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-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh.erl111
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl4
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_acceptor.erl7
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.erl13
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.hrl1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_connect.hrl3
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl258
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl22
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl531
9 files changed, 642 insertions, 308 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh.erl
index 5bde184070..54f94acbdc 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh.erl
@@ -235,10 +235,27 @@ start_daemon(Host, Port, Options, Inet) ->
{error, _Reason} = Error ->
Error;
{SocketOptions, SshOptions}->
- do_start_daemon(Host, Port,[{role, server} |SshOptions] , [Inet | SocketOptions])
+ try
+ do_start_daemon(Host, Port,[{role, server} |SshOptions] , [Inet | SocketOptions])
+ catch
+ throw:bad_fd -> {error,bad_fd};
+ _C:_E -> {error,{cannot_start_daemon,_C,_E}}
+ end
end.
-do_start_daemon(Host, Port, Options, SocketOptions) ->
+do_start_daemon(Host0, Port0, Options, SocketOptions) ->
+ {Host,Port} = try
+ case proplists:get_value(fd, SocketOptions) of
+ undefined ->
+ {Host0,Port0};
+ Fd when Port0==0 ->
+ find_hostport(Fd);
+ _ ->
+ {Host0,Port0}
+ end
+ catch
+ _:_ -> throw(bad_fd)
+ end,
Profile = proplists:get_value(profile, Options, ?DEFAULT_PROFILE),
case ssh_system_sup:system_supervisor(Host, Port, Profile) of
undefined ->
@@ -272,6 +289,15 @@ do_start_daemon(Host, Port, Options, SocketOptions) ->
end
end.
+find_hostport(Fd) ->
+ %% Using internal functions inet:open/8 and inet:close/0.
+ %% Don't try this at home unless you know what you are doing!
+ {ok,S} = inet:open(Fd, {0,0,0,0}, 0, [], tcp, inet, stream, inet_tcp),
+ {ok, HostPort} = inet:sockname(S),
+ ok = inet:close(S),
+ HostPort.
+
+
handle_options(Opts) ->
try handle_option(algs_compatibility(proplists:unfold(Opts)), [], []) of
{Inet, Ssh} ->
@@ -282,32 +308,27 @@ handle_options(Opts) ->
end.
-algs_compatibility(Os) ->
+algs_compatibility(Os0) ->
%% Take care of old options 'public_key_alg' and 'pref_public_key_algs'
- comp_pk(proplists:get_value(preferred_algorithms,Os),
- proplists:get_value(pref_public_key_algs,Os),
- proplists:get_value(public_key_alg, Os),
- [{K,V} || {K,V} <- Os,
- K =/= public_key_alg,
- K =/= pref_public_key_algs]
- ).
-
-comp_pk(undefined, undefined, undefined, Os) -> Os;
-comp_pk( PrefAlgs, _, _, Os) when PrefAlgs =/= undefined -> Os;
-
-comp_pk(undefined, undefined, ssh_dsa, Os) -> comp_pk(undefined, undefined, 'ssh-dss', Os);
-comp_pk(undefined, undefined, ssh_rsa, Os) -> comp_pk(undefined, undefined, 'ssh-rsa', Os);
-comp_pk(undefined, undefined, PK, Os) ->
- PKs = [PK | ssh_transport:supported_algorithms(public_key)--[PK]],
- [{preferred_algorithms, [{public_key,PKs}] } | Os];
-
-comp_pk(undefined, PrefPKs, _, Os) when PrefPKs =/= undefined ->
- PKs = [case PK of
- ssh_dsa -> 'ssh-dss';
- ssh_rsa -> 'ssh-rsa';
- _ -> PK
- end || PK <- PrefPKs],
- [{preferred_algorithms, [{public_key,PKs}]} | Os].
+ case proplists:get_value(public_key_alg, Os0) of
+ undefined ->
+ Os0;
+ A when is_atom(A) ->
+ %% Skip public_key_alg if pref_public_key_algs is defined:
+ Os = lists:keydelete(public_key_alg, 1, Os0),
+ case proplists:get_value(pref_public_key_algs,Os) of
+ undefined when A == 'ssh-rsa' ; A==ssh_rsa ->
+ [{pref_public_key_algs,['ssh-rsa','ssh-dss']} | Os];
+ undefined when A == 'ssh-dss' ; A==ssh_dsa ->
+ [{pref_public_key_algs,['ssh-dss','ssh-rsa']} | Os];
+ undefined ->
+ throw({error, {eoptions, {public_key_alg,A} }});
+ _ ->
+ Os
+ end;
+ V ->
+ throw({error, {eoptions, {public_key_alg,V} }})
+ end.
handle_option([], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
@@ -336,8 +357,12 @@ handle_option([{user_passwords, _} = Opt | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
handle_option([{pwdfun, _} = Opt | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
-handle_option([{key_cb, _} = Opt | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
- handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
+handle_option([{key_cb, {Module, Options}} | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
+ handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option({key_cb, Module}),
+ handle_ssh_priv_option({key_cb_private, Options}) |
+ SshOptions]);
+handle_option([{key_cb, Module} | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
+ handle_option([{key_cb, {Module, []}} | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions);
handle_option([{keyboard_interact_fun, _} = Opt | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
%%Backwards compatibility
@@ -374,6 +399,8 @@ handle_option([{auth_methods, _} = Opt | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
handle_option([{auth_method_kb_interactive_data, _} = Opt | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
+handle_option([{pref_public_key_algs, _} = Opt | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
+ handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
handle_option([{preferred_algorithms,_} = Opt | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
handle_option([{dh_gex_groups,_} = Opt | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
@@ -485,6 +512,13 @@ handle_ssh_option({dh_gex_limits,{Min,I,Max}} = Opt) when is_integer(Min), Min>0
is_integer(Max), Max>=I ->
%% Client
Opt;
+handle_ssh_option({pref_public_key_algs, Value} = Opt) when is_list(Value), length(Value) >= 1 ->
+ case handle_user_pref_pubkey_algs(Value, []) of
+ {true, NewOpts} ->
+ {pref_public_key_algs, NewOpts};
+ _ ->
+ throw({error, {eoptions, Opt}})
+ end;
handle_ssh_option({connect_timeout, Value} = Opt) when is_integer(Value); Value == infinity ->
Opt;
handle_ssh_option({max_sessions, Value} = Opt) when is_integer(Value), Value>0 ->
@@ -511,6 +545,9 @@ handle_ssh_option({pwdfun, Value} = Opt) when is_function(Value,4) ->
Opt;
handle_ssh_option({key_cb, Value} = Opt) when is_atom(Value) ->
Opt;
+handle_ssh_option({key_cb, {CallbackMod, CallbackOptions}} = Opt) when is_atom(CallbackMod),
+ is_list(CallbackOptions) ->
+ Opt;
handle_ssh_option({keyboard_interact_fun, Value} = Opt) when is_function(Value,3) ->
Opt;
handle_ssh_option({compression, Value} = Opt) when is_atom(Value) ->
@@ -577,6 +614,9 @@ handle_ssh_option({profile, Value} = Opt) when is_atom(Value) ->
handle_ssh_option(Opt) ->
throw({error, {eoptions, Opt}}).
+handle_ssh_priv_option({key_cb_private, Value} = Opt) when is_list(Value) ->
+ Opt.
+
handle_inet_option({active, _} = Opt) ->
throw({error, {{eoptions, Opt}, "SSH has built in flow control, "
"and active is handled internally, user is not allowed"
@@ -737,3 +777,16 @@ read_moduli_file(D, I, Acc) ->
end
end.
+handle_user_pref_pubkey_algs([], Acc) ->
+ {true, lists:reverse(Acc)};
+handle_user_pref_pubkey_algs([H|T], Acc) ->
+ case lists:member(H, ?SUPPORTED_USER_KEYS) of
+ true ->
+ handle_user_pref_pubkey_algs(T, [H| Acc]);
+
+ false when H==ssh_dsa -> handle_user_pref_pubkey_algs(T, ['ssh-dss'| Acc]);
+ false when H==ssh_rsa -> handle_user_pref_pubkey_algs(T, ['ssh-rsa'| Acc]);
+
+ false ->
+ false
+ end.
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl
index 4ad936f742..f88098819d 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl
@@ -29,11 +29,13 @@
-define(SSH_DEFAULT_PORT, 22).
-define(SSH_MAX_PACKET_SIZE, (256*1024)).
--define(SSH_LENGHT_INDICATOR_SIZE, 4).
-define(REKEY_TIMOUT, 3600000).
-define(REKEY_DATA_TIMOUT, 60000).
-define(DEFAULT_PROFILE, default).
+-define(SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS, "publickey,keyboard-interactive,password").
+-define(SUPPORTED_USER_KEYS, ['ssh-rsa','ssh-dss','ecdsa-sha2-nistp256','ecdsa-sha2-nistp384','ecdsa-sha2-nistp521']).
+
-define(FALSE, 0).
-define(TRUE, 1).
%% basic binary constructors
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_acceptor.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_acceptor.erl
index c5ad1d7b6c..d94dedf1bf 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_acceptor.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_acceptor.erl
@@ -56,7 +56,12 @@ acceptor_init(Parent, Port, Address, SockOpts, Opts, AcceptTimeout) ->
error
end.
-do_socket_listen(Callback, Port, Opts) ->
+do_socket_listen(Callback, Port0, Opts) ->
+ Port =
+ case proplists:get_value(fd, Opts) of
+ undefined -> Port0;
+ _ -> 0
+ end,
case Callback:listen(Port, Opts) of
{error, nxdomain} ->
Callback:listen(Port, lists:delete(inet6, Opts));
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.erl
index 4967a2e4cd..fdbb5c152a 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.erl
@@ -118,11 +118,16 @@ init_userauth_request_msg(#ssh{opts = Opts} = Ssh) ->
service = "ssh-connection",
method = "none",
data = <<>>},
+ Algs0 = proplists:get_value(pref_public_key_algs, Opts, ?SUPPORTED_USER_KEYS),
+ %% The following line is not strictly correct. The call returns the
+ %% supported HOST key types while we are interested in USER keys. However,
+ %% they "happens" to be the same (for now). This could change....
+ %% There is no danger as long as the set of user keys is a subset of the set
+ %% of host keys.
+ CryptoSupported = ssh_transport:supported_algorithms(public_key),
+ Algs = [A || A <- Algs0,
+ lists:member(A, CryptoSupported)],
-
- Algs = proplists:get_value(public_key,
- proplists:get_value(preferred_algorithms, Opts, []),
- ssh_transport:default_algorithms(public_key)),
Prefs = method_preference(Algs),
ssh_transport:ssh_packet(Msg, Ssh#ssh{user = User,
userauth_preference = Prefs,
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.hrl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.hrl
index 5197a42fa4..449bc4fa45 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.hrl
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
%%% Description: Ssh User Authentication Protocol
--define(SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS, "publickey,keyboard-interactive,password").
-define(SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, 50).
-define(SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, 51).
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connect.hrl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connect.hrl
index 6db89c5d80..9f9f3de8fa 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connect.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connect.hrl
@@ -248,6 +248,9 @@
local_id, %% local channel id
recv_window_size,
+ recv_window_pending = 0, %% Sum of window size updates that has not
+ %% yet been sent. This limits the number
+ %% of sent update msgs.
recv_packet_size,
recv_close = false,
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl
index 8448218d91..f082db136c 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl
@@ -433,6 +433,12 @@ key_exchange(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_request{} = Msg,
send_msg(GexGroup, State),
{next_state, key_exchange_dh_gex_init, next_packet(State#state{ssh_params = Ssh})};
+key_exchange(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_request_old{} = Msg,
+ #state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = server} = Ssh0} = State) ->
+ {ok, GexGroup, Ssh} = ssh_transport:handle_kex_dh_gex_request(Msg, Ssh0),
+ send_msg(GexGroup, State),
+ {next_state, key_exchange_dh_gex_init, next_packet(State#state{ssh_params = Ssh})};
+
key_exchange(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_group{} = Msg,
#state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = client} = Ssh0} = State) ->
{ok, KexGexInit, Ssh} = ssh_transport:handle_kex_dh_gex_group(Msg, Ssh0),
@@ -731,13 +737,28 @@ handle_event({adjust_window, ChannelId, Bytes}, StateName,
#connection{channel_cache = Cache}} = State0) ->
State =
case ssh_channel:cache_lookup(Cache, ChannelId) of
- #channel{recv_window_size = WinSize, remote_id = Id} = Channel ->
- ssh_channel:cache_update(Cache, Channel#channel{recv_window_size =
- WinSize + Bytes}),
- Msg = ssh_connection:channel_adjust_window_msg(Id, Bytes),
+ #channel{recv_window_size = WinSize,
+ recv_window_pending = Pending,
+ recv_packet_size = PktSize} = Channel
+ when (WinSize-Bytes) >= 2*PktSize ->
+ %% The peer can send at least two more *full* packet, no hurry.
+ ssh_channel:cache_update(Cache,
+ Channel#channel{recv_window_pending = Pending + Bytes}),
+ State0;
+
+ #channel{recv_window_size = WinSize,
+ recv_window_pending = Pending,
+ remote_id = Id} = Channel ->
+ %% Now we have to update the window - we can't receive so many more pkts
+ ssh_channel:cache_update(Cache,
+ Channel#channel{recv_window_size =
+ WinSize + Bytes + Pending,
+ recv_window_pending = 0}),
+ Msg = ssh_connection:channel_adjust_window_msg(Id, Bytes + Pending),
send_replies([{connection_reply, Msg}], State0);
- undefined ->
- State0
+
+ undefined ->
+ State0
end,
{next_state, StateName, next_packet(State)};
@@ -970,57 +991,55 @@ handle_info({Protocol, Socket, Info}, hello,
transport_protocol = Protocol} = State) ->
event({info_line, Info}, hello, State);
-handle_info({Protocol, Socket, Data}, Statename,
- #state{socket = Socket,
- transport_protocol = Protocol,
- ssh_params = #ssh{decrypt_block_size = BlockSize,
- recv_mac_size = MacSize} = Ssh0,
- decoded_data_buffer = <<>>,
- encoded_data_buffer = EncData0} = State0) ->
-
- %% Implementations SHOULD decrypt the length after receiving the
- %% first 8 (or cipher block size, whichever is larger) bytes of a
- %% packet. (RFC 4253: Section 6 - Binary Packet Protocol)
- case size(EncData0) + size(Data) >= erlang:max(8, BlockSize) of
- true ->
- {Ssh, SshPacketLen, DecData, EncData} =
-
- ssh_transport:decrypt_first_block(<<EncData0/binary,
- Data/binary>>, Ssh0),
- case SshPacketLen > ?SSH_MAX_PACKET_SIZE of
- true ->
- DisconnectMsg =
- #ssh_msg_disconnect{code =
- ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
- description = "Bad packet length "
- ++ integer_to_list(SshPacketLen),
- language = "en"},
- handle_disconnect(DisconnectMsg, State0);
- false ->
- RemainingSshPacketLen =
- (SshPacketLen + ?SSH_LENGHT_INDICATOR_SIZE) -
- BlockSize + MacSize,
- State = State0#state{ssh_params = Ssh},
- handle_ssh_packet_data(RemainingSshPacketLen,
- DecData, EncData, Statename,
- State)
- end;
- false ->
- {next_state, Statename,
- next_packet(State0#state{encoded_data_buffer =
- <<EncData0/binary, Data/binary>>})}
- end;
-
-handle_info({Protocol, Socket, Data}, Statename,
+handle_info({Protocol, Socket, Data}, StateName,
#state{socket = Socket,
transport_protocol = Protocol,
- decoded_data_buffer = DecData,
- encoded_data_buffer = EncData,
- undecoded_packet_length = Len} =
- State) when is_integer(Len) ->
- handle_ssh_packet_data(Len, DecData, <<EncData/binary, Data/binary>>,
- Statename, State);
+ ssh_params = Ssh0,
+ decoded_data_buffer = DecData0,
+ encoded_data_buffer = EncData0,
+ undecoded_packet_length = RemainingSshPacketLen0} = State0) ->
+ Encoded = <<EncData0/binary, Data/binary>>,
+ try ssh_transport:handle_packet_part(DecData0, Encoded, RemainingSshPacketLen0, Ssh0)
+ of
+ {get_more, DecBytes, EncDataRest, RemainingSshPacketLen, Ssh1} ->
+ {next_state, StateName,
+ next_packet(State0#state{encoded_data_buffer = EncDataRest,
+ decoded_data_buffer = DecBytes,
+ undecoded_packet_length = RemainingSshPacketLen,
+ ssh_params = Ssh1})};
+ {decoded, MsgBytes, EncDataRest, Ssh1} ->
+ generate_event(MsgBytes, StateName,
+ State0#state{ssh_params = Ssh1,
+ %% Important to be set for
+ %% next_packet
+%%% FIXME: the following three seem to always be set in generate_event!
+ decoded_data_buffer = <<>>,
+ undecoded_packet_length = undefined,
+ encoded_data_buffer = EncDataRest},
+ EncDataRest);
+ {bad_mac, Ssh1} ->
+ DisconnectMsg =
+ #ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
+ description = "Bad mac",
+ language = ""},
+ handle_disconnect(DisconnectMsg, State0#state{ssh_params=Ssh1});
+ {error, {exceeds_max_size,PacketLen}} ->
+ DisconnectMsg =
+ #ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
+ description = "Bad packet length "
+ ++ integer_to_list(PacketLen),
+ language = ""},
+ handle_disconnect(DisconnectMsg, State0)
+ catch
+ _:_ ->
+ DisconnectMsg =
+ #ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
+ description = "Bad packet",
+ language = ""},
+ handle_disconnect(DisconnectMsg, State0)
+ end;
+
handle_info({CloseTag, _Socket}, _StateName,
#state{transport_close_tag = CloseTag,
ssh_params = #ssh{role = _Role, opts = _Opts}} = State) ->
@@ -1389,44 +1408,54 @@ generate_event(<<?BYTE(Byte), _/binary>> = Msg, StateName,
Byte == ?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST;
Byte == ?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS;
Byte == ?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE ->
- ConnectionMsg = ssh_message:decode(Msg),
- State1 = generate_event_new_state(State0, EncData),
- try ssh_connection:handle_msg(ConnectionMsg, Connection0, Role) of
- {{replies, Replies0}, Connection} ->
- if StateName == connected ->
- Replies = Replies0,
- State2 = State1;
- true ->
- {ConnReplies, Replies} =
- lists:splitwith(fun not_connected_filter/1, Replies0),
- Q = State1#state.event_queue ++ ConnReplies,
- State2 = State1#state{ event_queue = Q }
- end,
- State = send_replies(Replies, State2#state{connection_state = Connection}),
- {next_state, StateName, next_packet(State)};
- {noreply, Connection} ->
- {next_state, StateName, next_packet(State1#state{connection_state = Connection})};
- {disconnect, {_, Reason}, {{replies, Replies}, Connection}} when
- Role == client andalso ((StateName =/= connected) and (not Renegotiation)) ->
- State = send_replies(Replies, State1#state{connection_state = Connection}),
- User ! {self(), not_connected, Reason},
- {stop, {shutdown, normal},
- next_packet(State#state{connection_state = Connection})};
- {disconnect, _Reason, {{replies, Replies}, Connection}} ->
- State = send_replies(Replies, State1#state{connection_state = Connection}),
- {stop, {shutdown, normal}, State#state{connection_state = Connection}}
+ try
+ ssh_message:decode(Msg)
+ of
+ ConnectionMsg ->
+ State1 = generate_event_new_state(State0, EncData),
+ try ssh_connection:handle_msg(ConnectionMsg, Connection0, Role) of
+ {{replies, Replies0}, Connection} ->
+ if StateName == connected ->
+ Replies = Replies0,
+ State2 = State1;
+ true ->
+ {ConnReplies, Replies} =
+ lists:splitwith(fun not_connected_filter/1, Replies0),
+ Q = State1#state.event_queue ++ ConnReplies,
+ State2 = State1#state{ event_queue = Q }
+ end,
+ State = send_replies(Replies, State2#state{connection_state = Connection}),
+ {next_state, StateName, next_packet(State)};
+ {noreply, Connection} ->
+ {next_state, StateName, next_packet(State1#state{connection_state = Connection})};
+ {disconnect, {_, Reason}, {{replies, Replies}, Connection}} when
+ Role == client andalso ((StateName =/= connected) and (not Renegotiation)) ->
+ State = send_replies(Replies, State1#state{connection_state = Connection}),
+ User ! {self(), not_connected, Reason},
+ {stop, {shutdown, normal},
+ next_packet(State#state{connection_state = Connection})};
+ {disconnect, _Reason, {{replies, Replies}, Connection}} ->
+ State = send_replies(Replies, State1#state{connection_state = Connection}),
+ {stop, {shutdown, normal}, State#state{connection_state = Connection}}
+ catch
+ _:Error ->
+ {disconnect, _Reason, {{replies, Replies}, Connection}} =
+ ssh_connection:handle_msg(
+ #ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION,
+ description = "Internal error",
+ language = "en"}, Connection0, Role),
+ State = send_replies(Replies, State1#state{connection_state = Connection}),
+ {stop, {shutdown, Error}, State#state{connection_state = Connection}}
+ end
+
catch
- _:Error ->
- {disconnect, _Reason, {{replies, Replies}, Connection}} =
- ssh_connection:handle_msg(
- #ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION,
- description = "Internal error",
- language = "en"}, Connection0, Role),
- State = send_replies(Replies, State1#state{connection_state = Connection}),
- {stop, {shutdown, Error}, State#state{connection_state = Connection}}
+ _:_ ->
+ handle_disconnect(
+ #ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
+ description = "Bad packet received",
+ language = ""}, State0)
end;
-
generate_event(Msg, StateName, State0, EncData) ->
try
Event = ssh_message:decode(set_prefix_if_trouble(Msg,State0)),
@@ -1631,57 +1660,6 @@ after_new_keys_events({connection_reply, _Data} = Reply, {StateName, State}) ->
NewState = send_replies([Reply], State),
{next_state, StateName, NewState}.
-handle_ssh_packet_data(RemainingSshPacketLen, DecData, EncData, StateName,
- State) ->
- EncSize = size(EncData),
- case RemainingSshPacketLen > EncSize of
- true ->
- {next_state, StateName,
- next_packet(State#state{decoded_data_buffer = DecData,
- encoded_data_buffer = EncData,
- undecoded_packet_length =
- RemainingSshPacketLen})};
- false ->
- handle_ssh_packet(RemainingSshPacketLen, StateName,
- State#state{decoded_data_buffer = DecData,
- encoded_data_buffer = EncData})
-
- end.
-
-handle_ssh_packet(Length, StateName, #state{decoded_data_buffer = DecData0,
- encoded_data_buffer = EncData0,
- ssh_params = Ssh0,
- transport_protocol = _Protocol,
- socket = _Socket} = State0) ->
- try
- {Ssh1, DecData, EncData, Mac} =
- ssh_transport:unpack(EncData0, Length, Ssh0),
- SshPacket = <<DecData0/binary, DecData/binary>>,
- case ssh_transport:is_valid_mac(Mac, SshPacket, Ssh1) of
- true ->
- PacketData = ssh_transport:msg_data(SshPacket),
- {Ssh1, Msg} = ssh_transport:decompress(Ssh1, PacketData),
- generate_event(Msg, StateName,
- State0#state{ssh_params = Ssh1,
- %% Important to be set for
- %% next_packet
- decoded_data_buffer = <<>>},
- EncData);
- false ->
- DisconnectMsg =
- #ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
- description = "Bad mac",
- language = "en"},
- handle_disconnect(DisconnectMsg, State0)
- end
- catch _:_ ->
- Disconnect =
- #ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
- description = "Bad input",
- language = "en"},
- handle_disconnect(Disconnect, State0)
- end.
-
handle_disconnect(DisconnectMsg, State) ->
handle_disconnect(own, DisconnectMsg, State).
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl
index a6549f1c73..819cba697e 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
-include("ssh.hrl").
-include("ssh_xfer.hrl").
+-include("ssh_connect.hrl"). %% For ?DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE and ?DEFAULT_WINDOW_SIZE
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% External exports
@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@
file_handler, % atom() - callback module
file_state, % state for the file callback module
max_files, % integer >= 0 max no files sent during READDIR
+ options, % from the subsystem declaration
handles % list of open handles
%% handle is either {<int>, directory, {Path, unread|eof}} or
%% {<int>, file, {Path, IoDevice}}
@@ -121,6 +123,7 @@ init(Options) ->
MaxLength = proplists:get_value(max_files, Options, 0),
Vsn = proplists:get_value(sftpd_vsn, Options, 5),
{ok, State#state{cwd = CWD, root = Root, max_files = MaxLength,
+ options = Options,
handles = [], pending = <<>>,
xf = #ssh_xfer{vsn = Vsn, ext = []}}}.
@@ -164,7 +167,9 @@ handle_ssh_msg({ssh_cm, _, {exit_status, ChannelId, Status}}, State) ->
%% Description: Handles other messages
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
handle_msg({ssh_channel_up, ChannelId, ConnectionManager},
- #state{xf =Xf} = State) ->
+ #state{xf = Xf,
+ options = Options} = State) ->
+ maybe_increase_recv_window(ConnectionManager, ChannelId, Options),
{ok, State#state{xf = Xf#ssh_xfer{cm = ConnectionManager,
channel = ChannelId}}}.
@@ -934,3 +939,18 @@ rename(Path, Path2, ReqId, State0) ->
{Status, FS1} = FileMod:rename(Path, Path2, FS0),
State1 = State0#state{file_state = FS1},
send_status(Status, ReqId, State1).
+
+
+maybe_increase_recv_window(ConnectionManager, ChannelId, Options) ->
+ WantedRecvWindowSize =
+ proplists:get_value(recv_window_size, Options, 1000000),
+ NumPkts = WantedRecvWindowSize div ?DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE,
+ Increment = NumPkts*?DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE - ?DEFAULT_WINDOW_SIZE,
+
+ if
+ Increment > 0 ->
+ ssh_connection:adjust_window(ConnectionManager, ChannelId,
+ Increment);
+ Increment =< 0 ->
+ do_nothing
+ end.
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl
index 0c999b96cc..18037b8461 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@
-include("ssh.hrl").
-export([versions/2, hello_version_msg/1]).
--export([next_seqnum/1, decrypt_first_block/2, decrypt_blocks/3,
+-export([next_seqnum/1,
supported_algorithms/0, supported_algorithms/1,
default_algorithms/0, default_algorithms/1,
- is_valid_mac/3,
+ handle_packet_part/4,
handle_hello_version/1,
key_exchange_init_msg/1,
key_init/3, new_keys_message/1,
@@ -45,9 +45,13 @@
handle_kex_ecdh_init/2,
handle_kex_ecdh_reply/2,
extract_public_key/1,
- unpack/3, decompress/2, ssh_packet/2, pack/2, pack/3, msg_data/1,
+ ssh_packet/2, pack/2,
sign/3, verify/4]).
+%%% For test suites
+-export([pack/3]).
+-export([decompress/2, decrypt_blocks/3, is_valid_mac/3 ]). % FIXME: remove
+
%%%----------------------------------------------------------------------------
%%%
%%% There is a difference between supported and default algorithms. The
@@ -66,10 +70,15 @@ default_algorithms() -> [{K,default_algorithms(K)} || K <- algo_classes()].
algo_classes() -> [kex, public_key, cipher, mac, compression].
-%% default_algorithms(kex) -> % Example of how to disable an algorithm
-%% supported_algorithms(kex, ['ecdh-sha2-nistp521']);
+
+default_algorithms(cipher) ->
+ supported_algorithms(cipher, same(['AEAD_AES_128_GCM',
+ 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM']));
+default_algorithms(mac) ->
+ supported_algorithms(mac, same(['AEAD_AES_128_GCM',
+ 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM']));
default_algorithms(Alg) ->
- supported_algorithms(Alg).
+ supported_algorithms(Alg, []).
supported_algorithms() -> [{K,supported_algorithms(K)} || K <- algo_classes()].
@@ -97,19 +106,25 @@ supported_algorithms(public_key) ->
supported_algorithms(cipher) ->
same(
select_crypto_supported(
- [{'aes256-ctr', [{ciphers,{aes_ctr,256}}]},
- {'aes192-ctr', [{ciphers,{aes_ctr,192}}]},
- {'aes128-ctr', [{ciphers,{aes_ctr,128}}]},
- {'aes128-cbc', [{ciphers,aes_cbc128}]},
- {'3des-cbc', [{ciphers,des3_cbc}]}
+ [{'aes256-ctr', [{ciphers,{aes_ctr,256}}]},
+ {'aes192-ctr', [{ciphers,{aes_ctr,192}}]},
+ {'aes128-ctr', [{ciphers,{aes_ctr,128}}]},
+ {'aes128-cbc', [{ciphers,aes_cbc128}]},
+ {'[email protected]', [{ciphers,{aes_gcm,128}}]},
+ {'[email protected]', [{ciphers,{aes_gcm,256}}]},
+ {'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', [{ciphers,{aes_gcm,128}}]},
+ {'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', [{ciphers,{aes_gcm,256}}]},
+ {'3des-cbc', [{ciphers,des3_cbc}]}
]
));
supported_algorithms(mac) ->
same(
select_crypto_supported(
- [{'hmac-sha2-256', [{hashs,sha256}]},
- {'hmac-sha2-512', [{hashs,sha512}]},
- {'hmac-sha1', [{hashs,sha}]}
+ [{'hmac-sha2-256', [{hashs,sha256}]},
+ {'hmac-sha2-512', [{hashs,sha512}]},
+ {'hmac-sha1', [{hashs,sha}]},
+ {'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', [{ciphers,{aes_gcm,128}}]},
+ {'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', [{ciphers,{aes_gcm,256}}]}
]
));
supported_algorithms(compression) ->
@@ -118,46 +133,6 @@ supported_algorithms(compression) ->
'zlib'
]).
-%% Dialyzer complains when not called...supported_algorithms(Key, [{client2server,BL1},{server2client,BL2}]) ->
-%% Dialyzer complains when not called... [{client2server,As1},{server2client,As2}] = supported_algorithms(Key),
-%% Dialyzer complains when not called... [{client2server,As1--BL1},{server2client,As2--BL2}];
-%% Dialyzer complains when not called...supported_algorithms(Key, BlackList) ->
-%% Dialyzer complains when not called... supported_algorithms(Key) -- BlackList.
-
-select_crypto_supported(L) ->
- Sup = [{ec_curve,crypto_supported_curves()} | crypto:supports()],
- [Name || {Name,CryptoRequires} <- L,
- crypto_supported(CryptoRequires, Sup)].
-
-crypto_supported_curves() ->
- try crypto:ec_curves()
- catch _:_ -> []
- end.
-
-crypto_supported(Conditions, Supported) ->
- lists:all( fun({Tag,CryptoName}) when is_atom(CryptoName) ->
- crypto_name_supported(Tag,CryptoName,Supported);
- ({Tag,{Name=aes_ctr,Len}}) when is_integer(Len) ->
- crypto_name_supported(Tag,Name,Supported) andalso
- ctr_len_supported(Name,Len)
- end, Conditions).
-
-crypto_name_supported(Tag, CryptoName, Supported) ->
- lists:member(CryptoName, proplists:get_value(Tag,Supported,[])).
-
-ctr_len_supported(Name, Len) ->
- try
- crypto:stream_encrypt(crypto:stream_init(Name, <<0:Len>>, <<0:128>>), <<"">>)
- of
- {_,X} -> is_binary(X)
- catch
- _:_ -> false
- end.
-
-
-same(Algs) -> [{client2server,Algs}, {server2client,Algs}].
-
-
%%%----------------------------------------------------------------------------
versions(client, Options)->
Vsn = proplists:get_value(vsn, Options, ?DEFAULT_CLIENT_VERSION),
@@ -196,12 +171,6 @@ hello_version_msg(Data) ->
next_seqnum(SeqNum) ->
(SeqNum + 1) band 16#ffffffff.
-decrypt_first_block(Bin, #ssh{decrypt_block_size = BlockSize} = Ssh0) ->
- <<EncBlock:BlockSize/binary, EncData/binary>> = Bin,
- {Ssh, <<?UINT32(PacketLen), _/binary>> = DecData} =
- decrypt(Ssh0, EncBlock),
- {Ssh, PacketLen, DecData, EncData}.
-
decrypt_blocks(Bin, Length, Ssh0) ->
<<EncBlocks:Length/binary, EncData/binary>> = Bin,
{Ssh, DecData} = decrypt(Ssh0, EncBlocks),
@@ -464,6 +433,40 @@ handle_kex_dh_gex_request(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_request{min = Min0,
language = ""})
end;
+handle_kex_dh_gex_request(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_request_old{n = NBits},
+ Ssh0=#ssh{opts=Opts}) ->
+ %% server
+ %%
+ %% This message was in the draft-00 of rfc4419
+ %% (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-dh-group-exchange-00)
+ %% In later drafts and the rfc is "is used for backward compatibility".
+ %% Unfortunatly the rfc does not specify how to treat the parameter n
+ %% if there is no group of that modulus length :(
+ %% The draft-00 however specifies that n is the "... number of bits
+ %% the subgroup should have at least".
+ %% Further, it says that "Servers and clients SHOULD support groups
+ %% with a modulus length of k bits, where 1024 <= k <= 8192."
+ %%
+ Min0 = NBits,
+ Max0 = 8192,
+ {Min, Max} = adjust_gex_min_max(Min0, Max0, Opts),
+ case public_key:dh_gex_group(Min, NBits, Max,
+ proplists:get_value(dh_gex_groups,Opts)) of
+ {ok, {_Sz, {G,P}}} ->
+ {Public, Private} = generate_key(dh, [P,G]),
+ {SshPacket, Ssh} =
+ ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_group{p = P, g = G}, Ssh0),
+ {ok, SshPacket,
+ Ssh#ssh{keyex_key = {{Private, Public}, {G, P}},
+ keyex_info = {-1, -1, NBits} % flag for kex_h hash calc
+ }};
+ {error,_} ->
+ throw(#ssh_msg_disconnect{
+ code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
+ description = "No possible diffie-hellman-group-exchange group found",
+ language = ""})
+ end;
+
handle_kex_dh_gex_request(_, _) ->
throw({{error,bad_ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_request},
#ssh_msg_disconnect{
@@ -757,8 +760,12 @@ known_host_key(#ssh{opts = Opts, key_cb = Mod, peer = Peer} = Ssh,
%% The first algorithm in each list MUST be the preferred (guessed)
%% algorithm. Each string MUST contain at least one algorithm name.
select_algorithm(Role, Client, Server) ->
- {Encrypt, Decrypt} = select_encrypt_decrypt(Role, Client, Server),
- {SendMac, RecvMac} = select_send_recv_mac(Role, Client, Server),
+ {Encrypt0, Decrypt0} = select_encrypt_decrypt(Role, Client, Server),
+ {SendMac0, RecvMac0} = select_send_recv_mac(Role, Client, Server),
+
+ {Encrypt, SendMac} = aead_gcm_simultan(Encrypt0, SendMac0),
+ {Decrypt, RecvMac} = aead_gcm_simultan(Decrypt0, RecvMac0),
+
{Compression, Decompression} =
select_compression_decompression(Role, Client, Server),
@@ -789,6 +796,38 @@ select_algorithm(Role, Client, Server) ->
s_lng = S_Lng},
{ok, Alg}.
+
+%%% It is an agreed problem with RFC 5674 that if the selection is
+%%% Cipher = AEAD_AES_x_GCM and
+%%% Mac = AEAD_AES_y_GCM (where x =/= y)
+%%% then it is undefined what length should be selected.
+%%%
+%%% If only one of the two lengths (128,256) is available, I claim that
+%%% there is no such ambiguity.
+
+%%% From https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/plain/PROTOCOL
+%%% (read Nov 20, 2015)
+%%% 1.6 transport: AES-GCM
+%%%
+%%% OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647.
+%%% Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange
+%%% the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows:
+%%%
+%%% AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms
+%%% "[email protected]" or "[email protected]" and never as
+%%% an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher
+%%% the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be
+%%% a matching MAC.
+
+aead_gcm_simultan('[email protected]', _) -> {'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM'};
+aead_gcm_simultan('[email protected]', _) -> {'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM'};
+aead_gcm_simultan('AEAD_AES_128_GCM', _) -> {'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM'};
+aead_gcm_simultan('AEAD_AES_256_GCM', _) -> {'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM'};
+aead_gcm_simultan(_, 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM') -> {'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM'};
+aead_gcm_simultan(_, 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM') -> {'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM'};
+aead_gcm_simultan(Cipher, Mac) -> {Cipher,Mac}.
+
+
select_encrypt_decrypt(client, Client, Server) ->
Encrypt =
select(Client#ssh_msg_kexinit.encryption_algorithms_client_to_server,
@@ -823,18 +862,18 @@ select_compression_decompression(client, Client, Server) ->
Compression =
select(Client#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_client_to_server,
Server#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_client_to_server),
- Decomprssion =
+ Decompression =
select(Client#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_server_to_client,
Server#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_server_to_client),
- {Compression, Decomprssion};
+ {Compression, Decompression};
select_compression_decompression(server, Client, Server) ->
- Decomprssion =
+ Decompression =
select(Client#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_client_to_server,
Server#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_client_to_server),
Compression =
select(Client#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_server_to_client,
Server#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_server_to_client),
- {Compression, Decomprssion}.
+ {Compression, Decompression}.
install_alg(SSH) ->
SSH1 = alg_final(SSH),
@@ -911,14 +950,39 @@ pack(Data, Ssh=#ssh{}) ->
%%% Note: pack/3 is only to be called from tests that wants
%%% to deliberetly send packets with wrong PacketLength!
%%% Use pack/2 for all other purposes!
-pack(Data0, #ssh{encrypt_block_size = BlockSize,
- send_sequence = SeqNum, send_mac = MacAlg,
- send_mac_key = MacKey,
- random_length_padding = RandomLengthPadding}
- = Ssh0,
- PacketLenDeviationForTests) when is_binary(Data0) ->
- {Ssh1, Data} = compress(Ssh0, Data0),
- PL = (BlockSize - ((4 + 1 + size(Data)) rem BlockSize)) rem BlockSize,
+pack(PlainText,
+ #ssh{send_sequence = SeqNum,
+ send_mac = MacAlg,
+ send_mac_key = MacKey,
+ encrypt = CryptoAlg} = Ssh0, PacketLenDeviationForTests) when is_binary(PlainText) ->
+
+ {Ssh1, CompressedPlainText} = compress(Ssh0, PlainText),
+ {EcryptedPacket, MAC, Ssh3} =
+ case pkt_type(CryptoAlg) of
+ common ->
+ PaddingLen = padding_length(4+1+size(CompressedPlainText), Ssh0),
+ Padding = ssh_bits:random(PaddingLen),
+ PlainPacketLen = 1 + PaddingLen + size(CompressedPlainText) + PacketLenDeviationForTests,
+ PlainPacketData = <<?UINT32(PlainPacketLen),?BYTE(PaddingLen), CompressedPlainText/binary, Padding/binary>>,
+ {Ssh2, EcryptedPacket0} = encrypt(Ssh1, PlainPacketData),
+ MAC0 = mac(MacAlg, MacKey, SeqNum, PlainPacketData),
+ {EcryptedPacket0, MAC0, Ssh2};
+ aead ->
+ PaddingLen = padding_length(1+size(CompressedPlainText), Ssh0),
+ Padding = ssh_bits:random(PaddingLen),
+ PlainPacketLen = 1 + PaddingLen + size(CompressedPlainText) + PacketLenDeviationForTests,
+ PlainPacketData = <<?BYTE(PaddingLen), CompressedPlainText/binary, Padding/binary>>,
+ {Ssh2, {EcryptedPacket0,MAC0}} = encrypt(Ssh1, {<<?UINT32(PlainPacketLen)>>,PlainPacketData}),
+ {<<?UINT32(PlainPacketLen),EcryptedPacket0/binary>>, MAC0, Ssh2}
+ end,
+ FinalPacket = [EcryptedPacket, MAC],
+ Ssh = Ssh3#ssh{send_sequence = (SeqNum+1) band 16#ffffffff},
+ {FinalPacket, Ssh}.
+
+
+padding_length(Size, #ssh{encrypt_block_size = BlockSize,
+ random_length_padding = RandomLengthPadding}) ->
+ PL = (BlockSize - (Size rem BlockSize)) rem BlockSize,
MinPaddingLen = if PL < 4 -> PL + BlockSize;
true -> PL
end,
@@ -927,45 +991,91 @@ pack(Data0, #ssh{encrypt_block_size = BlockSize,
ExtraPaddingLen = try crypto:rand_uniform(0,MaxExtraBlocks)*PadBlockSize
catch _:_ -> 0
end,
- PaddingLen = MinPaddingLen + ExtraPaddingLen,
- Padding = ssh_bits:random(PaddingLen),
- PacketLen = 1 + PaddingLen + size(Data) + PacketLenDeviationForTests,
- PacketData = <<?UINT32(PacketLen),?BYTE(PaddingLen),
- Data/binary, Padding/binary>>,
- {Ssh2, EncPacket} = encrypt(Ssh1, PacketData),
- MAC = mac(MacAlg, MacKey, SeqNum, PacketData),
- Packet = [EncPacket, MAC],
- Ssh = Ssh2#ssh{send_sequence = (SeqNum+1) band 16#ffffffff},
- {Packet, Ssh}.
-
-unpack(EncodedSoFar, ReminingLenght, #ssh{recv_mac_size = MacSize} = Ssh0) ->
- SshLength = ReminingLenght - MacSize,
- {NoMac, Mac, Rest} = case MacSize of
- 0 ->
- <<NoMac0:SshLength/binary,
- Rest0/binary>> = EncodedSoFar,
- {NoMac0, <<>>, Rest0};
- _ ->
- <<NoMac0:SshLength/binary,
- Mac0:MacSize/binary,
- Rest0/binary>> = EncodedSoFar,
- {NoMac0, Mac0, Rest0}
- end,
- {Ssh1, DecData, <<>>} =
- case SshLength of
- 0 ->
- {Ssh0, <<>>, <<>>};
- _ ->
- decrypt_blocks(NoMac, SshLength, Ssh0)
- end,
- {Ssh1, DecData, Rest, Mac}.
+ MinPaddingLen + ExtraPaddingLen.
+
+
+
+handle_packet_part(<<>>, Encrypted0, undefined, #ssh{decrypt = CryptoAlg} = Ssh0) ->
+ %% New ssh packet
+ case get_length(pkt_type(CryptoAlg), Encrypted0, Ssh0) of
+ get_more ->
+ %% too short to get the length
+ {get_more, <<>>, Encrypted0, undefined, Ssh0};
+
+ {ok, PacketLen, _, _, _} when PacketLen > ?SSH_MAX_PACKET_SIZE ->
+ %% far too long message than expected
+ {error, {exceeds_max_size,PacketLen}};
+
+ {ok, PacketLen, Decrypted, Encrypted1,
+ #ssh{recv_mac_size = MacSize} = Ssh1} ->
+ %% enough bytes so we got the length and can calculate how many
+ %% more bytes to expect for a full packet
+ TotalNeeded = (4 + PacketLen + MacSize),
+ handle_packet_part(Decrypted, Encrypted1, TotalNeeded, Ssh1)
+ end;
+
+handle_packet_part(DecryptedPfx, EncryptedBuffer, TotalNeeded, Ssh0)
+ when (size(DecryptedPfx)+size(EncryptedBuffer)) < TotalNeeded ->
+ %% need more bytes to finalize the packet
+ {get_more, DecryptedPfx, EncryptedBuffer, TotalNeeded, Ssh0};
+
+handle_packet_part(DecryptedPfx, EncryptedBuffer, TotalNeeded,
+ #ssh{recv_mac_size = MacSize,
+ decrypt = CryptoAlg} = Ssh0) ->
+ %% enough bytes to decode the packet.
+ DecryptLen = TotalNeeded - size(DecryptedPfx) - MacSize,
+ <<EncryptedSfx:DecryptLen/binary, Mac:MacSize/binary, NextPacketBytes/binary>> = EncryptedBuffer,
+ case pkt_type(CryptoAlg) of
+ common ->
+ {Ssh1, DecryptedSfx} = decrypt(Ssh0, EncryptedSfx),
+ DecryptedPacket = <<DecryptedPfx/binary, DecryptedSfx/binary>>,
+ case is_valid_mac(Mac, DecryptedPacket, Ssh1) of
+ false ->
+ {bad_mac, Ssh1};
+ true ->
+ {Ssh, DecompressedPayload} = decompress(Ssh1, payload(DecryptedPacket)),
+ {decoded, DecompressedPayload, NextPacketBytes, Ssh}
+ end;
+ aead ->
+ PacketLenBin = DecryptedPfx,
+ case decrypt(Ssh0, {PacketLenBin,EncryptedSfx,Mac}) of
+ {Ssh1, error} ->
+ {bad_mac, Ssh1};
+ {Ssh1, DecryptedSfx} ->
+ DecryptedPacket = <<DecryptedPfx/binary, DecryptedSfx/binary>>,
+ {Ssh, DecompressedPayload} = decompress(Ssh1, payload(DecryptedPacket)),
+ {decoded, DecompressedPayload, NextPacketBytes, Ssh}
+ end
+ end.
+
+
+get_length(common, EncryptedBuffer, #ssh{decrypt_block_size = BlockSize} = Ssh0) ->
+ case size(EncryptedBuffer) >= erlang:max(8, BlockSize) of
+ true ->
+ <<EncBlock:BlockSize/binary, EncryptedRest/binary>> = EncryptedBuffer,
+ {Ssh,
+ <<?UINT32(PacketLen),_/binary>> = Decrypted} = decrypt(Ssh0, EncBlock),
+ {ok, PacketLen, Decrypted, EncryptedRest, Ssh};
+ false ->
+ get_more
+ end;
+get_length(aead, EncryptedBuffer, Ssh) ->
+ case size(EncryptedBuffer) >= 4 of
+ true ->
+ <<?UINT32(PacketLen), EncryptedRest/binary>> = EncryptedBuffer,
+ {ok, PacketLen, <<?UINT32(PacketLen)>>, EncryptedRest, Ssh};
+ false ->
+ get_more
+ end.
+
+pkt_type('AEAD_AES_128_GCM') -> aead;
+pkt_type('AEAD_AES_256_GCM') -> aead;
+pkt_type(_) -> common.
-msg_data(PacketData) ->
- <<Len:32, PaddingLen:8, _/binary>> = PacketData,
- DataLen = Len - PaddingLen - 1,
- <<_:32, _:8, Data:DataLen/binary,
- _:PaddingLen/binary>> = PacketData,
- Data.
+payload(<<PacketLen:32, PaddingLen:8, PayloadAndPadding/binary>>) ->
+ PayloadLen = PacketLen - PaddingLen - 1,
+ <<Payload:PayloadLen/binary, _/binary>> = PayloadAndPadding,
+ Payload.
sign(SigData, Hash, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
DerSignature = public_key:sign(SigData, Hash, Key),
@@ -991,6 +1101,7 @@ verify(PlainText, Hash, Sig, {#'ECPoint'{},_} = Key) ->
verify(PlainText, Hash, Sig, Key) ->
public_key:verify(PlainText, Hash, Sig, Key).
+
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%
%% Encryption
@@ -999,6 +1110,30 @@ verify(PlainText, Hash, Sig, Key) ->
encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = none} = Ssh) ->
{ok, Ssh};
+encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', role = client} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 12*8),
+ <<K:16/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 128),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_block_size = 16,
+ encrypt_ctx = IV}};
+encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', role = server} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 12*8),
+ <<K:16/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 128),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_block_size = 16,
+ encrypt_ctx = IV}};
+encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', role = client} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 12*8),
+ <<K:32/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 256),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_block_size = 16,
+ encrypt_ctx = IV}};
+encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', role = server} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 12*8),
+ <<K:32/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 256),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_block_size = 16,
+ encrypt_ctx = IV}};
encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = '3des-cbc', role = client} = Ssh) ->
IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 64),
<<K1:8/binary, K2:8/binary, K3:8/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 192),
@@ -1075,6 +1210,18 @@ encrypt_final(Ssh) ->
encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = none} = Ssh, Data) ->
{Ssh, Data};
+encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM',
+ encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_ctx = IV0} = Ssh, Data={_AAD,_Ptext}) ->
+ Enc = {_Ctext,_Ctag} = crypto:block_encrypt(aes_gcm, K, IV0, Data),
+ IV = next_gcm_iv(IV0),
+ {Ssh#ssh{encrypt_ctx = IV}, Enc};
+encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM',
+ encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_ctx = IV0} = Ssh, Data={_AAD,_Ptext}) ->
+ Enc = {_Ctext,_Ctag} = crypto:block_encrypt(aes_gcm, K, IV0, Data),
+ IV = next_gcm_iv(IV0),
+ {Ssh#ssh{encrypt_ctx = IV}, Enc};
encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = '3des-cbc',
encrypt_keys = {K1,K2,K3},
encrypt_ctx = IV0} = Ssh, Data) ->
@@ -1107,6 +1254,30 @@ encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes256-ctr',
decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = none} = Ssh) ->
{ok, Ssh};
+decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', role = client} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 12*8),
+ <<K:16/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 128),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_block_size = 16,
+ decrypt_ctx = IV}};
+decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', role = server} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 12*8),
+ <<K:16/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 128),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_block_size = 16,
+ decrypt_ctx = IV}};
+decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', role = client} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 12*8),
+ <<K:32/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 256),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_block_size = 16,
+ decrypt_ctx = IV}};
+decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', role = server} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 12*8),
+ <<K:32/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 256),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_block_size = 16,
+ decrypt_ctx = IV}};
decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = '3des-cbc', role = client} = Ssh) ->
{IV, KD} = {hash(Ssh, "B", 64),
hash(Ssh, "D", 192)},
@@ -1181,8 +1352,22 @@ decrypt_final(Ssh) ->
decrypt_ctx = undefined,
decrypt_block_size = 8}}.
+decrypt(Ssh, <<>>) ->
+ {Ssh, <<>>};
decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = none} = Ssh, Data) ->
{Ssh, Data};
+decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM',
+ decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_ctx = IV0} = Ssh, Data = {_AAD,_Ctext,_Ctag}) ->
+ Dec = crypto:block_decrypt(aes_gcm, K, IV0, Data), % Dec = PlainText | error
+ IV = next_gcm_iv(IV0),
+ {Ssh#ssh{decrypt_ctx = IV}, Dec};
+decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM',
+ decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_ctx = IV0} = Ssh, Data = {_AAD,_Ctext,_Ctag}) ->
+ Dec = crypto:block_decrypt(aes_gcm, K, IV0, Data), % Dec = PlainText | error
+ IV = next_gcm_iv(IV0),
+ {Ssh#ssh{decrypt_ctx = IV}, Dec};
decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = '3des-cbc', decrypt_keys = Keys,
decrypt_ctx = IV0} = Ssh, Data) ->
{K1, K2, K3} = Keys,
@@ -1207,6 +1392,10 @@ decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = 'aes256-ctr',
{State, Enc} = crypto:stream_decrypt(State0,Data),
{Ssh#ssh{decrypt_ctx = State}, Enc}.
+
+next_gcm_iv(<<Fixed:32, InvCtr:64>>) -> <<Fixed:32, (InvCtr+1):64>>.
+
+
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% Compression
%%
@@ -1295,28 +1484,42 @@ decompress(#ssh{decompress = '[email protected]', decompress_ctx = Context, authe
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
send_mac_init(SSH) ->
- case SSH#ssh.role of
- client ->
- KeySize =mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.send_mac),
- Key = hash(SSH, "E", KeySize),
- {ok, SSH#ssh { send_mac_key = Key }};
- server ->
- KeySize = mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.send_mac),
- Key = hash(SSH, "F", KeySize),
- {ok, SSH#ssh { send_mac_key = Key }}
+ case pkt_type(SSH#ssh.send_mac) of
+ common ->
+ case SSH#ssh.role of
+ client ->
+ KeySize = mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.send_mac),
+ Key = hash(SSH, "E", KeySize),
+ {ok, SSH#ssh { send_mac_key = Key }};
+ server ->
+ KeySize = mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.send_mac),
+ Key = hash(SSH, "F", KeySize),
+ {ok, SSH#ssh { send_mac_key = Key }}
+ end;
+ aead ->
+ %% Not applicable
+ {ok, SSH}
end.
send_mac_final(SSH) ->
- {ok, SSH#ssh { send_mac = none, send_mac_key = undefined }}.
+ {ok, SSH#ssh {send_mac = none,
+ send_mac_key = undefined }}.
+
recv_mac_init(SSH) ->
- case SSH#ssh.role of
- client ->
- Key = hash(SSH, "F", mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.recv_mac)),
- {ok, SSH#ssh { recv_mac_key = Key }};
- server ->
- Key = hash(SSH, "E", mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.recv_mac)),
- {ok, SSH#ssh { recv_mac_key = Key }}
+ case pkt_type(SSH#ssh.recv_mac) of
+ common ->
+ case SSH#ssh.role of
+ client ->
+ Key = hash(SSH, "F", mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.recv_mac)),
+ {ok, SSH#ssh { recv_mac_key = Key }};
+ server ->
+ Key = hash(SSH, "E", mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.recv_mac)),
+ {ok, SSH#ssh { recv_mac_key = Key }}
+ end;
+ aead ->
+ %% Not applicable
+ {ok, SSH}
end.
recv_mac_final(SSH) ->
@@ -1399,8 +1602,11 @@ kex_h(SSH, Curve, Key, Q_c, Q_s, K) ->
crypto:hash(sha(Curve), L).
kex_h(SSH, Key, Min, NBits, Max, Prime, Gen, E, F, K) ->
+ KeyBin = public_key:ssh_encode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
L = if Min==-1; Max==-1 ->
- KeyBin = public_key:ssh_encode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
+ %% flag from 'ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_request_old'
+ %% It was like this before that message was supported,
+ %% why?
Ts = [string,string,binary,binary,binary,
uint32,
mpint,mpint,mpint,mpint,mpint],
@@ -1409,7 +1615,6 @@ kex_h(SSH, Key, Min, NBits, Max, Prime, Gen, E, F, K) ->
KeyBin, NBits, Prime, Gen, E,F,K],
Ts);
true ->
- KeyBin = public_key:ssh_encode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
Ts = [string,string,binary,binary,binary,
uint32,uint32,uint32,
mpint,mpint,mpint,mpint,mpint],
@@ -1447,6 +1652,8 @@ mac_digest_size('hmac-md5') -> 20;
mac_digest_size('hmac-md5-96') -> 12;
mac_digest_size('hmac-sha2-256') -> 32;
mac_digest_size('hmac-sha2-512') -> 64;
+mac_digest_size('AEAD_AES_128_GCM') -> 16;
+mac_digest_size('AEAD_AES_256_GCM') -> 16;
mac_digest_size(none) -> 0.
peer_name({Host, _}) ->
@@ -1476,6 +1683,68 @@ ecdh_curve('ecdh-sha2-nistp256') -> secp256r1;
ecdh_curve('ecdh-sha2-nistp384') -> secp384r1;
ecdh_curve('ecdh-sha2-nistp521') -> secp521r1.
+
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+%%
+%% Utils for default_algorithms/1 and supported_algorithms/1
+%%
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+
+supported_algorithms(Key, [{client2server,BL1},{server2client,BL2}]) ->
+ [{client2server,As1},{server2client,As2}] = supported_algorithms(Key),
+ [{client2server,As1--BL1},{server2client,As2--BL2}];
+supported_algorithms(Key, BlackList) ->
+ supported_algorithms(Key) -- BlackList.
+
+
+select_crypto_supported(L) ->
+ Sup = [{ec_curve,crypto_supported_curves()} | crypto:supports()],
+ [Name || {Name,CryptoRequires} <- L,
+ crypto_supported(CryptoRequires, Sup)].
+
+crypto_supported_curves() ->
+ try crypto:ec_curves()
+ catch _:_ -> []
+ end.
+
+crypto_supported(Conditions, Supported) ->
+ lists:all( fun({Tag,CryptoName}) when is_atom(CryptoName) ->
+ crypto_name_supported(Tag,CryptoName,Supported);
+ ({Tag,{Name,Len}}) when is_integer(Len) ->
+ crypto_name_supported(Tag,Name,Supported) andalso
+ len_supported(Name,Len)
+ end, Conditions).
+
+crypto_name_supported(Tag, CryptoName, Supported) ->
+ lists:member(CryptoName, proplists:get_value(Tag,Supported,[])).
+
+len_supported(Name, Len) ->
+ try
+ case Name of
+ aes_ctr ->
+ {_, <<_/binary>>} =
+ %% Test encryption
+ crypto:stream_encrypt(crypto:stream_init(Name, <<0:Len>>, <<0:128>>), <<"">>);
+ aes_gcm ->
+ {<<_/binary>>, <<_/binary>>} =
+ crypto:block_encrypt(Name,
+ _Key = <<0:Len>>,
+ _IV = <<0:12/unsigned-unit:8>>,
+ {<<"AAD">>,"PT"})
+ end
+ of
+ _ -> true
+ catch
+ _:_ -> false
+ end.
+
+
+same(Algs) -> [{client2server,Algs}, {server2client,Algs}].
+
+
+%% default_algorithms(kex) -> % Example of how to disable an algorithm
+%% supported_algorithms(kex, ['ecdh-sha2-nistp521']);
+
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%
%% Other utils