diff options
136 files changed, 4914 insertions, 9527 deletions
diff --git a/OTP_VERSION b/OTP_VERSION index b09651c1d0..2a0e5e0a15 100644 --- a/OTP_VERSION +++ b/OTP_VERSION @@ -1 +1 @@ -20.0.5 +20.1.1 diff --git a/erts/doc/src/notes.xml b/erts/doc/src/notes.xml index 4eeea87bad..cd0aa634e7 100644 --- a/erts/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/erts/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -31,6 +31,208 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the ERTS application.</p> +<section><title>Erts 9.1.1</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p>The new zlib module returned a data_error when + inflating concatenated streams, which was incompatible + with the old module's behavior of returning the + uncompressed data up to the end of the first stream.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14648</p> + </item> + <item> + <p>zlib:gunzip/1 will no longer stop at the end of the + first stream when decompressing concatenated gzip + files.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14649</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>Erts 9.1</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Changed <c>erlang:apply/2</c> to raise a <c>badarg</c> + exception if the second argument is not a proper list. + Previous behavior was a misleading <c>undef</c> + exception.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14490 Aux Id: ERL-432 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p>On macOS, <c>crypto</c> would crash if <c>observer</c> + had been started before <c>crypto</c>. On the beta for + macOS 10.13 (High Sierra), <c>crypto</c> would crash. + Both of those bugs have been fixed.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14499 Aux Id: ERL-251 ERL-439 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fixed bug in enif_whereis_pid/port that could cause heap + corruption in rare cases.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14523</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fix so that trace messages generated when in a dirty nif + are flushed correctly when the dirty nif is done + executing.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14538</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fix escape code handling when using ANSI color codes in + the shell.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14549 Aux Id: PR1536 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Upgraded the ERTS internal PCRE library from version 8.40 + to version 8.41. See <url + href="http://pcre.org/original/changelog.txt">http://pcre.org/original/changelog.txt</url> + for information about changes made to PCRE. This library + implements major parts of the <seealso + marker="stdlib:re"><c>re</c></seealso> regular + expressions module.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14574</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fixed a bug causing <c>statistics(runtime)</c> to produce + negative values and a bug in + <c>statistics(wall_clock)</c> causing it to produce + values one second too long.</p> + <p> + <c>statistics(runtime)</c> now also use + <c>getrusage()</c> as source when available preventing + the returned value from wrapping as frequent as before.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14597 Aux Id: ERL-465 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fixed small memory leak that could occur when sending to + a terminating port.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14609</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fix bug causing VM crash when a module with + <c>-on_load</c> directive is loaded while + <c>erlang:trace(on_load, ...)</c> is enabled.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14612</p> + </item> + <item> + <p>A warning that the compiler may optimize away atoms + have been added to the documentation of + <c>list_to_existing_atom/1</c> and + <c>binary_to_existing_atom/2</c>.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14614 Aux Id: ERL-453 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p>Lock counting can now be fully toggled at runtime in + the lock counting emulator (<c>-emu_type lcnt</c>). + Everything is enabled by default to match the old + behavior, but specific categories can be toggled at will + with minimal runtime overhead when disabled. Refer to the + documentation on <c>lcnt:rt_mask/1</c> for details.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13170</p> + </item> + <item> + <p>The <c>zlib</c> module has been refactored and all its + operations will now yield appropriately, allowing them to + be used freely in concurrent applications.</p> <p>The + following functions have been deprecated, but will not + produce compiler warnings until OTP 21: + <c>zlib:adler32</c>, <c>zlib:crc32</c>, + <c>zlib:inflateChunk</c>, <c>zlib:getBufSize</c>, + <c>zlib:setBufSize</c>.</p> <p>The behavior of throwing + an error when a dictionary is required for decompression + has also been deprecated. Refer to the documentation on + <c>inflateSetDictionary/2</c> for details.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14185</p> + </item> + <item> + <p><c>lcnt:collect</c> and <c>lcnt:clear</c> will no + longer block all other threads in the runtime system.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14412</p> + </item> + <item> + <p>Add <c>erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1</c>, which converts an + iolist() to an erlang:iovec(), which suitable for use + with <c>enif_inspect_iovec</c>.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14520</p> + </item> + <item> + <p>When provided with bad arguments, the <c>zlib</c> + module will now raise named exceptions instead of just + <c>badarg</c>. For example, <c>not_initialized</c> when + using <c>zlib:inflate/2</c> with an uninitialized + stream.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14527</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + <c>erlang:halt/2</c> allows any Unicode string as slogan + for the crash dump.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14553</p> + </item> + <item> + <p>Add new nif API functions for managing an I/O Queue. + The added functions are:</p> <list type="bulleted"> + <item><seealso marker="erl_nif#enif_ioq_create"> + <c>enif_ioq_create()</c></seealso></item> <item><seealso + marker="erl_nif#enif_ioq_destroy"> + <c>enif_ioq_destroy()</c></seealso></item> <item><seealso + marker="erl_nif#enif_ioq_enq_binary"> + <c>enif_ioq_enq_binary()</c></seealso></item> + <item><seealso marker="erl_nif#enif_ioq_enqv"> + <c>enif_ioq_enqv()</c></seealso></item> <item><seealso + marker="erl_nif#enif_ioq_deq"> + <c>enif_ioq_deq()</c></seealso></item> <item><seealso + marker="erl_nif#enif_ioq_peek"> + <c>enif_ioq_peek()</c></seealso></item> <item><seealso + marker="erl_nif#enif_inspect_iovec"> + <c>enif_inspect_iovec()</c></seealso></item> + <item><seealso marker="erl_nif#enif_free_iovec"> + <c>enif_free_iovec()</c></seealso></item> </list> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14598</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Erts 9.0.5</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> @@ -781,6 +983,91 @@ </section> +<section><title>Erts 8.3.5.3</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + A timer internal bit-field used for storing scheduler id + was too small. As a result, VM internal timer data + structures could become inconsistent when using 1024 + schedulers on the system. Note that systems with less + than 1024 schedulers are not effected by this bug.</p> + <p> + This bug was introduced in ERTS version 7.0 (OTP 18.0).</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14548 Aux Id: OTP-11997, ERL-468 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fixed bug in <c>binary_to_term</c> and + <c>binary_to_atom</c> that could cause VM crash. + Typically happens when the last character of an UTF8 + string is in the range 128 to 255, but truncated to only + one byte. Bug exists in <c>binary_to_term</c> since ERTS + version 5.10.2 (OTP_R16B01) and <c>binary_to_atom</c> + since ERTS version 9.0 (OTP-20.0).</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14590 Aux Id: ERL-474 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fix bug causing VM crash when a module with + <c>-on_load</c> directive is loaded while + <c>erlang:trace(on_load, ...)</c> is enabled.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14612</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fixed bug that could cause a VM crash when a corrupt + message is received on distribution channel from other + node.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14661 Aux Id: ERIERL-80 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>Erts 8.3.5.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Fix performance bug in pre-allocators that could cause + them to permanently fall back on normal more expensive + memory allocation. Pre-allocators are used for quick + allocation of short lived meta data used by messages and + other scheduled tasks. Bug exists since OTP_R15B02.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14491</p> + </item> + <item> + <p>Fixed a bug that prevented TCP sockets from being + closed properly on send timeouts.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14509</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fixed bug in operator <c>bxor</c> causing erroneuos + result when one operand is a big <em>negative</em> + integer with the lowest <c>N*W</c> bits as zero and the + other operand not larger than <c>N*W</c> bits. <c>N</c> + is an integer of 1 or larger and <c>W</c> is 32 or 64 + depending on word size.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14514</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Erts 8.3.5.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> <list> diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_bif_port.c b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_bif_port.c index ff03151619..1121a450cd 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_bif_port.c +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_bif_port.c @@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ static byte* convert_environment(Process* p, Eterm env) goto done; } - if ((size = erts_native_filename_need(all,encoding)) < 0) { + if ((size = erts_native_filename_need(all, encoding, 1)) < 0) { goto done; } diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_io_queue.c b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_io_queue.c index a01b676d39..190ba6bbb9 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_io_queue.c +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_io_queue.c @@ -973,9 +973,10 @@ static int iol2v_append_binary(iol2v_state_t *state, Eterm bin_term) { UWord binary_size; Uint byte_offset, bit_offset, bit_size; + byte *binary_data; + Eterm *parent_header; Eterm parent_binary; - byte *binary_data; ASSERT(state->bytereds_available > state->bytereds_spent); @@ -1001,14 +1002,14 @@ static int iol2v_append_binary(iol2v_state_t *state, Eterm bin_term) { erts_emasculate_writable_binary(pb); } - binary_data = pb->bytes; + binary_data = &((byte*)pb->bytes)[byte_offset]; } else { ErlHeapBin *hb = (ErlHeapBin*)parent_header; ASSERT(thing_subtag(*parent_header) == HEAP_BINARY_SUBTAG); ASSERT(is_bin_small); - binary_data = &((unsigned char*)&hb->data)[byte_offset]; + binary_data = &((byte*)&hb->data)[byte_offset]; } if (!is_bin_small && (state->acc_size == 0 || !is_acc_small)) { diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_message.c b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_message.c index c1af70592a..b30c4a49d7 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_message.c +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_message.c @@ -568,14 +568,11 @@ erts_msg_attached_data_size_aux(ErtsMessage *msg) sz = erts_decode_dist_ext_size(msg->data.dist_ext); if (sz < 0) { - /* Bad external; remove it */ - if (is_not_nil(ERL_MESSAGE_TOKEN(msg))) { - ErlHeapFragment *heap_frag; - heap_frag = erts_dist_ext_trailer(msg->data.dist_ext); - erts_cleanup_offheap(&heap_frag->off_heap); - } - erts_free_dist_ext_copy(msg->data.dist_ext); - msg->data.dist_ext = NULL; + /* Bad external + * We leave the message intact in this case as it's not worth the trouble + * to make all callers remove it from queue. It will be detected again + * and removed from message queue later anyway. + */ return 0; } diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_unicode.c b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_unicode.c index 2d1d1443a7..efd2ca3db2 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/erl_unicode.c +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/erl_unicode.c @@ -1988,7 +1988,7 @@ char *erts_convert_filename_to_encoding(Eterm name, char *statbuf, size_t statbu is_list(name) || (allow_empty && is_nil(name))) { Sint need; - if ((need = erts_native_filename_need(name,encoding)) < 0) { + if ((need = erts_native_filename_need(name, encoding, 0)) < 0) { return NULL; } if (encoding == ERL_FILENAME_WIN_WCHAR) { @@ -2152,12 +2152,13 @@ Eterm erts_convert_native_to_filename(Process *p, byte *bytes) } -Sint erts_native_filename_need(Eterm ioterm, int encoding) +Sint erts_native_filename_need(Eterm ioterm, int encoding, int allow_null) { Eterm *objp; Eterm obj; DECLARE_ESTACK(stack); Sint need = 0; + int seen_null = 0; if (is_atom(ioterm)) { Atom* ap; @@ -2194,6 +2195,24 @@ Sint erts_native_filename_need(Eterm ioterm, int encoding) default: need = -1; } + if (!allow_null) { + /* + * Do not allow null in + * the middle of filenames + */ + if (need > 0) { + byte *name = ap->name; + int len = ap->len; + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (name[i] == 0) + seen_null = 1; + else if (seen_null) { + need = -1; + break; + } + } + } + } DESTROY_ESTACK(stack); return need; } @@ -2224,6 +2243,18 @@ L_Again: /* Restart with sublist, old listend was pushed on stack */ if (is_small(obj)) { /* Always small */ for(;;) { Uint x = unsigned_val(obj); + if (!allow_null) { + /* + * Do not allow null in + * the middle of filenames + */ + if (x == 0) + seen_null = 1; + else if (seen_null) { + DESTROY_ESTACK(stack); + return ((Sint) -1); + } + } switch (encoding) { case ERL_FILENAME_LATIN1: if (x > 255) { @@ -2515,6 +2546,7 @@ BIF_RETTYPE prim_file_internal_name2native_1(BIF_ALIST_1) BIF_ERROR(BIF_P,BADARG); } if (is_binary(BIF_ARG_1)) { + int seen_null = 0; byte *temp_alloc = NULL; byte *bytes; byte *err_pos; @@ -2524,10 +2556,18 @@ BIF_RETTYPE prim_file_internal_name2native_1(BIF_ALIST_1) size = binary_size(BIF_ARG_1); bytes = erts_get_aligned_binary_bytes(BIF_ARG_1, &temp_alloc); if (encoding != ERL_FILENAME_WIN_WCHAR) { + Uint i; /*Add 0 termination only*/ bin_term = new_binary(BIF_P, NULL, size+1); bin_p = binary_bytes(bin_term); - memcpy(bin_p,bytes,size); + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { + /* Don't allow null in the middle of filenames... */ + if (bytes[i] == 0) + seen_null = 1; + else if (seen_null) + goto bin_name_error; + bin_p[i] = bytes[i]; + } bin_p[size]=0; erts_free_aligned_binary_bytes(temp_alloc); BIF_RET(bin_term); @@ -2541,6 +2581,11 @@ BIF_RETTYPE prim_file_internal_name2native_1(BIF_ALIST_1) bin_term = new_binary(BIF_P, 0, (size+1)*2); bin_p = binary_bytes(bin_term); while (size--) { + /* Don't allow null in the middle of filenames... */ + if (*bytes == 0) + seen_null = 1; + else if (seen_null) + goto bin_name_error; *bin_p++ = *bytes++; *bin_p++ = 0; } @@ -2558,11 +2603,14 @@ BIF_RETTYPE prim_file_internal_name2native_1(BIF_ALIST_1) bin_p[num_chars*2+1] = 0; erts_free_aligned_binary_bytes(temp_alloc); BIF_RET(bin_term); + bin_name_error: + erts_free_aligned_binary_bytes(temp_alloc); + BIF_ERROR(BIF_P,BADARG); } /* binary */ - if ((need = erts_native_filename_need(BIF_ARG_1,encoding)) < 0) { - BIF_ERROR(BIF_P,BADARG); + if ((need = erts_native_filename_need(BIF_ARG_1, encoding, 0)) < 0) { + BIF_ERROR(BIF_P,BADARG); } if (encoding == ERL_FILENAME_WIN_WCHAR) { need += 2; diff --git a/erts/emulator/beam/global.h b/erts/emulator/beam/global.h index 182d3aa44e..ddf7f03265 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/beam/global.h +++ b/erts/emulator/beam/global.h @@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ void erts_init_unicode(void); Sint erts_unicode_set_loop_limit(Sint limit); void erts_native_filename_put(Eterm ioterm, int encoding, byte *p) ; -Sint erts_native_filename_need(Eterm ioterm, int encoding); +Sint erts_native_filename_need(Eterm ioterm, int encoding, int allow_null); void erts_copy_utf8_to_utf16_little(byte *target, byte *bytes, int num_chars); int erts_analyze_utf8(byte *source, Uint size, byte **err_pos, Uint *num_chars, int *left); diff --git a/erts/emulator/nifs/common/zlib_nif.c b/erts/emulator/nifs/common/zlib_nif.c index a1a65e1946..a9c5b05e47 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/nifs/common/zlib_nif.c +++ b/erts/emulator/nifs/common/zlib_nif.c @@ -69,11 +69,27 @@ typedef enum { ST_DEFLATE = 1, ST_INFLATE = 2, ST_CLOSED = 3 -} zlib_state; +} zlib_state_t; + +/* Controls what to do when the user attempts to decompress more data after + * Z_STREAM_END has been returned: + * + * - 'cut' wipes all further input and returns empty results until reset by + * the user. This is the default behavior, matching that of the old driver. + * - 'reset' resets the state without discarding any input, making it possible + * to decompress blindly concatenated streams. + * - 'error' crashes with a data error. */ +typedef enum { + EOS_BEHAVIOR_ERROR = 0, + EOS_BEHAVIOR_RESET = 1, + EOS_BEHAVIOR_CUT = 2 +} zlib_eos_behavior_t; typedef struct { z_stream s; - zlib_state state; + zlib_state_t state; + + zlib_eos_behavior_t eos_behavior; /* These refer to the plaintext CRC, and are only needed for zlib:crc32/1 * which is deprecated. */ @@ -102,7 +118,6 @@ typedef struct { static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_open(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_close(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_deflateInit(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); -static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_deflateInit2(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_deflateSetDictionary(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_deflateReset(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_deflateEnd(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); @@ -110,7 +125,6 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_deflateParams(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_T static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_deflate(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_inflateInit(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); -static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_inflateInit2(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_inflateSetDictionary(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_inflateGetDictionary(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_inflateReset(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); @@ -130,8 +144,7 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_enqueue_input(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_T static ErlNifFunc nif_funcs[] = { /* deflate */ - {"deflateInit_nif", 2, zlib_deflateInit}, - {"deflateInit_nif", 6, zlib_deflateInit2}, + {"deflateInit_nif", 6, zlib_deflateInit}, {"deflateSetDictionary_nif", 2, zlib_deflateSetDictionary}, {"deflateReset_nif", 1, zlib_deflateReset}, {"deflateEnd_nif", 1, zlib_deflateEnd}, @@ -139,8 +152,7 @@ static ErlNifFunc nif_funcs[] = { {"deflate_nif", 4, zlib_deflate}, /* inflate */ - {"inflateInit_nif", 1, zlib_inflateInit}, - {"inflateInit_nif", 2, zlib_inflateInit2}, + {"inflateInit_nif", 3, zlib_inflateInit}, {"inflateSetDictionary_nif", 2, zlib_inflateSetDictionary}, {"inflateGetDictionary_nif", 1, zlib_inflateGetDictionary}, {"inflateReset_nif", 1, zlib_inflateReset}, @@ -509,9 +521,11 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_open(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[ d->s.opaque = d; d->s.data_type = Z_BINARY; - d->state = ST_NONE; + d->eos_behavior = EOS_BEHAVIOR_CUT; d->eos_seen = 0; + d->state = ST_NONE; + d->want_output_crc = 0; d->want_input_crc = 0; d->is_raw_stream = 0; @@ -551,42 +565,6 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_close(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_deflateInit(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) { zlib_data_t *d; - int level, res; - - if(argc != 2 || !get_zlib_data(env, argv[0], &d) || - !enif_get_int(env, argv[1], &level)) { - return enif_make_badarg(env); - } else if(!zlib_process_check(env, d)) { - return enif_raise_exception(env, am_not_on_controlling_process); - } else if(d->state != ST_NONE) { - return enif_raise_exception(env, am_already_initialized); - } - - res = deflateInit(&d->s, level); - - if(res == Z_OK) { - d->state = ST_DEFLATE; - d->eos_seen = 0; - - /* FIXME: crc32/1 is documented as returning "the current calculated - * checksum," but failed to mention that the old implementation only - * calculated it when WindowBits < 0 (See zlib_deflateInit2). - * - * We could fix this behavior by setting d->want_input_crc to 1 here, - * but we've decided to retain this quirk since the performance hit is - * quite significant. */ - d->want_output_crc = 0; - d->want_input_crc = 0; - - d->output_crc = crc32(0L, Z_NULL, 0); - d->input_crc = crc32(0L, Z_NULL, 0); - } - - return zlib_return(env, res); -} - -static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_deflateInit2(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) { - zlib_data_t *d; int level, method, windowBits, memLevel, strategy, res; if(argc != 6 || !get_zlib_data(env, argv[0], &d) @@ -741,39 +719,12 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_deflate(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM ar static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_inflateInit(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) { zlib_data_t *d; - int res; - if(argc != 1 || !get_zlib_data(env, argv[0], &d)) { - return enif_make_badarg(env); - } else if(!zlib_process_check(env, d)) { - return enif_raise_exception(env, am_not_on_controlling_process); - } else if(d->state != ST_NONE) { - return enif_raise_exception(env, am_already_initialized); - } - - res = inflateInit(&d->s); - - if(res == Z_OK) { - d->state = ST_INFLATE; - d->eos_seen = 0; - - d->want_output_crc = 0; - d->want_input_crc = 0; - d->is_raw_stream = 0; - - d->output_crc = crc32(0L, Z_NULL, 0); - d->input_crc = crc32(0L, Z_NULL, 0); - } - - return zlib_return(env, res); -} + int windowBits, eosBehavior, res; -static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_inflateInit2(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) { - zlib_data_t *d; - int windowBits, res; - - if(argc != 2 || !get_zlib_data(env, argv[0], &d) - || !enif_get_int(env, argv[1], &windowBits)) { + if(argc != 3 || !get_zlib_data(env, argv[0], &d) + || !enif_get_int(env, argv[1], &windowBits) + || !enif_get_int(env, argv[2], &eosBehavior)) { return enif_make_badarg(env); } else if(!zlib_process_check(env, d)) { return enif_raise_exception(env, am_not_on_controlling_process); @@ -785,6 +736,8 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_inflateInit2(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TE if(res == Z_OK) { d->state = ST_INFLATE; + + d->eos_behavior = eosBehavior; d->eos_seen = 0; d->is_raw_stream = (windowBits < 0); @@ -934,6 +887,28 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM zlib_inflate(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM ar return enif_raise_exception(env, am_not_initialized); } + if(d->eos_seen) { + int res; + + switch(d->eos_behavior) { + case EOS_BEHAVIOR_ERROR: + return zlib_return(env, Z_DATA_ERROR); + case EOS_BEHAVIOR_RESET: + res = inflateReset(&d->s); + + if(res != Z_OK) { + return zlib_return(env, res); + } + + d->eos_seen = 0; + break; + case EOS_BEHAVIOR_CUT: + zlib_reset_input(d); + + return enif_make_tuple2(env, am_finished, enif_make_list(env, 0)); + } + } + return zlib_codec(&inflate, env, d, input_chunk_size, output_chunk_size, flush); } diff --git a/erts/emulator/test/distribution_SUITE.erl b/erts/emulator/test/distribution_SUITE.erl index b4ec99f902..4a0b299e03 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/test/distribution_SUITE.erl +++ b/erts/emulator/test/distribution_SUITE.erl @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ bad_dist_ext_process_info/1, bad_dist_ext_control/1, bad_dist_ext_connection_id/1, + bad_dist_ext_size/1, start_epmd_false/1, epmd_module/1]). %% Internal exports. @@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ groups() -> [dist_auto_connect_never, dist_auto_connect_once]}, {bad_dist_ext, [], [bad_dist_ext_receive, bad_dist_ext_process_info, + bad_dist_ext_size, bad_dist_ext_control, bad_dist_ext_connection_id]}]. %% Tests pinging a node in different ways. @@ -1672,6 +1674,57 @@ bad_dist_ext_connection_id(Config) when is_list(Config) -> stop_node(Offender), stop_node(Victim). +%% OTP-14661: Bad message is discovered by erts_msg_attached_data_size +bad_dist_ext_size(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + {ok, Offender} = start_node(bad_dist_ext_process_info_offender), + %%Prog = "Prog=/home/uabseri/src/otp_new3/bin/cerl -rr -debug", + Prog = [], + {ok, Victim} = start_node(bad_dist_ext_process_info_victim, [], Prog), + start_node_monitors([Offender,Victim]), + + Parent = self(), + P = spawn_link(Victim, + fun () -> + Parent ! {self(), started}, + receive check_msgs -> ok end, %% DID CRASH HERE + bad_dist_ext_check_msgs([one]), + Parent ! {self(), messages_checked} + end), + + receive {P, started} -> ok end, + P ! one, + + Suspended = make_ref(), + S = spawn(Victim, + fun () -> + erlang:suspend_process(P), + Parent ! Suspended, + receive after infinity -> ok end + end), + + receive Suspended -> ok end, + pong = rpc:call(Victim, net_adm, ping, [Offender]), + verify_up(Offender, Victim), + send_bad_msgs(Offender, P, 1, dmsg_bad_tag()), + + %% Make sure bad msgs has reached Victim + rpc:call(Offender, rpc, call, [Victim, erlang, node, []]), + + verify_still_up(Offender, Victim), + + rpc:call(Victim, erlang, process_info, [P, total_heap_size]), + + verify_down(Offender, connection_closed, Victim, killed), + + P ! check_msgs, + exit(S, bang), % resume Victim + receive {P, messages_checked} -> ok end, + + unlink(P), + verify_no_down(Offender, Victim), + stop_node(Offender), + stop_node(Victim). + bad_dist_struct_check_msgs([]) -> receive @@ -1775,9 +1828,12 @@ send_bad_structure(Offender,Victim,Bad,WhereToPutSelf,PayLoad) -> send_bad_msg(BadNode, To) -> send_bad_msgs(BadNode, To, 1). -send_bad_msgs(BadNode, To, Repeat) when is_atom(BadNode), - is_pid(To), - is_integer(Repeat) -> +send_bad_msgs(BadNode, To, Repeat) -> + send_bad_msgs(BadNode, To, Repeat, dmsg_bad_atom_cache_ref()). + +send_bad_msgs(BadNode, To, Repeat, BadTerm) when is_atom(BadNode), + is_pid(To), + is_integer(Repeat) -> Parent = self(), Done = make_ref(), spawn_link(BadNode, @@ -1787,7 +1843,7 @@ send_bad_msgs(BadNode, To, Repeat) when is_atom(BadNode), DPrt = dport(Node), DData = [dmsg_hdr(), dmsg_ext({?DOP_SEND, ?COOKIE, To}), - dmsg_bad_atom_cache_ref()], + BadTerm], repeat(fun () -> port_command(DPrt, DData) end, Repeat), Parent ! Done end), @@ -1874,6 +1930,9 @@ dmsg_ext(Term) -> dmsg_bad_atom_cache_ref() -> [$R, 137]. +dmsg_bad_tag() -> %% Will fail early at heap size calculation + [$?, 66]. + start_epmd_false(Config) when is_list(Config) -> %% Start a node with the option -start_epmd false. {ok, OtherNode} = start_node(start_epmd_false, "-start_epmd false"), diff --git a/erts/emulator/test/iovec_SUITE.erl b/erts/emulator/test/iovec_SUITE.erl index 28df36d293..49dc64b0d2 100644 --- a/erts/emulator/test/iovec_SUITE.erl +++ b/erts/emulator/test/iovec_SUITE.erl @@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ -export([integer_lists/1, binary_lists/1, empty_lists/1, empty_binary_lists/1, mixed_lists/1, improper_lists/1, illegal_lists/1, cons_bomb/1, - iolist_to_iovec_idempotence/1, iolist_to_iovec_correctness/1]). + sub_binary_lists/1, iolist_to_iovec_idempotence/1, + iolist_to_iovec_correctness/1]). -include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl"). @@ -34,8 +35,8 @@ suite() -> all() -> [integer_lists, binary_lists, empty_lists, empty_binary_lists, mixed_lists, - illegal_lists, improper_lists, cons_bomb, iolist_to_iovec_idempotence, - iolist_to_iovec_correctness]. + sub_binary_lists, illegal_lists, improper_lists, cons_bomb, + iolist_to_iovec_idempotence, iolist_to_iovec_correctness]. init_per_suite(Config) -> Config. @@ -46,15 +47,16 @@ end_per_suite(Config) -> integer_lists(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Variations = gen_variations([I || I <- lists:seq(1, 255)]), + equivalence_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, Variations). - equivalence_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, Variations), - - ok. +sub_binary_lists(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + Parent = <<0:256/unit:8, "gazurka">>, + <<0:196/unit:8, Child/binary>> = Parent, + equivalence_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, gen_variations(Child)). binary_lists(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Variations = gen_variations([<<I:8>> || I <- lists:seq(1, 255)]), - equivalence_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, Variations), - ok. + equivalence_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, Variations). empty_lists(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Variations = gen_variations([[] || _ <- lists:seq(1, 256)]), @@ -70,8 +72,7 @@ empty_binary_lists(Config) when is_list(Config) -> mixed_lists(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Variations = gen_variations([<<>>, lists:seq(1, 40), <<12, 45, 78>>]), - equivalence_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, Variations), - ok. + equivalence_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, Variations). illegal_lists(Config) when is_list(Config) -> BitStrs = gen_variations(["gurka", <<1:1>>, "gaffel"]), @@ -82,18 +83,15 @@ illegal_lists(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Variations = BitStrs ++ BadInts ++ Atoms ++ BadTails, - illegality_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, Variations), - - ok. + illegality_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, Variations). improper_lists(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Variations = [ [[[[1 | <<2>>] | <<3>>] | <<4>>] | <<5>>], - [[<<"test">>, 3] | <<"improper tail">>], - [1, 2, 3 | <<"improper tail">>] + [[<<1>>, 2] | <<3, 4, 5>>], + [1, 2, 3 | <<4, 5>>] ], - equivalence_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, Variations), - ok. + equivalence_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, Variations). cons_bomb(Config) when is_list(Config) -> IntBase = gen_variations([I || I <- lists:seq(1, 255)]), @@ -108,8 +106,7 @@ cons_bomb(Config) when is_list(Config) -> end, Variations = gen_variations([IntBase, BinBase, MixBase], Rounds), - equivalence_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, Variations), - ok. + equivalence_test(fun erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1, Variations). iolist_to_iovec_idempotence(Config) when is_list(Config) -> IntVariations = gen_variations([I || I <- lists:seq(1, 255)]), @@ -134,11 +131,15 @@ iolist_to_iovec_correctness(Config) when is_list(Config) -> ok. illegality_test(Fun, Variations) -> - [{'EXIT',{badarg, _}} = (catch Fun(Variation)) || Variation <- Variations]. + [{'EXIT',{badarg, _}} = (catch Fun(Variation)) || Variation <- Variations], + ok. equivalence_test(Fun, [Head | _] = Variations) -> + %% Check that each variation is equal to the others, and that the sum of + %% them is equal to the input. Comparand = Fun(Head), - [is_iolist_equal(Comparand, Fun(Variation)) || Variation <- Variations], + [true = is_iolist_equal(Comparand, Fun(V)) || V <- Variations], + true = is_iolist_equal(Variations, Fun(Variations)), ok. is_iolist_equal(A, B) -> diff --git a/erts/preloaded/ebin/zlib.beam b/erts/preloaded/ebin/zlib.beam Binary files differindex 267b5cb0a8..5048bdb846 100644 --- a/erts/preloaded/ebin/zlib.beam +++ b/erts/preloaded/ebin/zlib.beam diff --git a/erts/preloaded/src/erts.app.src b/erts/preloaded/src/erts.app.src index 7ab06164b4..beb29a7c89 100644 --- a/erts/preloaded/src/erts.app.src +++ b/erts/preloaded/src/erts.app.src @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ {registered, []}, {applications, []}, {env, []}, - {runtime_dependencies, ["stdlib-3.0", "kernel-5.0", "sasl-3.0.1"]} + {runtime_dependencies, ["stdlib-3.4.3", "kernel-5.4.1", "sasl-3.0.1"]} ]}. %% vim: ft=erlang diff --git a/erts/preloaded/src/zlib.erl b/erts/preloaded/src/zlib.erl index dca5a42779..3170ab6351 100644 --- a/erts/preloaded/src/zlib.erl +++ b/erts/preloaded/src/zlib.erl @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ -export([open/0,close/1,deflateInit/1,deflateInit/2,deflateInit/6, deflateSetDictionary/2,deflateReset/1,deflateParams/3, deflate/2,deflate/3,deflateEnd/1, - inflateInit/1,inflateInit/2, + inflateInit/1,inflateInit/2,inflateInit/3, inflateSetDictionary/2,inflateGetDictionary/1, inflateReset/1, inflate/2,inflate/3,inflateEnd/1, inflateChunk/2,inflateChunk/1, @@ -68,6 +68,13 @@ -define(MAX_WBITS, 15). +-define(DEFAULT_MEMLEVEL, 8). +-define(DEFAULT_WBITS, 15). + +-define(EOS_BEHAVIOR_ERROR, 0). +-define(EOS_BEHAVIOR_RESET, 1). +-define(EOS_BEHAVIOR_CUT, 2). + %% Chunk sizes are hardcoded on account of them screwing with the %% predictability of the system. zlib is incapable of trapping so we need to %% ensure that it never operates on any significant amount of data. @@ -130,10 +137,7 @@ deflateInit(Z) -> Z :: zstream(), Level :: zlevel(). deflateInit(Z, Level) -> - deflateInit_nif(Z, arg_level(Level)). - -deflateInit_nif(_Z, _Level) -> - erlang:nif_error(undef). + deflateInit(Z, Level, deflated, ?DEFAULT_WBITS, ?DEFAULT_MEMLEVEL, default). -spec deflateInit(Z, Level, Method, WindowBits, MemLevel, Strategy) -> 'ok' when Z :: zstream(), @@ -225,16 +229,21 @@ deflateEnd_nif(_Z) -> -spec inflateInit(Z) -> 'ok' when Z :: zstream(). inflateInit(Z) -> - inflateInit_nif(Z). -inflateInit_nif(_Z) -> - erlang:nif_error(undef). + inflateInit(Z, ?DEFAULT_WBITS). -spec inflateInit(Z, WindowBits) -> 'ok' when Z :: zstream(), WindowBits :: zwindowbits(). inflateInit(Z, WindowBits) -> - inflateInit_nif(Z, WindowBits). -inflateInit_nif(_Z, _WindowBits) -> + inflateInit(Z, WindowBits, cut). + +-spec inflateInit(Z, WindowBits, EoSBehavior) -> 'ok' when + Z :: zstream(), + WindowBits :: zwindowbits(), + EoSBehavior :: error | reset | cut. +inflateInit(Z, WindowBits, EoSBehavior) -> + inflateInit_nif(Z, arg_bitsz(WindowBits), arg_eos_behavior(EoSBehavior)). +inflateInit_nif(_Z, _WindowBits, _EoSBehavior) -> erlang:nif_error(undef). -spec inflateSetDictionary(Z, Dictionary) -> 'ok' when @@ -532,7 +541,7 @@ gzip(Data) -> gunzip(Data) -> Z = open(), Bs = try - inflateInit(Z, 16+?MAX_WBITS), + inflateInit(Z, 16+?MAX_WBITS, reset), B = inflate(Z, Data), inflateEnd(Z), B @@ -652,6 +661,11 @@ arg_strategy(_) -> erlang:error(bad_compression_strategy). arg_method(deflated) -> ?Z_DEFLATED; arg_method(_) -> erlang:error(bad_compression_method). +arg_eos_behavior(error) -> ?EOS_BEHAVIOR_ERROR; +arg_eos_behavior(reset) -> ?EOS_BEHAVIOR_RESET; +arg_eos_behavior(cut) -> ?EOS_BEHAVIOR_CUT; +arg_eos_behavior(_) -> erlang:error(bad_eos_behavior). + -spec arg_bitsz(zwindowbits()) -> zwindowbits(). arg_bitsz(Bits) when is_integer(Bits) andalso ((8 =< Bits andalso Bits < 48) orelse @@ -678,4 +692,4 @@ enqueue_input_1(Z, IOVec) -> end. enqueue_nif(_Z, _IOVec) -> - erlang:nif_error(undef).
\ No newline at end of file + erlang:nif_error(undef). diff --git a/erts/vsn.mk b/erts/vsn.mk index c231c9c27d..1c6472a0ab 100644 --- a/erts/vsn.mk +++ b/erts/vsn.mk @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ # %CopyrightEnd% # -VSN = 9.0.5 +VSN = 9.1.1 # Port number 4365 in 4.2 # Port number 4366 in 4.3 diff --git a/lib/asn1/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/asn1/doc/src/notes.xml index 5399528271..ae6660c143 100644 --- a/lib/asn1/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/asn1/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -32,6 +32,24 @@ <p>This document describes the changes made to the asn1 application.</p> +<section><title>Asn1 5.0.3</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Compiling an ASN.1 module using the option {n2n, + EnumTypeName} when EnumTypeName contains a hypen like for + example Cause-Misc caused syntax errors when compiling + the generated Erlang code. This is now corrected.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14495 Aux Id: ERL-437 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Asn1 5.0.2</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/asn1/vsn.mk b/lib/asn1/vsn.mk index 5900f3037e..ef83b9e3dc 100644 --- a/lib/asn1/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/asn1/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -ASN1_VSN = 5.0.2 +ASN1_VSN = 5.0.3 diff --git a/lib/common_test/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/common_test/doc/src/notes.xml index 37a1846160..b039023e0f 100644 --- a/lib/common_test/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/common_test/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -33,6 +33,21 @@ <file>notes.xml</file> </header> +<section><title>Common_Test 1.15.2</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Common_Test 1.15.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/common_test/vsn.mk b/lib/common_test/vsn.mk index 9fc3f7f797..7b959ebfe3 100644 --- a/lib/common_test/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/common_test/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -COMMON_TEST_VSN = 1.15.1 +COMMON_TEST_VSN = 1.15.2 diff --git a/lib/compiler/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/compiler/doc/src/notes.xml index bc335a9eaa..433fc3b86e 100644 --- a/lib/compiler/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/compiler/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -32,6 +32,77 @@ <p>This document describes the changes made to the Compiler application.</p> +<section><title>Compiler 7.1.3</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p>The compiler could issue an incorrect internal + consistency failure diagnostic for some complicated bit + syntax maches.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14640 Aux Id: ERL-490 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>Compiler 7.1.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p>Fail labels on guard BIFs weren't taken into account + during an optimization pass, and a bug in the validation + pass sometimes prevented this from being noticed when a + fault occurred.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14522 Aux Id: ERIERL-48 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + When compiling from Core Erlang, an 'apply' with a nested + apply in the function position would be treated as an + invalid call. Corrected. (Thanks to Mikael Pettersson for + reporting this bug.)</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14526</p> + </item> + <item> + <p>Fixed checking of binary matching in the + <c>beam_validator</c> module to ensure that potential + compiler bugs are found at compile-time instead as + emulator crash at run-time.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14591</p> + </item> + <item> + <p>There could be false warnings for + <c>erlang:get_stacktrace/0</c> being used outside of a + <c>try</c> block when using multiple <c>catch</c> + clauses.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14600 Aux Id: ERL-478 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> The Erlang code linter no longer checks that the + functions mentioned in <c>nowarn_deprecated_function</c> + options are declared in the module. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14378</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Compiler 7.1.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> @@ -223,6 +294,23 @@ </section> +<section><title>Compiler 7.0.4.1</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p>Fail labels on guard BIFs weren't taken into account + during an optimization pass, and a bug in the validation + pass sometimes prevented this from being noticed when a + fault occurred.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14522 Aux Id: ERIERL-48 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Compiler 7.0.4</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/compiler/src/beam_validator.erl b/lib/compiler/src/beam_validator.erl index 00901077d3..be8908dd6b 100644 --- a/lib/compiler/src/beam_validator.erl +++ b/lib/compiler/src/beam_validator.erl @@ -1430,13 +1430,13 @@ merge_types(bool, {atom,A}) -> merge_bool(A); merge_types({atom,A}, bool) -> merge_bool(A); -merge_types(#ms{id=Id1,valid=B0,slots=Slots}, - #ms{id=Id2,valid=B1,slots=Slots}) -> +merge_types(#ms{id=Id1,valid=B1,slots=Slots1}, + #ms{id=Id2,valid=B2,slots=Slots2}) -> Id = if Id1 =:= Id2 -> Id1; true -> make_ref() end, - #ms{id=Id,valid=B0 band B1,slots=Slots}; + #ms{id=Id,valid=B1 band B2,slots=min(Slots1, Slots2)}; merge_types(T1, T2) when T1 =/= T2 -> %% Too different. All we know is that the type is a 'term'. term. diff --git a/lib/compiler/test/bs_match_SUITE.erl b/lib/compiler/test/bs_match_SUITE.erl index 0ec05456ec..2fe8cd0cff 100644 --- a/lib/compiler/test/bs_match_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/compiler/test/bs_match_SUITE.erl @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ match_string_opt/1,select_on_integer/1, map_and_binary/1,unsafe_branch_caching/1, bad_literals/1,good_literals/1,constant_propagation/1, - parse_xml/1,get_payload/1]). + parse_xml/1,get_payload/1,num_slots_different/1]). -export([coverage_id/1,coverage_external_ignore/2]). @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ groups() -> match_string_opt,select_on_integer, map_and_binary,unsafe_branch_caching, bad_literals,good_literals,constant_propagation,parse_xml, - get_payload]}]. + get_payload,num_slots_different]}]. init_per_suite(Config) -> @@ -1524,6 +1524,40 @@ do_get_payload(ExtHdr) -> <<_:13,_:35>> = ExtHdr#ext_header.ext_hdr_opts, ExtHdrOptions. +%% ERL-490 +num_slots_different(_Config) -> + Ts = [{<<"de">>, <<"default">>, <<"Remove">>, <<"a">>}, + {<<"de">>, <<"default">>, <<"Remove from list">>, <<"a">>}, + {<<"de">>, <<"default">>, <<"Remove from the list">>, <<"a">>}, + {<<"de">>, <<"default">>, <<"Results">>, <<"Ergebnisse">>}, + {<<"de">>, <<"default">>, <<"Reservatio">>, <<"a">>}, + {<<"de">>, <<"navigation">>, <<"Results">>, <<"Ergebnisse">>}, + {<<"de">>, <<"navigation">>, <<"Resources">>, <<"Ressourcen">>}], + _ = [{ok,Res} = lgettext(A, B, C) || {A,B,C,Res} <- Ts], + + {'EXIT',_} = (catch lgettext(<<"d">>, <<"default">>, <<"Remove">>)), + {'EXIT',_} = (catch lgettext("", <<"default">>, <<"Remove">>)), + {'EXIT',_} = (catch lgettext(<<"de">>, <<"def">>, <<"Remove">>)), + {'EXIT',_} = (catch lgettext(<<"de">>, <<"default">>, <<"Res">>)), + ok. + + +lgettext(<<"de">>, <<"default">>, <<"Remove">>) -> + {ok, <<"a">>}; +lgettext(<<"de">>, <<"default">>, <<"Remove from list">>) -> + {ok, <<"a">>}; +lgettext(<<"de">>, <<"default">>, <<"Remove from the list">>) -> + {ok, <<"a">>}; +lgettext(<<"de">>, <<"default">>, <<"Results">>) -> + {ok, <<"Ergebnisse">>}; +lgettext(<<"de">>, <<"default">>, <<"Reservatio">>) -> + {ok, <<"a">>}; +lgettext(<<"de">>, <<"navigation">>, <<"Results">>) -> + {ok, <<"Ergebnisse">>}; +lgettext(<<"de">>, <<"navigation">>, <<"Resources">>) -> + {ok, <<"Ressourcen">>}. + + check(F, R) -> R = F(). diff --git a/lib/compiler/vsn.mk b/lib/compiler/vsn.mk index 27ee5a3fb7..435a57aac2 100644 --- a/lib/compiler/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/compiler/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -COMPILER_VSN = 7.1.1 +COMPILER_VSN = 7.1.3 diff --git a/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c b/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c index 1d9c1e0f88..53fe233790 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c +++ b/lib/crypto/c_src/crypto.c @@ -442,8 +442,7 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM rc4_set_key(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM arg static ERL_NIF_TERM rc4_encrypt_with_state(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM pkey_sign_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM pkey_verify_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); -static ERL_NIF_TERM rsa_public_crypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); -static ERL_NIF_TERM rsa_private_crypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); +static ERL_NIF_TERM pkey_crypt_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM rsa_generate_key_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM dh_generate_parameters_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); static ERL_NIF_TERM dh_check(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]); @@ -511,8 +510,7 @@ static ErlNifFunc nif_funcs[] = { {"rc4_encrypt_with_state", 2, rc4_encrypt_with_state}, {"pkey_sign_nif", 5, pkey_sign_nif}, {"pkey_verify_nif", 6, pkey_verify_nif}, - {"rsa_public_crypt", 4, rsa_public_crypt}, - {"rsa_private_crypt", 4, rsa_private_crypt}, + {"pkey_crypt_nif", 6, pkey_crypt_nif}, {"rsa_generate_key_nif", 2, rsa_generate_key_nif}, {"dh_generate_parameters_nif", 2, dh_generate_parameters_nif}, {"dh_check", 1, dh_check}, @@ -549,6 +547,7 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_error; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_pkcs1_padding; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_pkcs1_oaep_padding; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_no_padding; +static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_signature_md; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_undefined; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_ok; @@ -589,8 +588,12 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_dss; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_ecdsa; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_mgf1_md; +static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_oaep_label; +static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_oaep_md; +static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_pad; /* backwards compatibility */ static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_padding; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_pkcs1_pss_padding; +static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_sslv23_padding; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_x931_padding; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_rsa_pss_saltlen; static ERL_NIF_TERM atom_sha224; @@ -895,6 +898,7 @@ static int initialize(ErlNifEnv* env, ERL_NIF_TERM load_info) atom_rsa_pkcs1_padding = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_pkcs1_padding"); atom_rsa_pkcs1_oaep_padding = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_pkcs1_oaep_padding"); atom_rsa_no_padding = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_no_padding"); + atom_signature_md = enif_make_atom(env,"signature_md"); atom_undefined = enif_make_atom(env,"undefined"); atom_ok = enif_make_atom(env,"ok"); atom_not_prime = enif_make_atom(env,"not_prime"); @@ -933,8 +937,12 @@ static int initialize(ErlNifEnv* env, ERL_NIF_TERM load_info) atom_dss = enif_make_atom(env,"dss"); atom_ecdsa = enif_make_atom(env,"ecdsa"); atom_rsa_mgf1_md = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_mgf1_md"); + atom_rsa_oaep_label = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_oaep_label"); + atom_rsa_oaep_md = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_oaep_md"); + atom_rsa_pad = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_pad"); /* backwards compatibility */ atom_rsa_padding = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_padding"); atom_rsa_pkcs1_pss_padding = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_pkcs1_pss_padding"); + atom_rsa_sslv23_padding = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_sslv23_padding"); atom_rsa_x931_padding = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_x931_padding"); atom_rsa_pss_saltlen = enif_make_atom(env,"rsa_pss_saltlen"); atom_sha224 = enif_make_atom(env,"sha224"); @@ -2722,118 +2730,6 @@ static int get_dss_public_key(ErlNifEnv* env, ERL_NIF_TERM key, DSA *dsa) return 1; } -static int rsa_pad(ERL_NIF_TERM term, int* padding) -{ - if (term == atom_rsa_pkcs1_padding) { - *padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; - } - else if (term == atom_rsa_pkcs1_oaep_padding) { - *padding = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; - } - else if (term == atom_rsa_no_padding) { - *padding = RSA_NO_PADDING; - } - else { - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -static ERL_NIF_TERM rsa_public_crypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) -{/* (Data, PublKey=[E,N], Padding, IsEncrypt) */ - ErlNifBinary data_bin, ret_bin; - ERL_NIF_TERM head, tail; - int padding, i; - RSA* rsa; - BIGNUM *e, *n; - - rsa = RSA_new(); - - if (!enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[0], &data_bin) - || !enif_get_list_cell(env, argv[1], &head, &tail) - || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &e) - || !enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail) - || !get_bn_from_bin(env, head, &n) - || !enif_is_empty_list(env,tail) - || !rsa_pad(argv[2], &padding)) { - - RSA_free(rsa); - return enif_make_badarg(env); - } - (void) RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL); - - enif_alloc_binary(RSA_size(rsa), &ret_bin); - - if (argv[3] == atom_true) { - ERL_VALGRIND_ASSERT_MEM_DEFINED(data_bin.data,data_bin.size); - i = RSA_public_encrypt(data_bin.size, data_bin.data, - ret_bin.data, rsa, padding); - if (i > 0) { - ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(ret_bin.data, i); - } - } - else { - i = RSA_public_decrypt(data_bin.size, data_bin.data, - ret_bin.data, rsa, padding); - if (i > 0) { - ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(ret_bin.data, i); - enif_realloc_binary(&ret_bin, i); - } - } - RSA_free(rsa); - if (i > 0) { - return enif_make_binary(env,&ret_bin); - } - else { - enif_release_binary(&ret_bin); - return atom_error; - } -} - -static ERL_NIF_TERM rsa_private_crypt(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) -{/* (Data, Key=[E,N,D]|[E,N,D,P1,P2,E1,E2,C], Padding, IsEncrypt) */ - ErlNifBinary data_bin, ret_bin; - int padding, i; - RSA* rsa; - - rsa = RSA_new(); - - if (!enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[0], &data_bin) - || !get_rsa_private_key(env, argv[1], rsa) - || !rsa_pad(argv[2], &padding)) { - - RSA_free(rsa); - return enif_make_badarg(env); - } - - enif_alloc_binary(RSA_size(rsa), &ret_bin); - - if (argv[3] == atom_true) { - ERL_VALGRIND_ASSERT_MEM_DEFINED(data_bin.data,data_bin.size); - i = RSA_private_encrypt(data_bin.size, data_bin.data, - ret_bin.data, rsa, padding); - if (i > 0) { - ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(ret_bin.data, i); - } - } - else { - i = RSA_private_decrypt(data_bin.size, data_bin.data, - ret_bin.data, rsa, padding); - if (i > 0) { - ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(ret_bin.data, i); - enif_realloc_binary(&ret_bin, i); - } - } - RSA_free(rsa); - if (i > 0) { - return enif_make_binary(env,&ret_bin); - } - else { - enif_release_binary(&ret_bin); - return atom_error; - } -} - /* Creates a term which can be parsed by get_rsa_private_key(). This is a list of plain integer binaries (not mpints). */ static ERL_NIF_TERM put_rsa_private_key(ErlNifEnv* env, const RSA *rsa) { @@ -3906,7 +3802,8 @@ static int get_pkey_sign_options(ErlNifEnv *env, ERL_NIF_TERM algorithm, ERL_NIF return PKEY_OK; } -static int get_pkey_sign_key(ErlNifEnv *env, ERL_NIF_TERM algorithm, ERL_NIF_TERM key, EVP_PKEY **pkey) + +static int get_pkey_private_key(ErlNifEnv *env, ERL_NIF_TERM algorithm, ERL_NIF_TERM key, EVP_PKEY **pkey) { if (algorithm == atom_rsa) { RSA *rsa = RSA_new(); @@ -3965,6 +3862,67 @@ static int get_pkey_sign_key(ErlNifEnv *env, ERL_NIF_TERM algorithm, ERL_NIF_TER return PKEY_OK; } + +static int get_pkey_public_key(ErlNifEnv *env, ERL_NIF_TERM algorithm, ERL_NIF_TERM key, + EVP_PKEY **pkey) +{ + if (algorithm == atom_rsa) { + RSA *rsa = RSA_new(); + + if (!get_rsa_public_key(env, key, rsa)) { + RSA_free(rsa); + return PKEY_BADARG; + } + + *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); + if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(*pkey, rsa)) { + EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey); + RSA_free(rsa); + return PKEY_BADARG; + } + } else if (algorithm == atom_ecdsa) { +#if defined(HAVE_EC) + EC_KEY *ec = NULL; + const ERL_NIF_TERM *tpl_terms; + int tpl_arity; + + if (enif_get_tuple(env, key, &tpl_arity, &tpl_terms) && tpl_arity == 2 + && enif_is_tuple(env, tpl_terms[0]) && enif_is_binary(env, tpl_terms[1]) + && get_ec_key(env, tpl_terms[0], atom_undefined, tpl_terms[1], &ec)) { + + *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); + if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(*pkey, ec)) { + EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey); + EC_KEY_free(ec); + return PKEY_BADARG; + } + } else { + return PKEY_BADARG; + } +#else + return PKEY_NOTSUP; +#endif + } else if (algorithm == atom_dss) { + DSA *dsa = DSA_new(); + + if (!get_dss_public_key(env, key, dsa)) { + DSA_free(dsa); + return PKEY_BADARG; + } + + *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); + if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(*pkey, dsa)) { + EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey); + DSA_free(dsa); + return PKEY_BADARG; + } + } else { + return PKEY_BADARG; + } + + return PKEY_OK; +} + static ERL_NIF_TERM pkey_sign_nif(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) {/* (Algorithm, Type, Data|{digest,Digest}, Key, Options) */ int i; @@ -4002,7 +3960,7 @@ printf("\r\n"); return enif_make_badarg(env); } - if (get_pkey_sign_key(env, argv[0], argv[3], &pkey) != PKEY_OK) { + if (get_pkey_private_key(env, argv[0], argv[3], &pkey) != PKEY_OK) { return enif_make_badarg(env); } @@ -4097,66 +4055,6 @@ printf("\r\n"); } -static int get_pkey_verify_key(ErlNifEnv *env, ERL_NIF_TERM algorithm, ERL_NIF_TERM key, - EVP_PKEY **pkey) -{ - if (algorithm == atom_rsa) { - RSA *rsa = RSA_new(); - - if (!get_rsa_public_key(env, key, rsa)) { - RSA_free(rsa); - return PKEY_BADARG; - } - - *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); - if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(*pkey, rsa)) { - EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey); - RSA_free(rsa); - return PKEY_BADARG; - } - } else if (algorithm == atom_ecdsa) { -#if defined(HAVE_EC) - EC_KEY *ec = NULL; - const ERL_NIF_TERM *tpl_terms; - int tpl_arity; - - if (enif_get_tuple(env, key, &tpl_arity, &tpl_terms) && tpl_arity == 2 - && enif_is_tuple(env, tpl_terms[0]) && enif_is_binary(env, tpl_terms[1]) - && get_ec_key(env, tpl_terms[0], atom_undefined, tpl_terms[1], &ec)) { - - *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); - if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(*pkey, ec)) { - EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey); - EC_KEY_free(ec); - return PKEY_BADARG; - } - } else { - return PKEY_BADARG; - } -#else - return PKEY_NOTSUP; -#endif - } else if (algorithm == atom_dss) { - DSA *dsa = DSA_new(); - - if (!get_dss_public_key(env, key, dsa)) { - DSA_free(dsa); - return PKEY_BADARG; - } - - *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); - if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(*pkey, dsa)) { - EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey); - DSA_free(dsa); - return PKEY_BADARG; - } - } else { - return PKEY_BADARG; - } - - return PKEY_OK; -} - static ERL_NIF_TERM pkey_verify_nif(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) {/* (Algorithm, Type, Data|{digest,Digest}, Signature, Key, Options) */ int i; @@ -4192,7 +4090,7 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM pkey_verify_nif(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM return enif_make_badarg(env); } - if (get_pkey_verify_key(env, argv[0], argv[4], &pkey) != PKEY_OK) { + if (get_pkey_public_key(env, argv[0], argv[4], &pkey) != PKEY_OK) { return enif_make_badarg(env); } @@ -4269,6 +4167,382 @@ static ERL_NIF_TERM pkey_verify_nif(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM } +/*--------------------------------*/ + +static int get_pkey_crypt_options(ErlNifEnv *env, ERL_NIF_TERM algorithm, ERL_NIF_TERM options, + PKeyCryptOptions *opt) +{ + ERL_NIF_TERM head, tail; + const ERL_NIF_TERM *tpl_terms; + int tpl_arity; + const EVP_MD *opt_md; + int i; + + if (!enif_is_list(env, options)) { + return PKEY_BADARG; + } + + /* defaults */ + if (algorithm == atom_rsa) { + opt->rsa_mgf1_md = NULL; + opt->rsa_oaep_label.data = NULL; + opt->rsa_oaep_label.size = 0; + opt->rsa_oaep_md = NULL; + opt->rsa_padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; + opt->signature_md = NULL; + } + + if (enif_is_empty_list(env, options)) { + return PKEY_OK; + } + + if (algorithm == atom_rsa) { + tail = options; + while (enif_get_list_cell(env, tail, &head, &tail)) { + if (enif_get_tuple(env, head, &tpl_arity, &tpl_terms) && tpl_arity == 2) { + if (tpl_terms[0] == atom_rsa_padding + || tpl_terms[0] == atom_rsa_pad /* Compatibility */ + ) { + if (tpl_terms[1] == atom_rsa_pkcs1_padding) { + opt->rsa_padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; + } else if (tpl_terms[1] == atom_rsa_pkcs1_oaep_padding) { + opt->rsa_padding = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; + } else if (tpl_terms[1] == atom_rsa_sslv23_padding) { + opt->rsa_padding = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING; + } else if (tpl_terms[1] == atom_rsa_x931_padding) { + opt->rsa_padding = RSA_X931_PADDING; + } else if (tpl_terms[1] == atom_rsa_no_padding) { + opt->rsa_padding = RSA_NO_PADDING; + } else { + return PKEY_BADARG; + } + } else if (tpl_terms[0] == atom_signature_md && enif_is_atom(env, tpl_terms[1])) { + i = get_pkey_digest_type(env, algorithm, tpl_terms[1], &opt_md); + if (i != PKEY_OK) { + return i; + } + opt->signature_md = opt_md; + } else if (tpl_terms[0] == atom_rsa_mgf1_md && enif_is_atom(env, tpl_terms[1])) { +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_OAEP_MD + if (tpl_terms[1] != atom_sha) + return PKEY_NOTSUP; +#endif + i = get_pkey_digest_type(env, algorithm, tpl_terms[1], &opt_md); + if (i != PKEY_OK) { + return i; + } + opt->rsa_mgf1_md = opt_md; + } else if (tpl_terms[0] == atom_rsa_oaep_label + && enif_inspect_binary(env, tpl_terms[1], &(opt->rsa_oaep_label))) { +#ifdef HAVE_RSA_OAEP_MD + continue; +#else + return PKEY_NOTSUP; +#endif + } else if (tpl_terms[0] == atom_rsa_oaep_md && enif_is_atom(env, tpl_terms[1])) { +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_OAEP_MD + if (tpl_terms[1] != atom_sha) + return PKEY_NOTSUP; +#endif + i = get_pkey_digest_type(env, algorithm, tpl_terms[1], &opt_md); + if (i != PKEY_OK) { + return i; + } + opt->rsa_oaep_md = opt_md; + } else { + return PKEY_BADARG; + } + } else { + return PKEY_BADARG; + } + } + } else { + return PKEY_BADARG; + } + + return PKEY_OK; +} + +static ERL_NIF_TERM pkey_crypt_nif(ErlNifEnv *env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) +{/* (Algorithm, Data, PublKey=[E,N]|[E,N,D]|[E,N,D,P1,P2,E1,E2,C], Options, IsPrivate, IsEncrypt) */ + int i; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; +#ifdef HAS_EVP_PKEY_CTX + EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx; +#else + RSA *rsa; +#endif + PKeyCryptOptions crypt_opt; + ErlNifBinary in_bin, out_bin, tmp_bin; + size_t outlen, tmplen; + int is_private = (argv[4] == atom_true), + is_encrypt = (argv[5] == atom_true); + int algo_init = 0; + +/* char algo[1024]; */ + + if (!enif_inspect_binary(env, argv[1], &in_bin)) { + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + + i = get_pkey_crypt_options(env, argv[0], argv[3], &crypt_opt); + if (i != PKEY_OK) { + if (i == PKEY_NOTSUP) + return atom_notsup; + else + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + + if (is_private) { + if (get_pkey_private_key(env, argv[0], argv[2], &pkey) != PKEY_OK) { + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + } else { + if (get_pkey_public_key(env, argv[0], argv[2], &pkey) != PKEY_OK) { + return enif_make_badarg(env); + } + } + + out_bin.data = NULL; + out_bin.size = 0; + tmp_bin.data = NULL; + tmp_bin.size = 0; + +#ifdef HAS_EVP_PKEY_CTX + ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); + if (!ctx) goto badarg; + +/* enif_get_atom(env,argv[0],algo,1024,ERL_NIF_LATIN1); */ + + if (is_private) { + if (is_encrypt) { + /* private encrypt */ + if ((algo_init=EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx)) <= 0) { + /* fprintf(stderr,"BADARG %s private encrypt algo_init=%d %s:%d\r\n", algo, algo_init, __FILE__, __LINE__); */ + goto badarg; + } + } else { + /* private decrypt */ + if ((algo_init=EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx)) <= 0) { + /* fprintf(stderr,"BADARG %s private decrypt algo_init=%d %s:%d\r\n", algo, algo_init, __FILE__, __LINE__); */ + goto badarg; + } + } + } else { + if (is_encrypt) { + /* public encrypt */ + if ((algo_init=EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx)) <= 0) { + /* fprintf(stderr,"BADARG %s public encrypt algo_init=%d %s:%d\r\n", algo,algo_init,__FILE__, __LINE__); */ + goto badarg; + } + } else { + /* public decrypt */ + if ((algo_init=EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(ctx)) <= 0) { + /* fprintf(stderr,"BADARG %s public decrypt algo_init=%d %s:%d\r\n", algo,algo_init,__FILE__, __LINE__); */ + goto badarg; + } + } + } + + if (argv[0] == atom_rsa) { + if (crypt_opt.signature_md != NULL + && EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, crypt_opt.signature_md) <= 0) + goto badarg; + if (crypt_opt.rsa_padding == RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) { + if (is_encrypt) { + RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (rsa == NULL) goto badarg; + tmplen = RSA_size(rsa); + if (!enif_alloc_binary(tmplen, &tmp_bin)) goto badarg; + if (RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(tmp_bin.data, tmplen, in_bin.data, in_bin.size) <= 0) + goto badarg; + in_bin = tmp_bin; + } + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_NO_PADDING) <= 0) goto badarg; + } else { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, crypt_opt.rsa_padding) <= 0) goto badarg; + } +#ifdef HAVE_RSA_OAEP_MD + if (crypt_opt.rsa_padding == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { + if (crypt_opt.rsa_oaep_md != NULL + && EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, crypt_opt.rsa_oaep_md) <= 0) + goto badarg; + if (crypt_opt.rsa_mgf1_md != NULL + && EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, crypt_opt.rsa_mgf1_md) <= 0) goto badarg; + if (crypt_opt.rsa_oaep_label.data != NULL && crypt_opt.rsa_oaep_label.size > 0) { + unsigned char *label_copy; + label_copy = OPENSSL_malloc(crypt_opt.rsa_oaep_label.size); + if (label_copy == NULL) goto badarg; + memcpy((void *)(label_copy), (const void *)(crypt_opt.rsa_oaep_label.data), + crypt_opt.rsa_oaep_label.size); + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, label_copy, + crypt_opt.rsa_oaep_label.size) <= 0) { + OPENSSL_free(label_copy); + label_copy = NULL; + goto badarg; + } + } + } +#endif + } + + if (is_private) { + if (is_encrypt) { + /* private_encrypt */ + i = EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in_bin.data, in_bin.size); + } else { + /* private_decrypt */ + i = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in_bin.data, in_bin.size); + } + } else { + if (is_encrypt) { + /* public_encrypt */ + i = EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in_bin.data, in_bin.size); + } else { + /* public_decrypt */ + i = EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, NULL, &outlen, in_bin.data, in_bin.size); + } + } + /* fprintf(stderr,"i = %d %s:%d\r\n", i, __FILE__, __LINE__); */ + + if (i != 1) goto badarg; + + enif_alloc_binary(outlen, &out_bin); + + ERL_VALGRIND_ASSERT_MEM_DEFINED(out_bin.data, out_bin.size); + if (is_private) { + if (is_encrypt) { + /* private_encrypt */ + i = EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, out_bin.data, &outlen, in_bin.data, in_bin.size); + } else { + /* private_decrypt */ + i = EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, out_bin.data, &outlen, in_bin.data, in_bin.size); + } + } else { + if (is_encrypt) { + /* public_encrypt */ + i = EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx, out_bin.data, &outlen, in_bin.data, in_bin.size); + } else { + /* public_decrypt */ + i = EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(ctx, out_bin.data, &outlen, in_bin.data, in_bin.size); + } + } + +#else + /* Non-EVP cryptolib. Only support RSA */ + + if (argv[0] != atom_rsa) { + algo_init = -2; /* exitcode: notsup */ + goto badarg; + } + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + enif_alloc_binary(RSA_size(rsa), &out_bin); + + if (is_private) { + if (is_encrypt) { + /* non-evp rsa private encrypt */ + ERL_VALGRIND_ASSERT_MEM_DEFINED(in_bin.data,in_bin.size); + i = RSA_private_encrypt(in_bin.size, in_bin.data, + out_bin.data, rsa, crypt_opt.rsa_padding); + if (i > 0) { + ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(out_bin.data, i); + } + } else { + /* non-evp rsa private decrypt */ + i = RSA_private_decrypt(in_bin.size, in_bin.data, + out_bin.data, rsa, crypt_opt.rsa_padding); + if (i > 0) { + ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(out_bin.data, i); + enif_realloc_binary(&out_bin, i); + } + } + } else { + if (is_encrypt) { + /* non-evp rsa public encrypt */ + ERL_VALGRIND_ASSERT_MEM_DEFINED(in_bin.data,in_bin.size); + i = RSA_public_encrypt(in_bin.size, in_bin.data, + out_bin.data, rsa, crypt_opt.rsa_padding); + if (i > 0) { + ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(out_bin.data, i); + } + } else { + /* non-evp rsa public decrypt */ + i = RSA_public_decrypt(in_bin.size, in_bin.data, + out_bin.data, rsa, crypt_opt.rsa_padding); + if (i > 0) { + ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(out_bin.data, i); + enif_realloc_binary(&out_bin, i); + } + } + } + + outlen = i; + RSA_free(rsa); +#endif + + if ((i > 0) && argv[0] == atom_rsa && !is_encrypt) { + if (crypt_opt.rsa_padding == RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) { + RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + unsigned char *p; + if (rsa == NULL) goto badarg; + tmplen = RSA_size(rsa); + if (!enif_alloc_binary(tmplen, &tmp_bin)) goto badarg; + p = out_bin.data; + p++; + i = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(tmp_bin.data, tmplen, p, out_bin.size - 1, tmplen); + if (i >= 0) { + outlen = i; + in_bin = out_bin; + out_bin = tmp_bin; + tmp_bin = in_bin; + i = 1; + } + } + } + + if (tmp_bin.data != NULL) { + enif_release_binary(&tmp_bin); + } + +#ifdef HAS_EVP_PKEY_CTX + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); +#else +#endif + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (i > 0) { + ERL_VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(out_bin.data, outlen); + if (outlen != out_bin.size) { + enif_realloc_binary(&out_bin, outlen); + ERL_VALGRIND_ASSERT_MEM_DEFINED(out_bin.data, outlen); + } + return enif_make_binary(env, &out_bin); + } else { + enif_release_binary(&out_bin); + return atom_error; + } + + badarg: + if (out_bin.data != NULL) { + enif_release_binary(&out_bin); + } + if (tmp_bin.data != NULL) { + enif_release_binary(&tmp_bin); + } +#ifdef HAS_EVP_PKEY_CTX + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); +#else +#endif + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (algo_init == -2) + return atom_notsup; + else + return enif_make_badarg(env); +} + + + +/*--------------------------------*/ + /*================================================================*/ static ERL_NIF_TERM rand_seed_nif(ErlNifEnv* env, int argc, const ERL_NIF_TERM argv[]) diff --git a/lib/crypto/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/crypto/doc/src/notes.xml index 574353ce7a..9376e6f649 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/crypto/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -31,6 +31,52 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the Crypto application.</p> +<section><title>Crypto 4.1</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p>On macOS, <c>crypto</c> would crash if <c>observer</c> + had been started before <c>crypto</c>. On the beta for + macOS 10.13 (High Sierra), <c>crypto</c> would crash. + Both of those bugs have been fixed.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14499 Aux Id: ERL-251 ERL-439 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Extend crypto:sign, crypto:verify, public_key:sign and + public_key:verify with:</p> + <p> + * support for RSASSA-PS padding for signatures and for + saltlength setting<br/> * X9.31 RSA padding.<br/> * sha, + sha224, sha256, sha384, and sha512 for dss signatures as + mentioned in NIST SP 800-57 Part 1.<br/> * ripemd160 to + be used for rsa signatures.</p> + <p> + This is a manual merge of half of the pull request 838 by + potatosalad from Sept 2015.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13704 Aux Id: PR838 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + A new tuple in <c>crypto:supports/0</c> reports supported + MAC algorithms.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14504</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Crypto 4.0</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl b/lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl index 1df05462c9..f9c4f7b71d 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl +++ b/lib/crypto/src/crypto.erl @@ -420,46 +420,55 @@ sign(Algorithm, Type, Data, Key, Options) -> Signature -> Signature end. --spec public_encrypt(rsa, binary(), [binary()], rsa_padding()) -> - binary(). --spec public_decrypt(rsa, binary(), [integer() | binary()], rsa_padding()) -> - binary(). --spec private_encrypt(rsa, binary(), [integer() | binary()], rsa_padding()) -> - binary(). --spec private_decrypt(rsa, binary(), [integer() | binary()], rsa_padding()) -> - binary(). - -public_encrypt(rsa, BinMesg, Key, Padding) -> - case rsa_public_crypt(BinMesg, map_ensure_int_as_bin(Key), Padding, true) of - error -> - erlang:error(encrypt_failed, [rsa, BinMesg,Key, Padding]); - Sign -> Sign - end. -%% Binary, Key = [E,N,D] -private_decrypt(rsa, BinMesg, Key, Padding) -> - case rsa_private_crypt(BinMesg, map_ensure_int_as_bin(Key), Padding, false) of - error -> - erlang:error(decrypt_failed, [rsa, BinMesg,Key, Padding]); - Sign -> Sign - end. +-type pk_algs() :: rsa | ecdsa | dss . +-type pk_opt() :: list() | rsa_padding() . +-spec public_encrypt(pk_algs(), binary(), [binary()], pk_opt()) -> binary(). +-spec public_decrypt(pk_algs(), binary(), [integer() | binary()], pk_opt()) -> binary(). +-spec private_encrypt(pk_algs(), binary(), [integer() | binary()], pk_opt()) -> binary(). +-spec private_decrypt(pk_algs(), binary(), [integer() | binary()], pk_opt()) -> binary(). -%% Binary, Key = [E,N,D] -private_encrypt(rsa, BinMesg, Key, Padding) -> - case rsa_private_crypt(BinMesg, map_ensure_int_as_bin(Key), Padding, true) of - error -> - erlang:error(encrypt_failed, [rsa, BinMesg,Key, Padding]); - Sign -> Sign - end. +public_encrypt(Algorithm, In, Key, Options) when is_list(Options) -> + case pkey_crypt_nif(Algorithm, In, format_pkey(Algorithm, Key), Options, false, true) of + error -> erlang:error(encrypt_failed, [Algorithm, In, Key, Options]); + notsup -> erlang:error(notsup); + Out -> Out + end; +%% Backwards compatible +public_encrypt(Algorithm = rsa, In, Key, Padding) when is_atom(Padding) -> + public_encrypt(Algorithm, In, Key, [{rsa_padding, Padding}]). + +private_decrypt(Algorithm, In, Key, Options) when is_list(Options) -> + case pkey_crypt_nif(Algorithm, In, format_pkey(Algorithm, Key), Options, true, false) of + error -> erlang:error(decrypt_failed, [Algorithm, In, Key, Options]); + notsup -> erlang:error(notsup); + Out -> Out + end; +%% Backwards compatible +private_decrypt(Algorithm = rsa, In, Key, Padding) when is_atom(Padding) -> + private_decrypt(Algorithm, In, Key, [{rsa_padding, Padding}]). + +private_encrypt(Algorithm, In, Key, Options) when is_list(Options) -> + case pkey_crypt_nif(Algorithm, In, format_pkey(Algorithm, Key), Options, true, true) of + error -> erlang:error(encrypt_failed, [Algorithm, In, Key, Options]); + notsup -> erlang:error(notsup); + Out -> Out + end; +%% Backwards compatible +private_encrypt(Algorithm = rsa, In, Key, Padding) when is_atom(Padding) -> + private_encrypt(Algorithm, In, Key, [{rsa_padding, Padding}]). + +public_decrypt(Algorithm, In, Key, Options) when is_list(Options) -> + case pkey_crypt_nif(Algorithm, In, format_pkey(Algorithm, Key), Options, false, false) of + error -> erlang:error(decrypt_failed, [Algorithm, In, Key, Options]); + notsup -> erlang:error(notsup); + Out -> Out + end; +%% Backwards compatible +public_decrypt(Algorithm = rsa, In, Key, Padding) when is_atom(Padding) -> + public_decrypt(Algorithm, In, Key, [{rsa_padding, Padding}]). -%% Binary, Key = [E,N] -public_decrypt(rsa, BinMesg, Key, Padding) -> - case rsa_public_crypt(BinMesg, map_ensure_int_as_bin(Key), Padding, false) of - error -> - erlang:error(decrypt_failed, [rsa, BinMesg,Key, Padding]); - Sign -> Sign - end. %% %% XOR - xor to iolists and return a binary @@ -970,9 +979,7 @@ format_pkey(_, Key) -> %% -type rsa_padding() :: 'rsa_pkcs1_padding' | 'rsa_pkcs1_oaep_padding' | 'rsa_no_padding'. -rsa_public_crypt(_BinMsg, _Key, _Padding, _IsEncrypt) -> ?nif_stub. - -rsa_private_crypt(_BinMsg, _Key, _Padding, _IsEncrypt) -> ?nif_stub. +pkey_crypt_nif(_Algorithm, _In, _Key, _Options, _IsPrivate, _IsEncrypt) -> ?nif_stub. %% large integer in a binary with 32bit length %% MP representaion (SSH2) diff --git a/lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl b/lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl index 88f13d766c..69f02d3da6 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/crypto/test/crypto_SUITE.erl @@ -122,10 +122,15 @@ groups() -> {sha512, [], [hash, hmac]}, {rsa, [], [sign_verify, public_encrypt, + private_encrypt, generate ]}, - {dss, [], [sign_verify]}, - {ecdsa, [], [sign_verify]}, + {dss, [], [sign_verify + %% Does not work yet: ,public_encrypt, private_encrypt + ]}, + {ecdsa, [], [sign_verify + %% Does not work yet: ,public_encrypt, private_encrypt + ]}, {dh, [], [generate_compute]}, {ecdh, [], [compute, generate]}, {srp, [], [generate_compute]}, @@ -439,10 +444,16 @@ sign_verify(Config) when is_list(Config) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- public_encrypt() -> - [{doc, "Test public_encrypt/decrypt and private_encrypt/decrypt functions. "}]. + [{doc, "Test public_encrypt/decrypt "}]. public_encrypt(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Params = proplists:get_value(pub_priv_encrypt, Config), - lists:foreach(fun do_public_encrypt/1, Params), + lists:foreach(fun do_public_encrypt/1, Params). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +private_encrypt() -> + [{doc, "Test private_encrypt/decrypt functions. "}]. +private_encrypt(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + Params = proplists:get_value(pub_priv_encrypt, Config), lists:foreach(fun do_private_encrypt/1, Params). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -819,7 +830,7 @@ do_private_encrypt({_Type, _Public, _Private, _Msg, rsa_pkcs1_oaep_padding}) -> ok; %% Not supported by openssl do_private_encrypt({Type, Public, Private, Msg, Padding}) -> PrivEcn = (catch crypto:private_encrypt(Type, Msg, Private, Padding)), - case crypto:public_decrypt(rsa, PrivEcn, Public, Padding) of + case crypto:public_decrypt(Type, PrivEcn, Public, Padding) of Msg -> ok; Other -> @@ -1233,7 +1244,9 @@ group_config(dss = Type, Config) -> SignVerify = [{Type, Hash, Public, Private, Msg} || Hash <- DssHashs, lists:member(Hash, SupportedHashs)], - [{sign_verify, SignVerify} | Config]; + MsgPubEnc = <<"7896345786348 Asldi">>, + PubPrivEnc = [{dss, Public, Private, MsgPubEnc, []}], + [{sign_verify, SignVerify}, {pub_priv_encrypt, PubPrivEnc} | Config]; group_config(ecdsa = Type, Config) -> {Private, Public} = ec_key_named(), @@ -1243,7 +1256,9 @@ group_config(ecdsa = Type, Config) -> SignVerify = [{Type, Hash, Public, Private, Msg} || Hash <- DssHashs, lists:member(Hash, SupportedHashs)], - [{sign_verify, SignVerify} | Config]; + MsgPubEnc = <<"7896345786348 Asldi">>, + PubPrivEnc = [{ecdsa, Public, Private, MsgPubEnc, []}], + [{sign_verify, SignVerify}, {pub_priv_encrypt, PubPrivEnc} | Config]; group_config(srp, Config) -> GenerateCompute = [srp3(), srp6(), srp6a(), srp6a_smaller_prime()], [{generate_compute, GenerateCompute} | Config]; diff --git a/lib/crypto/vsn.mk b/lib/crypto/vsn.mk index 796e3b6d84..1dceebb4e4 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/crypto/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -CRYPTO_VSN = 4.0 +CRYPTO_VSN = 4.1 diff --git a/lib/debugger/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/debugger/doc/src/notes.xml index fa85567a84..21fe7d449d 100644 --- a/lib/debugger/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/debugger/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -33,6 +33,21 @@ <p>This document describes the changes made to the Debugger application.</p> +<section><title>Debugger 4.2.3</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Tools are updated to show Unicode atoms correctly.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14464</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Debugger 4.2.2</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/debugger/vsn.mk b/lib/debugger/vsn.mk index 3534570ef5..72cedb2240 100644 --- a/lib/debugger/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/debugger/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -DEBUGGER_VSN = 4.2.2 +DEBUGGER_VSN = 4.2.3 diff --git a/lib/dialyzer/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/dialyzer/doc/src/notes.xml index c26b7aab5e..6a6e65cb94 100644 --- a/lib/dialyzer/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/dialyzer/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -32,6 +32,40 @@ <p>This document describes the changes made to the Dialyzer application.</p> +<section><title>Dialyzer 3.2.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> Fix a bug regarding map types that caused Dialyzer to + go into an infinite loop. A consequence of the fix is + that compound map keys such as maps and tuples sometimes + are handled with less precision than before. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14572 Aux Id: seq13319 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> The check for unknown remote types is improved. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14606 Aux Id: OTP-14218 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Dialyzer 3.2.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/dialyzer/vsn.mk b/lib/dialyzer/vsn.mk index 866a82ee3e..d130b14fec 100644 --- a/lib/dialyzer/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/dialyzer/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -DIALYZER_VSN = 3.2.1 +DIALYZER_VSN = 3.2.2 diff --git a/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_sctp.xml b/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_sctp.xml index c9b74a9ec5..62e958870e 100644 --- a/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_sctp.xml +++ b/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_sctp.xml @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> <!DOCTYPE erlref SYSTEM "erlref.dtd" [ + <!ENTITY man_tcp_sender + '<seealso marker="diameter_tcp#sender">diameter_tcp(3)</seealso>'> <!ENTITY gen_sctp '<seealso marker="kernel:gen_sctp">gen_sctp(3)</seealso>'> <!ENTITY gen_sctp_open1 '<seealso marker="kernel:gen_sctp#open-1">gen_sctp:open/1</seealso>'> @@ -78,7 +80,11 @@ and implements the behaviour documented in <v>Reason = term()</v> <v>OwnOpt = {raddr, &ip_address;} | {rport, integer()} - | {accept, Match}</v> + | {accept, Match} + | {unordered, boolean() | pos_integer()} + | {packet, boolean() | raw} + | {message_cb, &mod_eval;} + | {sender, boolean()}</v> <v>SctpOpt = term()</v> <v>Match = &ip_address; | string() | [Match]</v> </type> @@ -106,6 +112,41 @@ A string-valued <c>Match</c> that does not parse as an address is interpreted as a regular expression.</p> <p> +Option <c>unordered</c> specifies whether or not to use unordered +delivery, integer <c>N</c> being equivalent to <c>N =< OS</c>, +where <c>OS</c> is the number of outbound streams negotiated on the +association in question. +Regardless of configuration, sending is ordered on stream 0 +until reception of a second incoming message, to ensure that a peer +receives capabilities exchange messages before any other. +Defaults to <c>false</c>.</p> + +<p> +Option <c>packet</c> determines how/if an incoming message is +packaged into a diameter_packet record. +If <c>false</c> then messages are received as binary(). +If <c>true</c> then as a record with the binary() message in the +<c>bin</c> field and a <c>{stream, Id}</c> tuple in the +<c>transport_data</c> field, where <c>Id</c> is the identifier of the +inbound stream the message was received on. +If <c>raw</c> then as a record with the received ancillary +sctp_sndrcvinfo record in the <c>transport_data</c> field. +Defaults to <c>true</c>.</p> + +<p> +Options <c>message_cb</c> and <c>sender</c> have semantics identical +to those documented in &man_tcp_sender;, but with the message argument +to a <c>recv</c> callback being as directed by the <c>packet</c> +option.</p> + +<p> +An <c>{outstream, Id}</c> tuple in the <c>transport_data</c> field of +a outgoing diameter_packet record sets the outbound stream on which +the message is sent, modulo the negotiated number of outbound streams. +Any other value causes successive such sends to cycle though all +outbound streams.</p> + +<p> Remaining options are any accepted by &gen_sctp_open1;, with the exception of options <c>mode</c>, <c>binary</c>, <c>list</c>, <c>active</c> and <c>sctp_events</c>. @@ -121,29 +162,16 @@ connecting transport.</p> <warning> <p> -An insufficiently large receive buffer may result in a peer having to +An small receive buffer may result in a peer having to resend incoming messages: set the &inet; option <c>recbuf</c> to increase the buffer size.</p> <p> -An insufficiently large send buffer may result in outgoing messages +An small send buffer may result in outgoing messages being discarded: set the &inet; option <c>sndbuf</c> to increase the buffer size.</p> </warning> -<p> -The <c>transport_data</c> field of record <c>diameter_packet</c> -is used to communicate the stream on which an inbound message -has been received, or on which an outbound message should be sent. -The value will be of the form <c>{stream, Id}</c> for an inbound -message passed to a &app_handle_request; or &app_handle_answer; -callback. -For an outbound message, <c>{outstream, Id}</c> in the return value of -&app_handle_request; or &app_prepare_retransmit; sets the outbound -stream, the stream id being interpreted modulo the number of outbound -streams. -Any other value, or not setting a value, causes successive such sends -to cycle though all outbound streams.</p> </desc> </func> diff --git a/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc.xml b/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc.xml index ae404fcda4..28e01ff1be 100644 --- a/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc.xml +++ b/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc.xml @@ -1,15 +1,22 @@ <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> <!DOCTYPE chapter SYSTEM "chapter.dtd" [ + <!ENTITY gen_sctp '<seealso marker="kernel:gen_sctp">gen_sctp(3)</seealso>'> + <!ENTITY gen_tcp '<seealso marker="kernel:gen_tcp">gen_tcp(3)</seealso>'> + <!ENTITY service '<seealso marker="diameter#start_service-2">service</seealso>'> + <!ENTITY capabilities '<seealso marker="diameter#capability">capabilities</seealso>'> + <!ENTITY events '<seealso marker="diameter#service_event">events</seealso>'> + <!ENTITY NA '—'> + <!ENTITY BR '<br/> <br/>'> <!ENTITY % also SYSTEM "seealso.ent" > %also; ]> -<chapter xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"> +<chapter> <header> <copyright> <year>2011</year> -<year>2016</year> +<year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> @@ -41,63 +48,1285 @@ limitations under the License. </header> <p> -Known points of questionable or non-compliance.</p> +The table below summarizes the diameter application's compliance with +&the_rfc;. +Since the diameter application isn't a Diameter node on its own, +compliance is strictly the responsibility of the user in many cases, +diameter providing the means for the user to be compliant +rather than being compliant on its own.</p> -<!-- ===================================================================== --> - -<section> -<title>&the_rfc;</title> - -<list> - -<item> -<p> -There is no support for DTLS over SCTP.</p> -</item> - -<item> <p> -There is no explicit support for peer discovery (section 5.2). -It can possibly be implemented on top of diameter as is but this is -probably something that diameter should do.</p> -</item> +The Compliance column notes <em>C</em> (Compliant) if the required +functionality is implemented, <em>PC</em> (Partially Compliant) if +there are limitations, <em>NC</em> (Not Compliant) if functionality is +not implemented, or a dash if text is informational or only places +requirements that must be met by the user's implementation.</p> -<item> <p> -The peer state machine's election process (section 5.6.4) isn't -implemented as specified since it assumes knowledge of a -peer's Origin-Host before sending it a CER. (The identity becoming known -upon reception of CEA.) -The possibility of configuring -the peer's Origin-Host could be added, along with handling of the case -that it sends something else, but for many applications this will -just be unnecessary configuration of a value that it has no control over.</p> -</item> -<!-- Transport protocol plus address/port, which we do know when - sending and receiving CER, is enough to definitely identify - the peer. However, there's nothing stopping a peer from using - different identities on different transport protocols, even - if it's maybe a bit far-fetched. --> - -</list> - -<xi:include href="diameter_soc_rfc6733.xml"/> - -</section> +Capitalized <em>Diameter</em> refers to the protocol, lowercase +<em>diameter</em> to the Erlang application.</p> <!-- ===================================================================== --> <section> -<title>RFC 3539</title> +<title>&the_rfc; - Diameter Base Protocol</title> -<p> -RFC 3539 is more difficult to comply to since it discusses -problems as much as it requires functionality but all the MUST's are -covered, the watchdog state machine being the primary one. -Of the optional functionality, load balancing is left to the -diameter user (since it's the one deciding who to send to) and -there is no Congestion Manager.</p> +<table> +<row> + <cell><em>Section</em></cell> + <cell><em>Title</em></cell> + <cell><em>Compliance</em></cell> + <cell><em>Notes</em></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>1</cell> + <cell>Introduction</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>1.1</cell> + <cell>Diameter Protocol</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>1.1.1</cell> + <cell>Description of the Document Set</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>1.1.2</cell> + <cell>Conventions Used in This Document</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>1.1.3</cell> + <cell>Changes from RFC 3588</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>It is possible to configure a 3588 dictionary in + order to get 3588 semantics, where the differ from 6733.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>1.2</cell> + <cell>Terminology</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>1.3</cell> + <cell>Approach to Extensibility</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>The dictionary interface documented in &man_dict; provides + extensibility, allowing the user to defined new AVPs, commands, and + applications. + Ready dictionaries are provided for the &the_rfc; common message, base + accounting, and relay applications, as well as for RFC 7683, + Diameter Overload Indicator Conveyance.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>1.3.1</cell> + <cell>Defining New AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>1.3.2</cell> + <cell>Creating New AVPs</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>New AVPs can be defined using the dictionary interface. + Both both RFC data formats and extensions are supported.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>1.3.3</cell> + <cell>Creating New Commands</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>New commands can be defined using the dictionary interface.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>1.3.4</cell> + <cell>Creating New Diameter Applications</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>New applications can be defined using the dictionary interface.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2</cell> + <cell>Protocol Overview</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>Session state is the responsibility of the user.&BR; + The role of a Diameter node is determined by the user's + implementation.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.1</cell> + <cell>Transport</cell> + <cell>PC</cell> + <cell>Ports are configured by the user: diameter places no + restrictions.&BR; + The transport interface documented in &man_transport; + allows the user to implement their own methods. + Ready support is provided for TCP, TCP/TLS, and SCTP, but not + DTLS/SCTP.&BR; + Multiple connections to the same peer is possible. + ICMP messages are not interpreted.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.1.1</cell> + <cell>SCTP Guidelines</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Unordered sending is configurable in &man_sctp;. + There is no special handling of DPR/DPA: since a user that cares + about pending answers should wait for them before initiating + DPR.&BR; + A PPID can be configured with a a gen_sctp sctp_default_send_param + option.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.2</cell> + <cell>Securing Diameter Messages</cell> + <cell>PC</cell> + <cell>DTLS is not supported by &man_sctp;. See also + 2.1.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.3</cell> + <cell>Diameter Application Compliance</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.4</cell> + <cell>Application Identifiers</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>The user configures diameter with the identifiers to send at + capabilities exchange, along with corresponding dictionaries + defining the messages of the applications.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.5</cell> + <cell>Connections vs. Sessions</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Connections are realized by configuring transport. Sessions + are the responsibility of the user.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.6</cell> + <cell>Peer Table</cell> + <cell>PC</cell> + <cell>Routing is implemented by the user in callbacks documented in + &man_app;. + A peer table of the documented form is not exposed to the user.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.7</cell> + <cell>Routing Table</cell> + <cell>PC</cell> + <cell>See 2.6. + A routing table of the documented form is not exposed to + the user.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.8</cell> + <cell>Role of Diameter Agents</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Most role-specific behaviour is implemented by the user. + How a node advertises itself at capabilities exchange is determined + by user configuration.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.8.1</cell> + <cell>Relay Agents</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.8.2</cell> + <cell>Proxy Agents</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.8.3</cell> + <cell>Redirect Agents</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.8.4</cell> + <cell>Translation Agents</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>2.9</cell> + <cell>Diameter Path Authorization</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>Authorization is the responsibility of the user.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>3</cell> + <cell>Diameter Header</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Hop-by-Hop and End-to-End Identifiers are set by diameter when + sending outgoing requests.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>3.1</cell> + <cell>Command Codes</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>3.2</cell> + <cell>Command Code Format Specification</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Commands are defined as CCF specifications in dictionary + files.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>3.3</cell> + <cell>Diameter Command Naming Conventions</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>4</cell> + <cell>Diameter AVPs</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Any required padding is added by diameter when encoding + outgoing messages.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>4.1</cell> + <cell>AVP Header</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>4.1.1</cell> + <cell>Optional Header Elements</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>4.2</cell> + <cell>Basic AVP Data Formats</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>4.3</cell> + <cell>Derived AVP Data Formats</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Arbitrary derived data formats are supported by the dictionary + interface.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>4.3.1</cell> + <cell>Common Derived AVP Data Formats</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Beware that RFC 6733 changed the DiameterURI transport/port + defaults specified in RFC3588. + Relying on the defaults can result in interoperability + problems.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>4.4</cell> + <cell>Grouped AVP Values</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>The M-bit on a component AVP of a Grouped AVP that does not + set M is ignored: such AVPs are not regarded as erroneous at + decode.&BR; + Grouped AVPs are defined as CCF specifications in dictionary + files.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>4.4.1</cell> + <cell>Example AVP with a Grouped Data Type</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>4.5</cell> + <cell>Diameter Base Protocol AVPs</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>The base AVPs are defined in the common dictionary provided by + diameter. + There are common dictionaries for both RFC 3588 and RFC 6733 since + the latter made changes to both syntax and semantics.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5</cell> + <cell>Diameter Peers</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.1</cell> + <cell>Peer Connections</cell> + <cell>PC</cell> + <cell>A peer's DiameterIdentity is not required when initiating a + connection: the identify is received at capabilities exchange, at + which time the connection can be rejected if the identity is + objectionable.&BR; + The number of connections established depends on the user's + configuration. Multiple connections per peer is possible.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.2</cell> + <cell>Diameter Peer Discovery</cell> + <cell>NC</cell> + <cell>No form of peer discovery is implemented. + The user can implement this independently of diameter if + required.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.3</cell> + <cell>Capabilities Exchange</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>All supported applications are sent in CEA. + The user can reject an incoming CER or CEA in a configured + callback.&BR; + Both transport security at connection establishment and + negotiated via an Inband-Security AVP are supported.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.3.1</cell> + <cell>Capabilities-Exchange-Request</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>CER is sent and received by diameter.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.3.2</cell> + <cell>Capabilities-Exchange-Answer</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>CEA is sent and received by diameter.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.3.3</cell> + <cell>Vendor-Id AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.3.4</cell> + <cell>Firmware-Revision AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.3.5</cell> + <cell>Host-IP-Address AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.3.6</cell> + <cell>Supported-Vendor-Id AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.3.7</cell> + <cell>Product-Name AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.4</cell> + <cell>Disconnecting Peer Connections</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>DPA will not be answered with error: a peer that wants to a + avoid a race can wait for pending answers before sending + DPR.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.4.1</cell> + <cell>Disconnect-Peer-Request</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>DPR is sent by diameter in response to configuration + changes requiring a connection to be broken. + The user can also send DPR.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.4.2</cell> + <cell>Disconnect-Peer-Answer</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>DPR is answered by diameter.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.4.3</cell> + <cell>Disconnect-Cause AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.5</cell> + <cell>Transport Failure Detection</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.5.1</cell> + <cell>Device-Watchdog-Request</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>DWR is sent and received by diameter. + Callbacks notify the user of transitions into and out of the OKAY + state.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.5.2</cell> + <cell>Device-Watchdog-Answer</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>DWA is sent and received by diameter.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.5.3</cell> + <cell>Transport Failure Algorithm</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.5.4</cell> + <cell>Failover and Failback Procedures</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.6</cell> + <cell>Peer State Machine</cell> + <cell>PC</cell> + <cell>The election process is modified as described in 5.6.4.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.6.1</cell> + <cell>Incoming Connections</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.6.2</cell> + <cell>Events</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.6.3</cell> + <cell>Actions</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>5.6.4</cell> + <cell>The Election Process</cell> + <cell>PC</cell> + <cell>As documented, the election assumes knowledge of a peer's + DiameterIdentity when initiating a connection, which diameter + doesn't require. Connections will be accepted if configuration + allows multiple connections per peer to be established or there is + no existing connection. Note that the election process is only + applicable when multiple connections per peer is + disallowed.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6</cell> + <cell>Diameter Message Processing</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.1</cell> + <cell>Diameter Request Routing Overview</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>Routing is performed by the user. + A callback from diameter provides a list of available suitable peer + connections.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.1.1</cell> + <cell>Originating a Request</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Requests are constructed by the user; diameter sets header + fields as defined in the relevant dictionary.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.1.2</cell> + <cell>Sending a Request</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.1.3</cell> + <cell>Receiving Requests</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Loops are detected by diameter when the return value of a + request callback asks that a request be forwarded. + Loop detection in other cases is the responsibility of the + user.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.1.4</cell> + <cell>Processing Local Requests</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>The user decides whether or not to process a request locally + in the request callback from diameter.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.1.5</cell> + <cell>Request Forwarding</cell> + <cell>PC</cell> + <cell>See 2.6.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.1.6</cell> + <cell>Request Routing</cell> + <cell>PC</cell> + <cell>See 2.7.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.1.7</cell> + <cell>Predictive Loop Avoidance</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>See 6.1.3.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.1.8</cell> + <cell>Redirecting Requests</cell> + <cell>PC</cell> + <cell>See 2.6.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.1.9</cell> + <cell>Relaying and Proxying Requests</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>A Route-Record AVP is appended by diameter when the return + value of a request callback asks that a request be forwarded. + Appending the AVP in other cases is the responsibility of the + user.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.2</cell> + <cell>Diameter Answer Processing</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Answer message are constructed by the user, except in the case + of some protocol errors, in which case the procedures are + followed.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.2.1</cell> + <cell>Processing Received Answers</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Answers with an unknown Hop-by-Hop Identifier are + discarded.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.2.2</cell> + <cell>Relaying and Proxying Answers</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>Modifying answers is the responsibility of the user in + callbacks from diameter.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.3</cell> + <cell>Origin-Host AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>The order of AVPs in an encoded message is determined by + the CCF of the message in question.&BR; + AVPs defined in the RFC are defined in dictionaries provided by + diameter. + Their proper use in application messages is the responsibility of + the user.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.4</cell> + <cell>Origin-Realm AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.5</cell> + <cell>Destination-Host AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.6</cell> + <cell>Destination-Realm AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.7</cell> + <cell>Routing AVPs</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.7.1</cell> + <cell>Route-Record AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.7.2</cell> + <cell>Proxy-Info AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.7.3</cell> + <cell>Proxy-Host AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.7.4</cell> + <cell>Proxy-State AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.8</cell> + <cell>Auth-Application-Id AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.9</cell> + <cell>Acct-Application-Id AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.10</cell> + <cell>Inband-Security-Id AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>See 2.1.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.11</cell> + <cell>Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Note that the CCF of this AVP is not the same as in RFC + 3588.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.12</cell> + <cell>Redirect-Host AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.13</cell> + <cell>Redirect-Host-Usage AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>6.14</cell> + <cell>Redirect-Max-Cache-Time AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7</cell> + <cell>Error Handling</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Answers are formulated by the user in most cases. + Answers setting the E-bit can be sent by diameter itself in response + to a request that cannot be handled by the user.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7.1</cell> + <cell>Result-Code AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7.1.1</cell> + <cell>Informational</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7.1.2</cell> + <cell>Success</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7.1.3</cell> + <cell>Protocol Errors</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Result codes 3001, 3002, 3005, and 3007 can be sent in answers + formulated by diameter, if configured to do so.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7.1.4</cell> + <cell>Transient Failures</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Result code 4003 is sent in CEA if there is an existing + connection to the peer in question and configuration does not allow + more than one.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7.1.5</cell> + <cell>Permanent Failures</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>Message reception detects 5001, 5004, + 5005, 5008, 5009, 5010, 5011, 5014, 5015, and 5017 errors. + It ignores 5013 errors at the admonition of sections 3 and 4.1.&BR; + Note that RFC 3588 did not allow 5xxx result codes in + answers setting the E-bit, while RFC 6733 does. + This is a potential interoperability problem since the Diameter + protocol version has not changed.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7.2</cell> + <cell>Error Bit</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7.3</cell> + <cell>Error-Message AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>The user can include this AVP as required.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7.4</cell> + <cell>Error-Reporting-Host AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>The user can include this AVP as required.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7.5</cell> + <cell>Failed-AVP AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell>The user constructs application-specific messages, but + diameter provides failed AVPs in message callbacks. Failed component AVPs + are grouped within the relevant Grouped AVPs.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7.6</cell> + <cell>Experimental-Result AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>7.7</cell> + <cell>Experimental-Result-Code AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8</cell> + <cell>Diameter User Sessions</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>Authorization and accounting AVPs are defined in provided + dictionaries. Their proper use is the responsibility of the + user.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.1</cell> + <cell>Authorization Session State Machine</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>Authorization is the responsibility of the user: diameter does + not implement this state machine.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.2</cell> + <cell>Accounting Session State Machine</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>Accounting is the responsibility of the user: diameter does + not implement this state machine.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.3</cell> + <cell>Server-Initiated Re-Auth</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.3.1</cell> + <cell>Re-Auth-Request</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.3.2</cell> + <cell>Re-Auth-Answer</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.4</cell> + <cell>Session Termination</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>Session-related messages and AVPs are defined in provided + dictionaries. Their proper use is the user's responsibility.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.4.1</cell> + <cell>Session-Termination-Request</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.4.2</cell> + <cell>Session-Termination-Answer</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.5</cell> + <cell>Aborting a Session</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>Session-related messages and AVPs are defined in provided + dictionaries. Their proper use is the user's responsibility.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.5.1</cell> + <cell>Abort-Session-Request</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.5.2</cell> + <cell>Abort-Session-Answer</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.6</cell> + <cell>Inferring Session Termination from Origin-State-Id</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>Session-related messages and AVPs are defined in provided + dictionaries. Their proper use is the user's responsibility.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.7</cell> + <cell>Auth-Request-Type AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.8</cell> + <cell>Session-Id AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.9</cell> + <cell>Authorization-Lifetime AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.10</cell> + <cell>Auth-Grace-Period AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.11</cell> + <cell>Auth-Session-State AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.12</cell> + <cell>Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.13</cell> + <cell>Session-Timeout AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.14</cell> + <cell>User-Name AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.15</cell> + <cell>Termination-Cause AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.16</cell> + <cell>Origin-State-Id AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.17</cell> + <cell>Session-Binding AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.18</cell> + <cell>Session-Server-Failover AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.19</cell> + <cell>Multi-Round-Time-Out AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.20</cell> + <cell>Class AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>8.21</cell> + <cell>Event-Timestamp AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9</cell> + <cell>Accounting</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell>Accounting-related messages and AVPs are defined in provided + dictionaries. Their proper use is the user's responsibility.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.1</cell> + <cell>Server Directed Model</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.2</cell> + <cell>Protocol Messages</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.3</cell> + <cell>Accounting Application Extension and Requirements</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.4</cell> + <cell>Fault Resilience</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.5</cell> + <cell>Accounting Records</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.6</cell> + <cell>Correlation of Accounting Records</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.7</cell> + <cell>Accounting Command Codes</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.7.1</cell> + <cell>Accounting-Request</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.7.2</cell> + <cell>Accounting-Answer</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.8</cell> + <cell>Accounting AVPs</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.8.1</cell> + <cell>Accounting-Record-Type AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.8.2</cell> + <cell>Acct-Interim-Interval AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.8.3</cell> + <cell>Accounting-Record-Number AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.8.4</cell> + <cell>Acct-Session-Id AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.8.5</cell> + <cell>Acct-Multi-Session-Id AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.8.6</cell> + <cell>Accounting-Sub-Session-Id AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>9.8.7</cell> + <cell>Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP</cell> + <cell>C</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>10</cell> + <cell>AVP Occurrence Tables</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>10.1</cell> + <cell>Base Protocol Command AVP Table</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>10.2</cell> + <cell>Accounting AVP Table</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11</cell> + <cell>IANA Considerations</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.1</cell> + <cell>AVP Header</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.1.1</cell> + <cell>AVP Codes</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.1.2</cell> + <cell>AVP Flags</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.2</cell> + <cell>Diameter Header</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.2.1</cell> + <cell>Command Codes</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.2.2</cell> + <cell>Command Flags</cell> + <cell></cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3</cell> + <cell>AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.1</cell> + <cell>Experimental-Result-Code AVP</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.2</cell> + <cell>Result-Code AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.3</cell> + <cell>Accounting-Record-Type AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.4</cell> + <cell>Termination-Cause AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.5</cell> + <cell>Redirect-Host-Usage AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.6</cell> + <cell>Session-Server-Failover AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.7</cell> + <cell>Session-Binding AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.8</cell> + <cell>Disconnect-Cause AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.9</cell> + <cell>Auth-Request-Type AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.10</cell> + <cell>Auth-Session-State AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.11</cell> + <cell>Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.12</cell> + <cell>Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP Values</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.3.13</cell> + <cell>Inband-Security-Id AVP (code 299)</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.4</cell> + <cell>_diameters Service Name and Port Number Registration</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.5</cell> + <cell>SCTP Payload Protocol Identifiers</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>11.6</cell> + <cell>S-NAPTR Parameters</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>12</cell> + <cell>Diameter Protocol-Related Configurable Parameters</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>13</cell> + <cell>Security Considerations</cell> + <cell>PC</cell> + <cell>See 2.1.&BR; + IPsec is transparent to diameter.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>13.1</cell> + <cell>TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP Usage</cell> + <cell>PC</cell> + <cell>See 2.1.</cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>13.2</cell> + <cell>Peer-to-Peer Considerations</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>13.3</cell> + <cell>AVP Considerations</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>14</cell> + <cell>References</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>14.1</cell> + <cell>Normative References</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> +<row> + <cell>14.2</cell> + <cell>Informative References</cell> + <cell>&NA;</cell> + <cell></cell> +</row> + +<tcaption>RFC 6733 Compliance</tcaption> +</table> </section> </chapter> + +<!-- LocalWords: AVP AVPs CCF DiameterIdentity CEA CER Inband IP +--> +<!-- LocalWords: DPA DPR DWR DWA Failover Failback Proxying Auth +--> +<!-- LocalWords: interoperability Multi Timestamp Realtime +--> diff --git a/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc_rfc6733.xml b/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc_rfc6733.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 2098965706..0000000000 --- a/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_soc_rfc6733.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8693 +0,0 @@ -<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> - -<!-- - -<copyright> -<year>2013</year><year>2016</year> -<holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> -</copyright> - -<legalnotice> -Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); -you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. -You may obtain a copy of the License at - - http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - -Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software -distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, -WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. -See the License for the specific language governing permissions and -limitations under the License. - -</legalnotice> - ---> - -<!DOCTYPE section SYSTEM "chapter.dtd" [ - <!ENTITY gen_sctp '<seealso marker="kernel:gen_sctp">gen_sctp(3)</seealso>'> - <!ENTITY gen_tcp '<seealso marker="kernel:gen_tcp">gen_tcp(3)</seealso>'> - <!ENTITY service '<seealso marker="diameter#start_service-2">service</seealso>'> - <!ENTITY capabilities '<seealso marker="diameter#capability">capabilities</seealso>'> - <!ENTITY events '<seealso marker="diameter#service_event">events</seealso>'> - <!ENTITY nada '<p>No comment.</p>'> - <!ENTITY % also SYSTEM "seealso.ent" > - %also; -]> - -<section> -<title>Commentary</title> - -<p> -A more detailed commentary on &the_rfc; follows. -Its purpose is to (hopefully) clarify not only what is supported but -how, given that semantics and features discussed in the RFC are not -solely the responsibility of the diameter application: -in many cases much depends on the configuration a user passes to -diameter, the implementation of &man_app; callback modules in -particular.</p> - -<p> -Comments apply to all text following the preceding comment. -Be sure to distinguish between capitalized <em>Diameter</em>, the -protocol defined by the RFC, and lowercase <em>diameter</em>, the -Erlang application to which the commentary applies.</p> - -<warning> -<p> -The commentary is not yet complete. -Comments currently stop at chapter 4.</p> -</warning> - -<pre> -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -1. Introduction - - Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) protocols such as - TACACS [RFC1492] and RADIUS [RFC2865] were initially deployed to - provide dial-up PPP [RFC1661] and terminal server access. Over time, - AAA support was needed on many new access technologies, the scale and - complexity of AAA networks grew, and AAA was also used on new - applications (such as voice over IP). This led to new demands on AAA - protocols. -</pre> - -<p> -Note that diameter implements the Diameter protocol as defined in -&the_rfc;. -It also supported the previous version of the protocol, as defined in -RFC 3588, when there are differences. -(Which will be noted below.) -It does not support RADIUS.</p> - -<pre> - - Network access requirements for AAA protocols are summarized in - Aboba, et al. [RFC2989]. These include: - - Failover - - [RFC2865] does not define failover mechanisms and, as a result, - failover behavior differs between implementations. In order to - provide well-defined failover behavior, Diameter supports - application-layer acknowledgements and defines failover algorithms - and the associated state machine. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - - Transmission-level security - - RADIUS [RFC2865] defines an application-layer authentication and - integrity scheme that is required only for use with response - packets. While [RFC2869] defines an additional authentication and - integrity mechanism, use is only required during Extensible - Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] sessions. While attribute - hiding is supported, [RFC2865] does not provide support for per- - packet confidentiality. In accounting, [RFC2866] assumes that - replay protection is provided by the backend billing server rather - than within the protocol itself. - - While [RFC3162] defines the use of IPsec with RADIUS, support for - IPsec is not required. In order to provide universal support for - transmission-level security, and enable both intra- and inter- - domain AAA deployments, Diameter provides support for TLS/TCP and - DTLS/SCTP. Security is discussed in Section 13. -</pre> - -<p> -Whether or not IPsec is used is transparent to diameter.</p> - -<p> -The transport protocol used on a given peer connection is also -transparent to diameter in that transport to diameter is simply a -module that implements the transport protocol documented in -&man_transport;. -A diameter user configures this module as the &mod_transport_opt; -<c>transport_module</c>.</p> - -<p> -While a user can implement their own transport modules, diameter -includes implementations for TCP and SCTP: -&man_tcp; based on &gen_tcp; and &man_sctp; based on &gen_sctp;. -The former supports TLS but the latter does not currently support -DTLS.</p> - -<pre> - - Reliable transport - - RADIUS runs over UDP, and does not define retransmission behavior; - as a result, reliability varies between implementations. As - described in [RFC2975], this is a major issue in accounting, where - packet loss may translate directly into revenue loss. In order to - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - provide well-defined transport behavior, Diameter runs over - reliable transport mechanisms (TCP, Stream Control Transmission - Protocol (SCTP)) as defined in [RFC3539]. - - Agent support - - RADIUS does not provide for explicit support for agents, including - proxies, redirects, and relays. Since the expected behavior is - not defined, it varies between implementations. Diameter defines - agent behavior explicitly; this is described in Section 2.8. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - - Server-initiated messages - - While server-initiated messages are defined in RADIUS [RFC5176], - support is optional. This makes it difficult to implement - features such as unsolicited disconnect or re-authentication/ - re-authorization on demand across a heterogeneous deployment. To - address this issue, support for server-initiated messages is - mandatory in Diameter. -</pre> - -<p> -A diameter user can both send and receive messages.</p> - -<pre> - - Transition support - - While Diameter does not share a common protocol data unit (PDU) - with RADIUS, considerable effort has been expended in enabling - backward compatibility with RADIUS so that the two protocols may - be deployed in the same network. Initially, it is expected that - Diameter will be deployed within new network devices, as well as - within gateways enabling communication between legacy RADIUS - devices and Diameter agents. This capability enables Diameter - support to be added to legacy networks, by addition of a gateway - or server speaking both RADIUS and Diameter. -</pre> - -<p> -RADIUS Attributes can be redefined as Diameter AVP's using diameter's -&man_dict; interface but diameter provides no such definitions.</p> - -<pre> - - In addition to addressing the above requirements, Diameter also - provides support for the following: - - Capability negotiation - - RADIUS does not support error messages, capability negotiation, or - a mandatory/non-mandatory flag for attributes. Since RADIUS - clients and servers are not aware of each other's capabilities, - they may not be able to successfully negotiate a mutually - acceptable service or, in some cases, even be aware of what - service has been implemented. Diameter includes support for error - handling (Section 7), capability negotiation (Section 5.3), and - mandatory/non-mandatory Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) - (Section 4.1). - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Peer discovery and configuration - - RADIUS implementations typically require that the name or address - of servers or clients be manually configured, along with the - corresponding shared secrets. This results in a large - administrative burden and creates the temptation to reuse the - RADIUS shared secret, which can result in major security - vulnerabilities if the Request Authenticator is not globally and - temporally unique as required in [RFC2865]. Through DNS, Diameter - enables dynamic discovery of peers (see Section 5.2). Derivation - of dynamic session keys is enabled via transmission-level - security. - - Over time, the capabilities of Network Access Server (NAS) devices - have increased substantially. As a result, while Diameter is a - considerably more sophisticated protocol than RADIUS, it remains - feasible to implement it within embedded devices. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -1.1. Diameter Protocol - - The Diameter base protocol provides the following facilities: - - o Ability to exchange messages and deliver AVPs -</pre> - -<p> -There are two interfaces directly involved in message exchange when -using diameter: the function &mod_call; for sending outgoing requests, -and the application callback interface, documented in &man_app; for -receiving incoming request and answers.</p> - -<pre> - - o Capabilities negotiation -</pre> - -<p> -Capabilities negotiation is the responsibility of diameter: -a user configures a diameter service and/or transport with -&capabilities; to provide AVP values for CER and CEA messages but it -is diameter itself that sends these messages. -A user receives notification of a successful capabilities exchange by -way of &app_peer_up; callbacks.</p> - -<pre> - - o Error notification -</pre> - -<p> -A user can subscribe to &events;, using &mod_subscribe;, in order to -receive notification of various failures. -Errors in Diameter messaging are communicated via the application -callbacks &app_handle_request;, &app_handle_answer; and -&app_handle_error;.</p> - - -<pre> - - o Extensibility, required in [RFC2989], through addition of new - applications, commands, and AVPs -</pre> - -<p> -Support for applications, commands and AVP's is extensible using -diameter's dictionary interface, as documented in &man_dict;. -Dictionaries are compiled to Erlang encode/decode modules using -&man_compile; or &man_make;.</p> - -<pre> - - o Basic services necessary for applications, such as the handling of - user sessions or accounting -</pre> - -<p> -Compiled dictionaries are provided for the RFC 3588 and RFC 6733 -Diameter applications: common, base accounting and relay. -Dictionaries for a number of standardized -applications are provided in uncompiled form below the <c>examples</c> -subdirectory of the diameter application directory.</p> - -<pre> - - All data delivered by the protocol is in the form of AVPs. Some of - these AVP values are used by the Diameter protocol itself, while - others deliver data associated with particular applications that - employ Diameter. AVPs may be arbitrarily added to Diameter messages, - the only restriction being that the Command Code Format (CCF) - specification (Section 3.2) be satisfied. AVPs are used by the base - Diameter protocol to support the following required features: - - o Transporting of user authentication information, for the purposes - of enabling the Diameter server to authenticate the user - - o Transporting of service-specific authorization information, - between client and servers, allowing the peers to decide whether a - user's access request should be granted - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - o Exchanging resource usage information, which may be used for - accounting purposes, capacity planning, etc. - - o Routing, relaying, proxying, and redirecting of Diameter messages - through a server hierarchy - - The Diameter base protocol satisfies the minimum requirements for a - AAA protocol, as specified by [RFC2989]. The base protocol may be - used by itself for accounting purposes only, or it may be used with a - Diameter application, such as Mobile IPv4 [RFC4004], or network - access [RFC4005]. It is also possible for the base protocol to be - extended for use in new applications, via the addition of new - commands or AVPs. The initial focus of Diameter was network access - and accounting applications. A truly generic AAA protocol used by - many applications might provide functionality not provided by - Diameter. Therefore, it is imperative that the designers of new - applications understand their requirements before using Diameter. - See Section 1.3.4 for more information on Diameter applications. - - Any node can initiate a request. In that sense, Diameter is a peer- - to-peer protocol. In this document, a Diameter client is a device at - the edge of the network that performs access control, such as a - Network Access Server (NAS) or a Foreign Agent (FA). A Diameter - client generates Diameter messages to request authentication, - authorization, and accounting services for the user. A Diameter - agent is a node that does not provide local user authentication or - authorization services; agents include proxies, redirects, and relay - agents. A Diameter server performs authentication and/or - authorization of the user. A Diameter node may act as an agent for - certain requests while acting as a server for others. - - The Diameter protocol also supports server-initiated messages, such - as a request to abort service to a particular user. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -1.1.1. Description of the Document Set - - The Diameter specification consists of an updated version of the base - protocol specification (this document) and the Transport Profile - [RFC3539]. This document obsoletes both RFC 3588 and RFC 5719. A - summary of the base protocol updates included in this document can be - found in Section 1.1.3. - - This document defines the base protocol specification for AAA, which - includes support for accounting. There are also a myriad of - applications documents describing applications that use this base - specification for Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting. - These application documents specify how to use the Diameter protocol - within the context of their application. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - The Transport Profile document [RFC3539] discusses transport layer - issues that arise with AAA protocols and recommendations on how to - overcome these issues. This document also defines the Diameter - failover algorithm and state machine. - - "Clarifications on the Routing of Diameter Request Based on the - Username and the Realm" [RFC5729] defines specific behavior on how to - route requests based on the content of the User-Name AVP (Attribute - Value Pair). - -1.1.2. Conventions Used in This Document - - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", - "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this - document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -1.1.3. Changes from RFC 3588 - - This document obsoletes RFC 3588 but is fully backward compatible - with that document. The changes introduced in this document focus on - fixing issues that have surfaced during the implementation of - Diameter (RFC 3588). An overview of some the major changes are given - below. -</pre> - -<p> -RFC 6733 is not fully backwards compatible with RFC 3588. -(For example, in what values of Result-Code values are permissible with -the E-bit.) -The implications of incompatibilities for diameter are noted where -appropriate.</p> - -<pre> - - o Deprecated the use of the Inband-Security AVP for negotiating - Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246]. It has been generally - considered that bootstrapping of TLS via Inband-Security AVP - creates certain security risks because it does not completely - protect the information carried in the CER/CEA (Capabilities- - Exchange-Request/Capabilities-Exchange-Answer). This version of - Diameter adopts the common approach of defining a well-known - secured port that peers should use when communicating via TLS/TCP - and DTLS/SCTP. This new approach augments the existing in-band - security negotiation, but it does not completely replace it. The - old method is kept for backward compatibility reasons. -</pre> - -<p> -&man_tcp; supports both methods of negotiating TLS: -bootstrapping via Inband-Security and directly following connection -establishment.</p> - -<pre> - - o Deprecated the exchange of CER/CEA messages in the open state. - This feature was implied in the peer state machine table of RFC - 3588, but it was not clearly defined anywhere else in that - document. As work on this document progressed, it became clear - that the multiplicity of meaning and use of Application-Id AVPs in - the CER/CEA messages (and the messages themselves) is seen as an - abuse of the Diameter extensibility rules and thus required - simplification. Capabilities exchange in the open state has been - re-introduced in a separate specification [RFC6737], which clearly - defines new commands for this feature. -</pre> - -<p> -Capabilities exchange in the open state is not supported: an incoming -CER in the open state will cause diameter to ask the relevant -transport process to terminate, which implies the loss of the peer -connection in the case of &man_tcp; and &man_sctp;.</p> - -<p> -Capabilities update, as defined by RFC 6737, is not yet supported. -Support will require diameter to handle CUR/CUA in the same way that -it handles CER/CEA.</p> - -<pre> - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 11] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - o Simplified security requirements. The use of a secured transport - for exchanging Diameter messages remains mandatory. However, TLS/ - TCP and DTLS/SCTP have become the primary methods of securing - Diameter with IPsec as a secondary alternative. See Section 13 - for details. The support for the End-to-End security framework - (E2E-Sequence AVP and 'P'-bit in the AVP header) has also been - deprecated. -</pre> - -<p> -The End-to-End security framework is not supported since it's use is -largely unspecified: diameter will set the P-bit in outgoing AVP's as -directed by the relevant dictionary and/or &app_prepare_request; or -&app_handle_request; callbacks, but whether or not the P-bit is set on -incoming AVP's has no consequence.</p> - -<p> -As noted above, DTLS is not currently supported and whether or not -IPsec is used is transparent to diameter.</p> - -<pre> - - o Changed Diameter extensibility. This includes fixes to the - Diameter extensibility description (Section 1.3 and others) to - better aid Diameter application designers; in addition, the new - specification relaxes the policy with respect to the allocation of - Command Codes for vendor-specific uses. - - o Clarified Application Id usage. Clarify the proper use of - Application Id information, which can be found in multiple places - within a Diameter message. This includes correlating Application - Ids found in the message headers and AVPs. These changes also - clearly specify the proper Application Id value to use for - specific base protocol messages (ASR/ASA, STR/STA) as well as - clarify the content and use of Vendor-Specific-Application-Id. - - o Clarified routing fixes. This document more clearly specifies - what information (AVPs and Application Ids) can be used for making - general routing decisions. A rule for the prioritization of - redirect routing criteria when multiple route entries are found - via redirects has also been added (see Section 6.13). - - o Simplified Diameter peer discovery. The Diameter discovery - process now supports only widely used discovery schemes; the rest - have been deprecated (see Section 5.2 for details). -</pre> - -<p> -Peer discover is not currently supported: peers to which a node should -connect must be configured. -Connection requests are accepted from arbitrary peers but a -&mod_transport_opt; <c>capabilities_cb</c> can be used to reject a -peer based on an incoming CER or CEA.</p> - -<pre> - - There are many other miscellaneous fixes that have been introduced in - this document that may not be considered significant, but they have - value nonetheless. Examples are removal of obsolete types, fixes to - the state machine, clarification of the election process, message - validation, fixes to Failed-AVP and Result-Code AVP values, etc. All - of the errata filed against RFC 3588 prior to the publication of this - document have been addressed. A comprehensive list of changes is not - shown here for practical reasons. - -1.2. Terminology - - AAA - - Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting. - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 12] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - ABNF - - Augmented Backus-Naur Form [RFC5234]. A metalanguage with its own - formal syntax and rules. It is based on the Backus-Naur Form and - is used to define message exchanges in a bi-directional - communications protocol. - - Accounting - - The act of collecting information on resource usage for the - purpose of capacity planning, auditing, billing, or cost - allocation. - - Accounting Record - - An accounting record represents a summary of the resource - consumption of a user over the entire session. Accounting servers - creating the accounting record may do so by processing interim - accounting events or accounting events from several devices - serving the same user. - - Authentication - - The act of verifying the identity of an entity (subject). - - Authorization - - The act of determining whether a requesting entity (subject) will - be allowed access to a resource (object). - - Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) - - The Diameter protocol consists of a header followed by one or more - Attribute-Value-Pairs (AVPs). An AVP includes a header and is - used to encapsulate protocol-specific data (e.g., routing - information) as well as authentication, authorization, or - accounting information. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - - Command Code Format (CCF) - - A modified form of ABNF used to define Diameter commands (see - Section 3.2). -</pre> - -<p> -The <c>@messages</c> section of the &man_dict; format has the CCF as -content.</p> - -<pre> - - Diameter Agent - - A Diameter Agent is a Diameter node that provides relay, proxy, - redirect, or translation services. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 13] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Diameter Client - - A Diameter client is a Diameter node that supports Diameter client - applications as well as the base protocol. Diameter clients are - often implemented in devices situated at the edge of a network and - provide access control services for that network. Typical - examples of Diameter clients include the Network Access Server - (NAS) and the Mobile IP Foreign Agent (FA). - - Diameter Node - - A Diameter node is a host process that implements the Diameter - protocol and acts as either a client, an agent, or a server. - - Diameter Peer - - Two Diameter nodes sharing a direct TCP or SCTP transport - connection are called Diameter peers. - - Diameter Server - - A Diameter server is a Diameter node that handles authentication, - authorization, and accounting requests for a particular realm. By - its very nature, a Diameter server must support Diameter server - applications in addition to the base protocol. -</pre> - -<p> -A Diameter Node is implemented by configuring a service -using &mod_start_service; and one or more transports using -&mod_add_transport;. -The service typically represents a Diameter Node but since -capabilities can be configured on individual transports it's more -accurate to say that the node is a collection of transports -advertising the same Origin-Host.</p> - -<p> -The role of a node (agent, client or server) is not something that's -configured explicitly. -Transports are either connecting or listening, depending on whether -diameter should establish a peer connection and send CER or accept -connections and receive CER, but the role a node implements depends -largely on dictionary configuration and &man_app; callback -implementation.</p> - -<pre> - - Downstream - - Downstream is used to identify the direction of a particular - Diameter message from the home server towards the Diameter client. - - Home Realm - - A Home Realm is the administrative domain with which the user - maintains an account relationship. - - Home Server - - A Diameter server that serves the Home Realm. - - Interim Accounting - - An interim accounting message provides a snapshot of usage during - a user's session. Typically, it is implemented in order to - provide for partial accounting of a user's session in case a - device reboot or other network problem prevents the delivery of a - session summary message or session record. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 14] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Local Realm - - A local realm is the administrative domain providing services to a - user. An administrative domain may act as a local realm for - certain users while being a home realm for others. - - Multi-session - - A multi-session represents a logical linking of several sessions. - Multi-sessions are tracked by using the Acct-Multi-Session-Id. An - example of a multi-session would be a Multi-link PPP bundle. Each - leg of the bundle would be a session while the entire bundle would - be a multi-session. - - Network Access Identifier - - The Network Access Identifier, or NAI [RFC4282], is used in the - Diameter protocol to extract a user's identity and realm. The - identity is used to identify the user during authentication and/or - authorization while the realm is used for message routing - purposes. - - Proxy Agent or Proxy - - In addition to forwarding requests and responses, proxies make - policy decisions relating to resource usage and provisioning. - Typically, this is accomplished by tracking the state of NAS - devices. While proxies usually do not respond to client requests - prior to receiving a response from the server, they may originate - Reject messages in cases where policies are violated. As a - result, proxies need to understand the semantics of the messages - passing through them, and they may not support all Diameter - applications. - - Realm - - The string in the NAI that immediately follows the '@' character. - NAI realm names are required to be unique and are piggybacked on - the administration of the DNS namespace. Diameter makes use of - the realm, also loosely referred to as domain, to determine - whether messages can be satisfied locally or whether they must be - routed or redirected. In RADIUS, realm names are not necessarily - piggybacked on the DNS namespace but may be independent of it. - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 15] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Real-Time Accounting - - Real-time accounting involves the processing of information on - resource usage within a defined time window. Typically, time - constraints are imposed in order to limit financial risk. The - Diameter Credit-Control Application [RFC4006] is an example of an - application that defines real-time accounting functionality. - - Relay Agent or Relay - - Relays forward requests and responses based on routing-related - AVPs and routing table entries. Since relays do not make policy - decisions, they do not examine or alter non-routing AVPs. As a - result, relays never originate messages, do not need to understand - the semantics of messages or non-routing AVPs, and are capable of - handling any Diameter application or message type. Since relays - make decisions based on information in routing AVPs and realm - forwarding tables, they do not keep state on NAS resource usage or - sessions in progress. - - Redirect Agent - - Rather than forwarding requests and responses between clients and - servers, redirect agents refer clients to servers and allow them - to communicate directly. Since redirect agents do not sit in the - forwarding path, they do not alter any AVPs transiting between - client and server. Redirect agents do not originate messages and - are capable of handling any message type, although they may be - configured only to redirect messages of certain types, while - acting as relay or proxy agents for other types. As with relay - agents, redirect agents do not keep state with respect to sessions - or NAS resources. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - - Session - - A session is a related progression of events devoted to a - particular activity. Diameter application documents provide - guidelines as to when a session begins and ends. All Diameter - packets with the same Session-Id are considered to be part of the - same session. -</pre> - -<p> -Sessions are not something that diameter is aware of. -The function &mod_session_id; can be used to construct appropriate -values for Session-Id AVP's but logic connecting events in the same -session is the responsibility of the diameter user.</p> - -<pre> - - Stateful Agent - - A stateful agent is one that maintains session state information, - by keeping track of all authorized active sessions. Each - authorized session is bound to a particular service, and its state - is considered active either until it is notified otherwise or - until expiration. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 16] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Sub-session - - A sub-session represents a distinct service (e.g., QoS or data - characteristics) provided to a given session. These services may - happen concurrently (e.g., simultaneous voice and data transfer - during the same session) or serially. These changes in sessions - are tracked with the Accounting-Sub-Session-Id. - - Transaction State - - The Diameter protocol requires that agents maintain transaction - state, which is used for failover purposes. Transaction state - implies that upon forwarding a request, the Hop-by-Hop Identifier - is saved; the field is replaced with a locally unique identifier, - which is restored to its original value when the corresponding - answer is received. The request's state is released upon receipt - of the answer. A stateless agent is one that only maintains - transaction state. - - Translation Agent - - A translation agent (TLA in Figure 4) is a stateful Diameter node - that performs protocol translation between Diameter and another - AAA protocol, such as RADIUS. - - Upstream - - Upstream is used to identify the direction of a particular - Diameter message from the Diameter client towards the home server. - - User - - The entity or device requesting or using some resource, in support - of which a Diameter client has generated a request. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -1.3. Approach to Extensibility - - The Diameter protocol is designed to be extensible, using several - mechanisms, including: - - o Defining new AVP values - - o Creating new AVPs - - o Creating new commands - - o Creating new applications - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 17] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - From the point of view of extensibility, Diameter authentication, - authorization, and accounting applications are treated in the same - way. -</pre> - -<p> -Extensibility in diameter is by way of the dictionary interface -documented in &man_dict;: a diameter user creates applications, -commands and AVP's by implementing a new dictionary, -compiling the dictionary to a codec module using &man_compile; or -&man_make;, and configuring the resulting dictionary module on a -service. -The dictionary modules provided with diameter are all implemented in -this manner.</p> - -<pre> - Note: Protocol designers should try to reuse existing functionality, - namely AVP values, AVPs, commands, and Diameter applications. Reuse - simplifies standardization and implementation. To avoid potential - interoperability issues, it is important to ensure that the semantics - of the reused features are well understood. Given that Diameter can - also carry RADIUS attributes as Diameter AVPs, such reuse - considerations also apply to existing RADIUS attributes that may be - useful in a Diameter application. -</pre> - -<p> -Reuse in dictionary files is achieved by way of the <c>@inherits</c> -section. -AVP's are inherited, commands are not.</p> - -<pre> - -1.3.1. Defining New AVP Values - - In order to allocate a new AVP value for AVPs defined in the Diameter - base protocol, the IETF needs to approve a new RFC that describes the - AVP value. IANA considerations for these AVP values are discussed in - Section 11.3. - - The allocation of AVP values for other AVPs is guided by the IANA - considerations of the document that defines those AVPs. Typically, - allocation of new values for an AVP defined in an RFC would require - IETF Review [RFC5226], whereas values for vendor-specific AVPs can be - allocated by the vendor. - -1.3.2. Creating New AVPs - - A new AVP being defined MUST use one of the data types listed in - Sections 4.2 or 4.3. If an appropriate derived data type is already - defined, it SHOULD be used instead of a base data type to encourage - reusability and good design practice. - - In the event that a logical grouping of AVPs is necessary, and - multiple "groups" are possible in a given command, it is recommended - that a Grouped AVP be used (see Section 4.4). - - The creation of new AVPs can happen in various ways. The recommended - approach is to define a new general-purpose AVP in a Standards Track - RFC approved by the IETF. However, as described in Section 11.1.1, - there are other mechanisms. -</pre> - -<p> -Creating new AVP's is an issue for the dictionary designer, not -diameter.</p> - -<pre> - -1.3.3. Creating New Commands - - A new Command Code MUST be allocated when required AVPs (those - indicated as {AVP} in the CCF definition) are added to, deleted from, - or redefined in (for example, by changing a required AVP into an - optional one) an existing command. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 18] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Furthermore, if the transport characteristics of a command are - changed (for example, with respect to the number of round trips - required), a new Command Code MUST be registered. - - A change to the CCF of a command, such as described above, MUST - result in the definition of a new Command Code. This subsequently - leads to the need to define a new Diameter application for any - application that will use that new command. - - The IANA considerations for Command Codes are discussed in - Section 3.1. -</pre> - -<p> -Creating new commands is an issue for the dictionary designer, not -diameter.</p> - -<pre> - -1.3.4. Creating New Diameter Applications - - Every Diameter application specification MUST have an IANA-assigned - Application Id (see Section 2.4). The managed Application ID space - is flat, and there is no relationship between different Diameter - applications with respect to their Application Ids. As such, there - is no versioning support provided by these Application Ids - themselves; every Diameter application is a standalone application. - If the application has a relationship with other Diameter - applications, such a relationship is not known to Diameter. -</pre> - -<p> -Creating new applications is an issue for the dictionary designer, -not diameter.</p> - -<p> -An application's Application Id is specified in the <c>@id</c> section -of a dictionary file.</p> - -<pre> - - Before describing the rules for creating new Diameter applications, - it is important to discuss the semantics of the AVP occurrences as - stated in the CCF and the M-bit flag (Section 4.1) for an AVP. There - is no relationship imposed between the two; they are set - independently. - - o The CCF indicates what AVPs are placed into a Diameter command by - the sender of that command. Often, since there are multiple modes - of protocol interactions, many of the AVPs are indicated as - optional. - - o The M-bit allows the sender to indicate to the receiver whether or - not understanding the semantics of an AVP and its content is - mandatory. If the M-bit is set by the sender and the receiver - does not understand the AVP or the values carried within that AVP, - then a failure is generated (see Section 7). -</pre> - -<p> -The M-bit is set on outgoing AVP's as directed by the relevant -dictionary. -For incoming AVP's, an M-bit set on an AVP that isn't -explicitly included in the definition of the command in question is -interpreted as a 5001 error, DIAMETER_AVP_UNSUPPORTED, the -consequences of which depend on the value of the &mod_application_opt; -<c>answer_errors</c> or <c>request_errors</c>.</p> - -<pre> - - It is the decision of the protocol designer when to develop a new - Diameter application rather than extending Diameter in other ways. - However, a new Diameter application MUST be created when one or more - of the following criteria are met: - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 19] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - M-bit Setting - - An AVP with the M-bit in the MUST column of the AVP flag table is - added to an existing Command/Application. An AVP with the M-bit - in the MAY column of the AVP flag table is added to an existing - Command/Application. - - Note: The M-bit setting for a given AVP is relevant to an - Application and each command within that application that includes - the AVP. That is, if an AVP appears in two commands for - application Foo and the M-bit settings are different in each - command, then there should be two AVP flag tables describing when - to set the M-bit. - - Commands - - A new command is used within the existing application because - either an additional command is added, an existing command has - been modified so that a new Command Code had to be registered, or - a command has been deleted. - - AVP Flag bits - - If an existing application changes the meaning/semantics of its - AVP Flags or adds new flag bits, then a new Diameter application - MUST be created. - - If the CCF definition of a command allows it, an implementation may - add arbitrary optional AVPs with the M-bit cleared (including vendor- - specific AVPs) to that command without needing to define a new - application. Please refer to Section 11.1.1 for details. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -2. Protocol Overview - - The base Diameter protocol concerns itself with establishing - connections to peers, capabilities negotiation, how messages are sent - and routed through peers, and how the connections are eventually torn - down. The base protocol also defines certain rules that apply to all - message exchanges between Diameter nodes. - - Communication between Diameter peers begins with one peer sending a - message to another Diameter peer. The set of AVPs included in the - message is determined by a particular Diameter application. One AVP - that is included to reference a user's session is the Session-Id. - - The initial request for authentication and/or authorization of a user - would include the Session-Id AVP. The Session-Id is then used in all - subsequent messages to identify the user's session (see Section 8 for - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 20] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - more information). The communicating party may accept the request or - reject it by returning an answer message with the Result-Code AVP set - to indicate that an error occurred. The specific behavior of the - Diameter server or client receiving a request depends on the Diameter - application employed. - - Session state (associated with a Session-Id) MUST be freed upon - receipt of the Session-Termination-Request, Session-Termination- - Answer, expiration of authorized service time in the Session-Timeout - AVP, and according to rules established in a particular Diameter - application. -</pre> - -<p> -Like Session-Id, session state is maintained by the diameter user: -diameter has no session state of its own and does not interpret -STR/STA in any way.</p> - -<pre> - - The base Diameter protocol may be used by itself for accounting - applications. For authentication and authorization, it is always - extended for a particular application. - - Diameter clients MUST support the base protocol, which includes - accounting. In addition, they MUST fully support each Diameter - application that is needed to implement the client's service, e.g., - Network Access Server Requirements (NASREQ) [RFC2881] and/or Mobile - IPv4. A Diameter client MUST be referred to as "Diameter X Client" - where X is the application that it supports and not a "Diameter - Client". - - Diameter servers MUST support the base protocol, which includes - accounting. In addition, they MUST fully support each Diameter - application that is needed to implement the intended service, e.g., - NASREQ and/or Mobile IPv4. A Diameter server MUST be referred to as - "Diameter X Server" where X is the application that it supports, and - not a "Diameter Server". - - Diameter relays and redirect agents are transparent to the Diameter - applications, but they MUST support the Diameter base protocol, which - includes accounting, and all Diameter applications. - - Diameter proxies MUST support the base protocol, which includes - accounting. In addition, they MUST fully support each Diameter - application that is needed to implement proxied services, e.g., - NASREQ and/or Mobile IPv4. A Diameter proxy MUST be referred to as - "Diameter X Proxy" where X is the application which it supports, and - not a "Diameter Proxy". - -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 21] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -2.1. Transport - - The Diameter Transport profile is defined in [RFC3539]. - - The base Diameter protocol is run on port 3868 for both TCP [RFC0793] - and SCTP [RFC4960]. For TLS [RFC5246] and Datagram Transport Layer - Security (DTLS) [RFC6347], a Diameter node that initiates a - connection prior to any message exchanges MUST run on port 5658. It - is assumed that TLS is run on top of TCP when it is used, and DTLS is - run on top of SCTP when it is used. -</pre> - -<p> -Which port a transport connects to or listens on is a matter of -configuration. -Both &man_tcp; and &man_sctp; will default to 3868 if no other value -is specified.</p> - -<pre> - - If the Diameter peer does not support receiving TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP - connections on port 5658 (i.e., the peer complies only with RFC - 3588), then the initiator MAY revert to using TCP or SCTP on port - 3868. Note that this scheme is kept only for the purpose of backward - compatibility and that there are inherent security vulnerabilities - when the initial CER/CEA messages are sent unprotected (see - Section 5.6). - - Diameter clients MUST support either TCP or SCTP; agents and servers - SHOULD support both. - - A Diameter node MAY initiate connections from a source port other - than the one that it declares it accepts incoming connections on, and - it MUST always be prepared to receive connections on port 3868 for - TCP or SCTP and port 5658 for TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP connections. - When DNS-based peer discovery (Section 5.2) is used, the port numbers - received from SRV records take precedence over the default ports - (3868 and 5658). - - A given Diameter instance of the peer state machine MUST NOT use more - than one transport connection to communicate with a given peer, - unless multiple instances exist on the peer, in which, case a - separate connection per process is allowed. -</pre> - -<p> -The &mod_service_opt; <c>restrict_connection</c> controls to what -extent a diameter service allows multiple connections to the same -peer. -(As identified by the value of Origin-Host received from it -during capabilities exchange.)</p> - -<pre> - - When no transport connection exists with a peer, an attempt to - connect SHOULD be made periodically. This behavior is handled via - the Tc timer (see Section 12 for details), whose recommended value is - 30 seconds. There are certain exceptions to this rule, such as when - a peer has terminated the transport connection stating that it does - not wish to communicate. - -</pre> - -<p> -The frequency of reconnection attempts is configured with the -&mod_transport_opt; <c>connect_timer</c> and -<c>watchdog_timer</c>.</p> - -<pre> - - When connecting to a peer and either zero or more transports are - specified, TLS SHOULD be tried first, followed by DTLS, then by TCP, - and finally by SCTP. See Section 5.2 for more information on peer - discovery. -</pre> - -<p> -The order in which different transports are attempted depends on the -order of &mod_transport_opt; <c>transport_module</c> and -<c>transport_config</c> tuples in transport configuration.</p> - -<pre> - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 22] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Diameter implementations SHOULD be able to interpret ICMP protocol - port unreachable messages as explicit indications that the server is - not reachable, subject to security policy on trusting such messages. - Further guidance regarding the treatment of ICMP errors can be found - in [RFC5927] and [RFC5461]. Diameter implementations SHOULD also be - able to interpret a reset from the transport and timed-out connection - attempts. If Diameter receives data from the lower layer that cannot - be parsed or identified as a Diameter error made by the peer, the - stream is compromised and cannot be recovered. The transport - connection MUST be closed using a RESET call (send a TCP RST bit) or - an SCTP ABORT message (graceful closure is compromised). -</pre> - -<p> -ICMP messages and other transport-level errors aren't directly -visible to diameter but transport implementations like &man_tcp; and -&man_sctp; propagate these as terminating transport processes.</p> - -<pre> - -2.1.1. SCTP Guidelines - - Diameter messages SHOULD be mapped into SCTP streams in a way that - avoids head-of-the-line (HOL) blocking. Among different ways of - performing the mapping that fulfill this requirement it is - RECOMMENDED that a Diameter node send every Diameter message (request - or response) over stream zero with the unordered flag set. However, - Diameter nodes MAY select and implement other design alternatives for - avoiding HOL blocking such as using multiple streams with the - unordered flag cleared (as originally instructed in RFC 3588). On - the receiving side, a Diameter entity MUST be ready to receive - Diameter messages over any stream, and it is free to return responses - over a different stream. This way, both sides manage the available - streams in the sending direction, independently of the streams chosen - by the other side to send a particular Diameter message. These - messages can be out-of-order and belong to different Diameter - sessions. -</pre> - -<p> -&man_sctp; allows the sender to specify a stream number explicitly. -The stream on which an incoming message is received it passed to -&app_handle_request; and &app_handle_answer; callbacks as -<c>transport_data</c> in a <c>#diameter_packet{}</c>.</p> - -<p> -Ordered or unordered delivery can be configured per transport.</p> - -<pre> - - Out-of-order delivery has special concerns during a connection - establishment and termination. When a connection is established, the - responder side sends a CEA message and moves to R-Open state as - specified in Section 5.6. If an application message is sent shortly - after the CEA and delivered out-of-order, the initiator side, still - in Wait-I-CEA state, will discard the application message and close - the connection. In order to avoid this race condition, the receiver - side SHOULD NOT use out-of-order delivery methods until the first - message has been received from the initiator, proving that it has - moved to I-Open state. To trigger such a message, the receiver side - could send a DWR immediately after sending a CEA. Upon reception of - the corresponding DWA, the receiver side should start using out-of- - order delivery methods to counter the HOL blocking. -</pre> - -<p> -&man_sctp; does not currently allow the user to switch between ordered -and unordered delivery, or to specify the manner of sending per -message: one or the other must be configured, the defaults being -ordered.</p> - -<pre> - - Another race condition may occur when DPR and DPA messages are used. - Both DPR and DPA are small in size; thus, they may be delivered to - the peer faster than application messages when an out-of-order - delivery mechanism is used. Therefore, it is possible that a DPR/DPA - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 23] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - exchange completes while application messages are still in transit, - resulting in a loss of these messages. An implementation could - mitigate this race condition, for example, using timers, and wait for - a short period of time for pending application level messages to - arrive before proceeding to disconnect the transport connection. - Eventually, lost messages are handled by the retransmission mechanism - described in Section 5.5.4. - - A Diameter agent SHOULD use dedicated payload protocol identifiers - (PPIDs) for clear text and encrypted SCTP DATA chunks instead of only - using the unspecified payload protocol identifier (value 0). For - this purpose, two PPID values are allocated: the PPID value 46 is for - Diameter messages in clear text SCTP DATA chunks, and the PPID value - 47 is for Diameter messages in protected DTLS/SCTP DATA chunks. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -2.2. Securing Diameter Messages - - Connections between Diameter peers SHOULD be protected by TLS/TCP and - DTLS/SCTP. All Diameter base protocol implementations MUST support - the use of TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP. If desired, alternative security - mechanisms that are independent of Diameter, such as IPsec [RFC4301], - can be deployed to secure connections between peers. The Diameter - protocol MUST NOT be used without one of TLS, DTLS, or IPsec. -</pre> - -<p> -As noted above, DTLS is not currently supported and IPsec usage is -transparent to diameter. -Security is not enforced by diameter.</p> - -<pre> - -2.3. Diameter Application Compliance - - Application Ids are advertised during the capabilities exchange phase - (see Section 5.3). Advertising support of an application implies - that the sender supports the functionality specified in the - respective Diameter application specification. - - Implementations MAY add arbitrary optional AVPs with the M-bit - cleared (including vendor-specific AVPs) to a command defined in an - application, but only if the command's CCF syntax specification - allows for it. Please refer to Section 11.1.1 for details. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -2.4. Application Identifiers - - Each Diameter application MUST have an IANA-assigned Application ID. - The base protocol does not require an Application Id since its - support is mandatory. During the capabilities exchange, Diameter - nodes inform their peers of locally supported applications. - Furthermore, all Diameter messages contain an Application Id, which - is used in the message forwarding process. - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 24] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - The following Application Id values are defined: - - Diameter common message 0 - Diameter base accounting 3 - Relay 0xffffffff -</pre> - -<p> -These applications are implemented in the dictionary modules -<c>diameter_gen_base_rfc6733</c>, <c>diameter_gen_acct_rfc6733</c> and -<c>diameter_relay</c> respectively. -There are also RFC 3588 versions or the common and accounting -dictionaries: <c>diameter_gen_base_rfc3588</c> and -<c>diameter_base_accounting</c>. -(The inconsistent naming is historical.) -Dictionary modules are configured using the &mod_application_opt; -<c>dictionary</c>.</p> - -<pre> - Relay and redirect agents MUST advertise the Relay Application ID, - while all other Diameter nodes MUST advertise locally supported - applications. The receiver of a Capabilities Exchange message - advertising relay service MUST assume that the sender supports all - current and future applications. - - Diameter relay and proxy agents are responsible for finding an - upstream server that supports the application of a particular - message. If none can be found, an error message is returned with the - Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -2.5. Connections vs. Sessions - - This section attempts to provide the reader with an understanding of - the difference between "connection" and "session", which are terms - used extensively throughout this document. - - A connection refers to a transport-level connection between two peers - that is used to send and receive Diameter messages. A session is a - logical concept at the application layer that exists between the - Diameter client and the Diameter server; it is identified via the - Session-Id AVP. - - +--------+ +-------+ +--------+ - | Client | | Relay | | Server | - +--------+ +-------+ +--------+ - <----------> <----------> - peer connection A peer connection B - - <-----------------------------> - User session x - - Figure 1: Diameter Connections and Sessions - - In the example provided in Figure 1, peer connection A is established - between the client and the relay. Peer connection B is established - between the relay and the server. User session X spans from the - client via the relay to the server. Each "user" of a service causes - an auth request to be sent, with a unique session identifier. Once - accepted by the server, both the client and the server are aware of - the session. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 25] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - It is important to note that there is no relationship between a - connection and a session, and that Diameter messages for multiple - sessions are all multiplexed through a single connection. Also, note - that Diameter messages pertaining to the session, both application- - specific and those that are defined in this document such as ASR/ASA, - RAR/RAA, and STR/STA, MUST carry the Application Id of the - application. Diameter messages pertaining to peer connection - establishment and maintenance such as CER/CEA, DWR/DWA, and DPR/DPA - MUST carry an Application Id of zero (0). -</pre> - -<p> -As noted above, diameter is not involved in session management. -This is the responsibility of the diameter user.</p> - -<pre> - -2.6. Peer Table - - The Diameter peer table is used in message forwarding and is - referenced by the routing table. A peer table entry contains the - following fields: - - Host Identity - - Following the conventions described for the DiameterIdentity- - derived AVP data format in Section 4.3.1, this field contains the - contents of the Origin-Host (Section 6.3) AVP found in the CER or - CEA message. - - StatusT - - This is the state of the peer entry, and it MUST match one of the - values listed in Section 5.6. - - Static or Dynamic - - Specifies whether a peer entry was statically configured or - dynamically discovered. - - Expiration Time - - Specifies the time at which dynamically discovered peer table - entries are to be either refreshed or expired. If public key - certificates are used for Diameter security (e.g., with TLS), this - value MUST NOT be greater than the expiry times in the relevant - certificates. - - TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP Enabled - - Specifies whether TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP is to be used when - communicating with the peer. - - Additional security information, when needed (e.g., keys, - certificates). -</pre> - -<p> -The Peer Table is not directly accessible to the diameter user. -Information about connected peers can be retrieved using -&mod_service_info;.</p> - -<pre> - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 26] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -2.7. Routing Table - - All Realm-Based routing lookups are performed against what is - commonly known as the routing table (see Section 12). Each routing - table entry contains the following fields: - - Realm Name - - This is the field that MUST be used as a primary key in the - routing table lookups. Note that some implementations perform - their lookups based on longest-match-from-the-right on the realm - rather than requiring an exact match. - - Application Identifier - - An application is identified by an Application Id. A route entry - can have a different destination based on the Application Id in - the message header. This field MUST be used as a secondary key - field in routing table lookups. - - Local Action - - The Local Action field is used to identify how a message should be - treated. The following actions are supported: - - 1. LOCAL - Diameter messages that can be satisfied locally and do - not need to be routed to another Diameter entity. - - 2. RELAY - All Diameter messages that fall within this category - MUST be routed to a next-hop Diameter entity that is indicated - by the identifier described below. Routing is done without - modifying any non-routing AVPs. See Section 6.1.9 for - relaying guidelines. - - 3. PROXY - All Diameter messages that fall within this category - MUST be routed to a next Diameter entity that is indicated by - the identifier described below. The local server MAY apply - its local policies to the message by including new AVPs to the - message prior to routing. See Section 6.1.9 for proxying - guidelines. - - 4. REDIRECT - Diameter messages that fall within this category - MUST have the identity of the home Diameter server(s) - appended, and returned to the sender of the message. See - Section 6.1.8 for redirection guidelines. - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 27] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Server Identifier - - The identity of one or more servers to which the message is to be - routed. This identity MUST also be present in the Host Identity - field of the peer table (Section 2.6). When the Local Action is - set to RELAY or PROXY, this field contains the identity of the - server(s) to which the message MUST be routed. When the Local - Action field is set to REDIRECT, this field contains the identity - of one or more servers to which the message MUST be redirected. - - Static or Dynamic - - Specifies whether a route entry was statically configured or - dynamically discovered. - - Expiration Time - - Specifies the time at which a dynamically discovered route table - entry expires. If public key certificates are used for Diameter - security (e.g., with TLS), this value MUST NOT be greater than the - expiry time in the relevant certificates. - - It is important to note that Diameter agents MUST support at least - one of the LOCAL, RELAY, PROXY, or REDIRECT modes of operation. - Agents do not need to support all modes of operation in order to - conform with the protocol specification, but they MUST follow the - protocol compliance guidelines in Section 2. Relay agents and - proxies MUST NOT reorder AVPs. - - The routing table MAY include a default entry that MUST be used for - any requests not matching any of the other entries. The routing - table MAY consist of only such an entry. - - When a request is routed, the target server MUST have advertised the - Application Id (see Section 2.4) for the given message or have - advertised itself as a relay or proxy agent. Otherwise, an error is - returned with the Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER. -</pre> - -<p> -Routing does not need specific support in diameter: a user can -maintain their own routing table if desired and implement any desired -routing in &man_app; callbacks. -However, it may be convenient to add more specific routing support to -diameter in the future.</p> - -<pre> - -2.8. Role of Diameter Agents - - In addition to clients and servers, the Diameter protocol introduces - relay, proxy, redirect, and translation agents, each of which is - defined in Section 1.2. Diameter agents are useful for several - reasons: -</pre> - -<p> -An noted above, the role a node plays is largely a question of -configuration and &man_app; callback implementation.</p> - -<pre> - - o They can distribute administration of systems to a configurable - grouping, including the maintenance of security associations. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 28] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - o They can be used for concentration of requests from a number of - co-located or distributed NAS equipment sets to a set of like user - groups. - - o They can do value-added processing to the requests or responses. - - o They can be used for load balancing. - - o A complex network will have multiple authentication sources, they - can sort requests and forward towards the correct target. - - The Diameter protocol requires that agents maintain transaction - state, which is used for failover purposes. Transaction state - implies that upon forwarding a request, its Hop-by-Hop Identifier is - saved; the field is replaced with a locally unique identifier, which - is restored to its original value when the corresponding answer is - received. The request's state is released upon receipt of the - answer. A stateless agent is one that only maintains transaction - state. - - The Proxy-Info AVP allows stateless agents to add local state to a - Diameter request, with the guarantee that the same state will be - present in the answer. However, the protocol's failover procedures - require that agents maintain a copy of pending requests. - - A stateful agent is one that maintains session state information by - keeping track of all authorized active sessions. Each authorized - session is bound to a particular service, and its state is considered - active until either the agent is notified otherwise or the session - expires. Each authorized session has an expiration, which is - communicated by Diameter servers via the Session-Timeout AVP. - - Maintaining session state may be useful in certain applications, such - as: - - o Protocol translation (e.g., RADIUS <-> Diameter) - - o Limiting resources authorized to a particular user - - o Per-user or per-transaction auditing - - A Diameter agent MAY act in a stateful manner for some requests and - be stateless for others. A Diameter implementation MAY act as one - type of agent for some requests and as another type of agent for - others. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 29] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -2.8.1. Relay Agents - - Relay agents are Diameter agents that accept requests and route - messages to other Diameter nodes based on information found in the - messages (e.g., the value of the Destination-Realm AVP Section 6.6). - This routing decision is performed using a list of supported realms - and known peers. This is known as the routing table, as is defined - further in Section 2.7. - - Relays may, for example, be used to aggregate requests from multiple - Network Access Servers (NASes) within a common geographical area - (Point of Presence, POP). The use of relays is advantageous since it - eliminates the need for NASes to be configured with the necessary - security information they would otherwise require to communicate with - Diameter servers in other realms. Likewise, this reduces the - configuration load on Diameter servers that would otherwise be - necessary when NASes are added, changed, or deleted. - - Relays modify Diameter messages by inserting and removing routing - information, but they do not modify any other portion of a message. - Relays SHOULD NOT maintain session state but MUST maintain - transaction state. - - +------+ ---------> +------+ ---------> +------+ - | | 1. Request | | 2. Request | | - | NAS | | DRL | | HMS | - | | 4. Answer | | 3. Answer | | - +------+ <--------- +------+ <--------- +------+ - example.net example.net example.com - - Figure 2: Relaying of Diameter messages - - The example provided in Figure 2 depicts a request issued from a NAS, - which is an access device, for the user [email protected]. Prior to - issuing the request, the NAS performs a Diameter route lookup, using - "example.com" as the key, and determines that the message is to be - relayed to a DRL, which is a Diameter relay. The DRL performs the - same route lookup as the NAS, and relays the message to the HMS, - which is example.com's home server. The HMS identifies that the - request can be locally supported (via the realm), processes the - authentication and/or authorization request, and replies with an - answer, which is routed back to the NAS using saved transaction - state. - - Since relays do not perform any application-level processing, they - provide relaying services for all Diameter applications; therefore, - they MUST advertise the Relay Application Id. -</pre> - -<p> -Requests are relayed by returning a <c>relay</c> tuple from a -&app_handle_request; callback.</p> - -<pre> - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 30] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -2.8.2. Proxy Agents - - Similar to relays, proxy agents route Diameter messages using the - Diameter routing table. However, they differ since they modify - messages to implement policy enforcement. This requires that proxies - maintain the state of their downstream peers (e.g., access devices) - to enforce resource usage, provide admission control, and provide - provisioning. - - Proxies may, for example, be used in call control centers or access - ISPs that provide outsourced connections; they can monitor the number - and type of ports in use and make allocation and admission decisions - according to their configuration. - - Since enforcing policies requires an understanding of the service - being provided, proxies MUST only advertise the Diameter applications - they support. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -2.8.3. Redirect Agents - - Redirect agents are useful in scenarios where the Diameter routing - configuration needs to be centralized. An example is a redirect - agent that provides services to all members of a consortium, but does - not wish to be burdened with relaying all messages between realms. - This scenario is advantageous since it does not require that the - consortium provide routing updates to its members when changes are - made to a member's infrastructure. - - Since redirect agents do not relay messages, and only return an - answer with the information necessary for Diameter agents to - communicate directly, they do not modify messages. Since redirect - agents do not receive answer messages, they cannot maintain session - state. - - The example provided in Figure 3 depicts a request issued from the - access device, NAS, for the user [email protected]. The message is - forwarded by the NAS to its relay, DRL, which does not have a routing - entry in its Diameter routing table for example.com. The DRL has a - default route configured to DRD, which is a redirect agent that - returns a redirect notification to DRL, as well as the HMS' contact - information. Upon receipt of the redirect notification, the DRL - establishes a transport connection with the HMS, if one doesn't - already exist, and forwards the request to it. - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 31] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - +------+ - | | - | DRD | - | | - +------+ - ^ | - 2. Request | | 3. Redirection - | | Notification - | v - +------+ ---------> +------+ ---------> +------+ - | | 1. Request | | 4. Request | | - | NAS | | DRL | | HMS | - | | 6. Answer | | 5. Answer | | - +------+ <--------- +------+ <--------- +------+ - example.net example.net example.com - - Figure 3: Redirecting a Diameter Message - - Since redirect agents do not perform any application-level - processing, they provide relaying services for all Diameter - applications; therefore, they MUST advertise the Relay Application - ID. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -2.8.4. Translation Agents - - A translation agent is a device that provides translation between two - protocols (e.g., RADIUS<->Diameter, TACACS+<->Diameter). Translation - agents are likely to be used as aggregation servers to communicate - with a Diameter infrastructure, while allowing for the embedded - systems to be migrated at a slower pace. - - Given that the Diameter protocol introduces the concept of long-lived - authorized sessions, translation agents MUST be session stateful and - MUST maintain transaction state. - - Translation of messages can only occur if the agent recognizes the - application of a particular request; therefore, translation agents - MUST only advertise their locally supported applications. - - +------+ ---------> +------+ ---------> +------+ - | | RADIUS Request | | Diameter Request | | - | NAS | | TLA | | HMS | - | | RADIUS Answer | | Diameter Answer | | - +------+ <--------- +------+ <--------- +------+ - example.net example.net example.com - - Figure 4: Translation of RADIUS to Diameter -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 32] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -2.9. Diameter Path Authorization - - As noted in Section 2.2, Diameter provides transmission-level - security for each connection using TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP. Therefore, - each connection can be authenticated and can be replay and integrity - protected. - - In addition to authenticating each connection, the entire session - MUST also be authorized. Before initiating a connection, a Diameter - peer MUST check that its peers are authorized to act in their roles. - For example, a Diameter peer may be authentic, but that does not mean - that it is authorized to act as a Diameter server advertising a set - of Diameter applications. - - Prior to bringing up a connection, authorization checks are performed - at each connection along the path. Diameter capabilities negotiation - (CER/CEA) also MUST be carried out, in order to determine what - Diameter applications are supported by each peer. Diameter sessions - MUST be routed only through authorized nodes that have advertised - support for the Diameter application required by the session. - - As noted in Section 6.1.9, a relay or proxy agent MUST append a - Route-Record AVP to all requests forwarded. The AVP contains the - identity of the peer from which the request was received. - - The home Diameter server, prior to authorizing a session, MUST check - the Route-Record AVPs to make sure that the route traversed by the - request is acceptable. For example, administrators within the home - realm may not wish to honor requests that have been routed through an - untrusted realm. By authorizing a request, the home Diameter server - is implicitly indicating its willingness to engage in the business - transaction as specified by any contractual relationship between the - server and the previous hop. A DIAMETER_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED error - message (see Section 7.1.5) is sent if the route traversed by the - request is unacceptable. - - A home realm may also wish to check that each accounting request - message corresponds to a Diameter response authorizing the session. - Accounting requests without corresponding authorization responses - SHOULD be subjected to further scrutiny, as should accounting - requests indicating a difference between the requested and provided - service. - - Forwarding of an authorization response is considered evidence of a - willingness to take on financial risk relative to the session. A - local realm may wish to limit this exposure, for example, by - establishing credit limits for intermediate realms and refusing to - accept responses that would violate those limits. By issuing an - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 33] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - accounting request corresponding to the authorization response, the - local realm implicitly indicates its agreement to provide the service - indicated in the authorization response. If the service cannot be - provided by the local realm, then a DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY error - message MUST be sent within the accounting request; a Diameter client - receiving an authorization response for a service that it cannot - perform MUST NOT substitute an alternate service and then send - accounting requests for the alternate service instead. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -3. Diameter Header - - A summary of the Diameter header format is shown below. The fields - are transmitted in network byte order. - - 0 1 2 3 - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | Version | Message Length | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | Command Flags | Command Code | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | Application-ID | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | Hop-by-Hop Identifier | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | End-to-End Identifier | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | AVPs ... - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- -</pre> - -<p> -The Diameter Header is represented by the <c>diameter_header</c> -record defined in <c>diameter.hrl</c>. -The <c>diameter_packet</c> record contains a <c>header</c> field whose -value will be a decoded <c>#diameter_header{}</c> for incoming -messages passed to &app_handle_request; and &app_handle_answer; -callbacks. -In the case of outgoing messages, diameter and the relevant -dictionary populate the Diameter Header appropriately, although -&app_prepare_request; and &app_handle_request; callbacks can modify -header values. -(Which can be useful in test.)</p> - -<pre> - - Version - - This Version field MUST be set to 1 to indicate Diameter Version - 1. - - Message Length - - The Message Length field is three octets and indicates the length - of the Diameter message including the header fields and the padded - AVPs. Thus, the Message Length field is always a multiple of 4. - - Command Flags - - The Command Flags field is eight bits. The following bits are - assigned: - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 34] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - |R P E T r r r r| - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - - R(equest) - - If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is - an answer. - - P(roxiable) - - If set, the message MAY be proxied, relayed, or redirected. If - cleared, the message MUST be locally processed. - - E(rror) - - If set, the message contains a protocol error, and the message - will not conform to the CCF described for this command. - Messages with the 'E' bit set are commonly referred to as error - messages. This bit MUST NOT be set in request messages (see - Section 7.2). - - T(Potentially retransmitted message) - - This flag is set after a link failover procedure, to aid the - removal of duplicate requests. It is set when resending - requests not yet acknowledged, as an indication of a possible - duplicate due to a link failure. This bit MUST be cleared when - sending a request for the first time; otherwise, the sender - MUST set this flag. Diameter agents only need to be concerned - about the number of requests they send based on a single - received request; retransmissions by other entities need not be - tracked. Diameter agents that receive a request with the T - flag set, MUST keep the T flag set in the forwarded request. - This flag MUST NOT be set if an error answer message (e.g., a - protocol error) has been received for the earlier message. It - can be set only in cases where no answer has been received from - the server for a request, and the request has been sent again. - This flag MUST NOT be set in answer messages. - - r(eserved) - - These flag bits are reserved for future use; they MUST be set - to zero and ignored by the receiver. -</pre> - -<p> -Reserved bits are set to 0 in outgoing messages.</p> - -<pre> - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 35] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Command Code - - The Command Code field is three octets and is used in order to - communicate the command associated with the message. The 24-bit - address space is managed by IANA (see Section 3.1). Command Code - values 16,777,214 and 16,777,215 (hexadecimal values FFFFFE- - FFFFFF) are reserved for experimental use (see Section 11.2). - - Application-ID - - Application-ID is four octets and is used to identify for which - application the message is applicable. The application can be an - authentication application, an accounting application, or a - vendor-specific application. - - The value of the Application-ID field in the header MUST be the - same as any relevant Application-Id AVPs contained in the message. - - Hop-by-Hop Identifier - - The Hop-by-Hop Identifier is an unsigned 32-bit integer field (in - network byte order) that aids in matching requests and replies. - The sender MUST ensure that the Hop-by-Hop Identifier in a request - is unique on a given connection at any given time, and it MAY - attempt to ensure that the number is unique across reboots. The - sender of an answer message MUST ensure that the Hop-by-Hop - Identifier field contains the same value that was found in the - corresponding request. The Hop-by-Hop Identifier is normally a - monotonically increasing number, whose start value was randomly - generated. An answer message that is received with an unknown - Hop-by-Hop Identifier MUST be discarded. - - End-to-End Identifier - - The End-to-End Identifier is an unsigned 32-bit integer field (in - network byte order) that is used to detect duplicate messages. - Upon reboot, implementations MAY set the high order 12 bits to - contain the low order 12 bits of current time, and the low order - 20 bits to a random value. Senders of request messages MUST - insert a unique identifier on each message. The identifier MUST - remain locally unique for a period of at least 4 minutes, even - across reboots. The originator of an answer message MUST ensure - that the End-to-End Identifier field contains the same value that - was found in the corresponding request. The End-to-End Identifier - MUST NOT be modified by Diameter agents of any kind. The - combination of the Origin-Host AVP (Section 6.3) and this field is - used to detect duplicates. Duplicate requests SHOULD cause the - same answer to be transmitted (modulo the Hop-by-Hop Identifier - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 36] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - field and any routing AVPs that may be present), and they MUST NOT - affect any state that was set when the original request was - processed. Duplicate answer messages that are to be locally - consumed (see Section 6.2) SHOULD be silently discarded. - - AVPs - - AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the - Diameter message. See Section 4 for more information on AVPs. -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -3.1. Command Codes - - Each command Request/Answer pair is assigned a Command Code, and the - sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R' bit in - the Command Flags field of the Diameter header. - - Every Diameter message MUST contain a Command Code in its header's - Command Code field, which is used to determine the action that is to - be taken for a particular message. The following Command Codes are - defined in the Diameter base protocol: - - Section - Command Name Abbrev. Code Reference - -------------------------------------------------------- - Abort-Session-Request ASR 274 8.5.1 - Abort-Session-Answer ASA 274 8.5.2 - Accounting-Request ACR 271 9.7.1 - Accounting-Answer ACA 271 9.7.2 - Capabilities-Exchange- CER 257 5.3.1 - Request - Capabilities-Exchange- CEA 257 5.3.2 - Answer - Device-Watchdog-Request DWR 280 5.5.1 - Device-Watchdog-Answer DWA 280 5.5.2 - Disconnect-Peer-Request DPR 282 5.4.1 - Disconnect-Peer-Answer DPA 282 5.4.2 - Re-Auth-Request RAR 258 8.3.1 - Re-Auth-Answer RAA 258 8.3.2 - Session-Termination- STR 275 8.4.1 - Request - Session-Termination- STA 275 8.4.2 - Answer -</pre> - -<p> -These messages are all defined in diameter's implementation of the -common dictionary in modules <c>diameter_gen_base_rfc6733</c> and -<c>diameter_gen_base_rfc3588</c>. -Corresponding record definitions are found in -<c>diameter_gen_base_rfc6733.hrl</c> and -<c>diameter_gen_base_rfc3588.hrl</c>.</p> - -<pre> - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 37] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -3.2. Command Code Format Specification - - Every Command Code defined MUST include a corresponding Command Code - Format (CCF) specification, which is used to define the AVPs that - MUST or MAY be present when sending the message. The following ABNF - specifies the CCF used in the definition: -</pre> - -<p> -The CCF is what is specified in the <c>@messages</c> section of the -&man_dict; format, except as noted below.</p> - -<pre> - - command-def = "<" command-name ">" "::=" diameter-message -</pre> - -<p> -Angle brackets are currently not allowed here. -This was a change between RFC 3588 and RFC 6733: the former disallowed -them in the grammar but included them in its own command definitions.</p> - -<pre> - - command-name = diameter-name - - diameter-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-") - - diameter-message = header *fixed *required *optional - - header = "<Diameter-Header:" command-id - [r-bit] [p-bit] [e-bit] [application-id]">" - - application-id = 1*DIGIT - - command-id = 1*DIGIT - ; The Command Code assigned to the command. - - r-bit = ", REQ" - ; If present, the 'R' bit in the Command - ; Flags is set, indicating that the message - ; is a request as opposed to an answer. - - p-bit = ", PXY" - ; If present, the 'P' bit in the Command - ; Flags is set, indicating that the message - ; is proxiable. - - e-bit = ", ERR" - ; If present, the 'E' bit in the Command - ; Flags is set, indicating that the answer - ; message contains a Result-Code AVP in - ; the "protocol error" class. - - fixed = [qual] "<" avp-spec ">" - ; Defines the fixed position of an AVP. - - required = [qual] "{" avp-spec "}" - ; The AVP MUST be present and can appear - ; anywhere in the message. - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 38] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - optional = [qual] "[" avp-name "]" - ; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot - ; evaluate to any AVP Name that is included - ; in a fixed or required rule. The AVP can - ; appear anywhere in the message. - ; - ; NOTE: "[" and "]" have a slightly different - ; meaning than in ABNF. These braces - ; cannot be used to express optional fixed rules - ; (such as an optional ICV at the end). To do - ; this, the convention is '0*1fixed'. - - qual = [min] "*" [max] - ; See ABNF conventions, RFC 5234, Section 4. - ; The absence of any qualifier depends on - ; whether it precedes a fixed, required, or - ; optional rule. If a fixed or required rule has - ; no qualifier, then exactly one such AVP MUST - ; be present. If an optional rule has no - ; qualifier, then 0 or 1 such AVP may be - ; present. If an optional rule has a qualifier, - ; then the value of min MUST be 0 if present. - - min = 1*DIGIT - ; The minimum number of times the element may - ; be present. If absent, the default value is 0 - ; for fixed and optional rules and 1 for - ; required rules. The value MUST be at least 1 - ; for required rules. - - max = 1*DIGIT - ; The maximum number of times the element may - ; be present. If absent, the default value is - ; infinity. A value of 0 implies the AVP MUST - ; NOT be present. - - avp-spec = diameter-name - ; The avp-spec has to be an AVP Name, defined - ; in the base or extended Diameter - ; specifications. - - avp-name = avp-spec / "AVP" - ; The string "AVP" stands for *any* arbitrary AVP - ; Name, not otherwise listed in that Command Code - ; definition. The inclusion of this string - ; is recommended for all CCFs to allow for - ; extensibility. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 39] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - The following is a definition of a fictitious Command Code: - - Example-Request ::= < Diameter Header: 9999999, REQ, PXY > - { User-Name } - 1* { Origin-Host } - * [ AVP ] -</pre> - -&nada; - -<pre> - -3.3. Diameter Command Naming Conventions - - Diameter command names typically includes one or more English words - followed by the verb "Request" or "Answer". Each English word is - delimited by a hyphen. A three-letter acronym for both the request - and answer is also normally provided. - - An example is a message set used to terminate a session. The command - name is Session-Terminate-Request and Session-Terminate-Answer, while - the acronyms are STR and STA, respectively. - - Both the request and the answer for a given command share the same - Command Code. The request is identified by the R(equest) bit in the - Diameter header set to one (1), to ask that a particular action be - performed, such as authorizing a user or terminating a session. Once - the receiver has completed the request, it issues the corresponding - answer, which includes a result code that communicates one of the - following: - - o The request was successful - - o The request failed - - o An additional request has to be sent to provide information the - peer requires prior to returning a successful or failed answer. - - o The receiver could not process the request, but provides - information about a Diameter peer that is able to satisfy the - request, known as redirect. - - Additional information, encoded within AVPs, may also be included in - answer messages. -</pre> - -<p> -The &man_dict; format places no requirement on the naming of commands.</p> - -<pre> - -4. Diameter AVPs - - Diameter AVPs carry specific authentication, accounting, - authorization, and routing information as well as configuration - details for the request and reply. - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 40] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Each AVP of type OctetString MUST be padded to align on a 32-bit - boundary, while other AVP types align naturally. A number of zero- - valued bytes are added to the end of the AVP Data field until a word - boundary is reached. The length of the padding is not reflected in - the AVP Length field. - -4.1. AVP Header - - The fields in the AVP header MUST be sent in network byte order. The - format of the header is: - - 0 1 2 3 - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | AVP Code | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - |V M P r r r r r| AVP Length | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | Vendor-ID (opt) | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | Data ... - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - - AVP Code - - The AVP Code, combined with the Vendor-Id field, identifies the - attribute uniquely. AVP numbers 1 through 255 are reserved for - reuse of RADIUS attributes, without setting the Vendor-Id field. - AVP numbers 256 and above are used for Diameter, which are - allocated by IANA (see Section 11.1.1). - - AVP Flags - - The AVP Flags field informs the receiver how each attribute must - be handled. New Diameter applications SHOULD NOT define - additional AVP Flag bits. However, note that new Diameter - applications MAY define additional bits within the AVP header, and - an unrecognized bit SHOULD be considered an error. The sender of - the AVP MUST set 'R' (reserved) bits to 0 and the receiver SHOULD - ignore all 'R' (reserved) bits. The 'P' bit has been reserved for - future usage of end-to-end security. At the time of writing, - there are no end-to-end security mechanisms specified; therefore, - the 'P' bit SHOULD be set to 0. - - The 'M' bit, known as the Mandatory bit, indicates whether the - receiver of the AVP MUST parse and understand the semantics of the - AVP including its content. The receiving entity MUST return an - appropriate error message if it receives an AVP that has the M-bit - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 41] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - set but does not understand it. An exception applies when the AVP - is embedded within a Grouped AVP. See Section 4.4 for details. - Diameter relay and redirect agents MUST NOT reject messages with - unrecognized AVPs. - - The 'M' bit MUST be set according to the rules defined in the - application specification that introduces or reuses this AVP. - Within a given application, the M-bit setting for an AVP is - defined either for all command types or for each command type. - - AVPs with the 'M' bit cleared are informational only; a receiver - that receives a message with such an AVP that is not supported, or - whose value is not supported, MAY simply ignore the AVP. - - The 'V' bit, known as the Vendor-Specific bit, indicates whether - the optional Vendor-ID field is present in the AVP header. When - set, the AVP Code belongs to the specific vendor code address - space. - - AVP Length - - The AVP Length field is three octets, and indicates the number of - octets in this AVP including the AVP Code field, AVP Length field, - AVP Flags field, Vendor-ID field (if present), and the AVP Data - field. If a message is received with an invalid attribute length, - the message MUST be rejected. - -4.1.1. Optional Header Elements - - The AVP header contains one optional field. This field is only - present if the respective bit-flag is enabled. - - Vendor-ID - - The Vendor-ID field is present if the 'V' bit is set in the AVP - Flags field. The optional four-octet Vendor-ID field contains the - IANA-assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Codes" - [ENTERPRISE] value, encoded in network byte order. Any vendors or - standardization organizations that are also treated like vendors - in the IANA-managed "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise - Codes" space wishing to implement a vendor-specific Diameter AVP - MUST use their own Vendor-ID along with their privately managed - AVP address space, guaranteeing that they will not collide with - any other vendor's vendor-specific AVP(s) or with future IETF - AVPs. - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 42] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - A Vendor-ID value of zero (0) corresponds to the IETF-adopted AVP - values, as managed by IANA. Since the absence of the Vendor-ID - field implies that the AVP in question is not vendor specific, - implementations MUST NOT use the value of zero (0) for the - Vendor-ID field. - -4.2. Basic AVP Data Formats - - The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information - specific to the Attribute. The format and length of the Data field - is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields. The format of - the Data field MUST be one of the following base data types or a data - type derived from the base data types. In the event that a new Basic - AVP Data Format is needed, a new version of this RFC MUST be created. - - OctetString - - The data contains arbitrary data of variable length. Unless - otherwise noted, the AVP Length field MUST be set to at least 8 - (12 if the 'V' bit is enabled). AVP values of this type that are - not a multiple of 4 octets in length are followed by the necessary - padding so that the next AVP (if any) will start on a 32-bit - boundary. - - Integer32 - - 32-bit signed value, in network byte order. The AVP Length field - MUST be set to 12 (16 if the 'V' bit is enabled). - - Integer64 - - 64-bit signed value, in network byte order. The AVP Length field - MUST be set to 16 (20 if the 'V' bit is enabled). - - Unsigned32 - - 32-bit unsigned value, in network byte order. The AVP Length - field MUST be set to 12 (16 if the 'V' bit is enabled). - - Unsigned64 - - 64-bit unsigned value, in network byte order. The AVP Length - field MUST be set to 16 (20 if the 'V' bit is enabled). - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 43] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Float32 - - This represents floating point values of single precision as - described by [FLOATPOINT]. The 32-bit value is transmitted in - network byte order. The AVP Length field MUST be set to 12 (16 if - the 'V' bit is enabled). - - Float64 - - This represents floating point values of double precision as - described by [FLOATPOINT]. The 64-bit value is transmitted in - network byte order. The AVP Length field MUST be set to 16 (20 if - the 'V' bit is enabled). - - Grouped - - The Data field is specified as a sequence of AVPs. These AVPs are - concatenated -- including their headers and padding -- in the - order in which they are specified and the result encapsulated in - the Data field. The AVP Length field is set to 8 (12 if the 'V' - bit is enabled) plus the total length of all included AVPs, - including their headers and padding. Thus, the AVP Length field - of an AVP of type Grouped is always a multiple of 4. - -4.3. Derived AVP Data Formats - - In addition to using the Basic AVP Data Formats, applications may - define data formats derived from the Basic AVP Data Formats. An - application that defines new Derived AVP Data Formats MUST include - them in a section titled "Derived AVP Data Formats", using the same - format as the definitions below. Each new definition MUST be either - defined or listed with a reference to the RFC that defines the - format. - -4.3.1. Common Derived AVP Data Formats - - The following are commonly used Derived AVP Data Formats. - - Address - - The Address format is derived from the OctetString Basic AVP - Format. It is a discriminated union representing, for example, a - 32-bit (IPv4) [RFC0791] or 128-bit (IPv6) [RFC4291] address, most - significant octet first. The first two octets of the Address AVP - represent the AddressType, which contains an Address Family, - defined in [IANAADFAM]. The AddressType is used to discriminate - the content and format of the remaining octets. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 44] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Time - - The Time format is derived from the OctetString Basic AVP Format. - The string MUST contain four octets, in the same format as the - first four bytes are in the NTP timestamp format. The NTP - timestamp format is defined in Section 3 of [RFC5905]. - - This represents the number of seconds since 0h on 1 January 1900 - with respect to the Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). - - On 6h 28m 16s UTC, 7 February 2036, the time value will overflow. - Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) [RFC5905] describes a - procedure to extend the time to 2104. This procedure MUST be - supported by all Diameter nodes. - - UTF8String - - The UTF8String format is derived from the OctetString Basic AVP - Format. This is a human-readable string represented using the - ISO/IEC IS 10646-1 character set, encoded as an OctetString using - the UTF-8 transformation format [RFC3629]. - - Since additional code points are added by amendments to the 10646 - standard from time to time, implementations MUST be prepared to - encounter any code point from 0x00000001 to 0x7fffffff. Byte - sequences that do not correspond to the valid encoding of a code - point into UTF-8 charset or are outside this range are prohibited. - - The use of control codes SHOULD be avoided. When it is necessary - to represent a new line, the control code sequence CR LF SHOULD be - used. - - The use of leading or trailing white space SHOULD be avoided. - - For code points not directly supported by user interface hardware - or software, an alternative means of entry and display, such as - hexadecimal, MAY be provided. - - For information encoded in 7-bit US-ASCII, the UTF-8 charset is - identical to the US-ASCII charset. - - UTF-8 may require multiple bytes to represent a single character / - code point; thus, the length of a UTF8String in octets may be - different from the number of characters encoded. - - Note that the AVP Length field of an UTF8String is measured in - octets not characters. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 45] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - DiameterIdentity - - The DiameterIdentity format is derived from the OctetString Basic - AVP Format. - - DiameterIdentity = FQDN/Realm - - The DiameterIdentity value is used to uniquely identify either: - - * A Diameter node for purposes of duplicate connection and - routing loop detection. - - * A Realm to determine whether messages can be satisfied locally - or whether they must be routed or redirected. - - When a DiameterIdentity value is used to identify a Diameter node, - the contents of the string MUST be the Fully Qualified Domain Name - (FQDN) of the Diameter node. If multiple Diameter nodes run on - the same host, each Diameter node MUST be assigned a unique - DiameterIdentity. If a Diameter node can be identified by several - FQDNs, a single FQDN should be picked at startup and used as the - only DiameterIdentity for that node, whatever the connection on - which it is sent. In this document, note that DiameterIdentity is - in ASCII form in order to be compatible with existing DNS - infrastructure. See Appendix D for interactions between the - Diameter protocol and Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs). - - DiameterURI - - The DiameterURI MUST follow the Uniform Resource Identifiers (RFC - 3986) syntax [RFC3986] rules specified below: - - "aaa://" FQDN [ port ] [ transport ] [ protocol ] - - ; No transport security - - "aaas://" FQDN [ port ] [ transport ] [ protocol ] - - ; Transport security used - - FQDN = < Fully Qualified Domain Name > - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 46] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - port = ":" 1*DIGIT - - ; One of the ports used to listen for - ; incoming connections. - ; If absent, the default Diameter port - ; (3868) is assumed if no transport - ; security is used and port 5658 when - ; transport security (TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP) - ; is used. - - transport = ";transport=" transport-protocol - - ; One of the transports used to listen - ; for incoming connections. If absent, - ; the default protocol is assumed to be TCP. - ; UDP MUST NOT be used when the aaa-protocol - ; field is set to diameter. - - transport-protocol = ( "tcp" / "sctp" / "udp" ) - - protocol = ";protocol=" aaa-protocol - - ; If absent, the default AAA protocol - ; is Diameter. - - aaa-protocol = ( "diameter" / "radius" / "tacacs+" ) - - The following are examples of valid Diameter host identities: - - aaa://host.example.com;transport=tcp - aaa://host.example.com:6666;transport=tcp - aaa://host.example.com;protocol=diameter - aaa://host.example.com:6666;protocol=diameter - aaa://host.example.com:6666;transport=tcp;protocol=diameter - aaa://host.example.com:1813;transport=udp;protocol=radius - - Enumerated - - The Enumerated format is derived from the Integer32 Basic AVP - Format. The definition contains a list of valid values and their - interpretation and is described in the Diameter application - introducing the AVP. - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 47] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - IPFilterRule - - The IPFilterRule format is derived from the OctetString Basic AVP - Format and uses the ASCII charset. The rule syntax is a modified - subset of ipfw(8) from FreeBSD. Packets may be filtered based on - the following information that is associated with it: - - Direction (in or out) - Source and destination IP address (possibly masked) - Protocol - Source and destination port (lists or ranges) - TCP flags - IP fragment flag - IP options - ICMP types - - Rules for the appropriate direction are evaluated in order, with the - first matched rule terminating the evaluation. Each packet is - evaluated once. If no rule matches, the packet is dropped if the - last rule evaluated was a permit, and passed if the last rule was a - deny. - - IPFilterRule filters MUST follow the format: - - action dir proto from src to dst [options] - - action permit - Allow packets that match the rule. - deny - Drop packets that match the rule. - - dir "in" is from the terminal, "out" is to the - terminal. - - proto An IP protocol specified by number. The "ip" - keyword means any protocol will match. - - src and dst <address/mask> [ports] - - The <address/mask> may be specified as: - ipno An IPv4 or IPv6 number in dotted- - quad or canonical IPv6 form. Only - this exact IP number will match the - rule. - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 48] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - ipno/bits An IP number as above with a mask - width of the form 192.0.2.10/24. In - this case, all IP numbers from - 192.0.2.0 to 192.0.2.255 will match. - The bit width MUST be valid for the - IP version, and the IP number MUST - NOT have bits set beyond the mask. - For a match to occur, the same IP - version must be present in the - packet that was used in describing - the IP address. To test for a - particular IP version, the bits part - can be set to zero. The keyword - "any" is 0.0.0.0/0 or the IPv6 - equivalent. The keyword "assigned" - is the address or set of addresses - assigned to the terminal. For IPv4, - a typical first rule is often "deny - in ip! assigned". - - The sense of the match can be inverted by - preceding an address with the not modifier (!), - causing all other addresses to be matched - instead. This does not affect the selection of - port numbers. - - With the TCP, UDP, and SCTP protocols, optional - ports may be specified as: - - {port/port-port}[,ports[,...]] - - The '-' notation specifies a range of ports - (including boundaries). - - Fragmented packets that have a non-zero offset - (i.e., not the first fragment) will never match - a rule that has one or more port - specifications. See the frag option for - details on matching fragmented packets. - - options: - frag Match if the packet is a fragment and this is not - the first fragment of the datagram. frag may not - be used in conjunction with either tcpflags or - TCP/UDP port specifications. - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 49] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - ipoptions spec - Match if the IP header contains the comma-separated - list of options specified in spec. The - supported IP options are: - - ssrr (strict source route), lsrr (loose source - route), rr (record packet route), and ts - (timestamp). The absence of a particular option - may be denoted with a '!'. - - tcpoptions spec - Match if the TCP header contains the comma-separated - list of options specified in spec. The - supported TCP options are: - - mss (maximum segment size), window (tcp window - advertisement), sack (selective ack), ts (rfc1323 - timestamp), and cc (rfc1644 t/tcp connection - count). The absence of a particular option may - be denoted with a '!'. - - established - TCP packets only. Match packets that have the RST - or ACK bits set. - - setup TCP packets only. Match packets that have the SYN - bit set but no ACK bit. - - - tcpflags spec - TCP packets only. Match if the TCP header - contains the comma-separated list of flags - specified in spec. The supported TCP flags are: - - fin, syn, rst, psh, ack, and urg. The absence of a - particular flag may be denoted with a '!'. A rule - that contains a tcpflags specification can never - match a fragmented packet that has a non-zero - offset. See the frag option for details on - matching fragmented packets. - - icmptypes types - ICMP packets only. Match if the ICMP type is in - the list types. The list may be specified as any - combination of ranges or individual types - separated by commas. Both the numeric values and - the symbolic values listed below can be used. The - supported ICMP types are: - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 50] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - echo reply (0), destination unreachable (3), - source quench (4), redirect (5), echo request - (8), router advertisement (9), router - solicitation (10), time-to-live exceeded (11), IP - header bad (12), timestamp request (13), - timestamp reply (14), information request (15), - information reply (16), address mask request (17), - and address mask reply (18). - - There is one kind of packet that the access device MUST always - discard, that is an IP fragment with a fragment offset of one. This - is a valid packet, but it only has one use, to try to circumvent - firewalls. - - An access device that is unable to interpret or apply a deny rule - MUST terminate the session. An access device that is unable to - interpret or apply a permit rule MAY apply a more restrictive rule. - An access device MAY apply deny rules of its own before the supplied - rules, for example to protect the access device owner's - infrastructure. - -4.4. Grouped AVP Values - - The Diameter protocol allows AVP values of type 'Grouped'. This - implies that the Data field is actually a sequence of AVPs. It is - possible to include an AVP with a Grouped type within a Grouped type, - that is, to nest them. AVPs within an AVP of type Grouped have the - same padding requirements as non-Grouped AVPs, as defined in - Section 4.4. - - The AVP Code numbering space of all AVPs included in a Grouped AVP is - the same as for non-Grouped AVPs. Receivers of a Grouped AVP that - does not have the 'M' (mandatory) bit set and one or more of the - encapsulated AVPs within the group has the 'M' (mandatory) bit set - MAY simply be ignored if the Grouped AVP itself is unrecognized. The - rule applies even if the encapsulated AVP with its 'M' (mandatory) - bit set is further encapsulated within other sub-groups, i.e., other - Grouped AVPs embedded within the Grouped AVP. - - Every Grouped AVP definition MUST include a corresponding grammar, - using ABNF [RFC5234] (with modifications), as defined below. - - grouped-avp-def = "<" name ">" "::=" avp - - name-fmt = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-") - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 51] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - name = name-fmt - ; The name has to be the name of an AVP, - ; defined in the base or extended Diameter - ; specifications. - - avp = header *fixed *required *optional - - header = "<" "AVP-Header:" avpcode [vendor] ">" - - avpcode = 1*DIGIT - ; The AVP Code assigned to the Grouped AVP. - - vendor = 1*DIGIT - ; The Vendor-ID assigned to the Grouped AVP. - ; If absent, the default value of zero is - ; used. - -4.4.1. Example AVP with a Grouped Data Type - - The Example-AVP (AVP Code 999999) is of type Grouped and is used to - clarify how Grouped AVP values work. The Grouped Data field has the - following CCF grammar: - - Example-AVP ::= < AVP Header: 999999 > - { Origin-Host } - 1*{ Session-Id } - *[ AVP ] - - An Example-AVP with Grouped Data follows. - - The Origin-Host AVP (Section 6.3) is required. In this case: - - Origin-Host = "example.com". - - One or more Session-Ids must follow. Here there are two: - - Session-Id = - "grump.example.com:33041;23432;893;0AF3B81" - - Session-Id = - "grump.example.com:33054;23561;2358;0AF3B82" - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 52] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - optional AVPs included are - - Recovery-Policy = <binary> - 2163bc1d0ad82371f6bc09484133c3f09ad74a0dd5346d54195a7cf0b35 - 2cabc881839a4fdcfbc1769e2677a4c1fb499284c5f70b48f58503a45c5 - c2d6943f82d5930f2b7c1da640f476f0e9c9572a50db8ea6e51e1c2c7bd - f8bb43dc995144b8dbe297ac739493946803e1cee3e15d9b765008a1b2a - cf4ac777c80041d72c01e691cf751dbf86e85f509f3988e5875dc905119 - 26841f00f0e29a6d1ddc1a842289d440268681e052b30fb638045f7779c - 1d873c784f054f688f5001559ecff64865ef975f3e60d2fd7966b8c7f92 - - Futuristic-Acct-Record = <binary> - fe19da5802acd98b07a5b86cb4d5d03f0314ab9ef1ad0b67111ff3b90a0 - 57fe29620bf3585fd2dd9fcc38ce62f6cc208c6163c008f4258d1bc88b8 - 17694a74ccad3ec69269461b14b2e7a4c111fb239e33714da207983f58c - 41d018d56fe938f3cbf089aac12a912a2f0d1923a9390e5f789cb2e5067 - d3427475e49968f841 - - The data for the optional AVPs is represented in hexadecimal form - since the format of these AVPs is not known at the time of definition - of the Example-AVP group nor (likely) at the time when the example - instance of this AVP is interpreted -- except by Diameter - implementations that support the same set of AVPs. The encoding - example illustrates how padding is used and how length fields are - calculated. Also, note that AVPs may be present in the Grouped AVP - value that the receiver cannot interpret (here, the Recover-Policy - and Futuristic-Acct-Record AVPs). The length of the Example-AVP is - the sum of all the length of the member AVPs, including their - padding, plus the Example-AVP header size. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 53] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - This AVP would be encoded as follows: - - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 0 | Example AVP Header (AVP Code = 999999), Length = 496 | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 8 | Origin-Host AVP Header (AVP Code = 264), Length = 19 | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 16 | 'e' | 'x' | 'a' | 'm' | 'p' | 'l' | 'e' | '.' | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 24 | 'c' | 'o' | 'm' |Padding| Session-Id AVP Header | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 32 | (AVP Code = 263), Length = 49 | 'g' | 'r' | 'u' | 'm' | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - . . . - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 72 | 'F' | '3' | 'B' | '8' | '1' |Padding|Padding|Padding| - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 80 | Session-Id AVP Header (AVP Code = 263), Length = 50 | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 88 | 'g' | 'r' | 'u' | 'm' | 'p' | '.' | 'e' | 'x' | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - . . . - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 120| '5' | '8' | ';' | '0' | 'A' | 'F' | '3' | 'B' | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 128| '8' | '2' |Padding|Padding| Recovery-Policy Header (AVP | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 136| Code = 8341), Length = 223 | 0x21 | 0x63 | 0xbc | 0x1d | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 144| 0x0a | 0xd8 | 0x23 | 0x71 | 0xf6 | 0xbc | 0x09 | 0x48 | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - . . . - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 352| 0x8c | 0x7f | 0x92 |Padding| Futuristic-Acct-Record Header | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 328|(AVP Code = 15930),Length = 137| 0xfe | 0x19 | 0xda | 0x58 | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 336| 0x02 | 0xac | 0xd9 | 0x8b | 0x07 | 0xa5 | 0xb8 | 0xc6 | - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - . . . - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - 488| 0xe4 | 0x99 | 0x68 | 0xf8 | 0x41 |Padding|Padding|Padding| - +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 54] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -4.5. Diameter Base Protocol AVPs - - The following table describes the Diameter AVPs defined in the base - protocol, their AVP Code values, types, and possible flag values. - - Due to space constraints, the short form DiamIdent is used to - represent DiameterIdentity. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 55] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - +----------+ - | AVP Flag | - | rules | - |----+-----| - AVP Section | |MUST | - Attribute Name Code Defined Data Type |MUST| NOT | - -----------------------------------------|----+-----| - Acct- 85 9.8.2 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Interim-Interval | | | - Accounting- 483 9.8.7 Enumerated | M | V | - Realtime-Required | | | - Acct- 50 9.8.5 UTF8String | M | V | - Multi-Session-Id | | | - Accounting- 485 9.8.3 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Record-Number | | | - Accounting- 480 9.8.1 Enumerated | M | V | - Record-Type | | | - Acct- 44 9.8.4 OctetString| M | V | - Session-Id | | | - Accounting- 287 9.8.6 Unsigned64 | M | V | - Sub-Session-Id | | | - Acct- 259 6.9 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Application-Id | | | - Auth- 258 6.8 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Application-Id | | | - Auth-Request- 274 8.7 Enumerated | M | V | - Type | | | - Authorization- 291 8.9 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Lifetime | | | - Auth-Grace- 276 8.10 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Period | | | - Auth-Session- 277 8.11 Enumerated | M | V | - State | | | - Re-Auth-Request- 285 8.12 Enumerated | M | V | - Type | | | - Class 25 8.20 OctetString| M | V | - Destination-Host 293 6.5 DiamIdent | M | V | - Destination- 283 6.6 DiamIdent | M | V | - Realm | | | - Disconnect-Cause 273 5.4.3 Enumerated | M | V | - Error-Message 281 7.3 UTF8String | | V,M | - Error-Reporting- 294 7.4 DiamIdent | | V,M | - Host | | | - Event-Timestamp 55 8.21 Time | M | V | - Experimental- 297 7.6 Grouped | M | V | - Result | | | - -----------------------------------------|----+-----| - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 56] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - +----------+ - | AVP Flag | - | rules | - |----+-----| - AVP Section | |MUST | - Attribute Name Code Defined Data Type |MUST| NOT | - -----------------------------------------|----+-----| - Experimental- 298 7.7 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Result-Code | | | - Failed-AVP 279 7.5 Grouped | M | V | - Firmware- 267 5.3.4 Unsigned32 | | V,M | - Revision | | | - Host-IP-Address 257 5.3.5 Address | M | V | - Inband-Security | M | V | - -Id 299 6.10 Unsigned32 | | | - Multi-Round- 272 8.19 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Time-Out | | | - Origin-Host 264 6.3 DiamIdent | M | V | - Origin-Realm 296 6.4 DiamIdent | M | V | - Origin-State-Id 278 8.16 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Product-Name 269 5.3.7 UTF8String | | V,M | - Proxy-Host 280 6.7.3 DiamIdent | M | V | - Proxy-Info 284 6.7.2 Grouped | M | V | - Proxy-State 33 6.7.4 OctetString| M | V | - Redirect-Host 292 6.12 DiamURI | M | V | - Redirect-Host- 261 6.13 Enumerated | M | V | - Usage | | | - Redirect-Max- 262 6.14 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Cache-Time | | | - Result-Code 268 7.1 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Route-Record 282 6.7.1 DiamIdent | M | V | - Session-Id 263 8.8 UTF8String | M | V | - Session-Timeout 27 8.13 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Session-Binding 270 8.17 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Session-Server- 271 8.18 Enumerated | M | V | - Failover | | | - Supported- 265 5.3.6 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Vendor-Id | | | - Termination- 295 8.15 Enumerated | M | V | - Cause | | | - User-Name 1 8.14 UTF8String | M | V | - Vendor-Id 266 5.3.3 Unsigned32 | M | V | - Vendor-Specific- 260 6.11 Grouped | M | V | - Application-Id | | | - -----------------------------------------|----+-----| - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 57] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -5. Diameter Peers - - This section describes how Diameter nodes establish connections and - communicate with peers. - -5.1. Peer Connections - - Connections between diameter peers are established using their valid - DiameterIdentity. A Diameter node initiating a connection to a peer - MUST know the peer's DiameterIdentity. Methods for discovering a - Diameter peer can be found in Section 5.2. - - Although a Diameter node may have many possible peers with which it - is able to communicate, it may not be economical to have an - established connection to all of them. At a minimum, a Diameter node - SHOULD have an established connection with two peers per realm, known - as the primary and secondary peers. Of course, a node MAY have - additional connections, if it is deemed necessary. Typically, all - messages for a realm are sent to the primary peer but, in the event - that failover procedures are invoked, any pending requests are sent - to the secondary peer. However, implementations are free to load - balance requests between a set of peers. - - Note that a given peer MAY act as a primary for a given realm while - acting as a secondary for another realm. - - When a peer is deemed suspect, which could occur for various reasons, - including not receiving a DWA within an allotted time frame, no new - requests should be forwarded to the peer, but failover procedures are - invoked. When an active peer is moved to this mode, additional - connections SHOULD be established to ensure that the necessary number - of active connections exists. - - There are two ways that a peer is removed from the suspect peer list: - - 1. The peer is no longer reachable, causing the transport connection - to be shut down. The peer is moved to the closed state. - - 2. Three watchdog messages are exchanged with accepted round-trip - times, and the connection to the peer is considered stabilized. - - In the event the peer being removed is either the primary or - secondary, an alternate peer SHOULD replace the deleted peer and - assume the role of either primary or secondary. - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 58] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -5.2. Diameter Peer Discovery - - Allowing for dynamic Diameter agent discovery makes possible simpler - and more robust deployment of Diameter services. In order to promote - interoperable implementations of Diameter peer discovery, the - following mechanisms (manual configuration and DNS) are described. - These are based on existing IETF standards. Both mechanisms MUST be - supported by all Diameter implementations; either MAY be used. - - There are two cases where Diameter peer discovery may be performed. - The first is when a Diameter client needs to discover a first-hop - Diameter agent. The second case is when a Diameter agent needs to - discover another agent for further handling of a Diameter operation. - In both cases, the following 'search order' is recommended: - - 1. The Diameter implementation consults its list of statically - (manually) configured Diameter agent locations. These will be - used if they exist and respond. - - 2. The Diameter implementation performs a NAPTR query for a server - in a particular realm. The Diameter implementation has to know, - in advance, in which realm to look for a Diameter agent. This - could be deduced, for example, from the 'realm' in an NAI on - which a Diameter implementation needed to perform a Diameter - operation. - - The NAPTR usage in Diameter follows the S-NAPTR DDDS application - [RFC3958] in which the SERVICE field includes tags for the - desired application and supported application protocol. The - application service tag for a Diameter application is 'aaa' and - the supported application protocol tags are 'diameter.tcp', - 'diameter.sctp', 'diameter.dtls', or 'diameter.tls.tcp' - [RFC6408]. - - The client can follow the resolution process defined by the - S-NAPTR DDDS [RFC3958] application to find a matching SRV, A, or - AAAA record of a suitable peer. The domain suffixes in the NAPTR - replacement field SHOULD match the domain of the original query. - An example can be found in Appendix B. - - 3. If no NAPTR records are found, the requester directly queries for - one of the following SRV records: for Diameter over TCP, use - "_diameter._tcp.realm"; for Diameter over TLS, use - "_diameters._tcp.realm"; for Diameter over SCTP, use - "_diameter._sctp.realm"; for Diameter over DTLS, use - "_diameters._sctp.realm". If SRV records are found, then the - requester can perform address record query (A RR's and/or AAAA - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 59] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - RR's) for the target hostname specified in the SRV records - following the rules given in [RFC2782]. If no SRV records are - found, the requester gives up. - - If the server is using a site certificate, the domain name in the - NAPTR query and the domain name in the replacement field MUST both be - valid based on the site certificate handed out by the server in the - TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP or Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) - exchange. Similarly, the domain name in the SRV query and the domain - name in the target in the SRV record MUST both be valid based on the - same site certificate. Otherwise, an attacker could modify the DNS - records to contain replacement values in a different domain, and the - client could not validate whether this was the desired behavior or - the result of an attack. - - Also, the Diameter peer MUST check to make sure that the discovered - peers are authorized to act in its role. Authentication via IKE or - TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP, or validation of DNS RRs via DNSSEC is not - sufficient to conclude this. For example, a web server may have - obtained a valid TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP certificate, and secured RRs - may be included in the DNS, but this does not imply that it is - authorized to act as a Diameter server. - - Authorization can be achieved, for example, by the configuration of a - Diameter server Certification Authority (CA). The server CA issues a - certificate to the Diameter server, which includes an Object - Identifier (OID) to indicate the subject is a Diameter server in the - Extended Key Usage extension [RFC5280]. This certificate is then - used during TLS/TCP, DTLS/SCTP, or IKE security negotiation. - However, note that, at the time of writing, no Diameter server - Certification Authorities exist. - - A dynamically discovered peer causes an entry in the peer table (see - Section 2.6) to be created. Note that entries created via DNS MUST - expire (or be refreshed) within the DNS Time to Live (TTL). If a - peer is discovered outside of the local realm, a routing table entry - (see Section 2.7) for the peer's realm is created. The routing table - entry's expiration MUST match the peer's expiration value. - -5.3. Capabilities Exchange - - When two Diameter peers establish a transport connection, they MUST - exchange the Capabilities Exchange messages, as specified in the peer - state machine (see Section 5.6). This message allows the discovery - of a peer's identity and its capabilities (protocol version number, - the identifiers of supported Diameter applications, security - mechanisms, etc.). - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 60] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - The receiver only issues commands to its peers that have advertised - support for the Diameter application that defines the command. A - Diameter node MUST cache the supported Application Ids in order to - ensure that unrecognized commands and/or AVPs are not unnecessarily - sent to a peer. - - A receiver of a Capabilities-Exchange-Request (CER) message that does - not have any applications in common with the sender MUST return a - Capabilities-Exchange-Answer (CEA) with the Result-Code AVP set to - DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_APPLICATION and SHOULD disconnect the transport - layer connection. Note that receiving a CER or CEA from a peer - advertising itself as a relay (see Section 2.4) MUST be interpreted - as having common applications with the peer. - - The receiver of the Capabilities-Exchange-Request (CER) MUST - determine common applications by computing the intersection of its - own set of supported Application Ids against all of the - Application-Id AVPs (Auth-Application-Id, Acct-Application-Id, and - Vendor-Specific-Application-Id) present in the CER. The value of the - Vendor-Id AVP in the Vendor-Specific-Application-Id MUST NOT be used - during computation. The sender of the Capabilities-Exchange-Answer - (CEA) SHOULD include all of its supported applications as a hint to - the receiver regarding all of its application capabilities. - - Diameter implementations SHOULD first attempt to establish a TLS/TCP - and DTLS/SCTP connection prior to the CER/CEA exchange. This - protects the capabilities information of both peers. To support - older Diameter implementations that do not fully conform to this - document, the transport security MAY still be negotiated via an - Inband-Security AVP. In this case, the receiver of a Capabilities- - Exchange-Request (CER) message that does not have any security - mechanisms in common with the sender MUST return a Capabilities- - Exchange-Answer (CEA) with the Result-Code AVP set to - DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_SECURITY and SHOULD disconnect the transport layer - connection. - - CERs received from unknown peers MAY be silently discarded, or a CEA - MAY be issued with the Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_UNKNOWN_PEER. - In both cases, the transport connection is closed. If the local - policy permits receiving CERs from unknown hosts, a successful CEA - MAY be returned. If a CER from an unknown peer is answered with a - successful CEA, the lifetime of the peer entry is equal to the - lifetime of the transport connection. In case of a transport - failure, all the pending transactions destined to the unknown peer - can be discarded. - - The CER and CEA messages MUST NOT be proxied, redirected, or relayed. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 61] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Since the CER/CEA messages cannot be proxied, it is still possible - that an upstream agent will receive a message for which it has no - available peers to handle the application that corresponds to the - Command Code. In such instances, the 'E' bit is set in the answer - message (Section 7) with the Result-Code AVP set to - DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER to inform the downstream agent to take - action (e.g., re-routing request to an alternate peer). - - With the exception of the Capabilities-Exchange-Request message, a - message of type Request that includes the Auth-Application-Id or - Acct-Application-Id AVPs, or a message with an application-specific - Command Code MAY only be forwarded to a host that has explicitly - advertised support for the application (or has advertised the Relay - Application Id). - -5.3.1. Capabilities-Exchange-Request - - The Capabilities-Exchange-Request (CER), indicated by the Command - Code set to 257 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit set, is sent to - exchange local capabilities. Upon detection of a transport failure, - this message MUST NOT be sent to an alternate peer. - - When Diameter is run over SCTP [RFC4960] or DTLS/SCTP [RFC6083], - which allow for connections to span multiple interfaces and multiple - IP addresses, the Capabilities-Exchange-Request message MUST contain - one Host-IP-Address AVP for each potential IP address that MAY be - locally used when transmitting Diameter messages. - - Message Format - - <CER> ::= < Diameter Header: 257, REQ > - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - 1* { Host-IP-Address } - { Vendor-Id } - { Product-Name } - [ Origin-State-Id ] - * [ Supported-Vendor-Id ] - * [ Auth-Application-Id ] - * [ Inband-Security-Id ] - * [ Acct-Application-Id ] - * [ Vendor-Specific-Application-Id ] - [ Firmware-Revision ] - * [ AVP ] - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 62] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -5.3.2. Capabilities-Exchange-Answer - - The Capabilities-Exchange-Answer (CEA), indicated by the Command Code - set to 257 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit cleared, is sent in - response to a CER message. - - When Diameter is run over SCTP [RFC4960] or DTLS/SCTP [RFC6083], - which allow connections to span multiple interfaces, hence, multiple - IP addresses, the Capabilities-Exchange-Answer message MUST contain - one Host-IP-Address AVP for each potential IP address that MAY be - locally used when transmitting Diameter messages. - - Message Format - - <CEA> ::= < Diameter Header: 257 > - { Result-Code } - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - 1* { Host-IP-Address } - { Vendor-Id } - { Product-Name } - [ Origin-State-Id ] - [ Error-Message ] - [ Failed-AVP ] - * [ Supported-Vendor-Id ] - * [ Auth-Application-Id ] - * [ Inband-Security-Id ] - * [ Acct-Application-Id ] - * [ Vendor-Specific-Application-Id ] - [ Firmware-Revision ] - * [ AVP ] - -5.3.3. Vendor-Id AVP - - The Vendor-Id AVP (AVP Code 266) is of type Unsigned32 and contains - the IANA "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Codes" - [ENTERPRISE] value assigned to the Diameter Software vendor. It is - envisioned that the combination of the Vendor-Id, Product-Name - (Section 5.3.7), and Firmware-Revision (Section 5.3.4) AVPs may - provide useful debugging information. - - A Vendor-Id value of zero in the CER or CEA message is reserved and - indicates that this field is ignored. - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 63] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -5.3.4. Firmware-Revision AVP - - The Firmware-Revision AVP (AVP Code 267) is of type Unsigned32 and is - used to inform a Diameter peer of the firmware revision of the - issuing device. - - For devices that do not have a firmware revision (general-purpose - computers running Diameter software modules, for instance), the - revision of the Diameter software module may be reported instead. - -5.3.5. Host-IP-Address AVP - - The Host-IP-Address AVP (AVP Code 257) is of type Address and is used - to inform a Diameter peer of the sender's IP address. All source - addresses that a Diameter node expects to use with SCTP [RFC4960] or - DTLS/SCTP [RFC6083] MUST be advertised in the CER and CEA messages by - including a Host-IP-Address AVP for each address. - -5.3.6. Supported-Vendor-Id AVP - - The Supported-Vendor-Id AVP (AVP Code 265) is of type Unsigned32 and - contains the IANA "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Codes" - [ENTERPRISE] value assigned to a vendor other than the device vendor - but including the application vendor. This is used in the CER and - CEA messages in order to inform the peer that the sender supports (a - subset of) the Vendor-Specific AVPs defined by the vendor identified - in this AVP. The value of this AVP MUST NOT be set to zero. - Multiple instances of this AVP containing the same value SHOULD NOT - be sent. - -5.3.7. Product-Name AVP - - The Product-Name AVP (AVP Code 269) is of type UTF8String and - contains the vendor-assigned name for the product. The Product-Name - AVP SHOULD remain constant across firmware revisions for the same - product. - -5.4. Disconnecting Peer Connections - - When a Diameter node disconnects one of its transport connections, - its peer cannot know the reason for the disconnect and will most - likely assume that a connectivity problem occurred or that the peer - has rebooted. In these cases, the peer may periodically attempt to - reconnect, as stated in Section 2.1. In the event that the - disconnect was a result of either a shortage of internal resources or - simply that the node in question has no intentions of forwarding any - Diameter messages to the peer in the foreseeable future, a periodic - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 64] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - connection request would not be welcomed. The Disconnection-Reason - AVP contains the reason the Diameter node issued the Disconnect-Peer- - Request message. - - The Disconnect-Peer-Request message is used by a Diameter node to - inform its peer of its intent to disconnect the transport layer and - that the peer shouldn't reconnect unless it has a valid reason to do - so (e.g., message to be forwarded). Upon receipt of the message, the - Disconnect-Peer-Answer message is returned, which SHOULD contain an - error if messages have recently been forwarded, and are likely in - flight, which would otherwise cause a race condition. - - The receiver of the Disconnect-Peer-Answer message initiates the - transport disconnect. The sender of the Disconnect-Peer-Answer - message should be able to detect the transport closure and clean up - the connection. - -5.4.1. Disconnect-Peer-Request - - The Disconnect-Peer-Request (DPR), indicated by the Command Code set - to 282 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit set, is sent to a peer to - inform it of its intentions to shut down the transport connection. - Upon detection of a transport failure, this message MUST NOT be sent - to an alternate peer. - - Message Format - - <DPR> ::= < Diameter Header: 282, REQ > - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - { Disconnect-Cause } - * [ AVP ] - -5.4.2. Disconnect-Peer-Answer - - The Disconnect-Peer-Answer (DPA), indicated by the Command Code set - to 282 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit cleared, is sent as a response - to the Disconnect-Peer-Request message. Upon receipt of this - message, the transport connection is shut down. - - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 65] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Message Format - - <DPA> ::= < Diameter Header: 282 > - { Result-Code } - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - [ Error-Message ] - [ Failed-AVP ] - * [ AVP ] - - -5.4.3. Disconnect-Cause AVP - - The Disconnect-Cause AVP (AVP Code 273) is of type Enumerated. A - Diameter node MUST include this AVP in the Disconnect-Peer-Request - message to inform the peer of the reason for its intention to shut - down the transport connection. The following values are supported: - - REBOOTING 0 - A scheduled reboot is imminent. A receiver of a DPR with - above result code MAY attempt reconnection. - - BUSY 1 - The peer's internal resources are constrained, and it has - determined that the transport connection needs to be closed. - A receiver of a DPR with above result code SHOULD NOT attempt - reconnection. - - DO_NOT_WANT_TO_TALK_TO_YOU 2 - The peer has determined that it does not see a need for the - transport connection to exist, since it does not expect any - messages to be exchanged in the near future. A receiver of a - DPR with above result code SHOULD NOT attempt reconnection. - -5.5. Transport Failure Detection - - Given the nature of the Diameter protocol, it is recommended that - transport failures be detected as soon as possible. Detecting such - failures will minimize the occurrence of messages sent to unavailable - agents, resulting in unnecessary delays, and will provide better - failover performance. The Device-Watchdog-Request and Device- - Watchdog-Answer messages, defined in this section, are used to pro- - actively detect transport failures. - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 66] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -5.5.1. Device-Watchdog-Request - - The Device-Watchdog-Request (DWR), indicated by the Command Code set - to 280 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit set, is sent to a peer when no - traffic has been exchanged between two peers (see Section 5.5.3). - Upon detection of a transport failure, this message MUST NOT be sent - to an alternate peer. - - Message Format - - <DWR> ::= < Diameter Header: 280, REQ > - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - [ Origin-State-Id ] - * [ AVP ] - -5.5.2. Device-Watchdog-Answer - - The Device-Watchdog-Answer (DWA), indicated by the Command Code set - to 280 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit cleared, is sent as a response - to the Device-Watchdog-Request message. - - Message Format - - <DWA> ::= < Diameter Header: 280 > - { Result-Code } - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - [ Error-Message ] - [ Failed-AVP ] - [ Origin-State-Id ] - * [ AVP ] - -5.5.3. Transport Failure Algorithm - - The transport failure algorithm is defined in [RFC3539]. All - Diameter implementations MUST support the algorithm defined in that - specification in order to be compliant to the Diameter base protocol. - -5.5.4. Failover and Failback Procedures - - In the event that a transport failure is detected with a peer, it is - necessary for all pending request messages to be forwarded to an - alternate agent, if possible. This is commonly referred to as - "failover". - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 67] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - In order for a Diameter node to perform failover procedures, it is - necessary for the node to maintain a pending message queue for a - given peer. When an answer message is received, the corresponding - request is removed from the queue. The Hop-by-Hop Identifier field - is used to match the answer with the queued request. - - When a transport failure is detected, if possible, all messages in - the queue are sent to an alternate agent with the T flag set. On - booting a Diameter client or agent, the T flag is also set on any - remaining records in non-volatile storage that are still waiting to - be transmitted. An example of a case where it is not possible to - forward the message to an alternate server is when the message has a - fixed destination, and the unavailable peer is the message's final - destination (see Destination-Host AVP). Such an error requires that - the agent return an answer message with the 'E' bit set and the - Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER. - - It is important to note that multiple identical requests or answers - MAY be received as a result of a failover. The End-to-End Identifier - field in the Diameter header along with the Origin-Host AVP MUST be - used to identify duplicate messages. - - As described in Section 2.1, a connection request should be - periodically attempted with the failed peer in order to re-establish - the transport connection. Once a connection has been successfully - established, messages can once again be forwarded to the peer. This - is commonly referred to as "failback". - -5.6. Peer State Machine - - This section contains a finite state machine that MUST be observed by - all Diameter implementations. Each Diameter node MUST follow the - state machine described below when communicating with each peer. - Multiple actions are separated by commas, and may continue on - succeeding lines, as space requires. Similarly, state and next state - may also span multiple lines, as space requires. - - This state machine is closely coupled with the state machine - described in [RFC3539], which is used to open, close, failover, - probe, and reopen transport connections. In particular, note that - [RFC3539] requires the use of watchdog messages to probe connections. - For Diameter, DWR and DWA messages are to be used. - - The I- prefix is used to represent the initiator (connecting) - connection, while the R- prefix is used to represent the responder - (listening) connection. The lack of a prefix indicates that the - event or action is the same regardless of the connection on which the - event occurred. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 68] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - The stable states that a state machine may be in are Closed, I-Open, - and R-Open; all other states are intermediate. Note that I-Open and - R-Open are equivalent except for whether the initiator or responder - transport connection is used for communication. - - A CER message is always sent on the initiating connection immediately - after the connection request is successfully completed. In the case - of an election, one of the two connections will shut down. The - responder connection will survive if the Origin-Host of the local - Diameter entity is higher than that of the peer; the initiator - connection will survive if the peer's Origin-Host is higher. All - subsequent messages are sent on the surviving connection. Note that - the results of an election on one peer are guaranteed to be the - inverse of the results on the other. - - For TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP usage, a TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP handshake - SHOULD begin when both ends are in the closed state prior to any - Diameter message exchanges. The TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP connection - SHOULD be established before sending any CER or CEA message to secure - and protect the capabilities information of both peers. The TLS/TCP - and DTLS/SCTP connection SHOULD be disconnected when the state - machine moves to the closed state. When connecting to responders - that do not conform to this document (i.e., older Diameter - implementations that are not prepared to received TLS/TCP and DTLS/ - SCTP connections in the closed state), the initial TLS/TCP and DTLS/ - SCTP connection attempt will fail. The initiator MAY then attempt to - connect via TCP or SCTP and initiate the TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP - handshake when both ends are in the open state. If the handshake is - successful, all further messages will be sent via TLS/TCP and DTLS/ - SCTP. If the handshake fails, both ends move to the closed state. - - The state machine constrains only the behavior of a Diameter - implementation as seen by Diameter peers through events on the wire. - - Any implementation that produces equivalent results is considered - compliant. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 69] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - state event action next state - ----------------------------------------------------------------- - Closed Start I-Snd-Conn-Req Wait-Conn-Ack - R-Conn-CER R-Accept, R-Open - Process-CER, - R-Snd-CEA - - Wait-Conn-Ack I-Rcv-Conn-Ack I-Snd-CER Wait-I-CEA - I-Rcv-Conn-Nack Cleanup Closed - R-Conn-CER R-Accept, Wait-Conn-Ack/ - Process-CER Elect - Timeout Error Closed - - Wait-I-CEA I-Rcv-CEA Process-CEA I-Open - R-Conn-CER R-Accept, Wait-Returns - Process-CER, - Elect - I-Peer-Disc I-Disc Closed - I-Rcv-Non-CEA Error Closed - Timeout Error Closed - - Wait-Conn-Ack/ I-Rcv-Conn-Ack I-Snd-CER,Elect Wait-Returns - Elect I-Rcv-Conn-Nack R-Snd-CEA R-Open - R-Peer-Disc R-Disc Wait-Conn-Ack - R-Conn-CER R-Reject Wait-Conn-Ack/ - Elect - Timeout Error Closed - - Wait-Returns Win-Election I-Disc,R-Snd-CEA R-Open - I-Peer-Disc I-Disc, R-Open - R-Snd-CEA - I-Rcv-CEA R-Disc I-Open - R-Peer-Disc R-Disc Wait-I-CEA - R-Conn-CER R-Reject Wait-Returns - Timeout Error Closed - - R-Open Send-Message R-Snd-Message R-Open - R-Rcv-Message Process R-Open - R-Rcv-DWR Process-DWR, R-Open - R-Snd-DWA - R-Rcv-DWA Process-DWA R-Open - R-Conn-CER R-Reject R-Open - Stop R-Snd-DPR Closing - R-Rcv-DPR R-Snd-DPA Closing - R-Peer-Disc R-Disc Closed - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 70] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - I-Open Send-Message I-Snd-Message I-Open - I-Rcv-Message Process I-Open - I-Rcv-DWR Process-DWR, I-Open - I-Snd-DWA - I-Rcv-DWA Process-DWA I-Open - R-Conn-CER R-Reject I-Open - Stop I-Snd-DPR Closing - I-Rcv-DPR I-Snd-DPA Closing - I-Peer-Disc I-Disc Closed - - Closing I-Rcv-DPA I-Disc Closed - R-Rcv-DPA R-Disc Closed - Timeout Error Closed - I-Peer-Disc I-Disc Closed - R-Peer-Disc R-Disc Closed - -5.6.1. Incoming Connections - - When a connection request is received from a Diameter peer, it is - not, in the general case, possible to know the identity of that peer - until a CER is received from it. This is because host and port - determine the identity of a Diameter peer; the source port of an - incoming connection is arbitrary. Upon receipt of a CER, the - identity of the connecting peer can be uniquely determined from the - Origin-Host. - - For this reason, a Diameter peer must employ logic separate from the - state machine to receive connection requests, accept them, and await - the CER. Once the CER arrives on a new connection, the Origin-Host - that identifies the peer is used to locate the state machine - associated with that peer, and the new connection and CER are passed - to the state machine as an R-Conn-CER event. - - The logic that handles incoming connections SHOULD close and discard - the connection if any message other than a CER arrives or if an - implementation-defined timeout occurs prior to receipt of CER. - - Because handling of incoming connections up to and including receipt - of a CER requires logic, separate from that of any individual state - machine associated with a particular peer, it is described separately - in this section rather than in the state machine above. - -5.6.2. Events - - Transitions and actions in the automaton are caused by events. In - this section, we will ignore the I- and R- prefixes, since the actual - event would be identical, but it would occur on one of two possible - connections. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 71] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Start The Diameter application has signaled that a - connection should be initiated with the peer. - - R-Conn-CER An acknowledgement is received stating that the - transport connection has been established, and the - associated CER has arrived. - - Rcv-Conn-Ack A positive acknowledgement is received confirming that - the transport connection is established. - - Rcv-Conn-Nack A negative acknowledgement was received stating that - the transport connection was not established. - - Timeout An application-defined timer has expired while waiting - for some event. - - Rcv-CER A CER message from the peer was received. - - Rcv-CEA A CEA message from the peer was received. - - Rcv-Non-CEA A message, other than a CEA, from the peer was - received. - - Peer-Disc A disconnection indication from the peer was received. - - Rcv-DPR A DPR message from the peer was received. - - Rcv-DPA A DPA message from the peer was received. - - Win-Election An election was held, and the local node was the - winner. - - Send-Message A message is to be sent. - - Rcv-Message A message other than CER, CEA, DPR, DPA, DWR, or DWA - was received. - - Stop The Diameter application has signaled that a - connection should be terminated (e.g., on system - shutdown). - -5.6.3. Actions - - Actions in the automaton are caused by events and typically indicate - the transmission of packets and/or an action to be taken on the - connection. In this section, we will ignore the I- and R- prefixes, - since the actual action would be identical, but it would occur on one - of two possible connections. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 72] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Snd-Conn-Req A transport connection is initiated with the peer. - - Accept The incoming connection associated with the R-Conn-CER - is accepted as the responder connection. - - Reject The incoming connection associated with the R-Conn-CER - is disconnected. - - Process-CER The CER associated with the R-Conn-CER is processed. - - Snd-CER A CER message is sent to the peer. - - Snd-CEA A CEA message is sent to the peer. - - Cleanup If necessary, the connection is shut down, and any - local resources are freed. - - Error The transport layer connection is disconnected, - either politely or abortively, in response to - an error condition. Local resources are freed. - - Process-CEA A received CEA is processed. - - Snd-DPR A DPR message is sent to the peer. - - Snd-DPA A DPA message is sent to the peer. - - Disc The transport layer connection is disconnected, - and local resources are freed. - - Elect An election occurs (see Section 5.6.4 for more - information). - - Snd-Message A message is sent. - - Snd-DWR A DWR message is sent. - - Snd-DWA A DWA message is sent. - - Process-DWR The DWR message is serviced. - - Process-DWA The DWA message is serviced. - - Process A message is serviced. - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 73] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -5.6.4. The Election Process - - The election is performed on the responder. The responder compares - the Origin-Host received in the CER with its own Origin-Host as two - streams of octets. If the local Origin-Host lexicographically - succeeds the received Origin-Host, a Win-Election event is issued - locally. Diameter identities are in ASCII form; therefore, the - lexical comparison is consistent with DNS case insensitivity, where - octets that fall in the ASCII range 'a' through 'z' MUST compare - equally to their uppercase counterparts between 'A' and 'Z'. See - Appendix D for interactions between the Diameter protocol and - Internationalized Domain Name (IDNs). - - The winner of the election MUST close the connection it initiated. - Historically, maintaining the responder side of a connection was more - efficient than maintaining the initiator side. However, current - practices makes this distinction irrelevant. - -6. Diameter Message Processing - - This section describes how Diameter requests and answers are created - and processed. - -6.1. Diameter Request Routing Overview - - A request is sent towards its final destination using one of the - following three combinations of the Destination-Realm and - Destination-Host AVPs: - - o A request that is not able to be proxied (such as a CER) MUST NOT - contain either Destination-Realm or Destination-Host AVPs. - - o A request that needs to be sent to a home server serving a - specific realm, but not to a specific server (such as the first - request of a series of round trips), MUST contain a Destination- - Realm AVP but MUST NOT contain a Destination-Host AVP. For - Diameter clients, the value of the Destination-Realm AVP MAY be - extracted from the User-Name AVP, or other methods. - - o Otherwise, a request that needs to be sent to a specific home - server among those serving a given realm MUST contain both the - Destination-Realm and Destination-Host AVPs. - - The Destination-Host AVP is used as described above when the - destination of the request is fixed, which includes: - - o Authentication requests that span multiple round trips. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 74] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - o A Diameter message that uses a security mechanism that makes use - of a pre-established session key shared between the source and the - final destination of the message. - - o Server-initiated messages that MUST be received by a specific - Diameter client (e.g., access device), such as the Abort-Session- - Request message, which is used to request that a particular user's - session be terminated. - - Note that an agent can only forward a request to a host described in - the Destination-Host AVP if the host in question is included in its - peer table (see Section 2.6). Otherwise, the request is routed based - on the Destination-Realm only (see Section 6.1.6). - - When a message is received, the message is processed in the following - order: - - o If the message is destined for the local host, the procedures - listed in Section 6.1.4 are followed. - - o If the message is intended for a Diameter peer with whom the local - host is able to directly communicate, the procedures listed in - Section 6.1.5 are followed. This is known as "Request - Forwarding". - - o The procedure listed in Section 6.1.6 is followed, which is known - as "Request Routing". - - o If none of the above are successful, an answer is returned with - the Result-Code set to DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER, with the 'E' - bit set. - - For routing of Diameter messages to work within an administrative - domain, all Diameter nodes within the realm MUST be peers. - - The overview contained in this section (6.1) is intended to provide - general guidelines to Diameter developers. Implementations are free - to use different methods than the ones described here as long as they - conform to the requirements specified in Sections 6.1.1 through - 6.1.9. See Section 7 for more details on error handling. - -6.1.1. Originating a Request - - When creating a request, in addition to any other procedures - described in the application definition for that specific request, - the following procedures MUST be followed: - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 75] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - o the Command Code is set to the appropriate value; - - o the 'R' bit is set; - - o the End-to-End Identifier is set to a locally unique value; - - o the Origin-Host and Origin-Realm AVPs MUST be set to the - appropriate values, used to identify the source of the message; - and - - o the Destination-Host and Destination-Realm AVPs MUST be set to the - appropriate values, as described in Section 6.1. - -6.1.2. Sending a Request - - When sending a request, originated either locally or as the result of - a forwarding or routing operation, the following procedures SHOULD be - followed: - - o The Hop-by-Hop Identifier SHOULD be set to a locally unique value. - - o The message SHOULD be saved in the list of pending requests. - - Other actions to perform on the message based on the particular role - the agent is playing are described in the following sections. - -6.1.3. Receiving Requests - - A relay or proxy agent MUST check for forwarding loops when receiving - requests. A loop is detected if the server finds its own identity in - a Route-Record AVP. When such an event occurs, the agent MUST answer - with the Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_LOOP_DETECTED. - -6.1.4. Processing Local Requests - - A request is known to be for local consumption when one of the - following conditions occurs: - - o The Destination-Host AVP contains the local host's identity; - - o The Destination-Host AVP is not present, the Destination-Realm AVP - contains a realm the server is configured to process locally, and - the Diameter application is locally supported; or - - o Both the Destination-Host and the Destination-Realm are not - present. - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 76] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - When a request is locally processed, the rules in Section 6.2 should - be used to generate the corresponding answer. - -6.1.5. Request Forwarding - - Request forwarding is done using the Diameter peer table. The - Diameter peer table contains all of the peers with which the local - node is able to directly communicate. - - When a request is received, and the host encoded in the Destination- - Host AVP is one that is present in the peer table, the message SHOULD - be forwarded to the peer. - -6.1.6. Request Routing - - Diameter request message routing is done via realms and Application - Ids. A Diameter message that may be forwarded by Diameter agents - (proxies, redirect agents, or relay agents) MUST include the target - realm in the Destination-Realm AVP. Request routing SHOULD rely on - the Destination-Realm AVP and the Application Id present in the - request message header to aid in the routing decision. The realm MAY - be retrieved from the User-Name AVP, which is in the form of a - Network Access Identifier (NAI). The realm portion of the NAI is - inserted in the Destination-Realm AVP. - - Diameter agents MAY have a list of locally supported realms and - applications, and they MAY have a list of externally supported realms - and applications. When a request is received that includes a realm - and/or application that is not locally supported, the message is - routed to the peer configured in the routing table (see Section 2.7). - - Realm names and Application Ids are the minimum supported routing - criteria, additional information may be needed to support redirect - semantics. - -6.1.7. Predictive Loop Avoidance - - Before forwarding or routing a request, Diameter agents, in addition - to performing the processing described in Section 6.1.3, SHOULD check - for the presence of a candidate route's peer identity in any of the - Route-Record AVPs. In the event of the agent detecting the presence - of a candidate route's peer identity in a Route-Record AVP, the agent - MUST ignore such a route for the Diameter request message and attempt - alternate routes if any exist. In case all the candidate routes are - eliminated by the above criteria, the agent SHOULD return a - DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER message. - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 77] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -6.1.8. Redirecting Requests - - When a redirect agent receives a request whose routing entry is set - to REDIRECT, it MUST reply with an answer message with the 'E' bit - set, while maintaining the Hop-by-Hop Identifier in the header, and - include the Result-Code AVP to DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION. Each of - the servers associated with the routing entry are added in a separate - Redirect-Host AVP. - - +------------------+ - | Diameter | - | Redirect Agent | - +------------------+ - ^ | 2. command + 'E' bit - 1. Request | | Result-Code = - [email protected] | | DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION + - | | Redirect-Host AVP(s) - | v - +-------------+ 3. Request +-------------+ - | example.com |------------->| example.net | - | Relay | | Diameter | - | Agent |<-------------| Server | - +-------------+ 4. Answer +-------------+ - - Figure 5: Diameter Redirect Agent - - The receiver of an answer message with the 'E' bit set and the - Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION uses the Hop-by- - Hop Identifier in the Diameter header to identify the request in the - pending message queue (see Section 5.5.4) that is to be redirected. - If no transport connection exists with the new peer, one is created, - and the request is sent directly to it. - - Multiple Redirect-Host AVPs are allowed. The receiver of the answer - message with the 'E' bit set selects exactly one of these hosts as - the destination of the redirected message. - - When the Redirect-Host-Usage AVP included in the answer message has a - non-zero value, a route entry for the redirect indications is created - and cached by the receiver. The redirect usage for such a route - entry is set by the value of Redirect-Host-Usage AVP and the lifetime - of the cached route entry is set by Redirect-Max-Cache-Time AVP - value. - - It is possible that multiple redirect indications can create multiple - cached route entries differing only in their redirect usage and the - peer to forward messages to. As an example, two(2) route entries - that are created by two(2) redirect indications results in two(2) - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 78] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - cached routes for the same realm and Application Id. However, one - has a redirect usage of ALL_SESSION, where matching requests will be - forwarded to one peer; the other has a redirect usage of ALL_REALM, - where request are forwarded to another peer. Therefore, an incoming - request that matches the realm and Application Id of both routes will - need additional resolution. In such a case, a routing precedence - rule MUST be used against the redirect usage value to resolve the - contention. The precedence rule can be found in Section 6.13. - -6.1.9. Relaying and Proxying Requests - - A relay or proxy agent MUST append a Route-Record AVP to all requests - forwarded. The AVP contains the identity of the peer from which the - request was received. - - The Hop-by-Hop Identifier in the request is saved and replaced with a - locally unique value. The source of the request is also saved, which - includes the IP address, port, and protocol. - - A relay or proxy agent MAY include the Proxy-Info AVP in requests if - it requires access to any local state information when the - corresponding response is received. The Proxy-Info AVP has security - implications as state information is distributed to other entities. - As such, it is RECOMMENDED that the content of the Proxy-Info AVP be - protected with cryptographic mechanisms, for example, by using a - keyed message digest such as HMAC-SHA1 [RFC2104]. Such a mechanism, - however, requires the management of keys, although only locally at - the Diameter server. Still, a full description of the management of - the keys used to protect the Proxy-Info AVP is beyond the scope of - this document. Below is a list of common recommendations: - - o The keys should be generated securely following the randomness - recommendations in [RFC4086]. - - o The keys and cryptographic protection algorithms should be at - least 128 bits in strength. - - o The keys should not be used for any other purpose than generating - and verifying instances of the Proxy-Info AVP. - - o The keys should be changed regularly. - - o The keys should be changed if the AVP format or cryptographic - protection algorithms change. - - The message is then forwarded to the next hop, as identified in the - routing table. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 79] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Figure 6 provides an example of message routing using the procedures - listed in these sections. - - (Origin-Host=nas.example.net) (Origin-Host=nas.example.net) - (Origin-Realm=example.net) (Origin-Realm=example.net) - (Destination-Realm=example.com) (Destination-Realm=example.com) - (Route-Record=nas.example.net) - +------+ ------> +------+ ------> +------+ - | | (Request) | | (Request) | | - | NAS +-------------------+ DRL +-------------------+ HMS | - | | | | | | - +------+ <------ +------+ <------ +------+ - example.net (Answer) example.net (Answer) example.com - (Origin-Host=hms.example.com) (Origin-Host=hms.example.com) - (Origin-Realm=example.com) (Origin-Realm=example.com) - - Figure 6: Routing of Diameter messages - - Relay and proxy agents are not required to perform full inspection of - incoming messages. At a minimum, validation of the message header - and relevant routing AVPs has to be done when relaying messages. - Proxy agents may optionally perform more in-depth message validation - for applications in which it is interested. - -6.2. Diameter Answer Processing - - When a request is locally processed, the following procedures MUST be - applied to create the associated answer, in addition to any - additional procedures that MAY be discussed in the Diameter - application defining the command: - - o The same Hop-by-Hop Identifier in the request is used in the - answer. - - o The local host's identity is encoded in the Origin-Host AVP. - - o The Destination-Host and Destination-Realm AVPs MUST NOT be - present in the answer message. - - o The Result-Code AVP is added with its value indicating success or - failure. - - o If the Session-Id is present in the request, it MUST be included - in the answer. - - o Any Proxy-Info AVPs in the request MUST be added to the answer - message, in the same order they were present in the request. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 80] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - o The 'P' bit is set to the same value as the one in the request. - - o The same End-to-End identifier in the request is used in the - answer. - - Note that the error messages (see Section 7) are also subjected to - the above processing rules. - -6.2.1. Processing Received Answers - - A Diameter client or proxy MUST match the Hop-by-Hop Identifier in an - answer received against the list of pending requests. The - corresponding message should be removed from the list of pending - requests. It SHOULD ignore answers received that do not match a - known Hop-by-Hop Identifier. - -6.2.2. Relaying and Proxying Answers - - If the answer is for a request that was proxied or relayed, the agent - MUST restore the original value of the Diameter header's Hop-by-Hop - Identifier field. - - If the last Proxy-Info AVP in the message is targeted to the local - Diameter server, the AVP MUST be removed before the answer is - forwarded. - - If a relay or proxy agent receives an answer with a Result-Code AVP - indicating a failure, it MUST NOT modify the contents of the AVP. - Any additional local errors detected SHOULD be logged but not - reflected in the Result-Code AVP. If the agent receives an answer - message with a Result-Code AVP indicating success, and it wishes to - modify the AVP to indicate an error, it MUST modify the Result-Code - AVP to contain the appropriate error in the message destined towards - the access device as well as include the Error-Reporting-Host AVP; it - MUST also issue an STR on behalf of the access device towards the - Diameter server. - - The agent MUST then send the answer to the host that it received the - original request from. - -6.3. Origin-Host AVP - - The Origin-Host AVP (AVP Code 264) is of type DiameterIdentity, and - it MUST be present in all Diameter messages. This AVP identifies the - endpoint that originated the Diameter message. Relay agents MUST NOT - modify this AVP. - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 81] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - The value of the Origin-Host AVP is guaranteed to be unique within a - single host. - - Note that the Origin-Host AVP may resolve to more than one address as - the Diameter peer may support more than one address. - - This AVP SHOULD be placed as close to the Diameter header as - possible. - -6.4. Origin-Realm AVP - - The Origin-Realm AVP (AVP Code 296) is of type DiameterIdentity. - This AVP contains the Realm of the originator of any Diameter message - and MUST be present in all messages. - - This AVP SHOULD be placed as close to the Diameter header as - possible. - -6.5. Destination-Host AVP - - The Destination-Host AVP (AVP Code 293) is of type DiameterIdentity. - This AVP MUST be present in all unsolicited agent initiated messages, - MAY be present in request messages, and MUST NOT be present in answer - messages. - - The absence of the Destination-Host AVP will cause a message to be - sent to any Diameter server supporting the application within the - realm specified in Destination-Realm AVP. - - This AVP SHOULD be placed as close to the Diameter header as - possible. - -6.6. Destination-Realm AVP - - The Destination-Realm AVP (AVP Code 283) is of type DiameterIdentity - and contains the realm to which the message is to be routed. The - Destination-Realm AVP MUST NOT be present in answer messages. - Diameter clients insert the realm portion of the User-Name AVP. - Diameter servers initiating a request message use the value of the - Origin-Realm AVP from a previous message received from the intended - target host (unless it is known a priori). When present, the - Destination-Realm AVP is used to perform message routing decisions. - - The CCF for a request message that includes the Destination-Realm AVP - SHOULD list the Destination-Realm AVP as a required AVP (an AVP - indicated as {AVP}); otherwise, the message is inherently a non- - routable message. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 82] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - This AVP SHOULD be placed as close to the Diameter header as - possible. - -6.7. Routing AVPs - - The AVPs defined in this section are Diameter AVPs used for routing - purposes. These AVPs change as Diameter messages are processed by - agents. - -6.7.1. Route-Record AVP - - The Route-Record AVP (AVP Code 282) is of type DiameterIdentity. The - identity added in this AVP MUST be the same as the one received in - the Origin-Host of the Capabilities Exchange message. - -6.7.2. Proxy-Info AVP - - The Proxy-Info AVP (AVP Code 284) is of type Grouped. This AVP - contains the identity and local state information of the Diameter - node that creates and adds it to a message. The Grouped Data field - has the following CCF grammar: - - Proxy-Info ::= < AVP Header: 284 > - { Proxy-Host } - { Proxy-State } - * [ AVP ] - -6.7.3. Proxy-Host AVP - - The Proxy-Host AVP (AVP Code 280) is of type DiameterIdentity. This - AVP contains the identity of the host that added the Proxy-Info AVP. - -6.7.4. Proxy-State AVP - - The Proxy-State AVP (AVP Code 33) is of type OctetString. It - contains state information that would otherwise be stored at the - Diameter entity that created it. As such, this AVP MUST be treated - as opaque data by other Diameter entities. - -6.8. Auth-Application-Id AVP - - The Auth-Application-Id AVP (AVP Code 258) is of type Unsigned32 and - is used in order to advertise support of the Authentication and - Authorization portion of an application (see Section 2.4). If - present in a message other than CER and CEA, the value of the Auth- - Application-Id AVP MUST match the Application Id present in the - Diameter message header. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 83] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -6.9. Acct-Application-Id AVP - - The Acct-Application-Id AVP (AVP Code 259) is of type Unsigned32 and - is used in order to advertise support of the accounting portion of an - application (see Section 2.4). If present in a message other than - CER and CEA, the value of the Acct-Application-Id AVP MUST match the - Application Id present in the Diameter message header. - -6.10. Inband-Security-Id AVP - - The Inband-Security-Id AVP (AVP Code 299) is of type Unsigned32 and - is used in order to advertise support of the security portion of the - application. The use of this AVP in CER and CEA messages is NOT - RECOMMENDED. Instead, discovery of a Diameter entity's security - capabilities can be done either through static configuration or via - Diameter Peer Discovery as described in Section 5.2. - - The following values are supported: - - - NO_INBAND_SECURITY 0 - - This peer does not support TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP. This is the - default value, if the AVP is omitted. - - TLS 1 - - This node supports TLS/TCP [RFC5246] and DTLS/SCTP [RFC6083] - security. - -6.11. Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP - - The Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP (AVP Code 260) is of type - Grouped and is used to advertise support of a vendor-specific - Diameter application. Exactly one instance of either Auth- - Application-Id or Acct-Application-Id AVP MUST be present. The - Application Id carried by either Auth-Application-Id or Acct- - Application-Id AVP MUST comply with vendor-specific Application Id - assignment described in Section 11.3. It MUST also match the - Application Id present in the Diameter header except when used in a - CER or CEA message. - - The Vendor-Id AVP is an informational AVP pertaining to the vendor - who may have authorship of the vendor-specific Diameter application. - It MUST NOT be used as a means of defining a completely separate - vendor-specific Application Id space. - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 84] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - The Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP SHOULD be placed as close to - the Diameter header as possible. - - AVP Format - - <Vendor-Specific-Application-Id> ::= < AVP Header: 260 > - { Vendor-Id } - [ Auth-Application-Id ] - [ Acct-Application-Id ] - - A Vendor-Specific-Application-Id AVP MUST contain exactly one of - either Auth-Application-Id or Acct-Application-Id. If a Vendor- - Specific-Application-Id is received without one of these two AVPs, - then the recipient SHOULD issue an answer with a Result-Code set to - DIAMETER_MISSING_AVP. The answer SHOULD also include a Failed-AVP, - which MUST contain an example of an Auth-Application-Id AVP and an - Acct-Application-Id AVP. - - If a Vendor-Specific-Application-Id is received that contains both - Auth-Application-Id and Acct-Application-Id, then the recipient MUST - issue an answer with Result-Code set to - DIAMETER_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES. The answer MUST also include a - Failed-AVP, which MUST contain the received Auth-Application-Id AVP - and Acct-Application-Id AVP. - -6.12. Redirect-Host AVP - - The Redirect-Host AVP (AVP Code 292) is of type DiameterURI. One or - more instances of this AVP MUST be present if the answer message's - 'E' bit is set and the Result-Code AVP is set to - DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION. - - Upon receiving the above, the receiving Diameter node SHOULD forward - the request directly to one of the hosts identified in these AVPs. - The server contained in the selected Redirect-Host AVP SHOULD be used - for all messages matching the criteria set by the Redirect-Host-Usage - AVP. - -6.13. Redirect-Host-Usage AVP - - The Redirect-Host-Usage AVP (AVP Code 261) is of type Enumerated. - This AVP MAY be present in answer messages whose 'E' bit is set and - the Result-Code AVP is set to DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION. - - When present, this AVP provides hints about how the routing entry - resulting from the Redirect-Host is to be used. The following values - are supported: - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 85] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - DONT_CACHE 0 - - The host specified in the Redirect-Host AVP SHOULD NOT be cached. - This is the default value. - - ALL_SESSION 1 - - All messages within the same session, as defined by the same value - of the Session-ID AVP SHOULD be sent to the host specified in the - Redirect-Host AVP. - - ALL_REALM 2 - - All messages destined for the realm requested SHOULD be sent to - the host specified in the Redirect-Host AVP. - - REALM_AND_APPLICATION 3 - - All messages for the application requested to the realm specified - SHOULD be sent to the host specified in the Redirect-Host AVP. - - ALL_APPLICATION 4 - - All messages for the application requested SHOULD be sent to the - host specified in the Redirect-Host AVP. - - ALL_HOST 5 - - All messages that would be sent to the host that generated the - Redirect-Host SHOULD be sent to the host specified in the - Redirect-Host AVP. - - ALL_USER 6 - - All messages for the user requested SHOULD be sent to the host - specified in the Redirect-Host AVP. - - When multiple cached routes are created by redirect indications and - they differ only in redirect usage and peers to forward requests to - (see Section 6.1.8), a precedence rule MUST be applied to the - redirect usage values of the cached routes during normal routing to - resolve contentions that may occur. The precedence rule is the order - that dictate which redirect usage should be considered before any - other as they appear. The order is as follows: - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 86] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - 1. ALL_SESSION - - 2. ALL_USER - - 3. REALM_AND_APPLICATION - - 4. ALL_REALM - - 5. ALL_APPLICATION - - 6. ALL_HOST - -6.14. Redirect-Max-Cache-Time AVP - - The Redirect-Max-Cache-Time AVP (AVP Code 262) is of type Unsigned32. - This AVP MUST be present in answer messages whose 'E' bit is set, - whose Result-Code AVP is set to DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION, and - whose Redirect-Host-Usage AVP set to a non-zero value. - - This AVP contains the maximum number of seconds the peer and route - table entries, created as a result of the Redirect-Host, SHOULD be - cached. Note that once a host is no longer reachable, any associated - cache, peer, and routing table entries MUST be deleted. - -7. Error Handling - - There are two different types of errors in Diameter; protocol errors - and application errors. A protocol error is one that occurs at the - base protocol level and MAY require per-hop attention (e.g., a - message routing error). Application errors, on the other hand, - generally occur due to a problem with a function specified in a - Diameter application (e.g., user authentication, missing AVP). - - Result-Code AVP values that are used to report protocol errors MUST - only be present in answer messages whose 'E' bit is set. When a - request message is received that causes a protocol error, an answer - message is returned with the 'E' bit set, and the Result-Code AVP is - set to the appropriate protocol error value. As the answer is sent - back towards the originator of the request, each proxy or relay agent - MAY take action on the message. - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 87] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - 1. Request +---------+ Link Broken - +-------------------------->|Diameter |----///----+ - | +---------------------| | v - +------+--+ | 2. answer + 'E' set | Relay 2 | +--------+ - |Diameter |<-+ (Unable to Forward) +---------+ |Diameter| - | | | Home | - | Relay 1 |--+ +---------+ | Server | - +---------+ | 3. Request |Diameter | +--------+ - +-------------------->| | ^ - | Relay 3 |-----------+ - +---------+ - - Figure 7: Example of Protocol Error Causing Answer Message - - Figure 7 provides an example of a message forwarded upstream by a - Diameter relay. When the message is received by Relay 2, and it - detects that it cannot forward the request to the home server, an - answer message is returned with the 'E' bit set and the Result-Code - AVP set to DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER. Given that this error falls - within the protocol error category, Relay 1 would take special - action, and given the error, attempt to route the message through its - alternate Relay 3. - - +---------+ 1. Request +---------+ 2. Request +---------+ - | Access |------------>|Diameter |------------>|Diameter | - | | | | | Home | - | Device |<------------| Relay |<------------| Server | - +---------+ 4. Answer +---------+ 3. Answer +---------+ - (Missing AVP) (Missing AVP) - - Figure 8: Example of Application Error Answer Message - - Figure 8 provides an example of a Diameter message that caused an - application error. When application errors occur, the Diameter - entity reporting the error clears the 'R' bit in the Command Flags - and adds the Result-Code AVP with the proper value. Application - errors do not require any proxy or relay agent involvement; - therefore, the message would be forwarded back to the originator of - the request. - - In the case where the answer message itself contains errors, any - related session SHOULD be terminated by sending an STR or ASR - message. The Termination-Cause AVP in the STR MAY be filled with the - appropriate value to indicate the cause of the error. An application - MAY also send an application-specific request instead of an STR or - ASR message to signal the error in the case where no state is - maintained or to allow for some form of error recovery with the - corresponding Diameter entity. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 88] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - There are certain Result-Code AVP application errors that require - additional AVPs to be present in the answer. In these cases, the - Diameter node that sets the Result-Code AVP to indicate the error - MUST add the AVPs. Examples are as follows: - - o A request with an unrecognized AVP is received with the 'M' bit - (Mandatory bit) set causes an answer to be sent with the Result- - Code AVP set to DIAMETER_AVP_UNSUPPORTED and the Failed-AVP AVP - containing the offending AVP. - - o A request with an AVP that is received with an unrecognized value - causes an answer to be returned with the Result-Code AVP set to - DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_VALUE, with the Failed-AVP AVP containing the - AVP causing the error. - - o A received command that is missing AVPs that are defined as - required in the commands CCF; examples are AVPs indicated as - {AVP}. The receiver issues an answer with the Result-Code set to - DIAMETER_MISSING_AVP and creates an AVP with the AVP Code and - other fields set as expected in the missing AVP. The created AVP - is then added to the Failed-AVP AVP. - - The Result-Code AVP describes the error that the Diameter node - encountered in its processing. In case there are multiple errors, - the Diameter node MUST report only the first error it encountered - (detected possibly in some implementation-dependent order). The - specific errors that can be described by this AVP are described in - the following section. - -7.1. Result-Code AVP - - The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 268) is of type Unsigned32 and - indicates whether a particular request was completed successfully or - an error occurred. All Diameter answer messages in IETF-defined - Diameter application specifications MUST include one Result-Code AVP. - A non-successful Result-Code AVP (one containing a non-2xxx value - other than DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION) MUST include the Error- - Reporting-Host AVP if the host setting the Result-Code AVP is - different from the identity encoded in the Origin-Host AVP. - - The Result-Code data field contains an IANA-managed 32-bit address - space representing errors (see Section 11.3.2). Diameter provides - the following classes of errors, all identified by the thousands - digit in the decimal notation: - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 89] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - o 1xxx (Informational) - - o 2xxx (Success) - - o 3xxx (Protocol Errors) - - o 4xxx (Transient Failures) - - o 5xxx (Permanent Failure) - - An unrecognized class (one whose first digit is not defined in this - section) MUST be handled as a permanent failure. - -7.1.1. Informational - - Errors that fall within this category are used to inform the - requester that a request could not be satisfied, and additional - action is required on its part before access is granted. - - DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH 1001 - - This informational error is returned by a Diameter server to - inform the access device that the authentication mechanism being - used requires multiple round trips, and a subsequent request needs - to be issued in order for access to be granted. - -7.1.2. Success - - Errors that fall within the Success category are used to inform a - peer that a request has been successfully completed. - - DIAMETER_SUCCESS 2001 - - The request was successfully completed. - - DIAMETER_LIMITED_SUCCESS 2002 - - When returned, the request was successfully completed, but - additional processing is required by the application in order to - provide service to the user. - -7.1.3. Protocol Errors - - Errors that fall within the Protocol Error category SHOULD be treated - on a per-hop basis, and Diameter proxies MAY attempt to correct the - error, if it is possible. Note that these errors MUST only be used - in answer messages whose 'E' bit is set. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 90] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - DIAMETER_COMMAND_UNSUPPORTED 3001 - - This error code is used when a Diameter entity receives a message - with a Command Code that it does not support. - - DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 3002 - - This error is given when Diameter cannot deliver the message to - the destination, either because no host within the realm - supporting the required application was available to process the - request or because the Destination-Host AVP was given without the - associated Destination-Realm AVP. - - DIAMETER_REALM_NOT_SERVED 3003 - - The intended realm of the request is not recognized. - - DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY 3004 - - When returned, a Diameter node SHOULD attempt to send the message - to an alternate peer. This error MUST only be used when a - specific server is requested, and it cannot provide the requested - service. - - DIAMETER_LOOP_DETECTED 3005 - - An agent detected a loop while trying to get the message to the - intended recipient. The message MAY be sent to an alternate peer, - if one is available, but the peer reporting the error has - identified a configuration problem. - - DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION 3006 - - A redirect agent has determined that the request could not be - satisfied locally, and the initiator of the request SHOULD direct - the request directly to the server, whose contact information has - been added to the response. When set, the Redirect-Host AVP MUST - be present. - - DIAMETER_APPLICATION_UNSUPPORTED 3007 - - A request was sent for an application that is not supported. - - DIAMETER_INVALID_HDR_BITS 3008 - - A request was received whose bits in the Diameter header were set - either to an invalid combination or to a value that is - inconsistent with the Command Code's definition. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 91] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_BITS 3009 - - A request was received that included an AVP whose flag bits are - set to an unrecognized value or that is inconsistent with the - AVP's definition. - - DIAMETER_UNKNOWN_PEER 3010 - - A CER was received from an unknown peer. - -7.1.4. Transient Failures - - Errors that fall within the transient failures category are used to - inform a peer that the request could not be satisfied at the time it - was received but MAY be able to satisfy the request in the future. - Note that these errors MUST be used in answer messages whose 'E' bit - is not set. - - DIAMETER_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 4001 - - The authentication process for the user failed, most likely due to - an invalid password used by the user. Further attempts MUST only - be tried after prompting the user for a new password. - - DIAMETER_OUT_OF_SPACE 4002 - - A Diameter node received the accounting request but was unable to - commit it to stable storage due to a temporary lack of space. - - ELECTION_LOST 4003 - - The peer has determined that it has lost the election process and - has therefore disconnected the transport connection. - -7.1.5. Permanent Failures - - Errors that fall within the permanent failures category are used to - inform the peer that the request failed and should not be attempted - again. Note that these errors SHOULD be used in answer messages - whose 'E' bit is not set. In error conditions where it is not - possible or efficient to compose application-specific answer grammar, - answer messages with the 'E' bit set and which comply to the grammar - described in Section 7.2 MAY also be used for permanent errors. - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 92] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - DIAMETER_AVP_UNSUPPORTED 5001 - - The peer received a message that contained an AVP that is not - recognized or supported and was marked with the 'M' (Mandatory) - bit. A Diameter message with this error MUST contain one or more - Failed-AVP AVPs containing the AVPs that caused the failure. - - DIAMETER_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID 5002 - - The request contained an unknown Session-Id. - - DIAMETER_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 5003 - - A request was received for which the user could not be authorized. - This error could occur if the service requested is not permitted - to the user. - - DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_VALUE 5004 - - The request contained an AVP with an invalid value in its data - portion. A Diameter message indicating this error MUST include - the offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP. - - DIAMETER_MISSING_AVP 5005 - - The request did not contain an AVP that is required by the Command - Code definition. If this value is sent in the Result-Code AVP, a - Failed-AVP AVP SHOULD be included in the message. The Failed-AVP - AVP MUST contain an example of the missing AVP complete with the - Vendor-Id if applicable. The value field of the missing AVP - should be of correct minimum length and contain zeroes. - - DIAMETER_RESOURCES_EXCEEDED 5006 - - A request was received that cannot be authorized because the user - has already expended allowed resources. An example of this error - condition is when a user that is restricted to one dial-up PPP - port attempts to establish a second PPP connection. - - DIAMETER_CONTRADICTING_AVPS 5007 - - The Home Diameter server has detected AVPs in the request that - contradicted each other, and it is not willing to provide service - to the user. The Failed-AVP AVP MUST be present, which contain - the AVPs that contradicted each other. - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 93] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - DIAMETER_AVP_NOT_ALLOWED 5008 - - A message was received with an AVP that MUST NOT be present. The - Failed-AVP AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the - offending AVP. - - DIAMETER_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES 5009 - - A message was received that included an AVP that appeared more - often than permitted in the message definition. The Failed-AVP - AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the first instance of - the offending AVP that exceeded the maximum number of occurrences. - - DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_APPLICATION 5010 - - This error is returned by a Diameter node that receives a CER - whereby no applications are common between the CER sending peer - and the CER receiving peer. - - DIAMETER_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 5011 - - This error is returned when a request was received, whose version - number is unsupported. - - DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY 5012 - - This error is returned when a request is rejected for unspecified - reasons. - - DIAMETER_INVALID_BIT_IN_HEADER 5013 - - This error is returned when a reserved bit in the Diameter header - is set to one (1) or the bits in the Diameter header are set - incorrectly. - - DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_LENGTH 5014 - - The request contained an AVP with an invalid length. A Diameter - message indicating this error MUST include the offending AVPs - within a Failed-AVP AVP. In cases where the erroneous AVP length - value exceeds the message length or is less than the minimum AVP - header length, it is sufficient to include the offending AVP - header and a zero filled payload of the minimum required length - for the payloads data type. If the AVP is a Grouped AVP, the - Grouped AVP header with an empty payload would be sufficient to - indicate the offending AVP. In the case where the offending AVP - header cannot be fully decoded when the AVP length is less than - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 94] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - the minimum AVP header length, it is sufficient to include an - offending AVP header that is formulated by padding the incomplete - AVP header with zero up to the minimum AVP header length. - - DIAMETER_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 5015 - - This error is returned when a request is received with an invalid - message length. - - DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_BIT_COMBO 5016 - - The request contained an AVP with which is not allowed to have the - given value in the AVP Flags field. A Diameter message indicating - this error MUST include the offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP - AVP. - - DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_SECURITY 5017 - - This error is returned when a CER message is received, and there - are no common security mechanisms supported between the peers. A - Capabilities-Exchange-Answer (CEA) message MUST be returned with - the Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_SECURITY. - -7.2. Error Bit - - The 'E' (Error Bit) in the Diameter header is set when the request - caused a protocol-related error (see Section 7.1.3). A message with - the 'E' bit MUST NOT be sent as a response to an answer message. - Note that a message with the 'E' bit set is still subjected to the - processing rules defined in Section 6.2. When set, the answer - message will not conform to the CCF specification for the command; - instead, it and will conform to the following CCF: - - Message Format - - <answer-message> ::= < Diameter Header: code, ERR [, PXY] > - 0*1< Session-Id > - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - { Result-Code } - [ Origin-State-Id ] - [ Error-Message ] - [ Error-Reporting-Host ] - [ Failed-AVP ] - [ Experimental-Result ] - * [ Proxy-Info ] - * [ AVP ] - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 95] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Note that the code used in the header is the same than the one found - in the request message, but with the 'R' bit cleared and the 'E' bit - set. The 'P' bit in the header is set to the same value as the one - found in the request message. - -7.3. Error-Message AVP - - The Error-Message AVP (AVP Code 281) is of type UTF8String. It MAY - accompany a Result-Code AVP as a human-readable error message. The - Error-Message AVP is not intended to be useful in an environment - where error messages are processed automatically. It SHOULD NOT be - expected that the content of this AVP be parsed by network entities. - -7.4. Error-Reporting-Host AVP - - The Error-Reporting-Host AVP (AVP Code 294) is of type - DiameterIdentity. This AVP contains the identity of the Diameter - host that sent the Result-Code AVP to a value other than 2001 - (Success), only if the host setting the Result-Code is different from - the one encoded in the Origin-Host AVP. This AVP is intended to be - used for troubleshooting purposes, and it MUST be set when the - Result-Code AVP indicates a failure. - -7.5. Failed-AVP AVP - - The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 279) is of type Grouped and provides - debugging information in cases where a request is rejected or not - fully processed due to erroneous information in a specific AVP. The - value of the Result-Code AVP will provide information on the reason - for the Failed-AVP AVP. A Diameter answer message SHOULD contain an - instance of the Failed-AVP AVP that corresponds to the error - indicated by the Result-Code AVP. For practical purposes, this - Failed-AVP would typically refer to the first AVP processing error - that a Diameter node encounters. - - The possible reasons for this AVP are the presence of an improperly - constructed AVP, an unsupported or unrecognized AVP, an invalid AVP - value, the omission of a required AVP, the presence of an explicitly - excluded AVP (see tables in Section 10) or the presence of two or - more occurrences of an AVP that is restricted to 0, 1, or 0-1 - occurrences. - - A Diameter message SHOULD contain one Failed-AVP AVP, containing the - entire AVP that could not be processed successfully. If the failure - reason is omission of a required AVP, an AVP with the missing AVP - code, the missing Vendor-Id, and a zero-filled payload of the minimum - required length for the omitted AVP will be added. If the failure - reason is an invalid AVP length where the reported length is less - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 96] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - than the minimum AVP header length or greater than the reported - message length, a copy of the offending AVP header and a zero-filled - payload of the minimum required length SHOULD be added. - - In the case where the offending AVP is embedded within a Grouped AVP, - the Failed-AVP MAY contain the grouped AVP, which in turn contains - the single offending AVP. The same method MAY be employed if the - grouped AVP itself is embedded in yet another grouped AVP and so on. - In this case, the Failed-AVP MAY contain the grouped AVP hierarchy up - to the single offending AVP. This enables the recipient to detect - the location of the offending AVP when embedded in a group. - - AVP Format - - <Failed-AVP> ::= < AVP Header: 279 > - 1* {AVP} - -7.6. Experimental-Result AVP - - The Experimental-Result AVP (AVP Code 297) is of type Grouped, and - indicates whether a particular vendor-specific request was completed - successfully or whether an error occurred. This AVP has the - following structure: - - AVP Format - - Experimental-Result ::= < AVP Header: 297 > - { Vendor-Id } - { Experimental-Result-Code } - - The Vendor-Id AVP (see Section 5.3.3) in this grouped AVP identifies - the vendor responsible for the assignment of the result code that - follows. All Diameter answer messages defined in vendor-specific - applications MUST include either one Result-Code AVP or one - Experimental-Result AVP. - -7.7. Experimental-Result-Code AVP - - The Experimental-Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 298) is of type Unsigned32 - and contains a vendor-assigned value representing the result of - processing the request. - - It is recommended that vendor-specific result codes follow the same - conventions given for the Result-Code AVP regarding the different - types of result codes and the handling of errors (for non-2xxx - values). - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 97] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -8. Diameter User Sessions - - In general, Diameter can provide two different types of services to - applications. The first involves authentication and authorization, - and it can optionally make use of accounting. The second only makes - use of accounting. - - When a service makes use of the authentication and/or authorization - portion of an application, and a user requests access to the network, - the Diameter client issues an auth request to its local server. The - auth request is defined in a service-specific Diameter application - (e.g., NASREQ). The request contains a Session-Id AVP, which is used - in subsequent messages (e.g., subsequent authorization, accounting, - etc.) relating to the user's session. The Session-Id AVP is a means - for the client and servers to correlate a Diameter message with a - user session. - - When a Diameter server authorizes a user to implement network - resources for a finite amount of time, and it is willing to extend - the authorization via a future request, it MUST add the - Authorization- Lifetime AVP to the answer message. The - Authorization-Lifetime AVP defines the maximum number of seconds a - user MAY make use of the resources before another authorization - request is expected by the server. The Auth-Grace-Period AVP - contains the number of seconds following the expiration of the - Authorization-Lifetime, after which the server will release all state - information related to the user's session. Note that if payment for - services is expected by the serving realm from the user's home realm, - the Authorization-Lifetime AVP, combined with the Auth-Grace-Period - AVP, implies the maximum length of the session for which the home - realm is willing to be fiscally responsible. Services provided past - the expiration of the Authorization-Lifetime and Auth-Grace-Period - AVPs are the responsibility of the access device. Of course, the - actual cost of services rendered is clearly outside the scope of the - protocol. - - An access device that does not expect to send a re-authorization or a - session termination request to the server MAY include the Auth- - Session-State AVP with the value set to NO_STATE_MAINTAINED as a hint - to the server. If the server accepts the hint, it agrees that since - no session termination message will be received once service to the - user is terminated, it cannot maintain state for the session. If the - answer message from the server contains a different value in the - Auth-Session-State AVP (or the default value if the AVP is absent), - the access device MUST follow the server's directives. Note that the - value NO_STATE_MAINTAINED MUST NOT be set in subsequent re- - authorization requests and answers. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 98] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - The base protocol does not include any authorization request - messages, since these are largely application-specific and are - defined in a Diameter application document. However, the base - protocol does define a set of messages that are used to terminate - user sessions. These are used to allow servers that maintain state - information to free resources. - - When a service only makes use of the accounting portion of the - Diameter protocol, even in combination with an application, the - Session-Id is still used to identify user sessions. However, the - session termination messages are not used, since a session is - signaled as being terminated by issuing an accounting stop message. - - Diameter may also be used for services that cannot be easily - categorized as authentication, authorization, or accounting (e.g., - certain Third Generation Partnership Project Internet Multimedia - System (3GPP IMS) interfaces). In such cases, the finite state - machine defined in subsequent sections may not be applicable. - Therefore, the application itself MAY need to define its own finite - state machine. However, such application-specific state machines - SHOULD follow the general state machine framework outlined in this - document such as the use of Session-Id AVPs and the use of STR/STA, - ASR/ASA messages for stateful sessions. - -8.1. Authorization Session State Machine - - This section contains a set of finite state machines, which represent - the life cycle of Diameter sessions and which MUST be observed by all - Diameter implementations that make use of the authentication and/or - authorization portion of a Diameter application. The term "Service- - Specific" below refers to a message defined in a Diameter application - (e.g., Mobile IPv4, NASREQ). - - There are four different authorization session state machines - supported in the Diameter base protocol. The first two describe a - session in which the server is maintaining session state, indicated - by the value of the Auth-Session-State AVP (or its absence). One - describes the session from a client perspective, the other from a - server perspective. The second two state machines are used when the - server does not maintain session state. Here again, one describes - the session from a client perspective, the other from a server - perspective. - - When a session is moved to the Idle state, any resources that were - allocated for the particular session must be released. Any event not - listed in the state machines MUST be considered an error condition, - and an answer, if applicable, MUST be returned to the originator of - the message. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 99] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - In the case that an application does not support re-auth, the state - transitions related to server-initiated re-auth, when both client and - server sessions maintain state (e.g., Send RAR, Pending, Receive - RAA), MAY be ignored. - - In the state table, the event "Failure to send X" means that the - Diameter agent is unable to send command X to the desired - destination. This could be due to the peer being down or due to the - peer sending back a transient failure or temporary protocol error - notification DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY or DIAMETER_LOOP_DETECTED in the - Result-Code AVP of the corresponding Answer command. The event 'X - successfully sent' is the complement of 'Failure to send X'. - - The following state machine is observed by a client when state is - maintained on the server: - - CLIENT, STATEFUL - State Event Action New State - --------------------------------------------------------------- - Idle Client or device requests Send Pending - access service- - specific - auth req - - Idle ASR Received Send ASA Idle - for unknown session with - Result-Code = - UNKNOWN_ - SESSION_ID - - Idle RAR Received Send RAA Idle - for unknown session with - Result-Code = - UNKNOWN_ - SESSION_ID - - Pending Successful service-specific Grant Open - authorization answer Access - received with default - Auth-Session-State value - - Pending Successful service-specific Sent STR Discon - authorization answer received, - but service not provided - - Pending Error processing successful Sent STR Discon - service-specific authorization - answer - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 100] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Pending Failed service-specific Clean up Idle - authorization answer received - - Open User or client device Send Open - requests access to service service- - specific - auth req - - Open Successful service-specific Provide Open - authorization answer received service - - Open Failed service-specific Discon. Idle - authorization answer user/device - received. - - Open RAR received and client will Send RAA Open - perform subsequent re-auth with - Result-Code = - SUCCESS - - Open RAR received and client will Send RAA Idle - not perform subsequent with - re-auth Result-Code != - SUCCESS, - Discon. - user/device - - Open Session-Timeout expires on Send STR Discon - access device - - Open ASR received, Send ASA Discon - client will comply with - with request to end the Result-Code = - session = SUCCESS, - Send STR. - - Open ASR Received, Send ASA Open - client will not comply with - with request to end the Result-Code != - session != SUCCESS - - Open Authorization-Lifetime + Send STR Discon - Auth-Grace-Period expires on - access device - - Discon ASR received Send ASA Discon - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 101] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Discon STA received Discon. Idle - user/device - - The following state machine is observed by a server when it is - maintaining state for the session: - - SERVER, STATEFUL - State Event Action New State - --------------------------------------------------------------- - Idle Service-specific authorization Send Open - request received, and successful - user is authorized service- - specific - answer - - Idle Service-specific authorization Send Idle - request received, and failed - user is not authorized service- - specific - answer - - Open Service-specific authorization Send Open - request received, and user successful - is authorized service- - specific - answer - - Open Service-specific authorization Send Idle - request received, and user failed - is not authorized service- - specific - answer, - Clean up - - Open Home server wants to confirm Send RAR Pending - authentication and/or - authorization of the user - - Pending Received RAA with a failed Clean up Idle - Result-Code - - Pending Received RAA with Result-Code Update Open - = SUCCESS session - - Open Home server wants to Send ASR Discon - terminate the service - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 102] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Open Authorization-Lifetime (and Clean up Idle - Auth-Grace-Period) expires - on home server - - Open Session-Timeout expires on Clean up Idle - home server - - Discon Failure to send ASR Wait, Discon - resend ASR - - Discon ASR successfully sent and Clean up Idle - ASA Received with Result-Code - - Not ASA Received None No Change - Discon - - Any STR Received Send STA, Idle - Clean up - - The following state machine is observed by a client when state is not - maintained on the server: - - CLIENT, STATELESS - State Event Action New State - --------------------------------------------------------------- - Idle Client or device requests Send Pending - access service- - specific - auth req - - Pending Successful service-specific Grant Open - authorization answer access - received with Auth-Session- - State set to - NO_STATE_MAINTAINED - - Pending Failed service-specific Clean up Idle - authorization answer - received - - Open Session-Timeout expires on Discon. Idle - access device user/device - - Open Service to user is terminated Discon. Idle - user/device - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 103] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - The following state machine is observed by a server when it is not - maintaining state for the session: - - SERVER, STATELESS - State Event Action New State - --------------------------------------------------------------- - Idle Service-specific authorization Send Idle - request received, and service- - successfully processed specific - answer - -8.2. Accounting Session State Machine - - The following state machines MUST be supported for applications that - have an accounting portion or that require only accounting services. - The first state machine is to be observed by clients. - - See Section 9.7 for Accounting Command Codes and Section 9.8 for - Accounting AVPs. - - The server side in the accounting state machine depends in some cases - on the particular application. The Diameter base protocol defines a - default state machine that MUST be followed by all applications that - have not specified other state machines. This is the second state - machine in this section described below. - - The default server side state machine requires the reception of - accounting records in any order and at any time, and it does not - place any standards requirement on the processing of these records. - Implementations of Diameter may perform checking, ordering, - correlation, fraud detection, and other tasks based on these records. - AVPs may need to be inspected as a part of these tasks. The tasks - can happen either immediately after record reception or in a post- - processing phase. However, as these tasks are typically application - or even policy dependent, they are not standardized by the Diameter - specifications. Applications MAY define requirements on when to - accept accounting records based on the used value of Accounting- - Realtime-Required AVP, credit-limit checks, and so on. - - However, the Diameter base protocol defines one optional server side - state machine that MAY be followed by applications that require - keeping track of the session state at the accounting server. Note - that such tracking is incompatible with the ability to sustain long - duration connectivity problems. Therefore, the use of this state - machine is recommended only in applications where the value of the - Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP is DELIVER_AND_GRANT; hence, - accounting connectivity problems are required to cause the serviced - user to be disconnected. Otherwise, records produced by the client - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 104] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - may be lost by the server, which no longer accepts them after the - connectivity is re-established. This state machine is the third - state machine in this section. The state machine is supervised by a - supervision session timer Ts, whose value should be reasonably higher - than the Acct_Interim_Interval value. Ts MAY be set to two times the - value of the Acct_Interim_Interval so as to avoid the accounting - session in the Diameter server to change to Idle state in case of - short transient network failure. - - Any event not listed in the state machines MUST be considered as an - error condition, and a corresponding answer, if applicable, MUST be - returned to the originator of the message. - - In the state table, the event "Failure to send" means that the - Diameter client is unable to communicate with the desired - destination. This could be due to the peer being down, or due to the - peer sending back a transient failure or temporary protocol error - notification DIAMETER_OUT_OF_SPACE, DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY, or - DIAMETER_LOOP_DETECTED in the Result-Code AVP of the Accounting - Answer command. - - The event "Failed answer" means that the Diameter client received a - non-transient failure notification in the Accounting Answer command. - - Note that the action "Disconnect user/dev" MUST also have an effect - on the authorization session state table, e.g., cause the STR message - to be sent, if the given application has both authentication/ - authorization and accounting portions. - - The states PendingS, PendingI, PendingL, PendingE, and PendingB stand - for pending states to wait for an answer to an accounting request - related to a Start, Interim, Stop, Event, or buffered record, - respectively. - - CLIENT, ACCOUNTING - State Event Action New State - --------------------------------------------------------------- - Idle Client or device requests Send PendingS - access accounting - start req. - - Idle Client or device requests Send PendingE - a one-time service accounting - event req - - Idle Records in storage Send PendingB - record - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 105] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - PendingS Successful accounting Open - start answer received - - PendingS Failure to send and buffer Store Open - space available and real time Start - not equal to DELIVER_AND_GRANT Record - - PendingS Failure to send and no buffer Open - space available and real time - equal to GRANT_AND_LOSE - - PendingS Failure to send and no Disconnect Idle - buffer space available and user/dev - real time not equal to - GRANT_AND_LOSE - - PendingS Failed accounting start answer Open - received and real time equal - to GRANT_AND_LOSE - - PendingS Failed accounting start answer Disconnect Idle - received and real time not user/dev - equal to GRANT_AND_LOSE - - PendingS User service terminated Store PendingS - stop - record - - Open Interim interval elapses Send PendingI - accounting - interim - record - - Open User service terminated Send PendingL - accounting - stop req. - - PendingI Successful accounting interim Open - answer received - - PendingI Failure to send and (buffer Store Open - space available or old interim - record can be overwritten) record - and real time not equal to - DELIVER_AND_GRANT - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 106] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - PendingI Failure to send and no buffer Open - space available and real time - equal to GRANT_AND_LOSE - - PendingI Failure to send and no Disconnect Idle - buffer space available and user/dev - real time not equal to - GRANT_AND_LOSE - - PendingI Failed accounting interim Open - answer received and real time - equal to GRANT_AND_LOSE - - PendingI Failed accounting interim Disconnect Idle - answer received and user/dev - real time not equal to - GRANT_AND_LOSE - - PendingI User service terminated Store PendingI - stop - record - PendingE Successful accounting Idle - event answer received - - PendingE Failure to send and buffer Store Idle - space available event - record - - PendingE Failure to send and no buffer Idle - space available - - PendingE Failed accounting event answer Idle - received - - PendingB Successful accounting answer Delete Idle - received record - - PendingB Failure to send Idle - - PendingB Failed accounting answer Delete Idle - received record - - PendingL Successful accounting Idle - stop answer received - - PendingL Failure to send and buffer Store Idle - space available stop - record - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 107] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - PendingL Failure to send and no buffer Idle - space available - - PendingL Failed accounting stop answer Idle - received - - - SERVER, STATELESS ACCOUNTING - State Event Action New State - --------------------------------------------------------------- - - Idle Accounting start request Send Idle - received and successfully accounting - processed. start - answer - - Idle Accounting event request Send Idle - received and successfully accounting - processed. event - answer - - Idle Interim record received Send Idle - and successfully processed. accounting - interim - answer - - Idle Accounting stop request Send Idle - received and successfully accounting - processed stop answer - - Idle Accounting request received; Send Idle - no space left to store accounting - records answer; - Result-Code = - OUT_OF_ - SPACE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 108] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - SERVER, STATEFUL ACCOUNTING - State Event Action New State - --------------------------------------------------------------- - - Idle Accounting start request Send Open - received and successfully accounting - processed. start - answer; - Start Ts - - Idle Accounting event request Send Idle - received and successfully accounting - processed. event - answer - Idle Accounting request received; Send Idle - no space left to store accounting - records answer; - Result-Code = - OUT_OF_ - SPACE - - Open Interim record received Send Open - and successfully processed. accounting - interim - answer; - Restart Ts - - Open Accounting stop request Send Idle - received and successfully accounting - processed stop answer; - Stop Ts - - Open Accounting request received; Send Idle - no space left to store accounting - records answer; - Result-Code = - OUT_OF_ - SPACE; - Stop Ts - - Open Session supervision timer Ts Stop Ts Idle - expired - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 109] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -8.3. Server-Initiated Re-Auth - - A Diameter server may initiate a re-authentication and/or re- - authorization service for a particular session by issuing a Re-Auth- - Request (RAR). - - For example, for prepaid services, the Diameter server that - originally authorized a session may need some confirmation that the - user is still using the services. - - An access device that receives an RAR message with the Session-Id - equal to a currently active session MUST initiate a re-auth towards - the user, if the service supports this particular feature. Each - Diameter application MUST state whether server-initiated re-auth is - supported, since some applications do not allow access devices to - prompt the user for re-auth. - -8.3.1. Re-Auth-Request - - The Re-Auth-Request (RAR), indicated by the Command Code set to 258 - and the message flags' 'R' bit set, may be sent by any server to the - access device that is providing session service, to request that the - user be re-authenticated and/or re-authorized. - - - Message Format - - <RAR> ::= < Diameter Header: 258, REQ, PXY > - < Session-Id > - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - { Destination-Realm } - { Destination-Host } - { Auth-Application-Id } - { Re-Auth-Request-Type } - [ User-Name ] - [ Origin-State-Id ] - * [ Proxy-Info ] - * [ Route-Record ] - * [ AVP ] - -8.3.2. Re-Auth-Answer - - The Re-Auth-Answer (RAA), indicated by the Command Code set to 258 - and the message flags' 'R' bit clear, is sent in response to the RAR. - The Result-Code AVP MUST be present, and it indicates the disposition - of the request. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 110] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - A successful RAA message MUST be followed by an application-specific - authentication and/or authorization message. - - Message Format - - <RAA> ::= < Diameter Header: 258, PXY > - < Session-Id > - { Result-Code } - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - [ User-Name ] - [ Origin-State-Id ] - [ Error-Message ] - [ Error-Reporting-Host ] - [ Failed-AVP ] - * [ Redirect-Host ] - [ Redirect-Host-Usage ] - [ Redirect-Max-Cache-Time ] - * [ Proxy-Info ] - * [ AVP ] - -8.4. Session Termination - - It is necessary for a Diameter server that authorized a session, for - which it is maintaining state, to be notified when that session is no - longer active, both for tracking purposes as well as to allow - stateful agents to release any resources that they may have provided - for the user's session. For sessions whose state is not being - maintained, this section is not used. - - When a user session that required Diameter authorization terminates, - the access device that provided the service MUST issue a Session- - Termination-Request (STR) message to the Diameter server that - authorized the service, to notify it that the session is no longer - active. An STR MUST be issued when a user session terminates for any - reason, including user logoff, expiration of Session-Timeout, - administrative action, termination upon receipt of an Abort-Session- - Request (see below), orderly shutdown of the access device, etc. - - The access device also MUST issue an STR for a session that was - authorized but never actually started. This could occur, for - example, due to a sudden resource shortage in the access device, or - because the access device is unwilling to provide the type of service - requested in the authorization, or because the access device does not - support a mandatory AVP returned in the authorization, etc. - - It is also possible that a session that was authorized is never - actually started due to action of a proxy. For example, a proxy may - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 111] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - modify an authorization answer, converting the result from success to - failure, prior to forwarding the message to the access device. If - the answer did not contain an Auth-Session-State AVP with the value - NO_STATE_MAINTAINED, a proxy that causes an authorized session not to - be started MUST issue an STR to the Diameter server that authorized - the session, since the access device has no way of knowing that the - session had been authorized. - - A Diameter server that receives an STR message MUST clean up - resources (e.g., session state) associated with the Session-Id - specified in the STR and return a Session-Termination-Answer. - - A Diameter server also MUST clean up resources when the Session- - Timeout expires, or when the Authorization-Lifetime and the Auth- - Grace-Period AVPs expire without receipt of a re-authorization - request, regardless of whether an STR for that session is received. - The access device is not expected to provide service beyond the - expiration of these timers; thus, expiration of either of these - timers implies that the access device may have unexpectedly shut - down. - -8.4.1. Session-Termination-Request - - The Session-Termination-Request (STR), indicated by the Command Code - set to 275 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit set, is sent by a Diameter - client or by a Diameter proxy to inform the Diameter server that an - authenticated and/or authorized session is being terminated. - - Message Format - - <STR> ::= < Diameter Header: 275, REQ, PXY > - < Session-Id > - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - { Destination-Realm } - { Auth-Application-Id } - { Termination-Cause } - [ User-Name ] - [ Destination-Host ] - * [ Class ] - [ Origin-State-Id ] - * [ Proxy-Info ] - * [ Route-Record ] - * [ AVP ] - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 112] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -8.4.2. Session-Termination-Answer - - The Session-Termination-Answer (STA), indicated by the Command Code - set to 275 and the message flags' 'R' bit clear, is sent by the - Diameter server to acknowledge the notification that the session has - been terminated. The Result-Code AVP MUST be present, and it MAY - contain an indication that an error occurred while servicing the STR. - - Upon sending or receipt of the STA, the Diameter server MUST release - all resources for the session indicated by the Session-Id AVP. Any - intermediate server in the Proxy-Chain MAY also release any - resources, if necessary. - - Message Format - - <STA> ::= < Diameter Header: 275, PXY > - < Session-Id > - { Result-Code } - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - [ User-Name ] - * [ Class ] - [ Error-Message ] - [ Error-Reporting-Host ] - [ Failed-AVP ] - [ Origin-State-Id ] - * [ Redirect-Host ] - [ Redirect-Host-Usage ] - [ Redirect-Max-Cache-Time ] - * [ Proxy-Info ] - * [ AVP ] - -8.5. Aborting a Session - - A Diameter server may request that the access device stop providing - service for a particular session by issuing an Abort-Session-Request - (ASR). - - For example, the Diameter server that originally authorized the - session may be required to cause that session to be stopped for lack - of credit or other reasons that were not anticipated when the session - was first authorized. - - An access device that receives an ASR with Session-ID equal to a - currently active session MAY stop the session. Whether the access - device stops the session or not is implementation and/or - configuration dependent. For example, an access device may honor - ASRs from certain agents only. In any case, the access device MUST - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 113] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - respond with an Abort-Session-Answer, including a Result-Code AVP to - indicate what action it took. - -8.5.1. Abort-Session-Request - - The Abort-Session-Request (ASR), indicated by the Command Code set to - 274 and the message flags' 'R' bit set, may be sent by any Diameter - server or any Diameter proxy to the access device that is providing - session service, to request that the session identified by the - Session-Id be stopped. - - Message Format - - <ASR> ::= < Diameter Header: 274, REQ, PXY > - < Session-Id > - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - { Destination-Realm } - { Destination-Host } - { Auth-Application-Id } - [ User-Name ] - [ Origin-State-Id ] - * [ Proxy-Info ] - * [ Route-Record ] - * [ AVP ] - -8.5.2. Abort-Session-Answer - - The Abort-Session-Answer (ASA), indicated by the Command Code set to - 274 and the message flags' 'R' bit clear, is sent in response to the - ASR. The Result-Code AVP MUST be present and indicates the - disposition of the request. - - If the session identified by Session-Id in the ASR was successfully - terminated, the Result-Code is set to DIAMETER_SUCCESS. If the - session is not currently active, the Result-Code is set to - DIAMETER_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID. If the access device does not stop the - session for any other reason, the Result-Code is set to - DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY. - - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 114] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Message Format - - <ASA> ::= < Diameter Header: 274, PXY > - < Session-Id > - { Result-Code } - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - [ User-Name ] - [ Origin-State-Id ] - [ Error-Message ] - [ Error-Reporting-Host ] - [ Failed-AVP ] - * [ Redirect-Host ] - [ Redirect-Host-Usage ] - [ Redirect-Max-Cache-Time ] - * [ Proxy-Info ] - * [ AVP ] - -8.6. Inferring Session Termination from Origin-State-Id - - The Origin-State-Id is used to allow detection of terminated sessions - for which no STR would have been issued, due to unanticipated - shutdown of an access device. - - A Diameter client or access device increments the value of the - Origin-State-Id every time it is started or powered up. The new - Origin-State-Id is then sent in the CER/CEA message immediately upon - connection to the server. The Diameter server receiving the new - Origin-State-Id can determine whether the sending Diameter client had - abruptly shut down by comparing the old value of the Origin-State-Id - it has kept for that specific client is less than the new value and - whether it has un-terminated sessions originating from that client. - - An access device can also include the Origin-State-Id in request - messages other than the CER if there are relays or proxies in between - the access device and the server. In this case, however, the server - cannot discover that the access device has been restarted unless and - until it receives a new request from it. Therefore, this mechanism - is more opportunistic across proxies and relays. - - The Diameter server may assume that all sessions that were active - prior to detection of a client restart have been terminated. The - Diameter server MAY clean up all session state associated with such - lost sessions, and it MAY also issue STRs for all such lost sessions - that were authorized on upstream servers, to allow session state to - be cleaned up globally. - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 115] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -8.7. Auth-Request-Type AVP - - The Auth-Request-Type AVP (AVP Code 274) is of type Enumerated and is - included in application-specific auth requests to inform the peers - whether a user is to be authenticated only, authorized only, or both. - Note any value other than both MAY cause RADIUS interoperability - issues. The following values are defined: - - AUTHENTICATE_ONLY 1 - - The request being sent is for authentication only, and it MUST - contain the relevant application-specific authentication AVPs that - are needed by the Diameter server to authenticate the user. - - AUTHORIZE_ONLY 2 - - The request being sent is for authorization only, and it MUST - contain the application-specific authorization AVPs that are - necessary to identify the service being requested/offered. - - AUTHORIZE_AUTHENTICATE 3 - - The request contains a request for both authentication and - authorization. The request MUST include both the relevant - application-specific authentication information and authorization - information necessary to identify the service being requested/ - offered. - -8.8. Session-Id AVP - - The Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 263) is of type UTF8String and is used - to identify a specific session (see Section 8). All messages - pertaining to a specific session MUST include only one Session-Id - AVP, and the same value MUST be used throughout the life of a - session. When present, the Session-Id SHOULD appear immediately - following the Diameter header (see Section 3). - - The Session-Id MUST be globally and eternally unique, as it is meant - to uniquely identify a user session without reference to any other - information, and it may be needed to correlate historical - authentication information with accounting information. The - Session-Id includes a mandatory portion and an implementation-defined - portion; a recommended format for the implementation-defined portion - is outlined below. - - The Session-Id MUST begin with the sender's identity encoded in the - DiameterIdentity type (see Section 4.3.1). The remainder of the - Session-Id is delimited by a ";" character, and it MAY be any - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 116] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - sequence that the client can guarantee to be eternally unique; - however, the following format is recommended, (square brackets [] - indicate an optional element): - - <DiameterIdentity>;<high 32 bits>;<low 32 bits>[;<optional value>] - - <high 32 bits> and <low 32 bits> are decimal representations of the - high and low 32 bits of a monotonically increasing 64-bit value. The - 64-bit value is rendered in two part to simplify formatting by 32-bit - processors. At startup, the high 32 bits of the 64-bit value MAY be - initialized to the time in NTP format [RFC5905], and the low 32 bits - MAY be initialized to zero. This will for practical purposes - eliminate the possibility of overlapping Session-Ids after a reboot, - assuming the reboot process takes longer than a second. - Alternatively, an implementation MAY keep track of the increasing - value in non-volatile memory. - - - <optional value> is implementation specific, but it may include a - modem's device Id, a Layer 2 address, timestamp, etc. - - Example, in which there is no optional value: - - accesspoint7.example.com;1876543210;523 - - Example, in which there is an optional value: - - accesspoint7.example.com;1876543210;523;[email protected] - - The Session-Id is created by the Diameter application initiating the - session, which, in most cases, is done by the client. Note that a - Session-Id MAY be used for both the authentication, authorization, - and accounting commands of a given application. - -8.9. Authorization-Lifetime AVP - - The Authorization-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 291) is of type Unsigned32 - and contains the maximum number of seconds of service to be provided - to the user before the user is to be re-authenticated and/or re- - authorized. Care should be taken when the Authorization-Lifetime - value is determined, since a low, non-zero value could create - significant Diameter traffic, which could congest both the network - and the agents. - - A value of zero (0) means that immediate re-auth is necessary by the - access device. The absence of this AVP, or a value of all ones - (meaning all bits in the 32-bit field are set to one) means no re- - auth is expected. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 117] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - If both this AVP and the Session-Timeout AVP are present in a - message, the value of the latter MUST NOT be smaller than the - Authorization-Lifetime AVP. - - An Authorization-Lifetime AVP MAY be present in re-authorization - messages, and it contains the number of seconds the user is - authorized to receive service from the time the re-auth answer - message is received by the access device. - - This AVP MAY be provided by the client as a hint of the maximum - lifetime that it is willing to accept. The server MUST return a - value that is equal to, or smaller than, the one provided by the - client. - -8.10. Auth-Grace-Period AVP - - The Auth-Grace-Period AVP (AVP Code 276) is of type Unsigned32 and - contains the number of seconds the Diameter server will wait - following the expiration of the Authorization-Lifetime AVP before - cleaning up resources for the session. - -8.11. Auth-Session-State AVP - - The Auth-Session-State AVP (AVP Code 277) is of type Enumerated and - specifies whether state is maintained for a particular session. The - client MAY include this AVP in requests as a hint to the server, but - the value in the server's answer message is binding. The following - values are supported: - - STATE_MAINTAINED 0 - - This value is used to specify that session state is being - maintained, and the access device MUST issue a session termination - message when service to the user is terminated. This is the - default value. - - NO_STATE_MAINTAINED 1 - - This value is used to specify that no session termination messages - will be sent by the access device upon expiration of the - Authorization-Lifetime. - -8.12. Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP - - The Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP (AVP Code 285) is of type Enumerated and - is included in application-specific auth answers to inform the client - of the action expected upon expiration of the Authorization-Lifetime. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 118] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - If the answer message contains an Authorization-Lifetime AVP with a - positive value, the Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP MUST be present in an - answer message. The following values are defined: - - AUTHORIZE_ONLY 0 - - An authorization only re-auth is expected upon expiration of the - Authorization-Lifetime. This is the default value if the AVP is - not present in answer messages that include the Authorization- - Lifetime. - - AUTHORIZE_AUTHENTICATE 1 - - An authentication and authorization re-auth is expected upon - expiration of the Authorization-Lifetime. - -8.13. Session-Timeout AVP - - The Session-Timeout AVP (AVP Code 27) [RFC2865] is of type Unsigned32 - and contains the maximum number of seconds of service to be provided - to the user before termination of the session. When both the - Session-Timeout and the Authorization-Lifetime AVPs are present in an - answer message, the former MUST be equal to or greater than the value - of the latter. - - A session that terminates on an access device due to the expiration - of the Session-Timeout MUST cause an STR to be issued, unless both - the access device and the home server had previously agreed that no - session termination messages would be sent (see Section 8). - - A Session-Timeout AVP MAY be present in a re-authorization answer - message, and it contains the remaining number of seconds from the - beginning of the re-auth. - - A value of zero, or the absence of this AVP, means that this session - has an unlimited number of seconds before termination. - - This AVP MAY be provided by the client as a hint of the maximum - timeout that it is willing to accept. However, the server MAY return - a value that is equal to, or smaller than, the one provided by the - client. - -8.14. User-Name AVP - - The User-Name AVP (AVP Code 1) [RFC2865] is of type UTF8String, which - contains the User-Name, in a format consistent with the NAI - specification [RFC4282]. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 119] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -8.15. Termination-Cause AVP - - The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 295) is of type Enumerated, and - is used to indicate the reason why a session was terminated on the - access device. The currently assigned values for this AVP can be - found in the IANA registry for Termination-Cause AVP Values - [IANATCV]. - -8.16. Origin-State-Id AVP - - The Origin-State-Id AVP (AVP Code 278), of type Unsigned32, is a - monotonically increasing value that is advanced whenever a Diameter - entity restarts with loss of previous state, for example, upon - reboot. Origin-State-Id MAY be included in any Diameter message, - including CER. - - A Diameter entity issuing this AVP MUST create a higher value for - this AVP each time its state is reset. A Diameter entity MAY set - Origin-State-Id to the time of startup, or it MAY use an incrementing - counter retained in non-volatile memory across restarts. - - The Origin-State-Id, if present, MUST reflect the state of the entity - indicated by Origin-Host. If a proxy modifies Origin-Host, it MUST - either remove Origin-State-Id or modify it appropriately as well. - Typically, Origin-State-Id is used by an access device that always - starts up with no active sessions; that is, any session active prior - to restart will have been lost. By including Origin-State-Id in a - message, it allows other Diameter entities to infer that sessions - associated with a lower Origin-State-Id are no longer active. If an - access device does not intend for such inferences to be made, it MUST - either not include Origin-State-Id in any message or set its value to - 0. - -8.17. Session-Binding AVP - - The Session-Binding AVP (AVP Code 270) is of type Unsigned32, and it - MAY be present in application-specific authorization answer messages. - If present, this AVP MAY inform the Diameter client that all future - application-specific re-auth and Session-Termination-Request messages - for this session MUST be sent to the same authorization server. - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 120] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - This field is a bit mask, and the following bits have been defined: - - RE_AUTH 1 - - When set, future re-auth messages for this session MUST NOT - include the Destination-Host AVP. When cleared, the default - value, the Destination-Host AVP MUST be present in all re-auth - messages for this session. - - STR 2 - - When set, the STR message for this session MUST NOT include the - Destination-Host AVP. When cleared, the default value, the - Destination-Host AVP MUST be present in the STR message for this - session. - - ACCOUNTING 4 - - When set, all accounting messages for this session MUST NOT - include the Destination-Host AVP. When cleared, the default - value, the Destination-Host AVP, if known, MUST be present in all - accounting messages for this session. - -8.18. Session-Server-Failover AVP - - The Session-Server-Failover AVP (AVP Code 271) is of type Enumerated - and MAY be present in application-specific authorization answer - messages that either do not include the Session-Binding AVP or - include the Session-Binding AVP with any of the bits set to a zero - value. If present, this AVP MAY inform the Diameter client that if a - re-auth or STR message fails due to a delivery problem, the Diameter - client SHOULD issue a subsequent message without the Destination-Host - AVP. When absent, the default value is REFUSE_SERVICE. - - The following values are supported: - - REFUSE_SERVICE 0 - - If either the re-auth or the STR message delivery fails, terminate - service with the user and do not attempt any subsequent attempts. - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 121] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - TRY_AGAIN 1 - - If either the re-auth or the STR message delivery fails, resend - the failed message without the Destination-Host AVP present. - - ALLOW_SERVICE 2 - - If re-auth message delivery fails, assume that re-authorization - succeeded. If STR message delivery fails, terminate the session. - - TRY_AGAIN_ALLOW_SERVICE 3 - - If either the re-auth or the STR message delivery fails, resend - the failed message without the Destination-Host AVP present. If - the second delivery fails for re-auth, assume re-authorization - succeeded. If the second delivery fails for STR, terminate the - session. - -8.19. Multi-Round-Time-Out AVP - - The Multi-Round-Time-Out AVP (AVP Code 272) is of type Unsigned32 and - SHOULD be present in application-specific authorization answer - messages whose Result-Code AVP is set to DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. - This AVP contains the maximum number of seconds that the access - device MUST provide the user in responding to an authentication - request. - -8.20. Class AVP - - The Class AVP (AVP Code 25) is of type OctetString and is used by - Diameter servers to return state information to the access device. - When one or more Class AVPs are present in application-specific - authorization answer messages, they MUST be present in subsequent re- - authorization, session termination and accounting messages. Class - AVPs found in a re-authorization answer message override the ones - found in any previous authorization answer message. Diameter server - implementations SHOULD NOT return Class AVPs that require more than - 4096 bytes of storage on the Diameter client. A Diameter client that - receives Class AVPs whose size exceeds local available storage MUST - terminate the session. - -8.21. Event-Timestamp AVP - - The Event-Timestamp (AVP Code 55) is of type Time and MAY be included - in an Accounting-Request and Accounting-Answer messages to record the - time that the reported event occurred, in seconds since January 1, - 1900 00:00 UTC. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 122] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -9. Accounting - - This accounting protocol is based on a server directed model with - capabilities for real-time delivery of accounting information. - Several fault resilience methods [RFC2975] have been built into the - protocol in order minimize loss of accounting data in various fault - situations and under different assumptions about the capabilities of - the used devices. - -9.1. Server Directed Model - - The server directed model means that the device generating the - accounting data gets information from either the authorization server - (if contacted) or the accounting server regarding the way accounting - data shall be forwarded. This information includes accounting record - timeliness requirements. - - As discussed in [RFC2975], real-time transfer of accounting records - is a requirement, such as the need to perform credit-limit checks and - fraud detection. Note that batch accounting is not a requirement, - and is therefore not supported by Diameter. Should batched - accounting be required in the future, a new Diameter application will - need to be created, or it could be handled using another protocol. - Note, however, that even if at the Diameter layer, accounting - requests are processed one by one; transport protocols used under - Diameter typically batch several requests in the same packet under - heavy traffic conditions. This may be sufficient for many - applications. - - The authorization server (chain) directs the selection of proper - transfer strategy, based on its knowledge of the user and - relationships of roaming partnerships. The server (or agents) uses - the Acct-Interim-Interval and Accounting-Realtime-Required AVPs to - control the operation of the Diameter peer operating as a client. - The Acct-Interim-Interval AVP, when present, instructs the Diameter - node acting as a client to produce accounting records continuously - even during a session. Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP is used to - control the behavior of the client when the transfer of accounting - records from the Diameter client is delayed or unsuccessful. - - The Diameter accounting server MAY override the interim interval or - the real-time requirements by including the Acct-Interim-Interval or - Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP in the Accounting-Answer message. - When one of these AVPs is present, the latest value received SHOULD - be used in further accounting activities for the same session. - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 123] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -9.2. Protocol Messages - - A Diameter node that receives a successful authentication and/or - authorization message from the Diameter server SHOULD collect - accounting information for the session. The Accounting-Request - message is used to transmit the accounting information to the - Diameter server, which MUST reply with the Accounting-Answer message - to confirm reception. The Accounting-Answer message includes the - Result-Code AVP, which MAY indicate that an error was present in the - accounting message. The value of the Accounting-Realtime-Required - AVP received earlier for the session in question may indicate that - the user's session has to be terminated when a rejected Accounting- - Request message was received. - -9.3. Accounting Application Extension and Requirements - - Each Diameter application (e.g., NASREQ, Mobile IP) SHOULD define its - service-specific AVPs that MUST be present in the Accounting-Request - message in a section titled "Accounting AVPs". The application MUST - assume that the AVPs described in this document will be present in - all Accounting messages, so only their respective service-specific - AVPs need to be defined in that section. - - Applications have the option of using one or both of the following - accounting application extension models: - - Split Accounting Service - - The accounting message will carry the Application Id of the - Diameter base accounting application (see Section 2.4). - Accounting messages may be routed to Diameter nodes other than the - corresponding Diameter application. These nodes might be - centralized accounting servers that provide accounting service for - multiple different Diameter applications. These nodes MUST - advertise the Diameter base accounting Application Id during - capabilities exchange. - - Coupled Accounting Service - - The accounting message will carry the Application Id of the - application that is using it. The application itself will process - the received accounting records or forward them to an accounting - server. There is no accounting application advertisement required - during capabilities exchange, and the accounting messages will be - routed the same way as any of the other application messages. - - In cases where an application does not define its own accounting - service, it is preferred that the split accounting model be used. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 124] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -9.4. Fault Resilience - - Diameter base protocol mechanisms are used to overcome small message - loss and network faults of a temporary nature. - - Diameter peers acting as clients MUST implement the use of failover - to guard against server failures and certain network failures. - Diameter peers acting as agents or related off-line processing - systems MUST detect duplicate accounting records caused by the - sending of the same record to several servers and duplication of - messages in transit. This detection MUST be based on the inspection - of the Session-Id and Accounting-Record-Number AVP pairs. Appendix C - discusses duplicate detection needs and implementation issues. - - Diameter clients MAY have non-volatile memory for the safe storage of - accounting records over reboots or extended network failures, network - partitions, and server failures. If such memory is available, the - client SHOULD store new accounting records there as soon as the - records are created and until a positive acknowledgement of their - reception from the Diameter server has been received. Upon a reboot, - the client MUST start sending the records in the non-volatile memory - to the accounting server with the appropriate modifications in - termination cause, session length, and other relevant information in - the records. - - A further application of this protocol may include AVPs to control - the maximum number of accounting records that may be stored in the - Diameter client without committing them to the non-volatile memory or - transferring them to the Diameter server. - - The client SHOULD NOT remove the accounting data from any of its - memory areas before the correct Accounting-Answer has been received. - The client MAY remove the oldest, undelivered, or as yet - unacknowledged accounting data if it runs out of resources such as - memory. It is an implementation-dependent matter for the client to - accept new sessions under this condition. - -9.5. Accounting Records - - In all accounting records, the Session-Id AVP MUST be present; the - User-Name AVP MUST be present if it is available to the Diameter - client. - - Different types of accounting records are sent depending on the - actual type of accounted service and the authorization server's - directions for interim accounting. If the accounted service is a - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 125] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - one-time event, meaning that the start and stop of the event are - simultaneous, then the Accounting-Record-Type AVP MUST be present and - set to the value EVENT_RECORD. - - If the accounted service is of a measurable length, then the AVP MUST - use the values START_RECORD, STOP_RECORD, and possibly, - INTERIM_RECORD. If the authorization server has not directed interim - accounting to be enabled for the session, two accounting records MUST - be generated for each service of type session. When the initial - Accounting-Request for a given session is sent, the Accounting- - Record-Type AVP MUST be set to the value START_RECORD. When the last - Accounting-Request is sent, the value MUST be STOP_RECORD. - - If the authorization server has directed interim accounting to be - enabled, the Diameter client MUST produce additional records between - the START_RECORD and STOP_RECORD, marked INTERIM_RECORD. The - production of these records is directed by Acct-Interim-Interval as - well as any re-authentication or re-authorization of the session. - The Diameter client MUST overwrite any previous interim accounting - records that are locally stored for delivery, if a new record is - being generated for the same session. This ensures that only one - pending interim record can exist on an access device for any given - session. - - A particular value of Accounting-Sub-Session-Id MUST appear only in - one sequence of accounting records from a Diameter client, except for - the purposes of retransmission. The one sequence that is sent MUST - be either one record with Accounting-Record-Type AVP set to the value - EVENT_RECORD or several records starting with one having the value - START_RECORD, followed by zero or more INTERIM_RECORDs and a single - STOP_RECORD. A particular Diameter application specification MUST - define the type of sequences that MUST be used. - -9.6. Correlation of Accounting Records - - If an application uses accounting messages, it can correlate - accounting records with a specific application session by using the - Session-Id of the particular application session in the accounting - messages. Accounting messages MAY also use a different Session-Id - from that of the application sessions, in which case, other session- - related information is needed to perform correlation. - - In cases where an application requires multiple accounting sub- - sessions, an Accounting-Sub-Session-Id AVP is used to differentiate - each sub-session. The Session-Id would remain constant for all sub- - sessions and is used to correlate all the sub-sessions to a - particular application session. Note that receiving a STOP_RECORD - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 126] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - with no Accounting-Sub-Session-Id AVP when sub-sessions were - originally used in the START_RECORD messages implies that all sub- - sessions are terminated. - - There are also cases where an application needs to correlate multiple - application sessions into a single accounting record; the accounting - record may span multiple different Diameter applications and sessions - used by the same user at a given time. In such cases, the Acct- - Multi-Session-Id AVP is used. The Acct-Multi-Session-Id AVP SHOULD - be signaled by the server to the access device (typically, during - authorization) when it determines that a request belongs to an - existing session. The access device MUST then include the Acct- - Multi-Session-Id AVP in all subsequent accounting messages. - - The Acct-Multi-Session-Id AVP MAY include the value of the original - Session-Id. Its contents are implementation specific, but the MUST - be globally unique across other Acct-Multi-Session-Ids and MUST NOT - change during the life of a session. - - A Diameter application document MUST define the exact concept of a - session that is being accounted, and it MAY define the concept of a - multi-session. For instance, the NASREQ DIAMETER application treats - a single PPP connection to a Network Access Server as one session and - a set of Multilink PPP sessions as one multi-session. - -9.7. Accounting Command Codes - - This section defines Command Code values that MUST be supported by - all Diameter implementations that provide accounting services. - -9.7.1. Accounting-Request - - The Accounting-Request (ACR) command, indicated by the Command Code - field set to 271 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit set, is sent by a - Diameter node, acting as a client, in order to exchange accounting - information with a peer. - - In addition to the AVPs listed below, Accounting-Request messages - SHOULD include service-specific accounting AVPs. - - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 127] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Message Format - - <ACR> ::= < Diameter Header: 271, REQ, PXY > - < Session-Id > - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - { Destination-Realm } - { Accounting-Record-Type } - { Accounting-Record-Number } - [ Acct-Application-Id ] - [ Vendor-Specific-Application-Id ] - [ User-Name ] - [ Destination-Host ] - [ Accounting-Sub-Session-Id ] - [ Acct-Session-Id ] - [ Acct-Multi-Session-Id ] - [ Acct-Interim-Interval ] - [ Accounting-Realtime-Required ] - [ Origin-State-Id ] - [ Event-Timestamp ] - * [ Proxy-Info ] - * [ Route-Record ] - * [ AVP ] - -9.7.2. Accounting-Answer - - The Accounting-Answer (ACA) command, indicated by the Command Code - field set to 271 and the Command Flags' 'R' bit cleared, is used to - acknowledge an Accounting-Request command. The Accounting-Answer - command contains the same Session-Id as the corresponding request. - - Only the target Diameter server, known as the home Diameter server, - SHOULD respond with the Accounting-Answer command. - - In addition to the AVPs listed below, Accounting-Answer messages - SHOULD include service-specific accounting AVPs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 128] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Message Format - - <ACA> ::= < Diameter Header: 271, PXY > - < Session-Id > - { Result-Code } - { Origin-Host } - { Origin-Realm } - { Accounting-Record-Type } - { Accounting-Record-Number } - [ Acct-Application-Id ] - [ Vendor-Specific-Application-Id ] - [ User-Name ] - [ Accounting-Sub-Session-Id ] - [ Acct-Session-Id ] - [ Acct-Multi-Session-Id ] - [ Error-Message ] - [ Error-Reporting-Host ] - [ Failed-AVP ] - [ Acct-Interim-Interval ] - [ Accounting-Realtime-Required ] - [ Origin-State-Id ] - [ Event-Timestamp ] - * [ Proxy-Info ] - * [ AVP ] - -9.8. Accounting AVPs - - This section contains AVPs that describe accounting usage information - related to a specific session. - -9.8.1. Accounting-Record-Type AVP - - The Accounting-Record-Type AVP (AVP Code 480) is of type Enumerated - and contains the type of accounting record being sent. The following - values are currently defined for the Accounting-Record-Type AVP: - - EVENT_RECORD 1 - - An Accounting Event Record is used to indicate that a one-time - event has occurred (meaning that the start and end of the event - are simultaneous). This record contains all information relevant - to the service, and it is the only record of the service. - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 129] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - START_RECORD 2 - - Accounting Start, Interim, and Stop Records are used to indicate - that a service of a measurable length has been given. An - Accounting Start Record is used to initiate an accounting session - and contains accounting information that is relevant to the - initiation of the session. - - INTERIM_RECORD 3 - - An Interim Accounting Record contains cumulative accounting - information for an existing accounting session. Interim - Accounting Records SHOULD be sent every time a re-authentication - or re-authorization occurs. Further, additional interim record - triggers MAY be defined by application-specific Diameter - applications. The selection of whether to use INTERIM_RECORD - records is done by the Acct-Interim-Interval AVP. - - STOP_RECORD 4 - - An Accounting Stop Record is sent to terminate an accounting - session and contains cumulative accounting information relevant to - the existing session. - -9.8.2. Acct-Interim-Interval AVP - - The Acct-Interim-Interval AVP (AVP Code 85) is of type Unsigned32 and - is sent from the Diameter home authorization server to the Diameter - client. The client uses information in this AVP to decide how and - when to produce accounting records. With different values in this - AVP, service sessions can result in one, two, or two+N accounting - records, based on the needs of the home organization. The following - accounting record production behavior is directed by the inclusion of - this AVP: - - 1. The omission of the Acct-Interim-Interval AVP or its inclusion - with Value field set to 0 means that EVENT_RECORD, START_RECORD, - and STOP_RECORD are produced, as appropriate for the service. - - 2. The inclusion of the AVP with Value field set to a non-zero value - means that INTERIM_RECORD records MUST be produced between the - START_RECORD and STOP_RECORD records. The Value field of this - AVP is the nominal interval between these records in seconds. - The Diameter node that originates the accounting information, - known as the client, MUST produce the first INTERIM_RECORD record - roughly at the time when this nominal interval has elapsed from - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 130] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - the START_RECORD, the next one again as the interval has elapsed - once more, and so on until the session ends and a STOP_RECORD - record is produced. - - The client MUST ensure that the interim record production times - are randomized so that large accounting message storms are not - created either among records or around a common service start - time. - -9.8.3. Accounting-Record-Number AVP - - The Accounting-Record-Number AVP (AVP Code 485) is of type Unsigned32 - and identifies this record within one session. As Session-Id AVPs - are globally unique, the combination of Session-Id and Accounting- - Record-Number AVPs is also globally unique and can be used in - matching accounting records with confirmations. An easy way to - produce unique numbers is to set the value to 0 for records of type - EVENT_RECORD and START_RECORD and set the value to 1 for the first - INTERIM_RECORD, 2 for the second, and so on until the value for - STOP_RECORD is one more than for the last INTERIM_RECORD. - -9.8.4. Acct-Session-Id AVP - - The Acct-Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 44) is of type OctetString is only - used when RADIUS/Diameter translation occurs. This AVP contains the - contents of the RADIUS Acct-Session-Id attribute. - -9.8.5. Acct-Multi-Session-Id AVP - - The Acct-Multi-Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 50) is of type UTF8String, - following the format specified in Section 8.8. The Acct-Multi- - Session-Id AVP is used to link multiple related accounting sessions, - where each session would have a unique Session-Id but the same Acct- - Multi-Session-Id AVP. This AVP MAY be returned by the Diameter - server in an authorization answer, and it MUST be used in all - accounting messages for the given session. - -9.8.6. Accounting-Sub-Session-Id AVP - - The Accounting-Sub-Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 287) is of type - Unsigned64 and contains the accounting sub-session identifier. The - combination of the Session-Id and this AVP MUST be unique per sub- - session, and the value of this AVP MUST be monotonically increased by - one for all new sub-sessions. The absence of this AVP implies no - sub-sessions are in use, with the exception of an Accounting-Request - whose Accounting-Record-Type is set to STOP_RECORD. A STOP_RECORD - message with no Accounting-Sub-Session-Id AVP present will signal the - termination of all sub-sessions for a given Session-Id. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 131] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -9.8.7. Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP - - The Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP (AVP Code 483) is of type - Enumerated and is sent from the Diameter home authorization server to - the Diameter client or in the Accounting-Answer from the accounting - server. The client uses information in this AVP to decide what to do - if the sending of accounting records to the accounting server has - been temporarily prevented due to, for instance, a network problem. - - DELIVER_AND_GRANT 1 - - The AVP with Value field set to DELIVER_AND_GRANT means that the - service MUST only be granted as long as there is a connection to - an accounting server. Note that the set of alternative accounting - servers are treated as one server in this sense. Having to move - the accounting record stream to a backup server is not a reason to - discontinue the service to the user. - - GRANT_AND_STORE 2 - - The AVP with Value field set to GRANT_AND_STORE means that service - SHOULD be granted if there is a connection, or as long as records - can still be stored as described in Section 9.4. - - This is the default behavior if the AVP isn't included in the - reply from the authorization server. - - GRANT_AND_LOSE 3 - - The AVP with Value field set to GRANT_AND_LOSE means that service - SHOULD be granted even if the records cannot be delivered or - stored. - -10. AVP Occurrence Tables - - The following tables present the AVPs defined in this document and - specify in which Diameter messages they MAY or MAY NOT be present. - AVPs that occur only inside a Grouped AVP are not shown in these - tables. - - The tables use the following symbols: - - 0 The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message. - - 0+ Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the - message. - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 132] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - 0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message. - It is considered an error if there are more than one instance - of the AVP. - - 1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message. - - 1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the - message. - -10.1. Base Protocol Command AVP Table - - The table in this section is limited to the non-Accounting Command - Codes defined in this specification. - - +-----------------------------------------------+ - | Command Code | - +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ - Attribute Name |CER|CEA|DPR|DPA|DWR|DWA|RAR|RAA|ASR|ASA|STR|STA| - --------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ - Acct-Interim- |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0-1|0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Interval | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Accounting-Realtime-|0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0-1|0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Required | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Acct-Application-Id |0+ |0+ |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Auth-Application-Id |0+ |0+ |0 |0 |0 |0 |1 |0 |1 |0 |1 |0 | - Auth-Grace-Period |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Auth-Request-Type |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Auth-Session-State |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Authorization- |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Lifetime | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Class |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0+ |0+ | - Destination-Host |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |1 |0 |1 |0 |0-1|0 | - Destination-Realm |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |1 |0 |1 |0 |1 |0 | - Disconnect-Cause |0 |0 |1 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Error-Message |0 |0-1|0 |0-1|0 |0-1|0 |0-1|0 |0-1|0 |0-1| - Error-Reporting-Host|0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0-1|0 |0-1|0 |0-1| - Failed-AVP |0 |0-1|0 |0-1|0 |0-1|0 |0-1|0 |0-1|0 |0-1| - Firmware-Revision |0-1|0-1|0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Host-IP-Address |1+ |1+ |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Inband-Security-Id |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Multi-Round-Time-Out|0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 133] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Origin-Host |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 | - Origin-Realm |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 | - Origin-State-Id |0-1|0-1|0 |0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| - Product-Name |1 |1 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Proxy-Info |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0+ |0+ |0+ |0+ |0+ |0+ | - Redirect-Host |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0+ |0 |0+ |0 |0+ | - Redirect-Host-Usage |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0-1|0 |0-1|0 |0-1| - Redirect-Max-Cache- |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0-1|0 |0-1|0 |0-1| - Time | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Result-Code |0 |1 |0 |1 |0 |1 |0 |1 |0 |1 |0 |1 | - Re-Auth-Request-Type|0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |1 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Route-Record |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0+ |0 |0+ |0 |0+ |0 | - Session-Binding |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Session-Id |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 |1 | - Session-Server- |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Failover | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Session-Timeout |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Supported-Vendor-Id |0+ |0+ |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Termination-Cause |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |1 |0 | - User-Name |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| - Vendor-Id |1 |1 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Vendor-Specific- |0+ |0+ |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 | - Application-Id | | | | | | | | | | | | | - --------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ - -10.2. Accounting AVP Table - - The table in this section is used to represent which AVPs defined in - this document are to be present in the Accounting messages. These - AVP occurrence requirements are guidelines, which may be expanded, - and/or overridden by application-specific requirements in the - Diameter applications documents. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 134] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - +-----------+ - | Command | - | Code | - +-----+-----+ - Attribute Name | ACR | ACA | - ------------------------------+-----+-----+ - Acct-Interim-Interval | 0-1 | 0-1 | - Acct-Multi-Session-Id | 0-1 | 0-1 | - Accounting-Record-Number | 1 | 1 | - Accounting-Record-Type | 1 | 1 | - Acct-Session-Id | 0-1 | 0-1 | - Accounting-Sub-Session-Id | 0-1 | 0-1 | - Accounting-Realtime-Required | 0-1 | 0-1 | - Acct-Application-Id | 0-1 | 0-1 | - Auth-Application-Id | 0 | 0 | - Class | 0+ | 0+ | - Destination-Host | 0-1 | 0 | - Destination-Realm | 1 | 0 | - Error-Reporting-Host | 0 | 0+ | - Event-Timestamp | 0-1 | 0-1 | - Failed-AVP | 0 | 0-1 | - Origin-Host | 1 | 1 | - Origin-Realm | 1 | 1 | - Proxy-Info | 0+ | 0+ | - Route-Record | 0+ | 0 | - Result-Code | 0 | 1 | - Session-Id | 1 | 1 | - Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | - User-Name | 0-1 | 0-1 | - Vendor-Specific-Application-Id| 0-1 | 0-1 | - ------------------------------+-----+-----+ - -11. IANA Considerations - - This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers - Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the - Diameter protocol, in accordance with [RFC5226]. Existing IANA - registries and assignments put in place by RFC 3588 remain the same - unless explicitly updated or deprecated in this section. - -11.1. AVP Header - - As defined in Section 4, the AVP header contains three fields that - require IANA namespace management: the AVP Code, Vendor-ID, and Flags - fields. - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 135] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -11.1.1. AVP Codes - - There are multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes - namespace that will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as - Enterprise-Number), and they control the assignments of their vendor- - specific AVP Codes within their own namespace. The absence of a - Vendor-ID or a Vendor-ID value of zero (0) identifies the IETF AVP - Codes namespace, which is under IANA control. The AVP Codes and - sometimes possible values in an AVP are controlled and maintained by - IANA. AVP Code 0 is not used. AVP Codes 1-255 are managed - separately as RADIUS Attribute Types. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is - implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should - be encouraged instead. - - AVPs may be allocated following Expert Review (by a Designated - Expert) with Specification Required [RFC5226]. A block allocation - (release of more than three AVPs at a time for a given purpose) - requires IETF Review [RFC5226]. - -11.1.2. AVP Flags - - Section 4.1 describes the existing AVP Flags. The remaining bits can - only be assigned via a Standards Action [RFC5226]. - -11.2. Diameter Header - -11.2.1. Command Codes - - For the Diameter header, the Command Code namespace allocation has - changed. The new allocation rules are as follows: - - The Command Code values 256 - 8,388,607 (0x100 to 0x7fffff) are - for permanent, standard commands, allocated by IETF Review - [RFC5226]. - - The values 8,388,608 - 16,777,213 (0x800000 - 0xfffffd) are - reserved for vendor-specific Command Codes, to be allocated on a - First Come, First Served basis by IANA [RFC5226]. The request to - IANA for a Vendor-Specific Command Code SHOULD include a reference - to a publicly available specification that documents the command - in sufficient detail to aid in interoperability between - independent implementations. If the specification cannot be made - publicly available, the request for a vendor-specific Command Code - MUST include the contact information of persons and/or entities - responsible for authoring and maintaining the command. - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 136] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - The values 16,777,214 and 16,777,215 (hexadecimal values 0xfffffe - - 0xffffff) are reserved for experimental commands. As these - codes are only for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee - is made for interoperability between Diameter peers using - experimental commands. - -11.2.2. Command Flags - - Section 3 describes the existing Command Flags field. The remaining - bits can only be assigned via a Standards Action [RFC5226]. - -11.3. AVP Values - - For AVP values, the Experimental-Result-Code AVP value allocation has - been added; see Section 11.3.1. The old AVP value allocation rule, - IETF Consensus, has been updated to IETF Review as per [RFC5226], and - affected AVPs are listed as reminders. - -11.3.1. Experimental-Result-Code AVP - - Values for this AVP are purely local to the indicated vendor, and no - IANA registry is maintained for them. - -11.3.2. Result-Code AVP Values - - New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226]. - -11.3.3. Accounting-Record-Type AVP Values - - New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226]. - -11.3.4. Termination-Cause AVP Values - - New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226]. - -11.3.5. Redirect-Host-Usage AVP Values - - New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226]. - -11.3.6. Session-Server-Failover AVP Values - - New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226]. - -11.3.7. Session-Binding AVP Values - - New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226]. - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 137] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -11.3.8. Disconnect-Cause AVP Values - - New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226]. - -11.3.9. Auth-Request-Type AVP Values - - New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226]. - -11.3.10. Auth-Session-State AVP Values - - New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226]. - -11.3.11. Re-Auth-Request-Type AVP Values - - New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226]. - -11.3.12. Accounting-Realtime-Required AVP Values - - New values are available for assignment via IETF Review [RFC5226]. - -11.3.13. Inband-Security-Id AVP (code 299) - - The use of this AVP has been deprecated. - -11.4. _diameters Service Name and Port Number Registration - - IANA has registered the "_diameters" service name and assigned port - numbers for TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP according to the guidelines given - in [RFC6335]. - - Service Name: _diameters - - Transport Protocols: TCP, SCTP - - Assignee: IESG <[email protected]> - - Contact: IETF Chair <[email protected]> - - Description: Diameter over TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP - - Reference: RFC 6733 - - Port Number: 5868, from the User Range - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 138] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -11.5. SCTP Payload Protocol Identifiers - - Two SCTP payload protocol identifiers have been registered in the - SCTP Payload Protocol Identifiers registry: - - - Value | SCTP Payload Protocol Identifier - -------|----------------------------------- - 46 | Diameter in a SCTP DATA chunk - 47 | Diameter in a DTLS/SCTP DATA chunk - - -11.6. S-NAPTR Parameters - - The following tag has been registered in the S-NAPTR Application - Protocol Tags registry: - - Tag | Protocol - -------------------|--------- - diameter.dtls.sctp | DTLS/SCTP - -12. Diameter Protocol-Related Configurable Parameters - - This section contains the configurable parameters that are found - throughout this document: - - Diameter Peer - - A Diameter entity MAY communicate with peers that are statically - configured. A statically configured Diameter peer would require - that either the IP address or the fully qualified domain name - (FQDN) be supplied, which would then be used to resolve through - DNS. - - Routing Table - - A Diameter proxy server routes messages based on the realm portion - of a Network Access Identifier (NAI). The server MUST have a - table of Realm Names, and the address of the peer to which the - message must be forwarded. The routing table MAY also include a - "default route", which is typically used for all messages that - cannot be locally processed. - - Tc timer - - The Tc timer controls the frequency that transport connection - attempts are done to a peer with whom no active transport - connection exists. The recommended value is 30 seconds. - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 139] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -13. Security Considerations - - The Diameter base protocol messages SHOULD be secured by using TLS - [RFC5246] or DTLS/SCTP [RFC6083]. Additional security mechanisms - such as IPsec [RFC4301] MAY also be deployed to secure connections - between peers. However, all Diameter base protocol implementations - MUST support the use of TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP, and the Diameter - protocol MUST NOT be used without one of TLS, DTLS, or IPsec. - - If a Diameter connection is to be protected via TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP - or IPsec, then TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP or IPsec/IKE SHOULD begin prior - to any Diameter message exchange. All security parameters for TLS/ - TCP and DTLS/SCTP or IPsec are configured independent of the Diameter - protocol. All Diameter messages will be sent through the TLS/TCP and - DTLS/SCTP or IPsec connection after a successful setup. - - For TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP connections to be established in the open - state, the CER/CEA exchange MUST include an Inband-Security-ID AVP - with a value of TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP. The TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP - handshake will begin when both ends successfully reach the open - state, after completion of the CER/CEA exchange. If the TLS/TCP and - DTLS/SCTP handshake is successful, all further messages will be sent - via TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP. If the handshake fails, both ends MUST - move to the closed state. See Section 13.1 for more details. - -13.1. TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP Usage - - Diameter nodes using TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP for security MUST mutually - authenticate as part of TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP session establishment. - In order to ensure mutual authentication, the Diameter node acting as - the TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP server MUST request a certificate from the - Diameter node acting as TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP client, and the - Diameter node acting as the TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP client MUST be - prepared to supply a certificate on request. - - Diameter nodes MUST be able to negotiate the following TLS/TCP and - DTLS/SCTP cipher suites: - - TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 - TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - - Diameter nodes SHOULD be able to negotiate the following TLS/TCP and - DTLS/SCTP cipher suite: - - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 140] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - Note that it is quite possible that support for the - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cipher suite will be REQUIRED at some - future date. Diameter nodes MAY negotiate other TLS/TCP and DTLS/ - SCTP cipher suites. - - If public key certificates are used for Diameter security (for - example, with TLS), the value of the expiration times in the routing - and peer tables MUST NOT be greater than the expiry time in the - relevant certificates. - -13.2. Peer-to-Peer Considerations - - As with any peer-to-peer protocol, proper configuration of the trust - model within a Diameter peer is essential to security. When - certificates are used, it is necessary to configure the root - certificate authorities trusted by the Diameter peer. These root CAs - are likely to be unique to Diameter usage and distinct from the root - CAs that might be trusted for other purposes such as Web browsing. - In general, it is expected that those root CAs will be configured so - as to reflect the business relationships between the organization - hosting the Diameter peer and other organizations. As a result, a - Diameter peer will typically not be configured to allow connectivity - with any arbitrary peer. With certificate authentication, Diameter - peers may not be known beforehand and therefore peer discovery may be - required. - -13.3. AVP Considerations - - Diameter AVPs often contain security-sensitive data; for example, - user passwords and location data, network addresses and cryptographic - keys. The following AVPs defined in this document are considered to - be security-sensitive: - - o Acct-Interim-Interval - - o Accounting-Realtime-Required - - o Acct-Multi-Session-Id - - o Accounting-Record-Number - - o Accounting-Record-Type - - o Accounting-Session-Id - - o Accounting-Sub-Session-Id - - o Class - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 141] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - o Session-Id - - o Session-Binding - - o Session-Server-Failover - - o User-Name - - Diameter messages containing these or any other AVPs considered to be - security-sensitive MUST only be sent protected via mutually - authenticated TLS or IPsec. In addition, those messages MUST NOT be - sent via intermediate nodes unless there is end-to-end security - between the originator and recipient or the originator has locally - trusted configuration that indicates that end-to-end security is not - needed. For example, end-to-end security may not be required in the - case where an intermediary node is known to be operated as part of - the same administrative domain as the endpoints so that an ability to - successfully compromise the intermediary would imply a high - probability of being able to compromise the endpoints as well. Note - that no end-to-end security mechanism is specified in this document. - -14. References - -14.1. Normative References - - [FLOATPOINT] - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE - Standard for Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic, ANSI/IEEE - Standard 754-1985", August 1985. - - [IANAADFAM] - IANA, "Address Family Numbers", - <http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers>. - - [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, - September 1981. - - [RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, - RFC 793, September 1981. - - [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate - Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - - [RFC3492] Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode - for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications - (IDNA)", RFC 3492, March 2003. - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 142] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - [RFC3539] Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization and - Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile", RFC 3539, June 2003. - - [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO - 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003. - - [RFC3958] Daigle, L. and A. Newton, "Domain-Based Application - Service Location Using SRV RRs and the Dynamic Delegation - Discovery Service (DDDS)", RFC 3958, January 2005. - - [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform - Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, - RFC 3986, January 2005. - - [RFC4004] Calhoun, P., Johansson, T., Perkins, C., Hiller, T., and - P. McCann, "Diameter Mobile IPv4 Application", RFC 4004, - August 2005. - - [RFC4005] Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, - "Diameter Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005, - August 2005. - - [RFC4006] Hakala, H., Mattila, L., Koskinen, J-P., Stura, M., and J. - Loughney, "Diameter Credit-Control Application", RFC 4006, - August 2005. - - [RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness - Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005. - - [RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The - Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005. - - [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing - Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. - - [RFC4960] Stewart, R., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", - RFC 4960, September 2007. - - [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an - IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, - May 2008. - - [RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax - Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008. - - [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security - (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 143] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., - Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key - Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List - (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. - - [RFC5729] Korhonen, J., Jones, M., Morand, L., and T. Tsou, - "Clarifications on the Routing of Diameter Requests Based - on the Username and the Realm", RFC 5729, December 2009. - - [RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for - Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework", - RFC 5890, August 2010. - - [RFC5891] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names in - Applications (IDNA): Protocol", RFC 5891, August 2010. - - [RFC6083] Tuexen, M., Seggelmann, R., and E. Rescorla, "Datagram - Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for Stream Control - Transmission Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 6083, January 2011. - - [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer - Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012. - - [RFC6408] Jones, M., Korhonen, J., and L. Morand, "Diameter - Straightforward-Naming Authority Pointer (S-NAPTR) Usage", - RFC 6408, November 2011. - -14.2. Informative References - - [ENTERPRISE] IANA, "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise - Codes", - <http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers>. - - [IANATCV] IANA, "Termination-Cause AVP Values (code 295)", - <http://www.iana.org/assignments/aaa-parameters/ - aaa-parameters.xml#aaa-parameters-16>. - - [RFC1492] Finseth, C., "An Access Control Protocol, Sometimes - Called TACACS", RFC 1492, July 1993. - - [RFC1661] Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", - STD 51, RFC 1661, July 1994. - - [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: - Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, - February 1997. - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 144] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - [RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR - for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", - RFC 2782, February 2000. - - [RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, - "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", - RFC 2865, June 2000. - - [RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000. - - [RFC2869] Rigney, C., Willats, W., and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS - Extensions", RFC 2869, June 2000. - - [RFC2881] Mitton, D. and M. Beadles, "Network Access Server - Requirements Next Generation (NASREQNG) NAS Model", - RFC 2881, July 2000. - - [RFC2975] Aboba, B., Arkko, J., and D. Harrington, "Introduction - to Accounting Management", RFC 2975, October 2000. - - [RFC2989] Aboba, B., Calhoun, P., Glass, S., Hiller, T., McCann, - P., Shiino, H., Walsh, P., Zorn, G., Dommety, G., - Perkins, C., Patil, B., Mitton, D., Manning, S., - Beadles, M., Chen, X., Sivalingham, S., Hameed, A., - Munson, M., Jacobs, S., Lim, B., Hirschman, B., Hsu, - R., Koo, H., Lipford, M., Campbell, E., Xu, Y., Baba, - S., and E. Jaques, "Criteria for Evaluating AAA - Protocols for Network Access", RFC 2989, November 2000. - - [RFC3162] Aboba, B., Zorn, G., and D. Mitton, "RADIUS and IPv6", - RFC 3162, August 2001. - - [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and - H. Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol - (EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004. - - [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the - Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. - - [RFC4690] Klensin, J., Faltstrom, P., Karp, C., and IAB, "Review - and Recommendations for Internationalized Domain Names - (IDNs)", RFC 4690, September 2006. - - [RFC5176] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B. - Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote - Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", - RFC 5176, January 2008. - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 145] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - [RFC5461] Gont, F., "TCP's Reaction to Soft Errors", RFC 5461, - February 2009. - - [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, - "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and - Algorithms Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. - - [RFC5927] Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927, - July 2010. - - [RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and - S. Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority - (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service - Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", - BCP 165, RFC 6335, August 2011. - - [RFC6737] Kang, J. and G. Zorn, "The Diameter Capabilities Update - Application", RFC 6737, October 2012. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 146] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - -Appendix A. Acknowledgements - -A.1. This Document - - The authors would like to thank the following people that have - provided proposals and contributions to this document: - - To Vishnu Ram and Satendra Gera for their contributions on - capabilities updates, predictive loop avoidance, as well as many - other technical proposals. To Tolga Asveren for his insights and - contributions on almost all of the proposed solutions incorporated - into this document. To Timothy Smith for helping on the capabilities - Update and other topics. To Tony Zhang for providing fixes to - loopholes on composing Failed-AVPs as well as many other issues and - topics. To Jan Nordqvist for clearly stating the usage of - Application Ids. To Anders Kristensen for providing needed technical - opinions. To David Frascone for providing invaluable review of the - document. To Mark Jones for providing clarifying text on vendor - command codes and other vendor-specific indicators. To Victor - Pascual and Sebastien Decugis for new text and recommendations on - SCTP/DTLS. To Jouni Korhonen for taking over the editing task and - resolving last bits from versions 27 through 29. - - Special thanks to the Diameter extensibility design team, which - helped resolve the tricky question of mandatory AVPs and ABNF - semantics. The members of this team are as follows: - - Avi Lior, Jari Arkko, Glen Zorn, Lionel Morand, Mark Jones, Tolga - Asveren, Jouni Korhonen, and Glenn McGregor. - - Special thanks also to people who have provided invaluable comments - and inputs especially in resolving controversial issues: - - Glen Zorn, Yoshihiro Ohba, Marco Stura, Stephen Farrel, Pete Resnick, - Peter Saint-Andre, Robert Sparks, Krishna Prasad, Sean Turner, Barry - Leiba, and Pasi Eronen. - - Finally, we would like to thank the original authors of this - document: - - Pat Calhoun, John Loughney, Jari Arkko, Erik Guttman, and Glen Zorn. - - Their invaluable knowledge and experience has given us a robust and - flexible AAA protocol that many people have seen great value in - adopting. We greatly appreciate their support and stewardship for - the continued improvements of Diameter as a protocol. We would also - like to extend our gratitude to folks aside from the authors who have - - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 147] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - assisted and contributed to the original version of this document. - Their efforts significantly contributed to the success of Diameter. - -A.2. RFC 3588 - - The authors would like to thank Nenad Trifunovic, Tony Johansson and - Pankaj Patel for their participation in the pre-IETF Document Reading - Party. Allison Mankin, Jonathan Wood, and Bernard Aboba provided - invaluable assistance in working out transport issues and this was - also the case with Steven Bellovin in the security area. - - Paul Funk and David Mitton were instrumental in getting the Peer - State Machine correct, and our deep thanks go to them for their time. - - Text in this document was also provided by Paul Funk, Mark Eklund, - Mark Jones, and Dave Spence. Jacques Caron provided many great - comments as a result of a thorough review of the spec. - - The authors would also like to acknowledge the following people for - their contribution in the development of the Diameter protocol: - - Allan C. Rubens, Haseeb Akhtar, William Bulley, Stephen Farrell, - David Frascone, Daniel C. Fox, Lol Grant, Ignacio Goyret, Nancy - Greene, Peter Heitman, Fredrik Johansson, Mark Jones, Martin Julien, - Bob Kopacz, Paul Krumviede, Fergal Ladley, Ryan Moats, Victor Muslin, - Kenneth Peirce, John Schnizlein, Sumit Vakil, John R. Vollbrecht, and - Jeff Weisberg. - - Finally, Pat Calhoun would like to thank Sun Microsystems since most - of the effort put into this document was done while he was in their - employ. - -Appendix B. S-NAPTR Example - - As an example, consider a client that wishes to resolve aaa: - ex1.example.com. The client performs a NAPTR query for that domain, - and the following NAPTR records are returned: - - ;; order pref flags service regexp replacement - IN NAPTR 50 50 "s" "aaa:diameter.tls.tcp" "" - _diameter._tls.ex1.example.com - IN NAPTR 100 50 "s" "aaa:diameter.tcp" "" - _aaa._tcp.ex1.example.com - IN NAPTR 150 50 "s" "aaa:diameter.sctp" "" - _diameter._sctp.ex1.example.com - - This indicates that the server supports TLS, TCP, and SCTP in that - order. If the client supports TLS, TLS will be used, targeted to a - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 148] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - host determined by an SRV lookup of _diameter._tls.ex1.example.com. - That lookup would return: - - ;; Priority Weight Port Target - IN SRV 0 1 5060 server1.ex1.example.com - IN SRV 0 2 5060 server2.ex1.example.com - - As an alternative example, a client that wishes to resolve aaa: - ex2.example.com. The client performs a NAPTR query for that domain, - and the following NAPTR records are returned: - - ;; order pref flags service regexp replacement - IN NAPTR 150 50 "a" "aaa:diameter.tls.tcp" "" - server1.ex2.example.com - IN NAPTR 150 50 "a" "aaa:diameter.tls.tcp" "" - server2.ex2.example.com - - This indicates that the server supports TCP available at the returned - host names. - -Appendix C. Duplicate Detection - - As described in Section 9.4, accounting record duplicate detection is - based on session identifiers. Duplicates can appear for various - reasons: - - o Failover to an alternate server. Where close to real-time - performance is required, failover thresholds need to be kept low. - This may lead to an increased likelihood of duplicates. Failover - can occur at the client or within Diameter agents. - - o Failure of a client or agent after sending a record from non- - volatile memory, but prior to receipt of an application-layer ACK - and deletion of the record to be sent. This will result in - retransmission of the record soon after the client or agent has - rebooted. - - o Duplicates received from RADIUS gateways. Since the - retransmission behavior of RADIUS is not defined within [RFC2865], - the likelihood of duplication will vary according to the - implementation. - - o Implementation problems and misconfiguration. - - The T flag is used as an indication of an application-layer - retransmission event, e.g., due to failover to an alternate server. - It is defined only for request messages sent by Diameter clients or - agents. For instance, after a reboot, a client may not know whether - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 149] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - it has already tried to send the accounting records in its non- - volatile memory before the reboot occurred. Diameter servers MAY use - the T flag as an aid when processing requests and detecting duplicate - messages. However, servers that do this MUST ensure that duplicates - are found even when the first transmitted request arrives at the - server after the retransmitted request. It can be used only in cases - where no answer has been received from the server for a request and - the request is sent again, (e.g., due to a failover to an alternate - peer, due to a recovered primary peer or due to a client re-sending a - stored record from non-volatile memory such as after reboot of a - client or agent). - - In some cases, the Diameter accounting server can delay the duplicate - detection and accounting record processing until a post-processing - phase takes place. At that time records are likely to be sorted - according to the included User-Name and duplicate elimination is easy - in this case. In other situations, it may be necessary to perform - real-time duplicate detection, such as when credit limits are imposed - or real-time fraud detection is desired. - - In general, only generation of duplicates due to failover or re- - sending of records in non-volatile storage can be reliably detected - by Diameter clients or agents. In such cases, the Diameter client or - agents can mark the message as a possible duplicate by setting the T - flag. Since the Diameter server is responsible for duplicate - detection, it can choose whether or not to make use of the T flag, in - order to optimize duplicate detection. Since the T flag does not - affect interoperability, and it may not be needed by some servers, - generation of the T flag is REQUIRED for Diameter clients and agents, - but it MAY be implemented by Diameter servers. - - As an example, it can be usually be assumed that duplicates appear - within a time window of longest recorded network partition or device - fault, perhaps a day. So only records within this time window need - to be looked at in the backward direction. Secondly, hashing - techniques or other schemes, such as the use of the T flag in the - received messages, may be used to eliminate the need to do a full - search even in this set except for rare cases. - - The following is an example of how the T flag may be used by the - server to detect duplicate requests. - - A Diameter server MAY check the T flag of the received message to - determine if the record is a possible duplicate. If the T flag is - set in the request message, the server searches for a duplicate - within a configurable duplication time window backward and - forward. This limits database searching to those records where - the T flag is set. In a well-run network, network partitions and - - - -Fajardo, et al. Standards Track [Page 150] - -RFC 6733 Diameter Base Protocol October 2012 - - - device faults will presumably be rare events, so this approach - represents a substantial optimization of the duplicate detection - process. During failover, it is possible for the original record - to be received after the T-flag-marked record, due to differences - in network delays experienced along the path by the original and - duplicate transmissions. The likelihood of this occurring - increases as the failover interval is decreased. In order to be - able to detect duplicates that are out of order, the Diameter - server should use backward and forward time windows when - performing duplicate checking for the T-flag-marked request. For - example, in order to allow time for the original record to exit - the network and be recorded by the accounting server, the Diameter - server can delay processing records with the T flag set until a - time period TIME_WAIT + RECORD_PROCESSING_TIME has elapsed after - the closing of the original transport connection. After this time - period, it may check the T-flag-marked records against the - database with relative assurance that the original records, if - sent, have been received and recorded. - -Appendix D. Internationalized Domain Names - - To be compatible with the existing DNS infrastructure and simplify - host and domain name comparison, Diameter identities (FQDNs) are - represented in ASCII form. This allows the Diameter protocol to fall - in-line with the DNS strategy of being transparent from the effects - of Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) by following the - recommendations in [RFC4690] and [RFC5890]. Applications that - provide support for IDNs outside of the Diameter protocol but - interacting with it SHOULD use the representation and conversion - framework described in [RFC5890], [RFC5891], and [RFC3492]. -</pre> - -</section> diff --git a/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_tcp.xml b/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_tcp.xml index 1d65d14257..9f84eeb9fd 100644 --- a/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_tcp.xml +++ b/lib/diameter/doc/src/diameter_tcp.xml @@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ <erlref> <header> <copyright> -<year>2011</year><year>2016</year> +<year>2011</year> +<year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -99,7 +100,9 @@ before configuring TLS capability on diameter transports.</p> | {rport, integer()} | {accept, Match} | {port, integer()} - | {fragment_timer, infinity | 0..16#FFFFFFFF}</v> + | {fragment_timer, infinity | 0..16#FFFFFFFF} + | {message_cb, &mod_eval;} + | {sender, boolean()}</v> <v>SslOpt = {ssl_options, true | list()}</v> <v>TcpOpt = term()</v> <v>Match = &ip_address; | string() | [Match]</v> @@ -140,6 +143,44 @@ such a message is received over the transport interface after two successive timeouts without the reception of additional bytes. Defaults to 1000.</p> +<marker id="sender"/> +<p> +Option <c>sender</c> specifies whether or not to use a dedicated +process for sending outgoing messages, which avoids the possibility of +send blocking reception. +Defaults to <c>false</c>. +If set to <c>true</c> then a <c>message_cb</c> that avoids the +possibility of messages being queued in the sender process without +bound should be configured.</p> + +<p> +Option <c>message_cb</c> specifies a callback that is invoked on +incoming and outgoing messages, that can be used to implement +flow control. +It is applied to two arguments: an atom indicating the +reason for the callback (<c>send</c>, <c>recv</c>, or <c>ack</c> after +a completed send), and the message in question (binary() on +<c>recv</c>, binary() or diameter_packet record on <c>send</c> or +<c>ack</c>, or <c>false</c> on <c>ack</c> when an incoming request has +been discarded). +It should return a list of actions and a new callback as +tail; eg. <c>[fun cb/3, State]</c>. +Valid actions are the atoms <c>send</c> or <c>recv</c>, to +cause a following message-valued action to be sent/received, +a message to send/receive (binary() or +diameter_packet record), or a boolean() to enable/disable reading on +the socket. +More than one <c>send</c>/<c>recv</c>/message sequence can be +returned from the same callback, and an initial +<c>send</c>/<c>recv</c> can be omitted if the same as the value passed +as the callback's first argument. +Reading is initially enabled, and returning <c>false</c> does not +imply there cannot be subsequent <c>recv</c> callbacks since +messages may already have been read. +An empty tail is equivalent to the prevailing callback. +Defaults to a callback equivalent to <c>fun(ack, _) -> []; (_, Msg) -> +[Msg] end</c>.</p> + <p> Remaining options are any accepted by &ssl_connect3; or &gen_tcp_connect3; for diff --git a/lib/diameter/doc/src/files.mk b/lib/diameter/doc/src/files.mk index cb4f88a375..4c1297f6cc 100644 --- a/lib/diameter/doc/src/files.mk +++ b/lib/diameter/doc/src/files.mk @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # %CopyrightBegin% # -# Copyright Ericsson AB 2010-2016. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright Ericsson AB 2010-2017. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ XML_PART_FILES = \ user_man.xml XML_EXTRA_FILES = \ - seealso.ent \ - diameter_soc_rfc6733.xml + seealso.ent XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ diameter_intro.xml \ diff --git a/lib/diameter/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/diameter/doc/src/notes.xml index 60478606ad..d1ad00de5c 100644 --- a/lib/diameter/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/diameter/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -43,6 +43,208 @@ first.</p> <!-- ===================================================================== --> +<section><title>diameter 2.1</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Fix handling of Proxy-Info in answer messages setting the + E-bit.</p> + <p> + RFC 6733 requires that Proxy-Info AVPs in an incoming + request be echoed in an outgoing answer. This was not + done in answers formulated by diameter; for example, as a + result of a handle_request callback having returned an + 'answer-message' or protocol_error tuple.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-9869</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + React to nodeup/nodedown when sharing peer connections.</p> + <p> + Service configuration share_peers and use_shared_peers + did not respond to the coming and going of remote nodes.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14011</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fix inappropriate message callbacks.</p> + <p> + An incoming CER or DPR was regarded as discarded, + resulting in a corresponding message callback (if + configured) in diameter_tcp/sctp.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14486</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fix handling of 5009 errors (DIAMETER_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY + TIMES).</p> + <p> + RFC 6733 says that the first AVP that exceeds the bound + should be reported, but the suggestions in the errors + field of a diameter_packet record counted AVPs from the + rear of the message, not the front. Additionally, + diameter 2.0 in OTP 20.0 broke the counting by accepting + one more AVP than the message grammar in question + allowed.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14512</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Match case insensitively in diameter_tcp/sctp accept + tuple.</p> + <p> + Matching of remote addresses when accepting connections + in a listening transport was case-sensitive, causing the + semantics to change as a consequence of (kernel) + OTP-13006.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14535 Aux Id: OTP-13006 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fix backwards incompatibility of remote send when sharing + transports.</p> + <p> + The sending of requests over a transport connection on a + remote node running an older version of diameter was + broken by diameter 2.0 in OTP 20.0.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14552</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fix diameter_packet.avps decode of Grouped AVP errors in + Failed-AVP.</p> + <p> + Decode didn't produce a list of diameter_avp records, so + information about faulty component AVPs was lost.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14607</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Let unordered delivery be configured in diameter_sctp.</p> + <p> + With option {unordered, boolean() | pos_integer()}, with + false the default, and N equivalent to OS =< N, where + OS is the number of outbound streams negotiated on the + association in question. If configured, unordered sending + commences upon reception of a second message, outgoing + messages being sent on stream 0 before this.</p> + <p> + The default false is for backwards compatibility, but + false or 1 should be set to follow RFC 6733's + recommendation on the use of unordered sending to avoid + head-of-line blocking. There is typically no meaningful + order to preserve, since the order in which outgoing + messages are received by a transport process isn't known + to the sender.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-10889</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Complete/simplify Standards Compliance in User's Guide.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-10927</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Add service option decode_format.</p> + <p> + To allow incoming messages to be decoded into maps or + lists instead of records. Messages can be presented in + any of the formats for encode.</p> + <p> + Decode performance has also been improved.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14511 Aux Id: OTP-14343 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Add service option traffic_counters.</p> + <p> + To let message-related counters be disabled, which can be + a performance improvement in some usecases.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14521</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Allow loopback/any as local addresses in + diameter_tcp/sctp.</p> + <p> + The atoms were implied by documentation, but not handled + in code.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14544</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Add transport option strict_capx.</p> + <p> + To allow the RFC 6733 requirement that a transport + connection be closed if a message is received before + capabilities exchange to be relaxed.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14546</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Be consistent with service/transport configuration.</p> + <p> + For options for which it's meaningful, defaults values + for transport options can now be configured on a service. + This was previously the case only for an arbitrary subset + of options.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14555</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Add service/transport option avp_dictionaries.</p> + <p> + To provide better support for AVPs that are not defined + in the application dictionary: configuring additional + dictionaries in an avp_dictionaries tuple allows their + AVPs to be encoded/decoded in much the same fashion as + application AVPs.</p> + <p> + The motivation is RFC 7683 Diameter Overload, Indicator + Conveyance (DOIC), that defines AVPs intended to be + piggybacked onto arbitrary messages. A DOIC dictionary + has been included in the installation, in module + diameter_gen_doic_rfc7683.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14588</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Decode application AVPs in answers setting the E-bit.</p> + <p> + AVPs defined in the application of the message being sent + were previously not decoded, only those in the common + application that defines the answer-message grammar.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14596</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>diameter 2.0</title> <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> diff --git a/lib/edoc/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/edoc/doc/src/notes.xml index 7894811c78..96d7597d83 100644 --- a/lib/edoc/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/edoc/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -32,6 +32,21 @@ <p>This document describes the changes made to the EDoc application.</p> +<section><title>Edoc 0.9.1</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Tools are updated to show Unicode atoms correctly.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14464</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Edoc 0.9</title> <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> diff --git a/lib/edoc/vsn.mk b/lib/edoc/vsn.mk index 1a933b2ad8..065944ccef 100644 --- a/lib/edoc/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/edoc/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -EDOC_VSN = 0.9 +EDOC_VSN = 0.9.1 diff --git a/lib/erl_docgen/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/erl_docgen/doc/src/notes.xml index 59a268d6ac..59c65665d4 100644 --- a/lib/erl_docgen/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/erl_docgen/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -31,7 +31,22 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the <em>erl_docgen</em> application.</p> - <section><title>Erl_Docgen 0.7</title> + <section><title>Erl_Docgen 0.7.1</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>Erl_Docgen 0.7</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> <list> diff --git a/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_funcs.xsl b/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_funcs.xsl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8178ce44fb --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_funcs.xsl @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> +<!-- + # + # %CopyrightBegin% + # + # Copyright Ericsson AB 2009-2017. All Rights Reserved. + # + # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); + # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + # You may obtain a copy of the License at + # + # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + # + # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + # limitations under the License. + # + # %CopyrightEnd% + + --> +<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" + xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" + xmlns:erl="http://erlang.org" + xmlns:func="http://exslt.org/functions" + extension-element-prefixes="func" + xmlns:fo="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Format" + xmlns:fn="http://www.w3.org/2005/02/xpath-functions"> + + <!-- Used from code template to trim the newline/cr after the tag + and spaces/tabs between them + --> + <xsl:variable name="newlinechars" select="' '" /> + <xsl:variable name="spacechars" select="'	 '" /> + + <func:function name="erl:code_trim"> + <xsl:param name="string" /> + + <xsl:variable name="leftresult" select="erl:code_ltrim($string, $string)"/> + <xsl:variable name="result" select="erl:code_rtrim($leftresult, $leftresult)"/> + + <func:result select="$result"/> + </func:function> + + <func:function name="erl:code_rtrim"> + <xsl:param name="string" /> + <xsl:param name="origstring" /> + + <xsl:variable name="length" select="string-length($string)" /> + + <xsl:variable name="result"> + <xsl:if test="$length > 0"> + <xsl:choose> + <xsl:when test="contains($spacechars, substring($string, $length, 1))"> + <xsl:value-of select="erl:code_rtrim(substring($string, 1, $length - 1), $origstring)" /> + </xsl:when> + <xsl:when test="contains($newlinechars, substring($string, $length, 1))"> + <xsl:value-of select="erl:code_rtrim_1(substring($string, 1, $length - 1))" /> + </xsl:when> + <xsl:otherwise> + <xsl:value-of select="$origstring" /> + </xsl:otherwise> + </xsl:choose> + </xsl:if> + </xsl:variable> + + <func:result select="$result" /> + </func:function> + + <func:function name="erl:code_rtrim_1"> + <xsl:param name="string" /> + + <xsl:variable name="length" select="string-length($string)" /> + + <xsl:variable name="result"> + <xsl:if test="$length > 0"> + <xsl:choose> + <xsl:when test="contains($newlinechars, substring($string, $length, 1))"> + <xsl:value-of select="erl:code_rtrim_1(substring($string, 1, $length - 1))" /> + </xsl:when> + <xsl:otherwise> + <xsl:value-of select="erl:code_rtrim($string, $string)" /> + <!--xsl:value-of select="$string" /--> + </xsl:otherwise> + </xsl:choose> + </xsl:if> + </xsl:variable> + + <func:result select="$result" /> + </func:function> + + <func:function name="erl:code_ltrim"> + <xsl:param name="string" /> + <xsl:param name="origstring" /> + + <xsl:variable name="result"> + <xsl:if test="string-length($string) > 0"> + <xsl:choose> + <xsl:when test="contains($spacechars, substring($string, 1, 1))"> + <xsl:value-of select="erl:code_ltrim(substring($string, 2), $origstring)" /> + </xsl:when> + <xsl:when test="contains($newlinechars, substring($string, 1, 1))"> + <xsl:value-of select="erl:code_ltrim_1(substring($string, 2))" /> + </xsl:when> + <xsl:otherwise> + <xsl:value-of select="$origstring" /> + </xsl:otherwise> + </xsl:choose> + </xsl:if> + </xsl:variable> + + <func:result select="$result" /> + </func:function> + + <func:function name="erl:code_ltrim_1"> + <xsl:param name="string" /> + + <xsl:variable name="result"> + <xsl:if test="string-length($string) > 0"> + <xsl:choose> + <xsl:when test="contains($newlinechars, substring($string, 1, 1))"> + <xsl:value-of select="erl:code_ltrim_1(substring($string, 2))" /> + </xsl:when> + <xsl:otherwise> + <xsl:value-of select="erl:code_ltrim($string, $string)" /> + <!--xsl:value-of select="$string" /--> + </xsl:otherwise> + </xsl:choose> + </xsl:if> + </xsl:variable> + + <func:result select="$result" /> + </func:function> + +</xsl:stylesheet> diff --git a/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_html.xsl b/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_html.xsl index a5e277aece..75614392fb 100644 --- a/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_html.xsl +++ b/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_html.xsl @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ xmlns:fn="http://www.w3.org/2005/02/xpath-functions"> <xsl:include href="db_html_params.xsl"/> + <xsl:include href="db_funcs.xsl"/> <func:function name="erl:flip_first_char"> <xsl:param name="in"/> @@ -1132,7 +1133,14 @@ <xsl:variable name="codenum"> <xsl:number level="any" from="chapter" count="code"/> </xsl:variable> - <div class="example"><pre><xsl:apply-templates/></pre></div> + <xsl:choose> + <xsl:when test="not(descendant::anno)"> + <div class="example"><pre><xsl:value-of select="erl:code_trim(text())"/></pre></div> + </xsl:when> + <xsl:otherwise> + <div class="example"><pre><xsl:apply-templates/></pre></div> + </xsl:otherwise> + </xsl:choose> </xsl:template> <!-- Pre --> diff --git a/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_pdf.xsl b/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_pdf.xsl index 99263847fb..46de66bcd8 100644 --- a/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_pdf.xsl +++ b/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_pdf.xsl @@ -23,12 +23,16 @@ <xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" xmlns:exsl="http://exslt.org/common" - extension-element-prefixes="exsl" - xmlns:fo="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Format"> + xmlns:func="http://exslt.org/functions" + xmlns:erl="http://erlang.org" + extension-element-prefixes="exsl func" + xmlns:fo="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Format" + xmlns:fn="http://www.w3.org/2005/02/xpath-functions"> <xsl:output method="xml" indent="yes"/> <xsl:include href="db_pdf_params.xsl"/> + <xsl:include href="db_funcs.xsl"/> <!-- Start of Dialyzer type/spec tags. See also the templates matching "name" and "seealso" as well as @@ -687,7 +691,7 @@ <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="cover.inner.copyrightnotice"> <xsl:value-of select="/book/header/legalnotice"/> - <!-- + <!-- Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at @@ -744,12 +748,12 @@ <fo:bookmark internal-destination="{generate-id(header/title)}" starting-state="hide"> <fo:bookmark-title><xsl:value-of select="header/title"/></fo:bookmark-title> - + <xsl:call-template name="bookmarks2"> <xsl:with-param name="entries" select="chapter[header/title]"/> </xsl:call-template> - + </fo:bookmark> </xsl:for-each> </xsl:if> @@ -1122,52 +1126,60 @@ <!-- Note --> <xsl:template match="note"> <xsl:param name="partnum"/> - <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note"> - <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-warning-title"> - <xsl:text>Note:</xsl:text> - </fo:block> - <xsl:apply-templates> - <xsl:with-param name="partnum" select="$partnum"/> - </xsl:apply-templates> + <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-warning"> + <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-title"> + <xsl:text>Note:</xsl:text> + </fo:block> + <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-warning-content"> + <xsl:apply-templates> + <xsl:with-param name="partnum" select="$partnum"/> + </xsl:apply-templates> + </fo:block> </fo:block> </xsl:template> <!-- Warning --> <xsl:template match="warning"> <xsl:param name="partnum"/> - <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="warning"> - <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-warning-title"> - <xsl:text>Warning:</xsl:text> - </fo:block> - <xsl:apply-templates> - <xsl:with-param name="partnum" select="$partnum"/> - </xsl:apply-templates> + <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-warning"> + <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="warning-title"> + <xsl:text>Warning:</xsl:text> + </fo:block> + <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-warning-content"> + <xsl:apply-templates> + <xsl:with-param name="partnum" select="$partnum"/> + </xsl:apply-templates> + </fo:block> </fo:block> </xsl:template> <!-- Do --> <xsl:template match="do"> <xsl:param name="partnum"/> - <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="do"> - <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-warning-title"> - <xsl:text>Do:</xsl:text> - </fo:block> - <xsl:apply-templates> - <xsl:with-param name="partnum" select="$partnum"/> - </xsl:apply-templates> + <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-warning"> + <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-title"> + <xsl:text>Do:</xsl:text> + </fo:block> + <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-warning-content"> + <xsl:apply-templates> + <xsl:with-param name="partnum" select="$partnum"/> + </xsl:apply-templates> + </fo:block> </fo:block> </xsl:template> <!-- Dont --> <xsl:template match="dont"> <xsl:param name="partnum"/> - <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="dont"> - <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-warning-title"> - <xsl:text>Don't:</xsl:text> - </fo:block> - <xsl:apply-templates> - <xsl:with-param name="partnum" select="$partnum"/> - </xsl:apply-templates> + <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-warning"> + <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="warning-title"> + <xsl:text>Don't:</xsl:text> + </fo:block> + <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="note-warning-content"> + <xsl:apply-templates> + <xsl:with-param name="partnum" select="$partnum"/> + </xsl:apply-templates> + </fo:block> </fo:block> </xsl:template> @@ -1226,7 +1238,14 @@ </xsl:variable> <fo:block xsl:use-attribute-sets="code"> - <xsl:apply-templates select="text()"/> + <xsl:choose> + <xsl:when test="not(descendant::anno)"> + <xsl:value-of select="erl:code_trim(text())"/> + </xsl:when> + <xsl:otherwise> + <xsl:apply-templates/> + </xsl:otherwise> + </xsl:choose> </fo:block> <xsl:if test="@caption"> diff --git a/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_pdf_params.xsl b/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_pdf_params.xsl index d9a150d2d9..99da29c2ac 100644 --- a/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_pdf_params.xsl +++ b/lib/erl_docgen/priv/xsl/db_pdf_params.xsl @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> -<!-- +<!-- # # %CopyrightBegin% # - # Copyright Ericsson AB 2009-2016. All Rights Reserved. + # Copyright Ericsson AB 2009-2017. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ # limitations under the License. # # %CopyrightEnd% - + --> <xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ <xsl:param name="page-width">210mm</xsl:param> <!-- Paper size: US Letter (279x216 mm) --> - <!-- + <!-- <xsl:param name="page-height">11in</xsl:param> <xsl:param name="page-width">8.5in</xsl:param> --> @@ -248,86 +248,82 @@ </xsl:attribute-set> <xsl:attribute-set name="code"> - <xsl:attribute name="background-color">#e0e0ff</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="background-color">#f1f3f5</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="border-style">solid</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="border-color">#dee2e6</xsl:attribute><!-- dee2e6--> + <xsl:attribute name="border-width">0.3mm</xsl:attribute> <xsl:attribute name="font-family">DejaVuSansMono, monospace</xsl:attribute> <xsl:attribute name="font-size">0.8em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="keep-together.within-page">auto</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="keep-together.within-page">3</xsl:attribute> <xsl:attribute name="linefeed-treatment">preserve</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-before">0em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-after">1em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="space-after">1em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="space-before">2em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="margin-left">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="margin-right">0.5em</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-before">1.5mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-after">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-left">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-right">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="margin-left">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="margin-right">1mm</xsl:attribute> <xsl:attribute name="white-space-collapse">false</xsl:attribute> <xsl:attribute name="white-space-treatment">preserve</xsl:attribute> <xsl:attribute name="wrap-option">no-wrap</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="space-after">0.5em</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="space-before">0.5em</xsl:attribute> </xsl:attribute-set> - - <xsl:attribute-set name="toc.level1"> <xsl:attribute name="space-before">1em</xsl:attribute> - </xsl:attribute-set> - -<xsl:attribute-set name="note"> - <xsl:attribute name="background-color">#d0fed0</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="space-after">1em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="space-before">2em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="text-align">justify</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-before">1em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-after">0.3em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-left">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-right">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="margin-left">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="margin-right">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="keep-together.within-page">always</xsl:attribute> </xsl:attribute-set> -<xsl:attribute-set name="warning"> - <xsl:attribute name="background-color">#ffd6d6</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="space-after">1em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="space-before">2em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="text-align">justify</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-before">1em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-after">0.3em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-left">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-right">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="margin-left">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="margin-right">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="keep-together.within-page">always</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute-set name="note-title"> + <xsl:attribute name="space-before">0.5em</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="border-style">solid</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="border-bottom-width">0mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="border-color">#495057</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="background-color">#2b8a3e</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="font-weight">bold</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="color">#fefefe</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-before">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-after">0.5mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-left">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-right">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="margin-left">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="margin-right">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="font-size">1.33em</xsl:attribute> </xsl:attribute-set> -<xsl:attribute-set name="do"> - <xsl:attribute name="background-color">#d0fed0</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="space-after">1em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="space-before">2em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="text-align">justify</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-before">1em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-after">0.3em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-left">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-right">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="margin-left">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="margin-right">0.5em</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute-set name="note-warning"> <xsl:attribute name="keep-together.within-page">always</xsl:attribute> </xsl:attribute-set> -<xsl:attribute-set name="dont"> - <xsl:attribute name="background-color">#ffd6d6</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="space-after">1em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="space-before">2em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="text-align">justify</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-before">1em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-after">0.3em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-left">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="padding-right">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="margin-left">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="margin-right">0.5em</xsl:attribute> - <xsl:attribute name="keep-together.within-page">always</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute-set name="warning-title"> + <xsl:attribute name="space-before">0.5em</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="border-style">solid</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="border-bottom-width">0mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="border-color">#495057</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="background-color">#c92a2a</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="font-weight">bold</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="color">#fefefe</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-before">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-after">0.5mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-left">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-right">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="margin-left">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="margin-right">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="font-size">1.33em</xsl:attribute> </xsl:attribute-set> - <xsl:attribute-set name="note-warning-title"> - <xsl:attribute name="font-size">1.33em</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute-set name="note-warning-content"> + <xsl:attribute name="space-after">0.5em</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="border-style">solid</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="border-top-width">0mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="border-color">#495057</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="background-color">#f8f9fa</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="text-align">justify</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-before">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-after">0.5mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-left">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="padding-right">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="margin-left">1mm</xsl:attribute> + <xsl:attribute name="margin-right">1mm</xsl:attribute> </xsl:attribute-set> <xsl:attribute-set name="module-header"> @@ -354,7 +350,7 @@ <xsl:attribute name="keep-with-next.within-page">always</xsl:attribute> <xsl:attribute name="space-after">0.25em</xsl:attribute> <!-- xsl:attribute name="space-before">1.5em</xsl:attribute --> - </xsl:attribute-set> + </xsl:attribute-set> <xsl:attribute-set name="type-listblock"> <xsl:attribute name="provisional-distance-between-starts">1.8em</xsl:attribute> diff --git a/lib/erl_docgen/vsn.mk b/lib/erl_docgen/vsn.mk index 8fad061b26..17a7c483f4 100644 --- a/lib/erl_docgen/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/erl_docgen/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -ERL_DOCGEN_VSN = 0.7 +ERL_DOCGEN_VSN = 0.7.1 diff --git a/lib/et/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/et/doc/src/notes.xml index 5300d2e4ef..f0995b7c19 100644 --- a/lib/et/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/et/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -37,6 +37,21 @@ one section in this document. The title of each section is the version number of <c>Event Tracer (ET)</c>.</p> +<section><title>ET 1.6.1</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Tools are updated to show Unicode atoms correctly.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14464</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>ET 1.6</title> <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> diff --git a/lib/et/vsn.mk b/lib/et/vsn.mk index a37fec083b..aab63a402e 100644 --- a/lib/et/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/et/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -ET_VSN = 1.6 +ET_VSN = 1.6.1 diff --git a/lib/eunit/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/eunit/doc/src/notes.xml index 2a4ca6d12c..7133befe37 100644 --- a/lib/eunit/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/eunit/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -33,6 +33,21 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the EUnit application.</p> +<section><title>Eunit 2.3.4</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Tools are updated to show Unicode atoms correctly.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14464</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Eunit 2.3.3</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/eunit/vsn.mk b/lib/eunit/vsn.mk index 107ad5c101..25bb0dec17 100644 --- a/lib/eunit/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/eunit/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -EUNIT_VSN = 2.3.3 +EUNIT_VSN = 2.3.4 diff --git a/lib/hipe/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/hipe/doc/src/notes.xml index 9167d0aaec..eadaee50e2 100644 --- a/lib/hipe/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/hipe/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -31,6 +31,35 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to HiPE.</p> +<section><title>Hipe 3.16.1</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> Fix a bug regarding map types that caused Dialyzer to + go into an infinite loop. A consequence of the fix is + that compound map keys such as maps and tuples sometimes + are handled with less precision than before. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14572 Aux Id: seq13319 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Hipe 3.16</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/hipe/vsn.mk b/lib/hipe/vsn.mk index 0ef4aa7f09..f88d9147b1 100644 --- a/lib/hipe/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/hipe/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -HIPE_VSN = 3.16 +HIPE_VSN = 3.16.1 diff --git a/lib/inets/doc/src/mod_esi.xml b/lib/inets/doc/src/mod_esi.xml index a8393c9248..d024c8afa8 100644 --- a/lib/inets/doc/src/mod_esi.xml +++ b/lib/inets/doc/src/mod_esi.xml @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ to the client and <c>SessionID</c> is an identifier that shall by used when calling this function, do not assume anything about the datatype. This function may be called - several times to chunk the the respons data. Notice that the + several times to chunk the response data. Notice that the first chunk of data sent to the client must at least contain all HTTP header fields that the response will generate. If the first chunk does not contain the <em>end of HTTP header</em>, diff --git a/lib/inets/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/inets/doc/src/notes.xml index c85600d0be..10ef84d7cf 100644 --- a/lib/inets/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/inets/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -33,7 +33,29 @@ <file>notes.xml</file> </header> - <section><title>Inets 6.4.1</title> + <section><title>Inets 6.4.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Make sure mod_log uses the correct status code</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14510</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Correct behaviour of mod_disk_log to proparly handle + repair options</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14530</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>Inets 6.4.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> <list> diff --git a/lib/inets/vsn.mk b/lib/inets/vsn.mk index c4314f1ab5..34b6902747 100644 --- a/lib/inets/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/inets/vsn.mk @@ -19,6 +19,6 @@ # %CopyrightEnd% APPLICATION = inets -INETS_VSN = 6.4.1 +INETS_VSN = 6.4.2 PRE_VSN = APP_VSN = "$(APPLICATION)-$(INETS_VSN)$(PRE_VSN)" diff --git a/lib/kernel/doc/src/file.xml b/lib/kernel/doc/src/file.xml index b674b3ca93..593bee74fe 100644 --- a/lib/kernel/doc/src/file.xml +++ b/lib/kernel/doc/src/file.xml @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ terminal supports UTF-8, otherwise <c>latin1</c>. The default can be overridden using <c>+fnl</c> (to force <c>latin1</c> mode) or <c>+fnu</c> (to force <c>utf8</c> mode) when starting - <seealso marker="erts:erl"><c>erts:erl</c></seealso>.</p> + <seealso marker="erts:erl"><c>erl</c></seealso>.</p> <p>On operating systems with transparent naming, files can be inconsistently named, for example, some files are encoded in UTF-8 while @@ -81,6 +81,22 @@ <p>See also section <seealso marker="stdlib:unicode_usage#notes-about-raw-filenames">Notes About Raw Filenames</seealso> in the STDLIB User's Guide.</p> + <note><p> + File operations used to accept filenames containing + null characters (integer value zero). This caused + the name to be truncated at the first null character. + Filenames containing null characters inside the filename + are now <em>rejected</em> and will cause primitive + file operations fail. + </p></note> + <warning><p> + Currently null characters at the end of the filename + will be accepted by primitive file operations. Such + filenames are however still documented as invalid. The + implementation will also change in the future and + reject such filenames. + </p></warning> + </description> <datatypes> @@ -96,9 +112,21 @@ </datatype> <datatype> <name name="filename"/> + <desc> + <p> + See also the documentation of the + <seealso marker="#type-name_all"><c>name_all()</c></seealso> type. + </p> + </desc> </datatype> <datatype> <name name="filename_all"/> + <desc> + <p> + See also the documentation of the + <seealso marker="#type-name_all"><c>name_all()</c></seealso> type. + </p> + </desc> </datatype> <datatype> <name name="io_device"/> @@ -112,21 +140,23 @@ <name name="name"/> <desc> <p>If VM is in Unicode filename mode, <c>string()</c> and <c>char()</c> - are allowed to be > 255. + are allowed to be > 255. See also the documentation of the + <seealso marker="#type-name_all"><c>name_all()</c></seealso> type. </p> </desc> </datatype> <datatype> <name name="name_all"/> <desc> - <p>If VM is in Unicode filename mode, <c>string()</c> and <c>char()</c> + <p>If VM is in Unicode filename mode, characters are allowed to be > 255. <c><anno>RawFilename</anno></c> is a filename not subject to Unicode translation, meaning that it can contain characters not conforming to the Unicode encoding expected from the file system (that is, non-UTF-8 characters although the VM is started - in Unicode filename mode). + in Unicode filename mode). Null characters (integer value zero) + are <em>not</em> allowed in filenames (not even at the end). </p> </desc> </datatype> diff --git a/lib/kernel/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/kernel/doc/src/notes.xml index 9cd03ffcad..a5316dd476 100644 --- a/lib/kernel/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/kernel/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -31,6 +31,50 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the Kernel application.</p> +<section><title>Kernel 5.4</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Processes which did output after switching jobs (Ctrl+G) + could be left forever stuck in the io request.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14571 Aux Id: ERL-472 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p>Lock counting can now be fully toggled at runtime in + the lock counting emulator (<c>-emu_type lcnt</c>). + Everything is enabled by default to match the old + behavior, but specific categories can be toggled at will + with minimal runtime overhead when disabled. Refer to the + documentation on <c>lcnt:rt_mask/1</c> for details.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13170</p> + </item> + <item> + <p><c>lcnt:collect</c> and <c>lcnt:clear</c> will no + longer block all other threads in the runtime system.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14412</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Kernel 5.3.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/kernel/src/kernel.app.src b/lib/kernel/src/kernel.app.src index 2a88cc7e26..b5e5f8eb73 100644 --- a/lib/kernel/src/kernel.app.src +++ b/lib/kernel/src/kernel.app.src @@ -120,6 +120,6 @@ {applications, []}, {env, [{error_logger, tty}]}, {mod, {kernel, []}}, - {runtime_dependencies, ["erts-9.1", "stdlib-3.4", "sasl-3.0"]} + {runtime_dependencies, ["erts-9.1.1", "stdlib-3.4.3", "sasl-3.0"]} ] }. diff --git a/lib/kernel/test/file_name_SUITE.erl b/lib/kernel/test/file_name_SUITE.erl index 899102c908..f23529fec9 100644 --- a/lib/kernel/test/file_name_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/kernel/test/file_name_SUITE.erl @@ -302,7 +302,9 @@ check_normal(Mod) -> {ok, BC} = Mod:read(FD,1024), ok = file:close(FD) end || {regular,Name,Content} <- NormalDir ], + {error, badarg} = Mod:rename("fil1\0tmp_fil2","tmp_fil1"), Mod:rename("fil1","tmp_fil1"), + {error, badarg} = Mod:read_file("tmp_fil1\0.txt"), {ok, <<"fil1">>} = Mod:read_file("tmp_fil1"), {error,enoent} = Mod:read_file("fil1"), Mod:rename("tmp_fil1","fil1"), diff --git a/lib/kernel/test/zlib_SUITE.erl b/lib/kernel/test/zlib_SUITE.erl index e246276262..d17eded811 100644 --- a/lib/kernel/test/zlib_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/kernel/test/zlib_SUITE.erl @@ -276,10 +276,10 @@ api_inflateInit(Config) when is_list(Config) -> ?m(ok,zlib:close(Z12)) end, lists:seq(8,15)), ?m(?EXIT(badarg), zlib:inflateInit(gurka, -15)), - ?m(?EXIT(already_initialized), zlib:inflateInit(Z1, 7)), - ?m(?EXIT(already_initialized), zlib:inflateInit(Z1, -7)), - ?m(?EXIT(already_initialized), zlib:inflateInit(Z1, 48)), - ?m(?EXIT(already_initialized), zlib:inflateInit(Z1, -16)), + ?m(?EXIT(bad_windowbits), zlib:inflateInit(Z1, 7)), + ?m(?EXIT(bad_windowbits), zlib:inflateInit(Z1, -7)), + ?m(?EXIT(bad_windowbits), zlib:inflateInit(Z1, 48)), + ?m(?EXIT(bad_windowbits), zlib:inflateInit(Z1, -16)), ?m(ok, zlib:close(Z1)). %% Test inflateSetDictionary. @@ -416,6 +416,9 @@ api_inflateChunk(Config) when is_list(Config) -> {more, Part1AsIOList} = zlib:inflateChunk(Z1, Compressed), {more, Part2AsIOList} = zlib:inflateChunk(Z1), {more, Part3AsIOList} = zlib:inflateChunk(Z1), + + [] = zlib:inflateChunk(Z1), + [] = zlib:inflateChunk(Z1), [] = zlib:inflateChunk(Z1), ?m(Part1, iolist_to_binary(Part1AsIOList)), @@ -483,7 +486,8 @@ api_safeInflate(Config) when is_list(Config) -> SafeInflateLoop(zlib:safeInflate(Z1, Compressed), []), - ?m(?EXIT(data_error), zlib:safeInflate(Z1, Compressed)), + ?m({finished, []}, zlib:safeInflate(Z1, Compressed)), + ?m({finished, []}, zlib:safeInflate(Z1, Compressed)), ?m(ok, zlib:inflateReset(Z1)), ?m(?EXIT(badarg), zlib:safeInflate(gurka, Compressed)), @@ -632,6 +636,7 @@ api_g_un_zip(Config) when is_list(Config) -> ?m(?EXIT(badarg),zlib:gzip(not_a_binary)), Bin = <<1,11,1,23,45>>, Comp = zlib:gzip(Bin), + ?m(Comp, zlib:gzip(binary_to_list(Bin))), ?m(?EXIT(badarg), zlib:gunzip(not_a_binary)), ?m(?EXIT(data_error), zlib:gunzip(<<171,171,171,171,171>>)), @@ -639,6 +644,14 @@ api_g_un_zip(Config) when is_list(Config) -> ?m(Bin, zlib:gunzip(Comp)), ?m(Bin, zlib:gunzip(binary_to_list(Comp))), + %% RFC 1952: + %% + %% "A gzip file consists of a series of "members" (compressed data + %% sets). [...] The members simply appear one after another in the file, + %% with no additional information before, between, or after them." + Concatenated = <<Bin/binary, Bin/binary>>, + ?m(Concatenated, zlib:gunzip([Comp, Comp])), + %% Bad CRC; bad length. BadCrc = bad_crc_data(), ?m(?EXIT(data_error),(catch zlib:gunzip(BadCrc))), diff --git a/lib/kernel/vsn.mk b/lib/kernel/vsn.mk index c9463241d1..cef54dd41a 100644 --- a/lib/kernel/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/kernel/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -KERNEL_VSN = 5.3.1 +KERNEL_VSN = 5.4 diff --git a/lib/mnesia/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/mnesia/doc/src/notes.xml index 891711fa9e..026c6a89d7 100644 --- a/lib/mnesia/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/mnesia/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -39,7 +39,22 @@ thus constitutes one section in this document. The title of each section is the version number of Mnesia.</p> - <section><title>Mnesia 4.15</title> + <section><title>Mnesia 4.15.1</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>Mnesia 4.15</title> <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> <list> diff --git a/lib/mnesia/vsn.mk b/lib/mnesia/vsn.mk index 81b15d65db..a95f468ba2 100644 --- a/lib/mnesia/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/mnesia/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -MNESIA_VSN = 4.15 +MNESIA_VSN = 4.15.1 diff --git a/lib/observer/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/observer/doc/src/notes.xml index d329be5d5a..05ea550964 100644 --- a/lib/observer/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/observer/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -32,6 +32,57 @@ <p>This document describes the changes made to the Observer application.</p> +<section><title>Observer 2.5</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p>The following improvements are done to Crashdump + Viewer:</p> <list> <item>Reading of crash dumps with many + binaries is optimized.</item> <item>A progress bar is + shown when the detail view for a process is + opened.</item> <item>The <c>cdv</c> script now sets + <c>ERL_CRASH_DUMP_SECONDS=0</c> to avoid generating a new + crash dump from the node running the Crashdump + Viewer.</item> <item>A warning dialog is shown if the + node running the Crashdump Viewer could potentially + overwrite the crash dump under inspection.</item> + <item>Bugfix: In some situations, Crashdump Viewer could + not find the end of the 'Last calls' section in a crash + dump, and would erroneously mark the crash dump as + truncated. This is now corrected.</item> <item>Bugfix: In + some situations, process info for a specific process + would be marked as truncated by Crashdump Viewer, even if + the crash dump was truncated in the binary section - and + not related to the process in question. This is now + corrected.</item> </list> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14386</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Tools are updated to show Unicode atoms correctly.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14464</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Add system statistics and limits to frontpage in + observer.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14536</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Observer 2.4</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/observer/vsn.mk b/lib/observer/vsn.mk index 21edfcd184..5f43198f85 100644 --- a/lib/observer/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/observer/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -OBSERVER_VSN = 2.4 +OBSERVER_VSN = 2.5 diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/CosNaming.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/CosNaming.xml index d69b604f2f..251e721df1 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/CosNaming.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/CosNaming.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <erlref> <header> <copyright> - <year>1997</year><year>2016</year> + <year>1997</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ struct Binding { typedef sequence <Binding> BindingList; ]]></code> - <p>To get access to the record definitions for the structs use: - <c>-include_lib("orber/COSS/CosNaming.hrl").</c>.</p> + <p>To get access to the record definitions for the structs use:</p> + <code>-include_lib("orber/COSS/CosNaming.hrl").</code> <p>Names are not an ORB object but the can be structured in components as seen by the definition above. There are no requirements on names so the service can support many different conventions and standards.</p> diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/CosNaming_NamingContext.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/CosNaming_NamingContext.xml index 96a6367cbb..4c83e6a240 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/CosNaming_NamingContext.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/CosNaming_NamingContext.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <erlref> <header> <copyright> - <year>1997</year><year>2016</year> + <year>1997</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -37,61 +37,54 @@ naming contexts. Name context may be named in other contexts and cycles are permitted.</p> <p>The type <c>NameComponent</c> used below is defined as:</p> - <code type="none"> - -record('CosNaming_NameComponent', {id, kind=""}). - </code> + <code type="erl">-record('CosNaming_NameComponent', {id, kind=""}).</code> <p>where <c>id</c> and <c>kind</c> are strings. </p> <p>The type <c>Binding</c> used below is defined as:</p> - <code type="none"> - -record('CosNaming_Binding', {binding_name, binding_type}). - </code> + <code type="erl">-record('CosNaming_Binding', {binding_name, binding_type}).</code> <p>where <c>binding_name</c> is a Name and <c>binding_type</c> is an enum which has the values <c>nobject</c> and <c>ncontext</c>.</p> <p>Both these records are defined in the file <c>CosNaming.hrl</c> and it is included with:</p> - <code type="none"> - -include_lib("orber/COSS/CosNaming/CosNaming.hrl"). - </code> + <code type="erl">-include_lib("orber/COSS/CosNaming/CosNaming.hrl").</code> <p>There are a number of exceptions that can be returned from functions in this interface.</p> <list type="bulleted"> <item> <p>NotFound is defined as </p> - <code type="none"> --record('CosNaming_NamingContext_NotFound', - {rest_of_name, why}). </code> + <code type="erl"> +-record('CosNaming_NamingContext_NotFound', + {rest_of_name, why}).</code> </item> <item> <p>CannotProceed is defined as </p> - <code type="none"> --record('CosNaming_NamingContext_CannotProceed', - {rest_of_name, cxt}). </code> + <code type="erl"> +-record('CosNaming_NamingContext_CannotProceed', + {rest_of_name, cxt}). + </code> </item> <item> <p>InvalidName is defined as </p> - <code type="none"> --record('CosNaming_NamingContext_InvalidName', {}). </code> + <code type="erl"> +-record('CosNaming_NamingContext_InvalidName', {}). + </code> </item> <item> <p>NotFound is defined as </p> - <code type="none"> --record('CosNaming_NamingContext_NotFound', {}). </code> + <code type="erl">-record('CosNaming_NamingContext_NotFound', {}).</code> </item> <item> <p>AlreadyBound is defined as </p> - <code type="none"> --record('CosNaming_NamingContext_AlreadyBound', {}). </code> + <code type="erl">-record('CosNaming_NamingContext_AlreadyBound', {}).</code> </item> <item> <p>NotEmpty is defined as </p> - <code type="none"> --record('CosNaming_NamingContext_NotEmpty', {). </code> + <code type="erl">-record('CosNaming_NamingContext_NotEmpty', {}).</code> </item> </list> <p>These exceptions are defined in the file <c>CosNaming_NamingContext.hrl</c> and it is included with:</p> - <code type="none"> - -include_lib("orber/COSS/CosNaming/CosNaming_NamingContext.hrl"). + <code type="erl"> +-include_lib("orber/COSS/CosNaming/CosNaming_NamingContext.hrl"). </code> </description> <funcs> diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/CosNaming_NamingContextExt.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/CosNaming_NamingContextExt.xml index a571b97ccb..2af3deadda 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/CosNaming_NamingContextExt.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/CosNaming_NamingContextExt.xml @@ -4,8 +4,7 @@ <erlref> <header> <copyright> - <year>2000</year> - <year>2016</year> + <year>2000</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -36,8 +35,8 @@ <description> <p>To get access to the record definitions for the structures use: <br></br> </p> - <code type="none"> - -include_lib("orber/COSS/CosNaming/CosNaming.hrl"). + <code type="erl"> +-include_lib("orber/COSS/CosNaming/CosNaming.hrl"). </code> <p>This module also exports the functions described in:</p> <list type="bulleted"> diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/any.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/any.xml index f51712c97e..c94a2132d8 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/any.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/any.xml @@ -4,8 +4,7 @@ <erlref> <header> <copyright> - <year>1998</year> - <year>2016</year> + <year>1998</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -41,9 +40,7 @@ <p>The type <c>TC</c> used below describes an IDL type and is a tuple according to the to the Erlang language mapping.</p> <p>The type <c>Any</c> used below is defined as:</p> - <code type="none"> - -record(any, {typecode, value}). - </code> + <code type="erl">-record(any, {typecode, value}).</code> <p>where <c>typecode</c> is a TC tuple and <c>value</c> is an Erlang term of the type defined by the typecode field.</p> </description> diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_debugging.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_debugging.xml index a036cf5231..debac4313e 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_debugging.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_debugging.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>2001</year><year>2016</year> + <year>2001</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ Result.......: {'EXCEPTION',{'MARSHAL',[],102,'COMPLETED_NO'}} uses the <c>error_logger</c> module to generate the logs. If the traffic is intense you probably want to write the reports to a log-file. This is done by, for example, invoking:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> erl> error_logger:tty(false). erl> error_logger:logfile({open, "/tmp/IIOPTrace"}). </code> diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_exceptions.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_exceptions.xml index 52735dc394..17657d0d4a 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_exceptions.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_exceptions.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>2001</year><year>2016</year> + <year>2001</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ module MyModule { <title>Throwing Exceptions</title> <p>To be able to raise <c>MyException</c> or <c>MyExceptionMsg</c> exceptions, the generated <c>MyModule.hrl</c> must be included, and typical usage is:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> -module('MyModule_MyInterface_impl'). -include("MyModule.hrl"). diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_idl_to_erlang_mapping.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_idl_to_erlang_mapping.xml index a0feda3f84..eaa88f24f1 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_idl_to_erlang_mapping.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_idl_to_erlang_mapping.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>1997</year><year>2016</year> + <year>1997</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ module x { <p><term id="Type Codes"><termdef>Type codes give a complete description of the type including all its components and structure.</termdef></term>are, for example, used in <seealso marker="any">Any</seealso> values. Hence, we can encapsulate the <c>employee</c> struct in an <c>any</c> type by:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> %% Erlang code .... AnEmployee = #'DB_employee'{'No' = 1, @@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ R1 = m_i:foo(Obj, 55), representation of the IDL-type <c>void</c>, must be returned by <c>baz</c> and <c>'_set_RWAttribute'</c>. These operations can be implemented in the call-back module as:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> '_set_RWAttribute'(State, Long) -> {reply, ok, State}. @@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ $> erlc +"{be,erl_template}" DB.idl <p>We begin with implementing the <c>DB_Access_impl.erl</c> module, which, if we used <c>erl_template</c>, will look like the following. All we need to do is to add the logic to the <c>logon</c> operation.</p> - <code type="none"><![CDATA[ + <code type="erl"><![CDATA[ %%---------------------------------------------------------------------- %% <LICENSE> %% @@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ $ <input>erlc *.erl</input> <seealso marker="ch_exceptions">Exceptions</seealso> chapter. In the following example, only the implementation of the API functions are shown:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> %%====================================================================== %% API Functions %%====================================================================== diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_install.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_install.xml index 9bc974225d..65faa91ccf 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_install.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_install.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>1997</year><year>2016</year> + <year>1997</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ necessary to start the Erlang distribution (i.e. using <c>-name/-sname</c>).</p> <p>If we use <c>ram_copies</c> there is no need for creating a disk based schema. Simply use:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> erl> mnesia:start(). erl> corba:orb_init([{domain, "MyRAMSingleNodeORB"}]). erl> orber:install([node()], [{ifr_storage_type, ram_copies}]). @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ erl> orber:start(). <p>If you installation requires <c>disc_copies</c> you must begin with creating a Mnesia schema. Otherwise, the installation is similar to a RAM installation:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> erl> mnesia:create_schema([node()]). erl> mnesia:start(). erl> corba:orb_init([{domain, "MyDiskSingleNodeORB"}]). @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ erl> orber:start(). <title>Install RAM Based Multi Node Orber</title> <p>Within a domain Orber uses the Erlang distribution protocol. Hence, you <em>must</em> start it first by, for example, using:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> hostA> erl -sname nodeA </code> <p>In this example, we assume that we want to use two nodes; <c>nodeA</c> and @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ hostA> erl -sname nodeA parameter <c>extra_db_nodes</c> or use <c>mnesia:change_config/2</c>. To begin with, Mnesia must be started on all nodes before we can install Orber:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> nodeA@hostA> mnesia:start(). nodeA@hostA> mnesia:change_config(extra_db_nodes, [nodeA@hostA, nodeB@hostB]). @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ nodeA@hostA> mnesia:change_config(extra_db_nodes, <p>After that the above have been repeated on <c>nodeB</c> we must first make sure that both nodes will use the same domain name, then we can install Orber:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> nodeA@hostA> corba:orb_init([{domain, "MyRAMMultiNodeORB"}]). nodeA@hostA> orber:install([nodeA@hostA, nodeB@hostB], [{ifr_storage_type, ram_copies}]). @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ nodeA@hostA> orber:start(). </code> <p>Note that you can only invoke <c>orber:install/1/2</c> on one of the nodes. Now we can start Orber on the other node:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> nodeB@hostB> corba:orb_init([{domain, "MyRAMMultiNodeORB"}]). nodeB@hostB> orber:start(). </code> @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ nodeB@hostB> orber:start(). <p>As for RAM based multi-node Orber installations, the Erlang distribution must be started (e.g. erl -sname nodeA). The major difference is that when it is disk based a Mnesia schema must be created:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> nodeA@hostA> mnesia:create_schema([nodeA@hostA, nodeB@hostB]). nodeA@hostA> mnesia:start(). </code> @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ nodeA@hostA> mnesia:start(). <c>mnesia:start()</c>) on <c>nodeB</c>.</p> <p>After Mnesia have been started on all nodes, you must confirm that all nodes have the same domain name, then Orber is ready to be installed:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> nodeA@hostA> corba:orb_init([{domain, "MyDiskMultiNodeORB"}]). nodeA@hostA> orber:install([nodeA@hostA, nodeB@hostB], [{ifr_storage_type, disc_copies}]). @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ nodeA@hostA> orber:start(). </code> <p>Note that you can only invoke <c>orber:install/1/2</c> on one of the nodes. Now we can start Orber on the other node:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> nodeB@hostB> corba:orb_init([{domain, "MyDiskMultiNodeORB"}]). nodeB@hostB> orber:start(). </code> @@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ TCP Firewall With NAT</icaption> verify whether access would be granted or not. For example, if Orber would be started with the ACL <c>[{tcp_out, "10.1.1.1/8#4001/5001"}]</c>, then <c>orber_acl:match/2</c> would behave as follows:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> erl> orber_acl:match({11,1,1,1}, tcp_out). false @@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ erl> orber_acl:match({10,1,1,1}, tcp_out, true). the configuration of the underlying system.</p> <p>Adding the interface context, for generated stubs/skeletons, is done in the following way:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> Ctx = #'IOP_ServiceContext'{context_id = ?ORBER_GENERIC_CTX_ID, context_data = {interface, "10.0.0.1"}}, 'CosNaming_NamingContext':resolve(NS, [{context, [Ctx]}], Name), diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_interceptors.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_interceptors.xml index 392fe7de82..4a9f8e69ca 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_interceptors.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_interceptors.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>2001</year><year>2016</year> + <year>2001</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ The Invocation Order of Interceptor Functions.</icaption> we store which objects the clients are allowed to invoke operations on and <c>ChecksumModule</c> determines which module we should use to handle the checksums. </p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> new_in_connection(Arg, Host, Port) -> %% Since we only use one interceptor we do not care about the %% input Arg since it is set do undefined by Orber. @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ new_in_connection(Arg, Host, Port) -> <p>When a new request comes in the first interceptor function to be invoked is <c>in_request_encoded</c>. We will remove the checksum from the coded request body in the following way:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> in_request_encoded({ObjTable, ChecksumModule}, ObjKey, Ctx, Op, Bin, Extra) -> NewBin = ChecksumModule:remove_checksum(Bin), {NewBin, Extra}. @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ in_request_encoded({ObjTable, ChecksumModule}, ObjKey, Ctx, Op, Bin, Extra) -> good throughput.</p> <p>If we want to we can restrict any clients to only use a subset of operations exported by a server:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> in_request({ObjTable, ChecksumModule}, ObjKey, Ctx, Op, Params, Extra) -> case ets:lookup(ObjTable, {ObjKey, Op}) of [] -> @@ -166,13 +166,13 @@ in_request({ObjTable, ChecksumModule}, ObjKey, Ctx, Op, Params, Extra) -> <p>At this point Orber are now ready to invoke the operation on the target object. Since we do not care about what the reply is the <c>out_reply</c> function do nothing, i.e.:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> out_reply(_, _, _, _, Reply, Extra) -> {Reply, Extra}. </code> <p>If the client side ORB expects a checksum to be added to the reply we add it by using:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> out_reply_encoded({ObjTable, ChecksumModule}, ObjKey, Ctx, Op, Bin, Extra) -> NewBin = ChecksumModule:add_checksum(Bin), {NewBin, Extra}. @@ -183,8 +183,7 @@ out_reply_encoded({ObjTable, ChecksumModule}, ObjKey, Ctx, Op, Bin, Extra) -> </warning> <p>For outgoing requests the principle is the same. Hence, it is not further described here. The complete interceptor module would look like:</p> - <code type="none"> - + <code type="erl"> -module(myInterceptor). %% Interceptor functions. diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_naming_service.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_naming_service.xml index bcbab2a597..991402ae86 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_naming_service.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_naming_service.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>1997</year><year>2016</year> + <year>1997</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ Figure 1: Contextual object relationships using the Naming Service.</icaption> <title>Fetch Initial Reference to the Naming Service</title> <p>In order to use the naming service you have to fetch an initial reference to it. This is done with:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> NS = corba:resolve_initial_references("NameService"). </code> <note> @@ -128,14 +128,14 @@ NS = corba:resolve_initial_references("NameService"). <title>Creating a Naming Context</title> <p>There are two functions for creating a naming context. The first function, which only creates a naming context object is:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> NC = 'CosNaming_NamingContext':new_context(NS). </code> <p>The other function creates a naming context and binds it to a name in an already existing naming context (the initial context in this example): </p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> NC = 'CosNaming_NamingContext':bind_new_context(NS, lname:new(["new"])). </code> </section> @@ -150,19 +150,19 @@ NC = 'CosNaming_NamingContext':bind_new_context(NS, lname:new(["new"])). <list type="ordered"> <item> <p>Use the naming library functions to create a name</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> Name = lname:new(["object"]). </code> </item> <item> <p>Use CosNaming::NamingContext::bind() to bind a name to an object</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> 'CosNaming_NamingContext':bind(Sc, Name, Object). </code> </item> <item> <p>Use CosNaming::NamingContext::unbind() to remove the NameBinding from an object</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> 'CosNaming_NamingContext':unbind(Sc, Name). </code> </item> @@ -180,19 +180,19 @@ Name = lname:new(["object"]). <list type="ordered"> <item> <p>Use the naming library functions to create a name path:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> Name = lname:new(["workgroup", "services"]). </code> </item> <item> <p>Use CosNaming::NamingContext::resolve() to to resolve the name to an object</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> Sc = 'CosNaming_NamingContext':resolve(NS, Name). </code> </item> </list> <p>An alternative is to use:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> Sc = corba:string_to_object("corbaname:rir:/NameService#workgroup/services/"). </code> <p>The <c>corbaname</c> schema is described further in the Interoperable @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ Sc = corba:string_to_object("corbaname:rir:/NameService#workgroup/services/"). <item> <p>Use CosNaming::NamingContext::list() to list all the bindings in a context</p> <p>The following code retrieves and lists up to 10 bindings from a context.</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> {BList, BIterator} = 'CosNaming_NamingContext':list(Sc, 10). lists:foreach(fun({{Id, Kind},BindingType}) -> case BindingType of @@ -229,8 +229,8 @@ lists:foreach(fun({{Id, Kind},BindingType}) -> case BindingType of <em>must be removed</em> otherwise dangling processes will occur. Use <c>CosNaming::BindingIterator::destroy()</c> to remove it.</p> </warning> - <code type="none"> - 'CosNaming_NamingContext':destroy(BIterator). + <code type="erl"> +'CosNaming_NamingContext':destroy(BIterator). </code> </section> @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ lists:foreach(fun({{Id, Kind},BindingType}) -> case BindingType of <list type="ordered"> <item> <p>Use CosNaming::NamingContext::destroy() to remove a NamingContext</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> 'CosNaming_NamingContext':destroy(Sc). </code> </item> @@ -318,13 +318,13 @@ lists:foreach(fun({{Id, Kind},BindingType}) -> case BindingType of listed below, they should be associated with. The <c>NameService</c> key may <em>not</em> be changed in Orber. If you want to add one of the reserved keys as an initial service, simply use:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> 1> Factory = cosNotificationApp:start_global_factory(). 2> corba:add_initial_service("NotificationService", Factory). </code> <p>This object can then be easily resolved by any other ORB, supporting the Interoperable Naming Service, by using:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> 3> NF = corba:string_to_object("corbaloc::[email protected]:4001/NotificationService"). </code> <table> @@ -438,13 +438,13 @@ lists:foreach(fun({{Id, Kind},BindingType}) -> case BindingType of <tcaption>Stringified Name representation</tcaption> </table> <p>After creating a stringified Name we can either use:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> NameStr = "org.erlang", NS = corba:resolve_initial_references("NameService"), Obj = 'CosNaming_NamingContextExt':resolve_str(NS, NameStr), </code> <p>or concatenate the Name String using:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> NameStr = "Swedish/Soccer/Champions", Address = "corbaname:iiop:[email protected]:2000/NameService", NS = corba:resolve_initial_references("NameService"), diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_orberweb.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_orberweb.xml index be1d7fb983..c9dcc382e6 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_orberweb.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_orberweb.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>2001</year><year>2016</year> + <year>2001</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -208,8 +208,7 @@ <p>You may choose to start OrberWeb on node, on which Orber is running or not. But the Erlang distribution must be started (e.g. by using -sname aNodeName). Now, all you have to do is to invoke:</p> - <code type="none"> - + <code type="none"> erl> webtool:start(). WebTool is available at http://localhost:8888/ Or http://127.0.0.1:8888/ diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_stubs.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_stubs.xml index 144191a66a..9290c127f9 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_stubs.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/ch_stubs.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>1999</year><year>2016</year> + <year>1999</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ up_to_date <p>Arguments and Replies are determined by the IDL-code and, hence, not further described here.</p> </note> - <code type="none"> + <code type="erl"> %%%----------------------------------------------------------- %%% File : Module_Interface_impl.erl %%% Author : diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/corba.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/corba.xml index d89f035dba..fbfb55f2f2 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/corba.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/corba.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <erlref> <header> <copyright> - <year>1997</year><year>2016</year> + <year>1997</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -370,12 +370,12 @@ Example: <desc> <p>This function takes a <c>corbaname</c>, <c>corbaloc</c> or an IOR on the external string representation and returns the object reference.</p> - <p>To lookup the NameService reference, simply use - <c>"corbaloc:iiop:[email protected]:4001/NameService"</c></p> - <p>We can also resolve an object from the NameService by using - <c>"corbaname:iiop:[email protected]:4001/NameService#org/Erlang/MyObj"</c></p> - <p>To lookup the NameService reference with an IPv6 address, simply use - <c>"corbaloc:iiop:1.2@[FEC1:0:3:0:0312:44AF:FAB1:3D01]:4001/NameService"</c></p> + <p>To lookup the NameService reference, simply use:</p> + <code>corbaloc:iiop:[email protected]:4001/NameService</code> + <p>We can also resolve an object from the NameService by using:</p> + <code>corbaname:iiop:[email protected]:4001/NameService#org/Erlang/MyObj</code> + <p>To lookup the NameService reference with an IPv6 address, simply use:</p> + <code>corbaloc:iiop:1.2@[FEC1:0:3:0:0312:44AF:FAB1:3D01]:4001/NameService</code> <p>For more information about <c>corbaname</c> and <c>corbaloc</c>, see the User's Guide (Interoperable Naming Service).</p> <p>The <em>configuration</em> context is used to override the global diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/fixed.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/fixed.xml index a751476cf7..ef4d1bd604 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/fixed.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/fixed.xml @@ -4,8 +4,7 @@ <erlref> <header> <copyright> - <year>2002</year> - <year>2016</year> + <year>2002</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -38,8 +37,8 @@ <description> <p>This module contains functions that gives an interface to the CORBA fixed type.</p> <p>The type <c>Fixed</c> used below is defined as:</p> - <code type="none"> - -record(fixed, {digits, scale, value}). + <code type="erl"> +-record(fixed, {digits, scale, value}). </code> <p>where <c>digits</c> is the total amount of digits it consists of and <c>scale</c> is the number of fractional digits. The <c>value</c> field diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/lname.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/lname.xml index 09d6859777..c0c9be1a85 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/lname.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/lname.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <erlref> <header> <copyright> - <year>1997</year><year>2016</year> + <year>1997</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -44,14 +44,14 @@ the Names are represented as standard Erlang lists and therefor will be removed by the garbage collector when not in use.</p> <p>The type <c>NameComponent</c> used below is defined as:</p> - <code type="none"> - -record('CosNaming_NameComponent', {id, kind=""}). + <code type="erl"> +-record('CosNaming_NameComponent', {id, kind=""}). </code> <p><c>id</c> and <c>kind</c> are strings. </p> <p>The record is defined in the file <c>CosNaming.hrl</c> and it is included with:</p> - <code type="none"> - -include_lib("orber/COSS/CosNaming/CosNaming.hrl"). + <code type="erl"> +-include_lib("orber/COSS/CosNaming/CosNaming.hrl"). </code> </description> <funcs> diff --git a/lib/orber/doc/src/lname_component.xml b/lib/orber/doc/src/lname_component.xml index 631e5d0244..8b8001c0fb 100644 --- a/lib/orber/doc/src/lname_component.xml +++ b/lib/orber/doc/src/lname_component.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <erlref> <header> <copyright> - <year>1997</year><year>2016</year> + <year>1997</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -44,14 +44,14 @@ function because the NameComponents are represented as Erlang records and therefor will be removed by the garbage collector when not in use.</p> <p>The type <c>NameComponent</c> used below is defined as:</p> - <code type="none"> - -record('CosNaming_NameComponent', {id, kind=""}). + <code type="erl"> +-record('CosNaming_NameComponent', {id, kind=""}). </code> <p><c>id</c> and <c>kind</c> are strings. </p> <p>The record is defined in the file <c>CosNaming.hrl</c> and it is included with:</p> - <code type="none"> - -include_lib("orber/COSS/CosNaming/CosNaming.hrl"). + <code type="erl"> +-include_lib("orber/COSS/CosNaming/CosNaming.hrl"). </code> </description> <funcs> diff --git a/lib/os_mon/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/os_mon/doc/src/notes.xml index df4151147c..b29a64155e 100644 --- a/lib/os_mon/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/os_mon/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -31,6 +31,23 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the OS_Mon application.</p> +<section><title>Os_Mon 2.4.3</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + On macOS 10.13 (High Sierra), disksup could not grab + information for any disks that used the new APFS file + system. That has been corrected.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14560 Aux Id: ERL-461 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Os_Mon 2.4.2</title> <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> diff --git a/lib/os_mon/vsn.mk b/lib/os_mon/vsn.mk index 59a3d9dee4..e4250f577b 100644 --- a/lib/os_mon/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/os_mon/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -OS_MON_VSN = 2.4.2 +OS_MON_VSN = 2.4.3 diff --git a/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml index 64592a6d87..7a7c828760 100644 --- a/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -35,6 +35,76 @@ <file>notes.xml</file> </header> +<section><title>Public_Key 1.5</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + public_key now handles elliptic curve parameters in a + consistent way so that decoded ECDSA keys can be + correctly re-encoded.</p> + <p> + *** POTENTIAL INCOMPATIBILITY ***</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14621 Aux Id: ERL-480, ERL-481 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Extend crypto:sign, crypto:verify, public_key:sign and + public_key:verify with:</p> + <p> + * support for RSASSA-PS padding for signatures and for + saltlength setting<br/> * X9.31 RSA padding.<br/> * sha, + sha224, sha256, sha384, and sha512 for dss signatures as + mentioned in NIST SP 800-57 Part 1.<br/> * ripemd160 to + be used for rsa signatures.</p> + <p> + This is a manual merge of half of the pull request 838 by + potatosalad from Sept 2015.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13704 Aux Id: PR838 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Add API function pkix_test_data/1 for facilitating + automated testing. This is useful for applications that + preform X509-certifcate path validation of so called + certificate chains, such as TLS.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14181</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Improved error propagation and reports</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14236</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + RSAPrivateKey version is set to 'two-prime' instead of + using the underlying enumeration value directly.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14534</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Deprecated function <c>crypto:rand_uniform/2</c> is + replaced by <c>rand:uniform/1</c>.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14608</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Public_Key 1.4.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml b/lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml index 5a4fdf057b..3040f2db0d 100644 --- a/lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml +++ b/lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml @@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ fun(#'DistributionPoint'{}, #'CertificateList'{}, client_config := [conf_opt()]}</v> <v>conf_opt() = {cert, der_encoded()} | {key, der_encoded()} |{cacerts, [der_encoded()]}</v> - <d>This is a subset of the type <seealso marker="ssl#type-ssloption"> ssl:ssl_option()</seealso> </d> + <d>This is a subset of the type <seealso marker="ssl:ssl#type-ssloption"> ssl:ssl_option()</seealso> </d> </type> <desc> @@ -871,12 +871,13 @@ fun(#'DistributionPoint'{}, #'CertificateList'{}, <type> <v>Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{} </v> <v>ReferenceIDs = [ RefID ]</v> - <v>RefID = {IdType,string()}</v> - <v>IdType = dns_id | srv_id | uri_id</v> + <v>RefID = {dns_id,string()} | {srv_id,string()} | {uri_id,string()} | {ip,inet:ip_address()|string()} | {OtherRefID,term()}}</v> + <v>OtherRefID = atom()</v> <v>Opts = [ PvhOpt() ]</v> <v>PvhOpt = [MatchOpt | FailCallBackOpt | FqdnExtractOpt]</v> - <v>MatchOpt = {fun(RefId | FQDN::string(), PresentedID) -> boolean() | default}</v> - <v>PresentedID = {dNSName,string()} | {uniformResourceIdentifier,string()}</v> + <v>MatchOpt = {match_fun, fun(RefId | FQDN::string(), PresentedID) -> boolean() | default}</v> + <v>PresentedID = {dNSName,string()} | {uniformResourceIdentifier,string() | {iPAddress,list(byte())} | {OtherPresId,term()}}</v> + <v>OtherPresID = atom()</v> <v>FailCallBackOpt = {fail_callback, fun(#'OTPCertificate'{}) -> boolean()}</v> <v>FqdnExtractOpt = {fqdn_fun, fun(RefID) -> FQDN::string() | default | undefined}</v> </type> @@ -893,6 +894,11 @@ fun(#'DistributionPoint'{}, #'CertificateList'{}, <seealso marker="using_public_key#verify_hostname_examples">code examples</seealso> describes this function more detailed. </p> + <p>The <c>{OtherRefId,term()}</c> is defined by the user and is passed to the <c>match_fun</c>, if defined. + If that term is a binary, it will be converted to a string. + </p> + <p>The <c>ip</c> takes a 4-tuple or a + </p> </desc> </func> diff --git a/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_pbe.erl b/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_pbe.erl index 0243bcaa82..e89e16f120 100644 --- a/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_pbe.erl +++ b/lib/public_key/src/pubkey_pbe.erl @@ -222,7 +222,8 @@ pbe_pad(Data, {#'PBEParameter'{}, _}) -> pbe_pad(Data, #'PBES2-params'{}) -> pbe_pad(Data); pbe_pad(Data, _) -> - Data. +pbe_pad(Data).%% Data. + pbe_pad(Data) -> N = 8 - (erlang:byte_size(Data) rem 8), diff --git a/lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl b/lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl index cc01b61433..c3f2d791a3 100644 --- a/lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl +++ b/lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl @@ -1454,13 +1454,43 @@ verify_hostname_match_default0({dns_id,R}, {dNSName,P}) -> R==P; verify_hostname_match_default0({uri_id,R}, {uniformResourceIdentifier,P}) -> R==P; -verify_hostname_match_default0({srv_id,R}, {T,P}) when T == srvName ; - T == ?srvName_OID -> +verify_hostname_match_default0({ip,R}, {iPAddress,P}) when length(P) == 4 -> + %% IPv4 + try + list_to_tuple(P) + == if is_tuple(R), size(R)==4 -> R; + is_list(R) -> ok(inet:parse_ipv4strict_address(R)) + end + catch + _:_ -> + false + end; + +verify_hostname_match_default0({ip,R}, {iPAddress,P}) when length(P) == 16 -> + %% IPv6. The length 16 is due to the certificate specification. + try + l16_to_tup(P) + == if is_tuple(R), size(R)==8 -> R; + is_list(R) -> ok(inet:parse_ipv6strict_address(R)) + end + catch + _:_ -> + false + end; +verify_hostname_match_default0({srv_id,R}, {srvName,P}) -> + R==P; +verify_hostname_match_default0({srv_id,R}, {?srvName_OID,P}) -> R==P; verify_hostname_match_default0(_, _) -> false. +ok({ok,X}) -> X. +l16_to_tup(L) -> list_to_tuple(l16_to_tup(L, [])). +%% +l16_to_tup([A,B|T], Acc) -> l16_to_tup(T, [(A bsl 8) bor B | Acc]); +l16_to_tup([], Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc). + match_wild(A, [$*|B]) -> match_wild_suffixes(A, B); match_wild([C|A], [ C|B]) -> match_wild(A, B); match_wild([], []) -> true; @@ -1505,7 +1535,8 @@ to_lower_ascii(C) when $A =< C,C =< $Z -> C + ($a-$A); to_lower_ascii(C) -> C. to_string(S) when is_list(S) -> S; -to_string(B) when is_binary(B) -> binary_to_list(B). +to_string(B) when is_binary(B) -> binary_to_list(B); +to_string(X) -> X. format_details([]) -> no_relevant_crls; diff --git a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl index 374fb20375..0077c7908c 100644 --- a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ all() -> pkix_iso_rsa_oid, pkix_iso_dsa_oid, pkix_crl, general_name, pkix_verify_hostname_cn, pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName, + pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP, pkix_verify_hostname_options, pkix_test_data_all_default, pkix_test_data, @@ -985,6 +986,41 @@ pkix_verify_hostname_options(Config) -> false = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{uri_id,"some://very.wrong.domain"}]). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% To generate the PEM file contents: +%% +%% openssl req -x509 -nodes -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout /dev/null -extensions SAN -config public_key_SUITE_data/verify_hostname_ip.conf 2>/dev/null > public_key_SUITE_data/pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP.pem +%% +%% Subject: C=SE, CN=example.com +%% Subject Alternative Name: DNS:1.2.3.4, DNS: abcd:ef::1, IP:5.6.7.8, URI:https://10.11.12.13 + +pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP(Config) -> + DataDir = proplists:get_value(data_dir, Config), + {ok,Bin} = file:read_file(filename:join(DataDir,"pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP.pem")), + Cert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(element(2,hd(public_key:pem_decode(Bin))), otp), + + %% Print the tests that a matchfun has to handle + catch public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{some_tag,"some.domain"}, + {ip, {5,6,7,8}} + ], + [{match_fun, + fun(Ref,Pres) -> + ct:pal("~p:~p:~nRef : ~p~nPres: ~p",[?MODULE,?LINE,Ref,Pres]), + false + end}]), + + false = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{uri_id,"https://1.2.3.4"}]), + true = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{uri_id,"https://10.11.12.13"}]), + true = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{dns_id,"1.2.3.4"}]), + true = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{dns_id,<<"1.2.3.4">>}]), + false = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{dns_id,"5.6.7.8"}]), + true = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{ip, "aBcD:ef:0::0:1"}]), + true = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{ip, {16#abcd,16#ef,0,0,0,0,0,1}}]), + true = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{ip, "5.6.7.8"}]), + true = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{ip, <<"5.6.7.8">>}]), + true = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{ip, {5,6,7,8}}]). + + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- pkix_iso_rsa_oid() -> [{doc, "Test workaround for supporting certs that use ISO oids" " 1.3.14.3.2.29 instead of PKIX/PKCS oid"}]. diff --git a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP.pem b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f9ffb257b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP.pem @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- +MIIB/zCCAWigAwIBAgIJAMoSejmTjwAGMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMB8xCzAJBgNV +BAYTAlNFMRAwDgYDVQQDEwc1LjYuNy44MB4XDTE3MDkyODE0MDAxNVoXDTE3MTAy +ODE0MDAxNVowHzELMAkGA1UEBhMCU0UxEDAOBgNVBAMTBzUuNi43LjgwgZ8wDQYJ +KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAMUPU89KwVbTCDkyxQSz3wprMbZTLe35K6jm +Q7oY1rJyVXjsFHwZrFqqNMScEyX40rJhczQ2Z9etEX6qYLbdb/DZeFcKo14fR583 +QMFZC+qqpLWHdvjaQN0KwD99VFeZIGpRgywG8SR+BXZjDHUkGsMrikAEJtf0Tgih +IPyiFtiJAgMBAAGjQzBBMD8GA1UdEQQ4MDaCBzEuMi4zLjSHBAUGBwiHEKvNAO8A +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAGGE2h0dHBzOi8vMTAuMTEuMTIuMTMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAD +gYEAtWVeQaRFZ0kH/pzSWMSsOCUrjbwlWRwDNbagNKoM6nCRv0QQ59fG6XrVZwR3 +c0s5arlMh3U2+bjKE+Iq9+b/lN1lGzf8iaAqBNa7KptwTSUEY3TiNG5X0zlSXKTI +3z7AaUEtghL9ImCPj5V3tVksqWd7U0zLmeeLZnM+wGAL9Hc= +-----END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/verify_hostname_ip.conf b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/verify_hostname_ip.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0a738f2586 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/verify_hostname_ip.conf @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +[req] +prompt = no +distinguished_name = DN + +[DN] +C=SE +CN=example.com +CN=5.6.7.8 + +[SAN] +subjectAltName = @alt_names + +[alt_names] +DNS = 1.2.3.4 +IP.1 = 5.6.7.8 +IP.2 = abcd:ef::1 +URI = https://10.11.12.13 + diff --git a/lib/reltool/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/reltool/doc/src/notes.xml index 8593a1017f..d7ad7c8dcc 100644 --- a/lib/reltool/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/reltool/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -38,7 +38,26 @@ thus constitutes one section in this document. The title of each section is the version number of Reltool.</p> - <section><title>Reltool 0.7.4</title> + <section><title>Reltool 0.7.5</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Files generated by <c>release_handler</c> and + <c>reltool</c>, which might contain Unicode characters, + are now encoded as UTF-8 and written with format "~tp" or + "~ts". If the file is to be read by + <c>file:consult/1</c>, an encoding comment is added.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14463</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>Reltool 0.7.4</title> <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> <list> diff --git a/lib/reltool/vsn.mk b/lib/reltool/vsn.mk index 3617f6e0d9..49997b1e52 100644 --- a/lib/reltool/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/reltool/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -RELTOOL_VSN = 0.7.4 +RELTOOL_VSN = 0.7.5 diff --git a/lib/runtime_tools/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/runtime_tools/doc/src/notes.xml index d50994306b..8b4d437c26 100644 --- a/lib/runtime_tools/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/runtime_tools/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -32,6 +32,21 @@ <p>This document describes the changes made to the Runtime_Tools application.</p> +<section><title>Runtime_Tools 1.12.2</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Runtime_Tools 1.12.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/runtime_tools/vsn.mk b/lib/runtime_tools/vsn.mk index 7296221033..d8a4ede136 100644 --- a/lib/runtime_tools/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/runtime_tools/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -RUNTIME_TOOLS_VSN = 1.12.1 +RUNTIME_TOOLS_VSN = 1.12.2 diff --git a/lib/sasl/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/sasl/doc/src/notes.xml index bc35939d7e..b144122c4b 100644 --- a/lib/sasl/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/sasl/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -31,6 +31,41 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the SASL application.</p> +<section><title>SASL 3.1</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Files generated by <c>release_handler</c> and + <c>reltool</c>, which might contain Unicode characters, + are now encoded as UTF-8 and written with format "~tp" or + "~ts". If the file is to be read by + <c>file:consult/1</c>, an encoding comment is added.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14463</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + The SASL error logger event handler, + <c>sasl_report_file_h</c>, will now by default open its + log file with encoding UTF-8. This can be overridden when + configuring SASL, see configuration parameter + <c>sasl_error_logger</c> in the SASL reference manual.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14618</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>SASL 3.0.4</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/sasl/vsn.mk b/lib/sasl/vsn.mk index 2608ca5e00..e980a42688 100644 --- a/lib/sasl/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/sasl/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -SASL_VSN = 3.0.4 +SASL_VSN = 3.1 diff --git a/lib/snmp/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/snmp/doc/src/notes.xml index 440077e931..4705804759 100644 --- a/lib/snmp/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/snmp/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -34,7 +34,24 @@ </header> - <section><title>SNMP 5.2.6</title> + <section><title>SNMP 5.2.7</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + A bug in the SNMP MIB compiler has been fixed. An + AUGMENTS referring to a table defined later in the MIB + did not work.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13014 Aux Id: ERL-375 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>SNMP 5.2.6</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> <list> diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml index 5826d14a4a..ef3e94a1e1 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -30,6 +30,76 @@ <file>notes.xml</file> </header> +<section><title>Ssh 4.6.1</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Fixed broken printout</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14645</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Disable aes_gcm ciphers if peer is OpenSSH 6.2 which is + known to have trouble with them in some cases.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14638</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>Ssh 4.6</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Enables the <c>ssh_io module</c> to also accept binary + values when reading standard_io instead of getting stuck + in the receive clause.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14506 Aux Id: PR1503 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Previously, the file owner access permission in response + to ssh_sftp:read_file_info/2 function was always + <c>read_write</c>. With this fix, the actual value of + file owner access permission is added to the returning + record. That value is calculated from file mode value.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14550 Aux Id: PR1533 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + A new option <c>modify_algorithms</c> is implemented. It + enables specifying changes on the default algorithms + list. See the reference manual and the SSH User's Guide + chapter "Configuring algorithms in SSH".</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14568</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Ssh 4.5.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh.xml b/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh.xml index d9516fff12..337f4094cc 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh.xml +++ b/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh.xml @@ -178,6 +178,12 @@ supplied with this option. </p> </item> + <tag><c><![CDATA[{ecdsa_pass_phrase, string()}]]></c></tag> + <item> + <p>If the user ECDSA key is protected by a passphrase, it can be + supplied with this option. + </p> + </item> <tag> <c><![CDATA[{silently_accept_hosts, boolean()}]]></c> <br/> <c><![CDATA[{silently_accept_hosts, CallbackFun}]]></c> <br/> diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl index 8d3ddb09a4..4158a52a27 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl +++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl @@ -1357,6 +1357,7 @@ handle_event(info, UnexpectedMessage, StateName, D = #data{ssh_params = Ssh}) -> report -> Msg = lists:flatten( io_lib:format( + "*** SSH: " "Unexpected message '~p' received in state '~p'\n" "Role: ~p\n" "Peer: ~p\n" @@ -1365,7 +1366,7 @@ handle_event(info, UnexpectedMessage, StateName, D = #data{ssh_params = Ssh}) -> StateName, Ssh#ssh.role, Ssh#ssh.peer, - ?GET_INTERNAL_OPT(address, Ssh#ssh.opts)])), + ?GET_INTERNAL_OPT(address, Ssh#ssh.opts, undefined)])), error_logger:info_report(Msg), keep_state_and_data; @@ -1374,7 +1375,8 @@ handle_event(info, UnexpectedMessage, StateName, D = #data{ssh_params = Ssh}) -> Other -> Msg = lists:flatten( - io_lib:format("Call to fun in 'unexpectedfun' failed:~n" + io_lib:format("*** SSH: " + "Call to fun in 'unexpectedfun' failed:~n" "Return: ~p\n" "Message: ~p\n" "Role: ~p\n" @@ -1383,8 +1385,8 @@ handle_event(info, UnexpectedMessage, StateName, D = #data{ssh_params = Ssh}) -> [Other, UnexpectedMessage, Ssh#ssh.role, - element(2,Ssh#ssh.peer), - ?GET_INTERNAL_OPT(address, Ssh#ssh.opts)] + Ssh#ssh.peer, + ?GET_INTERNAL_OPT(address, Ssh#ssh.opts, undefined)] )), error_logger:error_report(Msg), keep_state_and_data diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_dbg.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_dbg.erl index 3f742ad9b6..906640b490 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_dbg.erl +++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_dbg.erl @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ -export([messages/0, messages/1, messages/2, messages/3, auth/0, auth/1, auth/2, auth/3, + hostkey/0, hostkey/1, hostkey/2, hostkey/3, stop/0 ]). @@ -46,6 +47,11 @@ auth(F) -> start(auth,F). auth(F,X) -> start(auth,F,X). auth(F,M,I) -> start(auth,F,M,I). +hostkey() -> start(hostkey). +hostkey(F) -> start(hostkey,F). +hostkey(F,X) -> start(hostkey,F,X). +hostkey(F,M,I) -> start(hostkey,F,M,I). + stop() -> dbg:stop(). %%%---------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -71,23 +77,44 @@ fmt_fun(F) -> fun(Fmt,Args,Data) -> F(Fmt,Args), Data end. id_fun() -> fun(X) -> X end. %%%---------------------------------------------------------------- -dbg_ssh(msg) -> - dbg_ssh(auth), - dbg:tp(ssh_message,encode,1, x), - dbg:tp(ssh_message,decode,1, x), - dbg:tpl(ssh_transport,select_algorithm,4, x), - dbg:tp(ssh_transport,hello_version_msg,1, x), - dbg:tp(ssh_transport,handle_hello_version,1, x), - dbg:tpl(ssh_connection_handler,ext_info,2, x); +dbg_ssh(What) -> + case [E || E <- lists:flatten(dbg_ssh0(What)), + element(1,E) =/= ok] of + [] -> ok; + Other -> Other + end. + + +dbg_ssh0(auth) -> + [dbg:tp(ssh_transport,hello_version_msg,1, x), + dbg:tp(ssh_transport,handle_hello_version,1, x), + dbg:tp(ssh_message,encode,1, x), + dbg:tpl(ssh_transport,select_algorithm,4, x), + dbg:tpl(ssh_connection_handler,ext_info,2, x), + lists:map(fun(F) -> dbg:tp(ssh_auth, F, x) end, + [publickey_msg, password_msg, keyboard_interactive_msg]) + ]; + +dbg_ssh0(hostkey) -> + [dbg:tpl(ssh_transport, verify_host_key, 4, x), + dbg:tp(ssh_transport, verify, 4, x), + dbg:tpl(ssh_transport, known_host_key, 3, x), +%% dbg:tpl(ssh_transport, accepted_host, 4, x), + dbg:tpl(ssh_transport, add_host_key, 4, x), + dbg:tpl(ssh_transport, is_host_key, 5, x) + ]; + +dbg_ssh0(msg) -> + [dbg_ssh0(hostkey), + dbg_ssh0(auth), + dbg:tp(ssh_message,encode,1, x), + dbg:tp(ssh_message,decode,1, x), + dbg:tpl(ssh_transport,select_algorithm,4, x), + dbg:tp(ssh_transport,hello_version_msg,1, x), + dbg:tp(ssh_transport,handle_hello_version,1, x), + dbg:tpl(ssh_connection_handler,ext_info,2, x) + ]. -dbg_ssh(auth) -> - dbg:tp(ssh_transport,hello_version_msg,1, x), - dbg:tp(ssh_transport,handle_hello_version,1, x), - dbg:tp(ssh_message,encode,1, x), - dbg:tpl(ssh_transport,select_algorithm,4, x), - dbg:tpl(ssh_connection_handler,ext_info,2, x), - lists:foreach(fun(F) -> dbg:tp(ssh_auth, F, x) end, - [publickey_msg, password_msg, keyboard_interactive_msg]). %%%================================================================ cond_start(Type, WriteFun, MangleArgFun, Init) -> @@ -110,10 +137,10 @@ msg_formater(msg, {trace_ts,_Pid,call,{ssh_message,decode,_},_TS}, D) -> msg_formater(msg, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from,{ssh_message,decode,1},Msg,TS}, D) -> fmt("~n~s ~p RECV ~s~n", [ts(TS),Pid,wr_record(shrink_bin(Msg))], D); -msg_formater(auth, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from,{ssh_message,decode,1},#ssh_msg_userauth_failure{authentications=As},TS}, D) -> +msg_formater(_auth, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from,{ssh_message,decode,1},#ssh_msg_userauth_failure{authentications=As},TS}, D) -> fmt("~n~s ~p Client login FAILURE. Try ~s~n", [ts(TS),Pid,As], D); -msg_formater(auth, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from,{ssh_message,decode,1},#ssh_msg_userauth_success{},TS}, D) -> +msg_formater(_auth, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from,{ssh_message,decode,1},#ssh_msg_userauth_success{},TS}, D) -> fmt("~n~s ~p Client login SUCCESS~n", [ts(TS),Pid], D); @@ -155,10 +182,50 @@ msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from,{ssh_connection_handler,ext_info,2},St D end; +msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,Pid,call, {ssh_transport,verify_host_key,[_Ssh,_PK,_Dgst,{AlgStr,_Sign}]},TS}, D) -> + fmt("~n~s ~p Client got a ~s hostkey. Will try to verify it~n", [ts(TS),Pid,AlgStr], D); +msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from, {ssh_transport,verify_host_key,4}, Result, TS}, D) -> + case Result of + ok -> fmt("~n~s ~p Hostkey verified.~n", [ts(TS),Pid], D); + {error,E} -> + fmt("~n~s ~p ***** Hostkey NOT verified: ~p ******!~n", [ts(TS),Pid,E], D); + _ -> fmt("~n~s ~p ***** Hostkey is NOT verified: ~p ******!~n", [ts(TS),Pid,Result], D) + end; + +msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from, {ssh_transport,verify,4}, Result, TS}, D) -> + case Result of + true -> D; + _ -> fmt("~n~s ~p Couldn't verify the signature!~n", [ts(TS),Pid], D) + end; + +msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,_Pid,call, {ssh_transport,is_host_key,_}, _TS}, D) -> D; +msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from, {ssh_transport,is_host_key,5}, {CbMod,Result}, TS}, D) -> + case Result of + true -> fmt("~n~s ~p Hostkey found by ~p.~n", [ts(TS),Pid,CbMod], D); + _ -> fmt("~n~s ~p Hostkey NOT found by ~p.~n", [ts(TS),Pid,CbMod], D) + end; + +msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,_Pid,call, {ssh_transport,add_host_key,_}, _TS}, D) -> D; +msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from, {ssh_transport,add_host_key,4}, {CbMod,Result}, TS}, D) -> + case Result of + ok -> fmt("~n~s ~p New hostkey added by ~p.~n", [ts(TS),Pid,CbMod], D); + _ -> D + end; + +msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,_Pid,call,{ssh_transport,known_host_key,_},_TS}, D) -> D; +msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from, {ssh_transport,known_host_key,3}, Result, TS}, D) -> + case Result of + ok -> D; + {error,E} -> fmt("~n~s ~p Hostkey addition failed: ~p~n", [ts(TS),Pid,E], D); + _ -> fmt("~n~s ~p Hostkey addition: ~p~n", [ts(TS),Pid,Result], D) + end; + msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,Pid,call,{ssh_auth,publickey_msg,[[SigAlg,#ssh{user=User}]]},TS}, D) -> fmt("~n~s ~p Client will try to login user ~p with public key algorithm ~p~n", [ts(TS),Pid,User,SigAlg], D); msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from,{ssh_auth,publickey_msg,1},{not_ok,#ssh{user=User}},TS}, D) -> fmt("~s ~p User ~p can't login with that kind of public key~n", [ts(TS),Pid,User], D); +msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,Pid,return_from,{ssh_auth,publickey_msg,1},{_,#ssh{user=User}},TS}, D) -> + fmt("~s ~p User ~p logged in~n", [ts(TS),Pid,User], D); msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,Pid,call,{ssh_auth,password_msg,[[#ssh{user=User}]]},TS}, D) -> fmt("~n~s ~p Client will try to login user ~p with password~n", [ts(TS),Pid,User], D); @@ -187,26 +254,20 @@ msg_formater(msg, {trace_ts,Pid,'receive',ErlangMsg,TS}, D) -> fmt("~n~s ~p ERL MSG RECEIVE~n ~p~n", [ts(TS),Pid,shrink_bin(ErlangMsg)], D); -%% msg_formater(_, {trace_ts,_Pid,return_from,MFA,_Ret,_TS}=M, D) -> -%% case lists:member(MFA, [{ssh_auth,keyboard_interactive_msg,1}, -%% {ssh_auth,password_msg,1}, -%% {ssh_auth,publickey_msg,1}]) of -%% true -> -%% D; -%% false -> -%% fmt("~nDBG ~n~p~n", [shrink_bin(M)], D) -%% end; - -%% msg_formater(_, M, D) -> -%% fmt("~nDBG ~n~p~n", [shrink_bin(M)], D). - -msg_formater(_, _, D) -> - D. +msg_formater(_, _M, D) -> + fmt("~nDBG other ~n~p~n", [shrink_bin(_M)], D), + D. %%%---------------------------------------------------------------- -record(data, {writer, + initialized, acc}). +fmt(Fmt, Args, D=#data{initialized=false}) -> + fmt(Fmt, Args, + D#data{acc = (D#data.writer)("~s~n", [initial_info()], D#data.acc), + initialized = true} + ); fmt(Fmt, Args, D=#data{writer=Write, acc=Acc}) -> D#data{acc = Write(Fmt,Args,Acc)}. @@ -221,10 +282,47 @@ setup_tracer(Type, WriteFun, MangleArgFun, Init) -> msg_formater(Type, MangleArgFun(Arg), D) end, InitialData = #data{writer = WriteFun, + initialized = false, acc = Init}, {ok,_} = dbg:tracer(process, {Handler, InitialData}), ok. + +initial_info() -> + Lines = + [ts(erlang:timestamp()), + "", + "SSH:"] + ++ as_list_of_lines(case application:get_key(ssh,vsn) of + {ok,Vsn} -> Vsn; + _ -> "(ssh not started)" + end) + ++ ["", + "Cryptolib:"] + ++ as_list_of_lines(crypto:info_lib()) + ++ ["", + "Crypto app:"] + ++ as_list_of_lines(crypto:supports()), + W = max_len(Lines), + append_lines([line_of($*, W+4)] + ++ prepend_lines("* ", Lines) + ++ [line_of($-, W+4)], + io_lib:nl() + ). + + +as_list_of_lines(Term) -> + prepend_lines(" ", + string:tokens(lists:flatten(io_lib:format("~p",[Term])), + io_lib:nl() % Get line endings in current OS + ) + ). + +line_of(Char,W) -> lists:duplicate(W,Char). +max_len(L) -> lists:max([length(S) || S<-L]). +append_lines(L, X) -> [S++X || S<-L]. +prepend_lines(X, L) -> [X++S || S<-L]. + %%%---------------------------------------------------------------- shrink_bin(B) when is_binary(B), size(B)>256 -> {'*** SHRINKED BIN', size(B), diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_options.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_options.erl index 6939094401..68c99743ee 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_options.erl +++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_options.erl @@ -421,6 +421,12 @@ default(client) -> class => user_options }, + {ecdsa_pass_phrase, def} => + #{default => undefined, + chk => fun check_string/1, + class => user_options + }, + {silently_accept_hosts, def} => #{default => false, chk => fun check_silently_accept_hosts/1, diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl index c48c0800e4..46154cf536 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl +++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl @@ -251,9 +251,9 @@ key_exchange_init_msg(Ssh0) -> {SshPacket, Ssh} = ssh_packet(Msg, Ssh0), {Msg, SshPacket, Ssh}. -kex_init(#ssh{role = Role, opts = Opts, available_host_keys = HostKeyAlgs}) -> +kex_init(#ssh{role = Role, opts = Opts, available_host_keys = HostKeyAlgs} = Ssh) -> Random = ssh_bits:random(16), - PrefAlgs = ?GET_OPT(preferred_algorithms, Opts), + PrefAlgs = adjust_algs_for_peer_version(Role, ?GET_OPT(preferred_algorithms, Opts), Ssh), kexinit_message(Role, Random, PrefAlgs, HostKeyAlgs, Opts). key_init(client, Ssh, Value) -> @@ -261,7 +261,22 @@ key_init(client, Ssh, Value) -> key_init(server, Ssh, Value) -> Ssh#ssh{s_keyinit = Value}. - +adjust_algs_for_peer_version(client, PrefAlgs, #ssh{s_version=V}) -> + adjust_algs_for_peer_version(V, PrefAlgs); +adjust_algs_for_peer_version(server, PrefAlgs, #ssh{c_version=V}) -> + adjust_algs_for_peer_version(V, PrefAlgs). +%% +adjust_algs_for_peer_version("SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_6.2"++_, PrefAlgs) -> + C0 = proplists:get_value(cipher, PrefAlgs, same([])), + C = [{D,L} || D <- [client2server, server2client], + L <- [[K || K <- proplists:get_value(D, C0, []), + K =/= '[email protected]', + K =/= '[email protected]']] + ], + lists:keyreplace(cipher, 1, PrefAlgs, {cipher,C}); +adjust_algs_for_peer_version(_, PrefAlgs) -> + PrefAlgs. + kexinit_message(Role, Random, Algs, HostKeyAlgs, Opts) -> #ssh_msg_kexinit{ cookie = Random, @@ -809,6 +824,7 @@ verify_host_key(#ssh{algorithms=Alg}=SSH, PublicKey, Digest, {AlgStr,Signature}) end. +%%% -> boolean() | {error,_} accepted_host(Ssh, PeerName, Public, Opts) -> case ?GET_OPT(silently_accept_hosts, Opts) of @@ -830,11 +846,16 @@ accepted_host(Ssh, PeerName, Public, Opts) -> %% Call-back alternatives: A user provided fun is called for the decision: F when is_function(F,2) -> - true == (catch F(PeerName, public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(Public))); + case catch F(PeerName, public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(Public)) of + true -> true; + _ -> {error, fingerprint_check_failed} + end; {DigestAlg,F} when is_function(F,2) -> - true == (catch F(PeerName, public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(DigestAlg,Public))) - + case catch F(PeerName, public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(DigestAlg,Public)) of + true -> true; + _ -> {error, {fingerprint_check_failed,DigestAlg}} + end end. @@ -852,18 +873,27 @@ fmt_hostkey(X) -> X. known_host_key(#ssh{opts = Opts, key_cb = {KeyCb,KeyCbOpts}, peer = {PeerName,_}} = Ssh, Public, Alg) -> UserOpts = ?GET_OPT(user_options, Opts), - case KeyCb:is_host_key(Public, PeerName, Alg, [{key_cb_private,KeyCbOpts}|UserOpts]) of - true -> + case is_host_key(KeyCb, Public, PeerName, Alg, [{key_cb_private,KeyCbOpts}|UserOpts]) of + {_,true} -> ok; - false -> + {_,false} -> case accepted_host(Ssh, PeerName, Public, Opts) of true -> - KeyCb:add_host_key(PeerName, Public, [{key_cb_private,KeyCbOpts}|UserOpts]); + {_,R} = add_host_key(KeyCb, PeerName, Public, [{key_cb_private,KeyCbOpts}|UserOpts]), + R; false -> - {error, rejected} + {error, rejected_by_user}; + {error,E} -> + {error,E} end end. +is_host_key(KeyCb, Public, PeerName, Alg, Data) -> + {KeyCb, KeyCb:is_host_key(Public, PeerName, Alg, Data)}. + +add_host_key(KeyCb, PeerName, Public, Data) -> + {KeyCb, KeyCb:add_host_key(PeerName, Public, Data)}. + %% Each of the algorithm strings MUST be a comma-separated list of %% algorithm names (see ''Algorithm Naming'' in [SSH-ARCH]). Each diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/Makefile b/lib/ssh/test/Makefile index 32e76cf077..5ea048a352 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/test/Makefile +++ b/lib/ssh/test/Makefile @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ MODULES= \ ssh_bench_SUITE \ ssh_connection_SUITE \ ssh_protocol_SUITE \ + ssh_property_test_SUITE \ ssh_sftp_SUITE \ ssh_sftpd_SUITE \ ssh_sftpd_erlclient_SUITE \ diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE.erl index 62e2a585e4..db2ae241e5 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE.erl @@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ all() -> {group, ecdsa_sha2_nistp521_key}, {group, dsa_pass_key}, {group, rsa_pass_key}, + {group, ecdsa_sha2_nistp256_pass_key}, + {group, ecdsa_sha2_nistp384_pass_key}, + {group, ecdsa_sha2_nistp521_pass_key}, {group, host_user_key_differs}, {group, key_cb}, {group, internal_error}, @@ -124,6 +127,9 @@ groups() -> exec_key_differs_fail]}, {dsa_pass_key, [], [pass_phrase]}, {rsa_pass_key, [], [pass_phrase]}, + {ecdsa_sha2_nistp256_pass_key, [], [pass_phrase]}, + {ecdsa_sha2_nistp384_pass_key, [], [pass_phrase]}, + {ecdsa_sha2_nistp521_pass_key, [], [pass_phrase]}, {key_cb, [], [key_callback, key_callback_options]}, {internal_error, [], [internal_error]}, {login_bad_pwd_no_retry, [], [login_bad_pwd_no_retry1, @@ -229,6 +235,45 @@ init_per_group(dsa_pass_key, Config) -> false -> {skip, unsupported_pub_key} end; +init_per_group(ecdsa_sha2_nistp256_pass_key, Config) -> + DataDir = proplists:get_value(data_dir, Config), + PrivDir = proplists:get_value(priv_dir, Config), + case lists:member('ecdsa-sha2-nistp256', + ssh_transport:default_algorithms(public_key)) + andalso + ssh_test_lib:setup_ecdsa_pass_phrase("256", DataDir, PrivDir, "Password") + of + true -> + [{pass_phrase, {ecdsa_pass_phrase, "Password"}}| Config]; + false -> + {skip, unsupported_pub_key} + end; +init_per_group(ecdsa_sha2_nistp384_pass_key, Config) -> + DataDir = proplists:get_value(data_dir, Config), + PrivDir = proplists:get_value(priv_dir, Config), + case lists:member('ecdsa-sha2-nistp384', + ssh_transport:default_algorithms(public_key)) + andalso + ssh_test_lib:setup_ecdsa_pass_phrase("384", DataDir, PrivDir, "Password") + of + true -> + [{pass_phrase, {ecdsa_pass_phrase, "Password"}}| Config]; + false -> + {skip, unsupported_pub_key} + end; +init_per_group(ecdsa_sha2_nistp521_pass_key, Config) -> + DataDir = proplists:get_value(data_dir, Config), + PrivDir = proplists:get_value(priv_dir, Config), + case lists:member('ecdsa-sha2-nistp521', + ssh_transport:default_algorithms(public_key)) + andalso + ssh_test_lib:setup_ecdsa_pass_phrase("521", DataDir, PrivDir, "Password") + of + true -> + [{pass_phrase, {ecdsa_pass_phrase, "Password"}}| Config]; + false -> + {skip, unsupported_pub_key} + end; init_per_group(host_user_key_differs, Config) -> Data = proplists:get_value(data_dir, Config), Sys = filename:join(proplists:get_value(priv_dir, Config), system_rsa), @@ -241,7 +286,7 @@ init_per_group(host_user_key_differs, Config) -> file:copy(filename:join(Data, "ssh_host_rsa_key.pub"), filename:join(Sys, "ssh_host_rsa_key.pub")), file:copy(filename:join(Data, "id_ecdsa256"), filename:join(Usr, "id_ecdsa")), file:copy(filename:join(Data, "id_ecdsa256.pub"), filename:join(Usr, "id_ecdsa.pub")), - ssh_test_lib:setup_ecdsa_auth_keys("256", Usr, SysUsr), + ssh_test_lib:setup_ecdsa_auth_keys("256", Data, SysUsr), ssh_test_lib:setup_rsa_known_host(Sys, Usr), Config; init_per_group(key_cb, Config) -> @@ -306,6 +351,7 @@ init_per_group(dir_options, Config) -> init_per_group(_, Config) -> Config. + end_per_group(dsa_key, Config) -> PrivDir = proplists:get_value(priv_dir, Config), ssh_test_lib:clean_dsa(PrivDir), diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_bench_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_bench_SUITE.erl index 2c0cd8fc8e..cd0fe23f4a 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_bench_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_bench_SUITE.erl @@ -57,12 +57,15 @@ init_per_suite(Config) -> ok -> DataSize = 1000000, SystemDir = proplists:get_value(data_dir, Config), - Algs = insert_none(ssh:default_algorithms()), +%%% Algs = insert_none(ssh:default_algorithms()), + Algs = ssh:default_algorithms(), {_ServerPid, _Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SystemDir}, {user_passwords, [{?UID,?PWD}]}, {failfun, fun ssh_test_lib:failfun/2}, {preferred_algorithms, Algs}, + {modify_algorithms,[{prepend,[{cipher,[none]}, + {mac,[none]}]}]}, {max_random_length_padding, 0}, {subsystems, [{"/dev/null", {ssh_bench_dev_null,[DataSize]}}]} ]), @@ -175,11 +178,23 @@ gen_data(DataSz) -> %% {suite, ?MODULE}, %% {name, mk_name(["Transfer 1M bytes ",Cipher,"/",Mac," [µs]"])}]); connect_measure(Port, Cipher, Mac, Data, Options) -> + AlgOpt = case {Cipher,Mac} of + {none,none} -> + [{modify_algorithms,[{prepend, [{cipher,[Cipher]}, + {mac,[Mac]}]}]}]; + {none,_} -> + [{modify_algorithms,[{prepend, [{cipher,[Cipher]}]}]}, + {preferred_algorithms, [{mac,[Mac]}]}]; + {_,none} -> + [{modify_algorithms,[{prepend, [{mac,[Mac]}]}]}, + {preferred_algorithms, [{cipher,[Cipher]}]}]; + _ -> + [{preferred_algorithms, [{cipher,[Cipher]}, + {mac,[Mac]}]}] + end, Times = [begin - {ok,C} = ssh:connect("localhost", Port, [{preferred_algorithms, [{cipher,[Cipher]}, - {mac,[Mac]}]} - |Options]), + {ok,C} = ssh:connect("localhost", Port, AlgOpt ++ Options), {ok,Ch} = ssh_connection:session_channel(C, 10000), success = ssh_connection:subsystem(C, Ch, "/dev/null", 10000), {Time,ok} = timer:tc(?MODULE, send_wait_acc, [C, Ch, Data]), diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_test_lib.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_test_lib.erl index 7b273fecef..83819b97a5 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_test_lib.erl +++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_test_lib.erl @@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ setup_ecdsa(Size, DataDir, UserDir) -> file:copy(filename:join(DataDir, "ssh_host_ecdsa_key"++Size++".pub"), filename:join(System, "ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub")), ct:log("DataDir ~p:~n ~p~n~nSystDir ~p:~n ~p~n~nUserDir ~p:~n ~p",[DataDir, file:list_dir(DataDir), System, file:list_dir(System), UserDir, file:list_dir(UserDir)]), setup_ecdsa_known_host(Size, System, UserDir), - setup_ecdsa_auth_keys(Size, UserDir, UserDir). + setup_ecdsa_auth_keys(Size, DataDir, UserDir). clean_dsa(UserDir) -> del_dirs(filename:join(UserDir, "system")), @@ -438,6 +438,29 @@ setup_rsa_pass_pharse(DataDir, UserDir, Phrase) -> setup_rsa_known_host(DataDir, UserDir), setup_rsa_auth_keys(DataDir, UserDir). +setup_ecdsa_pass_phrase(Size, DataDir, UserDir, Phrase) -> + try + {ok, KeyBin} = + case file:read_file(F=filename:join(DataDir, "id_ecdsa"++Size)) of + {error,E} -> + ct:log("Failed (~p) to read ~p~nFiles: ~p", [E,F,file:list_dir(DataDir)]), + file:read_file(filename:join(DataDir, "id_ecdsa")); + Other -> + Other + end, + setup_pass_pharse(KeyBin, filename:join(UserDir, "id_ecdsa"), Phrase), + System = filename:join(UserDir, "system"), + file:make_dir(System), + file:copy(filename:join(DataDir, "ssh_host_ecdsa_key"++Size), filename:join(System, "ssh_host_ecdsa_key")), + file:copy(filename:join(DataDir, "ssh_host_ecdsa_key"++Size++".pub"), filename:join(System, "ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub")), + setup_ecdsa_known_host(Size, System, UserDir), + setup_ecdsa_auth_keys(Size, DataDir, UserDir) + of + _ -> true + catch + _:_ -> false + end. + setup_pass_pharse(KeyBin, OutFile, Phrase) -> [{KeyType, _,_} = Entry0] = public_key:pem_decode(KeyBin), Key = public_key:pem_entry_decode(Entry0), @@ -489,8 +512,15 @@ setup_rsa_auth_keys(Dir, UserDir) -> PKey = #'RSAPublicKey'{publicExponent = E, modulus = N}, setup_auth_keys([{ PKey, [{comment, "Test"}]}], UserDir). -setup_ecdsa_auth_keys(_Size, Dir, UserDir) -> - {ok, Pem} = file:read_file(filename:join(Dir, "id_ecdsa")), +setup_ecdsa_auth_keys(Size, Dir, UserDir) -> + {ok, Pem} = + case file:read_file(F=filename:join(Dir, "id_ecdsa"++Size)) of + {error,E} -> + ct:log("Failed (~p) to read ~p~nFiles: ~p", [E,F,file:list_dir(Dir)]), + file:read_file(filename:join(Dir, "id_ecdsa")); + Other -> + Other + end, ECDSA = public_key:pem_entry_decode(hd(public_key:pem_decode(Pem))), #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = Q, parameters = Param = {namedCurve,_Id0}} = ECDSA, @@ -572,7 +602,6 @@ check_ssh_client_support2(P) -> {P, {exit_status, E}} -> E after 5000 -> - ct:log("Openssh command timed out ~n"), -1 end. diff --git a/lib/ssh/vsn.mk b/lib/ssh/vsn.mk index 006228f8e7..5154658e8a 100644 --- a/lib/ssh/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/ssh/vsn.mk @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #-*-makefile-*- ; force emacs to enter makefile-mode -SSH_VSN = 4.5.1 +SSH_VSN = 4.6.1 APP_VSN = "ssh-$(SSH_VSN)" diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml index 5a39cac9bc..4c6a204e63 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -28,6 +28,40 @@ <p>This document describes the changes made to the SSL application.</p> +<section><title>SSL 8.2.1</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Max session table works correctly again</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14556</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Customize alert handling for DTLS over UDP to mitigate + DoS attacks</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14078</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Improved error propagation and reports</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14236</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>SSL 8.2</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl index ff3e69bae5..a352b7e025 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ -export([renegotiate/2, reinit_handshake_data/1, send_handshake/2, queue_handshake/2, queue_change_cipher/2, - select_sni_extension/1]). + select_sni_extension/1, empty_connection_state/2]). %% Alert and close handling -export([encode_alert/3,send_alert/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). @@ -79,9 +79,9 @@ start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} Error end. -send_handshake(Handshake, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates} = States) -> +send_handshake(Handshake, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> #{epoch := Epoch} = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), - send_handshake_flight(queue_handshake(Handshake, States), Epoch). + send_handshake_flight(queue_handshake(Handshake, State), Epoch). queue_handshake(Handshake0, #state{tls_handshake_history = Hist0, negotiated_version = Version, @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, %% TODO remove hardcoded Max size {Encoded, ConnectionStates} = encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates0), - send(Transport, Socket, Encoded), - {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; + send(Transport, Socket, Encoded), + {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, @@ -188,9 +188,10 @@ reinit_handshake_data(#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers} = State) -> public_key_info = undefined, tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT}, - protocol_buffers = + flight_buffer = new_flight(), + protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{ - dtls_handshake_next_seq = 0, + dtls_handshake_next_seq = 0, dtls_handshake_next_fragments = [], dtls_handshake_later_fragments = [] }}. @@ -199,6 +200,9 @@ select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = HelloExtensions}) -> HelloExtensions#hello_extensions.sni; select_sni_extension(_) -> undefined. +empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> + Empty = ssl_record:empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation), + dtls_record:empty_connection_state(Empty). socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, _) -> dtls_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection). @@ -355,13 +359,14 @@ hello(internal, #hello_verify_request{cookie = Cookie}, #state{role = client, session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb } = State0) -> - State1 = prepare_flight(State0#state{tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history()}), + Hello = dtls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, Cookie, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert), Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version, - HelloVersion = dtls_record:lowest_protocol_version(SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), - {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State1#state{negotiated_version = HelloVersion}), + State1 = prepare_flight(State0#state{tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history()}), + + {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State1), State3 = State2#state{negotiated_version = Version, %% Requested version session = Session0#session{session_id = @@ -451,17 +456,22 @@ connection(enter, _, State) -> connection(info, Event, State) -> handle_info(Event, connection, State); connection(internal, #hello_request{}, #state{host = Host, port = Port, - session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, - session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb, - ssl_options = SslOpts, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = State0) -> + session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, + session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb, + ssl_options = SslOpts, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = State0) -> + Hello = dtls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), - {State1, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State0), + Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version, + HelloVersion = dtls_record:hello_version(Version, SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), + State1 = prepare_flight(State0), + {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State1#state{negotiated_version = HelloVersion}), {Record, State} = next_record( - State1#state{session = Session0#session{session_id + State2#state{flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT}, + session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}), next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions); connection(internal, #client_hello{} = Hello, #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = true} = State) -> @@ -471,7 +481,8 @@ connection(internal, #client_hello{} = Hello, #state{role = server, allow_renego %% initiated renegotiation we will disallow many client initiated %% renegotiations immediately after each other. erlang:send_after(?WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, self(), allow_renegotiate), - {next_state, hello, State#state{allow_renegotiate = false}, [{next_event, internal, Hello}]}; + {next_state, hello, State#state{allow_renegotiate = false, renegotiation = {true, peer}}, + [{next_event, internal, Hello}]}; connection(internal, #client_hello{}, #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = false} = State0) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION), State1 = send_alert(Alert, State0), @@ -542,7 +553,6 @@ handle_info(new_cookie_secret, StateName, handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> ssl_connection:handle_info(Msg, StateName, State). - handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State) -> ssl_connection:handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State, ?MODULE). @@ -796,7 +806,13 @@ next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, case next_record_if_active(State0) of {no_record, State} -> ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); - {#ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch} = Record, State} -> + {#ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, + type = ?HANDSHAKE, + version = Version} = Record, State1} -> + State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State1), + {next_state, StateName, State, + [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + {#ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch} = Record, State} -> {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; {#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, type = ?HANDSHAKE, @@ -822,6 +838,12 @@ next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, next_event(connection = StateName, Record, #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> case Record of + #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, + type = ?HANDSHAKE, + version = Version} = Record -> + State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State0), + {next_state, StateName, State, + [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch} -> {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; #ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, @@ -845,11 +867,11 @@ next_event(StateName, Record, case Record of no_record -> {next_state, StateName, State0, Actions}; - #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, - version = Version} = Record -> - {next_state, StateName, - dtls_version(StateName, Version, State0), - [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, + version = Version} = Record -> + State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State0), + {next_state, StateName, State, + [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; #ssl_tls{epoch = _Epoch, version = _Version} = _Record -> %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch @@ -895,7 +917,7 @@ next_flight(Flight) -> Flight#{handshakes => [], change_cipher_spec => undefined, handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec => []}. - + handle_flight_timer(#state{transport_cb = gen_udp, flight_state = {retransmit, Timeout}} = State) -> start_retransmision_timer(Timeout, State); @@ -923,21 +945,15 @@ dtls_handshake_events(Packets) -> renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State, Actions) -> %% Handle same way as if server requested %% the renegotiation - Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), - {next_state, connection, State#state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0, - protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{}}, + %% Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), + {next_state, connection, State, [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]}; -renegotiate(#state{role = server, - connection_states = CS0} = State0, Actions) -> +renegotiate(#state{role = server} = State0, Actions) -> HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(), - CS = CS0#{write_msg_seq => 0}, - {State1, MoreActions} = send_handshake(HelloRequest, - State0#state{connection_states = - CS}), - Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), - {Record, State} = next_record(State1#state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0, - protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{}}), + State1 = prepare_flight(State0), + {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake(HelloRequest, State1), + {Record, State} = next_record(State2), next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions ++ MoreActions). handle_alerts([], Result) -> @@ -953,7 +969,6 @@ retransmit_epoch(_StateName, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) -> #{epoch := Epoch} = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), Epoch. - update_handshake_history(#hello_verify_request{}, _, Hist) -> Hist; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl index 8a7f8c1d0a..a8520717e5 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). %% Handling of incoming data --export([get_dtls_records/2, init_connection_states/2]). +-export([get_dtls_records/2, init_connection_states/2, empty_connection_state/1]). %% Decoding -export([decode_cipher_text/2]). @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation) -> Initial = initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation), Current = Initial#{epoch := 0}, InitialPending = ssl_record:empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation), - Pending = InitialPending#{epoch => undefined, replay_window => init_replay_window(?REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE)}, + Pending = empty_connection_state(InitialPending), #{saved_read => Current, current_read => Current, pending_read => Pending, @@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation) -> current_write => Current, pending_write => Pending}. +empty_connection_state(Empty) -> + Empty#{epoch => undefined, replay_window => init_replay_window(?REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE)}. + + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec save_current_connection_state(ssl_record:connection_states(), read | write) -> ssl_record:connection_states(). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl index b031d3d47b..2dbe08e0a7 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ abbreviated(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) -> ConnectionStates1 = - ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), + ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read, Connection), {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}), Connection:next_event(abbreviated, Record, State#state{expecting_finished = true}); @@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ cipher(internal, #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, cipher(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) -> ConnectionStates1 = - ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), + ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read, Connection), {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}), Connection:next_event(cipher, Record, State#state{expecting_finished = true}); @@ -1168,8 +1168,9 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}), - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0), + {Record, State1} = Connection:next_record(State0), %% Go back to connection! + State = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State1#state{renegotiation = undefined}), Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State); %% Gracefully log and ignore all other warning alerts @@ -1721,7 +1722,7 @@ finalize_handshake(State0, StateName, Connection) -> ConnectionStates = ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, - write), + write, Connection), State2 = State1#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, State = next_protocol(State2, Connection), diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl index 62c2ffce8b..003ad4994b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ %% Connection state handling -export([initial_security_params/1, current_connection_state/2, pending_connection_state/2, - activate_pending_connection_state/2, + activate_pending_connection_state/3, set_security_params/3, set_mac_secret/4, set_master_secret/2, @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write) -> maps:get(pending_write, ConnectionStates). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec activate_pending_connection_state(connection_states(), read | write) -> +-spec activate_pending_connection_state(connection_states(), read | write, tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> connection_states(). %% %% Description: Creates a new instance of the connection_states record @@ -91,13 +91,13 @@ pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- activate_pending_connection_state(#{current_read := Current, pending_read := Pending} = States, - read) -> + read, Connection) -> #{secure_renegotiation := SecureRenegotation} = Current, #{beast_mitigation := BeastMitigation, security_parameters := SecParams} = Pending, NewCurrent = Pending#{sequence_number => 0}, ConnectionEnd = SecParams#security_parameters.connection_end, - EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation), + EmptyPending = Connection:empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation), NewPending = EmptyPending#{secure_renegotiation => SecureRenegotation}, States#{current_read => NewCurrent, pending_read => NewPending @@ -105,13 +105,13 @@ activate_pending_connection_state(#{current_read := Current, activate_pending_connection_state(#{current_write := Current, pending_write := Pending} = States, - write) -> + write, Connection) -> NewCurrent = Pending#{sequence_number => 0}, #{secure_renegotiation := SecureRenegotation} = Current, #{beast_mitigation := BeastMitigation, security_parameters := SecParams} = Pending, ConnectionEnd = SecParams#security_parameters.connection_end, - EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation), + EmptyPending = Connection:empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation), NewPending = EmptyPending#{secure_renegotiation => SecureRenegotation}, States#{current_write => NewCurrent, pending_write => NewPending diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl index e3ffbea3d3..010e904839 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ %% Handshake handling -export([renegotiate/2, send_handshake/2, queue_handshake/2, queue_change_cipher/2, - reinit_handshake_data/1, select_sni_extension/1]). + reinit_handshake_data/1, select_sni_extension/1, empty_connection_state/2]). %% Alert and close handling -export([send_alert/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). @@ -152,6 +152,9 @@ select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = HelloExtensions}) -> select_sni_extension(_) -> undefined. +empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> + ssl_record:empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation). + encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0). diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl index 9efde4752f..3b4ca40058 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl @@ -83,13 +83,14 @@ groups() -> ]. tls_versions_groups ()-> - [{group, renegotiate}, %% Should be in all_versions_groups not fixed for DTLS yet + [ {group, api_tls}, {group, tls_ciphers}, {group, error_handling_tests_tls}]. all_versions_groups ()-> [{group, api}, + {group, renegotiate}, {group, ciphers}, {group, ciphers_ec}, {group, error_handling_tests}]. diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_to_openssl_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_to_openssl_SUITE.erl index 2e1a0b94ea..9118e4b7e3 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_to_openssl_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_to_openssl_SUITE.erl @@ -90,9 +90,9 @@ dtls_all_versions_tests() -> erlang_client_openssl_server_dsa_cert, erlang_server_openssl_client_dsa_cert, erlang_server_openssl_client_reuse_session, - %%erlang_client_openssl_server_renegotiate, - %%erlang_client_openssl_server_nowrap_seqnum, - %%erlang_server_openssl_client_nowrap_seqnum, + erlang_client_openssl_server_renegotiate, + erlang_client_openssl_server_nowrap_seqnum, + erlang_server_openssl_client_nowrap_seqnum, erlang_client_openssl_server_no_server_ca_cert, erlang_client_openssl_server_client_cert, erlang_server_openssl_client_client_cert, diff --git a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/ets.xml b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/ets.xml index 95af2b77a5..576959b1c8 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/ets.xml +++ b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/ets.xml @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ <p><c><anno>Acc0</anno></c> is returned if the table is empty. This function is similar to <seealso marker="lists#foldl/3"><c>lists:foldl/3</c></seealso>. - The table elements are traversed is unspecified order, except for + The table elements are traversed in an unspecified order, except for <c>ordered_set</c> tables, where they are traversed first to last.</p> <p>If <c><anno>Function</anno></c> inserts objects into the table, or another @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ <p><c><anno>Acc0</anno></c> is returned if the table is empty. This function is similar to <seealso marker="lists#foldr/3"><c>lists:foldr/3</c></seealso>. - The table elements are traversed is unspecified order, except for + The table elements are traversed in an unspecified order, except for <c>ordered_set</c> tables, where they are traversed last to first.</p> <p>If <c><anno>Function</anno></c> inserts objects into the table, or another diff --git a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/filelib.xml b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/filelib.xml index 80c4acffdb..57c4348745 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/filelib.xml +++ b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/filelib.xml @@ -45,6 +45,30 @@ <p>For more information about raw filenames, see the <seealso marker="kernel:file"><c>file</c></seealso> module.</p> + + <note> + <p> + Functionality in this module generally assumes valid input and + does not necessarily fail on input that does not use a valid + encoding. You can validate the encoding of a filename using + <seealso marker="stdlib:filename#validate/1">filename:validate/1</seealso>. + </p> + <p> + File operations used to accept filenames containing + null characters (integer value zero). This caused + the name to be truncated at the first null character. + Filenames containing null characters inside the filename + are now <em>rejected</em> and will cause primitive + file operations fail. + </p> + </note> + <warning><p> + Currently null characters at the end of the filename + will be accepted by primitive file operations. Such + filenames are however still documented as invalid. The + implementation will also change in the future and + reject such filenames. + </p></warning> </description> <datatypes> diff --git a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/filename.xml b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/filename.xml index 14fd5ef787..b6028fc066 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/filename.xml +++ b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/filename.xml @@ -46,7 +46,10 @@ filename by removing redundant directory separators, use <seealso marker="#join/1"><c>join/1</c></seealso>.</p> - <p>The module supports raw filenames in the way that if a binary is + <p> + The module supports + <seealso marker="unicode_usage#notes-about-raw-filenames">raw + filenames</seealso> in the way that if a binary is present, or the filename cannot be interpreted according to the return value of <seealso marker="kernel:file#native_name_encoding/0"> <c>file:native_name_encoding/0</c></seealso>, a raw filename is also @@ -56,6 +59,30 @@ (the join operation is performed of course). For more information about raw filenames, see the <seealso marker="kernel:file"><c>file</c></seealso> module.</p> + + <note> + <p> + Functionality in this module generally assumes valid input and + does not necessarily fail on input that does not use a valid + encoding. You can validate the encoding of a filename using + <seealso marker="#validate/1">filename:validate/1</seealso>. + </p> + <p> + File operations used to accept filenames containing + null characters (integer value zero). This caused + the name to be truncated at the first null character. + Filenames containing null characters inside the filename + are now <em>rejected</em> and will cause primitive + file operations fail. + </p> + </note> + <warning><p> + Currently null characters at the end of the filename + will be accepted by primitive file operations. Such + filenames are however still documented as invalid. The + implementation will also change in the future and + reject such filenames. + </p></warning> </description> <datatypes> <datatype> @@ -555,6 +582,55 @@ unsafe</pre> ["a:/","msdev","include"]</pre> </desc> </func> + + <func> + <name name="validate" arity="1"/> + <fsummary>Validate encoding of filename</fsummary> + <desc> + <p> + Validates filename encoding. Returns <c>true</c> if + <c><anno>FileName</anno></c> has a valid encoding; + otherwise, returns <c>false</c>. + </p> + <taglist> + <tag>Ordinary Filename</tag> + <item> + <p> + Type: <c><anno>FileName</anno> = </c><seealso marker="kernel:file#type-name"><c>file:name()</c></seealso> + </p> + <p> + Validates encoding against the + <seealso marker="kernel:file#native_name_encoding/0">native file + name encoding</seealso>, and the + capabilities of the operating system used. + Regardless of configuration and OS, null + characters (integer value zero) will be + rejected by the validation (even when only + present at the end of the filename). + </p> + </item> + <tag><seealso marker="unicode_usage#notes-about-raw-filenames">Raw + Filename</seealso></tag> + <item> + <p> + Type: <c><anno>FileName</anno> = binary()</c> + </p> + <p> + The encoding will not be interpreted, but + null bytes (integer value zero) will be + rejected by the validation (even when only + present at the end of the filename). + </p> + </item> + </taglist> + <p> + For information on filename encoding see the documentation + of unicode filenames in + <seealso marker="stdlib:unicode_usage#unicode_file_names">STDLIB + Users Guide ➜ Using Unicode in Erlang ➜ Unicode Filenames</seealso>. + </p> + </desc> + </func> </funcs> </erlref> diff --git a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/notes.xml index 604d758db3..d396f1de8f 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -31,6 +31,56 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the STDLIB application.</p> +<section><title>STDLIB 3.4.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> Fix a bug in the Erlang shell where recursively + defined records with typed fields could cause a loop. + </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14488 Aux Id: PR-1489 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Make edlin handle grapheme clusters instead of codepoints + to improve the handling multi-codepoints characters.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14542</p> + </item> + <item> + <p>There could be false warnings for + <c>erlang:get_stacktrace/0</c> being used outside of a + <c>try</c> block when using multiple <c>catch</c> + clauses.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14600 Aux Id: ERL-478 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> The Erlang code linter no longer checks that the + functions mentioned in <c>nowarn_deprecated_function</c> + options are declared in the module. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14378</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>STDLIB 3.4.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/unicode_usage.xml b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/unicode_usage.xml index 26dc46719e..ff1f864e22 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/doc/src/unicode_usage.xml +++ b/lib/stdlib/doc/src/unicode_usage.xml @@ -719,8 +719,8 @@ Eshell V5.10.1 (abort with ^G) </section> <section> - <title>Unicode Filenames</title> <marker id="unicode_file_names"/> + <title>Unicode Filenames</title> <p>Most modern operating systems support Unicode filenames in some way. There are many different ways to do this and Erlang by default treats the different approaches differently:</p> @@ -855,8 +855,8 @@ Eshell V5.10.1 (abort with ^G) </note> <section> - <title>Notes About Raw Filenames</title> <marker id="notes-about-raw-filenames"/> + <title>Notes About Raw Filenames</title> <p>Raw filenames were introduced together with Unicode filename support in ERTS 5.8.2 (Erlang/OTP R14B01). The reason "raw filenames" were introduced in the system was diff --git a/lib/stdlib/src/filename.erl b/lib/stdlib/src/filename.erl index 9bf4290916..1c3ab6d274 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/src/filename.erl +++ b/lib/stdlib/src/filename.erl @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ safe_relative_path/1]). -export([find_src/1, find_src/2]). % deprecated -export([basedir/2, basedir/3]). +-export([validate/1]). %% Undocumented and unsupported exports. -export([append/2]). @@ -1135,3 +1136,72 @@ basedir_os_type() -> {win32,_} -> windows; _ -> linux end. + +%% +%% validate/1 +%% + +-spec validate(FileName) -> boolean() when + FileName :: file:name_all(). + +validate(FileName) when is_binary(FileName) -> + %% Raw filename... + validate_bin(FileName); +validate(FileName) when is_list(FileName); + is_atom(FileName) -> + validate_list(FileName, + file:native_name_encoding(), + os:type()). + +validate_list(FileName, Enc, Os) -> + try + true = validate_list(FileName, Enc, Os, 0) > 0 + catch + _ : _ -> false + end. + +validate_list([], _Enc, _Os, Chars) -> + Chars; +validate_list(C, Enc, Os, Chars) when is_integer(C) -> + validate_char(C, Enc, Os), + Chars+1; +validate_list(A, Enc, Os, Chars) when is_atom(A) -> + validate_list(atom_to_list(A), Enc, Os, Chars); +validate_list([H|T], Enc, Os, Chars) -> + NewChars = validate_list(H, Enc, Os, Chars), + validate_list(T, Enc, Os, NewChars). + +%% C is always an integer... +% validate_char(C, _, _) when not is_integer(C) -> +% throw(invalid); +validate_char(C, _, _) when C < 1 -> + throw(invalid); %% No negative or null characters... +validate_char(C, latin1, _) when C > 255 -> + throw(invalid); +validate_char(C, utf8, _) when C >= 16#110000 -> + throw(invalid); +validate_char(C, utf8, {win32, _}) when C > 16#ffff -> + throw(invalid); %% invalid win wchar... +validate_char(_C, utf8, {win32, _}) -> + ok; %% Range below is accepted on windows... +validate_char(C, utf8, _) when 16#D800 =< C, C =< 16#DFFF -> + throw(invalid); %% invalid unicode range... +validate_char(_, _, _) -> + ok. + +validate_bin(Bin) -> + %% Raw filename. That is, we do not interpret + %% the encoding, but we still do not accept + %% null characters... + try + true = validate_bin(Bin, 0) > 0 + catch + _ : _ -> false + end. + +validate_bin(<<>>, Bs) -> + Bs; +validate_bin(<<0, _Rest/binary>>, _Bs) -> + throw(invalid); %% No null characters allowed... +validate_bin(<<_B, Rest/binary>>, Bs) -> + validate_bin(Rest, Bs+1). diff --git a/lib/stdlib/src/otp_internal.erl b/lib/stdlib/src/otp_internal.erl index c59db903dc..5b488cc677 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/src/otp_internal.erl +++ b/lib/stdlib/src/otp_internal.erl @@ -466,8 +466,6 @@ obsolete_1(inviso, _, _) -> {removed,"the inviso application was removed in R16"}; %% Added in R15B01. -obsolete_1(gs, _, _) -> - {removed,"the gs application has been removed; use the wx application instead"}; obsolete_1(ssh, sign_data, 2) -> {removed,"removed in R16A; use public_key:pem_decode/1, public_key:pem_entry_decode/1 " "and public_key:sign/3 instead"}; diff --git a/lib/stdlib/src/stdlib.app.src b/lib/stdlib/src/stdlib.app.src index 3c449d3cb9..41c89270aa 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/src/stdlib.app.src +++ b/lib/stdlib/src/stdlib.app.src @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ dets]}, {applications, [kernel]}, {env, []}, - {runtime_dependencies, ["sasl-3.0","kernel-5.0","erts-9.0","crypto-3.3", + {runtime_dependencies, ["sasl-3.0","kernel-5.4.1","erts-9.1.1","crypto-3.3", "compiler-5.0"]} ]}. diff --git a/lib/stdlib/test/filename_SUITE.erl b/lib/stdlib/test/filename_SUITE.erl index fc77593bb8..4c82ec1c22 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/test/filename_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/stdlib/test/filename_SUITE.erl @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ -export([pathtype_bin/1,rootname_bin/1,split_bin/1]). -export([t_basedir_api/1, t_basedir_xdg/1, t_basedir_windows/1]). -export([safe_relative_path/1]). +-export([validate/1]). -include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl"). @@ -43,7 +44,8 @@ all() -> absname_bin, absname_bin_2, {group,p}, t_basedir_xdg, t_basedir_windows, - safe_relative_path]. + safe_relative_path, + validate]. groups() -> [{p, [parallel], @@ -1011,3 +1013,56 @@ basedir_xdg_def(Type,Home,Name) -> Dir <- ["/usr/local/share/","/usr/share/"]]; site_config -> [filename:join(["/etc/xdg",Name])] end. + +validate(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + true = filename:validate(blipp), + false = filename:validate('bli\0pp'), + false = filename:validate('blipp\0'), + true = filename:validate("blipp"), + false = filename:validate("bli"++[0]++"pp"), + false = filename:validate("blipp"++[0]), + true = filename:validate(["one ", blipp, "blopp"]), + false = filename:validate(["one ", 'bli\0pp', "blopp"]), + false = filename:validate(["one ", 'blipp\0', "blopp"]), + false = filename:validate(["one ", 'blipp', "blopp\0"]), + false = filename:validate([0]), + false = filename:validate([]), + false = filename:validate([[[]],[[[[],[[[[[[[[]]], '', [[[[[]]]]]]]]]]]]]]), + false = filename:validate([16#110000]), + false = filename:validate([16#110001]), + false = filename:validate([16#110000*2]), + case file:native_name_encoding() of + latin1 -> + true = filename:validate(lists:seq(1, 255)), + false = filename:validate([256]); + utf8 -> + true = filename:validate(lists:seq(1, 16#D7FF)), + true = filename:validate(lists:seq(16#E000, 16#FFFF)), + true = filename:validate([16#FFFF]), + case os:type() of + {win32, _} -> + false = filename:validate([16#10000]), + true = filename:validate(lists:seq(16#D800,16#DFFF)); + _ -> + true = filename:validate([16#10000]), + true = filename:validate([16#10FFFF]), + lists:foreach(fun (C) -> + false = filename:validate([C]) + end, + lists:seq(16#D800,16#DFFF)) + end + + end, + true = filename:validate(<<1,17,255>>), + false = filename:validate(<<1,0,17,255>>), + false = filename:validate(<<1,17,255,0>>), + false = filename:validate(<<>>), + lists:foreach(fun (N) -> + true = filename:validate(N) + end, + code:get_path()), + ok. + + + + diff --git a/lib/stdlib/vsn.mk b/lib/stdlib/vsn.mk index 8a83cdec1e..48db5dc900 100644 --- a/lib/stdlib/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/stdlib/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -STDLIB_VSN = 3.4.1 +STDLIB_VSN = 3.4.2 diff --git a/lib/syntax_tools/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/syntax_tools/doc/src/notes.xml index f85d963919..8c91f01e3b 100644 --- a/lib/syntax_tools/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/syntax_tools/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -32,6 +32,27 @@ <p>This document describes the changes made to the Syntax_Tools application.</p> +<section><title>Syntax_Tools 2.1.3</title> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> A process trapping exits and calling <c>erl_tidy</c> + no longer hangs if an error occurs. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14471 Aux Id: ERL-413 </p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Syntax_Tools 2.1.2</title> <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> diff --git a/lib/syntax_tools/vsn.mk b/lib/syntax_tools/vsn.mk index 9b33f1e1f4..e0880d61ee 100644 --- a/lib/syntax_tools/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/syntax_tools/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -SYNTAX_TOOLS_VSN = 2.1.2 +SYNTAX_TOOLS_VSN = 2.1.3 diff --git a/lib/tools/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/tools/doc/src/notes.xml index f0df43bf2b..3eaa2058a0 100644 --- a/lib/tools/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/tools/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -31,6 +31,75 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the Tools application.</p> +<section><title>Tools 2.11</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> The predefined Xref analysis <c>locals_not_used</c> + no longer reports unused functions with the + <c>-on_load()</c> attribute.</p> <p> The new predefined + Xref variable <c>OL</c> holds all functions with the + <c>-on_load()</c> attribute. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14344</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + In fprof when sampling multiple processes and analyzing + with totals set to true, the output now sums together all + caller and callee entries which concerns the same + function. Previous behaviour was to report each + contributing entry separately.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14500</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p>Lock counting can now be fully toggled at runtime in + the lock counting emulator (<c>-emu_type lcnt</c>). + Everything is enabled by default to match the old + behavior, but specific categories can be toggled at will + with minimal runtime overhead when disabled. Refer to the + documentation on <c>lcnt:rt_mask/1</c> for details.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13170</p> + </item> + <item> + <p><c>lcnt:collect</c> and <c>lcnt:clear</c> will no + longer block all other threads in the runtime system.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14412</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Tools are updated to show Unicode atoms correctly.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14464</p> + </item> + <item> + <p>Add <c>erlang:iolist_to_iovec/1</c>, which converts an + iolist() to an erlang:iovec(), which suitable for use + with <c>enif_inspect_iovec</c>.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14520</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Tools 2.10.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/tools/vsn.mk b/lib/tools/vsn.mk index 831d850217..b9249ae45c 100644 --- a/lib/tools/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/tools/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -TOOLS_VSN = 2.10.1 +TOOLS_VSN = 2.11 diff --git a/lib/wx/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/wx/doc/src/notes.xml index d300ab5128..599b5b64fd 100644 --- a/lib/wx/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/wx/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -32,6 +32,36 @@ <p>This document describes the changes made to the wxErlang application.</p> +<section><title>Wx 1.8.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Do not deprecate + <c>wxGraphicsContext:createLinearGradientBrush/7</c> and + <c>wxGraphicsContext:createRadialGradientBrush/8</c> + which are still available in wxWidgets-3.0.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14539</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + General Unicode improvements.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14462</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>Wx 1.8.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> diff --git a/lib/wx/vsn.mk b/lib/wx/vsn.mk index b9100e7c87..039fae322e 100644 --- a/lib/wx/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/wx/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -WX_VSN = 1.8.1 +WX_VSN = 1.8.2 diff --git a/otp_versions.table b/otp_versions.table index b6527594da..c8e355b695 100644 --- a/otp_versions.table +++ b/otp_versions.table @@ -1,9 +1,12 @@ +OTP-20.1.1 : compiler-7.1.3 erts-9.1.1 ssh-4.6.1 # asn1-5.0.3 common_test-1.15.2 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.1 debugger-4.2.3 dialyzer-3.2.2 diameter-2.1 edoc-0.9.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7.1 erl_interface-3.10 et-1.6.1 eunit-2.3.4 hipe-3.16.1 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.4.2 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.4 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15.1 observer-2.5 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.3 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.5 reltool-0.7.5 runtime_tools-1.12.2 sasl-3.1 snmp-5.2.7 ssl-8.2.1 stdlib-3.4.2 syntax_tools-2.1.3 tools-2.11 wx-1.8.2 xmerl-1.3.15 : +OTP-20.1 : asn1-5.0.3 common_test-1.15.2 compiler-7.1.2 crypto-4.1 debugger-4.2.3 dialyzer-3.2.2 diameter-2.1 edoc-0.9.1 erl_docgen-0.7.1 erts-9.1 et-1.6.1 eunit-2.3.4 hipe-3.16.1 inets-6.4.2 kernel-5.4 mnesia-4.15.1 observer-2.5 os_mon-2.4.3 public_key-1.5 reltool-0.7.5 runtime_tools-1.12.2 sasl-3.1 snmp-5.2.7 ssh-4.6 ssl-8.2.1 stdlib-3.4.2 syntax_tools-2.1.3 tools-2.11 wx-1.8.2 # cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 eldap-1.2.2 erl_interface-3.10 ic-4.4.2 jinterface-1.8 megaco-3.18.2 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 xmerl-1.3.15 : OTP-20.0.5 : erts-9.0.5 inets-6.4.1 # asn1-5.0.2 common_test-1.15.1 compiler-7.1.1 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.0 debugger-4.2.2 dialyzer-3.2.1 diameter-2.0 edoc-0.9 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7 erl_interface-3.10 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.3 hipe-3.16 ic-4.4.2 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.3.1 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15 observer-2.4 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.4.1 reltool-0.7.4 runtime_tools-1.12.1 sasl-3.0.4 snmp-5.2.6 ssh-4.5.1 ssl-8.2 stdlib-3.4.1 syntax_tools-2.1.2 tools-2.10.1 wx-1.8.1 xmerl-1.3.15 : OTP-20.0.4 : dialyzer-3.2.1 erts-9.0.4 # asn1-5.0.2 common_test-1.15.1 compiler-7.1.1 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.0 debugger-4.2.2 diameter-2.0 edoc-0.9 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7 erl_interface-3.10 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.3 hipe-3.16 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.4 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.3.1 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15 observer-2.4 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.4.1 reltool-0.7.4 runtime_tools-1.12.1 sasl-3.0.4 snmp-5.2.6 ssh-4.5.1 ssl-8.2 stdlib-3.4.1 syntax_tools-2.1.2 tools-2.10.1 wx-1.8.1 xmerl-1.3.15 : OTP-20.0.3 : asn1-5.0.2 compiler-7.1.1 erts-9.0.3 ssh-4.5.1 # common_test-1.15.1 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.0 debugger-4.2.2 dialyzer-3.2 diameter-2.0 edoc-0.9 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7 erl_interface-3.10 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.3 hipe-3.16 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.4 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.3.1 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15 observer-2.4 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.4.1 reltool-0.7.4 runtime_tools-1.12.1 sasl-3.0.4 snmp-5.2.6 ssl-8.2 stdlib-3.4.1 syntax_tools-2.1.2 tools-2.10.1 wx-1.8.1 xmerl-1.3.15 : OTP-20.0.2 : asn1-5.0.1 erts-9.0.2 kernel-5.3.1 # common_test-1.15.1 compiler-7.1 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.0 debugger-4.2.2 dialyzer-3.2 diameter-2.0 edoc-0.9 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7 erl_interface-3.10 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.3 hipe-3.16 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.4 jinterface-1.8 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15 observer-2.4 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.4.1 reltool-0.7.4 runtime_tools-1.12.1 sasl-3.0.4 snmp-5.2.6 ssh-4.5 ssl-8.2 stdlib-3.4.1 syntax_tools-2.1.2 tools-2.10.1 wx-1.8.1 xmerl-1.3.15 : OTP-20.0.1 : common_test-1.15.1 erts-9.0.1 runtime_tools-1.12.1 stdlib-3.4.1 tools-2.10.1 # asn1-5.0 compiler-7.1 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-4.0 debugger-4.2.2 dialyzer-3.2 diameter-2.0 edoc-0.9 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.7 erl_interface-3.10 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.3 hipe-3.16 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.4 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.3 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15 observer-2.4 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.3 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.4.1 reltool-0.7.4 sasl-3.0.4 snmp-5.2.6 ssh-4.5 ssl-8.2 syntax_tools-2.1.2 wx-1.8.1 xmerl-1.3.15 : OTP-20.0 : asn1-5.0 common_test-1.15 compiler-7.1 cosProperty-1.2.2 crypto-4.0 debugger-4.2.2 dialyzer-3.2 diameter-2.0 edoc-0.9 erl_docgen-0.7 erl_interface-3.10 erts-9.0 eunit-2.3.3 hipe-3.16 inets-6.4 jinterface-1.8 kernel-5.3 megaco-3.18.2 mnesia-4.15 observer-2.4 orber-3.8.3 parsetools-2.1.5 public_key-1.4.1 reltool-0.7.4 runtime_tools-1.12 sasl-3.0.4 snmp-5.2.6 ssh-4.5 ssl-8.2 stdlib-3.4 syntax_tools-2.1.2 tools-2.10 wx-1.8.1 xmerl-1.3.15 # cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 eldap-1.2.2 et-1.6 ic-4.4.2 odbc-2.12 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 : +OTP-19.3.6.3 : compiler-7.0.4.1 erts-8.3.5.3 # asn1-4.0.4 common_test-1.14 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.1 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-3.7.4 debugger-4.2.1 dialyzer-3.1.1 diameter-1.12.2 edoc-0.8.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.6.1 erl_interface-3.9.3 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.2 gs-1.6.2 hipe-3.15.4 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.3.9 jinterface-1.7.1 kernel-5.2 megaco-3.18.1 mnesia-4.14.3 observer-2.3.1 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.2 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.4 percept-0.9 public_key-1.4 reltool-0.7.3 runtime_tools-1.11.1 sasl-3.0.3 snmp-5.2.5 ssh-4.4.2 ssl-8.1.3 stdlib-3.3 syntax_tools-2.1.1 tools-2.9.1 typer-0.9.12 wx-1.8 xmerl-1.3.14 : OTP-19.3.6.2 : erts-8.3.5.2 # asn1-4.0.4 common_test-1.14 compiler-7.0.4 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.1 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-3.7.4 debugger-4.2.1 dialyzer-3.1.1 diameter-1.12.2 edoc-0.8.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.6.1 erl_interface-3.9.3 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.2 gs-1.6.2 hipe-3.15.4 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.3.9 jinterface-1.7.1 kernel-5.2 megaco-3.18.1 mnesia-4.14.3 observer-2.3.1 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.2 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.4 percept-0.9 public_key-1.4 reltool-0.7.3 runtime_tools-1.11.1 sasl-3.0.3 snmp-5.2.5 ssh-4.4.2 ssl-8.1.3 stdlib-3.3 syntax_tools-2.1.1 tools-2.9.1 typer-0.9.12 wx-1.8 xmerl-1.3.14 : OTP-19.3.6.1 : erts-8.3.5.1 # asn1-4.0.4 common_test-1.14 compiler-7.0.4 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.1 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-3.7.4 debugger-4.2.1 dialyzer-3.1.1 diameter-1.12.2 edoc-0.8.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.6.1 erl_interface-3.9.3 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.2 gs-1.6.2 hipe-3.15.4 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.3.9 jinterface-1.7.1 kernel-5.2 megaco-3.18.1 mnesia-4.14.3 observer-2.3.1 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.2 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.4 percept-0.9 public_key-1.4 reltool-0.7.3 runtime_tools-1.11.1 sasl-3.0.3 snmp-5.2.5 ssh-4.4.2 ssl-8.1.3 stdlib-3.3 syntax_tools-2.1.1 tools-2.9.1 typer-0.9.12 wx-1.8 xmerl-1.3.14 : OTP-19.3.6 : erts-8.3.5 # asn1-4.0.4 common_test-1.14 compiler-7.0.4 cosEvent-2.2.1 cosEventDomain-1.2.1 cosFileTransfer-1.2.1 cosNotification-1.2.2 cosProperty-1.2.1 cosTime-1.2.2 cosTransactions-1.3.2 crypto-3.7.4 debugger-4.2.1 dialyzer-3.1.1 diameter-1.12.2 edoc-0.8.1 eldap-1.2.2 erl_docgen-0.6.1 erl_interface-3.9.3 et-1.6 eunit-2.3.2 gs-1.6.2 hipe-3.15.4 ic-4.4.2 inets-6.3.9 jinterface-1.7.1 kernel-5.2 megaco-3.18.1 mnesia-4.14.3 observer-2.3.1 odbc-2.12 orber-3.8.2 os_mon-2.4.2 otp_mibs-1.1.1 parsetools-2.1.4 percept-0.9 public_key-1.4 reltool-0.7.3 runtime_tools-1.11.1 sasl-3.0.3 snmp-5.2.5 ssh-4.4.2 ssl-8.1.3 stdlib-3.3 syntax_tools-2.1.1 tools-2.9.1 typer-0.9.12 wx-1.8 xmerl-1.3.14 : diff --git a/scripts/pre-push b/scripts/pre-push new file mode 100755 index 0000000000..0349378056 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/pre-push @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# This is a git pre-push hook script. +# It limits what you can push toward https://github.com/erlang/otp.git +# +# To activate, make a copy as .git/hooks/pre-push in your repo. + +# Called by "git push" +# after it has checked the remote status, but before anything has been +# pushed. If this script exits with a non-zero status nothing will be pushed. +# +# This hook is called with the following parameters: +# +# $1 -- Name of the remote to which the push is being done +# $2 -- URL to which the push is being done +# +# If pushing without using a named remote those arguments will be equal. +# +# Information about the commits which are being pushed is supplied as lines to +# the standard input in the form: +# +# <local ref> <local sha1> <remote ref> <remote sha1> +# + +RELEASES="20 19 18 17 r16 r15 r14 r13" + +# First commit on master, not allowed in other branches +MASTER_ONLY=f52748254f17ba42e344798e8c787a1e3361fa33 + +# Number of commits and files allowed in one push by this script +NCOMMITS_MAX=100 +NFILES_MAX=100 + +remote="$1" +url="$2" + +null=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 + +#echo "pre-push hook: remote=$remote" +#echo "pre-push hook: url=$url" + +if [ "$url" = 'https://github.com/erlang/otp.git' -o "$url" = '[email protected]:erlang/otp.git' ] +then + if [ $remote = "$url" ]; then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** Push to $url without using a named remote is NOT ALLOWED!!!!" + echo "***" + exit 1 + fi + IFS=' ' + while read local_ref local_sha remote_ref remote_sha + do + #echo "pre-push hook: local_ref=$local_ref" + #echo "pre-push hook: remote_ref=$remote_ref" + #echo "pre-push hook: local_sha=$local_sha" + #echo "pre-push hook: remote_sha=$remote_sha" + + if [ "$local_sha" = $null ] + then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** DELETE push to '$remote' NOT ALLOWED!!!!!" + echo "***" + exit 1 + fi + if [ "$local_ref" != "$remote_ref" ] + then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** RENAME push: $local_ref pushed as $remote_ref to '$remote' NOT ALLOWED!!!!" + echo "***" + exit 1 + fi + case "$remote_ref" in + refs/heads/master | refs/heads/maint | refs/heads/maint-[0-9][0-9] | refs/heads/maint-r[0-9][0-9]) + branch=${remote_ref#refs/heads/} + if [ "$remote_sha" = $null ] + then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** UNKNOWN BRANCH: '$branch' does not exist at '$remote'!!!!" + echo "***" + exit 1 + fi + if ! git log -1 --oneline $remote_sha > /dev/null 2>&1 + then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** The top of '$branch' at '$remote' ($remote_sha)" + echo "*** does not exist locally!!!" + echo "*** You probably need to refresh local '$branch' and redo merge." + echo "***" + exit 1 + fi + if ! git merge-base --is-ancestor $remote_sha $local_sha + then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** FORCE push branch to '$remote' NOT ALLOWED!!!" + echo "***" + exit 1 + fi + if [ $remote_ref != refs/heads/master -a "$MASTER_ONLY" ] && git merge-base --is-ancestor $MASTER_ONLY $local_sha + then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** INVALID MERGE: Commit $MASTER_ONLY should not be reachable from '$branch'!!!!" + echo "*** You have probably merged master into '$branch' by mistake" + echo "***" + exit 1 + fi + if [ ${remote_ref#refs/heads/maint-} != $remote_ref ] && git merge-base --is-ancestor refs/remotes/$remote/maint $local_sha + then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** INVALID MERGE: Branch maint should not be reachable from '$branch'!!!!" + echo "*** You have probably merged maint into '$branch' by mistake." + echo "***" + exit 1 + fi + if [ $remote_ref = refs/heads/maint -o $remote_ref = refs/heads/master ]; then + for x in $RELEASES; do + if ! git merge-base --is-ancestor refs/remotes/$remote/maint-$x $local_sha; then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** WARNING: Branch '$remote/maint-$x' is not reachable from '$branch'!!!!" + echo "*** Someone needs to merge 'maint-$x' forward and push." + echo "***" + fi + done + fi + if [ $remote_ref = refs/heads/master ] && ! git merge-base --is-ancestor refs/remotes/$remote/maint $local_sha + then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** INVALID PUSH: Branch '$remote/maint' is not reachable from master!!!!" + echo "*** Someone needs to merge maint forward to master and push." + echo "***" + exit 1 + fi + NCOMMITS=`git rev-list --count $remote_sha..$local_sha` + if [ $NCOMMITS -gt $NCOMMITS_MAX ] + then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** HUGE push: $NCOMMITS commits (> $NCOMMITS_MAX) to '$branch' at '$remote' NOT ALLOWED!!!!" + echo "***" + exit 1 + fi + NFILES=`git diff --name-only $remote_sha $local_sha | wc --lines` + if [ $NFILES -gt $NFILES_MAX ] + then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** HUGE push: $NFILES changed files (> $NFILES_MAX) to '$branch' at '$remote' NOT ALLOWED!!!!" + echo "***" + exit 1 + fi + ;; + refs/tags/OTP-20.* | refs/tags/OTP-19.* | refs/tags/OTP-18.* | refs/tags/OTP-17.*) + tag=${remote_ref#refs/tags/} + if [ "$remote_sha" != $null ] + then + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** FORCE push tag to '$remote' NOT ALLOWED!!!" + echo "*** Tag '$tag' already exists at '$remote'." + echo "***" + exit 1 + fi + ;; + refs/heads/*) + branch=${remote_ref#refs/heads/} + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** UNKNOWN branch name: '$branch' pushed to '$remote' NOT ALLOWED!!!!" + echo "***" + exit 1 + ;; + refs/tags/*) + tag=${remote_ref#refs/tags/} + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** UNKNOWN tag name: '$tag' pushed to '$remote' NOT ALLOWED!!!!" + echo "***" + exit 1 + ;; + *) + echo "$0 says:" + echo "***" + echo "*** STRANGE ref: '$remote_ref' pushed to '$remote' NOT ALLOWED!!!!" + echo "***" + exit 1 + ;; + esac + done +else + echo "$0: No checks done for remote '$remote' at $url." +fi + +exit 0 diff --git a/system/doc/design_principles/des_princ.xml b/system/doc/design_principles/des_princ.xml index af5904ce78..e21f2a7f4e 100644 --- a/system/doc/design_principles/des_princ.xml +++ b/system/doc/design_principles/des_princ.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>1997</year><year>2016</year> + <year>1997</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> diff --git a/system/doc/efficiency_guide/advanced.xml b/system/doc/efficiency_guide/advanced.xml index e1760d0ded..bb4440a245 100644 --- a/system/doc/efficiency_guide/advanced.xml +++ b/system/doc/efficiency_guide/advanced.xml @@ -264,21 +264,26 @@ </row> <row> <cell><marker id="unique_integers"/>Unique Integers on a Runtime System Instance</cell> - <cell>There are two types of unique integers both created using the - <seealso marker="erts:erlang#unique_integer/1">erlang:unique_integer()</seealso> - BIF. Unique integers created: - <taglist> - <tag>with the <c>monotonic</c> modifier</tag> - <item>consist of a set of <c>2⁶⁴ - 1</c> unique integers.</item> - <tag>without the <c>monotonic</c> modifier</tag> - <item>consist of a set of <c>2⁶⁴ - 1</c> unique integers per scheduler - thread and a set of <c>2⁶⁴ - 1</c> unique integers shared by - other threads. That is the total amount of unique integers without - the <c>monotonic</c> modifier is <c>(NoSchedulers + 1) * (2⁶⁴ - 1)</c></item> - </taglist> - If a unique integer is created each nano second, unique integers - will at earliest be reused after more than 584 years. That is, for - the foreseeable future they are unique enough.</cell> + <cell> + There are two types of unique integers both created using the + <seealso marker="erts:erlang#unique_integer/1">erlang:unique_integer()</seealso> + BIF: + <br/><br/> + <em>1.</em> Unique integers created <em>with</em> the + <c>monotonic</c> modifier consist of a set of <c>2⁶⁴ - 1</c> + unique integers. + <br/><br/> + <em>2.</em> Unique integers created <em>without</em> the + <c>monotonic</c> modifier consist of a set of <c>2⁶⁴ - 1</c> + unique integers per scheduler thread and a set of <c>2⁶⁴ - 1</c> + unique integers shared by other threads. That is, the total + amount of unique integers without the <c>monotonic</c> modifier + is <c>(NoSchedulers + 1) × (2⁶⁴ - 1)</c>. + <br/><br/> + If a unique integer is created each nano second, unique integers + will at earliest be reused after more than 584 years. That is, for + the foreseeable future they are unique enough. + </cell> </row> <tcaption>System Limits</tcaption> </table> diff --git a/system/doc/oam/oam_intro.xml b/system/doc/oam/oam_intro.xml index b4142b3cc5..d3867f03ca 100644 --- a/system/doc/oam/oam_intro.xml +++ b/system/doc/oam/oam_intro.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>1997</year><year>2016</year> + <year>1997</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> |