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+Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) E. McMurry
+Request for Comments: 7068 B. Campbell
+Category: Informational Oracle
+ISSN: 2070-1721 November 2013
+
+
+ Diameter Overload Control Requirements
+
+Abstract
+
+ When a Diameter server or agent becomes overloaded, it needs to be
+ able to gracefully reduce its load, typically by advising clients to
+ reduce traffic for some period of time. Otherwise, it must continue
+ to expend resources parsing and responding to Diameter messages,
+ possibly resulting in a progressively severe overload condition. The
+ existing Diameter mechanisms are not sufficient for managing overload
+ conditions. This document describes the limitations of the existing
+ mechanisms. Requirements for new overload management mechanisms are
+ also provided.
+
+Status of This Memo
+
+ This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
+ published for informational purposes.
+
+ This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
+ (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
+ received public review and has been approved for publication by the
+ Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
+ approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
+ Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
+
+ Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
+ and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
+ http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7068.
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+McMurry & Campbell Informational [Page 1]
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+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
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+Copyright Notice
+
+ Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+ document authors. All rights reserved.
+
+ This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
+ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
+ (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
+ publication of this document. Please review these documents
+ carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
+ to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
+ include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
+ the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
+ described in the Simplified BSD License.
+
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+McMurry & Campbell Informational [Page 2]
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+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+Table of Contents
+
+ 1. Introduction ....................................................4
+ 1.1. Documentation Conventions ..................................4
+ 1.2. Causes of Overload .........................................5
+ 1.3. Effects of Overload ........................................6
+ 1.4. Overload vs. Network Congestion ............................6
+ 1.5. Diameter Applications in a Broader Network .................7
+ 2. Overload Control Scenarios ......................................7
+ 2.1. Peer-to-Peer Scenarios .....................................8
+ 2.2. Agent Scenarios ...........................................10
+ 2.3. Interconnect Scenario .....................................14
+ 3. Diameter Overload Case Studies .................................15
+ 3.1. Overload in Mobile Data Networks ..........................15
+ 3.2. 3GPP Study on Core Network Overload .......................16
+ 4. Existing Mechanisms ............................................17
+ 5. Issues with the Current Mechanisms .............................18
+ 5.1. Problems with Implicit Mechanism ..........................18
+ 5.2. Problems with Explicit Mechanisms .........................18
+ 6. Extensibility and Application Independence .....................19
+ 7. Solution Requirements ..........................................20
+ 7.1. General ...................................................20
+ 7.2. Performance ...............................................21
+ 7.3. Heterogeneous Support for Solution ........................22
+ 7.4. Granular Control ..........................................23
+ 7.5. Priority and Policy .......................................23
+ 7.6. Security ..................................................23
+ 7.7. Flexibility and Extensibility .............................24
+ 8. Security Considerations ........................................25
+ 8.1. Access Control ............................................25
+ 8.2. Denial-of-Service Attacks .................................26
+ 8.3. Replay Attacks ............................................26
+ 8.4. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks .................................26
+ 8.5. Compromised Hosts .........................................27
+ 9. References .....................................................27
+ 9.1. Normative References ......................................27
+ 9.2. Informative References ....................................27
+ Appendix A. Contributors ..........................................29
+ Appendix B. Acknowledgements ......................................29
+
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+McMurry & Campbell Informational [Page 3]
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+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ A Diameter [RFC6733] node is said to be overloaded when it has
+ insufficient resources to successfully process all of the Diameter
+ requests that it receives. When a node becomes overloaded, it needs
+ to be able to gracefully reduce its load, typically by advising
+ clients to reduce traffic for some period of time. Otherwise, it
+ must continue to expend resources parsing and responding to Diameter
+ messages, possibly resulting in a progressively severe overload
+ condition. The existing mechanisms provided by Diameter are not
+ sufficient for managing overload conditions. This document describes
+ the limitations of the existing mechanisms and provides requirements
+ for new overload management mechanisms.
+
+ This document draws on the work done on SIP overload control
+ ([RFC5390], [RFC6357]) as well as on experience gained via overload
+ handling in Signaling System No. 7 (SS7) networks and studies done by
+ the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) (Section 3).
+
+ Diameter is not typically an end-user protocol; rather, it is
+ generally used as one component in support of some end-user activity.
+
+ For example, a SIP server might use Diameter to authenticate and
+ authorize user access. Overload in the Diameter backend
+ infrastructure will likely impact the experience observed by the end
+ user in the SIP application.
+
+ The impact of Diameter overload on the client application (a client
+ application may use the Diameter protocol and other protocols to do
+ its job) is beyond the scope of this document.
+
+ This document presents non-normative descriptions of causes of
+ overload, along with related scenarios and studies. Finally, it
+ offers a set of normative requirements for an improved overload
+ indication mechanism.
+
+1.1. Documentation Conventions
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
+ "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
+ document are to be interpreted as defined in [RFC2119], with the
+ exception that they are not intended for interoperability of
+ implementations. Rather, they are used to describe requirements
+ towards future specifications where the interoperability requirements
+ will be defined.
+
+ The terms "client", "server", "agent", "node", "peer", "upstream",
+ and "downstream" are used as defined in [RFC6733].
+
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+1.2. Causes of Overload
+
+ Overload occurs when an element, such as a Diameter server or agent,
+ has insufficient resources to successfully process all of the traffic
+ it is receiving. Resources include all of the capabilities of the
+ element used to process a request, including CPU processing, memory,
+ I/O, and disk resources. It can also include external resources such
+ as a database or DNS server, in which case the CPU, processing,
+ memory, I/O, and disk resources of those elements are effectively
+ part of the logical element processing the request.
+
+ External resources can include upstream Diameter nodes; for example,
+ a Diameter agent can become effectively overloaded if one or more
+ upstream nodes are overloaded.
+
+ A Diameter node can become overloaded due to request levels that
+ exceed its capacity, a reduction of available resources (for example,
+ a local or upstream hardware failure), or a combination of the two.
+
+ Overload can occur for many reasons, including:
+
+ Inadequate capacity: When designing Diameter networks, that is,
+ application-layer multi-node Diameter deployments, it can be very
+ difficult to predict all scenarios that may cause elevated
+ traffic. It may also be more costly to implement support for some
+ scenarios than a network operator may deem worthwhile. This
+ results in the likelihood that a Diameter network will not have
+ adequate capacity to handle all situations.
+
+ Dependency failures: A Diameter node can become overloaded because a
+ resource on which it depends has failed or become overloaded,
+ greatly reducing the logical capacity of the node. In these
+ cases, even minimal traffic might cause the node to go into
+ overload. Examples of such dependency overloads include DNS
+ servers, databases, disks, and network interfaces that have failed
+ or become overloaded.
+
+ Component failures: A Diameter node can become overloaded when it is
+ a member of a cluster of servers that each share the load of
+ traffic and one or more of the other members in the cluster fail.
+ In this case, the remaining nodes take over the work of the failed
+ nodes. Normally, capacity planning takes such failures into
+ account, and servers are typically run with enough spare capacity
+ to handle failure of another node. However, unusual failure
+ conditions can cause many nodes to fail at once. This is often
+ the case with software failures, where a bad packet or bad
+ database entry hits the same bug in a set of nodes in a cluster.
+
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+ Network-initiated traffic flood: Certain access network events can
+ precipitate floods of Diameter signaling traffic. For example,
+ operational changes can trigger avalanche restarts, or frequent
+ radio overlay handovers can generate excessive authorization
+ requests. Failure of a Diameter proxy may also result in a large
+ amount of signaling as connections and sessions are reestablished.
+
+ Subscriber-initiated traffic flood: Large gatherings of subscribers
+ or events that result in many subscribers interacting with the
+ network in close time proximity can result in Diameter signaling
+ traffic floods. For example, the finale of a large fireworks show
+ could be immediately followed by many subscribers posting
+ messages, pictures, and videos concentrated on one portion of a
+ network. Subscriber devices such as smartphones may use
+ aggressive registration strategies that generate unusually high
+ Diameter traffic loads.
+
+ DoS attacks: An attacker wishing to disrupt service in the network
+ can cause a large amount of traffic to be launched at a target
+ element. This can be done from a central source of traffic or
+ through a distributed DoS attack. In all cases, the volume of
+ traffic well exceeds the capacity of the element, sending the
+ system into overload.
+
+1.3. Effects of Overload
+
+ Modern Diameter networks, composed of application-layer multi-node
+ deployments of Diameter elements, may operate at very large
+ transaction volumes. If a Diameter node becomes overloaded or, even
+ worse, fails completely, a large number of messages may be lost very
+ quickly. Even with redundant servers, many messages can be lost in
+ the time it takes for failover to complete. While a Diameter client
+ or agent should be able to retry such requests, an overloaded peer
+ may cause a sudden large increase in the number of transactions
+ needing to be retried, rapidly filling local queues or otherwise
+ contributing to local overload. Therefore, Diameter devices need to
+ be able to shed load before critical failures can occur.
+
+1.4. Overload vs. Network Congestion
+
+ This document uses the term "overload" to refer to application-layer
+ overload at Diameter nodes. This is distinct from "network
+ congestion", that is, congestion that occurs at the lower networking
+ layers that may impact the delivery of Diameter messages between
+ nodes. This document recognizes that element overload and network
+ congestion are interrelated, and that overload can contribute to
+ network congestion and vice versa.
+
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+ Network congestion issues are better handled by the transport
+ protocols. Diameter uses TCP and the Stream Control Transmission
+ Protocol (SCTP), both of which include congestion management
+ features. Analysis of whether those features are sufficient for
+ transport-level congestion between Diameter nodes and of any work to
+ further mitigate network congestion is out of scope for both this
+ document and the work proposed by it.
+
+1.5. Diameter Applications in a Broader Network
+
+ Most elements using Diameter applications do not use Diameter
+ exclusively. It is important to realize that overload of an element
+ can be caused by a number of factors that may be unrelated to the
+ processing of Diameter or Diameter applications.
+
+ An element that doesn't use Diameter exclusively needs to be able to
+ signal to Diameter peers that it is experiencing overload regardless
+ of the cause of the overload, since the overload will affect that
+ element's ability to process Diameter transactions. If the element
+ communicates with protocols other than Diameter, it may also need to
+ signal the overload situation on these protocols, depending on its
+ function and the architecture of the network and application for
+ which it is providing services. Whether that is necessary can only
+ be decided within the context of that architecture and use cases.
+ This specification details the requirements for a mechanism for
+ signaling overload with Diameter; this mechanism provides Diameter
+ nodes the ability to inform their Diameter peers of overload,
+ mitigating that part of the issue. Diameter nodes may need to use
+ this, as well as other mechanisms, to solve their broader overload
+ issues. Indicating overload on protocols other than Diameter is out
+ of scope for this document and for the work proposed by it.
+
+2. Overload Control Scenarios
+
+ Several Diameter deployment scenarios exist that may impact overload
+ management. The following scenarios help motivate the requirements
+ for an overload management mechanism.
+
+ These scenarios are by no means exhaustive and are in general
+ simplified for the sake of clarity. In particular, this document
+ assumes for the sake of clarity that the client sends Diameter
+ requests to the server, and the server sends responses to the client,
+ even though Diameter supports bidirectional applications. Each
+ direction in such an application can be modeled separately.
+
+ In a large-scale deployment, many of the nodes represented in these
+ scenarios would be deployed as clusters of servers. This document
+ assumes that such a cluster is responsible for managing its own
+
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+ internal load-balancing and overload management so that it appears as
+ a single Diameter node. That is, other Diameter nodes can treat it
+ as a single, monolithic node for the purposes of overload management.
+
+ These scenarios do not illustrate the client application. As
+ mentioned in Section 1, Diameter is not typically an end-user
+ protocol; rather, it is generally used in support of some other
+ client application. These scenarios do not consider the impact of
+ Diameter overload on the client application.
+
+2.1. Peer-to-Peer Scenarios
+
+ This section describes Diameter peer-to-peer scenarios, that is,
+ scenarios where a Diameter client talks directly with a Diameter
+ server, without the use of a Diameter agent.
+
+ Figure 1 illustrates the simplest possible Diameter relationship.
+ The client and server share a one-to-one peer-to-peer relationship.
+ If the server becomes overloaded, either because the client exceeds
+ the server's capacity or because the server's capacity is reduced due
+ to some resource dependency, the client needs to reduce the amount of
+ Diameter traffic it sends to the server. Since the client cannot
+ forward requests to another server, it must either queue requests
+ until the server recovers or itself become overloaded in the context
+ of the client application and other protocols it may also use.
+
+ +------------------+
+ | |
+ | |
+ | Server |
+ | |
+ +--------+---------+
+ |
+ |
+ +--------+---------+
+ | |
+ | |
+ | Client |
+ | |
+ +------------------+
+
+ Figure 1: Basic Peer-to-Peer Scenario
+
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+ Figure 2 shows a similar scenario, except in this case the client has
+ multiple servers that can handle work for a specific realm and
+ application. If Server 1 becomes overloaded, the client can forward
+ traffic to Server 2. Assuming that Server 2 has sufficient reserve
+ capacity to handle the forwarded traffic, the client should be able
+ to continue serving client application protocol users. If Server 1
+ is approaching overload, but can still handle some number of new
+ requests, it needs to be able to instruct the client to forward a
+ subset of its traffic to Server 2.
+
+ +------------------+ +------------------+
+ | | | |
+ | | | |
+ | Server 1 | | Server 2 |
+ | | | |
+ +--------+-`.------+ +------.'+---------+
+ `. .'
+ `. .'
+ `. .'
+ `. .'
+ +-------`.'--------+
+ | |
+ | |
+ | Client |
+ | |
+ +------------------+
+
+ Figure 2: Multiple-Server Peer-to-Peer Scenario
+
+ Figure 3 illustrates a peer-to-peer scenario with multiple Diameter
+ realm and application combinations. In this example, Server 2 can
+ handle work for both applications. Each application might have
+ different resource dependencies. For example, a server might need to
+ access one database for Application A and another for Application B.
+ This creates a possibility that Server 2 could become overloaded for
+ Application A but not for Application B, in which case the client
+ would need to divert some part of its Application A requests to
+ Server 1, but the client should not divert any Application B
+ requests. This requires that Server 2 be able to distinguish between
+ applications when it indicates an overload condition to the client.
+
+ On the other hand, it's possible that the servers host many
+ applications. If Server 2 becomes overloaded for all applications,
+ it would be undesirable for it to have to notify the client
+ separately for each application. Therefore, it also needs a way to
+ indicate that it is overloaded for all possible applications.
+
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+ +---------------------------------------------+
+ | Application A +----------------------+----------------------+
+ |+------------------+ | +----------------+ | +------------------+|
+ || | | | | | | ||
+ || | | | | | | ||
+ || Server 1 | | | Server 2 | | | Server 3 ||
+ || | | | | | | ||
+ |+--------+---------+ | +-------+--------+ | +-+----------------+|
+ | | | | | | |
+ +---------+-----------+----------+-----------+ | |
+ | | | | |
+ | | | | Application B |
+ | +----------+----------------+-----------------+
+ ``-.._ | |
+ `-..__ | _.-''
+ `--._ | _.-''
+ ``-._ | _.-''
+ +-----`-.-''-----+
+ | |
+ | |
+ | Client |
+ | |
+ +----------------+
+
+ Figure 3: Multiple-Application Peer-to-Peer Scenario
+
+2.2. Agent Scenarios
+
+ This section describes scenarios that include a Diameter agent, in
+ the form of either a Diameter relay or Diameter proxy. These
+ scenarios do not consider Diameter redirect agents, since they are
+ more readily modeled as end servers. The examples have been kept
+ simple deliberately, to illustrate basic concepts. Significantly
+ more complicated topologies are possible with Diameter, including
+ multiple intermediate agents in a path connected in a variety
+ of ways.
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+ Figure 4 illustrates a simple Diameter agent scenario with a single
+ client, agent, and server. In this case, overload can occur at the
+ server, at the agent, or both. But in most cases, client behavior is
+ the same whether overload occurs at the server or at the agent. From
+ the client's perspective, server overload and agent overload are the
+ same thing.
+
+ +------------------+
+ | |
+ | |
+ | Server |
+ | |
+ +--------+---------+
+ |
+ |
+ +--------+---------+
+ | |
+ | |
+ | Agent |
+ | |
+ +--------+---------+
+ |
+ |
+ +--------+---------+
+ | |
+ | |
+ | Client |
+ | |
+ +------------------+
+
+ Figure 4: Basic Agent Scenario
+
+ Figure 5 shows an agent scenario with multiple servers. If Server 1
+ becomes overloaded but Server 2 has sufficient reserve capacity, the
+ agent may be able to transparently divert some or all Diameter
+ requests originally bound for Server 1 to Server 2.
+
+ In most cases, the client does not have detailed knowledge of the
+ Diameter topology upstream of the agent. If the agent uses dynamic
+ discovery to find eligible servers, the set of eligible servers may
+ not be enumerable from the perspective of the client. Therefore, in
+ most cases the agent needs to deal with any upstream overload issues
+ in a way that is transparent to the client. If one server notifies
+ the agent that it has become overloaded, the notification should not
+ be passed back to the client in a way that the client could
+ mistakenly perceive the agent itself as being overloaded. If the set
+
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+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
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+ of all possible destinations upstream of the agent no longer has
+ sufficient capacity for incoming load, the agent itself becomes
+ effectively overloaded.
+
+ On the other hand, there are cases where the client needs to be able
+ to select a particular server from behind an agent. For example, if
+ a Diameter request is part of a multiple-round-trip authentication,
+ or is otherwise part of a Diameter "session", it may have a
+ Destination-Host Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) that requires that the
+ request be served by Server 1. Therefore, the agent may need to
+ inform a client that a particular upstream server is overloaded or
+ otherwise unavailable. Note that there can be many ways a server can
+ be specified, which may have different implications (e.g., by IP
+ address, by host name, etc).
+
+ +------------------+ +------------------+
+ | | | |
+ | | | |
+ | Server 1 | | Server 2 |
+ | | | |
+ +--------+-`.------+ +------.'+---------+
+ `. .'
+ `. .'
+ `. .'
+ `. .'
+ +-------`.'--------+
+ | |
+ | |
+ | Agent |
+ | |
+ +--------+---------+
+ |
+ |
+ |
+ +--------+---------+
+ | |
+ | |
+ | Client |
+ | |
+ +------------------+
+
+ Figure 5: Multiple-Server Agent Scenario
+
+
+
+
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+ Figure 6 shows a scenario where an agent routes requests to a set of
+ servers for more than one Diameter realm and application. In this
+ scenario, if Server 1 becomes overloaded or unavailable while
+ Server 2 still has available capacity, the agent may effectively
+ operate at reduced capacity for Application A but at full capacity
+ for Application B. Therefore, the agent needs to be able to report
+ that it is overloaded for one application but not for another.
+
+ +--------------------------------------------+
+ | Application A +----------------------+----------------------+
+ |+------------------+ | +----------------+ | +------------------+|
+ || | | | | | | ||
+ || | | | | | | ||
+ || Server 1 | | | Server 2 | | | Server 3 ||
+ || | | | | | | ||
+ |+---------+--------+ | +-------+--------+ | +--+---------------+|
+ | | | | | | |
+ +----------+----------+----------+-----------+ | |
+ | | | | |
+ | | | | Application B |
+ | +----------+-----------------+----------------+
+ | | |
+ ``--.__ | _.
+ ``-.__ | __.--''
+ `--.._ | _..--'
+ +----``-+.''-----+
+ | |
+ | |
+ | Agent |
+ | |
+ +-------+--------+
+ |
+ |
+ +-------+--------+
+ | |
+ | |
+ | Client |
+ | |
+ +----------------+
+
+ Figure 6: Multiple-Application Agent Scenario
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+2.3. Interconnect Scenario
+
+ Another scenario to consider when looking at Diameter overload is
+ that of multiple network operators using Diameter components
+ connected through an interconnect service, e.g., using IPX (IP Packet
+ eXchange). IPX [IR.34] is an Inter-Operator IP Backbone that
+ provides a roaming interconnection network between mobile operators
+ and service providers. IPX is also used to transport Diameter
+ signaling between operators [IR.88]. Figure 7 shows two network
+ operators with an interconnect network between them. There could be
+ any number of these networks between any two network operators'
+ networks.
+
+ +-------------------------------------------+
+ | Interconnect |
+ | |
+ | +--------------+ +--------------+ |
+ | | Server 3 |------| Server 4 | |
+ | +--------------+ +--------------+ |
+ | .' `. |
+ +------.-'--------------------------`.------+
+ .' `.
+ .-' `.
+ ------------.'-----+ +----`.-------------
+ +----------+ | | +----------+
+ | Server 1 | | | | Server 2 |
+ +----------+ | | +----------+
+ | |
+ Network Operator 1 | | Network Operator 2
+ -------------------+ +-------------------
+
+ Figure 7: Two-Network Interconnect Scenario
+
+ The characteristics of the information that an operator would want to
+ share over such a connection are different from the information
+ shared between components within a network operator's network. For
+ example, network operators may not want to convey topology or
+ operational information; this would in turn limit how much overload
+ and loading information can be sent. For the interconnect scenario
+ shown in Figure 7, Server 2 may want to signal overload to Server 1,
+ to affect traffic coming from Network Operator 1.
+
+ This case is distinct from those internal to a network operator's
+ network, where there may be many more elements in a more complicated
+ topology. Also, the elements in the interconnect network may not
+ support Diameter overload control, and the network operators may not
+ want the interconnect network to use overload or loading information.
+ They may only want the information to pass through the interconnect
+
+
+
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+ network without further processing or action by the interconnect
+ network, even if the elements in the interconnect network do support
+ Diameter overload control.
+
+3. Diameter Overload Case Studies
+
+3.1. Overload in Mobile Data Networks
+
+ As the number of smartphone devices that are Third Generation (3G)
+ and Long Term Evolution (LTE) enabled continues to expand in mobile
+ networks, there have been situations where high signaling traffic
+ load led to overload events at the Diameter-based Home Location
+ Registers (HLRs) and/or Home Subscriber Servers (HSS) [TR23.843].
+ The root causes of the HLR overload events were manifold but included
+ hardware failure and procedural errors. The result was high
+ signaling traffic load on the HLR and HSS.
+
+ The 3GPP architecture [TS23.002] makes extensive use of Diameter. It
+ is used for mobility management [TS29.272], the IP Multimedia
+ Subsystem (IMS) [TS29.228], and policy and charging control
+ [TS29.212], as well as other functions. The details of the
+ architecture are out of scope for this document, but it is worth
+ noting that there are quite a few Diameter applications, some with
+ quite large amounts of Diameter signaling in deployed networks.
+
+ The 3GPP specifications do not currently address overload for
+ Diameter applications or provide a load control mechanism equivalent
+ to those provided in the more traditional SS7 elements in the Global
+ System for Mobile Communications (GSM); see [TS29.002]. The
+ capabilities specified in the 3GPP standards do not adequately
+ address the abnormal condition where excessively high signaling
+ traffic load situations are experienced.
+
+ Smartphones, which comprise an increasingly large percentage of
+ mobile devices, contribute much more heavily, relative to
+ non-smartphones, to the continuation of a registration surge, due to
+ their very aggressive registration algorithms. Smartphone behavior
+ contributes to network loading and can contribute to overload
+ conditions. The aggressive smartphone logic is designed to:
+
+ a. always have voice and data registration, and
+
+ b. constantly try to be on 3G or LTE data (and thus on 3G voice or
+ Voice over LTE (VoLTE) [IR.92]) for their added benefits.
+
+ Non-smartphones typically have logic to wait for a time period after
+ registering successfully on voice and data.
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ The aggressive smartphone registration is problematic in two ways:
+
+ o first, by generating excessive signaling load towards the HSS that
+ is ten times the load from a non-smartphone, and
+
+ o second, by causing continual registration attempts when a network
+ failure affects registrations through the 3G data network.
+
+3.2. 3GPP Study on Core Network Overload
+
+ A study in the 3GPP System Aspects working group 2 (SA2) on core
+ network overload has produced the technical report [TR23.843]. This
+ enumerates several causes of overload in mobile core networks,
+ including portions that are signaled using Diameter. [TR23.843] is a
+ work in progress and is not complete. However, it is useful for
+ pointing out scenarios and the general need for an overload control
+ mechanism for Diameter.
+
+ It is common for mobile networks to employ more than one radio
+ technology and to do so in an overlay fashion with multiple
+ technologies present in the same location (such as 2nd or 3rd
+ generation mobile technologies, along with LTE). This presents
+ opportunities for traffic storms when issues occur on one overlay and
+ not another as all devices that had been on the overlay with issues
+ switch. This causes a large amount of Diameter traffic as locations
+ and policies are updated.
+
+ Another scenario called out by this study is a flood of registration
+ and mobility management events caused by some element in the core
+ network failing. This flood of traffic from end nodes falls under
+ the network-initiated traffic flood category. There is likely to
+ also be traffic resulting directly from the component failure in this
+ case. A similar flood can occur when elements or components recover
+ as well.
+
+ Subscriber-initiated traffic floods are also indicated in this study
+ as an overload mechanism where a large number of mobile devices are
+ attempting to access services at the same time, such as in response
+ to an entertainment event or a catastrophic event.
+
+ While this 3GPP study is concerned with the broader effects of these
+ scenarios on wireless networks and their elements, they have
+ implications specifically for Diameter signaling. One of the goals
+ of this document is to provide guidance for a core mechanism that can
+ be used to mitigate the scenarios called out by this study.
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
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+
+
+4. Existing Mechanisms
+
+ Diameter offers both implicit and explicit mechanisms for a Diameter
+ node to learn that a peer is overloaded or unreachable. The implicit
+ mechanism is simply the lack of responses to requests. If a client
+ fails to receive a response in a certain time period, it assumes that
+ the upstream peer is unavailable or is overloaded to the point of
+ effective unavailability. The watchdog mechanism [RFC3539] ensures
+ that transaction responses occur at a certain rate even when there is
+ otherwise little or no other Diameter traffic.
+
+ The explicit mechanism can involve specific protocol error responses,
+ where an agent or server tells a downstream peer that it is either
+ too busy to handle a request (DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY) or unable to route a
+ request to an upstream destination (DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER)
+ perhaps because that destination itself is overloaded to the point of
+ unavailability.
+
+ Another explicit mechanism, a DPR (Disconnect-Peer-Request) message,
+ can be sent with a Disconnect-Cause of BUSY. This signals the
+ sender's intent to close the transport connection and requests that
+ the client not reconnect.
+
+ Once a Diameter node learns via one of these mechanisms that an
+ upstream peer has become overloaded, it can then attempt to take
+ action to reduce the load. This usually means forwarding traffic to
+ an alternate destination, if available. If no alternate destination
+ is available, the node must either reduce the number of messages it
+ originates (in the case of a client) or inform the client to reduce
+ traffic (in the case of an agent).
+
+ Diameter requires the use of a congestion-managed transport layer,
+ currently TCP or SCTP, to mitigate network congestion. It is
+ expected that these transports manage network congestion and that
+ issues with transport (e.g., congestion propagation and window
+ management) are managed at that level. But even with a congestion-
+ managed transport, a Diameter node can become overloaded at the
+ Diameter protocol or application layers due to the causes described
+ in Section 1.2, and congestion-managed transports do not provide
+ facilities (and are at the wrong level) to handle server overload.
+ Transport-level congestion management is also not sufficient to
+ address overload in cases of multi-hop and multi-destination
+ signaling.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+5. Issues with the Current Mechanisms
+
+ The currently available Diameter mechanisms for indicating an
+ overload condition are not adequate to avoid service outages due to
+ overload. This inadequacy may, in turn, contribute to broader
+ impacts resulting from overload due to unresponsive Diameter nodes
+ causing application-layer or transport-layer retransmissions. In
+ particular, they do not allow a Diameter agent or server to shed load
+ as it approaches overload. At best, a node can only indicate that it
+ needs to entirely stop receiving requests, i.e., that it has
+ effectively failed. Even that is problematic due to the inability to
+ indicate durational validity on the transient errors available in the
+ base Diameter protocol. Diameter offers no mechanism to allow a node
+ to indicate different overload states for different categories of
+ messages, for example, if it is overloaded for one Diameter
+ application but not another.
+
+5.1. Problems with Implicit Mechanism
+
+ The implicit mechanism doesn't allow an agent or server to inform the
+ client of a problem until it is effectively too late to do anything
+ about it. The client does not know that it needs to take action
+ until the upstream node has effectively failed. A Diameter node has
+ no opportunity to shed load early to avoid collapse in the first
+ place.
+
+ Additionally, the implicit mechanism cannot distinguish between
+ overload of a Diameter node and network congestion. Diameter treats
+ the failure to receive an answer as a transport failure.
+
+5.2. Problems with Explicit Mechanisms
+
+ The Diameter specification is ambiguous on how a client should handle
+ receipt of a DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY response. The base specification
+ [RFC6733] indicates that the sending client should attempt to send
+ the request to a different peer. It makes no suggestion that the
+ receipt of a DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY response should affect future Diameter
+ messages in any way.
+
+ The Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Transport
+ Profile [RFC3539] recommends that a AAA node that receives a "Busy"
+ response failover all remaining requests to a different agent or
+ server. But while the Diameter base specification explicitly depends
+ on [RFC3539] to define transport behavior, it does not refer to
+ [RFC3539] in the description of behavior on receipt of a
+ DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY error. There's a strong likelihood that at least
+ some implementations will continue to send Diameter requests to an
+ upstream peer even after receiving a DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY error.
+
+
+
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+
+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+ BCP 41 [RFC2914] describes, among other things, how end-to-end
+ application behavior can help avoid congestion collapse. In
+ particular, an application should avoid sending messages that will
+ never be delivered or processed. The DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY behavior as
+ described in the Diameter base specification fails at this, since if
+ an upstream node becomes overloaded, a client attempts each request
+ and does not discover the need to failover the request until the
+ initial attempt fails.
+
+ The situation is improved if implementations follow the [RFC3539]
+ recommendation to keep state about upstream peer overload. But even
+ then, the Diameter specification offers no guidance on how long a
+ client should wait before retrying the overloaded destination. If an
+ agent or server supports multiple realms and/or applications,
+ DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY offers no way to indicate that it is overloaded for
+ one application but not another. A DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY error can only
+ indicate overload at a "whole server" scope.
+
+ Agent processing of a DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY response is also problematic
+ as described in the base specification. DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY is defined
+ as a protocol error. If an agent receives a protocol error, it may
+ either handle it locally or forward the response back towards the
+ downstream peer. If a downstream peer receives the DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY
+ response, it may stop sending all requests to the agent for some
+ period of time, even though the agent may still be able to deliver
+ requests to other upstream peers.
+
+ DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER errors, or using DPR with cause code BUSY,
+ also have no mechanisms for specifying the scope or cause of the
+ failure, or the durational validity.
+
+ The issues with error responses described in [RFC6733] extend beyond
+ the particular issues for overload control and have been addressed in
+ an ad hoc fashion by various implementations. Addressing these in a
+ standard way would be a useful exercise, but it is beyond the scope
+ of this document.
+
+6. Extensibility and Application Independence
+
+ Given the variety of scenarios in which Diameter elements can be
+ deployed and the variety of roles they can fulfill with Diameter and
+ other technologies, a single algorithm for handling overload may not
+ be sufficient. For purposes of this discussion, an algorithm is
+ inclusive of behavior for control of overload but does not encompass
+ the general mechanism for transporting control information. This
+ effort cannot anticipate all possible future scenarios and roles.
+ Extensibility, particularly of algorithms used to deal with overload,
+ will be important to cover these cases.
+
+
+
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+
+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+ Similarly, the scopes to which overload information may apply may
+ include cases that have not yet been considered. Extensibility in
+ this area will also be important.
+
+ The basic mechanism is intended to be application independent, that
+ is, a Diameter node can use it across any existing and future
+ Diameter applications and expect reasonable results. Certain
+ Diameter applications might, however, benefit from application-
+ specific behavior over and above the mechanism's defaults. For
+ example, an application specification might specify relative
+ priorities of messages or selection of a specific overload control
+ algorithm.
+
+7. Solution Requirements
+
+ This section proposes requirements for an improved mechanism to
+ control Diameter overload, with the goals of addressing the issues
+ described in Section 5 and supporting the scenarios described in
+ Section 2. These requirements are stated primarily in terms of
+ individual node behavior to inform the design of the improved
+ mechanism; solution designers should keep in mind that the overall
+ goal is improved overall system behavior across all the nodes
+ involved, not just improved behavior from specific individual nodes.
+
+7.1. General
+
+ REQ 1: The solution MUST provide a communication method for Diameter
+ nodes to exchange load and overload information.
+
+ REQ 2: The solution MUST allow Diameter nodes to support overload
+ control regardless of which Diameter applications they
+ support. Diameter clients and agents must be able to use the
+ received load and overload information to support graceful
+ behavior during an overload condition. Graceful behavior
+ under overload conditions is best described by REQ 3.
+
+ REQ 3: The solution MUST limit the impact of overload on the overall
+ useful throughput of a Diameter server, even when the
+ incoming load on the network is far in excess of its
+ capacity. The overall useful throughput under load is the
+ ultimate measure of the value of a solution.
+
+ REQ 4: Diameter allows requests to be sent from either side of a
+ connection, and either side of a connection may have need to
+ provide its overload status. The solution MUST allow each
+ side of a connection to independently inform the other of its
+ overload status.
+
+
+
+
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+
+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+ REQ 5: Diameter allows nodes to determine their peers via dynamic
+ discovery or manual configuration. The solution MUST work
+ consistently without regard to how peers are determined.
+
+ REQ 6: The solution designers SHOULD seek to minimize the amount of
+ new configuration required in order to work. For example, it
+ is better to allow peers to advertise or negotiate support
+ for the solution, rather than to require that this knowledge
+ be configured at each node.
+
+7.2. Performance
+
+ REQ 7: The solution and any associated default algorithm(s) MUST
+ ensure that the system remains stable. At some point after
+ an overload condition has ended, the solution MUST enable
+ capacity to stabilize and become equal to what it would be in
+ the absence of an overload condition. Note that this also
+ requires that the solution MUST allow nodes to shed load
+ without introducing non-converging oscillations during or
+ after an overload condition.
+
+ REQ 8: Supporting nodes MUST be able to distinguish current overload
+ information from stale information.
+
+ REQ 9: The solution MUST function across fully loaded as well as
+ quiescent transport connections. This is partially derived
+ from the requirement for stability in REQ 7.
+
+ REQ 10: Consumers of overload information MUST be able to determine
+ when the overload condition improves or ends.
+
+ REQ 11: The solution MUST be able to operate in networks of different
+ sizes.
+
+ REQ 12: When a single network node fails, goes into overload, or
+ suffers from reduced processing capacity, the solution MUST
+ make it possible to limit the impact of the affected node on
+ other nodes in the network. This helps to prevent a small-
+ scale failure from becoming a widespread outage.
+
+ REQ 13: The solution MUST NOT introduce substantial additional work
+ for a node in an overloaded state. For example, a
+ requirement for an overloaded node to send overload
+ information every time it received a new request would
+ introduce substantial work.
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+ REQ 14: Some scenarios that result in overload involve a rapid
+ increase of traffic with little time between normal levels
+ and levels that induce overload. The solution SHOULD provide
+ for rapid feedback when traffic levels increase.
+
+ REQ 15: The solution MUST NOT interfere with the congestion control
+ mechanisms of underlying transport protocols. For example, a
+ solution that opened additional TCP connections when the
+ network is congested would reduce the effectiveness of the
+ underlying congestion control mechanisms.
+
+7.3. Heterogeneous Support for Solution
+
+ REQ 16: The solution is likely to be deployed incrementally. The
+ solution MUST support a mixed environment where some, but not
+ all, nodes implement it.
+
+ REQ 17: In a mixed environment with nodes that support the solution
+ and nodes that do not, the solution MUST NOT result in
+ materially less useful throughput during overload as would
+ have resulted if the solution were not present. It SHOULD
+ result in less severe overload in this environment.
+
+ REQ 18: In a mixed environment of nodes that support the solution and
+ nodes that do not, the solution MUST NOT preclude elements
+ that support overload control from treating elements that do
+ not support overload control in an equitable fashion relative
+ to those that do. Users and operators of nodes that do not
+ support the solution MUST NOT unfairly benefit from the
+ solution. The solution specification SHOULD provide guidance
+ to implementors for dealing with elements not supporting
+ overload control.
+
+ REQ 19: It MUST be possible to use the solution between nodes in
+ different realms and in different administrative domains.
+
+ REQ 20: Any explicit overload indication MUST be clearly
+ distinguishable from other errors reported via Diameter.
+
+ REQ 21: In cases where a network node fails, is so overloaded that it
+ cannot process messages, or cannot communicate due to a
+ network failure, it may not be able to provide explicit
+ indications of the nature of the failure or its levels of
+ overload. The solution MUST result in at least as much
+ useful throughput as would have resulted if the solution were
+ not in place.
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+7.4. Granular Control
+
+ REQ 22: The solution MUST provide a way for a node to throttle the
+ amount of traffic it receives from a peer node. This
+ throttling SHOULD be graded so that it can be applied
+ gradually as offered load increases. Overload is not a
+ binary state; there may be degrees of overload.
+
+ REQ 23: The solution MUST provide sufficient information to enable a
+ load-balancing node to divert messages that are rejected or
+ otherwise throttled by an overloaded upstream node to other
+ upstream nodes that are the most likely to have sufficient
+ capacity to process them.
+
+ REQ 24: The solution MUST provide a mechanism for indicating load
+ levels, even when not in an overload condition, to assist
+ nodes in making decisions to prevent overload conditions from
+ occurring.
+
+7.5. Priority and Policy
+
+ REQ 25: The base specification for the solution SHOULD offer general
+ guidance on which message types might be desirable to send or
+ process over others during times of overload, based on
+ application-specific considerations. For example, it may be
+ more beneficial to process messages for existing sessions
+ ahead of new sessions. Some networks may have a requirement
+ to give priority to requests associated with emergency
+ sessions. Any normative or otherwise detailed definition of
+ the relative priorities of message types during an overload
+ condition will be the responsibility of the application
+ specification.
+
+ REQ 26: The solution MUST NOT prevent a node from prioritizing
+ requests based on any local policy, so that certain requests
+ are given preferential treatment, given additional
+ retransmission, not throttled, or processed ahead of others.
+
+7.6. Security
+
+ REQ 27: The solution MUST NOT provide new vulnerabilities to
+ malicious attack or increase the severity of any existing
+ vulnerabilities. This includes vulnerabilities to DoS and
+ DDoS attacks as well as replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
+ Note that the Diameter base specification [RFC6733] lacks
+ end-to-end security, and this must be considered (see
+ Security Considerations in this document (Section 8)). Note
+
+
+
+
+McMurry & Campbell Informational [Page 23]
+
+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+ that this requirement was expressed at a high level so as to
+ not preclude any particular solution. Is is expected that
+ the solution will address this in more detail.
+
+ REQ 28: The solution MUST NOT depend on being deployed in
+ environments where all Diameter nodes are completely trusted.
+ It SHOULD operate as effectively as possible in environments
+ where other nodes are malicious; this includes preventing
+ malicious nodes from obtaining more than a fair share of
+ service. Note that this does not imply any responsibility on
+ the solution to detect, or take countermeasures against,
+ malicious nodes.
+
+ REQ 29: It MUST be possible for a supporting node to make
+ authorization decisions about what information will be sent
+ to peer nodes based on the identity of those nodes. This
+ allows a domain administrator who considers the load of their
+ nodes to be sensitive information to restrict access to that
+ information. Of course, in such cases, there is no
+ expectation that the solution itself will help prevent
+ overload from that peer node.
+
+ REQ 30: The solution MUST NOT interfere with any Diameter-compliant
+ method that a node may use to protect itself from overload
+ from non-supporting nodes or from denial-of-service attacks.
+
+7.7. Flexibility and Extensibility
+
+ REQ 31: There are multiple situations where a Diameter node may be
+ overloaded for some purposes but not others. For example,
+ this can happen to an agent or server that supports multiple
+ applications, or when a server depends on multiple external
+ resources, some of which may become overloaded while others
+ are fully available. The solution MUST allow Diameter nodes
+ to indicate overload with sufficient granularity to allow
+ clients to take action based on the overloaded resources
+ without unreasonably forcing available capacity to go unused.
+ The solution MUST support specification of overload
+ information with granularities of at least "Diameter node",
+ "realm", and "Diameter application" and MUST allow
+ extensibility for others to be added in the future.
+
+ REQ 32: The solution MUST provide a method for extending the
+ information communicated and the algorithms used for overload
+ control.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+McMurry & Campbell Informational [Page 24]
+
+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+ REQ 33: The solution MUST provide a default algorithm that is
+ mandatory to implement.
+
+ REQ 34: The solution SHOULD provide a method for exchanging overload
+ and load information between elements that are connected by
+ intermediaries that do not support the solution.
+
+8. Security Considerations
+
+ A Diameter overload control mechanism is primarily concerned with the
+ load-related and overload-related behavior of nodes in a Diameter
+ network, and the information used to affect that behavior. Load and
+ overload information is shared between nodes and directly affects the
+ behavior, and thus the information is potentially vulnerable to a
+ number of methods of attack.
+
+ Load and overload information may also be sensitive from both
+ business and network protection viewpoints. Operators of Diameter
+ equipment want to control the visibility of load and overload
+ information to keep it from being used for competitive intelligence
+ or for targeting attacks. It is also important that the Diameter
+ overload control mechanism not introduce any way in which any other
+ information carried by Diameter is sent inappropriately.
+
+ Note that the Diameter base specification [RFC6733] lacks end-to-end
+ security, making it difficult for non-adjacent nodes to verify the
+ authenticity and ownership of load and overload information.
+ Authentication of load and overload information helps to alleviate
+ several of the security issues listed in this section.
+
+ This document includes requirements intended to mitigate the effects
+ of attacks and to protect the information used by the mechanism.
+ This section discusses potential security considerations for overload
+ control solutions. This discussion provides the motivation for
+ several normative requirements described in Section 7. The
+ discussion includes specific references to the normative requirements
+ that apply for each issue.
+
+8.1. Access Control
+
+ To control the visibility of load and overload information, sending
+ should be subject to some form of authentication and authorization of
+ the receiver. It is also important to the receivers that they are
+ confident the load and overload information they receive is from a
+ legitimate source. REQ 28 requires that the solution work without
+ assuming that all Diameter nodes in a network are trusted for the
+ purposes of exchanging overload and load information. REQ 29
+ requires that the solution let nodes restrict unauthorized parties
+
+
+
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+
+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+ from seeing overload information. Note that this implies a certain
+ amount of configurability on the nodes supporting the Diameter
+ overload control mechanism.
+
+8.2. Denial-of-Service Attacks
+
+ An overload control mechanism provides a very attractive target for
+ denial-of-service attacks. A small number of messages may effect a
+ large service disruption by falsely reporting overload conditions.
+ Alternately, attacking servers nearing, or in, overload may also be
+ facilitated by disrupting their overload indications, potentially
+ preventing them from mitigating their overload condition.
+
+ A design goal for the Diameter overload control mechanism is to
+ minimize or eliminate the possibility of using the mechanism for this
+ type of attack. More strongly, REQ 27 forbids the solution from
+ introducing new vulnerabilities to malicious attack. Additionally,
+ REQ 30 stipulates that the solution not interfere with other
+ mechanisms used for protection against denial-of-service attacks.
+
+ As the intent of some denial-of-service attacks is to induce overload
+ conditions, an effective overload control mechanism should help to
+ mitigate the effects of such an attack.
+
+8.3. Replay Attacks
+
+ An attacker that has managed to obtain some messages from the
+ overload control mechanism may attempt to affect the behavior of
+ nodes supporting the mechanism by sending those messages at
+ potentially inopportune times. In addition to time shifting, replay
+ attacks may send messages to other nodes as well (target shifting).
+
+ A design goal for the Diameter overload control solution is to
+ minimize or eliminate the possibility of causing disruption by using
+ a replay attack on the Diameter overload control mechanism.
+ (Allowing a replay attack using the overload control solution would
+ violate REQ 27.)
+
+8.4. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
+
+ By inserting themselves between two nodes supporting the Diameter
+ overload control mechanism, an attacker may potentially both access
+ and alter the information sent between those nodes. This can be used
+ for information gathering for business intelligence and attack
+ targeting, as well as direct attacks.
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+ REQs 27, 28, and 29 imply a need to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
+ on the overload control solution. A transport using Transport Layer
+ Security (TLS) and/or IPsec may be desirable for this purpose.
+
+8.5. Compromised Hosts
+
+ A compromised host that supports the Diameter overload control
+ mechanism could be used for information gathering as well as for
+ sending malicious information to any Diameter node that would
+ normally accept information from it. While it is beyond the scope of
+ the Diameter overload control mechanism to mitigate any operational
+ interruption to the compromised host, REQs 28 and 29 imply a need to
+ minimize the impact that a compromised host can have on other nodes
+ through the use of the Diameter overload control mechanism. Of
+ course, a compromised host could be used to cause damage in a number
+ of other ways. This is out of scope for a Diameter overload control
+ mechanism.
+
+9. References
+
+9.1. Normative References
+
+ [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+ [RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
+ "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.
+
+ [RFC2914] Floyd, S., "Congestion Control Principles", BCP 41,
+ RFC 2914, September 2000.
+
+ [RFC3539] Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization and
+ Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile", RFC 3539, June 2003.
+
+9.2. Informative References
+
+ [RFC5390] Rosenberg, J., "Requirements for Management of Overload
+ in the Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 5390,
+ December 2008.
+
+ [RFC6357] Hilt, V., Noel, E., Shen, C., and A. Abdelal, "Design
+ Considerations for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
+ Overload Control", RFC 6357, August 2011.
+
+ [TR23.843] 3GPP, "Study on Core Network (CN) overload solutions",
+ TR 23.843 1.2.0, Work in Progress, October 2013.
+
+
+
+
+
+McMurry & Campbell Informational [Page 27]
+
+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+ [IR.34] GSMA, "Inter-Service Provider IP Backbone Guidelines",
+ IR 34 9.1, May 2013.
+
+ [IR.88] GSMA, "LTE Roaming Guidelines", IR 88 9.0, January 2013.
+
+ [IR.92] GSMA, "IMS Profile for Voice and SMS", IR 92 7.0,
+ March 2013.
+
+ [TS23.002] 3GPP, "Network Architecture", TS 23.002 12.2.0,
+ June 2013.
+
+ [TS29.272] 3GPP, "Evolved Packet System (EPS); Mobility Management
+ Entity (MME) and Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) related
+ interfaces based on Diameter protocol", TS 29.272 12.2.0,
+ September 2013.
+
+ [TS29.212] 3GPP, "Policy and Charging Control (PCC) over Gx/Sd
+ reference point", TS 29.212 12.2.0, September 2013.
+
+ [TS29.228] 3GPP, "IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem Cx and Dx interfaces;
+ Signalling flows and message contents", TS 29.228 12.0.0,
+ September 2013.
+
+ [TS29.002] 3GPP, "Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification",
+ TS 29.002 12.2.0, September 2013.
+
+
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+McMurry & Campbell Informational [Page 28]
+
+RFC 7068 Diameter Overload Control Requirements November 2013
+
+
+Appendix A. Contributors
+
+ Significant contributions to this document were made by Adam Roach
+ and Eric Noel.
+
+Appendix B. Acknowledgements
+
+ Review of, and contributions to, this specification by Martin Dolly,
+ Carolyn Johnson, Jianrong Wang, Imtiaz Shaikh, Jouni Korhonen, Robert
+ Sparks, Dieter Jacobsohn, Janet Gunn, Jean-Jacques Trottin, Laurent
+ Thiebaut, Andrew Booth, and Lionel Morand were most appreciated. We
+ would like to thank them for their time and expertise.
+
+Authors' Addresses
+
+ Eric McMurry
+ Oracle
+ 17210 Campbell Rd.
+ Suite 250
+ Dallas, TX 75252
+ US
+
+ EMail: [email protected]
+
+
+ Ben Campbell
+ Oracle
+ 17210 Campbell Rd.
+ Suite 250
+ Dallas, TX 75252
+ US
+
+ EMail: [email protected]
+
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+McMurry & Campbell Informational [Page 29]
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