ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> - Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -%% ECParameters with named_curve -%% TODO: explicit curve -dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID), - ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary, - _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> - Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)}, - public = ECPoint}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - KeyExchange, Version) - when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK -> - Params = #server_psk_params{ - hint = PskIdentityHint}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary, - ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, - ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) -> - DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, - Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{ - hint = IdentityHint, - dh_params = DHParams}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, - ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary, - ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) -> - Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + #server_key_params{}. +%% +%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) -> + dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + #encrypted_premaster_secret{} + | #client_diffie_hellman_public{} + | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{} + | #client_psk_identity{} + | #client_dhe_psk_identity{} + | #client_rsa_psk_identity{} + | #client_srp_public{}. +%% +%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) -> + dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decode_suites('2_bytes'|'3_bytes', binary()) -> list(). @@ -1086,7 +750,9 @@ decode_suites('2_bytes', Dec) -> decode_suites('3_bytes', Dec) -> from_3bytes(Dec). -%%-------------Cipeher suite handling -------------------------------- +%%==================================================================== +%% Cipher suite handling +%%==================================================================== available_suites(UserSuites, Version) -> lists:filtermap(fun(Suite) -> @@ -1099,60 +765,37 @@ available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) -> available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, Curve) -> Suites = available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve), filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, []). -filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) -> - lists:reverse(Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, - Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> - do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); - -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, - Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == srp_rsa; - KeyExchange == rsa_psk -> - do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when - KeyExchange == dhe_dss; - KeyExchange == srp_dss -> - do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when - KeyExchange == dh_dss; - KeyExchange == dh_rsa; - KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa -> - %% Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature - %% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names - %% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical. - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when - KeyExchange == dh_anon; - KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; - KeyExchange == srp_anon; - KeyExchange == psk; - KeyExchange == dhe_psk -> - %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]). -do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) -> - case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of - true -> - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); - false -> - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) - end. - -unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) -> - ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites(); -unavailable_ecc_suites(_) -> - []. +available_signature_algs(undefined, _) -> + undefined; +available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} -> + #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = SupportedHashSigns}; +available_signature_algs(_, _) -> + undefined. +available_signature_algs(undefined, SupportedHashSigns, _, Version) when + Version >= {3,3} -> + SupportedHashSigns; +available_signature_algs(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, SupportedHashSigns, + _, Version) when Version >= {3,3} -> + sets:to_list(sets:intersection(sets:from_list(ClientHashSigns), + sets:from_list(SupportedHashSigns))); +available_signature_algs(_, _, _, _) -> + undefined. cipher_suites(Suites, false) -> [?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV | Suites]; cipher_suites(Suites, true) -> Suites. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), non_neg_integer(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) -> + {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}. +%% +%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) -> + {error, undefined}; +prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> + {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}. select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve} = Session, Version, @@ -1173,68 +816,109 @@ select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, {resumed, Resumed} end. -%% Deprecated? supported_ecc({Major, Minor}) when ((Major == 3) and (Minor >= 1)) orelse (Major > 3) -> Curves = tls_v1:ecc_curves(Minor), #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = Curves}; supported_ecc(_) -> #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = []}. -%%-------------certificate handling -------------------------------- - -certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 -> - case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa, - proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of - true -> - <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; - false -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>> +premaster_secret(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params) -> + try + public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params) + catch + error:computation_failed -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) + end; +premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}) -> + try + crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base]) + catch + error:computation_failed -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) end; +premaster_secret(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, ServerKey, #srp_user{prime = Prime, + verifier = Verifier}) -> + case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of + error -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); + PremasterSecret -> + PremasterSecret + end; +premaster_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator, srp_s = Salt, srp_b = Public}, + ClientKeys, {Username, Password}) -> + case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of + ok -> + DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]), + case crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of + error -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); + PremasterSecret -> + PremasterSecret + end; + _ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) + end; +premaster_secret(#client_rsa_psk_identity{ + identity = PSKIdentity, + exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = EncPMS} + }, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key, PSKLookup) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key), + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret); +premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{ + hint = IdentityHint, + dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_y = PublicDhKey} = Params}, + PrivateDhKey, + LookupFun) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params), + psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret); +premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) -> + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret). -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa; - KeyExchange == dh_rsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; - KeyExchange == dhe_dss; - KeyExchange == srp_dss -> - <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> - <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types(_, _) -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>. - -certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> - Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), - Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) -> - OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject, - DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp), - DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin), - <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>> - end, - list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]). - -certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) when is_reference(CertDbRef) -> - ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref == CertDbRef -> - [Cert | Acc]; - (_, Acc) -> - Acc - end, - ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle); -certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) -> - %% Cache disabled, Ref contains data - lists:foldl(fun({decoded, {_Key,Cert}}, Acc) -> [Cert | Acc] end, - [], CertDbData). - +premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{ + identity = PSKIdentity, + dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateKey, Params), + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret). +premaster_secret(#client_psk_identity{identity = PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) -> + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup); +premaster_secret({psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) -> + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup); +premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{} = ECPoint, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ECDHKeys) -> + public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys); +premaster_secret(EncSecret, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = RSAPrivateKey) -> + try public_key:decrypt_private(EncSecret, RSAPrivateKey, + [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) + catch + _:_ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)) + end. +%%==================================================================== +%% Extensions handling +%%==================================================================== +client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, + #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, + eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> + {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = + case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of + true -> + client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs); + false -> + {undefined, undefined} + end, + SRP = srp_user(SslOpts), -%%-------------Extension handling -------------------------------- + #hello_extensions{ + renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client, + ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), + srp = SRP, + signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version), + ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, + elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, + alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation), + next_protocol_negotiation = + encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, + Renegotiation), + sni = sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}. handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, ClientCipherSuites, #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info, @@ -1311,231 +995,209 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, too_many_protocols_in_server_hello) end. -select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) -> - do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions). - -do_select_version(_, ClientVersion, []) -> - ClientVersion; -do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions]) -> - case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of - true -> - %% Version too high for client - keep looking - do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions); - false -> - %% Version ok for client - look for a higher - do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, Version) - end. -%% -do_select_version(_, _, [], GoodVersion) -> - GoodVersion; -do_select_version( - RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions], GoodVersion) -> - BetterVersion = - case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of - true -> - %% Version too high for client - GoodVersion; - false -> - %% Version ok for client - case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, GoodVersion) of - true -> - %% Use higher version - Version; - false -> - GoodVersion - end - end, - do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, BetterVersion). +select_curve(Client, Server) -> + select_curve(Client, Server, false). -renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}; -renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of - true -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}; - false -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} - end; -renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of - true -> - Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data}; - false -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} +select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves}, + #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves}, + ServerOrder) -> + case ServerOrder of + false -> + select_shared_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves); + true -> + select_shared_curve(ServerCurves, ClientCurves) end; +select_curve(undefined, _, _) -> + %% Client did not send ECC extension use default curve if + %% ECC cipher is negotiated + {namedCurve, ?secp256r1}. -renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of - true -> - CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), - SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState), - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>}; - false -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} - end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{} | undefined, undefined | binary(), + atom(), [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + {atom(), atom()} | undefined | #alert{}. -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, - ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> - {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; +%% +%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms hello extension (server) +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +select_hashsign(_, undefined, _, _, _Version) -> + {null, anon}; +%% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have +%% negotiated a lower version. +select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, + undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> + select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); +select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, + {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, + signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = + TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> - case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of - true -> - {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; - false -> - {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)} + Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), + SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), + + case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign, + SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); + (_) -> + false + end, HashSigns) of + [] -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); + [HashSign | _] -> + HashSign end; +select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) -> + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, + select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, binary(), + [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + {atom(), atom()} | #alert{}. -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> - {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}; +%% +%% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client) +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, undefined, _, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> + %% There client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail + %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is + %% no certificate to verify. + {undefined, undefined}; + +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, + certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, + {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, + signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = + TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, - ConnectionStates, true, _, _) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), - SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState), - case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of + Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), + SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), + + case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of true -> - {ok, ConnectionStates}; + case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); + (_) -> + false + end, HashSigns) of + [] -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); + [HashSign | _] -> + HashSign + end; false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm) end; -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, - ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) -> - - case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of - true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); - false -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), - case Data == ClientVerify of - true -> - {ok, ConnectionStates}; - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation) - end - end; +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) -> + select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version). -handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) -> - handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation); +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + {atom(), atom()}. -handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> - case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of - true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); - false -> - handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) - end. +%% Description: For TLS 1.2 hash function and signature algorithm pairs can be +%% negotiated with the signature_algorithms extension, +%% for previous versions always use appropriate defaults. +%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1. Signature Algorithms +%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the +%% server MUST do the following: (e.i defaults for TLS 1.2) +%% +%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA, +%% DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had +%% sent the value {sha1,rsa}. +%% +%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS, +%% DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}. +%% +%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA, +%% ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}. -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - case {SecureRenegotation, maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState)} of - {_, true} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure); - {true, false} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION); - {false, false} -> - {ok, ConnectionStates} - end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +select_hashsign_algs(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso + Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> + HashSign; +select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> + {sha, rsa}; +select_hashsign_algs(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) -> + {sha, ecdsa}; +select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) -> + {md5sha, rsa}; +select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) -> + {sha, dsa}. -hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, - srp = SRP, - signature_algs = HashSigns, - ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, - elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, - alpn = ALPN, - next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation, - sni = Sni}) -> - [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns, - EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined]. srp_user(#ssl_options{srp_identity = {UserName, _}}) -> #srp{username = UserName}; srp_user(_) -> undefined. -client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) -> - CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), - case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of - true -> - EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}, - EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs, - {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves}; - _ -> - {undefined, undefined} - end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Internal functions +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%------------- Create handshake messages ---------------------------- -server_ecc_extension(_Version, EcPointFormats) -> - CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), - case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of +int_to_bin(I) -> + L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2, + <<I:(L*8)>>. + +certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 -> + case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa, + proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of true -> - handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats); + <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; false -> - undefined - end. + <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>> + end; -handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) -> - undefined; -handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) -> - #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}. +certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa; + KeyExchange == dh_rsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> + <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>; -advertises_ec_ciphers([]) -> - false; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) -> - advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest). +certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; + KeyExchange == dhe_dss; + KeyExchange == srp_dss -> + <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; -select_curve(Client, Server) -> - select_curve(Client, Server, false). +certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> + <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>; -select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves}, - #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves}, - ServerOrder) -> - case ServerOrder of - false -> - select_shared_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves); - true -> - select_shared_curve(ServerCurves, ClientCurves) - end; -select_curve(undefined, _, _) -> - %% Client did not send ECC extension use default curve if - %% ECC cipher is negotiated - {namedCurve, ?secp256r1}. +certificate_types(_, _) -> + <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>. -select_shared_curve([], _) -> - no_curve; -select_shared_curve([Curve | Rest], Curves) -> - case lists:member(Curve, Curves) of - true -> - {namedCurve, Curve}; - false -> - select_shared_curve(Rest, Curves) - end. +certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> + Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), + Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) -> + OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject, + DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp), + DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin), + <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>> + end, + list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]). -sni(undefined) -> - undefined; -sni(disable) -> - undefined; -sni(Hostname) -> - #sni{hostname = Hostname}. +certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) when is_reference(CertDbRef) -> + ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref == CertDbRef -> + [Cert | Acc]; + (_, Acc) -> + Acc + end, + ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle); +certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) -> + %% Cache disabled, Ref contains data + lists:foldl(fun({decoded, {_Key,Cert}}, Acc) -> [Cert | Acc] end, + [], CertDbData). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%%% Internal functions -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%-------------Handle handshake messages -------------------------------- validation_fun_and_state({Fun, UserState0}, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerNameIndication, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, CertPath) -> {fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) -> @@ -1627,17 +1289,6 @@ path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) -> path_validation_alert(Reason) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason). -encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) -> - try - PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey, - [{rsa_pad, - rsa_pkcs1_padding}]), - #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret} - catch - _:_-> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed)) - end. - digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) -> try do_digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of Signature -> @@ -1663,6 +1314,106 @@ do_digitally_signed({3, _}, Hash, HashAlgo, #{algorithm := Alg} = Engine) -> do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) -> public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key). +bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) -> + unacceptable_dsa_key; +bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> + unacceptable_rsa_key; +bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) -> + unacceptable_ecdsa_key. + +crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _, _) -> + valid; +crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid, _) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option. + valid; +crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, CertPath) -> + Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) -> + ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, {CertPath, + DBInfo}) + end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}}, + {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end}, + {undetermined_details, true} + ], + case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of + no_dps -> + crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, + dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), + Options); + DpsAndCRLs -> %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed + %% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} + case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of + {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} -> + crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, + CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options); + Other -> + Other + end + end. + +crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) -> + case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of + {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} -> + valid; + Other -> + Other + end; +crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, _, Dps, Options) -> + public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options). + +dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) -> + case public_key:pkix_dist_points(OtpCert) of + [] -> + no_dps; + DistPoints -> + Issuer = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer, + CRLs = distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle), + dps_and_crls(DistPoints, CRLs, []) + end; + +dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) -> + DP = #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, GenNames}} = + public_key:pkix_dist_point(OtpCert), + CRLs = lists:flatmap(fun({directoryName, Issuer}) -> + Callback:select(Issuer, CRLDbHandle); + (_) -> + [] + end, GenNames), + [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs]. + +dps_and_crls([], _, Acc) -> + Acc; +dps_and_crls([DP | Rest], CRLs, Acc) -> + DpCRL = [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs], + dps_and_crls(Rest, CRLs, DpCRL ++ Acc). + +distpoints_lookup([],_, _, _) -> + []; +distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) -> + Result = + try Callback:lookup(DistPoint, Issuer, CRLDbHandle) + catch + error:undef -> + %% The callback module still uses the 2-argument + %% version of the lookup function. + Callback:lookup(DistPoint, CRLDbHandle) + end, + case Result of + not_available -> + distpoints_lookup(Rest, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle); + CRLs -> + CRLs + end. + +encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) -> + try + PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey, + [{rsa_pad, + rsa_pkcs1_padding}]), + #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret} + catch + _:_-> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed)) + end. + calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) -> ssl_v3:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)); calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, HashAlgo, _MasterSecret, Handshake) -> @@ -1715,24 +1466,7 @@ calc_master_secret({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) calc_master_secret({3,_}, PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) -> tls_v1:master_secret(PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom). - -handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, - ClientCipherSuites, Compression, - ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) -> - case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0, - Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, - ClientCipherSuites) of - {ok, ConnectionStates} -> - hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role, - Version, - NegotiatedCipherSuite, - Random, - Compression, - ConnectionStates); - #alert{} = Alert -> - throw(Alert) - end. - + %% Update pending connection states with parameters exchanged via %% hello messages %% NOTE : Role is the role of the receiver of the hello message @@ -1772,7 +1506,43 @@ hello_security_parameters(server, Version, #{security_parameters := SecParams}, compression_algorithm = Compression }. -%%-------------Encode/Decode -------------------------------- +select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) -> + ?NULL. + +do_select_version(_, ClientVersion, []) -> + ClientVersion; +do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions]) -> + case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of + true -> + %% Version too high for client - keep looking + do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions); + false -> + %% Version ok for client - look for a higher + do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, Version) + end. +%% +do_select_version(_, _, [], GoodVersion) -> + GoodVersion; +do_select_version( + RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions], GoodVersion) -> + BetterVersion = + case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of + true -> + %% Version too high for client + GoodVersion; + false -> + %% Version ok for client + case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, GoodVersion) of + true -> + %% Use higher version + Version; + false -> + GoodVersion + end + end, + do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, BetterVersion). + +%%-------------Encode handshakes -------------------------------- encode_server_key(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}) -> PLen = byte_size(P), @@ -1860,6 +1630,110 @@ encode_protocol(Protocol, Acc) -> Len = byte_size(Protocol), <<Acc/binary, ?BYTE(Len), Protocol/binary>>. +enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, + ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) -> + EncParams = encode_server_key(Params), + case HashAlgo of + null -> + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = EncParams, + hashsign = {null, anon}, + signature = <<>>}; + _ -> + Hash = + server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary, + ServerRandom/binary, + EncParams/binary>>), + Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = EncParams, + hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, + signature = Signature} + end. + +%% While the RFC opens the door to allow ALPN during renegotiation, in practice +%% this does not work and it is recommended to ignore any ALPN extension during +%% renegotiation, as done here. +encode_alpn(_, true) -> + undefined; +encode_alpn(undefined, _) -> + undefined; +encode_alpn(Protocols, _) -> + #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}. + +hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, + srp = SRP, + signature_algs = HashSigns, + ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, + elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, + alpn = ALPN, + next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation, + sni = Sni}) -> + [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns, + EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined]. + +%%-------------Decode handshakes--------------------------------- +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, + ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, + ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> + Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +%% ECParameters with named_curve +%% TODO: explicit curve +dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID), + ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary, + _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> + Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)}, + public = ECPoint}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + KeyExchange, Version) + when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK -> + Params = #server_psk_params{ + hint = PskIdentityHint}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary, + ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, + ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, + ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) -> + DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, + Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{ + hint = IdentityHint, + dh_params = DHParams}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary, + ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, + ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary, + ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) -> + Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})). + dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) -> #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}; dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) -> @@ -2001,6 +1875,11 @@ dec_sni(<<?BYTE(?SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME), ?UINT16(Len), dec_sni(<<?BYTE(_), ?UINT16(Len), _:Len, Rest/binary>>) -> dec_sni(Rest); dec_sni(_) -> undefined. +decode_alpn(undefined) -> + undefined; +decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) -> + decode_protocols(Data, []). + decode_next_protocols({next_protocol_negotiation, Protocols}) -> decode_protocols(Protocols, []). @@ -2045,6 +1924,7 @@ from_2bytes(<<>>, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc); from_2bytes(<<?UINT16(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> from_2bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]). + key_exchange_alg(rsa) -> ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA; key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss; @@ -2066,8 +1946,122 @@ key_exchange_alg(Alg) key_exchange_alg(_) -> ?NULL. +%%-------------Cipher suite handling ----------------------------- +select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, false) -> + select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites); +select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, true) -> + select_cipher_suite(Suites, CipherSuites). + +select_cipher_suite([], _) -> + no_suite; +select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) -> + case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of + true -> + Suite; + false -> + select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites) + end. + +is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) -> + lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites). + +psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) -> + case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of + {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> + Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK), + <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>; + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + _ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) + end. + +psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret) -> + case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of + {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> + Len = erlang:byte_size(PremasterSecret), + PSKLen = erlang:byte_size(PSK), + <<?UINT16(Len), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(PSKLen), PSK/binary>>; + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + _ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) + end. + +handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun) + when LookupFun == undefined -> + error; +handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) -> + Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState). + +filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, + Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> + do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); + +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, + Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == srp_rsa; + KeyExchange == rsa_psk -> + do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + KeyExchange == dhe_dss; + KeyExchange == srp_dss -> + do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + KeyExchange == dh_dss; + KeyExchange == dh_rsa; + KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa -> + %% Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature + %% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names + %% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical. + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + KeyExchange == dh_anon; + KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; + KeyExchange == srp_anon; + KeyExchange == psk; + KeyExchange == dhe_psk -> + %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]). + +do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) -> + case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of + true -> + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); + false -> + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) + end. + +unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) -> + ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites(); +unavailable_ecc_suites(_) -> + []. %%-------------Extension handling -------------------------------- +handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, + ClientCipherSuites, Compression, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) -> + case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0, + Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, + ClientCipherSuites) of + {ok, ConnectionStates} -> + hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role, + Version, + NegotiatedCipherSuite, + Random, + Compression, + ConnectionStates); + #alert{} = Alert -> + throw(Alert) + end. + %% Receive protocols, choose one from the list, return it. handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, Reason}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason); @@ -2130,150 +2124,6 @@ handle_srp_extension(undefined, Session) -> handle_srp_extension(#srp{username = Username}, Session) -> Session#session{srp_username = Username}. -%%-------------Misc -------------------------------- - -select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, false) -> - select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites); -select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, true) -> - select_cipher_suite(Suites, CipherSuites). - -select_cipher_suite([], _) -> - no_suite; -select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) -> - case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of - true -> - Suite; - false -> - select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites) - end. - -int_to_bin(I) -> - L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2, - <<I:(L*8)>>. - -is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) -> - lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites). - -select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) -> - ?NULL. - -available_signature_algs(undefined, _) -> - undefined; -available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} -> - #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = SupportedHashSigns}; -available_signature_algs(_, _) -> - undefined. - -psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) -> - case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of - {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> - Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK), - <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>; - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - _ -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end. - -psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret) -> - case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of - {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> - Len = erlang:byte_size(PremasterSecret), - PSKLen = erlang:byte_size(PSK), - <<?UINT16(Len), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(PSKLen), PSK/binary>>; - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - _ -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end. - -handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun) - when LookupFun == undefined -> - error; -handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) -> - Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState). - -crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _, _) -> - valid; -crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid, _) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option. - valid; -crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, CertPath) -> - Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) -> - ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, {CertPath, - DBInfo}) - end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}}, - {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end}, - {undetermined_details, true} - ], - case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of - no_dps -> - crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, - dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), - Options); - DpsAndCRLs -> %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed - %% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} - case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of - {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} -> - crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, - CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options); - Other -> - Other - end - end. - -crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) -> - case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of - {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} -> - valid; - Other -> - Other - end; -crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, _, Dps, Options) -> - public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options). - -dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) -> - case public_key:pkix_dist_points(OtpCert) of - [] -> - no_dps; - DistPoints -> - Issuer = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer, - CRLs = distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle), - dps_and_crls(DistPoints, CRLs, []) - end; - -dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) -> - DP = #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, GenNames}} = - public_key:pkix_dist_point(OtpCert), - CRLs = lists:flatmap(fun({directoryName, Issuer}) -> - Callback:select(Issuer, CRLDbHandle); - (_) -> - [] - end, GenNames), - [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs]. - -dps_and_crls([], _, Acc) -> - Acc; -dps_and_crls([DP | Rest], CRLs, Acc) -> - DpCRL = [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs], - dps_and_crls(Rest, CRLs, DpCRL ++ Acc). - -distpoints_lookup([],_, _, _) -> - []; -distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) -> - Result = - try Callback:lookup(DistPoint, Issuer, CRLDbHandle) - catch - error:undef -> - %% The callback module still uses the 2-argument - %% version of the lookup function. - Callback:lookup(DistPoint, CRLDbHandle) - end, - case Result of - not_available -> - distpoints_lookup(Rest, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle); - CRLs -> - CRLs - end. sign_algo(?rsaEncryption) -> rsa; @@ -2323,7 +2173,6 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when true; is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_, _,_,_) -> false. - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) -> lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns). @@ -2343,27 +2192,162 @@ sign_type(dsa) -> sign_type(ecdsa) -> ?ECDSA_SIGN. - -bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) -> - unacceptable_dsa_key; -bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> - unacceptable_rsa_key; -bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) -> - unacceptable_ecdsa_key. - -available_signature_algs(undefined, SupportedHashSigns, _, Version) when - Version >= {3,3} -> - SupportedHashSigns; -available_signature_algs(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, SupportedHashSigns, - _, Version) when Version >= {3,3} -> - sets:to_list(sets:intersection(sets:from_list(ClientHashSigns), - sets:from_list(SupportedHashSigns))); -available_signature_algs(_, _, _, _) -> - undefined. - server_name(_, _, server) -> undefined; %% Not interesting to check your own name. server_name(undefined, Host, client) -> {fallback, Host}; %% Fallback to Host argument to connect server_name(SNI, _, client) -> SNI. %% If Server Name Indication is available + +client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) -> + CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), + case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of + true -> + EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}, + EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs, + {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves}; + _ -> + {undefined, undefined} + end. + +server_ecc_extension(_Version, EcPointFormats) -> + CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), + case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of + true -> + handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats); + false -> + undefined + end. + +handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) -> + undefined; +handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) -> + #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}. + +advertises_ec_ciphers([]) -> + false; +advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) -> + advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest). + +select_shared_curve([], _) -> + no_curve; +select_shared_curve([Curve | Rest], Curves) -> + case lists:member(Curve, Curves) of + true -> + {namedCurve, Curve}; + false -> + select_shared_curve(Rest, Curves) + end. + +sni(undefined) -> + undefined; +sni(disable) -> + undefined; +sni(Hostname) -> + #sni{hostname = Hostname}. + +renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}; +renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of + true -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}; + false -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} + end; +renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of + true -> + Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data}; + false -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} + end; + +renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of + true -> + CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), + SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState), + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>}; + false -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} + end. + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, + ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> + case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of + true -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; + false -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)} + end; + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}; + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, + ConnectionStates, true, _, _) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), + SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState), + case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of + true -> + {ok, ConnectionStates}; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation) + end; +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, + ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) -> + + case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of + true -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); + false -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), + case Data == ClientVerify of + true -> + {ok, ConnectionStates}; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation) + end + end; + +handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) -> + handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation); + +handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> + case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of + true -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); + false -> + handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) + end. + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + case {SecureRenegotation, maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState)} of + {_, true} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure); + {true, false} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION); + {false, false} -> + {ok, ConnectionStates} + end. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl index 003ad4994b..dd6a3e8521 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl @@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ -type ssl_atom_version() :: tls_record:tls_atom_version(). -type connection_states() :: term(). %% Map -type connection_state() :: term(). %% Map + %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Connection state handling %%==================================================================== - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec current_connection_state(connection_states(), read | write) -> connection_state(). @@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ set_pending_cipher_state(#{pending_read := Read, pending_read => Read#{cipher_state => ServerState}, pending_write => Write#{cipher_state => ClientState}}. +%%==================================================================== +%% Compression +%%==================================================================== uncompress(?NULL, Data, CS) -> {Data, CS}. @@ -282,6 +285,11 @@ compress(?NULL, Data, CS) -> compressions() -> [?byte(?NULL)]. + +%%==================================================================== +%% Payload encryption/decryption +%%==================================================================== + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec cipher(ssl_version(), iodata(), connection_state(), MacHash::binary()) -> {CipherFragment::binary(), connection_state()}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl index ccda58e0a9..b033eea261 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl @@ -45,10 +45,8 @@ %% Setup -export([start_fsm/8, start_link/7, init/1]). --export([encode_data/3, encode_alert/3]). - %% State transition handling --export([next_record/1, next_event/3, next_event/4]). +-export([next_record/1, next_event/3, next_event/4, handle_common_event/4]). %% Handshake handling -export([renegotiate/2, send_handshake/2, @@ -56,11 +54,11 @@ reinit_handshake_data/1, select_sni_extension/1, empty_connection_state/2]). %% Alert and close handling --export([send_alert/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). +-export([encode_alert/3, send_alert/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). %% Data handling --export([passive_receive/2, next_record_if_active/1, handle_common_event/4, send/3, - socket/5, setopts/3, getopts/3]). +-export([encode_data/3, passive_receive/2, next_record_if_active/1, send/3, + socket/5, setopts/3, getopts/3]). %% gen_statem state functions -export([init/3, error/3, downgrade/3, %% Initiation and take down states @@ -72,6 +70,9 @@ %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API %%==================================================================== +%%==================================================================== +%% Setup +%%==================================================================== start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} = Opts, User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, Timeout) -> @@ -100,6 +101,165 @@ start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = true},_, Tracker} = Error end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> + {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, reason()}. +%% +%% Description: Creates a gen_statem process which calls Module:init/1 to +%% initialize. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) -> + {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}. + +init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]) -> + process_flag(trap_exit, true), + State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), + try + State = ssl_connection:ssl_config(State0#state.ssl_options, Role, State0), + gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], init, State) + catch throw:Error -> + gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error, State0}) + end. +%%==================================================================== +%% State transition handling +%%==================================================================== +next_record(#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = State) when N > 0 -> + {no_record, State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}; + +next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest]} + = Buffers, + connection_states = ConnStates0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) -> + case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0, Check) of + {Plain, ConnStates} -> + {Plain, State#state{protocol_buffers = + Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = Rest}, + connection_states = ConnStates}}; + #alert{} = Alert -> + {Alert, State} + end; +next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = []}, + socket = Socket, + close_tag = CloseTag, + transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> + case tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]) of + ok -> + {no_record, State}; + _ -> + self() ! {CloseTag, Socket}, + {no_record, State} + end; +next_record(State) -> + {no_record, State}. + +next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> + next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). + +next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) -> + case next_record_if_active(State0) of + {no_record, State} -> + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); + {#ssl_tls{} = Record, State} -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} + end; +next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions) -> + case Record of + no_record -> + {next_state, StateName, State, Actions}; + #ssl_tls{} = Record -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + #alert{} = Alert -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} + end. + +handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName, + #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State); +%%% TLS record protocol level handshake messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, + StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf0} = Buffers, + negotiated_version = Version, + ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> + try + {Packets, Buf} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version,Data,Buf0, Options), + State1 = + State0#state{protocol_buffers = + Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf}}, + case Packets of + [] -> + assert_buffer_sanity(Buf, Options), + {Record, State} = next_record(State1), + next_event(StateName, Record, State); + _ -> + Events = tls_handshake_events(Packets), + case StateName of + connection -> + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State1, Events); + _ -> + {next_state, StateName, + State1#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}, Events} + end + end + catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0) + end; +%%% TLS record protocol level application data messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {application_data, Data}}]}; +%%% TLS record protocol level change cipher messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = Data}}]}; +%%% TLS record protocol level Alert messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, + #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try decode_alerts(EncAlerts) of + Alerts = [_|_] -> + handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, StateName, State}); + [] -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, empty_alert), + Version, StateName, State); + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, alert_decode_error), + Version, StateName, State) + + end; +%% Ignore unknown TLS record level protocol messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State}. +%%==================================================================== +%% Handshake handling +%%==================================================================== +renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State, Actions) -> + %% Handle same way as if server requested + %% the renegotiation + Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), + {next_state, connection, State#state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0}, + [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]}; + +renegotiate(#state{role = server, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + negotiated_version = Version, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Actions) -> + HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(), + Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version), + Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), + {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = + tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0), + send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + State1 = State0#state{connection_states = + ConnectionStates, + tls_handshake_history = Hs0}, + {Record, State} = next_record(State1), + next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions). + send_handshake(Handshake, State) -> send_handshake_flight(queue_handshake(Handshake, State)). @@ -128,15 +288,6 @@ queue_change_cipher(Msg, #state{negotiated_version = Version, State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, flight_buffer = Flight0 ++ [BinChangeCipher]}. -send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> - {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = - encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), - send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), - State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. - reinit_handshake_data(State) -> %% premaster_secret, public_key_info and tls_handshake_info %% are only needed during the handshake phase. @@ -155,8 +306,17 @@ select_sni_extension(_) -> empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> ssl_record:empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation). -encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> - tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0). +%%==================================================================== +%% Alert and close handling +%%==================================================================== +send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> + {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = + encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), + send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec encode_alert(#alert{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> @@ -166,42 +326,66 @@ encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) -> tls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates). - +%% User closes or recursive call! +close({close, Timeout}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, _,_) -> + tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]), + Transport:shutdown(Socket, write), + _ = Transport:recv(Socket, 0, Timeout), + ok; +%% Peer closed socket +close({shutdown, transport_closed}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, ConnectionStates, Check) -> + close({close, 0}, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check); +%% We generate fatal alert +close({shutdown, own_alert}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, ConnectionStates, Check) -> + %% Standard trick to try to make sure all + %% data sent to the tcp port is really delivered to the + %% peer application before tcp port is closed so that the peer will + %% get the correct TLS alert message and not only a transport close. + %% Will return when other side has closed or after timout millisec + %% e.g. we do not want to hang if something goes wrong + %% with the network but we want to maximise the odds that + %% peer application gets all data sent on the tcp connection. + close({close, ?DEFAULT_TIMEOUT}, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check); +close(downgrade, _,_,_,_) -> + ok; +%% Other +close(_, Socket, Transport, _,_) -> + Transport:close(Socket). protocol_name() -> "TLS". -%%==================================================================== -%% tls_connection_sup API -%%==================================================================== -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> - {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, reason()}. -%% -%% Description: Creates a gen_fsm process which calls Module:init/1 to -%% initialize. To ensure a synchronized start-up procedure, this function -%% does not return until Module:init/1 has returned. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) -> - {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}. +%%==================================================================== +%% Data handling +%%==================================================================== +encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> + tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0). -init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]) -> - process_flag(trap_exit, true), - State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), - try - State = ssl_connection:ssl_config(State0#state.ssl_options, Role, State0), - gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], init, State) - catch throw:Error -> - gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error, State0}) +passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) -> + case Buffer of + <<>> -> + {Record, State} = next_record(State0), + next_event(StateName, Record, State); + _ -> + {Record, State} = ssl_connection:read_application_data(<<>>, State0), + next_event(StateName, Record, State) end. -callback_mode() -> - state_functions. +next_record_if_active(State = + #state{socket_options = + #socket_options{active = false}}) -> + {no_record ,State}; +next_record_if_active(State) -> + next_record(State). + +send(Transport, Socket, Data) -> + tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Data). socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker) -> tls_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker). setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) -> tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, Other). + getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag) -> tls_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag). @@ -244,7 +428,7 @@ init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, {Record, State} = next_record(State1), next_event(hello, Record, State); init(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec error(gen_statem:event_type(), @@ -254,8 +438,8 @@ init(Type, Event, State) -> error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, {Error, State}) -> {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State}; -error({call, From}, Msg, State) -> - handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +error({call, _} = Call, Msg, State) -> + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Call, Msg, State); error(_, _, _) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. @@ -285,13 +469,13 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, undefined -> CurrentProtocol; _ -> Protocol0 end, - - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, hello, internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, - State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - negotiated_version = Version, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, - session = Session, - negotiated_protocol = Protocol}) + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, + State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + negotiated_version = Version, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, + client_hello_version = ClientVersion, + session = Session, + negotiated_protocol = Protocol}) end; hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, @@ -309,7 +493,7 @@ hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, hello(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); hello(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec abbreviated(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> @@ -318,7 +502,7 @@ hello(Type, Event, State) -> abbreviated(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); abbreviated(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certify(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> @@ -327,7 +511,7 @@ abbreviated(Type, Event, State) -> certify(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec cipher(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> @@ -336,7 +520,7 @@ certify(Type, Event, State) -> cipher(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); cipher(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec connection(gen_statem:event_type(), @@ -387,156 +571,24 @@ connection(Type, Event, State) -> downgrade(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% Event handling functions called by state functions to handle -%% common or unexpected events for the state. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State, ?MODULE). - -%% raw data from socket, unpack records -handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName, - #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) -> - case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of - {Record, State} -> - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - #alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), - {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}} - end; -handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, - #state{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag, - socket_options = #socket_options{active = Active}, - protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = CTs}, - negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - - %% Note that as of TLS 1.1, - %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a - %% session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform - %% with widespread implementation practice. - - case (Active == false) andalso (CTs =/= []) of - false -> - case Version of - {1, N} when N >= 1 -> - ok; - _ -> - %% As invalidate_sessions here causes performance issues, - %% we will conform to the widespread implementation - %% practice and go aginst the spec - %%invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session) - ok - end, - - ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}}; - true -> - %% Fixes non-delivery of final TLS record in {active, once}. - %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again - %% and then receive the final message. - next_event(StateName, no_record, State) - end; -handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_info(Msg, StateName, State). - -handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State); - -%%% TLS record protocol level handshake messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, - StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf0} = Buffers, - negotiated_version = Version, - ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> - try - {Packets, Buf} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version,Data,Buf0, Options), - State1 = - State0#state{protocol_buffers = - Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf}}, - case Packets of - [] -> - assert_buffer_sanity(Buf, Options), - {Record, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - _ -> - Events = tls_handshake_events(Packets), - case StateName of - connection -> - ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State1, Events); - _ -> - {next_state, StateName, - State1#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}, Events} - end - end - catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0) - end; -%%% TLS record protocol level application data messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {application_data, Data}}]}; -%%% TLS record protocol level change cipher messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = Data}}]}; -%%% TLS record protocol level Alert messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - try decode_alerts(EncAlerts) of - Alerts = [_|_] -> - handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, StateName, State}); - [] -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, empty_alert), - Version, StateName, State); - #alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) - catch - _:_ -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, alert_decode_error), - Version, StateName, State) - - end; -%% Ignore unknown TLS record level protocol messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State}. - -send(Transport, Socket, Data) -> - tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Data). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% gen_statem callbacks %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +callback_mode() -> + state_functions. + terminate(Reason, StateName, State) -> catch ssl_connection:terminate(Reason, StateName, State). format_status(Type, Data) -> ssl_connection:format_status(Type, Data). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% code_change(OldVsn, StateName, State, Extra) -> {ok, StateName, NewState} -%% Description: Convert process state when code is changed -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State0, {Direction, From, To}) -> - State = convert_state(State0, Direction, From, To), - {ok, StateName, State}; code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _) -> {ok, StateName, State}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hist0, V2HComp) -> - Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(Handshake, Version), - Hist = ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hist0, Frag, V2HComp), - {Encoded, ConnectionStates} = - tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0), - {Encoded, ConnectionStates, Hist}. - -encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) -> - tls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates). - -decode_alerts(Bin) -> - ssl_alert:decode(Bin). - initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, Tracker}, User, {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) -> #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation} = SSLOptions, @@ -586,108 +638,56 @@ next_tls_record(Data, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_record_buf #alert{} = Alert -> Alert end. -next_record(#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = State) when N > 0 -> - {no_record, State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}; - -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest]} - = Buffers, - connection_states = ConnStates0, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) -> - case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0, Check) of - {Plain, ConnStates} -> - {Plain, State#state{protocol_buffers = - Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = Rest}, - connection_states = ConnStates}}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - {Alert, State} - end; -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = []}, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> - case tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]) of - ok -> - {no_record, State}; - _ -> - {socket_closed, State} - end; -next_record(State) -> - {no_record, State}. - -next_record_if_active(State = - #state{socket_options = - #socket_options{active = false}}) -> - {no_record ,State}; - -next_record_if_active(State) -> - next_record(State). - -passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) -> - case Buffer of - <<>> -> - {Record, State} = next_record(State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - _ -> - {Record, State} = ssl_connection:read_application_data(<<>>, State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State) - end. - -next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> - next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). - -next_event(StateName, socket_closed, State, _) -> - ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State}; -next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) -> - case next_record_if_active(State0) of - {no_record, State} -> - ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); - {socket_closed, State} -> - next_event(StateName, socket_closed, State, Actions); - {#ssl_tls{} = Record, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} - end; -next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions) -> - case Record of - no_record -> - {next_state, StateName, State, Actions}; - #ssl_tls{} = Record -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} - end. tls_handshake_events(Packets) -> lists:map(fun(Packet) -> {next_event, internal, {handshake, Packet}} end, Packets). +%% raw data from socket, upack records +handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName, + #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) -> + case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of + {Record, State} -> + next_event(StateName, Record, State); + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), + {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}} + end; +handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, + #state{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = Active}, + protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = CTs}, + negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> -renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State, Actions) -> - %% Handle same way as if server requested - %% the renegotiation - Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), - {next_state, connection, State#state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0}, - [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]}; + %% Note that as of TLS 1.1, + %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a + %% session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform + %% with widespread implementation practice. -renegotiate(#state{role = server, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - negotiated_version = Version, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Actions) -> - HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(), - Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version), - Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), - {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = - tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0), - send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), - State1 = State0#state{connection_states = - ConnectionStates, - tls_handshake_history = Hs0}, - {Record, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions). + case (Active == false) andalso (CTs =/= []) of + false -> + case Version of + {1, N} when N >= 1 -> + ok; + _ -> + %% As invalidate_sessions here causes performance issues, + %% we will conform to the widespread implementation + %% practice and go aginst the spec + %%invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session) + ok + end, + + ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), + {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}}; + true -> + %% Fixes non-delivery of final TLS record in {active, once}. + %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again + %% and then receive the final message. + next_event(StateName, no_record, State) + end; +handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> + ssl_connection:StateName(info, Msg, State, ?MODULE). handle_alerts([], Result) -> Result; @@ -698,47 +698,22 @@ handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) -> handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State, _Actions}) -> handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)). +encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hist0, V2HComp) -> + Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(Handshake, Version), + Hist = ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hist0, Frag, V2HComp), + {Encoded, ConnectionStates} = + tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0), + {Encoded, ConnectionStates, Hist}. -%% User closes or recursive call! -close({close, Timeout}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, _,_) -> - tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]), - Transport:shutdown(Socket, write), - _ = Transport:recv(Socket, 0, Timeout), - ok; -%% Peer closed socket -close({shutdown, transport_closed}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, ConnectionStates, Check) -> - close({close, 0}, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check); -%% We generate fatal alert -close({shutdown, own_alert}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, ConnectionStates, Check) -> - %% Standard trick to try to make sure all - %% data sent to the tcp port is really delivered to the - %% peer application before tcp port is closed so that the peer will - %% get the correct TLS alert message and not only a transport close. - %% Will return when other side has closed or after timout millisec - %% e.g. we do not want to hang if something goes wrong - %% with the network but we want to maximise the odds that - %% peer application gets all data sent on the tcp connection. - close({close, ?DEFAULT_TIMEOUT}, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check); -close(downgrade, _,_,_,_) -> - ok; -%% Other -close(_, Socket, Transport, _,_) -> - Transport:close(Socket). - -convert_state(#state{ssl_options = Options} = State, up, "5.3.5", "5.3.6") -> - State#state{ssl_options = convert_options_partial_chain(Options, up)}; -convert_state(#state{ssl_options = Options} = State, down, "5.3.6", "5.3.5") -> - State#state{ssl_options = convert_options_partial_chain(Options, down)}. +encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) -> + tls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates). -convert_options_partial_chain(Options, up) -> - {Head, Tail} = lists:split(5, tuple_to_list(Options)), - list_to_tuple(Head ++ [{partial_chain, fun(_) -> unknown_ca end}] ++ Tail); -convert_options_partial_chain(Options, down) -> - list_to_tuple(proplists:delete(partial_chain, tuple_to_list(Options))). +decode_alerts(Bin) -> + ssl_alert:decode(Bin). -gen_handshake(GenConnection, StateName, Type, Event, +gen_handshake(StateName, Type, Event, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - try GenConnection:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of + try ssl_connection:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of Result -> Result catch diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl index b54540393a..a38c5704a6 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl @@ -32,13 +32,19 @@ -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). --export([client_hello/8, hello/4, - get_tls_handshake/4, encode_handshake/2, decode_handshake/4]). +%% Handshake handling +-export([client_hello/8, hello/4]). + +%% Handshake encoding +-export([encode_handshake/2]). + +%% Handshake decodeing +-export([get_tls_handshake/4, decode_handshake/4]). -type tls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake(). %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Handshake handling %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec client_hello(host(), inet:port_number(), ssl_record:connection_states(), @@ -54,15 +60,18 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, } = SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert) -> Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions), - #{security_parameters := SecParams} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + #{security_parameters := SecParams} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), AvailableCipherSuites = ssl_handshake:available_suites(UserSuites, Version), Extensions = ssl_handshake:client_hello_extensions(Version, AvailableCipherSuites, - SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), + SslOpts, ConnectionStates, + Renegotiation), CipherSuites = case Fallback of true -> - [?TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV | ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(AvailableCipherSuites, Renegotiation)]; + [?TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV | + ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(AvailableCipherSuites, Renegotiation)]; false -> ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(AvailableCipherSuites, Renegotiation) end, @@ -85,8 +94,8 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, ssl_record:connection_states(), alpn | npn, binary() | undefined}| {tls_record:tls_version(), {resumed | new, #session{}}, ssl_record:connection_states(), binary() | undefined, - #hello_extensions{}, {ssl_cipher:hash(), ssl_cipher:sign_algo()} | undefined} | - #alert{}. + #hello_extensions{}, {ssl_cipher:hash(), ssl_cipher:sign_algo()} | + undefined} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Handles a received hello message %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -99,7 +108,8 @@ hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, random = Random, case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, SupportedVersions) of true -> handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, - Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation); + Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation); false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION) end; @@ -127,18 +137,29 @@ hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, malformed_handshake_data) end. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Handshake encodeing +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec encode_handshake(tls_handshake(), tls_record:tls_version()) -> iolist(). %% %% Description: Encode a handshake packet -%%--------------------------------------------------------------------x +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_handshake(Package, Version) -> {MsgType, Bin} = enc_handshake(Package, Version), Len = byte_size(Bin), [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), Bin]. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Handshake decodeing +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec get_tls_handshake(tls_record:tls_version(), binary(), binary() | iolist(), #ssl_options{}) -> +-spec get_tls_handshake(tls_record:tls_version(), binary(), binary() | iolist(), + #ssl_options{}) -> {[tls_handshake()], binary()}. %% %% Description: Given buffered and new data from ssl_record, collects @@ -153,37 +174,45 @@ get_tls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffer, Options) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handle_client_hello(Version, #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId, - cipher_suites = CipherSuites, - compression_methods = Compressions, - random = Random, - extensions = #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves, - signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} = HelloExt}, +handle_client_hello(Version, + #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId, + cipher_suites = CipherSuites, + compression_methods = Compressions, + random = Random, + extensions = + #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves, + signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} + = HelloExt}, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, eccs = SupportedECCs, honor_ecc_order = ECCOrder} = SslOpts, - {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert, _}, Renegotiation) -> + {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert, _}, + Renegotiation) -> case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of true -> AvailableHashSigns = ssl_handshake:available_signature_algs( ClientHashSigns, SupportedHashSigns, Cert, Version), ECCCurve = ssl_handshake:select_curve(Curves, SupportedECCs, ECCOrder), {Type, #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session1} - = ssl_handshake:select_session(SugesstedId, CipherSuites, AvailableHashSigns, Compressions, - Port, Session0#session{ecc = ECCCurve}, Version, - SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert), + = ssl_handshake:select_session(SugesstedId, CipherSuites, + AvailableHashSigns, Compressions, + Port, Session0#session{ecc = ECCCurve}, + Version, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert), case CipherSuite of no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_ciphers); _ -> {KeyExAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), - case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, Version) of + case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, + SupportedHashSigns, Version) of #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; HashSign -> - handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, HelloExt, - SslOpts, Session1, ConnectionStates0, + handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, + CipherSuites, HelloExt, + SslOpts, Session1, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, HashSign) end end; @@ -191,6 +220,59 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION) end. +handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, + HelloExt, SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, + Renegotiation, HashSign) -> + try ssl_handshake:handle_client_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuites, + HelloExt, Version, SslOpts, + Session0, ConnectionStates0, + Renegotiation) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt} -> + {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, Protocol, + ServerHelloExt, HashSign} + catch throw:Alert -> + Alert + end. + + +handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, + Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> + case ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuite, + Compression, HelloExt, Version, + SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, + Renegotiation) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + {ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} -> + {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} + end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, _Version) -> + {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>}; +enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, + random = Random, + session_id = SessionID, + cipher_suites = CipherSuites, + compression_methods = CompMethods, + extensions = HelloExtensions}, _Version) -> + SIDLength = byte_size(SessionID), + BinCompMethods = list_to_binary(CompMethods), + CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods), + BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites), + CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites), + ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions), + + {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, + ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary, + ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary, + ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>}; + +enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version) -> + ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), Body:Length/binary,Rest/binary>>, #ssl_options{v2_hello_compatible = V2Hello} = Opts, Acc) -> @@ -219,11 +301,12 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, Bin, true) -> decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, Bin, false) -> decode_hello(Bin); -decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, - ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, - ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary, - ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary, - Extensions/binary>>, _) -> +decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, + ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, + ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary, + ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary, + Extensions/binary>>, _) -> DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions({client, Extensions}), @@ -268,53 +351,3 @@ decode_v2_hello(<<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), compression_methods = [?NULL], extensions = #hello_extensions{} }. - -enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, _Version) -> - {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>}; -enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, - random = Random, - session_id = SessionID, - cipher_suites = CipherSuites, - compression_methods = CompMethods, - extensions = HelloExtensions}, _Version) -> - SIDLength = byte_size(SessionID), - BinCompMethods = list_to_binary(CompMethods), - CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods), - BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites), - CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites), - ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions), - - {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, - ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary, - ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary, - ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>}; - -enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version) -> - ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version). - - -handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, - HelloExt, SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, HashSign) -> - try ssl_handshake:handle_client_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuites, - HelloExt, Version, SslOpts, - Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt} -> - {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} - catch throw:Alert -> - Alert - end. - - -handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, - Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> - case ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuite, - Compression, HelloExt, Version, - SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - {ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} -> - {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} - end. - diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl index 4ac6cdc6b5..ab179c1bf0 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl @@ -39,15 +39,15 @@ encode_change_cipher_spec/2, encode_data/3]). -export([encode_plain_text/4]). +%% Decoding +-export([decode_cipher_text/3]). + %% Protocol version handling -export([protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/2, highest_protocol_version/1, highest_protocol_version/2, is_higher/2, supported_protocol_versions/0, is_acceptable_version/1, is_acceptable_version/2, hello_version/2]). -%% Decoding --export([decode_cipher_text/3]). - -export_type([tls_version/0, tls_atom_version/0]). -type tls_version() :: ssl_record:ssl_version(). @@ -56,13 +56,12 @@ -compile(inline). %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Handling of incoming data %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec init_connection_states(client | server, one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled) -> ssl_record:connection_states(). -%% % - % +%% %% Description: Creates a connection_states record with appropriate %% values for the initial SSL connection setup. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -87,6 +86,10 @@ get_tls_records(Data, <<>>) -> get_tls_records(Data, Buffer) -> get_tls_records_aux(list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), []). +%%==================================================================== +%% Encoding +%%==================================================================== + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec encode_handshake(iolist(), tls_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. @@ -141,6 +144,74 @@ encode_data(Frag, Version, Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA, BeastMitigation), encode_iolist(?APPLICATION_DATA, Data, Version, ConnectionStates). +%%==================================================================== +%% Decoding +%%==================================================================== + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states(), boolean()) -> + {#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states()}| #alert{}. +%% +%% Description: Decode cipher text +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, + fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, + #{current_read := + #{compression_state := CompressionS0, + sequence_number := Seq, + cipher_state := CipherS0, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{ + cipher_type = ?AEAD, + bulk_cipher_algorithm = + BulkCipherAlgo, + compression_algorithm = CompAlg} + } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, _) -> + AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, ReadState0), + case ssl_cipher:decipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, Seq, AAD, CipherFragment, Version) of + {PlainFragment, CipherS1} -> + {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg, + PlainFragment, CompressionS0), + ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#{ + current_read => ReadState0#{ + cipher_state => CipherS1, + sequence_number => Seq + 1, + compression_state => CompressionS1}}, + {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert + end; + +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, + fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, + #{current_read := + #{compression_state := CompressionS0, + sequence_number := Seq, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg} + } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, PaddingCheck) -> + case ssl_record:decipher(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0, PaddingCheck) of + {PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} -> + MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState1), + case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of + true -> + {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg, + PlainFragment, CompressionS0), + ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#{ + current_read => ReadState1#{ + sequence_number => Seq + 1, + compression_state => CompressionS1}}, + {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + end; + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert + end. + +%%==================================================================== +%% Protocol version handling +%%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec protocol_version(tls_atom_version() | tls_version()) -> @@ -278,11 +349,6 @@ supported_protocol_versions([_|_] = Vsns) -> end end. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -%% Description: ssl version 2 is not acceptable security risks are too big. -%% -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec is_acceptable_version(tls_version()) -> boolean(). is_acceptable_version({N,_}) when N >= ?LOWEST_MAJOR_SUPPORTED_VERSION -> @@ -302,6 +368,7 @@ hello_version(Version, _) when Version >= {3, 3} -> Version; hello_version(_, Versions) -> lowest_protocol_version(Versions). + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -376,37 +443,17 @@ get_tls_records_aux(Data, Acc) -> false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) end. - +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{current_write := Write0} = ConnectionStates) -> {CipherFragment, Write1} = do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, Write0), {CipherText, Write} = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, CipherFragment, Write1), {CipherText, ConnectionStates#{current_write => Write}}. -lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> - Ver; -lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> - lowest_list_protocol_version(lowest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). - -highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> - Ver; -highest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> - highest_list_protocol_version(highest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). - encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Fragment, #{sequence_number := Seq} = Write) -> Length = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment), {[<<?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Fragment], Write#{sequence_number => Seq +1}}. -highest_protocol_version() -> - highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). - -lowest_protocol_version() -> - lowest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). - -sufficient_tlsv1_2_crypto_support() -> - CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(), - proplists:get_bool(sha256, proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport)). - encode_iolist(Type, Data, Version, ConnectionStates0) -> {ConnectionStates, EncodedMsg} = lists:foldl(fun(Text, {CS0, Encoded}) -> @@ -415,6 +462,31 @@ encode_iolist(Type, Data, Version, ConnectionStates0) -> {CS1, [Enc | Encoded]} end, {ConnectionStates0, []}, Data), {lists:reverse(EncodedMsg), ConnectionStates}. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{compression_state := CompS0, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{ + cipher_type = ?AEAD, + compression_algorithm = CompAlg} + } = WriteState0) -> + {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0), + WriteState1 = WriteState0#{compression_state => CompS1}, + AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, WriteState1), + ssl_record:cipher_aead(Version, Comp, WriteState1, AAD); +do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{compression_state := CompS0, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg} + }= WriteState0) -> + {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0), + WriteState1 = WriteState0#{compression_state => CompS1}, + MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, Comp, WriteState1), + ssl_record:cipher(Version, Comp, WriteState1, MacHash); +do_encode_plain_text(_,_,_,CS) -> + exit({cs, CS}). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +calc_aad(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, + #{sequence_number := SeqNo}) -> + <<?UINT64(SeqNo), ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>. %% 1/n-1 splitting countermeasure Rizzo/Duong-Beast, RC4 chiphers are %% not vulnerable to this attack. @@ -440,89 +512,25 @@ do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Acc) -> _ -> lists:reverse(Acc, [Bin]) end. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states(), boolean()) -> - {#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states()}| #alert{}. -%% -%% Description: Decode cipher text -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, - fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, - #{current_read := - #{compression_state := CompressionS0, - sequence_number := Seq, - cipher_state := CipherS0, - security_parameters := - #security_parameters{ - cipher_type = ?AEAD, - bulk_cipher_algorithm = - BulkCipherAlgo, - compression_algorithm = CompAlg} - } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, _) -> - AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, ReadState0), - case ssl_cipher:decipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, Seq, AAD, CipherFragment, Version) of - {PlainFragment, CipherS1} -> - {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg, - PlainFragment, CompressionS0), - ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#{ - current_read => ReadState0#{ - cipher_state => CipherS1, - sequence_number => Seq + 1, - compression_state => CompressionS1}}, - {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert - end; +lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> + Ver; +lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> + lowest_list_protocol_version(lowest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). -decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, - fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, - #{current_read := - #{compression_state := CompressionS0, - sequence_number := Seq, - security_parameters := - #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg} - } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, PaddingCheck) -> - case ssl_record:decipher(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0, PaddingCheck) of - {PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} -> - MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState1), - case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of - true -> - {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg, - PlainFragment, CompressionS0), - ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#{ - current_read => ReadState1#{ - sequence_number => Seq + 1, - compression_state => CompressionS1}}, - {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) - end; - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert - end. +highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> + Ver; +highest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> + highest_list_protocol_version(highest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). + +highest_protocol_version() -> + highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). + +lowest_protocol_version() -> + lowest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). + +sufficient_tlsv1_2_crypto_support() -> + CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(), + proplists:get_bool(sha256, proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport)). -do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{compression_state := CompS0, - security_parameters := - #security_parameters{ - cipher_type = ?AEAD, - compression_algorithm = CompAlg} - } = WriteState0) -> - {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0), - WriteState1 = WriteState0#{compression_state => CompS1}, - AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, WriteState1), - ssl_record:cipher_aead(Version, Comp, WriteState1, AAD); -do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{compression_state := CompS0, - security_parameters := - #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg} - }= WriteState0) -> - {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0), - WriteState1 = WriteState0#{compression_state => CompS1}, - MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, Comp, WriteState1), - ssl_record:cipher(Version, Comp, WriteState1, MacHash); -do_encode_plain_text(_,_,_,CS) -> - exit({cs, CS}). -calc_aad(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, - #{sequence_number := SeqNo}) -> - <<?UINT64(SeqNo), ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>. diff --git a/lib/ssl/vsn.mk b/lib/ssl/vsn.mk index bb77326751..cf6481d14c 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/ssl/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -SSL_VSN = 8.2.1 +SSL_VSN = 8.2.2 diff --git a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/Makefile index 93eac8220d..e7ea38c5c3 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/Makefile @@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ XML_REF3_FILES = \ XML_REF6_FILES = stdlib_app.xml XML_PART_FILES = part.xml -XML_CHAPTER_FILES = io_protocol.xml unicode_usage.xml notes.xml notes_history.xml assert_hrl.xml +XML_CHAPTER_FILES = introduction.xml io_protocol.xml unicode_usage.xml \ + notes.xml assert_hrl.xml BOOK_FILES = book.xml diff --git a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/unicode.xml b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/unicode.xml index e86f45431f..d822aca89c 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/unicode.xml +++ b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/unicode.xml @@ -239,8 +239,13 @@ <c><anno>InEncoding</anno></c>.</p> </item> </list> - <p>Only when <c><anno>InEncoding</anno></c> is one of the UTF - encodings, integers in the list are allowed to be > 255.</p> + <p> + Note that integers in the list always represent code points + regardless of <c><anno>InEncoding</anno></c> passed. If + <c><anno>InEncoding</anno> latin1</c> is passed, only code + points < 256 are allowed; otherwise, all valid unicode code + points are allowed. + </p> <p>If <c><anno>InEncoding</anno></c> is <c>latin1</c>, parameter <c><anno>Data</anno></c> corresponds to the <c>iodata()</c> type, but for <c>unicode</c>, parameter <c><anno>Data</anno></c> can diff --git a/lib/stdlib/src/string.erl b/lib/stdlib/src/string.erl index 4972da297d..ab041ff53c 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/src/string.erl +++ b/lib/stdlib/src/string.erl @@ -74,19 +74,21 @@ -export([to_upper/1, to_lower/1]). %% -import(lists,[member/2]). - -compile({no_auto_import,[length/1]}). +-compile({inline, [btoken/2, rev/1, append/2, stack/2, search_compile/1]}). +-define(ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2), CP1 < 256, CP2 < 256, CP1 =/= $\r). -export_type([grapheme_cluster/0]). -type grapheme_cluster() :: char() | [char()]. -type direction() :: 'leading' | 'trailing'. --dialyzer({no_improper_lists, stack/2}). +-dialyzer({no_improper_lists, [stack/2, length_b/3]}). %%% BIFs internal (not documented) should not to be used outside of this module %%% May be removed -export([list_to_float/1, list_to_integer/1]). + %% Uses bifs: string:list_to_float/1 and string:list_to_integer/1 -spec list_to_float(String) -> {Float, Rest} | {'error', Reason} when String :: string(), @@ -117,8 +119,10 @@ is_empty(_) -> false. %% Count the number of grapheme clusters in chardata -spec length(String::unicode:chardata()) -> non_neg_integer(). +length(<<CP1/utf8, Bin/binary>>) -> + length_b(Bin, CP1, 0); length(CD) -> - length_1(unicode_util:gc(CD), 0). + length_1(CD, 0). %% Convert a string to a list of grapheme clusters -spec to_graphemes(String::unicode:chardata()) -> [grapheme_cluster()]. @@ -166,6 +170,8 @@ equal(A, B, true, Norm) -> %% Reverse grapheme clusters -spec reverse(String::unicode:chardata()) -> [grapheme_cluster()]. +reverse(<<CP1/utf8, Rest/binary>>) -> + reverse_b(Rest, CP1, []); reverse(CD) -> reverse_1(CD, []). @@ -176,7 +182,10 @@ reverse(CD) -> Start :: non_neg_integer(), Slice :: unicode:chardata(). slice(CD, N) when is_integer(N), N >= 0 -> - slice_l(CD, N, is_binary(CD)). + case slice_l0(CD, N) of + [] when is_binary(CD) -> <<>>; + Res -> Res + end. -spec slice(String, Start, Length) -> Slice when String::unicode:chardata(), @@ -185,9 +194,15 @@ slice(CD, N) when is_integer(N), N >= 0 -> Slice :: unicode:chardata(). slice(CD, N, Length) when is_integer(N), N >= 0, is_integer(Length), Length > 0 -> - slice_trail(slice_l(CD, N, is_binary(CD)), Length); + case slice_l0(CD, N) of + [] when is_binary(CD) -> <<>>; + L -> slice_trail(L, Length) + end; slice(CD, N, infinity) -> - slice_l(CD, N, is_binary(CD)); + case slice_l0(CD, N) of + [] when is_binary(CD) -> <<>>; + Res -> Res + end; slice(CD, _, 0) -> case is_binary(CD) of true -> <<>>; @@ -246,18 +261,22 @@ trim(Str, Dir) -> Dir :: direction() | 'both', Characters :: [grapheme_cluster()]. trim(Str, _, []) -> Str; +trim(Str, leading, [Sep]) when is_list(Str), Sep < 256 -> + trim_ls(Str, Sep); trim(Str, leading, Sep) when is_list(Sep) -> - trim_l(Str, search_pattern(Sep)); -trim(Str, trailing, Sep) when is_list(Sep) -> - trim_t(Str, 0, search_pattern(Sep)); -trim(Str, both, Sep0) when is_list(Sep0) -> - Sep = search_pattern(Sep0), - trim_t(trim_l(Str,Sep), 0, Sep). + trim_l(Str, Sep); +trim(Str, trailing, [Sep]) when is_list(Str), Sep < 256 -> + trim_ts(Str, Sep); +trim(Str, trailing, Seps0) when is_list(Seps0) -> + Seps = search_pattern(Seps0), + trim_t(Str, 0, Seps); +trim(Str, both, Sep) when is_list(Sep) -> + trim(trim(Str,leading,Sep), trailing, Sep). %% Delete trailing newlines or \r\n -spec chomp(String::unicode:chardata()) -> unicode:chardata(). chomp(Str) -> - trim_t(Str,0, {[[$\r,$\n],$\n], [$\r,$\n], [<<$\r>>,<<$\n>>]}). + trim(Str, trailing, [[$\r,$\n],$\n]). %% Split String into two parts where the leading part consists of Characters -spec take(String, Characters) -> {Leading, Trailing} when @@ -290,8 +309,7 @@ take(Str, [], Complement, Dir) -> {true, leading} -> {Str, Empty}; {true, trailing} -> {Empty, Str} end; -take(Str, Sep0, false, leading) -> - Sep = search_pattern(Sep0), +take(Str, Sep, false, leading) -> take_l(Str, Sep, []); take(Str, Sep0, true, leading) -> Sep = search_pattern(Sep0), @@ -451,6 +469,7 @@ replace(String, SearchPattern, Replacement, Where) -> SeparatorList::[grapheme_cluster()]) -> [unicode:chardata()]. lexemes([], _) -> []; +lexemes(Str, []) -> [Str]; lexemes(Str, Seps0) when is_list(Seps0) -> Seps = search_pattern(Seps0), lexemes_m(Str, Seps, []). @@ -484,13 +503,13 @@ find(String, SearchPattern, leading) -> find(String, SearchPattern, trailing) -> find_r(String, unicode:characters_to_list(SearchPattern), nomatch). -%% Fetch first codepoint and return rest in tail +%% Fetch first grapheme cluster and return rest in tail -spec next_grapheme(String::unicode:chardata()) -> maybe_improper_list(grapheme_cluster(),unicode:chardata()) | {error,unicode:chardata()}. next_grapheme(CD) -> unicode_util:gc(CD). -%% Fetch first grapheme cluster and return rest in tail +%% Fetch first codepoint and return rest in tail -spec next_codepoint(String::unicode:chardata()) -> maybe_improper_list(char(),unicode:chardata()) | {error,unicode:chardata()}. @@ -498,10 +517,23 @@ next_codepoint(CD) -> unicode_util:cp(CD). %% Internals -length_1([_|Rest], N) -> - length_1(unicode_util:gc(Rest), N+1); -length_1([], N) -> - N. +length_1([CP1|[CP2|_]=Cont], N) when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2) -> + length_1(Cont, N+1); +length_1(Str, N) -> + case unicode_util:gc(Str) of + [] -> N; + [_|Rest] -> length_1(Rest, N+1) + end. + +length_b(<<CP2/utf8, Rest/binary>>, CP1, N) + when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2) -> + length_b(Rest, CP2, N+1); +length_b(Bin0, CP1, N) -> + [_|Bin1] = unicode_util:gc([CP1|Bin0]), + case unicode_util:cp(Bin1) of + [] -> N+1; + [CP3|Bin] -> length_b(Bin, CP3, N+1) + end. equal_1([A|AR], [B|BR]) when is_integer(A), is_integer(B) -> A =:= B andalso equal_1(AR, BR); @@ -540,29 +572,66 @@ equal_norm_nocase(A0, B0, Norm) -> {L1,L2} when is_list(L1), is_list(L2) -> false end. +reverse_1([CP1|[CP2|_]=Cont], Acc) when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2) -> + reverse_1(Cont, [CP1|Acc]); reverse_1(CD, Acc) -> case unicode_util:gc(CD) of [GC|Rest] -> reverse_1(Rest, [GC|Acc]); [] -> Acc end. -slice_l(CD, N, Binary) when N > 0 -> +reverse_b(<<CP2/utf8, Rest/binary>>, CP1, Acc) + when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2) -> + reverse_b(Rest, CP2, [CP1|Acc]); +reverse_b(Bin0, CP1, Acc) -> + [GC|Bin1] = unicode_util:gc([CP1|Bin0]), + case unicode_util:cp(Bin1) of + [] -> [GC|Acc]; + [CP3|Bin] -> reverse_b(Bin, CP3, [GC|Acc]) + end. + +slice_l0(<<CP1/utf8, Bin/binary>>, N) when N > 0 -> + slice_lb(Bin, CP1, N); +slice_l0(L, N) -> + slice_l(L, N). + +slice_l([CP1|[CP2|_]=Cont], N) when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2),N > 0 -> + slice_l(Cont, N-1); +slice_l(CD, N) when N > 0 -> case unicode_util:gc(CD) of - [_|Cont] -> slice_l(Cont, N-1, Binary); - [] when Binary -> <<>>; + [_|Cont] -> slice_l(Cont, N-1); [] -> [] end; -slice_l(Cont, 0, Binary) -> - case is_empty(Cont) of - true when Binary -> <<>>; - _ -> Cont +slice_l(Cont, 0) -> + Cont. + +slice_lb(<<CP2/utf8, Bin/binary>>, CP1, N) when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2), N > 1 -> + slice_lb(Bin, CP2, N-1); +slice_lb(Bin, CP1, N) -> + [_|Rest] = unicode_util:gc([CP1|Bin]), + if N > 1 -> + case unicode_util:cp(Rest) of + [CP2|Cont] -> slice_lb(Cont, CP2, N-1); + [] -> <<>> + end; + N =:= 1 -> + Rest end. +slice_trail(Orig, N) when is_binary(Orig) -> + case Orig of + <<CP1/utf8, Bin/binary>> when N > 0 -> + Length = slice_bin(Bin, CP1, N), + Sz = byte_size(Orig) - Length, + <<Keep:Sz/binary, _/binary>> = Orig, + Keep; + _ -> <<>> + end; slice_trail(CD, N) when is_list(CD) -> - slice_list(CD, N); -slice_trail(CD, N) when is_binary(CD) -> - slice_bin(CD, N, CD). + slice_list(CD, N). +slice_list([CP1|[CP2|_]=Cont], N) when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2),N > 0 -> + [CP1|slice_list(Cont, N-1)]; slice_list(CD, N) when N > 0 -> case unicode_util:gc(CD) of [GC|Cont] -> append(GC, slice_list(Cont, N-1)); @@ -571,17 +640,16 @@ slice_list(CD, N) when N > 0 -> slice_list(_, 0) -> []. -slice_bin(CD, N, Orig) when N > 0 -> - case unicode_util:gc(CD) of - [_|Cont] -> slice_bin(Cont, N-1, Orig); - [] -> Orig +slice_bin(<<CP2/utf8, Bin/binary>>, CP1, N) when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2), N > 0 -> + slice_bin(Bin, CP2, N-1); +slice_bin(CD, CP1, N) when N > 0 -> + [_|Bin] = unicode_util:gc([CP1|CD]), + case unicode_util:cp(Bin) of + [CP2|Cont] -> slice_bin(Cont, CP2, N-1); + [] -> 0 end; -slice_bin([], 0, Orig) -> - Orig; -slice_bin(CD, 0, Orig) -> - Sz = byte_size(Orig) - byte_size(CD), - <<Keep:Sz/binary, _/binary>> = Orig, - Keep. +slice_bin(CD, CP1, 0) -> + byte_size(CD)+byte_size(<<CP1/utf8>>). uppercase_list(CPs0) -> case unicode_util:uppercase(CPs0) of @@ -631,16 +699,31 @@ casefold_bin(CPs0, Acc) -> [] -> Acc end. - +%% Fast path for ascii searching for one character in lists +trim_ls([CP1|[CP2|_]=Cont]=Str, Sep) + when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2) -> + case Sep of + CP1 -> trim_ls(Cont, Sep); + _ -> Str + end; +trim_ls(Str, Sep) -> + trim_l(Str, [Sep]). + +trim_l([CP1|[CP2|_]=Cont]=Str, Sep) + when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2) -> + case lists:member(CP1, Sep) of + true -> trim_l(Cont, Sep); + false -> Str + end; trim_l([Bin|Cont0], Sep) when is_binary(Bin) -> case bin_search_inv(Bin, Cont0, Sep) of {nomatch, Cont} -> trim_l(Cont, Sep); Keep -> Keep end; -trim_l(Str, {GCs, _, _}=Sep) when is_list(Str) -> +trim_l(Str, Sep) when is_list(Str) -> case unicode_util:gc(Str) of [C|Cs] -> - case lists:member(C, GCs) of + case lists:member(C, Sep) of true -> trim_l(Cs, Sep); false -> Str end; @@ -652,15 +735,51 @@ trim_l(Bin, Sep) when is_binary(Bin) -> [Keep] -> Keep end. -trim_t([Bin|Cont0], N, Sep) when is_binary(Bin) -> +%% Fast path for ascii searching for one character in lists +trim_ts([Sep|Cs1]=Str, Sep) -> + case Cs1 of + [] -> []; + [CP2|_] when ?ASCII_LIST(Sep,CP2) -> + Tail = trim_ts(Cs1, Sep), + case is_empty(Tail) of + true -> []; + false -> [Sep|Tail] + end; + _ -> + trim_t(Str, 0, search_pattern([Sep])) + end; +trim_ts([CP|Cont],Sep) when is_integer(CP) -> + [CP|trim_ts(Cont, Sep)]; +trim_ts(Str, Sep) -> + trim_t(Str, 0, search_pattern([Sep])). + +trim_t([CP1|Cont]=Cs0, _, {GCs,CPs,_}=Seps) when is_integer(CP1) -> + case lists:member(CP1, CPs) of + true -> + [GC|Cs1] = unicode_util:gc(Cs0), + case lists:member(GC, GCs) of + true -> + Tail = trim_t(Cs1, 0, Seps), + case is_empty(Tail) of + true -> []; + false -> append(GC,Tail) + end; + false -> + append(GC,trim_t(Cs1, 0, Seps)) + end; + false -> + [CP1|trim_t(Cont, 0, Seps)] + end; +trim_t([Bin|Cont0], N, {GCs,_,_}=Seps0) when is_binary(Bin) -> <<_:N/binary, Rest/binary>> = Bin, - case bin_search(Rest, Cont0, Sep) of + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), + case bin_search(Rest, Cont0, Seps) of {nomatch,_} -> - stack(Bin, trim_t(Cont0, 0, Sep)); + stack(Bin, trim_t(Cont0, 0, Seps)); [SepStart|Cont1] -> - case bin_search_inv(SepStart, Cont1, Sep) of + case bin_search_inv(SepStart, Cont1, GCs) of {nomatch, Cont} -> - Tail = trim_t(Cont, 0, Sep), + Tail = trim_t(Cont, 0, Seps), case is_empty(Tail) of true -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(SepStart), @@ -672,67 +791,69 @@ trim_t([Bin|Cont0], N, Sep) when is_binary(Bin) -> end; [NonSep|Cont] when is_binary(NonSep) -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(NonSep), - trim_t([Bin|Cont], KeepSz, Sep) + trim_t([Bin|Cont], KeepSz, Seps) end end; -trim_t(Str, 0, {GCs,CPs,_}=Sep) when is_list(Str) -> - case unicode_util:cp(Str) of - [CP|Cs] -> - case lists:member(CP, CPs) of +trim_t(Str, 0, {GCs,_,_}=Seps) when is_list(Str) -> + case unicode_util:gc(Str) of + [GC|Cs1] -> + case lists:member(GC, GCs) of true -> - [GC|Cs1] = unicode_util:gc(Str), - case lists:member(GC, GCs) of - true -> - Tail = trim_t(Cs1, 0, Sep), - case is_empty(Tail) of - true -> []; - false -> append(GC,Tail) - end; - false -> - append(GC,trim_t(Cs1, 0, Sep)) + Tail = trim_t(Cs1, 0, Seps), + case is_empty(Tail) of + true -> []; + false -> append(GC,Tail) end; false -> - append(CP,trim_t(Cs, 0, Sep)) + append(GC,trim_t(Cs1, 0, Seps)) end; [] -> [] end; -trim_t(Bin, N, Sep) when is_binary(Bin) -> +trim_t(Bin, N, {GCs,_,_}=Seps0) when is_binary(Bin) -> <<_:N/binary, Rest/binary>> = Bin, - case bin_search(Rest, Sep) of + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), + case bin_search(Rest, [], Seps) of {nomatch,_} -> Bin; [SepStart] -> - case bin_search_inv(SepStart, [], Sep) of + case bin_search_inv(SepStart, [], GCs) of {nomatch,_} -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(SepStart), <<Keep:KeepSz/binary, _/binary>> = Bin, Keep; [NonSep] -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(NonSep), - trim_t(Bin, KeepSz, Sep) + trim_t(Bin, KeepSz, Seps) end end. -take_l([Bin|Cont0], Sep, Acc) when is_binary(Bin) -> - case bin_search_inv(Bin, Cont0, Sep) of + +take_l([CP1|[CP2|_]=Cont]=Str, Seps, Acc) + when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2) -> + case lists:member(CP1, Seps) of + true -> take_l(Cont, Seps, [CP1|Acc]); + false -> {rev(Acc), Str} + end; +take_l([Bin|Cont0], Seps, Acc) when is_binary(Bin) -> + case bin_search_inv(Bin, Cont0, Seps) of {nomatch, Cont} -> Used = cp_prefix(Cont0, Cont), - take_l(Cont, Sep, [unicode:characters_to_binary([Bin|Used])|Acc]); + take_l(Cont, Seps, [unicode:characters_to_binary([Bin|Used])|Acc]); [Bin1|_]=After when is_binary(Bin1) -> First = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(Bin1), <<Keep:First/binary, _/binary>> = Bin, {btoken(Keep,Acc), After} end; -take_l(Str, {GCs, _, _}=Sep, Acc) when is_list(Str) -> +take_l(Str, Seps, Acc) when is_list(Str) -> case unicode_util:gc(Str) of [C|Cs] -> - case lists:member(C, GCs) of - true -> take_l(Cs, Sep, append(rev(C),Acc)); + case lists:member(C, Seps) of + true -> take_l(Cs, Seps, append(rev(C),Acc)); false -> {rev(Acc), Str} end; [] -> {rev(Acc), []} end; -take_l(Bin, Sep, Acc) when is_binary(Bin) -> - case bin_search_inv(Bin, [], Sep) of +take_l(Bin, Seps, Acc) when is_binary(Bin) -> + case bin_search_inv(Bin, [], Seps) of {nomatch,_} -> {btoken(Bin, Acc), <<>>}; [After] -> @@ -741,27 +862,41 @@ take_l(Bin, Sep, Acc) when is_binary(Bin) -> {btoken(Keep, Acc), After} end. -take_lc([Bin|Cont0], Sep, Acc) when is_binary(Bin) -> - case bin_search(Bin, Cont0, Sep) of + +take_lc([CP1|Cont]=Str0, {GCs,CPs,_}=Seps, Acc) when is_integer(CP1) -> + case lists:member(CP1, CPs) of + true -> + [GC|Str] = unicode_util:gc(Str0), + case lists:member(GC, GCs) of + false -> take_lc(Str, Seps, append(rev(GC),Acc)); + true -> {rev(Acc), Str0} + end; + false -> + take_lc(Cont, Seps, append(CP1,Acc)) + end; +take_lc([Bin|Cont0], Seps0, Acc) when is_binary(Bin) -> + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), + case bin_search(Bin, Cont0, Seps) of {nomatch, Cont} -> Used = cp_prefix(Cont0, Cont), - take_lc(Cont, Sep, [unicode:characters_to_binary([Bin|Used])|Acc]); + take_lc(Cont, Seps, [unicode:characters_to_binary([Bin|Used])|Acc]); [Bin1|_]=After when is_binary(Bin1) -> First = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(Bin1), <<Keep:First/binary, _/binary>> = Bin, {btoken(Keep,Acc), After} end; -take_lc(Str, {GCs, _, _}=Sep, Acc) when is_list(Str) -> +take_lc(Str, {GCs,_,_}=Seps, Acc) when is_list(Str) -> case unicode_util:gc(Str) of [C|Cs] -> case lists:member(C, GCs) of - false -> take_lc(Cs, Sep, append(rev(C),Acc)); + false -> take_lc(Cs, Seps, append(rev(C),Acc)); true -> {rev(Acc), Str} end; [] -> {rev(Acc), []} end; -take_lc(Bin, Sep, Acc) when is_binary(Bin) -> - case bin_search(Bin, [], Sep) of +take_lc(Bin, Seps0, Acc) when is_binary(Bin) -> + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), + case bin_search(Bin, [], Seps) of {nomatch,_} -> {btoken(Bin, Acc), <<>>}; [After] -> @@ -770,148 +905,192 @@ take_lc(Bin, Sep, Acc) when is_binary(Bin) -> {btoken(Keep, Acc), After} end. -take_t([Bin|Cont0], N, Sep) when is_binary(Bin) -> + +take_t([CP1|Cont]=Str0, _, {GCs,CPs,_}=Seps) when is_integer(CP1) -> + case lists:member(CP1, CPs) of + true -> + [GC|Str] = unicode_util:gc(Str0), + case lists:member(GC, GCs) of + true -> + {Head, Tail} = take_t(Str, 0, Seps), + case is_empty(Head) of + true -> {Head, append(GC,Tail)}; + false -> {append(GC,Head), Tail} + end; + false -> + {Head, Tail} = take_t(Str, 0, Seps), + {append(GC,Head), Tail} + end; + false -> + {Head, Tail} = take_t(Cont, 0, Seps), + {[CP1|Head], Tail} + end; +take_t([Bin|Cont0], N, {GCs,_,_}=Seps0) when is_binary(Bin) -> <<_:N/binary, Rest/binary>> = Bin, - case bin_search(Rest, Cont0, Sep) of + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), + case bin_search(Rest, Cont0, Seps) of {nomatch,Cont} -> Used = cp_prefix(Cont0, Cont), - {Head, Tail} = take_t(Cont, 0, Sep), + {Head, Tail} = take_t(Cont, 0, Seps), {stack(unicode:characters_to_binary([Bin|Used]), Head), Tail}; [SepStart|Cont1] -> - case bin_search_inv(SepStart, Cont1, Sep) of + case bin_search_inv(SepStart, Cont1, GCs) of {nomatch, Cont} -> - {Head, Tail} = take_t(Cont, 0, Sep), + {Head, Tail} = take_t(Cont, 0, Seps), Used = cp_prefix(Cont0, Cont), - case equal(Tail, Cont) of + case is_empty(Head) of true -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(SepStart), <<Keep:KeepSz/binary, End/binary>> = Bin, - {stack(Keep,Head), stack(stack(End,Used),Tail)}; + {Keep, stack(stack(End,Used),Tail)}; false -> {stack(unicode:characters_to_binary([Bin|Used]),Head), Tail} end; [NonSep|Cont] when is_binary(NonSep) -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(NonSep), - take_t([Bin|Cont], KeepSz, Sep) + take_t([Bin|Cont], KeepSz, Seps) end end; -take_t(Str, 0, {GCs,CPs,_}=Sep) when is_list(Str) -> - case unicode_util:cp(Str) of - [CP|Cs] -> - case lists:member(CP, CPs) of +take_t(Str, 0, {GCs,_,_}=Seps) when is_list(Str) -> + case unicode_util:gc(Str) of + [GC|Cs1] -> + case lists:member(GC, GCs) of true -> - [GC|Cs1] = unicode_util:gc(Str), - case lists:member(GC, GCs) of - true -> - {Head, Tail} = take_t(Cs1, 0, Sep), - case equal(Tail, Cs1) of - true -> {Head, append(GC,Tail)}; - false -> {append(GC,Head), Tail} - end; - false -> - {Head, Tail} = take_t(Cs, 0, Sep), - {append(CP,Head), Tail} + {Head, Tail} = take_t(Cs1, 0, Seps), + case is_empty(Head) of + true -> {Head, append(GC,Tail)}; + false -> {append(GC,Head), Tail} end; false -> - {Head, Tail} = take_t(Cs, 0, Sep), - {append(CP,Head), Tail} + {Head, Tail} = take_t(Cs1, 0, Seps), + {append(GC,Head), Tail} end; [] -> {[],[]} end; -take_t(Bin, N, Sep) when is_binary(Bin) -> +take_t(Bin, N, {GCs,_,_}=Seps0) when is_binary(Bin) -> <<_:N/binary, Rest/binary>> = Bin, - case bin_search(Rest, Sep) of + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), + case bin_search(Rest, [], Seps) of {nomatch,_} -> {Bin, <<>>}; [SepStart] -> - case bin_search_inv(SepStart, [], Sep) of + case bin_search_inv(SepStart, [], GCs) of {nomatch,_} -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(SepStart), <<Before:KeepSz/binary, End/binary>> = Bin, {Before, End}; [NonSep] -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(NonSep), - take_t(Bin, KeepSz, Sep) + take_t(Bin, KeepSz, Seps) end end. -take_tc([Bin|Cont0], N, Sep) when is_binary(Bin) -> +take_tc([CP1|[CP2|_]=Cont], _, {GCs,_,_}=Seps) when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1,CP2) -> + case lists:member(CP1, GCs) of + false -> + {Head, Tail} = take_tc(Cont, 0, Seps), + case is_empty(Head) of + true -> {Head, append(CP1,Tail)}; + false -> {append(CP1,Head), Tail} + end; + true -> + {Head, Tail} = take_tc(Cont, 0, Seps), + {append(CP1,Head), Tail} + end; +take_tc([Bin|Cont0], N, {GCs,_,_}=Seps0) when is_binary(Bin) -> <<_:N/binary, Rest/binary>> = Bin, - case bin_search_inv(Rest, Cont0, Sep) of + case bin_search_inv(Rest, Cont0, GCs) of {nomatch,Cont} -> Used = cp_prefix(Cont0, Cont), - {Head, Tail} = take_tc(Cont, 0, Sep), + {Head, Tail} = take_tc(Cont, 0, Seps0), {stack(unicode:characters_to_binary([Bin|Used]), Head), Tail}; [SepStart|Cont1] -> - case bin_search(SepStart, Cont1, Sep) of + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), + case bin_search(SepStart, Cont1, Seps) of {nomatch, Cont} -> - {Head, Tail} = take_tc(Cont, 0, Sep), + {Head, Tail} = take_tc(Cont, 0, Seps), Used = cp_prefix(Cont0, Cont), - case equal(Tail, Cont) of + case is_empty(Head) of true -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(SepStart), <<Keep:KeepSz/binary, End/binary>> = Bin, - {stack(Keep,Head), stack(stack(End,Used),Tail)}; + {Keep, stack(stack(End,Used),Tail)}; false -> {stack(unicode:characters_to_binary([Bin|Used]),Head), Tail} end; [NonSep|Cont] when is_binary(NonSep) -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(NonSep), - take_tc([Bin|Cont], KeepSz, Sep) + take_tc([Bin|Cont], KeepSz, Seps) end end; -take_tc(Str, 0, {GCs,CPs,_}=Sep) when is_list(Str) -> - case unicode_util:cp(Str) of - [CP|Cs] -> - case lists:member(CP, CPs) of - true -> - [GC|Cs1] = unicode_util:gc(Str), - case lists:member(GC, GCs) of - false -> - {Head, Tail} = take_tc(Cs1, 0, Sep), - case equal(Tail, Cs1) of - true -> {Head, append(GC,Tail)}; - false -> {append(GC,Head), Tail} - end; - true -> - {Head, Tail} = take_tc(Cs1, 0, Sep), - {append(GC,Head), Tail} - end; +take_tc(Str, 0, {GCs,_,_}=Seps) when is_list(Str) -> + case unicode_util:gc(Str) of + [GC|Cs1] -> + case lists:member(GC, GCs) of false -> - {Head, Tail} = take_tc(Cs, 0, Sep), - case equal(Tail, Cs) of - true -> {Head, append(CP,Tail)}; - false -> {append(CP,Head), Tail} - end + {Head, Tail} = take_tc(Cs1, 0, Seps), + case is_empty(Head) of + true -> {Head, append(GC,Tail)}; + false -> {append(GC,Head), Tail} + end; + true -> + {Head, Tail} = take_tc(Cs1, 0, Seps), + {append(GC,Head), Tail} end; [] -> {[],[]} end; -take_tc(Bin, N, Sep) when is_binary(Bin) -> +take_tc(Bin, N, {GCs,_,_}=Seps0) when is_binary(Bin) -> <<_:N/binary, Rest/binary>> = Bin, - case bin_search_inv(Rest, [], Sep) of + case bin_search_inv(Rest, [], GCs) of {nomatch,_} -> {Bin, <<>>}; [SepStart] -> - case bin_search(SepStart, [], Sep) of + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), + case bin_search(SepStart, [], Seps) of {nomatch,_} -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(SepStart), <<Before:KeepSz/binary, End/binary>> = Bin, {Before, End}; [NonSep] -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin) - byte_size(NonSep), - take_tc(Bin, KeepSz, Sep) + take_tc(Bin, KeepSz, Seps) end end. -prefix_1(Cs, []) -> Cs; -prefix_1(Cs, [_]=Pre) -> - prefix_2(unicode_util:gc(Cs), Pre); -prefix_1(Cs, Pre) -> - prefix_2(unicode_util:cp(Cs), Pre). - -prefix_2([C|Cs], [C|Pre]) -> - prefix_1(Cs, Pre); -prefix_2(_, _) -> - nomatch. +prefix_1(Cs0, [GC]) -> + case unicode_util:gc(Cs0) of + [GC|Cs] -> Cs; + _ -> nomatch + end; +prefix_1([CP|Cs], [Pre|PreR]) when is_integer(CP) -> + case CP =:= Pre of + true -> prefix_1(Cs,PreR); + false -> nomatch + end; +prefix_1(<<CP/utf8, Cs/binary>>, [Pre|PreR]) -> + case CP =:= Pre of + true -> prefix_1(Cs,PreR); + false -> nomatch + end; +prefix_1(Cs0, [Pre|PreR]) -> + case unicode_util:cp(Cs0) of + [Pre|Cs] -> prefix_1(Cs,PreR); + _ -> nomatch + end. +split_1([CP1|Cs]=Cs0, [C|_]=Needle, _, Where, Curr, Acc) when is_integer(CP1) -> + case CP1=:=C of + true -> + case prefix_1(Cs0, Needle) of + nomatch -> split_1(Cs, Needle, 0, Where, append(C,Curr), Acc); + Rest when Where =:= leading -> + [rev(Curr), Rest]; + Rest when Where =:= trailing -> + split_1(Cs, Needle, 0, Where, [C|Curr], [rev(Curr), Rest]); + Rest when Where =:= all -> + split_1(Rest, Needle, 0, Where, [], [rev(Curr)|Acc]) + end; + false -> + split_1(Cs, Needle, 0, Where, append(CP1,Curr), Acc) + end; split_1([Bin|Cont0], Needle, Start, Where, Curr0, Acc) when is_binary(Bin) -> case bin_search_str(Bin, Start, Cont0, Needle) of @@ -971,32 +1150,50 @@ split_1(Bin, [_C|_]=Needle, Start, Where, Curr0, Acc) -> end end. -lexemes_m([Bin|Cont0], Seps, Ts) when is_binary(Bin) -> - case bin_search_inv(Bin, Cont0, Seps) of +lexemes_m([CP|_]=Cs0, {GCs,CPs,_}=Seps, Ts) when is_integer(CP) -> + case lists:member(CP, CPs) of + true -> + [GC|Cs2] = unicode_util:gc(Cs0), + case lists:member(GC, GCs) of + true -> + lexemes_m(Cs2, Seps, Ts); + false -> + {Lexeme,Rest} = lexeme_pick(Cs0, Seps, []), + lexemes_m(Rest, Seps, [Lexeme|Ts]) + end; + false -> + {Lexeme,Rest} = lexeme_pick(Cs0, Seps, []), + lexemes_m(Rest, Seps, [Lexeme|Ts]) + end; +lexemes_m([Bin|Cont0], {GCs,_,_}=Seps0, Ts) when is_binary(Bin) -> + case bin_search_inv(Bin, Cont0, GCs) of {nomatch,Cont} -> - lexemes_m(Cont, Seps, Ts); + lexemes_m(Cont, Seps0, Ts); Cs -> + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), {Lexeme,Rest} = lexeme_pick(Cs, Seps, []), lexemes_m(Rest, Seps, [Lexeme|Ts]) end; -lexemes_m(Cs0, {GCs, _, _}=Seps, Ts) when is_list(Cs0) -> +lexemes_m(Cs0, {GCs, _, _}=Seps0, Ts) when is_list(Cs0) -> case unicode_util:gc(Cs0) of [C|Cs] -> case lists:member(C, GCs) of true -> - lexemes_m(Cs, Seps, Ts); + lexemes_m(Cs, Seps0, Ts); false -> + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), {Lexeme,Rest} = lexeme_pick(Cs0, Seps, []), lexemes_m(Rest, Seps, [Lexeme|Ts]) end; [] -> lists:reverse(Ts) end; -lexemes_m(Bin, Seps, Ts) when is_binary(Bin) -> - case bin_search_inv(Bin, [], Seps) of +lexemes_m(Bin, {GCs,_,_}=Seps0, Ts) when is_binary(Bin) -> + case bin_search_inv(Bin, [], GCs) of {nomatch,_} -> lists:reverse(Ts); [Cs] -> + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), {Lexeme,Rest} = lexeme_pick(Cs, Seps, []), lexemes_m(Rest, Seps, add_non_empty(Lexeme,Ts)) end. @@ -1027,7 +1224,7 @@ lexeme_pick(Cs0, {GCs, CPs, _} = Seps, Tkn) when is_list(Cs0) -> true -> [GC|Cs2] = unicode_util:gc(Cs0), case lists:member(GC, GCs) of - true -> {rev(Tkn), Cs0}; + true -> {rev(Tkn), Cs2}; false -> lexeme_pick(Cs2, Seps, append(rev(GC),Tkn)) end; false -> @@ -1037,7 +1234,7 @@ lexeme_pick(Cs0, {GCs, CPs, _} = Seps, Tkn) when is_list(Cs0) -> {rev(Tkn), []} end; lexeme_pick(Bin, Seps, Tkn) when is_binary(Bin) -> - case bin_search(Bin, Seps) of + case bin_search(Bin, [], Seps) of {nomatch,_} -> {btoken(Bin,Tkn), []}; [Left] -> @@ -1046,35 +1243,38 @@ lexeme_pick(Bin, Seps, Tkn) when is_binary(Bin) -> {btoken(Lexeme, Tkn), Left} end. -nth_lexeme_m([Bin|Cont0], Seps, N) when is_binary(Bin) -> - case bin_search_inv(Bin, Cont0, Seps) of +nth_lexeme_m([Bin|Cont0], {GCs,_,_}=Seps0, N) when is_binary(Bin) -> + case bin_search_inv(Bin, Cont0, GCs) of {nomatch,Cont} -> - nth_lexeme_m(Cont, Seps, N); + nth_lexeme_m(Cont, Seps0, N); Cs when N > 1 -> - Rest = lexeme_skip(Cs, Seps), - nth_lexeme_m(Rest, Seps, N-1); + Rest = lexeme_skip(Cs, Seps0), + nth_lexeme_m(Rest, Seps0, N-1); Cs -> + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), {Lexeme,_} = lexeme_pick(Cs, Seps, []), Lexeme end; -nth_lexeme_m(Cs0, {GCs, _, _}=Seps, N) when is_list(Cs0) -> +nth_lexeme_m(Cs0, {GCs, _, _}=Seps0, N) when is_list(Cs0) -> case unicode_util:gc(Cs0) of [C|Cs] -> case lists:member(C, GCs) of true -> - nth_lexeme_m(Cs, Seps, N); + nth_lexeme_m(Cs, Seps0, N); false when N > 1 -> - Cs1 = lexeme_skip(Cs, Seps), - nth_lexeme_m(Cs1, Seps, N-1); + Cs1 = lexeme_skip(Cs, Seps0), + nth_lexeme_m(Cs1, Seps0, N-1); false -> + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), {Lexeme,_} = lexeme_pick(Cs0, Seps, []), Lexeme end; [] -> [] end; -nth_lexeme_m(Bin, Seps, N) when is_binary(Bin) -> - case bin_search_inv(Bin, [], Seps) of +nth_lexeme_m(Bin, {GCs,_,_}=Seps0, N) when is_binary(Bin) -> + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), + case bin_search_inv(Bin, [], GCs) of [Cs] when N > 1 -> Cs1 = lexeme_skip(Cs, Seps), nth_lexeme_m(Cs1, Seps, N-1); @@ -1090,16 +1290,17 @@ lexeme_skip([CP|Cs1]=Cs0, {GCs,CPs,_}=Seps) when is_integer(CP) -> true -> [GC|Cs2] = unicode_util:gc(Cs0), case lists:member(GC, GCs) of - true -> Cs0; + true -> Cs2; false -> lexeme_skip(Cs2, Seps) end; false -> lexeme_skip(Cs1, Seps) end; -lexeme_skip([Bin|Cont0], Seps) when is_binary(Bin) -> +lexeme_skip([Bin|Cont0], Seps0) when is_binary(Bin) -> + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), case bin_search(Bin, Cont0, Seps) of {nomatch,_} -> lexeme_skip(Cont0, Seps); - Cs -> Cs + Cs -> tl(unicode_util:gc(Cs)) end; lexeme_skip(Cs0, {GCs, CPs, _} = Seps) when is_list(Cs0) -> case unicode_util:cp(Cs0) of @@ -1108,7 +1309,7 @@ lexeme_skip(Cs0, {GCs, CPs, _} = Seps) when is_list(Cs0) -> true -> [GC|Cs2] = unicode_util:gc(Cs0), case lists:member(GC, GCs) of - true -> Cs0; + true -> Cs2; false -> lexeme_skip(Cs2, Seps) end; false -> @@ -1117,12 +1318,23 @@ lexeme_skip(Cs0, {GCs, CPs, _} = Seps) when is_list(Cs0) -> [] -> [] end; -lexeme_skip(Bin, Seps) when is_binary(Bin) -> - case bin_search(Bin, Seps) of +lexeme_skip(Bin, Seps0) when is_binary(Bin) -> + Seps = search_compile(Seps0), + case bin_search(Bin, [], Seps) of {nomatch,_} -> <<>>; - [Left] -> Left + [Left] -> tl(unicode_util:gc(Left)) end. +find_l([C1|Cs]=Cs0, [C|_]=Needle) when is_integer(C1) -> + case C1 of + C -> + case prefix_1(Cs0, Needle) of + nomatch -> find_l(Cs, Needle); + _ -> Cs0 + end; + _ -> + find_l(Cs, Needle) + end; find_l([Bin|Cont0], Needle) when is_binary(Bin) -> case bin_search_str(Bin, 0, Cont0, Needle) of {nomatch, _, Cont} -> @@ -1147,6 +1359,16 @@ find_l(Bin, Needle) -> {_Before, [Cs], _After} -> Cs end. +find_r([Cp|Cs]=Cs0, [C|_]=Needle, Res) when is_integer(Cp) -> + case Cp of + C -> + case prefix_1(Cs0, Needle) of + nomatch -> find_r(Cs, Needle, Res); + _ -> find_r(Cs, Needle, Cs0) + end; + _ -> + find_r(Cs, Needle, Res) + end; find_r([Bin|Cont0], Needle, Res) when is_binary(Bin) -> case bin_search_str(Bin, 0, Cont0, Needle) of {nomatch,_,Cont} -> @@ -1217,11 +1439,6 @@ cp_prefix_1(Orig, Until, Cont) -> %% Binary special -bin_search(Bin, Seps) -> - bin_search(Bin, [], Seps). - -bin_search(_Bin, Cont, {[],_,_}) -> - {nomatch, Cont}; bin_search(Bin, Cont, {Seps,_,BP}) -> bin_search_loop(Bin, 0, BP, Cont, Seps). @@ -1229,10 +1446,14 @@ bin_search(Bin, Cont, {Seps,_,BP}) -> %% i.e. å in nfd form $a "COMBINING RING ABOVE" %% and PREPEND characters like "ARABIC NUMBER SIGN" 1536 <<216,128>> %% combined with other characters are currently ignored. +search_pattern({_,_,_}=P) -> P; search_pattern(Seps) -> CPs = search_cp(Seps), - Bin = bin_pattern(CPs), - {Seps, CPs, Bin}. + {Seps, CPs, undefined}. + +search_compile({Sep, CPs, undefined}) -> + {Sep, CPs, binary:compile_pattern(bin_pattern(CPs))}; +search_compile({_,_,_}=Compiled) -> Compiled. search_cp([CP|Seps]) when is_integer(CP) -> [CP|search_cp(Seps)]; @@ -1253,9 +1474,21 @@ bin_search_loop(Bin0, Start, BinSeps, Cont, Seps) -> case binary:match(Bin, BinSeps) of nomatch -> {nomatch,Cont}; + {Where, _CL} when Cont =:= [] -> + <<_:Where/binary, Cont1/binary>> = Bin, + [GC|Cont2] = unicode_util:gc(Cont1), + case lists:member(GC, Seps) of + false when Cont2 =:= [] -> + {nomatch, []}; + false -> + Next = byte_size(Bin0) - byte_size(Cont2), + bin_search_loop(Bin0, Next, BinSeps, Cont, Seps); + true -> + [Cont1] + end; {Where, _CL} -> <<_:Where/binary, Cont0/binary>> = Bin, - Cont1 = stack(Cont0, Cont), + Cont1 = [Cont0|Cont], [GC|Cont2] = unicode_util:gc(Cont1), case lists:member(GC, Seps) of false -> @@ -1263,55 +1496,108 @@ bin_search_loop(Bin0, Start, BinSeps, Cont, Seps) -> [BinR|Cont] when is_binary(BinR) -> Next = byte_size(Bin0) - byte_size(BinR), bin_search_loop(Bin0, Next, BinSeps, Cont, Seps); - BinR when is_binary(BinR), Cont =:= [] -> - Next = byte_size(Bin0) - byte_size(BinR), - bin_search_loop(Bin0, Next, BinSeps, Cont, Seps); _ -> {nomatch, Cont2} end; - true when is_list(Cont1) -> - Cont1; true -> - [Cont1] + Cont1 end end. -bin_search_inv(Bin, Cont, {[], _, _}) -> - [Bin|Cont]; -bin_search_inv(Bin, Cont, {[Sep], _, _}) -> - bin_search_inv_1([Bin|Cont], Sep); -bin_search_inv(Bin, Cont, {Seps, _, _}) -> - bin_search_inv_n([Bin|Cont], Seps). - -bin_search_inv_1([<<>>|CPs], _) -> - {nomatch, CPs}; -bin_search_inv_1(CPs = [Bin0|Cont], Sep) when is_binary(Bin0) -> - case unicode_util:gc(CPs) of - [Sep|Bin] when is_binary(Bin), Cont =:= [] -> - bin_search_inv_1([Bin], Sep); - [Sep|[Bin|Cont]=Cs] when is_binary(Bin) -> - bin_search_inv_1(Cs, Sep); - [Sep|Cs] -> - {nomatch, Cs}; - _ -> CPs - end. +bin_search_inv(<<>>, Cont, _) -> + {nomatch, Cont}; +bin_search_inv(Bin, Cont, [Sep]) -> + bin_search_inv_1(Bin, Cont, Sep); +bin_search_inv(Bin, Cont, Seps) -> + bin_search_inv_n(Bin, Cont, Seps). + +bin_search_inv_1(<<CP1/utf8, BinRest/binary>>=Bin0, Cont, Sep) -> + case BinRest of + <<CP2/utf8, _/binary>> when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1, CP2) -> + case CP1 of + Sep -> bin_search_inv_1(BinRest, Cont, Sep); + _ -> [Bin0|Cont] + end; + _ when Cont =:= [] -> + case unicode_util:gc(Bin0) of + [Sep|Bin] -> bin_search_inv_1(Bin, Cont, Sep); + _ -> [Bin0|Cont] + end; + _ -> + case unicode_util:gc([Bin0|Cont]) of + [Sep|[Bin|Cont]] when is_binary(Bin) -> + bin_search_inv_1(Bin, Cont, Sep); + [Sep|Cs] -> + {nomatch, Cs}; + _ -> [Bin0|Cont] + end + end; +bin_search_inv_1(<<>>, Cont, _Sep) -> + {nomatch, Cont}; +bin_search_inv_1([], Cont, _Sep) -> + {nomatch, Cont}. -bin_search_inv_n([<<>>|CPs], _) -> - {nomatch, CPs}; -bin_search_inv_n([Bin0|Cont]=CPs, Seps) when is_binary(Bin0) -> - [C|Cs0] = unicode_util:gc(CPs), - case {lists:member(C, Seps), Cs0} of - {true, Cs} when is_binary(Cs), Cont =:= [] -> - bin_search_inv_n([Cs], Seps); - {true, [Bin|Cont]=Cs} when is_binary(Bin) -> - bin_search_inv_n(Cs, Seps); - {true, Cs} -> {nomatch, Cs}; - {false, _} -> CPs - end. +bin_search_inv_n(<<CP1/utf8, BinRest/binary>>=Bin0, Cont, Seps) -> + case BinRest of + <<CP2/utf8, _/binary>> when ?ASCII_LIST(CP1, CP2) -> + case lists:member(CP1,Seps) of + true -> bin_search_inv_n(BinRest, Cont, Seps); + false -> [Bin0|Cont] + end; + _ when Cont =:= [] -> + [GC|Bin] = unicode_util:gc(Bin0), + case lists:member(GC, Seps) of + true -> bin_search_inv_n(Bin, Cont, Seps); + false -> [Bin0|Cont] + end; + _ -> + [GC|Cs0] = unicode_util:gc([Bin0|Cont]), + case lists:member(GC, Seps) of + false -> [Bin0|Cont]; + true -> + case Cs0 of + [Bin|Cont] when is_binary(Bin) -> + bin_search_inv_n(Bin, Cont, Seps); + _ -> + {nomatch, Cs0} + end + end + end; +bin_search_inv_n(<<>>, Cont, _Sep) -> + {nomatch, Cont}; +bin_search_inv_n([], Cont, _Sep) -> + {nomatch, Cont}. + +bin_search_str(Bin0, Start, [], SearchCPs) -> + Compiled = binary:compile_pattern(unicode:characters_to_binary(SearchCPs)), + bin_search_str_1(Bin0, Start, Compiled, SearchCPs); bin_search_str(Bin0, Start, Cont, [CP|_]=SearchCPs) -> + First = binary:compile_pattern(<<CP/utf8>>), + bin_search_str_2(Bin0, Start, Cont, First, SearchCPs). + +bin_search_str_1(Bin0, Start, First, SearchCPs) -> + <<_:Start/binary, Bin/binary>> = Bin0, + case binary:match(Bin, First) of + nomatch -> {nomatch, byte_size(Bin0), []}; + {Where0, _} -> + Where = Start+Where0, + <<Keep:Where/binary, Cs0/binary>> = Bin0, + case prefix_1(Cs0, SearchCPs) of + nomatch -> + <<_/utf8, Cs/binary>> = Cs0, + KeepSz = byte_size(Bin0) - byte_size(Cs), + bin_search_str_1(Bin0, KeepSz, First, SearchCPs); + [] -> + {Keep, [Cs0], <<>>}; + Rest -> + {Keep, [Cs0], Rest} + end + end. + +bin_search_str_2(Bin0, Start, Cont, First, SearchCPs) -> <<_:Start/binary, Bin/binary>> = Bin0, - case binary:match(Bin, <<CP/utf8>>) of + case binary:match(Bin, First) of nomatch -> {nomatch, byte_size(Bin0), Cont}; {Where0, _} -> Where = Start+Where0, @@ -1320,7 +1606,7 @@ bin_search_str(Bin0, Start, Cont, [CP|_]=SearchCPs) -> case prefix_1(stack(Cs0,Cont), SearchCPs) of nomatch when is_binary(Cs) -> KeepSz = byte_size(Bin0) - byte_size(Cs), - bin_search_str(Bin0, KeepSz, Cont, SearchCPs); + bin_search_str_2(Bin0, KeepSz, Cont, First, SearchCPs); nomatch -> {nomatch, Where, stack([GC|Cs],Cont)}; [] -> diff --git a/lib/stdlib/test/string_SUITE.erl b/lib/stdlib/test/string_SUITE.erl index 90f980c0e5..f43bfb4482 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/test/string_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/stdlib/test/string_SUITE.erl @@ -92,14 +92,11 @@ end_per_testcase(_Case, _Config) -> ok. debug() -> - Config = [{data_dir, ?MODULE_STRING++"_data"}], + Config = [{data_dir, "./" ++ ?MODULE_STRING++"_data"}], [io:format("~p:~p~n",[Test,?MODULE:Test(Config)]) || {_,Tests} <- groups(), Test <- Tests]. -define(TEST(B,C,D), test(?LINE,?FUNCTION_NAME,B,C,D, true)). --define(TEST_EQ(B,C,D), - test(?LINE,?FUNCTION_NAME,B,C,D, true), - test(?LINE,?FUNCTION_NAME,hd(C),[B|tl(C),D, true)). -define(TEST_NN(B,C,D), test(?LINE,?FUNCTION_NAME,B,C,D, false), @@ -294,6 +291,7 @@ trim(_) -> ?TEST(["..h", ".e", <<"j..">>], [both, ". "], "h.ej"), ?TEST(["..h", <<".ejsa"/utf8>>, "n.."], [both, ". "], "h.ejsan"), %% Test that it behaves with graphemes (i.e. nfd tests are the hard part) + ?TEST([1013,101,778,101,101], [trailing, [101]], [1013,101,778]), ?TEST("aaåaa", [both, "a"], "å"), ?TEST(["aaa",778,"äöoo"], [both, "ao"], "åäö"), ?TEST([<<"aaa">>,778,"äöoo"], [both, "ao"], "åäö"), @@ -353,6 +351,7 @@ take(_) -> ?TEST([<<>>,<<"..">>, " h.ej", <<" ..">>], [Chars, true, leading], {".. ", "h.ej .."}), ?TEST(["..h", <<".ejsa"/utf8>>, "n.."], [Chars, true, leading], {"..", "h.ejsan.."}), %% Test that it behaves with graphemes (i.e. nfd tests are the hard part) + ?TEST([101,778], [[[101, 779]], true], {[101,778], []}), ?TEST(["aaee",778,"äöoo"], [[[$e,778]], true, leading], {"aae", [$e,778|"äöoo"]}), ?TEST([<<"aae">>,778,"äöoo"], [[[$e,778]],true,leading], {"aa", [$e,778|"äöoo"]}), ?TEST([<<"e">>,778,"åäöe", <<778/utf8>>], [[[$e,778]], true, leading], {[], [$e,778]++"åäöe"++[778]}), @@ -713,29 +712,123 @@ nth_lexeme(_) -> meas(Config) -> + Parent = self(), + Exec = fun() -> + DataDir0 = proplists:get_value(data_dir, Config), + DataDir = filename:join(lists:droplast(filename:split(DataDir0))), + case proplists:get_value(profile, Config, false) of + false -> + do_measure(DataDir); + eprof -> + eprof:profile(fun() -> do_measure(DataDir) end, [set_on_spawn]), + eprof:stop_profiling(), + eprof:analyze(), + eprof:stop() + end, + Parent ! {test_done, self()}, + normal + end, + ct:timetrap({minutes,2}), case ct:get_timetrap_info() of {_,{_,Scale}} when Scale > 1 -> {skip,{will_not_run_in_debug,Scale}}; - _ -> % No scaling - DataDir = proplists:get_value(data_dir, Config), - TestDir = filename:dirname(string:trim(DataDir, trailing, "/")), - do_measure(TestDir) + _ -> % No scaling, run at most 1.5 min + Tester = spawn(Exec), + receive {test_done, Tester} -> ok + after 90000 -> + io:format("Timelimit reached stopping~n",[]), + exit(Tester, die) + end, + ok end. -do_measure(TestDir) -> - File = filename:join(TestDir, ?MODULE_STRING ++ ".erl"), +do_measure(DataDir) -> + File = filename:join([DataDir,"unicode_util_SUITE_data","NormalizationTest.txt"]), io:format("File ~s ",[File]), {ok, Bin} = file:read_file(File), io:format("~p~n",[byte_size(Bin)]), Do = fun(Name, Func, Mode) -> {N, Mean, Stddev, _} = time_func(Func, Mode, Bin), - io:format("~10w ~6w ~6.2fms ±~4.2fms #~.2w gc included~n", + io:format("~15w ~6w ~6.2fms ±~5.2fms #~.2w gc included~n", [Name, Mode, Mean/1000, Stddev/1000, N]) end, + Do2 = fun(Name, Func, Mode) -> + {N, Mean, Stddev, _} = time_func(Func, binary, <<>>), + io:format("~15w ~6w ~6.2fms ±~5.2fms #~.2w gc included~n", + [Name, Mode, Mean/1000, Stddev/1000, N]) + end, io:format("----------------------~n"), - Do(tokens, fun(Str) -> string:tokens(Str, [$\n,$\r]) end, list), + + Do(old_tokens, fun(Str) -> string:tokens(Str, [$\n,$\r]) end, list), Tokens = {lexemes, fun(Str) -> string:lexemes(Str, [$\n,$\r]) end}, [Do(Name,Fun,Mode) || {Name,Fun} <- [Tokens], Mode <- [list, binary]], + + S0 = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxy.....", + S0B = <<"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxy.....">>, + Do2(old_strip_l, repeat(fun() -> string:strip(S0, left, $x) end), list), + Do2(trim_l, repeat(fun() -> string:trim(S0, leading, [$x]) end), list), + Do2(trim_l, repeat(fun() -> string:trim(S0B, leading, [$x]) end), binary), + Do2(old_strip_r, repeat(fun() -> string:strip(S0, right, $.) end), list), + Do2(trim_t, repeat(fun() -> string:trim(S0, trailing, [$.]) end), list), + Do2(trim_t, repeat(fun() -> string:trim(S0B, trailing, [$.]) end), binary), + + Do2(old_chr_sub, repeat(fun() -> string:sub_string(S0, string:chr(S0, $.)) end), list), + Do2(old_str_sub, repeat(fun() -> string:sub_string(S0, string:str(S0, [$.])) end), list), + Do2(find, repeat(fun() -> string:find(S0, [$.]) end), list), + Do2(find, repeat(fun() -> string:find(S0B, [$.]) end), binary), + Do2(old_str_sub2, repeat(fun() -> N = string:str(S0, "xy.."), + {string:sub_string(S0,1,N), string:sub_string(S0,N+4)} end), list), + Do2(split, repeat(fun() -> string:split(S0, "xy..") end), list), + Do2(split, repeat(fun() -> string:split(S0B, "xy..") end), binary), + + Do2(old_rstr_sub, repeat(fun() -> string:sub_string(S0, string:rstr(S0, [$y])) end), list), + Do2(find_t, repeat(fun() -> string:find(S0, [$y], trailing) end), list), + Do2(find_t, repeat(fun() -> string:find(S0B, [$y], trailing) end), binary), + Do2(old_rstr_sub2, repeat(fun() -> N = string:rstr(S0, "y.."), + {string:sub_string(S0,1,N), string:sub_string(S0,N+3)} end), list), + Do2(split_t, repeat(fun() -> string:split(S0, "y..", trailing) end), list), + Do2(split_t, repeat(fun() -> string:split(S0B, "y..", trailing) end), binary), + + Do2(old_span, repeat(fun() -> N=string:span(S0, [$x, $y]), + {string:sub_string(S0,1,N),string:sub_string(S0,N+1)} + end), list), + Do2(take, repeat(fun() -> string:take(S0, [$x, $y]) end), list), + Do2(take, repeat(fun() -> string:take(S0B, [$x, $y]) end), binary), + + Do2(old_cspan, repeat(fun() -> N=string:cspan(S0, [$.,$y]), + {string:sub_string(S0,1,N),string:sub_string(S0,N+1)} + end), list), + Do2(take_c, repeat(fun() -> string:take(S0, [$.,$y], true) end), list), + Do2(take_c, repeat(fun() -> string:take(S0B, [$.,$y], true) end), binary), + + Do2(old_substr, repeat(fun() -> string:substr(S0, 21, 15) end), list), + Do2(slice, repeat(fun() -> string:slice(S0, 20, 15) end), list), + Do2(slice, repeat(fun() -> string:slice(S0B, 20, 15) end), binary), + + io:format("--~n",[]), + NthTokens = {nth_lexemes, fun(Str) -> string:nth_lexeme(Str, 18000, [$\n,$\r]) end}, + [Do(Name,Fun,Mode) || {Name,Fun} <- [NthTokens], Mode <- [list, binary]], + Do2(take_t, repeat(fun() -> string:take(S0, [$.,$y], false, trailing) end), list), + Do2(take_t, repeat(fun() -> string:take(S0B, [$.,$y], false, trailing) end), binary), + Do2(take_tc, repeat(fun() -> string:take(S0, [$x], true, trailing) end), list), + Do2(take_tc, repeat(fun() -> string:take(S0B, [$x], true, trailing) end), binary), + + Length = {length, fun(Str) -> string:length(Str) end}, + [Do(Name,Fun,Mode) || {Name,Fun} <- [Length], Mode <- [list, binary]], + + Reverse = {reverse, fun(Str) -> string:reverse(Str) end}, + [Do(Name,Fun,Mode) || {Name,Fun} <- [Reverse], Mode <- [list, binary]], + + ok. + +repeat(F) -> + fun(_) -> repeat_1(F,20000) end. + +repeat_1(F, N) when N > 0 -> + F(), + repeat_1(F, N-1); +repeat_1(_, _) -> + erlang:garbage_collect(), ok. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% @@ -865,8 +958,6 @@ check_types_1({list, _},{list, undefined}) -> ok; check_types_1({list, _},{list, codepoints}) -> ok; -check_types_1({list, _},{list, {list, codepoints}}) -> - ok; check_types_1({list, {list, _}},{list, {list, codepoints}}) -> ok; check_types_1(mixed,_) -> @@ -947,7 +1038,7 @@ time_func(Fun, Mode, Bin) -> end), receive {Pid,Msg} -> Msg end. -time_func(N,Sum,SumSq, Fun, Str, _) when N < 50 -> +time_func(N,Sum,SumSq, Fun, Str, _) when N < 20 -> {Time, Res} = timer:tc(fun() -> Fun(Str) end), time_func(N+1,Sum+Time,SumSq+Time*Time, Fun, Str, Res); time_func(N,Sum,SumSq, _, _, Res) -> diff --git a/lib/stdlib/test/unicode_util_SUITE.erl b/lib/stdlib/test/unicode_util_SUITE.erl index 03c24c7027..a89627eba5 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/test/unicode_util_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/stdlib/test/unicode_util_SUITE.erl @@ -310,12 +310,23 @@ get(_) -> add_get_tests. count(Config) -> + Parent = self(), + Exec = fun() -> + do_measure(Config), + Parent ! {test_done, self()} + end, ct:timetrap({minutes,5}), case ct:get_timetrap_info() of - {_,{_,Scale}} -> + {_,{_,Scale}} when Scale > 1 -> {skip,{measurments_skipped_debug,Scale}}; - _ -> % No scaling - do_measure(Config) + _ -> % No scaling, run at most 2 min + Tester = spawn(Exec), + receive {test_done, Tester} -> ok + after 120000 -> + io:format("Timelimit reached stopping~n",[]), + exit(Tester, die) + end, + ok end. do_measure(Config) -> diff --git a/lib/stdlib/uc_spec/gen_unicode_mod.escript b/lib/stdlib/uc_spec/gen_unicode_mod.escript index fefd7d3b70..73c351e1af 100755 --- a/lib/stdlib/uc_spec/gen_unicode_mod.escript +++ b/lib/stdlib/uc_spec/gen_unicode_mod.escript @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ gen_header(Fd) -> io:put_chars(Fd, "-export([spec_version/0, lookup/1, get_case/1]).\n"), io:put_chars(Fd, "-inline([class/1]).\n"), io:put_chars(Fd, "-compile(nowarn_unused_vars).\n"), - io:put_chars(Fd, "-dialyzer({no_improper_lists, [cp/1, gc_prepend/2, gc_e_cont/2]}).\n"), + io:put_chars(Fd, "-dialyzer({no_improper_lists, [cp/1, gc/1, gc_prepend/2, gc_e_cont/2]}).\n"), io:put_chars(Fd, "-type gc() :: char()|[char()].\n\n\n"), ok. @@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ gen_norm(Fd) -> "-spec nfd(unicode:chardata()) -> maybe_improper_list(gc(),unicode:chardata()) | {error, unicode:chardata()}.\n" "nfd(Str0) ->\n" " case gc(Str0) of\n" - " [GC|R] when GC < 127 -> [GC|R];\n" + " [GC|R] when GC < 128 -> [GC|R];\n" " [GC|Str] -> [decompose(GC)|Str];\n" " [] -> [];\n" " {error,_}=Error -> Error\n end.\n\n" @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ gen_norm(Fd) -> "-spec nfkd(unicode:chardata()) -> maybe_improper_list(gc(),unicode:chardata()) | {error, unicode:chardata()}.\n" "nfkd(Str0) ->\n" " case gc(Str0) of\n" - " [GC|R] when GC < 127 -> [GC|R];\n" + " [GC|R] when GC < 128 -> [GC|R];\n" " [GC|Str] -> [decompose_compat(GC)|Str];\n" " [] -> [];\n" " {error,_}=Error -> Error\n end.\n\n" @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ gen_norm(Fd) -> "-spec nfc(unicode:chardata()) -> maybe_improper_list(gc(),unicode:chardata()) | {error, unicode:chardata()}.\n" "nfc(Str0) ->\n" " case gc(Str0) of\n" - " [GC|R] when GC < 255 -> [GC|R];\n" + " [GC|R] when GC < 256 -> [GC|R];\n" " [GC|Str] -> [compose(decompose(GC))|Str];\n" " [] -> [];\n" " {error,_}=Error -> Error\n end.\n\n" @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ gen_norm(Fd) -> "-spec nfkc(unicode:chardata()) -> maybe_improper_list(gc(),unicode:chardata()) | {error, unicode:chardata()}.\n" "nfkc(Str0) ->\n" " case gc(Str0) of\n" - " [GC|R] when GC < 127 -> [GC|R];\n" + " [GC|R] when GC < 128 -> [GC|R];\n" " [GC|Str] -> [compose_compat_0(decompose_compat(GC))|Str];\n" " [] -> [];\n" " {error,_}=Error -> Error\n end.\n\n" @@ -476,13 +476,30 @@ gen_gc(Fd, GBP) -> "-spec gc(String::unicode:chardata()) ->" " maybe_improper_list() | {error, unicode:chardata()}.\n"), io:put_chars(Fd, + "gc([CP1, CP2|_]=T)\n" + " when CP1 < 256, CP2 < 256, CP1 =/= $\r -> %% Ascii Fast path\n" + " T;\n" + "gc(<<CP1/utf8, Rest/binary>>) ->\n" + " if CP1 < 256, CP1 =/= $\r ->\n" + " case Rest of\n" + " <<CP2/utf8, _/binary>> when CP2 < 256 -> %% Ascii Fast path\n" + " [CP1|Rest];\n" + " _ -> gc_1([CP1|Rest])\n" + " end;\n" + " true -> gc_1([CP1|Rest])\n" + " end;\n" "gc(Str) ->\n" " gc_1(cp(Str)).\n\n" "gc_1([$\\r|R0] = R) ->\n" " case cp(R0) of % Don't break CRLF\n" " [$\\n|R1] -> [[$\\r,$\\n]|R1];\n" " _ -> R\n" - " end;\n"), + " end;\n" + %% "gc_1([CP1, CP2|_]=T) when CP1 < 256, CP2 < 256 ->\n" + %% " T; %% Fast path\n" + %% "gc_1([CP1|<<CP2/utf8, _/binary>>]=T) when CP1 < 256, CP2 < 256 ->\n" + %% " T; %% Fast path\n" + ), io:put_chars(Fd, "%% Handle control\n"), GenControl = fun(Range) -> io:format(Fd, "gc_1~s R0;\n", [gen_clause(Range)]) end, @@ -490,7 +507,7 @@ gen_gc(Fd, GBP) -> [R1,R2,R3|Crs] = CRs0, [GenControl(CP) || CP <- merge_ranges([R1,R2,R3], split), CP =/= {$\r, undefined}], %%GenControl(R1),GenControl(R2),GenControl(R3), - io:format(Fd, "gc_1([CP|R]) when CP < 255 -> gc_extend(R,CP);\n", []), + io:format(Fd, "gc_1([CP|R]) when CP < 256 -> gc_extend(R,CP);\n", []), [GenControl(CP) || CP <- Crs], %% One clause per CP %% CRs0 = merge_ranges(maps:get(cr, GBP) ++ maps:get(lf, GBP) ++ maps:get(control, GBP)), diff --git a/lib/tools/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/tools/doc/src/Makefile index 7011f869cd..b554781382 100644 --- a/lib/tools/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/tools/doc/src/Makefile @@ -58,8 +58,7 @@ XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ lcnt_chapter.xml \ erlang_mode_chapter.xml \ xref_chapter.xml \ - notes.xml \ - notes_history.xml + notes.xml BOOK_FILES = book.xml diff --git a/make/otp_release_targets.mk b/make/otp_release_targets.mk index 13b54645ad..23b4416963 100644 --- a/make/otp_release_targets.mk +++ b/make/otp_release_targets.mk @@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ $(HTMLDIR)/users_guide.html: $(XML_FILES) # ------------------------------------------------------------------------ # The following targets just exist in the documentation directory # ------------------------------------------------------------------------ +.PHONY: xmllint + ifneq ($(XML_FILES),) # ---------------------------------------------------- @@ -108,21 +110,38 @@ $(HTMLDIR)/$(APPLICATION).eix: $(XML_FILES) $(SPECS_FILES) -xinclude $(TOP_SPECS_PARAM) \ -path $(DOCGEN)/priv/dtd \ -path $(DOCGEN)/priv/dtd_html_entities \ - $(DOCGEN)/priv/xsl/db_eix.xsl book.xml > $@ + $(DOCGEN)/priv/xsl/db_eix.xsl book.xml > $@ docs: $(HTMLDIR)/$(APPLICATION).eix -xmllint: $(XML_FILES) - @echo "Running xmllint" - @BookFiles=`awk -F\" '/xi:include/ {print $$2}' book.xml`; \ - for i in $$BookFiles; do \ - if [ $$i = "notes.xml" ]; then \ - echo Checking $$i; \ - xmllint --noout --valid --nodefdtd --loaddtd --path $(DOCGEN)/priv/dtd:$(DOCGEN)/priv/dtd_html_entities $$i; \ - else\ - awk -F\" '/xi:include/ {print "echo Checking " $$2 ;print "xmllint --noout --valid --nodefdtd --loaddtd --path $(DOCGEN)/priv/dtd:$(DOCGEN)/priv/dtd_html_entities:$(XMLLINT_SRCDIRS) " $$2}' $$i |sh; \ - fi \ - done +## Here awk is used to find all xi:include files in $(BOOK_FILES) +## Then we look into all those files check for xi:includes +BOOK_XI_INC_FILES:=$(foreach file,$(BOOK_FILES),$(shell awk -F\" '/xi:include/ {print $$2}' $(file))) $(BOOK_FILES) +ALL_XI_INC_FILES:=$(foreach file,$(BOOK_XI_INC_FILES),$(shell awk -F\" '/xi:include/ {if ("$(dir $(file))" != "./") printf "$(dir $(file))"; print $$2}' $(file))) $(BOOK_XI_INC_FILES) + +## These are the patterns of file names that xmllint cannot currently parse +XI_INC_FILES:=%user_man.xml %usersguide.xml %refman.xml %ref_man.xml %part.xml %book.xml + +## These are the files that we should run the xmllint on +LINT_XI_INC_FILES := $(filter-out $(XI_INC_FILES), $(ALL_XI_INC_FILES)) + +EMPTY := +SPACE := $(EMPTY) $(EMPTY) +XMLLINT_SRCDIRS:=$(subst $(SPACE),:,$(sort $(foreach file,$(XML_FILES),$(dir $(file))))) + +xmllint: $(ALL_XI_INC_FILES) +## We verify that the $(XML_FILES) variable in the Makefile have exactly +## the same files as we found out by following xi:include. +ifneq ($(filter-out $(filter %.xml,$(XML_FILES)),$(ALL_XI_INC_FILES)),) + $(error "$(filter-out $(filter %.xml,$(XML_FILES)),$(ALL_XI_INC_FILES)) in $$ALL_XI_INC_FILES but not in $$XML_FILES"); +endif +ifneq ($(filter-out $(ALL_XI_INC_FILES),$(filter %.xml,$(XML_FILES))),) + $(error "$(filter-out $(ALL_XI_INC_FILES),$(filter %.xml,$(XML_FILES))) in $$XML_FILES but not in $$ALL_XI_INC_FILES"); +endif + @echo "xmllint $(LINT_XI_INC_FILES)" + @xmllint --noout --valid --nodefdtd --loaddtd --path \ + $(DOCGEN)/priv/dtd:$(DOCGEN)/priv/dtd_html_entities:$(XMLLINT_SRCDIRS) \ + $(LINT_XI_INC_FILES) # ---------------------------------------------------- # Local documentation target for testing @@ -143,6 +162,8 @@ local_copy_of_topdefs: $(DOCGEN)/priv/js/flipmenu/flip_static.gif \ $(DOCGEN)/priv/js/flipmenu/flipmenu.js $(HTMLDIR)/js/flipmenu +else +xmllint: endif # ---------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/make/otp_subdir.mk b/make/otp_subdir.mk index 5734970298..19c744955c 100644 --- a/make/otp_subdir.mk +++ b/make/otp_subdir.mk @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ # # Targets that don't affect documentation directories # -opt debug lcnt release docs release_docs tests release_tests clean depend valgrind static_lib: +opt debug lcnt release docs release_docs tests release_tests clean depend valgrind static_lib xmllint: @set -e ; \ app_pwd=`pwd` ; \ if test -f vsn.mk; then \ diff --git a/make/run_make.mk b/make/run_make.mk index 2591a37cad..bcbbf53f7d 100644 --- a/make/run_make.mk +++ b/make/run_make.mk @@ -38,9 +38,5 @@ plain smp frag smp_frag: $(make_verbose)$(MAKE) -f $(TARGET)/Makefile FLAVOR=$@ clean generate depend docs release release_spec release_docs release_docs_spec \ - tests release_tests release_tests_spec static_lib: + tests release_tests release_tests_spec static_lib xmllint: $(make_verbose)$(MAKE) -f $(TARGET)/Makefile $@ - - - - diff --git a/otp_versions.table b/otp_versions.table index 157ca8f0ba..0cf7a34600 100644 --- a/otp_versions.table +++ b/otp_versions.table @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +OTP-20.1.7 : public_key-1.5.1 ssl-8.2.2 # asn1-5.0.3 common_test-1.15.2 compiler-7.1.3 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.1 debugger-4.2.3 dialyzer-3.2.2 diameter-2.1.2 edoc-0.9.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7.1 erl_interface-3.10 erts-9.1.5 et-1.6.1 eunit-2.3.4 hipe-3.16.1 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.4.4 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.4 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15.1 observer-2.5 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.3 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 reltool-0.7.5 runtime_tools-1.12.2 sasl-3.1 snmp-5.2.8 ssh-4.6.2 stdlib-3.4.2 syntax_tools-2.1.3 tools-2.11 wx-1.8.2 xmerl-1.3.15 : +OTP-20.1.6 : erts-9.1.5 ssh-4.6.2 # asn1-5.0.3 common_test-1.15.2 compiler-7.1.3 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.1 debugger-4.2.3 dialyzer-3.2.2 diameter-2.1.2 edoc-0.9.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7.1 erl_interface-3.10 et-1.6.1 eunit-2.3.4 hipe-3.16.1 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.4.4 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.4 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15.1 observer-2.5 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.3 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.5 reltool-0.7.5 runtime_tools-1.12.2 sasl-3.1 snmp-5.2.8 ssl-8.2.1 stdlib-3.4.2 syntax_tools-2.1.3 tools-2.11 wx-1.8.2 xmerl-1.3.15 : OTP-20.1.5 : erts-9.1.4 inets-6.4.4 # asn1-5.0.3 common_test-1.15.2 compiler-7.1.3 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.1 debugger-4.2.3 dialyzer-3.2.2 diameter-2.1.2 edoc-0.9.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7.1 erl_interface-3.10 et-1.6.1 eunit-2.3.4 hipe-3.16.1 ic-4.4.2 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.4 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15.1 observer-2.5 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.3 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.5 reltool-0.7.5 runtime_tools-1.12.2 sasl-3.1 snmp-5.2.8 ssh-4.6.1 ssl-8.2.1 stdlib-3.4.2 syntax_tools-2.1.3 tools-2.11 wx-1.8.2 xmerl-1.3.15 : OTP-20.1.4 : inets-6.4.3 # asn1-5.0.3 common_test-1.15.2 compiler-7.1.3 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.1 debugger-4.2.3 dialyzer-3.2.2 diameter-2.1.2 edoc-0.9.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7.1 erl_interface-3.10 erts-9.1.3 et-1.6.1 eunit-2.3.4 hipe-3.16.1 ic-4.4.2 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.4 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15.1 observer-2.5 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.3 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.5 reltool-0.7.5 runtime_tools-1.12.2 sasl-3.1 snmp-5.2.8 ssh-4.6.1 ssl-8.2.1 stdlib-3.4.2 syntax_tools-2.1.3 tools-2.11 wx-1.8.2 xmerl-1.3.15 : OTP-20.1.3 : diameter-2.1.2 erts-9.1.3 snmp-5.2.8 # asn1-5.0.3 common_test-1.15.2 compiler-7.1.3 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.1 debugger-4.2.3 dialyzer-3.2.2 edoc-0.9.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7.1 erl_interface-3.10 et-1.6.1 eunit-2.3.4 hipe-3.16.1 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.4.2 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.4 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15.1 observer-2.5 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.3 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.5 reltool-0.7.5 runtime_tools-1.12.2 sasl-3.1 ssh-4.6.1 ssl-8.2.1 stdlib-3.4.2 syntax_tools-2.1.3 tools-2.11 wx-1.8.2 xmerl-1.3.15 : @@ -10,6 +12,7 @@ OTP-20.0.3 : asn1-5.0.2 compiler-7.1.1 erts-9.0.3 ssh-4.5.1 # common_test-1.15.1 OTP-20.0.2 : asn1-5.0.1 erts-9.0.2 kernel-5.3.1 # common_test-1.15.1 compiler-7.1 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.0 debugger-4.2.2 dialyzer-3.2 diameter-2.0 edoc-0.9 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7 erl_interface-3.10 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.3 hipe-3.16 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.4 jinterface-1.8 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15 observer-2.4 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.4.1 reltool-0.7.4 runtime_tools-1.12.1 sasl-3.0.4 snmp-5.2.6 ssh-4.5 ssl-8.2 stdlib-3.4.1 syntax_tools-2.1.2 tools-2.10.1 wx-1.8.1 xmerl-1.3.15 : OTP-20.0.1 : common_test-1.15.1 erts-9.0.1 runtime_tools-1.12.1 stdlib-3.4.1 tools-2.10.1 # asn1-5.0 compiler-7.1 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.0 debugger-4.2.2 dialyzer-3.2 diameter-2.0 edoc-0.9 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7 erl_interface-3.10 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.3 hipe-3.16 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.4 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.3 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15 observer-2.4 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.4.1 reltool-0.7.4 sasl-3.0.4 snmp-5.2.6 ssh-4.5 ssl-8.2 syntax_tools-2.1.2 wx-1.8.1 xmerl-1.3.15 : OTP-20.0 : asn1-5.0 common_test-1.15 compiler-7.1 cosProperty-1.2.2 crypto-4.0 debugger-4.2.2 dialyzer-3.2 diameter-2.0 edoc-0.9 erl_docgen-0.7 erl_interface-3.10 erts-9.0 eunit-2.3.3 hipe-3.16 inets-6.4 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.3 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15 observer-2.4 orber-3.8.3 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.4.1 reltool-0.7.4 runtime_tools-1.12 sasl-3.0.4 snmp-5.2.6 ssh-4.5 ssl-8.2 stdlib-3.4 syntax_tools-2.1.2 tools-2.10 wx-1.8.1 xmerl-1.3.15 # cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 eldap-1.2.2 et-1.6 ic-4.4.2 odbc-2.12 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 : +OTP-19.3.6.4 : ssl-8.1.3.1 # asn1-4.0.4 common_test-1.14 compiler-7.0.4.1 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.1 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-3.7.4 debugger-4.2.1 dialyzer-3.1.1 diameter-1.12.2 edoc-0.8.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.6.1 erl_interface-3.9.3 erts-8.3.5.3 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.2 gs-1.6.2 hipe-3.15.4 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.3.9 jinterface-1.7.1 kernel-5.2 megaco-3.18.1 mnesia-4.14.3 observer-2.3.1 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.2 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.4 percept-0.9 public_key-1.4 reltool-0.7.3 runtime_tools-1.11.1 sasl-3.0.3 snmp-5.2.5 ssh-4.4.2 stdlib-3.3 syntax_tools-2.1.1 tools-2.9.1 typer-0.9.12 wx-1.8 xmerl-1.3.14 : OTP-19.3.6.3 : compiler-7.0.4.1 erts-8.3.5.3 # asn1-4.0.4 common_test-1.14 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.1 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-3.7.4 debugger-4.2.1 dialyzer-3.1.1 diameter-1.12.2 edoc-0.8.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.6.1 erl_interface-3.9.3 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.2 gs-1.6.2 hipe-3.15.4 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.3.9 jinterface-1.7.1 kernel-5.2 megaco-3.18.1 mnesia-4.14.3 observer-2.3.1 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.2 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.4 percept-0.9 public_key-1.4 reltool-0.7.3 runtime_tools-1.11.1 sasl-3.0.3 snmp-5.2.5 ssh-4.4.2 ssl-8.1.3 stdlib-3.3 syntax_tools-2.1.1 tools-2.9.1 typer-0.9.12 wx-1.8 xmerl-1.3.14 : OTP-19.3.6.2 : erts-8.3.5.2 # asn1-4.0.4 common_test-1.14 compiler-7.0.4 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.1 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-3.7.4 debugger-4.2.1 dialyzer-3.1.1 diameter-1.12.2 edoc-0.8.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.6.1 erl_interface-3.9.3 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.2 gs-1.6.2 hipe-3.15.4 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.3.9 jinterface-1.7.1 kernel-5.2 megaco-3.18.1 mnesia-4.14.3 observer-2.3.1 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.2 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.4 percept-0.9 public_key-1.4 reltool-0.7.3 runtime_tools-1.11.1 sasl-3.0.3 snmp-5.2.5 ssh-4.4.2 ssl-8.1.3 stdlib-3.3 syntax_tools-2.1.1 tools-2.9.1 typer-0.9.12 wx-1.8 xmerl-1.3.14 : OTP-19.3.6.1 : erts-8.3.5.1 # asn1-4.0.4 common_test-1.14 compiler-7.0.4 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.1 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-3.7.4 debugger-4.2.1 dialyzer-3.1.1 diameter-1.12.2 edoc-0.8.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.6.1 erl_interface-3.9.3 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.2 gs-1.6.2 hipe-3.15.4 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.3.9 jinterface-1.7.1 kernel-5.2 megaco-3.18.1 mnesia-4.14.3 observer-2.3.1 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.2 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.4 percept-0.9 public_key-1.4 reltool-0.7.3 runtime_tools-1.11.1 sasl-3.0.3 snmp-5.2.5 ssh-4.4.2 ssl-8.1.3 stdlib-3.3 syntax_tools-2.1.1 tools-2.9.1 typer-0.9.12 wx-1.8 xmerl-1.3.14 : @@ -40,10 +43,13 @@ OTP-19.0.3 : inets-6.3.2 kernel-5.0.1 ssl-8.0.1 # asn1-4.0.3 common_test-1.12.2 OTP-19.0.2 : compiler-7.0.1 erts-8.0.2 stdlib-3.0.1 # asn1-4.0.3 common_test-1.12.2 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.1 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-3.7 debugger-4.2 dialyzer-3.0.1 diameter-1.12 edoc-0.7.19 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.5 erl_interface-3.9 et-1.6 eunit-2.3 gs-1.6.1 hipe-3.15.1 ic-4.4.1 inets-6.3.1 jinterface-1.7 kernel-5.0 megaco-3.18.1 mnesia-4.14 observer-2.2.1 odbc-2.11.2 orber-3.8.2 os_mon-2.4.1 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.2 percept-0.9 public_key-1.2 reltool-0.7.1 runtime_tools-1.10 sasl-3.0 snmp-5.2.3 ssh-4.3.1 ssl-8.0 syntax_tools-2.0 tools-2.8.5 typer-0.9.11 wx-1.7 xmerl-1.3.11 : OTP-19.0.1 : dialyzer-3.0.1 erts-8.0.1 inets-6.3.1 observer-2.2.1 ssh-4.3.1 tools-2.8.5 # asn1-4.0.3 common_test-1.12.2 compiler-7.0 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.1 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-3.7 debugger-4.2 diameter-1.12 edoc-0.7.19 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.5 erl_interface-3.9 et-1.6 eunit-2.3 gs-1.6.1 hipe-3.15.1 ic-4.4.1 jinterface-1.7 kernel-5.0 megaco-3.18.1 mnesia-4.14 odbc-2.11.2 orber-3.8.2 os_mon-2.4.1 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.2 percept-0.9 public_key-1.2 reltool-0.7.1 runtime_tools-1.10 sasl-3.0 snmp-5.2.3 ssl-8.0 stdlib-3.0 syntax_tools-2.0 typer-0.9.11 wx-1.7 xmerl-1.3.11 : OTP-19.0 : asn1-4.0.3 common_test-1.12.2 compiler-7.0 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.1 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-3.7 debugger-4.2 dialyzer-3.0 diameter-1.12 edoc-0.7.19 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.5 erl_interface-3.9 erts-8.0 et-1.6 eunit-2.3 gs-1.6.1 hipe-3.15.1 ic-4.4.1 inets-6.3 jinterface-1.7 kernel-5.0 megaco-3.18.1 mnesia-4.14 observer-2.2 odbc-2.11.2 orber-3.8.2 os_mon-2.4.1 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.2 percept-0.9 public_key-1.2 reltool-0.7.1 runtime_tools-1.10 sasl-3.0 snmp-5.2.3 ssh-4.3 ssl-8.0 stdlib-3.0 syntax_tools-2.0 tools-2.8.4 typer-0.9.11 wx-1.7 xmerl-1.3.11 # : +OTP-18.3.4.7 : ssl-7.3.3.2 # asn1-4.0.2 common_test-1.12.1.1 compiler-6.0.3.1 cosEvent-2.2 cosEventDomain-1.2 cosFileTransfer-1.2 cosNotification-1.2.1 cosProperty-1.2 cosTime-1.2.1 cosTransactions-1.3.1 crypto-3.6.3.1 debugger-4.1.2 dialyzer-2.9 diameter-1.11.2 edoc-0.7.18 eldap-1.2.1.1 erl_docgen-0.4.2 erl_interface-3.8.2 erts-7.3.1.4 et-1.5.1 eunit-2.2.13 gs-1.6 hipe-3.15 ic-4.4 inets-6.2.4.1 jinterface-1.6.1 kernel-4.2 megaco-3.18 mnesia-4.13.4 observer-2.1.2 odbc-2.11.1 orber-3.8.1 os_mon-2.4 ose-1.1 otp_mibs-1.1 parsetools-2.1.1 percept-0.8.11 public_key-1.1.1 reltool-0.7 runtime_tools-1.9.3 sasl-2.7 snmp-5.2.2 ssh-4.2.2.4 stdlib-2.8 syntax_tools-1.7 test_server-3.10 tools-2.8.3 typer-0.9.10 webtool-0.9.1 wx-1.6.1 xmerl-1.3.10 : +OTP-18.3.4.6 : compiler-6.0.3.1 eldap-1.2.1.1 erts-7.3.1.4 ssh-4.2.2.4 # asn1-4.0.2 common_test-1.12.1.1 cosEvent-2.2 cosEventDomain-1.2 cosFileTransfer-1.2 cosNotification-1.2.1 cosProperty-1.2 cosTime-1.2.1 cosTransactions-1.3.1 crypto-3.6.3.1 debugger-4.1.2 dialyzer-2.9 diameter-1.11.2 edoc-0.7.18 erl_docgen-0.4.2 erl_interface-3.8.2 et-1.5.1 eunit-2.2.13 gs-1.6 hipe-3.15 ic-4.4 inets-6.2.4.1 jinterface-1.6.1 kernel-4.2 megaco-3.18 mnesia-4.13.4 observer-2.1.2 odbc-2.11.1 orber-3.8.1 os_mon-2.4 ose-1.1 otp_mibs-1.1 parsetools-2.1.1 percept-0.8.11 public_key-1.1.1 reltool-0.7 runtime_tools-1.9.3 sasl-2.7 snmp-5.2.2 ssl-7.3.3.1 stdlib-2.8 syntax_tools-1.7 test_server-3.10 tools-2.8.3 typer-0.9.10 webtool-0.9.1 wx-1.6.1 xmerl-1.3.10 : OTP-18.3.4.5 : crypto-3.6.3.1 erts-7.3.1.3 inets-6.2.4.1 ssh-4.2.2.3 # asn1-4.0.2 common_test-1.12.1.1 compiler-6.0.3 cosEvent-2.2 cosEventDomain-1.2 cosFileTransfer-1.2 cosNotification-1.2.1 cosProperty-1.2 cosTime-1.2.1 cosTransactions-1.3.1 debugger-4.1.2 dialyzer-2.9 diameter-1.11.2 edoc-0.7.18 eldap-1.2.1 erl_docgen-0.4.2 erl_interface-3.8.2 et-1.5.1 eunit-2.2.13 gs-1.6 hipe-3.15 ic-4.4 jinterface-1.6.1 kernel-4.2 megaco-3.18 mnesia-4.13.4 observer-2.1.2 odbc-2.11.1 orber-3.8.1 os_mon-2.4 ose-1.1 otp_mibs-1.1 parsetools-2.1.1 percept-0.8.11 public_key-1.1.1 reltool-0.7 runtime_tools-1.9.3 sasl-2.7 snmp-5.2.2 ssl-7.3.3.1 stdlib-2.8 syntax_tools-1.7 test_server-3.10 tools-2.8.3 typer-0.9.10 webtool-0.9.1 wx-1.6.1 xmerl-1.3.10 : OTP-18.3.4.4 : erts-7.3.1.2 # asn1-4.0.2 common_test-1.12.1.1 compiler-6.0.3 cosEvent-2.2 cosEventDomain-1.2 cosFileTransfer-1.2 cosNotification-1.2.1 cosProperty-1.2 cosTime-1.2.1 cosTransactions-1.3.1 crypto-3.6.3 debugger-4.1.2 dialyzer-2.9 diameter-1.11.2 edoc-0.7.18 eldap-1.2.1 erl_docgen-0.4.2 erl_interface-3.8.2 et-1.5.1 eunit-2.2.13 gs-1.6 hipe-3.15 ic-4.4 inets-6.2.4 jinterface-1.6.1 kernel-4.2 megaco-3.18 mnesia-4.13.4 observer-2.1.2 odbc-2.11.1 orber-3.8.1 os_mon-2.4 ose-1.1 otp_mibs-1.1 parsetools-2.1.1 percept-0.8.11 public_key-1.1.1 reltool-0.7 runtime_tools-1.9.3 sasl-2.7 snmp-5.2.2 ssh-4.2.2.2 ssl-7.3.3.1 stdlib-2.8 syntax_tools-1.7 test_server-3.10 tools-2.8.3 typer-0.9.10 webtool-0.9.1 wx-1.6.1 xmerl-1.3.10 : OTP-18.3.4.3 : ssh-4.2.2.2 # asn1-4.0.2 common_test-1.12.1.1 compiler-6.0.3 cosEvent-2.2 cosEventDomain-1.2 cosFileTransfer-1.2 cosNotification-1.2.1 cosProperty-1.2 cosTime-1.2.1 cosTransactions-1.3.1 crypto-3.6.3 debugger-4.1.2 dialyzer-2.9 diameter-1.11.2 edoc-0.7.18 eldap-1.2.1 erl_docgen-0.4.2 erl_interface-3.8.2 erts-7.3.1.1 et-1.5.1 eunit-2.2.13 gs-1.6 hipe-3.15 ic-4.4 inets-6.2.4 jinterface-1.6.1 kernel-4.2 megaco-3.18 mnesia-4.13.4 observer-2.1.2 odbc-2.11.1 orber-3.8.1 os_mon-2.4 ose-1.1 otp_mibs-1.1 parsetools-2.1.1 percept-0.8.11 public_key-1.1.1 reltool-0.7 runtime_tools-1.9.3 sasl-2.7 snmp-5.2.2 ssl-7.3.3.1 stdlib-2.8 syntax_tools-1.7 test_server-3.10 tools-2.8.3 typer-0.9.10 webtool-0.9.1 wx-1.6.1 xmerl-1.3.10 : OTP-18.3.4.2 : common_test-1.12.1.1 erts-7.3.1.1 ssl-7.3.3.1 # asn1-4.0.2 compiler-6.0.3 cosEvent-2.2 cosEventDomain-1.2 cosFileTransfer-1.2 cosNotification-1.2.1 cosProperty-1.2 cosTime-1.2.1 cosTransactions-1.3.1 crypto-3.6.3 debugger-4.1.2 dialyzer-2.9 diameter-1.11.2 edoc-0.7.18 eldap-1.2.1 erl_docgen-0.4.2 erl_interface-3.8.2 et-1.5.1 eunit-2.2.13 gs-1.6 hipe-3.15 ic-4.4 inets-6.2.4 jinterface-1.6.1 kernel-4.2 megaco-3.18 mnesia-4.13.4 observer-2.1.2 odbc-2.11.1 orber-3.8.1 os_mon-2.4 ose-1.1 otp_mibs-1.1 parsetools-2.1.1 percept-0.8.11 public_key-1.1.1 reltool-0.7 runtime_tools-1.9.3 sasl-2.7 snmp-5.2.2 ssh-4.2.2.1 stdlib-2.8 syntax_tools-1.7 test_server-3.10 tools-2.8.3 typer-0.9.10 webtool-0.9.1 wx-1.6.1 xmerl-1.3.10 : +OTP-18.3.4.1.1 : ssl-7.3.3.0.1 # asn1-4.0.2 common_test-1.12.1 compiler-6.0.3 cosEvent-2.2 cosEventDomain-1.2 cosFileTransfer-1.2 cosNotification-1.2.1 cosProperty-1.2 cosTime-1.2.1 cosTransactions-1.3.1 crypto-3.6.3 debugger-4.1.2 dialyzer-2.9 diameter-1.11.2 edoc-0.7.18 eldap-1.2.1 erl_docgen-0.4.2 erl_interface-3.8.2 erts-7.3.1 et-1.5.1 eunit-2.2.13 gs-1.6 hipe-3.15 ic-4.4 inets-6.2.4 jinterface-1.6.1 kernel-4.2 megaco-3.18 mnesia-4.13.4 observer-2.1.2 odbc-2.11.1 orber-3.8.1 os_mon-2.4 ose-1.1 otp_mibs-1.1 parsetools-2.1.1 percept-0.8.11 public_key-1.1.1 reltool-0.7 runtime_tools-1.9.3 sasl-2.7 snmp-5.2.2 ssh-4.2.2.1 stdlib-2.8 syntax_tools-1.7 test_server-3.10 tools-2.8.3 typer-0.9.10 webtool-0.9.1 wx-1.6.1 xmerl-1.3.10 : OTP-18.3.4.1 : ssh-4.2.2.1 # asn1-4.0.2 common_test-1.12.1 compiler-6.0.3 cosEvent-2.2 cosEventDomain-1.2 cosFileTransfer-1.2 cosNotification-1.2.1 cosProperty-1.2 cosTime-1.2.1 cosTransactions-1.3.1 crypto-3.6.3 debugger-4.1.2 dialyzer-2.9 diameter-1.11.2 edoc-0.7.18 eldap-1.2.1 erl_docgen-0.4.2 erl_interface-3.8.2 erts-7.3.1 et-1.5.1 eunit-2.2.13 gs-1.6 hipe-3.15 ic-4.4 inets-6.2.4 jinterface-1.6.1 kernel-4.2 megaco-3.18 mnesia-4.13.4 observer-2.1.2 odbc-2.11.1 orber-3.8.1 os_mon-2.4 ose-1.1 otp_mibs-1.1 parsetools-2.1.1 percept-0.8.11 public_key-1.1.1 reltool-0.7 runtime_tools-1.9.3 sasl-2.7 snmp-5.2.2 ssl-7.3.3 stdlib-2.8 syntax_tools-1.7 test_server-3.10 tools-2.8.3 typer-0.9.10 webtool-0.9.1 wx-1.6.1 xmerl-1.3.10 : OTP-18.3.4 : inets-6.2.4 ssl-7.3.3 # asn1-4.0.2 common_test-1.12.1 compiler-6.0.3 cosEvent-2.2 cosEventDomain-1.2 cosFileTransfer-1.2 cosNotification-1.2.1 cosProperty-1.2 cosTime-1.2.1 cosTransactions-1.3.1 crypto-3.6.3 debugger-4.1.2 dialyzer-2.9 diameter-1.11.2 edoc-0.7.18 eldap-1.2.1 erl_docgen-0.4.2 erl_interface-3.8.2 erts-7.3.1 et-1.5.1 eunit-2.2.13 gs-1.6 hipe-3.15 ic-4.4 jinterface-1.6.1 kernel-4.2 megaco-3.18 mnesia-4.13.4 observer-2.1.2 odbc-2.11.1 orber-3.8.1 os_mon-2.4 ose-1.1 otp_mibs-1.1 parsetools-2.1.1 percept-0.8.11 public_key-1.1.1 reltool-0.7 runtime_tools-1.9.3 sasl-2.7 snmp-5.2.2 ssh-4.2.2 stdlib-2.8 syntax_tools-1.7 test_server-3.10 tools-2.8.3 typer-0.9.10 webtool-0.9.1 wx-1.6.1 xmerl-1.3.10 : OTP-18.3.3 : common_test-1.12.1 inets-6.2.3 ssl-7.3.2 # asn1-4.0.2 compiler-6.0.3 cosEvent-2.2 cosEventDomain-1.2 cosFileTransfer-1.2 cosNotification-1.2.1 cosProperty-1.2 cosTime-1.2.1 cosTransactions-1.3.1 crypto-3.6.3 debugger-4.1.2 dialyzer-2.9 diameter-1.11.2 edoc-0.7.18 eldap-1.2.1 erl_docgen-0.4.2 erl_interface-3.8.2 erts-7.3.1 et-1.5.1 eunit-2.2.13 gs-1.6 hipe-3.15 ic-4.4 jinterface-1.6.1 kernel-4.2 megaco-3.18 mnesia-4.13.4 observer-2.1.2 odbc-2.11.1 orber-3.8.1 os_mon-2.4 ose-1.1 otp_mibs-1.1 parsetools-2.1.1 percept-0.8.11 public_key-1.1.1 reltool-0.7 runtime_tools-1.9.3 sasl-2.7 snmp-5.2.2 ssh-4.2.2 stdlib-2.8 syntax_tools-1.7 test_server-3.10 tools-2.8.3 typer-0.9.10 webtool-0.9.1 wx-1.6.1 xmerl-1.3.10 : diff --git a/system/doc/efficiency_guide/profiling.xml b/system/doc/efficiency_guide/profiling.xml index bf50a03fa6..f185456158 100644 --- a/system/doc/efficiency_guide/profiling.xml +++ b/system/doc/efficiency_guide/profiling.xml @@ -41,30 +41,87 @@ <p>Erlang/OTP contains several tools to help finding bottlenecks:</p> <list type="bulleted"> - <item><c>fprof</c> provides the most detailed information about - where the program time is spent, but it significantly slows down the - program it profiles.</item> - - <item><p><c>eprof</c> provides time information of each function - used in the program. No call graph is produced, but <c>eprof</c> has - considerable less impact on the program it profiles.</p> - <p>If the program is too large to be profiled by <c>fprof</c> or - <c>eprof</c>, the <c>cover</c> and <c>cprof</c> tools can be used - to locate code parts that are to be more thoroughly profiled using - <c>fprof</c> or <c>eprof</c>.</p></item> - - <item><c>cover</c> provides execution counts per line per - process, with less overhead than <c>fprof</c>. Execution counts - can, with some caution, be used to locate potential performance - bottlenecks.</item> - - <item><c>cprof</c> is the most lightweight tool, but it only - provides execution counts on a function basis (for all processes, - not per process).</item> + <item><p><seealso marker="tools:fprof"><c>fprof</c></seealso> provides + the most detailed information about where the program time is spent, + but it significantly slows down the program it profiles.</p></item> + + <item><p><seealso marker="tools:eprof"><c>eprof</c></seealso> provides + time information of each function used in the program. No call graph is + produced, but <c>eprof</c> has considerable less impact on the program it + profiles.</p> + <p>If the program is too large to be profiled by <c>fprof</c> or + <c>eprof</c>, <c>cprof</c> can be used to locate code parts that + are to be more thoroughly profiled using <c>fprof</c> or <c>eprof</c>.</p></item> + + <item><p><seealso marker="tools:cprof"><c>cprof</c></seealso> is the + most lightweight tool, but it only provides execution counts on a + function basis (for all processes, not per process).</p></item> + + <item><p><seealso marker="runtime_tools:dbg"><c>dbg</c></seealso> is the + generic erlang tracing frontend. By using the <c>timestamp</c> or + <c>cpu_timestamp</c> options it can be used to time how long function + calls in a live system take.</p></item> + + <item><p><seealso marker="tools:lcnt"><c>lcnt</c></seealso> is used + to find contention points in the Erlang Run-Time System's internal + locking mechanisms. It is useful when looking for bottlenecks in + interaction between process, port, ets tables and other entities + that can be run in parallel.</p></item> + </list> <p>The tools are further described in <seealso marker="#profiling_tools">Tools</seealso>.</p> + + <p>There are also several open source tools outside of Erlang/OTP + that can be used to help profiling. Some of them are:</p> + + <list type="bulleted"> + <item><url href="https://github.com/isacssouza/erlgrind">erlgrind</url> + can be used to visualize fprof data in kcachegrind.</item> + <item><url href="https://github.com/proger/eflame">eflame</url> + is an alternative to fprof that displays the profiling output as a flamegraph.</item> + <item><url href="https://ferd.github.io/recon/index.html">recon</url> + is a collection of Erlang profiling and debugging tools. + This tool comes with an accompanying E-book called + <url href="https://www.erlang-in-anger.com/">Erlang in Anger</url>.</item> + </list> + </section> + + <section> + <title>Memory profiling</title> + <pre>eheap_alloc: Cannot allocate 1234567890 bytes of memory (of type "heap").</pre> + <p>The above slogan is one of the more common reasons for Erlang to terminate. + For unknown reasons the Erlang Run-Time System failed to allocate memory to + use. When this happens a crash dump is generated that contains information + about the state of the system as it ran out of mmeory. Use the + <seealso marker="observer:cdv"><c>crashdump_viewer</c></seealso> to get a + view of the memory is being used. Look for processes with large heaps or + many messages, large ets tables, etc.</p> + <p>When looking at memory usage in a running system the most basic function + to get information from is <seealso marker="erts:erlang#memory/0"><c> + erlang:memory()</c></seealso>. It returns the current memory usage + of the system. <seealso marker="tools:instrument"><c>instrument(3)</c></seealso> + can be used to get a more detailed breakdown of where memory is used.</p> + <p>Processes, ports and ets tables can then be inspecting using their + respective info functions, i.e. + <seealso marker="erts:erlang#process_info_memory"><c>erlang:process_info/2 + </c></seealso>, + <seealso marker="erts:erlang#port_info_memory"><c>erlang:port_info/2 + </c></seealso> and + <seealso marker="stdlib:ets#info/1"><c>ets:info/1</c></seealso>. + </p> + <p>Sometimes the system can enter a state where the reported memory + from <c>erlang:memory(total)</c> is very different from the + memory reported by the OS. This can be because of internal + fragmentation within the Erlang Run-Time System. Data about + how memory is allocated can be retrieved using + <seealso marker="erts:erlang#system_info_allocator"> + <c>erlang:system_info(allocator)</c></seealso>. + The data you get from that function is very raw and not very plesant to read. + <url href="http://ferd.github.io/recon/recon_alloc.html">recon_alloc</url> + can be used to extract useful information from system_info + statistics counters.</p> </section> <section> @@ -80,6 +137,22 @@ tools on the whole system. Instead you want to concentrate on central processes and modules, which contribute for a big part of the execution.</p> + + <p>There are also some tools that can be used to get a view of the + whole system with more or less overhead.</p> + <list type="bulleted"> + <item><seealso marker="observer:observer"><c>observer</c></seealso> + is a GUI tool that can connect to remote nodes and display a + variety of information about the running system.</item> + <item><seealso marker="observer:etop"><c>etop</c></seealso> + is a command line tool that can connect to remote nodes and + display information similar to what the UNIX tool top shows.</item> + <item><seealso marker="runtime_tools:msacc"><c>msacc</c></seealso> + allows the user to get a view of what the Erlang Run-Time system + is spending its time doing. Has a very low overhead, which makes it + useful to run in heavily loaded systems to get some idea of where + to start doing more granular profiling.</item> + </list> </section> <section> @@ -128,7 +201,7 @@ performance impact. Using <c>fprof</c> is just a matter of calling a few library functions, see the <seealso marker="tools:fprof">fprof</seealso> manual page in - Tools .<c>fprof</c> was introduced in R8.</p> + Tools.</p> </section> <section> @@ -142,20 +215,6 @@ </section> <section> - <title>cover</title> - <p>The primary use of <c>cover</c> is coverage analysis to verify - test cases, making sure that all relevant code is covered. - <c>cover</c> counts how many times each executable line of code - is executed when a program is run, on a per module basis.</p> - <p>Clearly, this information can be used to determine what - code is run very frequently and can therefore be subject for - optimization. Using <c>cover</c> is just a matter of calling a - few library functions, see the - <seealso marker="tools:cover">cover</seealso> manual page in - Tools.</p> - </section> - - <section> <title>cprof</title> <p><c>cprof</c> is something in between <c>fprof</c> and <c>cover</c> regarding features. It counts how many times each @@ -202,16 +261,6 @@ <cell>No</cell> </row> <row> - <cell><c>cover</c></cell> - <cell>Per module to screen/file</cell> - <cell>Small</cell> - <cell>Moderate slowdown</cell> - <cell>Yes, per line</cell> - <cell>No</cell> - <cell>No</cell> - <cell>No</cell> - </row> - <row> <cell><c>cprof</c></cell> <cell>Per module to caller</cell> <cell>Small</cell> @@ -224,6 +273,37 @@ <tcaption>Tool Summary</tcaption> </table> </section> + + <section> + <title>dbg</title> + <p><c>dbg</c> is a generic Erlang trace tool. By using the + <c>timestamp</c> or <c>cpu_timestamp</c> options it can be used + as a precision instrument to profile how long time a function + call takes for a specific process. This can be very useful when + trying to understand where time is spent in a heavily loaded + system as it is possible to limit the scope of what is profiled + to be very small. + For more information, see the + <seealso marker="runtime_tools:dbg">dbg</seealso> manual page in + Runtime Tools.</p> + </section> + + <section> + <title>lcnt</title> + <p><c>lcnt</c> is used to profile interactions inbetween + entities that run in parallel. For example if you have + a process that all other processes in the system needs + to interact with (maybe it has some global configuration), + then <c>lcnt</c> can be used to figure out if the interaction + with that process is a problem.</p> + <p>In the Erlang Run-time System entities are only run in parallel + when there are multiple schedulers. Therefore <c>lcnt</c> will + show more contention points (and thus be more useful) on systems + using many schedulers on many cores.</p> + <p>For more information, see the + <seealso marker="tools:lcnt">lcnt</seealso> manual page in Tools.</p> + </section> + </section> <section> @@ -282,4 +362,3 @@ </list> </section> </chapter> - diff --git a/system/doc/efficiency_guide/xmlfiles.mk b/system/doc/efficiency_guide/xmlfiles.mk index 88df9417f5..23c0d991b4 100644 --- a/system/doc/efficiency_guide/xmlfiles.mk +++ b/system/doc/efficiency_guide/xmlfiles.mk @@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ EFF_GUIDE_CHAPTER_FILES = \ processes.xml \ profiling.xml \ tablesDatabases.xml \ - drivers.xml - + drivers.xml \ + retired_myths.xml diff --git a/system/doc/reference_manual/xmlfiles.mk b/system/doc/reference_manual/xmlfiles.mk index 61637ae701..fffcbdd911 100644 --- a/system/doc/reference_manual/xmlfiles.mk +++ b/system/doc/reference_manual/xmlfiles.mk @@ -30,5 +30,6 @@ REF_MAN_CHAPTER_FILES = \ processes.xml \ distributed.xml \ code_loading.xml \ - ports.xml - + ports.xml \ + character_set.xml \ + typespec.xml diff --git a/system/doc/top/Makefile b/system/doc/top/Makefile index 116ec688fa..b6a80aadf5 100644 --- a/system/doc/top/Makefile +++ b/system/doc/top/Makefile @@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ include ../tutorial/xmlfiles.mk include ../design_principles/xmlfiles.mk include ../oam/xmlfiles.mk +BOOK_FILES = book.xml + XML_FILES = \ $(INST_GUIDE_CHAPTER_FILES:%=../installation_guide/%) \ $(SYSTEM_PRINCIPLES_CHAPTER_FILES:%=../system_principles/%) \ @@ -70,9 +72,9 @@ XML_FILES = \ ../efficiency_guide/part.xml \ ../tutorial/part.xml \ ../design_principles/part.xml \ - ../oam/part.xml + ../oam/part.xml \ + $(BOOK_FILES) -BOOK_FILES = book.xml XMLLINT_SRCDIRS= ../installation_guide:../system_principles:../embedded:../getting_started:../reference_manual:../programming_examples:../efficiency_guide:../tutorial:../design_principles:../oam HTMLDIR= ../html |