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-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml42
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh.xml125
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_app.xml211
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_connection.xml6
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/src/using_ssh.xml6
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.2.ps3315
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.txt1624
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-connect-18.2.ps2557
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-connect-18.txt1232
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.2.ps2853
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt1627
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-03.2.ps3511
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-03.txt1962
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-04.txt2130
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-transport-17.2.ps3205
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-transport-17.txt1624
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-userauth-18.2.ps1881
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-userauth-18.txt896
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh.erl169
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl16
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_acceptor.erl7
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.erl171
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.hrl2
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_connect.hrl3
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection.erl31
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl304
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_file.erl94
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_message.erl153
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl22
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl910
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.hrl36
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE.erl91
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa5
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa.pub1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa2565
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256.pub1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key2565
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256.pub1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE.erl217
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa2565
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256.pub1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa3846
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa384.pub1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa5217
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa521.pub1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key2565
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256.pub1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key3846
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key384.pub1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key5217
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key521.pub1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_connection_SUITE.erl121
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_options_SUITE.erl175
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_protocol_SUITE.erl227
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_protocol_SUITE_data/dh_group_test.moduli3
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_renegotiate_SUITE.erl35
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_sftp_SUITE.erl6
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_sftpd_SUITE.erl2
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_test_lib.erl213
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_to_openssh_SUITE.erl285
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/test/ssh_trpt_test_lib.erl16
-rw-r--r--lib/ssh/vsn.mk2
62 files changed, 2567 insertions, 29611 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml
index 368bb0f552..012d7051eb 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml
+++ b/lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
<chapter>
<header>
<copyright>
- <year>2004</year><year>2014</year>
+ <year>2004</year><year>2015</year>
<holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder>
</copyright>
<legalnotice>
@@ -30,6 +30,38 @@
<file>notes.xml</file>
</header>
+<section><title>Ssh 4.1.2</title>
+
+ <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title>
+ <list>
+ <item>
+ <p>
+ Add a 1024 group to the list of key group-exchange groups</p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-13046</p>
+ </item>
+ </list>
+ </section>
+
+</section>
+
+<section><title>Ssh 4.1.1</title>
+
+ <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title>
+ <list>
+ <item>
+ <p>
+ A new option <c>max_channels</c> limits the number of
+ channels with active server-side subsystems that are
+ accepted.</p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-13036</p>
+ </item>
+ </list>
+ </section>
+
+</section>
+
<section><title>Ssh 4.1</title>
<section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title>
@@ -184,9 +216,9 @@
<p>
Thanks to Simon Cornish</p>
<p>
- Own Id: OTP-12760 Aux Id: <a
+ Own Id: OTP-12760 Aux Id: <url
href="https://github.com/erlang/otp/pull/715">pull req
- 715</a> </p>
+ 715</url> </p>
</item>
<item>
<p>
@@ -352,13 +384,13 @@
</item>
<item>
<p>
- Made Codenomicon Defensics test suite pass: <list>
+ Made Codenomicon Defensics test suite pass:</p> <list>
<item>limit number of algorithms in kexinit
message</item> <item>check 'e' and 'f' parameters in
kexdh</item> <item>implement 'keyboard-interactive' user
authentication on server side</item> <item> return plain
text message to bad version exchange message</item>
- </list></p>
+ </list>
<p>
Own Id: OTP-12784</p>
</item>
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh.xml b/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh.xml
index cf5e8f1aff..1e9acf4a99 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh.xml
+++ b/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh.xml
@@ -32,28 +32,33 @@
<modulesummary>Main API of the ssh application</modulesummary>
<description>
<p>Interface module for the <c>ssh</c> application.</p>
+ <p>See <seealso marker="ssh:SSH_app#supported">ssh(6)</seealso> for details of supported version,
+ algorithms and unicode support.</p>
</description>
- <section>
- <title>SSH</title>
- <marker id="supported"/>
- <list type="bulleted">
- <item>For application dependencies see <seealso marker="SSH_app"> ssh(6)</seealso> </item>
- <item>Supported SSH version is 2.0.</item>
- <item>Supported public key algorithms: ssh-rsa and ssh-dss.</item>
- <item>Supported MAC algorithms: hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha1.</item>
- <item>Supported encryption algorithms: aes128-ctr, aes128-cb and 3des-cbc.</item>
- <item>Supported key exchange algorithms: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1, diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 and diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256.</item>
- <item>Supported compression algorithms: none, zlib, [email protected],</item>
- <item>Supports unicode filenames if the emulator and the underlaying OS support it.
- See section DESCRIPTION in the
- <seealso marker="kernel:file">file</seealso> manual page in <c>kernel</c>
- for information about this subject.</item>
- <item>Supports unicode in shell and CLI.</item>
- </list>
-
+ <section>
+ <title>OPTIONS</title>
+ <p>The exact behaviour of some functions can be adjusted with the use of options which are documented together
+ with the functions. Generally could each option be used at most one time in each function call. If given two or more
+ times, the effect is not predictable unless explicitly documented.</p>
+ <p>The options are of different kinds:</p>
+ <taglist>
+ <tag>Limits</tag>
+ <item><p>which alters limits in the system, for example number of simultaneous login attempts.</p></item>
+
+ <tag>Timeouts</tag>
+ <item><p>which give some defined behaviour if too long time elapses before a given event or action,
+ for example time to wait for an answer.</p></item>
+
+ <tag>Callbacks</tag>
+ <item><p>which gives the caller of the function the possibility to execute own code on some events,
+ for example calling an own logging function or to perform an own login function</p></item>
+
+ <tag>Behaviour</tag>
+ <item><p>which changes the systems behaviour.</p></item>
+ </taglist>
</section>
-
+
<section>
<title>DATA TYPES</title>
<p>Type definitions that are used more than once in
@@ -243,7 +248,7 @@ kex is implicit but public_key is set explicitly.</p>
<tag><c><![CDATA[{dh_gex_limits,{Min=integer(),I=integer(),Max=integer()}}]]></c></tag>
<item>
<p>Sets the three diffie-hellman-group-exchange parameters that guides the connected server in choosing a group.
- See RFC 4419 for the function of thoose. The default value is <c>{512, 1024, 4096}</c>.
+ See RFC 4419 for the function of thoose. The default value is <c>{1024, 6144, 8192}</c>.
</p>
</item>
@@ -456,21 +461,82 @@ kex is implicit but public_key is set explicitly.</p>
</warning>
</item>
- <tag><c><![CDATA[{dh_gex_groups, [{Size=integer(),G=integer(),P=integer()}] | {file,filename()} }]]></c></tag>
+ <tag><c><![CDATA[{dh_gex_groups, [{Size=integer(),G=integer(),P=integer()}] | {file,filename()} {ssh_moduli_file,filename()} }]]></c></tag>
+ <item>
+ <p>Defines the groups the server may choose among when diffie-hellman-group-exchange is negotiated.
+ See RFC 4419 for details. The three variants of this option are:
+ </p>
+ <taglist>
+ <tag><c>{Size=integer(),G=integer(),P=integer()}</c></tag>
+ <item>The groups are given explicitly in this list. There may be several elements with the same <c>Size</c>.
+ In such a case, the server will choose one randomly in the negotiated Size.
+ </item>
+ <tag><c>{file,filename()}</c></tag>
+ <item>The file must have one or more three-tuples <c>{Size=integer(),G=integer(),P=integer()}</c>
+ terminated by a dot. The file is read when the daemon starts.
+ </item>
+ <tag><c>{ssh_moduli_file,filename()}</c></tag>
+ <item>The file must be in
+ <seealso marker="public_key:public_key#dh_gex_group/4">ssh-keygen moduli file format</seealso>.
+ The file is read when the daemon starts.
+ </item>
+ </taglist>
+ <p>The default list is fetched from the
+ <seealso marker="public_key:public_key#dh_gex_group/4">public_key</seealso> application.
+ </p>
+ </item>
+
+ <tag><c><![CDATA[{dh_gex_limits,{Min=integer(),Max=integer()}}]]></c></tag>
<item>
- <p>Sets the groups that the server may choose among when diffie-hellman-group-exchange is negotiated.
- See RFC 4419 for details.
+ <p>Limits what a client can ask for in diffie-hellman-group-exchange.
+ The limits will be
+ <c>{MaxUsed = min(MaxClient,Max), MinUsed = max(MinClient,Min)}</c> where <c>MaxClient</c> and
+ <c>MinClient</c> are the values proposed by a connecting client.
</p>
- <p>If the parameter is <c>{file,filename()}</c>, the file must exist and have one or more three-tuples terminated by a dot. The interpretation is as if the tuples had been given directly in the option. The file is read when the daemon starts.
+ <p>The default value is <c>{0,infinity}</c>.
+ </p>
+ <p>If <c>MaxUsed &lt; MinUsed</c> in a key exchange, it will fail with a disconnect.
+ </p>
+ <p>See RFC 4419 for the function of the Max and Min values.</p>
+ </item>
+
+ <tag><c><![CDATA[{pwdfun, fun(User::string(), Password::string(), PeerAddress::{ip_adress(),port_number()}, State::any()) -> boolean() | disconnect | {boolean(),any()} }]]></c></tag>
+ <item>
+ <p>Provides a function for password validation. This could used for calling an external system or if
+ passwords should be stored as a hash. The fun returns:
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item><c>true</c> if the user and password is valid and</item>
+ <item><c>false</c> otherwise.</item>
+ </list>
+ </p>
+ <p>This fun can also be used to make delays in authentication tries for example by calling
+ <seealso marker="stdlib:timer#sleep/1">timer:sleep/1</seealso>. To facilitate counting of failed tries
+ the <c>State</c> variable could be used. This state is per connection only. The first time the pwdfun
+ is called for a connection, the <c>State</c> variable has the value <c>undefined</c>.
+ The pwdfun can return - in addition to the values above - a new state
+ as:
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item><c>{true, NewState:any()}</c> if the user and password is valid or</item>
+ <item><c>{false, NewState:any()}</c> if the user or password is invalid</item>
+ </list>
+ </p>
+ <p>A third usage is to block login attempts from a missbehaving peer. The <c>State</c> described above
+ can be used for this. In addition to the responses above, the following return value is introduced:
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item><c>disconnect</c> if the connection should be closed immediately after sending a SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT
+ message.</item>
+ </list>
</p>
</item>
- <tag><c><![CDATA[{pwdfun, fun(User::string(), password::string()) -> boolean()}]]></c></tag>
+ <tag><c><![CDATA[{pwdfun, fun(User::string(), Password::string()) -> boolean()}]]></c></tag>
<item>
<p>Provides a function for password validation. This function is called
with user and password as strings, and returns
<c><![CDATA[true]]></c> if the password is valid and
<c><![CDATA[false]]></c> otherwise.</p>
+ <p>This option (<c>{pwdfun,fun/2}</c>) is the same as a subset of the previous
+ (<c>{pwdfun,fun/4}</c>). It is kept for compatibility.</p>
</item>
<tag><c><![CDATA[{negotiation_timeout, integer()}]]></c></tag>
@@ -501,6 +567,15 @@ kex is implicit but public_key is set explicitly.</p>
</p>
</item>
+ <tag><c><![CDATA[{max_channels, pos_integer()}]]></c></tag>
+ <item>
+ <p>The maximum number of channels with active remote subsystem that are accepted for
+ each connection to this daemon</p>
+ <p>By default, this option is not set. This means that the number is not limited.
+ </p>
+ </item>
+
+
<tag><c><![CDATA[{parallel_login, boolean()}]]></c></tag>
<item>
<p>If set to false (the default value), only one login is handled at a time.
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_app.xml b/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_app.xml
index 4c85585820..79dd1e210e 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_app.xml
+++ b/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_app.xml
@@ -41,15 +41,18 @@
<section>
<title>DEPENDENCIES</title>
- <p>The <c>ssh</c> application uses the applications <c>public_key</c> and
- <c>crypto</c> to handle public keys and encryption. Hence, these
+ <p>The <c>ssh</c> application uses the applications
+ <seealso marker="public_key:public_key">public_key</seealso> and
+ <seealso marker="crypto:crypto">crypto</seealso>
+ to handle public keys and encryption. Hence, these
applications must be loaded for the <c>ssh</c> application to work. In
an embedded environment this means that they must be started with
- <c>application:start/[1,2]</c> before the <c>ssh</c> application is started.
+ <seealso marker="kernel:application#start/1">application:start/1,2</seealso> before the
+ <c>ssh</c> application is started.
</p>
</section>
- <section>
+ <section>
<title>CONFIGURATION</title>
<p>The <c>ssh</c> application does not have an application-
@@ -62,10 +65,13 @@
<item><c>authorized_keys2</c></item>
<item><c>id_dsa</c></item>
<item><c>id_rsa</c></item>
+ <item><c>id_ecdsa</c></item>
<item><c>ssh_host_dsa_key</c></item>
<item><c>ssh_host_rsa_key</c></item>
+ <item><c>ssh_host_ecdsa_key</c></item>
</list>
<p>By default, <c>ssh</c> looks for <c>id_dsa</c>, <c>id_rsa</c>,
+ <c>id_ecdsa_key</c>,
<c>known_hosts</c>, and <c>authorized_keys</c> in ~/.ssh,
and for the host key files in <c>/etc/ssh</c>. These locations can be changed
by the options <c>user_dir</c> and <c>system_dir</c>.
@@ -79,7 +85,7 @@
</section>
<section>
<title>Public Keys</title>
- <p><c>id_dsa</c> and <c>id_rsa</c> are the users private key files.
+ <p><c>id_dsa</c>, <c>id_rsa</c> and <c>id_ecdsa</c> are the users private key files.
Notice that the public key is part of the private key so the <c>ssh</c>
application does not use the <c>id_&lt;*>.pub</c> files. These are
for the user's convenience when it is needed to convey the user's
@@ -104,8 +110,8 @@
<section>
<title>Host Keys</title>
<p>RSA and DSA host keys are supported and are
- expected to be found in files named <c>ssh_host_rsa_key</c> and
- <c>ssh_host_dsa_key</c>.
+ expected to be found in files named <c>ssh_host_rsa_key</c>,
+ <c>ssh_host_dsa_key</c> and <c>ssh_host_ecdsa_key</c>.
</p>
</section>
<section>
@@ -114,6 +120,197 @@
</section>
<section>
+ <marker id="supported"/>
+ <title>SUPPORTED SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS</title>
+ <p>The supported SSH version is 2.0.</p>
+ </section>
+ <section>
+ <title>Algorithms</title>
+ <p>The actual set of algorithms may vary depending on which OpenSSL crypto library that is installed on the machine.
+ For the list on a particular installation, use the command
+ <seealso marker="ssh:ssh#default_algorithms/0">ssh:default_algorithms/0</seealso>.
+ The user may override the default algorithm configuration both on the server side and the client side.
+ See the option <c>preferred_algorithms</c> in the <seealso marker="ssh:ssh#daemon/1">ssh:daemon/1,2,3</seealso> and
+ <seealso marker="ssh:ssh#connect/3">ssh:connect/3,4</seealso> functions.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>Supported algorithms are:</p>
+
+ <taglist>
+ <tag>Key exchange algorithms</tag>
+ <item>
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item>ecdh-sha2-nistp256</item>
+ <item>ecdh-sha2-nistp384</item>
+ <item>ecdh-sha2-nistp521</item>
+ <item>diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1</item>
+ <item>diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256</item>
+ <item>diffie-hellman-group14-sha1</item>
+ <item>diffie-hellman-group1-sha1</item>
+ </list>
+ </item>
+
+ <tag>Public key algorithms</tag>
+ <item>
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item>ecdsa-sha2-nistp256</item>
+ <item>ecdsa-sha2-nistp384</item>
+ <item>ecdsa-sha2-nistp521</item>
+ <item>ssh-rsa</item>
+ <item>ssh-dss</item>
+ </list>
+ </item>
+
+ <tag>MAC algorithms</tag>
+ <item>
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item>hmac-sha2-256</item>
+ <item>hmac-sha2-512</item>
+ <item>hmac-sha1</item>
+ </list>
+ </item>
+
+ <tag>Encryption algorithms (ciphers)</tag>
+ <item>
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item>[email protected] (AEAD_AES_128_GCM)</item>
+ <item>[email protected] (AEAD_AES_256_GCM)</item>
+ <item>aes128-ctr</item>
+ <item>aes192-ctr</item>
+ <item>aes256-ctr</item>
+ <item>aes128-cbc</item>
+ <item>3des-cbc</item>
+ </list>
+ <p>Following the internet de-facto standard, the cipher and mac algorithm AEAD_AES_128_GCM is selected when the
+ cipher [email protected] is negotiated. The cipher and mac algorithm AEAD_AES_256_GCM is selected when the
+ cipher [email protected] is negotiated.
+ </p>
+ <p>See the text at the description of <seealso marker="#rfc5647_note">the rfc 5647 further down</seealso>
+ for more information.
+ </p>
+ </item>
+
+ <tag>Compression algorithms</tag>
+ <item>
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item>none</item>
+ <item>[email protected]</item>
+ <item>zlib</item>
+ </list>
+ </item>
+ </taglist>
+ </section>
+ <section>
+ <title>Unicode support</title>
+ <p>Unicode filenames are supported if the emulator and the underlaying OS support it. See section DESCRIPTION in the
+ <seealso marker="kernel:file">file</seealso> manual page in <c>kernel</c> for information about this subject.
+ </p>
+ <p>The shell and the cli both support unicode.
+ </p>
+ </section>
+
+ <section>
+ <title>Rfcs</title>
+ <p>The following rfc:s are supported:</p>
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item><url href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4251">RFC 4251</url>, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture.
+ <p>Except
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item>9.4.6 Host-Based Authentication</item>
+ <item>9.5.2 Proxy Forwarding</item>
+ <item>9.5.3 X11 Forwarding</item>
+ </list>
+ </p>
+ </item>
+
+ <item><url href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4252">RFC 4252</url>, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol.
+ <p>Except
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item>9. Host-Based Authentication: "hostbased"</item>
+ </list>
+ </p>
+ </item>
+
+ <item><url href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253">RFC 4253</url>, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol.
+ <p></p>
+ </item>
+
+ <item><url href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4254">RFC 4254</url>, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol.
+ <p>Except
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item>6.3. X11 Forwarding</item>
+ <item>7. TCP/IP Port Forwarding</item>
+ </list>
+ </p>
+ </item>
+
+ <item><url href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4256">RFC 4256</url>, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for
+ the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH).
+ <p>Except
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item><c>num-prompts > 1</c></item>
+ <item>password changing</item>
+ <item>other identification methods than userid-password</item>
+ </list>
+ </p>
+ </item>
+
+ <item><url href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4419">RFC 4419</url>, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
+ the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol.
+ <p></p>
+ </item>
+
+ <item><url href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4716">RFC 4716</url>, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format.
+ <p></p>
+ </item>
+
+ <item><url href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5647">RFC 5647</url>, AES Galois Counter Mode for
+ the Secure Shell Transport Layer Protocol.
+ <p><marker id="rfc5647_note"/>There is an ambiguity in the synchronized selection of cipher and mac algorithm.
+ This is resolved by OpenSSH in the ciphers [email protected] and [email protected] which are implemented.
+ If the explicit ciphers and macs AEAD_AES_128_GCM or AEAD_AES_256_GCM are needed,
+ they could be enabled with the option preferred_algorithms.
+ <warning>
+ If the client or the server is not Erlang/OTP, it is the users responsibility to check that
+ other implementation has the same interpretation of AEAD_AES_*_GCM as the Erlang/OTP SSH before
+ enabling them. The aes*[email protected] variants are always safe to use since they lack the
+ ambiguity.
+ </warning>
+ </p>
+ <p>The second paragraph in section 5.1 is resolved as:
+ <list type="ordered">
+ <item>If the negotiated cipher is AEAD_AES_128_GCM, the mac algorithm is set to AEAD_AES_128_GCM.</item>
+ <item>If the negotiated cipher is AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the mac algorithm is set to AEAD_AES_256_GCM.</item>
+ <item>If the mac algorithm is AEAD_AES_128_GCM, the cipher is set to AEAD_AES_128_GCM.</item>
+ <item>If the mac algorithm is AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the cipher is set to AEAD_AES_256_GCM.</item>
+ </list>
+ The first rule that matches when read in order from the top is applied
+ </p>
+ </item>
+
+ <item><url href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5656">RFC 5656</url>, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in
+ the Secure Shell Transport Layer.
+ <p>Except
+ <list type="bulleted">
+ <item>5. ECMQV Key Exchange</item>
+ <item>6.4. ECMQV Key Exchange and Verification Method Name</item>
+ <item>7.2. ECMQV Message Numbers</item>
+ <item>10.2. Recommended Curves</item>
+ </list>
+ </p>
+ </item>
+
+ <item><url href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6668">RFC 6668</url>, SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for
+ the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
+ <p>Comment: Defines hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512
+ </p>
+ </item>
+
+ </list>
+
+ </section>
+
+ <section>
<title>SEE ALSO</title>
<p><seealso marker="kernel:application">application(3)</seealso></p>
</section>
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_connection.xml b/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_connection.xml
index 9a7bb09b12..064a623eb6 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_connection.xml
+++ b/lib/ssh/doc/src/ssh_connection.xml
@@ -373,6 +373,9 @@
<desc>
<p>Is to be called by client- and server-channel processes to send data to each other.
</p>
+ <p>The function <seealso marker="ssh:ssh_connection#subsystem/4">subsystem/4</seealso> and subsequent
+ calls of <c>send/3,4,5</c> must be executed in the same process.
+ </p>
</desc>
</func>
@@ -454,6 +457,9 @@
<p>Is to be called by a client-channel process for requesting to execute a predefined
subsystem on the server.
</p>
+ <p>The function <c>subsystem/4</c> and subsequent calls of
+ <seealso marker="ssh:ssh_connection#send/3">send/3,4,5</seealso> must be executed in the same process.
+ </p>
</desc>
</func>
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/src/using_ssh.xml b/lib/ssh/doc/src/using_ssh.xml
index 91185a0f6e..6826f20fb3 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/src/using_ssh.xml
+++ b/lib/ssh/doc/src/using_ssh.xml
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@
<title>SFTP Client with TAR Compression and Encryption</title>
<p>Example of writing and then reading a tar file follows:</p>
- <code type="erlang">
+ <code type="erl">
{ok,HandleWrite} = ssh_sftp:open_tar(ChannelPid, ?tar_file_name, [write]),
ok = erl_tar:add(HandleWrite, .... ),
ok = erl_tar:add(HandleWrite, .... ),
@@ -249,10 +249,10 @@
</code>
<p>The previous write and read example can be extended with encryption and decryption as follows:</p>
- <code type="erlang">
+ <code type="erl">
%% First three parameters depending on which crypto type we select:
Key = &lt;&lt;"This is a 256 bit key. abcdefghi">>,
-Ivec0 = crypto:rand_bytes(16),
+Ivec0 = crypto:strong_rand_bytes(16),
DataSize = 1024, % DataSize rem 16 = 0 for aes_cbc
%% Initialization of the CryptoState, in this case it is the Ivector.
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.2.ps b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.2.ps
deleted file mode 100644
index d766a933b4..0000000000
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.2.ps
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3315 +0,0 @@
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-(Network Working Group T. Ylonen) s
-5 690 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Communications Security Corp) s
-5 679 M
-(Expires: March 31, 2004 D. Moffat, Ed.) s
-5 668 M
-( Sun Microsystems, Inc) s
-5 657 M
-( Oct 2003) s
-5 624 M
-( SSH Protocol Architecture) s
-5 613 M
-( draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.txt) s
-5 591 M
-(Status of this Memo) s
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-( Task Force \(IETF\), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other) s
-5 514 M
-( groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.) s
-5 492 M
-( Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months) s
-5 481 M
-( and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any) s
-5 470 M
-( time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference) s
-5 459 M
-( material or to cite them other than as "work in progress.") s
-5 437 M
-( The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://) s
-5 426 M
-( www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.) s
-5 404 M
-( The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at) s
-5 393 M
-( http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.) s
-5 371 M
-( This Internet-Draft will expire on March 31, 2004.) s
-5 349 M
-(Copyright Notice) s
-5 327 M
-( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2003\). All Rights Reserved.) s
-5 305 M
-(Abstract) s
-5 283 M
-( SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network) s
-5 272 M
-( services over an insecure network. This document describes the) s
-5 261 M
-( architecture of the SSH protocol, as well as the notation and) s
-5 250 M
-( terminology used in SSH protocol documents. It also discusses the SSH) s
-5 239 M
-( algorithm naming system that allows local extensions. The SSH) s
-5 228 M
-( protocol consists of three major components: The Transport Layer) s
-5 217 M
-( Protocol provides server authentication, confidentiality, and) s
-5 206 M
-( integrity with perfect forward secrecy. The User Authentication) s
-5 195 M
-( Protocol authenticates the client to the server. The Connection) s
-5 184 M
-( Protocol multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical) s
-5 173 M
-( channels. Details of these protocols are described in separate) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 1]) s
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-5 602 M
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-5 591 M
-( 4.2 Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5) s
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-( 4.3 Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5) s
-5 569 M
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-5 536 M
-( 5. Data Type Representations Used in the SSH Protocols . . . . 8) s
-5 525 M
-( 6. Algorithm Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10) s
-5 514 M
-( 7. Message Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11) s
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-5 426 M
-( 9.2.4 Man-in-the-middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17) s
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-( 9.2.5 Denial-of-service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19) s
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-( 9.2.6 Covert Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19) s
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-( 9.2.7 Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20) s
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-( 9.3 Authentication Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20) s
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-( 9.3.1 Weak Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21) s
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-( 9.3.2 Debug messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21) s
-5 349 M
-( 9.3.3 Local security policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21) s
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-( 9.3.4 Public key authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22) s
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-( 9.3.5 Password authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22) s
-5 316 M
-( 9.3.6 Host based authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23) s
-5 305 M
-( 9.4 Connection protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23) s
-5 294 M
-( 9.4.1 End point security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23) s
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-( 9.4.2 Proxy forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23) s
-5 272 M
-( 9.4.3 X11 forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24) s
-5 261 M
-( Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24) s
-5 250 M
-( Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25) s
-5 239 M
-( Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27) s
-5 228 M
-( Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 28) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 2]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(1. Contributors) s
-5 668 M
-( The major original contributors of this document were: Tatu Ylonen,) s
-5 657 M
-( Tero Kivinen, Timo J. Rinne, Sami Lehtinen \(all of SSH Communications) s
-5 646 M
-( Security Corp\), and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen \(University of) s
-5 635 M
-( Jyvaskyla\)) s
-5 613 M
-( The document editor is: [email protected]. Comments on this) s
-5 602 M
-( internet draft should be sent to the IETF SECSH working group,) s
-5 591 M
-( details at: http://ietf.org/html.charters/secsh-charter.html) s
-5 569 M
-(2. Introduction) s
-5 547 M
-( SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network) s
-5 536 M
-( services over an insecure network. It consists of three major) s
-5 525 M
-( components:) s
-5 514 M
-( o The Transport Layer Protocol [SSH-TRANS] provides server) s
-5 503 M
-( authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. It may optionally) s
-5 492 M
-( also provide compression. The transport layer will typically be) s
-5 481 M
-( run over a TCP/IP connection, but might also be used on top of any) s
-5 470 M
-( other reliable data stream.) s
-5 459 M
-( o The User Authentication Protocol [SSH-USERAUTH] authenticates the) s
-5 448 M
-( client-side user to the server. It runs over the transport layer) s
-5 437 M
-( protocol.) s
-5 426 M
-( o The Connection Protocol [SSH-CONNECT] multiplexes the encrypted) s
-5 415 M
-( tunnel into several logical channels. It runs over the user) s
-5 404 M
-( authentication protocol.) s
-5 382 M
-( The client sends a service request once a secure transport layer) s
-5 371 M
-( connection has been established. A second service request is sent) s
-5 360 M
-( after user authentication is complete. This allows new protocols to) s
-5 349 M
-( be defined and coexist with the protocols listed above.) s
-5 327 M
-( The connection protocol provides channels that can be used for a wide) s
-5 316 M
-( range of purposes. Standard methods are provided for setting up) s
-5 305 M
-( secure interactive shell sessions and for forwarding \("tunneling"\)) s
-5 294 M
-( arbitrary TCP/IP ports and X11 connections.) s
-5 272 M
-(3. Specification of Requirements) s
-5 250 M
-( All documents related to the SSH protocols shall use the keywords) s
-5 239 M
-( "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",) s
-5 228 M
-( "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" to describe) s
-5 217 M
-( requirements. They are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].) s
-5 195 M
-(4. Architecture) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 3]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(4.1 Host Keys) s
-5 668 M
-( Each server host SHOULD have a host key. Hosts MAY have multiple) s
-5 657 M
-( host keys using multiple different algorithms. Multiple hosts MAY) s
-5 646 M
-( share the same host key. If a host has keys at all, it MUST have at) s
-5 635 M
-( least one key using each REQUIRED public key algorithm \(DSS) s
-5 624 M
-( [FIPS-186]\).) s
-5 602 M
-( The server host key is used during key exchange to verify that the) s
-5 591 M
-( client is really talking to the correct server. For this to be) s
-5 580 M
-( possible, the client must have a priori knowledge of the server's) s
-5 569 M
-( public host key.) s
-5 547 M
-( Two different trust models can be used:) s
-5 536 M
-( o The client has a local database that associates each host name \(as) s
-5 525 M
-( typed by the user\) with the corresponding public host key. This) s
-5 514 M
-( method requires no centrally administered infrastructure, and no) s
-5 503 M
-( third-party coordination. The downside is that the database of) s
-5 492 M
-( name-to-key associations may become burdensome to maintain.) s
-5 481 M
-( o The host name-to-key association is certified by some trusted) s
-5 470 M
-( certification authority. The client only knows the CA root key,) s
-5 459 M
-( and can verify the validity of all host keys certified by accepted) s
-5 448 M
-( CAs.) s
-5 426 M
-( The second alternative eases the maintenance problem, since) s
-5 415 M
-( ideally only a single CA key needs to be securely stored on the) s
-5 404 M
-( client. On the other hand, each host key must be appropriately) s
-5 393 M
-( certified by a central authority before authorization is possible.) s
-5 382 M
-( Also, a lot of trust is placed on the central infrastructure.) s
-5 360 M
-( The protocol provides the option that the server name - host key) s
-5 349 M
-( association is not checked when connecting to the host for the first) s
-5 338 M
-( time. This allows communication without prior communication of host) s
-5 327 M
-( keys or certification. The connection still provides protection) s
-5 316 M
-( against passive listening; however, it becomes vulnerable to active) s
-5 305 M
-( man-in-the-middle attacks. Implementations SHOULD NOT normally allow) s
-5 294 M
-( such connections by default, as they pose a potential security) s
-5 283 M
-( problem. However, as there is no widely deployed key infrastructure) s
-5 272 M
-( available on the Internet yet, this option makes the protocol much) s
-5 261 M
-( more usable during the transition time until such an infrastructure) s
-5 250 M
-( emerges, while still providing a much higher level of security than) s
-5 239 M
-( that offered by older solutions \(e.g. telnet [RFC-854] and rlogin) s
-5 228 M
-( [RFC-1282]\).) s
-5 206 M
-( Implementations SHOULD try to make the best effort to check host) s
-5 195 M
-( keys. An example of a possible strategy is to only accept a host key) s
-5 184 M
-( without checking the first time a host is connected, save the key in) s
-5 173 M
-( a local database, and compare against that key on all future) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 4]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( connections to that host.) s
-5 668 M
-( Implementations MAY provide additional methods for verifying the) s
-5 657 M
-( correctness of host keys, e.g. a hexadecimal fingerprint derived from) s
-5 646 M
-( the SHA-1 hash of the public key. Such fingerprints can easily be) s
-5 635 M
-( verified by using telephone or other external communication channels.) s
-5 613 M
-( All implementations SHOULD provide an option to not accept host keys) s
-5 602 M
-( that cannot be verified.) s
-5 580 M
-( We believe that ease of use is critical to end-user acceptance of) s
-5 569 M
-( security solutions, and no improvement in security is gained if the) s
-5 558 M
-( new solutions are not used. Thus, providing the option not to check) s
-5 547 M
-( the server host key is believed to improve the overall security of) s
-5 536 M
-( the Internet, even though it reduces the security of the protocol in) s
-5 525 M
-( configurations where it is allowed.) s
-5 503 M
-(4.2 Extensibility) s
-5 481 M
-( We believe that the protocol will evolve over time, and some) s
-5 470 M
-( organizations will want to use their own encryption, authentication) s
-5 459 M
-( and/or key exchange methods. Central registration of all extensions) s
-5 448 M
-( is cumbersome, especially for experimental or classified features.) s
-5 437 M
-( On the other hand, having no central registration leads to conflicts) s
-5 426 M
-( in method identifiers, making interoperability difficult.) s
-5 404 M
-( We have chosen to identify algorithms, methods, formats, and) s
-5 393 M
-( extension protocols with textual names that are of a specific format.) s
-5 382 M
-( DNS names are used to create local namespaces where experimental or) s
-5 371 M
-( classified extensions can be defined without fear of conflicts with) s
-5 360 M
-( other implementations.) s
-5 338 M
-( One design goal has been to keep the base protocol as simple as) s
-5 327 M
-( possible, and to require as few algorithms as possible. However, all) s
-5 316 M
-( implementations MUST support a minimal set of algorithms to ensure) s
-5 305 M
-( interoperability \(this does not imply that the local policy on all) s
-5 294 M
-( hosts would necessary allow these algorithms\). The mandatory) s
-5 283 M
-( algorithms are specified in the relevant protocol documents.) s
-5 261 M
-( Additional algorithms, methods, formats, and extension protocols can) s
-5 250 M
-( be defined in separate drafts. See Section Algorithm Naming \(Section) s
-5 239 M
-( 6\) for more information.) s
-5 217 M
-(4.3 Policy Issues) s
-5 195 M
-( The protocol allows full negotiation of encryption, integrity, key) s
-5 184 M
-( exchange, compression, and public key algorithms and formats.) s
-5 173 M
-( Encryption, integrity, public key, and compression algorithms can be) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 5]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( different for each direction.) s
-5 668 M
-( The following policy issues SHOULD be addressed in the configuration) s
-5 657 M
-( mechanisms of each implementation:) s
-5 646 M
-( o Encryption, integrity, and compression algorithms, separately for) s
-5 635 M
-( each direction. The policy MUST specify which is the preferred) s
-5 624 M
-( algorithm \(e.g. the first algorithm listed in each category\).) s
-5 613 M
-( o Public key algorithms and key exchange method to be used for host) s
-5 602 M
-( authentication. The existence of trusted host keys for different) s
-5 591 M
-( public key algorithms also affects this choice.) s
-5 580 M
-( o The authentication methods that are to be required by the server) s
-5 569 M
-( for each user. The server's policy MAY require multiple) s
-5 558 M
-( authentication for some or all users. The required algorithms MAY) s
-5 547 M
-( depend on the location where the user is trying to log in from.) s
-5 536 M
-( o The operations that the user is allowed to perform using the) s
-5 525 M
-( connection protocol. Some issues are related to security; for) s
-5 514 M
-( example, the policy SHOULD NOT allow the server to start sessions) s
-5 503 M
-( or run commands on the client machine, and MUST NOT allow) s
-5 492 M
-( connections to the authentication agent unless forwarding such) s
-5 481 M
-( connections has been requested. Other issues, such as which TCP/) s
-5 470 M
-( IP ports can be forwarded and by whom, are clearly issues of local) s
-5 459 M
-( policy. Many of these issues may involve traversing or bypassing) s
-5 448 M
-( firewalls, and are interrelated with the local security policy.) s
-5 426 M
-(4.4 Security Properties) s
-5 404 M
-( The primary goal of the SSH protocol is improved security on the) s
-5 393 M
-( Internet. It attempts to do this in a way that is easy to deploy,) s
-5 382 M
-( even at the cost of absolute security.) s
-5 371 M
-( o All encryption, integrity, and public key algorithms used are) s
-5 360 M
-( well-known, well-established algorithms.) s
-5 349 M
-( o All algorithms are used with cryptographically sound key sizes) s
-5 338 M
-( that are believed to provide protection against even the strongest) s
-5 327 M
-( cryptanalytic attacks for decades.) s
-5 316 M
-( o All algorithms are negotiated, and in case some algorithm is) s
-5 305 M
-( broken, it is easy to switch to some other algorithm without) s
-5 294 M
-( modifying the base protocol.) s
-5 272 M
-( Specific concessions were made to make wide-spread fast deployment) s
-5 261 M
-( easier. The particular case where this comes up is verifying that) s
-5 250 M
-( the server host key really belongs to the desired host; the protocol) s
-5 239 M
-( allows the verification to be left out \(but this is NOT RECOMMENDED\).) s
-5 228 M
-( This is believed to significantly improve usability in the short) s
-5 217 M
-( term, until widespread Internet public key infrastructures emerge.) s
-5 195 M
-(4.5 Packet Size and Overhead) s
-5 173 M
-( Some readers will worry about the increase in packet size due to new) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 6]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( headers, padding, and MAC. The minimum packet size is in the order) s
-5 679 M
-( of 28 bytes \(depending on negotiated algorithms\). The increase is) s
-5 668 M
-( negligible for large packets, but very significant for one-byte) s
-5 657 M
-( packets \(telnet-type sessions\). There are, however, several factors) s
-5 646 M
-( that make this a non-issue in almost all cases:) s
-5 635 M
-( o The minimum size of a TCP/IP header is 32 bytes. Thus, the) s
-5 624 M
-( increase is actually from 33 to 51 bytes \(roughly\).) s
-5 613 M
-( o The minimum size of the data field of an Ethernet packet is 46) s
-5 602 M
-( bytes [RFC-894]. Thus, the increase is no more than 5 bytes. When) s
-5 591 M
-( Ethernet headers are considered, the increase is less than 10) s
-5 580 M
-( percent.) s
-5 569 M
-( o The total fraction of telnet-type data in the Internet is) s
-5 558 M
-( negligible, even with increased packet sizes.) s
-5 536 M
-( The only environment where the packet size increase is likely to have) s
-5 525 M
-( a significant effect is PPP [RFC-1134] over slow modem lines \(PPP) s
-5 514 M
-( compresses the TCP/IP headers, emphasizing the increase in packet) s
-5 503 M
-( size\). However, with modern modems, the time needed to transfer is in) s
-5 492 M
-( the order of 2 milliseconds, which is a lot faster than people can) s
-5 481 M
-( type.) s
-5 459 M
-( There are also issues related to the maximum packet size. To) s
-5 448 M
-( minimize delays in screen updates, one does not want excessively) s
-5 437 M
-( large packets for interactive sessions. The maximum packet size is) s
-5 426 M
-( negotiated separately for each channel.) s
-5 404 M
-(4.6 Localization and Character Set Support) s
-5 382 M
-( For the most part, the SSH protocols do not directly pass text that) s
-5 371 M
-( would be displayed to the user. However, there are some places where) s
-5 360 M
-( such data might be passed. When applicable, the character set for the) s
-5 349 M
-( data MUST be explicitly specified. In most places, ISO 10646 with) s
-5 338 M
-( UTF-8 encoding is used [RFC-2279]. When applicable, a field is also) s
-5 327 M
-( provided for a language tag [RFC-3066].) s
-5 305 M
-( One big issue is the character set of the interactive session. There) s
-5 294 M
-( is no clear solution, as different applications may display data in) s
-5 283 M
-( different formats. Different types of terminal emulation may also be) s
-5 272 M
-( employed in the client, and the character set to be used is) s
-5 261 M
-( effectively determined by the terminal emulation. Thus, no place is) s
-5 250 M
-( provided for directly specifying the character set or encoding for) s
-5 239 M
-( terminal session data. However, the terminal emulation type \(e.g.) s
-5 228 M
-( "vt100"\) is transmitted to the remote site, and it implicitly) s
-5 217 M
-( specifies the character set and encoding. Applications typically use) s
-5 206 M
-( the terminal type to determine what character set they use, or the) s
-5 195 M
-( character set is determined using some external means. The terminal) s
-5 184 M
-( emulation may also allow configuring the default character set. In) s
-5 173 M
-( any case, the character set for the terminal session is considered) s
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-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 7]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( primarily a client local issue.) s
-5 668 M
-( Internal names used to identify algorithms or protocols are normally) s
-5 657 M
-( never displayed to users, and must be in US-ASCII.) s
-5 635 M
-( The client and server user names are inherently constrained by what) s
-5 624 M
-( the server is prepared to accept. They might, however, occasionally) s
-5 613 M
-( be displayed in logs, reports, etc. They MUST be encoded using ISO) s
-5 602 M
-( 10646 UTF-8, but other encodings may be required in some cases. It) s
-5 591 M
-( is up to the server to decide how to map user names to accepted user) s
-5 580 M
-( names. Straight bit-wise binary comparison is RECOMMENDED.) s
-5 558 M
-( For localization purposes, the protocol attempts to minimize the) s
-5 547 M
-( number of textual messages transmitted. When present, such messages) s
-5 536 M
-( typically relate to errors, debugging information, or some externally) s
-5 525 M
-( configured data. For data that is normally displayed, it SHOULD be) s
-5 514 M
-( possible to fetch a localized message instead of the transmitted) s
-5 503 M
-( message by using a numerical code. The remaining messages SHOULD be) s
-5 492 M
-( configurable.) s
-5 470 M
-(5. Data Type Representations Used in the SSH Protocols) s
-5 459 M
-( byte) s
-5 437 M
-( A byte represents an arbitrary 8-bit value \(octet\) [RFC-1700].) s
-5 426 M
-( Fixed length data is sometimes represented as an array of bytes,) s
-5 415 M
-( written byte[n], where n is the number of bytes in the array.) s
-5 393 M
-( boolean) s
-5 371 M
-( A boolean value is stored as a single byte. The value 0) s
-5 360 M
-( represents FALSE, and the value 1 represents TRUE. All non-zero) s
-5 349 M
-( values MUST be interpreted as TRUE; however, applications MUST NOT) s
-5 338 M
-( store values other than 0 and 1.) s
-5 316 M
-( uint32) s
-5 294 M
-( Represents a 32-bit unsigned integer. Stored as four bytes in the) s
-5 283 M
-( order of decreasing significance \(network byte order\). For) s
-5 272 M
-( example, the value 699921578 \(0x29b7f4aa\) is stored as 29 b7 f4) s
-5 261 M
-( aa.) s
-5 239 M
-( uint64) s
-5 217 M
-( Represents a 64-bit unsigned integer. Stored as eight bytes in) s
-5 206 M
-( the order of decreasing significance \(network byte order\).) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 8]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
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-( string) s
-5 668 M
-( Arbitrary length binary string. Strings are allowed to contain) s
-5 657 M
-( arbitrary binary data, including null characters and 8-bit) s
-5 646 M
-( characters. They are stored as a uint32 containing its length) s
-5 635 M
-( \(number of bytes that follow\) and zero \(= empty string\) or more) s
-5 624 M
-( bytes that are the value of the string. Terminating null) s
-5 613 M
-( characters are not used.) s
-5 591 M
-( Strings are also used to store text. In that case, US-ASCII is) s
-5 580 M
-( used for internal names, and ISO-10646 UTF-8 for text that might) s
-5 569 M
-( be displayed to the user. The terminating null character SHOULD) s
-5 558 M
-( NOT normally be stored in the string.) s
-5 536 M
-( For example, the US-ASCII string "testing" is represented as 00 00) s
-5 525 M
-( 00 07 t e s t i n g. The UTF8 mapping does not alter the encoding) s
-5 514 M
-( of US-ASCII characters.) s
-5 492 M
-( mpint) s
-5 470 M
-( Represents multiple precision integers in two's complement format,) s
-5 459 M
-( stored as a string, 8 bits per byte, MSB first. Negative numbers) s
-5 448 M
-( have the value 1 as the most significant bit of the first byte of) s
-5 437 M
-( the data partition. If the most significant bit would be set for a) s
-5 426 M
-( positive number, the number MUST be preceded by a zero byte.) s
-5 415 M
-( Unnecessary leading bytes with the value 0 or 255 MUST NOT be) s
-5 404 M
-( included. The value zero MUST be stored as a string with zero) s
-5 393 M
-( bytes of data.) s
-5 371 M
-( By convention, a number that is used in modular computations in) s
-5 360 M
-( Z_n SHOULD be represented in the range 0 <= x < n.) s
-5 338 M
-( Examples:) s
-5 327 M
-( value \(hex\) representation \(hex\)) s
-5 316 M
-( ---------------------------------------------------------------) s
-5 305 M
-( 0 00 00 00 00) s
-5 294 M
-( 9a378f9b2e332a7 00 00 00 08 09 a3 78 f9 b2 e3 32 a7) s
-5 283 M
-( 80 00 00 00 02 00 80) s
-5 272 M
-( -1234 00 00 00 02 ed cc) s
-5 261 M
-( -deadbeef 00 00 00 05 ff 21 52 41 11) s
-5 217 M
-( name-list) s
-5 195 M
-( A string containing a comma separated list of names. A name list) s
-5 184 M
-( is represented as a uint32 containing its length \(number of bytes) s
-5 173 M
-( that follow\) followed by a comma-separated list of zero or more) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 9]) s
-_R
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-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 421.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 10 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( names. A name MUST be non-zero length, and it MUST NOT contain a) s
-5 679 M
-( comma \(','\). Context may impose additional restrictions on the) s
-5 668 M
-( names; for example, the names in a list may have to be valid) s
-5 657 M
-( algorithm identifier \(see Algorithm Naming below\), or [RFC-3066]) s
-5 646 M
-( language tags. The order of the names in a list may or may not be) s
-5 635 M
-( significant, also depending on the context where the list is is) s
-5 624 M
-( used. Terminating NUL characters are not used, neither for the) s
-5 613 M
-( individual names, nor for the list as a whole.) s
-5 591 M
-( Examples:) s
-5 580 M
-( value representation \(hex\)) s
-5 569 M
-( ---------------------------------------) s
-5 558 M
-( \(\), the empty list 00 00 00 00) s
-5 547 M
-( \("zlib"\) 00 00 00 04 7a 6c 69 62) s
-5 536 M
-( \("zlib", "none"\) 00 00 00 09 7a 6c 69 62 2c 6e 6f 6e 65) s
-5 481 M
-(6. Algorithm Naming) s
-5 459 M
-( The SSH protocols refer to particular hash, encryption, integrity,) s
-5 448 M
-( compression, and key exchange algorithms or protocols by names.) s
-5 437 M
-( There are some standard algorithms that all implementations MUST) s
-5 426 M
-( support. There are also algorithms that are defined in the protocol) s
-5 415 M
-( specification but are OPTIONAL. Furthermore, it is expected that) s
-5 404 M
-( some organizations will want to use their own algorithms.) s
-5 382 M
-( In this protocol, all algorithm identifiers MUST be printable) s
-5 371 M
-( US-ASCII non-empty strings no longer than 64 characters. Names MUST) s
-5 360 M
-( be case-sensitive.) s
-5 338 M
-( There are two formats for algorithm names:) s
-5 327 M
-( o Names that do not contain an at-sign \(@\) are reserved to be) s
-5 316 M
-( assigned by IETF consensus \(RFCs\). Examples include `3des-cbc',) s
-5 305 M
-( `sha-1', `hmac-sha1', and `zlib' \(the quotes are not part of the) s
-5 294 M
-( name\). Names of this format MUST NOT be used without first) s
-5 283 M
-( registering them. Registered names MUST NOT contain an at-sign) s
-5 272 M
-( \(@\) or a comma \(,\).) s
-5 261 M
-( o Anyone can define additional algorithms by using names in the) s
-5 250 M
-( format name@domainname, e.g. "[email protected]". The) s
-5 239 M
-( format of the part preceding the at sign is not specified; it MUST) s
-5 228 M
-( consist of US-ASCII characters except at-sign and comma. The part) s
-5 217 M
-( following the at-sign MUST be a valid fully qualified internet) s
-5 206 M
-( domain name [RFC-1034] controlled by the person or organization) s
-5 195 M
-( defining the name. It is up to each domain how it manages its) s
-5 184 M
-( local namespace.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 10]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 0.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 11 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(7. Message Numbers) s
-5 668 M
-( SSH packets have message numbers in the range 1 to 255. These numbers) s
-5 657 M
-( have been allocated as follows:) s
-5 624 M
-( Transport layer protocol:) s
-5 602 M
-( 1 to 19 Transport layer generic \(e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug,) s
-5 591 M
-( etc.\)) s
-5 580 M
-( 20 to 29 Algorithm negotiation) s
-5 569 M
-( 30 to 49 Key exchange method specific \(numbers can be reused for) s
-5 558 M
-( different authentication methods\)) s
-5 536 M
-( User authentication protocol:) s
-5 514 M
-( 50 to 59 User authentication generic) s
-5 503 M
-( 60 to 79 User authentication method specific \(numbers can be) s
-5 492 M
-( reused for different authentication methods\)) s
-5 470 M
-( Connection protocol:) s
-5 448 M
-( 80 to 89 Connection protocol generic) s
-5 437 M
-( 90 to 127 Channel related messages) s
-5 415 M
-( Reserved for client protocols:) s
-5 393 M
-( 128 to 191 Reserved) s
-5 371 M
-( Local extensions:) s
-5 349 M
-( 192 to 255 Local extensions) s
-5 305 M
-(8. IANA Considerations) s
-5 283 M
-( The initial state of the IANA registry is detailed in [SSH-NUMBERS].) s
-5 261 M
-( Allocation of the following types of names in the SSH protocols is) s
-5 250 M
-( assigned by IETF consensus:) s
-5 239 M
-( o SSH encryption algorithm names,) s
-5 228 M
-( o SSH MAC algorithm names,) s
-5 217 M
-( o SSH public key algorithm names \(public key algorithm also implies) s
-5 206 M
-( encoding and signature/encryption capability\),) s
-5 195 M
-( o SSH key exchange method names, and) s
-5 184 M
-( o SSH protocol \(service\) names.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 11]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 421.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 12 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( These names MUST be printable US-ASCII strings, and MUST NOT contain) s
-5 679 M
-( the characters at-sign \('@'\), comma \(','\), or whitespace or control) s
-5 668 M
-( characters \(ASCII codes 32 or less\). Names are case-sensitive, and) s
-5 657 M
-( MUST NOT be longer than 64 characters.) s
-5 635 M
-( Names with the at-sign \('@'\) in them are allocated by the owner of) s
-5 624 M
-( DNS name after the at-sign \(hierarchical allocation in [RFC-2343]\),) s
-5 613 M
-( otherwise the same restrictions as above.) s
-5 591 M
-( Each category of names listed above has a separate namespace.) s
-5 580 M
-( However, using the same name in multiple categories SHOULD be avoided) s
-5 569 M
-( to minimize confusion.) s
-5 547 M
-( Message numbers \(see Section Message Numbers \(Section 7\)\) in the) s
-5 536 M
-( range of 0..191 are allocated via IETF consensus; message numbers in) s
-5 525 M
-( the 192..255 range \(the "Local extensions" set\) are reserved for) s
-5 514 M
-( private use.) s
-5 492 M
-(9. Security Considerations) s
-5 470 M
-( In order to make the entire body of Security Considerations more) s
-5 459 M
-( accessible, Security Considerations for the transport,) s
-5 448 M
-( authentication, and connection documents have been gathered here.) s
-5 426 M
-( The transport protocol [1] provides a confidential channel over an) s
-5 415 M
-( insecure network. It performs server host authentication, key) s
-5 404 M
-( exchange, encryption, and integrity protection. It also derives a) s
-5 393 M
-( unique session id that may be used by higher-level protocols.) s
-5 371 M
-( The authentication protocol [2] provides a suite of mechanisms which) s
-5 360 M
-( can be used to authenticate the client user to the server.) s
-5 349 M
-( Individual mechanisms specified in the in authentication protocol use) s
-5 338 M
-( the session id provided by the transport protocol and/or depend on) s
-5 327 M
-( the security and integrity guarantees of the transport protocol.) s
-5 305 M
-( The connection protocol [3] specifies a mechanism to multiplex) s
-5 294 M
-( multiple streams [channels] of data over the confidential and) s
-5 283 M
-( authenticated transport. It also specifies channels for accessing an) s
-5 272 M
-( interactive shell, for 'proxy-forwarding' various external protocols) s
-5 261 M
-( over the secure transport \(including arbitrary TCP/IP protocols\), and) s
-5 250 M
-( for accessing secure 'subsystems' on the server host.) s
-5 228 M
-(9.1 Pseudo-Random Number Generation) s
-5 206 M
-( This protocol binds each session key to the session by including) s
-5 195 M
-( random, session specific data in the hash used to produce session) s
-5 184 M
-( keys. Special care should be taken to ensure that all of the random) s
-5 173 M
-( numbers are of good quality. If the random data here \(e.g., DH) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 12]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 0.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 13 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( parameters\) are pseudo-random then the pseudo-random number generator) s
-5 679 M
-( should be cryptographically secure \(i.e., its next output not easily) s
-5 668 M
-( guessed even when knowing all previous outputs\) and, furthermore,) s
-5 657 M
-( proper entropy needs to be added to the pseudo-random number) s
-5 646 M
-( generator. RFC 1750 [1750] offers suggestions for sources of random) s
-5 635 M
-( numbers and entropy. Implementors should note the importance of) s
-5 624 M
-( entropy and the well-meant, anecdotal warning about the difficulty in) s
-5 613 M
-( properly implementing pseudo-random number generating functions.) s
-5 591 M
-( The amount of entropy available to a given client or server may) s
-5 580 M
-( sometimes be less than what is required. In this case one must) s
-5 569 M
-( either resort to pseudo-random number generation regardless of) s
-5 558 M
-( insufficient entropy or refuse to run the protocol. The latter is) s
-5 547 M
-( preferable.) s
-5 525 M
-(9.2 Transport) s
-5 503 M
-(9.2.1 Confidentiality) s
-5 481 M
-( It is beyond the scope of this document and the Secure Shell Working) s
-5 470 M
-( Group to analyze or recommend specific ciphers other than the ones) s
-5 459 M
-( which have been established and accepted within the industry. At the) s
-5 448 M
-( time of this writing, ciphers commonly in use include 3DES, ARCFOUR,) s
-5 437 M
-( twofish, serpent and blowfish. AES has been accepted by The) s
-5 426 M
-( published as a US Federal Information Processing Standards [FIPS-197]) s
-5 415 M
-( and the cryptographic community as being acceptable for this purpose) s
-5 404 M
-( as well has accepted AES. As always, implementors and users should) s
-5 393 M
-( check current literature to ensure that no recent vulnerabilities) s
-5 382 M
-( have been found in ciphers used within products. Implementors should) s
-5 371 M
-( also check to see which ciphers are considered to be relatively) s
-5 360 M
-( stronger than others and should recommend their use to users over) s
-5 349 M
-( relatively weaker ciphers. It would be considered good form for an) s
-5 338 M
-( implementation to politely and unobtrusively notify a user that a) s
-5 327 M
-( stronger cipher is available and should be used when a weaker one is) s
-5 316 M
-( actively chosen.) s
-5 294 M
-( The "none" cipher is provided for debugging and SHOULD NOT be used) s
-5 283 M
-( except for that purpose. It's cryptographic properties are) s
-5 272 M
-( sufficiently described in RFC 2410, which will show that its use does) s
-5 261 M
-( not meet the intent of this protocol.) s
-5 239 M
-( The relative merits of these and other ciphers may also be found in) s
-5 228 M
-( current literature. Two references that may provide information on) s
-5 217 M
-( the subject are [SCHNEIER] and [KAUFMAN,PERLMAN,SPECINER]. Both of) s
-5 206 M
-( these describe the CBC mode of operation of certain ciphers and the) s
-5 195 M
-( weakness of this scheme. Essentially, this mode is theoretically) s
-5 184 M
-( vulnerable to chosen cipher-text attacks because of the high) s
-5 173 M
-( predictability of the start of packet sequence. However, this attack) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 13]) s
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-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 421.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 14 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( is still deemed difficult and not considered fully practicable) s
-5 679 M
-( especially if relatively longer block sizes are used.) s
-5 657 M
-( Additionally, another CBC mode attack may be mitigated through the) s
-5 646 M
-( insertion of packets containing SSH_MSG_IGNORE. Without this) s
-5 635 M
-( technique, a specific attack may be successful. For this attack) s
-5 624 M
-( \(commonly known as the Rogaway attack) s
-5 613 M
-( [ROGAWAY],[DAI],[BELLARE,KOHNO,NAMPREMPRE]\) to work, the attacker) s
-5 602 M
-( would need to know the IV of the next block that is going to be) s
-5 591 M
-( encrypted. In CBC mode that is the output of the encryption of the) s
-5 580 M
-( previous block. If the attacker does not have any way to see the) s
-5 569 M
-( packet yet \(i.e it is in the internal buffers of the ssh) s
-5 558 M
-( implementation or even in the kernel\) then this attack will not work.) s
-5 547 M
-( If the last packet has been sent out to the network \(i.e the attacker) s
-5 536 M
-( has access to it\) then he can use the attack.) s
-5 514 M
-( In the optimal case an implementor would need to add an extra packet) s
-5 503 M
-( only if the packet has been sent out onto the network and there are) s
-5 492 M
-( no other packets waiting for transmission. Implementors may wish to) s
-5 481 M
-( check to see if there are any unsent packets awaiting transmission,) s
-5 470 M
-( but unfortunately it is not normally easy to obtain this information) s
-5 459 M
-( from the kernel or buffers. If there are not, then a packet) s
-5 448 M
-( containing SSH_MSG_IGNORE SHOULD be sent. If a new packet is added) s
-5 437 M
-( to the stream every time the attacker knows the IV that is supposed) s
-5 426 M
-( to be used for the next packet, then the attacker will not be able to) s
-5 415 M
-( guess the correct IV, thus the attack will never be successfull.) s
-5 393 M
-( As an example, consider the following case:) s
-5 360 M
-( Client Server) s
-5 349 M
-( ------ ------) s
-5 338 M
-( TCP\(seq=x, len=500\) ->) s
-5 327 M
-( contains Record 1) s
-5 305 M
-( [500 ms passes, no ACK]) s
-5 283 M
-( TCP\(seq=x, len=1000\) ->) s
-5 272 M
-( contains Records 1,2) s
-5 250 M
-( ACK) s
-5 217 M
-( 1. The Nagle algorithm + TCP retransmits mean that the two records) s
-5 206 M
-( get coalesced into a single TCP segment) s
-5 195 M
-( 2. Record 2 is *not* at the beginning of the TCP segment and never) s
-5 184 M
-( will be, since it gets ACKed.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 14]) s
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-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 0.271378 translate
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-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 15 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( 3. Yet, the attack is possible because Record 1 has already been) s
-5 679 M
-( seen.) s
-5 657 M
-( As this example indicates, it's totally unsafe to use the existence) s
-5 646 M
-( of unflushed data in the TCP buffers proper as a guide to whether you) s
-5 635 M
-( need an empty packet, since when you do the second write\(\), the) s
-5 624 M
-( buffers will contain the un-ACKed Record 1.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 15]) s
-_R
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-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 421.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 16 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( On the other hand, it's perfectly safe to have the following) s
-5 679 M
-( situation:) s
-5 646 M
-( Client Server) s
-5 635 M
-( ------ ------) s
-5 624 M
-( TCP\(seq=x, len=500\) ->) s
-5 613 M
-( contains SSH_MSG_IGNORE) s
-5 591 M
-( TCP\(seq=y, len=500\) ->) s
-5 580 M
-( contains Data) s
-5 558 M
-( Provided that the IV for second SSH Record is fixed after the data for) s
-5 547 M
-( the Data packet is determined -i.e. you do:) s
-5 536 M
-( read from user) s
-5 525 M
-( encrypt null packet) s
-5 514 M
-( encrypt data packet) s
-5 481 M
-(9.2.2 Data Integrity) s
-5 459 M
-( This protocol does allow the Data Integrity mechanism to be disabled.) s
-5 448 M
-( Implementors SHOULD be wary of exposing this feature for any purpose) s
-5 437 M
-( other than debugging. Users and administrators SHOULD be explicitly) s
-5 426 M
-( warned anytime the "none" MAC is enabled.) s
-5 404 M
-( So long as the "none" MAC is not used, this protocol provides data) s
-5 393 M
-( integrity.) s
-5 371 M
-( Because MACs use a 32 bit sequence number, they might start to leak) s
-5 360 M
-( information after 2**32 packets have been sent. However, following) s
-5 349 M
-( the rekeying recommendations should prevent this attack. The) s
-5 338 M
-( transport protocol [1] recommends rekeying after one gigabyte of) s
-5 327 M
-( data, and the smallest possible packet is 16 bytes. Therefore,) s
-5 316 M
-( rekeying SHOULD happen after 2**28 packets at the very most.) s
-5 294 M
-(9.2.3 Replay) s
-5 272 M
-( The use of a MAC other than 'none' provides integrity and) s
-5 261 M
-( authentication. In addition, the transport protocol provides a) s
-5 250 M
-( unique session identifier \(bound in part to pseudo-random data that) s
-5 239 M
-( is part of the algorithm and key exchange process\) that can be used) s
-5 228 M
-( by higher level protocols to bind data to a given session and prevent) s
-5 217 M
-( replay of data from prior sessions. For example, the authentication) s
-5 206 M
-( protocol uses this to prevent replay of signatures from previous) s
-5 195 M
-( sessions. Because public key authentication exchanges are) s
-5 184 M
-( cryptographically bound to the session \(i.e., to the initial key) s
-5 173 M
-( exchange\) they cannot be successfully replayed in other sessions.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 16]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 0.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 17 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( Note that the session ID can be made public without harming the) s
-5 679 M
-( security of the protocol.) s
-5 657 M
-( If two session happen to have the same session ID [hash of key) s
-5 646 M
-( exchanges] then packets from one can be replayed against the other.) s
-5 635 M
-( It must be stressed that the chances of such an occurrence are,) s
-5 624 M
-( needless to say, minimal when using modern cryptographic methods.) s
-5 613 M
-( This is all the more so true when specifying larger hash function) s
-5 602 M
-( outputs and DH parameters.) s
-5 580 M
-( Replay detection using monotonically increasing sequence numbers as) s
-5 569 M
-( input to the MAC, or HMAC in some cases, is described in [RFC2085] />) s
-5 558 M
-( [RFC2246], [RFC2743], [RFC1964], [RFC2025], and [RFC1510]. The) s
-5 547 M
-( underlying construct is discussed in [RFC2104]. Essentially a) s
-5 536 M
-( different sequence number in each packet ensures that at least this) s
-5 525 M
-( one input to the MAC function will be unique and will provide a) s
-5 514 M
-( nonrecurring MAC output that is not predictable to an attacker. If) s
-5 503 M
-( the session stays active long enough, however, this sequence number) s
-5 492 M
-( will wrap. This event may provide an attacker an opportunity to) s
-5 481 M
-( replay a previously recorded packet with an identical sequence number) s
-5 470 M
-( but only if the peers have not rekeyed since the transmission of the) s
-5 459 M
-( first packet with that sequence number. If the peers have rekeyed,) s
-5 448 M
-( then the replay will be detected as the MAC check will fail. For) s
-5 437 M
-( this reason, it must be emphasized that peers MUST rekey before a) s
-5 426 M
-( wrap of the sequence numbers. Naturally, if an attacker does attempt) s
-5 415 M
-( to replay a captured packet before the peers have rekeyed, then the) s
-5 404 M
-( receiver of the duplicate packet will not be able to validate the MAC) s
-5 393 M
-( and it will be discarded. The reason that the MAC will fail is) s
-5 382 M
-( because the receiver will formulate a MAC based upon the packet) s
-5 371 M
-( contents, the shared secret, and the expected sequence number. Since) s
-5 360 M
-( the replayed packet will not be using that expected sequence number) s
-5 349 M
-( \(the sequence number of the replayed packet will have already been) s
-5 338 M
-( passed by the receiver\) then the calculated MAC will not match the) s
-5 327 M
-( MAC received with the packet.) s
-5 305 M
-(9.2.4 Man-in-the-middle) s
-5 283 M
-( This protocol makes no assumptions nor provisions for an) s
-5 272 M
-( infrastructure or means for distributing the public keys of hosts. It) s
-5 261 M
-( is expected that this protocol will sometimes be used without first) s
-5 250 M
-( verifying the association between the server host key and the server) s
-5 239 M
-( host name. Such usage is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.) s
-5 228 M
-( This section describes this and encourages administrators and users) s
-5 217 M
-( to understand the importance of verifying this association before any) s
-5 206 M
-( session is initiated.) s
-5 184 M
-( There are three cases of man-in-the-middle attacks to consider. The) s
-5 173 M
-( first is where an attacker places a device between the client and the) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 17]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 421.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 18 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( server before the session is initiated. In this case, the attack) s
-5 679 M
-( device is trying to mimic the legitimate server and will offer its) s
-5 668 M
-( public key to the client when the client initiates a session. If it) s
-5 657 M
-( were to offer the public key of the server, then it would not be able) s
-5 646 M
-( to decrypt or sign the transmissions between the legitimate server) s
-5 635 M
-( and the client unless it also had access to the private-key of the) s
-5 624 M
-( host. The attack device will also, simultaneously to this, initiate) s
-5 613 M
-( a session to the legitimate server masquerading itself as the client.) s
-5 602 M
-( If the public key of the server had been securely distributed to the) s
-5 591 M
-( client prior to that session initiation, the key offered to the) s
-5 580 M
-( client by the attack device will not match the key stored on the) s
-5 569 M
-( client. In that case, the user SHOULD be given a warning that the) s
-5 558 M
-( offered host key does not match the host key cached on the client.) s
-5 547 M
-( As described in Section 3.1 of [ARCH], the user may be free to accept) s
-5 536 M
-( the new key and continue the session. It is RECOMMENDED that the) s
-5 525 M
-( warning provide sufficient information to the user of the client) s
-5 514 M
-( device so they may make an informed decision. If the user chooses to) s
-5 503 M
-( continue the session with the stored public-key of the server \(not) s
-5 492 M
-( the public-key offered at the start of the session\), then the session) s
-5 481 M
-( specific data between the attacker and server will be different) s
-5 470 M
-( between the client-to-attacker session and the attacker-to-server) s
-5 459 M
-( sessions due to the randomness discussed above. From this, the) s
-5 448 M
-( attacker will not be able to make this attack work since the attacker) s
-5 437 M
-( will not be able to correctly sign packets containing this session) s
-5 426 M
-( specific data from the server since he does not have the private key) s
-5 415 M
-( of that server.) s
-5 393 M
-( The second case that should be considered is similar to the first) s
-5 382 M
-( case in that it also happens at the time of connection but this case) s
-5 371 M
-( points out the need for the secure distribution of server public) s
-5 360 M
-( keys. If the server public keys are not securely distributed then) s
-5 349 M
-( the client cannot know if it is talking to the intended server. An) s
-5 338 M
-( attacker may use social engineering techniques to pass off server) s
-5 327 M
-( keys to unsuspecting users and may then place a man-in-the-middle) s
-5 316 M
-( attack device between the legitimate server and the clients. If this) s
-5 305 M
-( is allowed to happen then the clients will form client-to-attacker) s
-5 294 M
-( sessions and the attacker will form attacker-to-server sessions and) s
-5 283 M
-( will be able to monitor and manipulate all of the traffic between the) s
-5 272 M
-( clients and the legitimate servers. Server administrators are) s
-5 261 M
-( encouraged to make host key fingerprints available for checking by) s
-5 250 M
-( some means whose security does not rely on the integrity of the) s
-5 239 M
-( actual host keys. Possible mechanisms are discussed in Section 3.1) s
-5 228 M
-( of [SSH-ARCH] and may also include secured Web pages, physical pieces) s
-5 217 M
-( of paper, etc. Implementors SHOULD provide recommendations on how) s
-5 206 M
-( best to do this with their implementation. Because the protocol is) s
-5 195 M
-( extensible, future extensions to the protocol may provide better) s
-5 184 M
-( mechanisms for dealing with the need to know the server's host key) s
-5 173 M
-( before connecting. For example, making the host key fingerprint) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 18]) s
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-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 0.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 19 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( available through a secure DNS lookup, or using kerberos over gssapi) s
-5 679 M
-( during key exchange to authenticate the server are possibilities.) s
-5 657 M
-( In the third man-in-the-middle case, attackers may attempt to) s
-5 646 M
-( manipulate packets in transit between peers after the session has) s
-5 635 M
-( been established. As described in the Replay part of this section, a) s
-5 624 M
-( successful attack of this nature is very improbable. As in the) s
-5 613 M
-( Replay section, this reasoning does assume that the MAC is secure and) s
-5 602 M
-( that it is infeasible to construct inputs to a MAC algorithm to give) s
-5 591 M
-( a known output. This is discussed in much greater detail in Section) s
-5 580 M
-( 6 of RFC 2104. If the MAC algorithm has a vulnerability or is weak) s
-5 569 M
-( enough, then the attacker may be able to specify certain inputs to) s
-5 558 M
-( yield a known MAC. With that they may be able to alter the contents) s
-5 547 M
-( of a packet in transit. Alternatively the attacker may be able to) s
-5 536 M
-( exploit the algorithm vulnerability or weakness to find the shared) s
-5 525 M
-( secret by reviewing the MACs from captured packets. In either of) s
-5 514 M
-( those cases, an attacker could construct a packet or packets that) s
-5 503 M
-( could be inserted into an SSH stream. To prevent that, implementors) s
-5 492 M
-( are encouraged to utilize commonly accepted MAC algorithms and) s
-5 481 M
-( administrators are encouraged to watch current literature and) s
-5 470 M
-( discussions of cryptography to ensure that they are not using a MAC) s
-5 459 M
-( algorithm that has a recently found vulnerability or weakness.) s
-5 437 M
-( In summary, the use of this protocol without a reliable association) s
-5 426 M
-( of the binding between a host and its host keys is inherently) s
-5 415 M
-( insecure and is NOT RECOMMENDED. It may however be necessary in) s
-5 404 M
-( non-security critical environments, and will still provide protection) s
-5 393 M
-( against passive attacks. Implementors of protocols and applications) s
-5 382 M
-( running on top of this protocol should keep this possibility in mind.) s
-5 360 M
-(9.2.5 Denial-of-service) s
-5 338 M
-( This protocol is designed to be used over a reliable transport. If) s
-5 327 M
-( transmission errors or message manipulation occur, the connection is) s
-5 316 M
-( closed. The connection SHOULD be re-established if this occurs.) s
-5 305 M
-( Denial of service attacks of this type \("wire cutter"\) are almost) s
-5 294 M
-( impossible to avoid.) s
-5 272 M
-( In addition, this protocol is vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks) s
-5 261 M
-( because an attacker can force the server to go through the CPU and) s
-5 250 M
-( memory intensive tasks of connection setup and key exchange without) s
-5 239 M
-( authenticating. Implementors SHOULD provide features that make this) s
-5 228 M
-( more difficult. For example, only allowing connections from a subset) s
-5 217 M
-( of IPs known to have valid users.) s
-5 195 M
-(9.2.6 Covert Channels) s
-5 173 M
-( The protocol was not designed to eliminate covert channels. For) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 19]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 421.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 20 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( example, the padding, SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages, and several other) s
-5 679 M
-( places in the protocol can be used to pass covert information, and) s
-5 668 M
-( the recipient has no reliable way to verify whether such information) s
-5 657 M
-( is being sent.) s
-5 635 M
-(9.2.7 Forward Secrecy) s
-5 613 M
-( It should be noted that the Diffie-Hellman key exchanges may provide) s
-5 602 M
-( perfect forward secrecy \(PFS\). PFS is essentially defined as the) s
-5 591 M
-( cryptographic property of a key-establishment protocol in which the) s
-5 580 M
-( compromise of a session key or long-term private key after a given) s
-5 569 M
-( session does not cause the compromise of any earlier session. [ANSI) s
-5 558 M
-( T1.523-2001] SSHv2 sessions resulting from a key exchange using) s
-5 547 M
-( diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 are secure even if private keying/) s
-5 536 M
-( authentication material is later revealed, but not if the session) s
-5 525 M
-( keys are revealed. So, given this definition of PFS, SSHv2 does have) s
-5 514 M
-( PFS. It is hoped that all other key exchange mechanisms proposed and) s
-5 503 M
-( used in the future will also provide PFS. This property is not) s
-5 492 M
-( commuted to any of the applications or protocols using SSH as a) s
-5 481 M
-( transport however. The transport layer of SSH provides) s
-5 470 M
-( confidentiality for password authentication and other methods that) s
-5 459 M
-( rely on secret data.) s
-5 437 M
-( Of course, if the DH private parameters for the client and server are) s
-5 426 M
-( revealed then the session key is revealed, but these items can be) s
-5 415 M
-( thrown away after the key exchange completes. It's worth pointing) s
-5 404 M
-( out that these items should not be allowed to end up on swap space) s
-5 393 M
-( and that they should be erased from memory as soon as the key) s
-5 382 M
-( exchange completes.) s
-5 360 M
-(9.3 Authentication Protocol) s
-5 338 M
-( The purpose of this protocol is to perform client user) s
-5 327 M
-( authentication. It assumes that this run over a secure transport) s
-5 316 M
-( layer protocol, which has already authenticated the server machine,) s
-5 305 M
-( established an encrypted communications channel, and computed a) s
-5 294 M
-( unique session identifier for this session.) s
-5 272 M
-( Several authentication methods with different security) s
-5 261 M
-( characteristics are allowed. It is up to the server's local policy) s
-5 250 M
-( to decide which methods \(or combinations of methods\) it is willing to) s
-5 239 M
-( accept for each user. Authentication is no stronger than the weakest) s
-5 228 M
-( combination allowed.) s
-5 206 M
-( The server may go into a "sleep" period after repeated unsuccessful) s
-5 195 M
-( authentication attempts to make key search more difficult for) s
-5 184 M
-( attackers. Care should be taken so that this doesn't become a) s
-5 173 M
-( self-denial of service vector.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 20]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 0.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 21 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(9.3.1 Weak Transport) s
-5 668 M
-( If the transport layer does not provide confidentiality,) s
-5 657 M
-( authentication methods that rely on secret data SHOULD be disabled.) s
-5 646 M
-( If it does not provide strong integrity protection, requests to) s
-5 635 M
-( change authentication data \(e.g. a password change\) SHOULD be) s
-5 624 M
-( disabled to prevent an attacker from modifying the ciphertext) s
-5 613 M
-( without being noticed, or rendering the new authentication data) s
-5 602 M
-( unusable \(denial of service\).) s
-5 580 M
-( The assumption as stated above that the Authentication Protocol only) s
-5 569 M
-( run over a secure transport that has previously authenticated the) s
-5 558 M
-( server is very important to note. People deploying SSH are reminded) s
-5 547 M
-( of the consequences of man-in-the-middle attacks if the client does) s
-5 536 M
-( not have a very strong a priori association of the server with the) s
-5 525 M
-( host key of that server. Specifically for the case of the) s
-5 514 M
-( Authentication Protocol the client may form a session to a) s
-5 503 M
-( man-in-the-middle attack device and divulge user credentials such as) s
-5 492 M
-( their username and password. Even in the cases of authentication) s
-5 481 M
-( where no user credentials are divulged, an attacker may still gain) s
-5 470 M
-( information they shouldn't have by capturing key-strokes in much the) s
-5 459 M
-( same way that a honeypot works.) s
-5 437 M
-(9.3.2 Debug messages) s
-5 415 M
-( Special care should be taken when designing debug messages. These) s
-5 404 M
-( messages may reveal surprising amounts of information about the host) s
-5 393 M
-( if not properly designed. Debug messages can be disabled \(during) s
-5 382 M
-( user authentication phase\) if high security is required.) s
-5 371 M
-( Administrators of host machines should make all attempts to) s
-5 360 M
-( compartmentalize all event notification messages and protect them) s
-5 349 M
-( from unwarranted observation. Developers should be aware of the) s
-5 338 M
-( sensitive nature of some of the normal event messages and debug) s
-5 327 M
-( messages and may want to provide guidance to administrators on ways) s
-5 316 M
-( to keep this information away from unauthorized people. Developers) s
-5 305 M
-( should consider minimizing the amount of sensitive information) s
-5 294 M
-( obtainable by users during the authentication phase in accordance) s
-5 283 M
-( with the local policies. For this reason, it is RECOMMENDED that) s
-5 272 M
-( debug messages be initially disabled at the time of deployment and) s
-5 261 M
-( require an active decision by an administrator to allow them to be) s
-5 250 M
-( enabled. It is also RECOMMENDED that a message expressing this) s
-5 239 M
-( concern be presented to the administrator of a system when the action) s
-5 228 M
-( is taken to enable debugging messages.) s
-5 206 M
-(9.3.3 Local security policy) s
-5 184 M
-( Implementer MUST ensure that the credentials provided validate the) s
-5 173 M
-( professed user and also MUST ensure that the local policy of the) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 21]) s
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-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 421.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 22 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( server permits the user the access requested. In particular, because) s
-5 679 M
-( of the flexible nature of the SSH connection protocol, it may not be) s
-5 668 M
-( possible to determine the local security policy, if any, that should) s
-5 657 M
-( apply at the time of authentication because the kind of service being) s
-5 646 M
-( requested is not clear at that instant. For example, local policy) s
-5 635 M
-( might allow a user to access files on the server, but not start an) s
-5 624 M
-( interactive shell. However, during the authentication protocol, it is) s
-5 613 M
-( not known whether the user will be accessing files or attempting to) s
-5 602 M
-( use an interactive shell, or even both. In any event, where local) s
-5 591 M
-( security policy for the server host exists, it MUST be applied and) s
-5 580 M
-( enforced correctly.) s
-5 558 M
-( Implementors are encouraged to provide a default local policy and) s
-5 547 M
-( make its parameters known to administrators and users. At the) s
-5 536 M
-( discretion of the implementors, this default policy may be along the) s
-5 525 M
-( lines of 'anything goes' where there are no restrictions placed upon) s
-5 514 M
-( users, or it may be along the lines of 'excessively restrictive' in) s
-5 503 M
-( which case the administrators will have to actively make changes to) s
-5 492 M
-( this policy to meet their needs. Alternatively, it may be some) s
-5 481 M
-( attempt at providing something practical and immediately useful to) s
-5 470 M
-( the administrators of the system so they don't have to put in much) s
-5 459 M
-( effort to get SSH working. Whatever choice is made MUST be applied) s
-5 448 M
-( and enforced as required above.) s
-5 426 M
-(9.3.4 Public key authentication) s
-5 404 M
-( The use of public-key authentication assumes that the client host has) s
-5 393 M
-( not been compromised. It also assumes that the private-key of the) s
-5 382 M
-( server host has not been compromised.) s
-5 360 M
-( This risk can be mitigated by the use of passphrases on private keys;) s
-5 349 M
-( however, this is not an enforceable policy. The use of smartcards,) s
-5 338 M
-( or other technology to make passphrases an enforceable policy is) s
-5 327 M
-( suggested.) s
-5 305 M
-( The server could require both password and public-key authentication,) s
-5 294 M
-( however, this requires the client to expose its password to the) s
-5 283 M
-( server \(see section on password authentication below.\)) s
-5 261 M
-(9.3.5 Password authentication) s
-5 239 M
-( The password mechanism as specified in the authentication protocol) s
-5 228 M
-( assumes that the server has not been compromised. If the server has) s
-5 217 M
-( been compromised, using password authentication will reveal a valid) s
-5 206 M
-( username / password combination to the attacker, which may lead to) s
-5 195 M
-( further compromises.) s
-5 173 M
-( This vulnerability can be mitigated by using an alternative form of) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 22]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 0.271378 translate
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-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 23 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( authentication. For example, public-key authentication makes no) s
-5 679 M
-( assumptions about security on the server.) s
-5 657 M
-(9.3.6 Host based authentication) s
-5 635 M
-( Host based authentication assumes that the client has not been) s
-5 624 M
-( compromised. There are no mitigating strategies, other than to use) s
-5 613 M
-( host based authentication in combination with another authentication) s
-5 602 M
-( method.) s
-5 580 M
-(9.4 Connection protocol) s
-5 558 M
-(9.4.1 End point security) s
-5 536 M
-( End point security is assumed by the connection protocol. If the) s
-5 525 M
-( server has been compromised, any terminal sessions, port forwarding,) s
-5 514 M
-( or systems accessed on the host are compromised. There are no) s
-5 503 M
-( mitigating factors for this.) s
-5 481 M
-( If the client end point has been compromised, and the server fails to) s
-5 470 M
-( stop the attacker at the authentication protocol, all services) s
-5 459 M
-( exposed \(either as subsystems or through forwarding\) will be) s
-5 448 M
-( vulnerable to attack. Implementors SHOULD provide mechanisms for) s
-5 437 M
-( administrators to control which services are exposed to limit the) s
-5 426 M
-( vulnerability of other services.) s
-5 404 M
-( These controls might include controlling which machines and ports can) s
-5 393 M
-( be target in 'port-forwarding' operations, which users are allowed to) s
-5 382 M
-( use interactive shell facilities, or which users are allowed to use) s
-5 371 M
-( exposed subsystems.) s
-5 349 M
-(9.4.2 Proxy forwarding) s
-5 327 M
-( The SSH connection protocol allows for proxy forwarding of other) s
-5 316 M
-( protocols such as SNMP, POP3, and HTTP. This may be a concern for) s
-5 305 M
-( network administrators who wish to control the access of certain) s
-5 294 M
-( applications by users located outside of their physical location.) s
-5 283 M
-( Essentially, the forwarding of these protocols may violate site) s
-5 272 M
-( specific security policies as they may be undetectably tunneled) s
-5 261 M
-( through a firewall. Implementors SHOULD provide an administrative) s
-5 250 M
-( mechanism to control the proxy forwarding functionality so that site) s
-5 239 M
-( specific security policies may be upheld.) s
-5 217 M
-( In addition, a reverse proxy forwarding functionality is available,) s
-5 206 M
-( which again can be used to bypass firewall controls.) s
-5 184 M
-( As indicated above, end-point security is assumed during proxy) s
-5 173 M
-( forwarding operations. Failure of end-point security will compromise) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 23]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 421.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 24 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( all data passed over proxy forwarding.) s
-5 668 M
-(9.4.3 X11 forwarding) s
-5 646 M
-( Another form of proxy forwarding provided by the ssh connection) s
-5 635 M
-( protocol is the forwarding of the X11 protocol. If end-point) s
-5 624 M
-( security has been compromised, X11 forwarding may allow attacks) s
-5 613 M
-( against the X11 server. Users and administrators should, as a matter) s
-5 602 M
-( of course, use appropriate X11 security mechanisms to prevent) s
-5 591 M
-( unauthorized use of the X11 server. Implementors, administrators and) s
-5 580 M
-( users who wish to further explore the security mechanisms of X11 are) s
-5 569 M
-( invited to read [SCHEIFLER] and analyze previously reported problems) s
-5 558 M
-( with the interactions between SSH forwarding and X11 in CERT) s
-5 547 M
-( vulnerabilities VU#363181 and VU#118892 [CERT].) s
-5 525 M
-( X11 display forwarding with SSH, by itself, is not sufficient to) s
-5 514 M
-( correct well known problems with X11 security [VENEMA]. However, X11) s
-5 503 M
-( display forwarding in SSHv2 \(or other, secure protocols\), combined) s
-5 492 M
-( with actual and pseudo-displays which accept connections only over) s
-5 481 M
-( local IPC mechanisms authorized by permissions or ACLs, does correct) s
-5 470 M
-( many X11 security problems as long as the "none" MAC is not used. It) s
-5 459 M
-( is RECOMMENDED that X11 display implementations default to allowing) s
-5 448 M
-( display opens only over local IPC. It is RECOMMENDED that SSHv2) s
-5 437 M
-( server implementations that support X11 forwarding default to) s
-5 426 M
-( allowing display opens only over local IPC. On single-user systems) s
-5 415 M
-( it might be reasonable to default to allowing local display opens) s
-5 404 M
-( over TCP/IP.) s
-5 382 M
-( Implementors of the X11 forwarding protocol SHOULD implement the) s
-5 371 M
-( magic cookie access checking spoofing mechanism as described in) s
-5 360 M
-( [ssh-connect] as an additional mechanism to prevent unauthorized use) s
-5 349 M
-( of the proxy.) s
-5 327 M
-(Normative References) s
-5 305 M
-( [SSH-ARCH]) s
-5 294 M
-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Protocol Architecture", I-D) s
-5 283 M
-( draft-ietf-architecture-15.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 261 M
-( [SSH-TRANS]) s
-5 250 M
-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Transport Layer Protocol", I-D) s
-5 239 M
-( draft-ietf-transport-17.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 217 M
-( [SSH-USERAUTH]) s
-5 206 M
-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Authentication Protocol", I-D) s
-5 195 M
-( draft-ietf-userauth-18.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 173 M
-( [SSH-CONNECT]) s
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-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 24]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Connection Protocol", I-D) s
-5 679 M
-( draft-ietf-connect-18.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 657 M
-( [SSH-NUMBERS]) s
-5 646 M
-( Lehtinen, S. and D. Moffat, "SSH Protocol Assigned) s
-5 635 M
-( Numbers", I-D draft-ietf-secsh-assignednumbers-05.txt, Oct) s
-5 624 M
-( 2003.) s
-5 602 M
-( [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate) s
-5 591 M
-( Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.) s
-5 569 M
-(Informative References) s
-5 547 M
-( [FIPS-186]) s
-5 536 M
-( Federal Information Processing Standards Publication,) s
-5 525 M
-( "FIPS PUB 186, Digital Signature Standard", May 1994.) s
-5 503 M
-( [FIPS-197]) s
-5 492 M
-( National Institue of Standards and Technology, "FIPS 197,) s
-5 481 M
-( Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard",) s
-5 470 M
-( November 2001.) s
-5 448 M
-( [ANSI T1.523-2001]) s
-5 437 M
-( American National Standards Insitute, Inc., "Telecom) s
-5 426 M
-( Glossary 2000", February 2001.) s
-5 404 M
-( [SCHEIFLER]) s
-5 393 M
-( Scheifler, R., "X Window System : The Complete Reference) s
-5 382 M
-( to Xlib, X Protocol, Icccm, Xlfd, 3rd edition.", Digital) s
-5 371 M
-( Press ISBN 1555580882, Feburary 1992.) s
-5 349 M
-( [RFC0854] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol) s
-5 338 M
-( Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, May 1983.) s
-5 316 M
-( [RFC0894] Hornig, C., "Standard for the transmission of IP datagrams) s
-5 305 M
-( over Ethernet networks", STD 41, RFC 894, April 1984.) s
-5 283 M
-( [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",) s
-5 272 M
-( STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.) s
-5 250 M
-( [RFC1134] Perkins, D., "Point-to-Point Protocol: A proposal for) s
-5 239 M
-( multi-protocol transmission of datagrams over) s
-5 228 M
-( Point-to-Point links", RFC 1134, November 1989.) s
-5 206 M
-( [RFC1282] Kantor, B., "BSD Rlogin", RFC 1282, December 1991.) s
-5 184 M
-( [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and B. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network) s
-5 173 M
-( Authentication Service \(V5\)", RFC 1510, September 1993.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 25]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( [RFC1700] Reynolds, J. and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", RFC 1700,) s
-5 679 M
-( October 1994.) s
-5 657 M
-( [RFC1750] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness) s
-5 646 M
-( Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.) s
-5 624 M
-( [RFC3066] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of) s
-5 613 M
-( Languages", BCP 47, RFC 3066, January 2001.) s
-5 591 M
-( [RFC1964] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC) s
-5 580 M
-( 1964, June 1996.) s
-5 558 M
-( [RFC2025] Adams, C., "The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism) s
-5 547 M
-( \(SPKM\)", RFC 2025, October 1996.) s
-5 525 M
-( [RFC2085] Oehler, M. and R. Glenn, "HMAC-MD5 IP Authentication with) s
-5 514 M
-( Replay Prevention", RFC 2085, February 1997.) s
-5 492 M
-( [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC:) s
-5 481 M
-( Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,) s
-5 470 M
-( February 1997.) s
-5 448 M
-( [RFC2246] Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A.) s
-5 437 M
-( and P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246,) s
-5 426 M
-( January 1999.) s
-5 404 M
-( [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO) s
-5 393 M
-( 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.) s
-5 371 M
-( [RFC2410] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and) s
-5 360 M
-( Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, November 1998.) s
-5 338 M
-( [RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an) s
-5 327 M
-( IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,) s
-5 316 M
-( October 1998.) s
-5 294 M
-( [RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program) s
-5 283 M
-( Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.) s
-5 261 M
-( [SCHNEIER]) s
-5 250 M
-( Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition:) s
-5 239 M
-( protocols algorithms and source in code in C", 1996.) s
-5 217 M
-( [KAUFMAN,PERLMAN,SPECINER]) s
-5 206 M
-( Kaufman, C., Perlman, R. and M. Speciner, "Network) s
-5 195 M
-( Security: PRIVATE Communication in a PUBLIC World", 1995.) s
-5 173 M
-( [CERT] CERT Coordination Center, The., "http://www.cert.org/nav/) s
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-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( index_red.html".) s
-5 668 M
-( [VENEMA] Venema, W., "Murphy's Law and Computer Security",) s
-5 657 M
-( Proceedings of 6th USENIX Security Symposium, San Jose CA) s
-5 646 M
-( http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/) s
-5 635 M
-( sec96/venema.html, July 1996.) s
-5 613 M
-( [ROGAWAY] Rogaway, P., "Problems with Proposed IP Cryptography",) s
-5 602 M
-( Unpublished paper http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/) s
-5 591 M
-( papers/draft-rogaway-ipsec-comments-00.txt, 1996.) s
-5 569 M
-( [DAI] Dai, W., "An attack against SSH2 protocol", Email to the) s
-5 558 M
-( SECSH Working Group [email protected] ftp://) s
-5 547 M
-( ftp.ietf.org/ietf-mail-archive/secsh/2002-02.mail, Feb) s
-5 536 M
-( 2002.) s
-5 514 M
-( [BELLARE,KOHNO,NAMPREMPRE]) s
-5 503 M
-( Bellaire, M., Kohno, T. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated) s
-5 492 M
-( Encryption in SSH: Fixing the SSH Binary Packet Protocol",) s
-5 481 M
-( , Sept 2002.) s
-5 448 M
-(Authors' Addresses) s
-5 426 M
-( Tatu Ylonen) s
-5 415 M
-( SSH Communications Security Corp) s
-5 404 M
-( Fredrikinkatu 42) s
-5 393 M
-( HELSINKI FIN-00100) s
-5 382 M
-( Finland) s
-5 360 M
-( EMail: [email protected]) s
-5 327 M
-( Darren J. Moffat \(editor\)) s
-5 316 M
-( Sun Microsystems, Inc) s
-5 305 M
-( 17 Network Circle) s
-5 294 M
-( Menlo Park CA 94025) s
-5 283 M
-( USA) s
-5 261 M
-( EMail: [email protected]) s
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-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 27]) s
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- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(Intellectual Property Statement) s
-5 668 M
-( The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any) s
-5 657 M
-( intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to) s
-5 646 M
-( pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in) s
-5 635 M
-( this document or the extent to which any license under such rights) s
-5 624 M
-( might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it) s
-5 613 M
-( has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the) s
-5 602 M
-( IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and) s
-5 591 M
-( standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of) s
-5 580 M
-( claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of) s
-5 569 M
-( licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to) s
-5 558 M
-( obtain a general license or permission for the use of such) s
-5 547 M
-( proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can) s
-5 536 M
-( be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.) s
-5 514 M
-( The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any) s
-5 503 M
-( copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary) s
-5 492 M
-( rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice) s
-5 481 M
-( this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive) s
-5 470 M
-( Director.) s
-5 448 M
-( The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in) s
-5 437 M
-( regard to some or all of the specification contained in this) s
-5 426 M
-( document. For more information consult the online list of claimed) s
-5 415 M
-( rights.) s
-5 382 M
-(Full Copyright Statement) s
-5 360 M
-( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2003\). All Rights Reserved.) s
-5 338 M
-( This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to) s
-5 327 M
-( others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it) s
-5 316 M
-( or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published) s
-5 305 M
-( and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any) s
-5 294 M
-( kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are) s
-5 283 M
-( included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this) s
-5 272 M
-( document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing) s
-5 261 M
-( the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other) s
-5 250 M
-( Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of) s
-5 239 M
-( developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for) s
-5 228 M
-( copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be) s
-5 217 M
-( followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than) s
-5 206 M
-( English.) s
-5 184 M
-( The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be) s
-5 173 M
-( revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.) s
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- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
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-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/pagenum 29 def
-/fname () def
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-/ftail () def
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-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( This document and the information contained herein is provided on an) s
-5 679 M
-( "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING) s
-5 668 M
-( TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING) s
-5 657 M
-( BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION) s
-5 646 M
-( HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF) s
-5 635 M
-( MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.) s
-5 602 M
-(Acknowledgment) s
-5 580 M
-( Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the) s
-5 569 M
-( Internet Society.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 29]) s
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- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
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-PStoPSxform concat
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-%%Trailer
-%%Pages: 29
-%%DocumentNeededResources: font Courier-Bold Courier
-%%EOF
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.txt b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 18070e8485..0000000000
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1624 +0,0 @@
-
-
-
-Network Working Group T. Ylonen
-Internet-Draft SSH Communications Security Corp
-Expires: March 31, 2004 D. Moffat, Ed.
- Sun Microsystems, Inc
- Oct 2003
-
-
- SSH Protocol Architecture
- draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-15.txt
-
-Status of this Memo
-
- This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
- all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
-
- Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
- Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
- groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
-
- Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
- and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
- time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
- material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
-
- The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
- www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
-
- The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
- http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
-
- This Internet-Draft will expire on March 31, 2004.
-
-Copyright Notice
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
-
-Abstract
-
- SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network
- services over an insecure network. This document describes the
- architecture of the SSH protocol, as well as the notation and
- terminology used in SSH protocol documents. It also discusses the SSH
- algorithm naming system that allows local extensions. The SSH
- protocol consists of three major components: The Transport Layer
- Protocol provides server authentication, confidentiality, and
- integrity with perfect forward secrecy. The User Authentication
- Protocol authenticates the client to the server. The Connection
- Protocol multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical
- channels. Details of these protocols are described in separate
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 1]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003
-
-
- documents.
-
-Table of Contents
-
- 1. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 3. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 4. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 4.1 Host Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 4.2 Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 4.3 Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 4.4 Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 4.5 Packet Size and Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 4.6 Localization and Character Set Support . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 5. Data Type Representations Used in the SSH Protocols . . . . 8
- 6. Algorithm Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 7. Message Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 9.1 Pseudo-Random Number Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 9.2 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
- 9.2.1 Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
- 9.2.2 Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
- 9.2.3 Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
- 9.2.4 Man-in-the-middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
- 9.2.5 Denial-of-service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
- 9.2.6 Covert Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
- 9.2.7 Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
- 9.3 Authentication Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
- 9.3.1 Weak Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 9.3.2 Debug messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 9.3.3 Local security policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 9.3.4 Public key authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
- 9.3.5 Password authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
- 9.3.6 Host based authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
- 9.4 Connection protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
- 9.4.1 End point security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
- 9.4.2 Proxy forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
- 9.4.3 X11 forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
- Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
- Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 28
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 2]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003
-
-
-1. Contributors
-
- The major original contributors of this document were: Tatu Ylonen,
- Tero Kivinen, Timo J. Rinne, Sami Lehtinen (all of SSH Communications
- Security Corp), and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen (University of
- Jyvaskyla)
-
- The document editor is: [email protected]. Comments on this
- internet draft should be sent to the IETF SECSH working group,
- details at: http://ietf.org/html.charters/secsh-charter.html
-
-2. Introduction
-
- SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network
- services over an insecure network. It consists of three major
- components:
- o The Transport Layer Protocol [SSH-TRANS] provides server
- authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. It may optionally
- also provide compression. The transport layer will typically be
- run over a TCP/IP connection, but might also be used on top of any
- other reliable data stream.
- o The User Authentication Protocol [SSH-USERAUTH] authenticates the
- client-side user to the server. It runs over the transport layer
- protocol.
- o The Connection Protocol [SSH-CONNECT] multiplexes the encrypted
- tunnel into several logical channels. It runs over the user
- authentication protocol.
-
- The client sends a service request once a secure transport layer
- connection has been established. A second service request is sent
- after user authentication is complete. This allows new protocols to
- be defined and coexist with the protocols listed above.
-
- The connection protocol provides channels that can be used for a wide
- range of purposes. Standard methods are provided for setting up
- secure interactive shell sessions and for forwarding ("tunneling")
- arbitrary TCP/IP ports and X11 connections.
-
-3. Specification of Requirements
-
- All documents related to the SSH protocols shall use the keywords
- "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
- "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" to describe
- requirements. They are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
-
-4. Architecture
-
-
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-4.1 Host Keys
-
- Each server host SHOULD have a host key. Hosts MAY have multiple
- host keys using multiple different algorithms. Multiple hosts MAY
- share the same host key. If a host has keys at all, it MUST have at
- least one key using each REQUIRED public key algorithm (DSS
- [FIPS-186]).
-
- The server host key is used during key exchange to verify that the
- client is really talking to the correct server. For this to be
- possible, the client must have a priori knowledge of the server's
- public host key.
-
- Two different trust models can be used:
- o The client has a local database that associates each host name (as
- typed by the user) with the corresponding public host key. This
- method requires no centrally administered infrastructure, and no
- third-party coordination. The downside is that the database of
- name-to-key associations may become burdensome to maintain.
- o The host name-to-key association is certified by some trusted
- certification authority. The client only knows the CA root key,
- and can verify the validity of all host keys certified by accepted
- CAs.
-
- The second alternative eases the maintenance problem, since
- ideally only a single CA key needs to be securely stored on the
- client. On the other hand, each host key must be appropriately
- certified by a central authority before authorization is possible.
- Also, a lot of trust is placed on the central infrastructure.
-
- The protocol provides the option that the server name - host key
- association is not checked when connecting to the host for the first
- time. This allows communication without prior communication of host
- keys or certification. The connection still provides protection
- against passive listening; however, it becomes vulnerable to active
- man-in-the-middle attacks. Implementations SHOULD NOT normally allow
- such connections by default, as they pose a potential security
- problem. However, as there is no widely deployed key infrastructure
- available on the Internet yet, this option makes the protocol much
- more usable during the transition time until such an infrastructure
- emerges, while still providing a much higher level of security than
- that offered by older solutions (e.g. telnet [RFC-854] and rlogin
- [RFC-1282]).
-
- Implementations SHOULD try to make the best effort to check host
- keys. An example of a possible strategy is to only accept a host key
- without checking the first time a host is connected, save the key in
- a local database, and compare against that key on all future
-
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- connections to that host.
-
- Implementations MAY provide additional methods for verifying the
- correctness of host keys, e.g. a hexadecimal fingerprint derived from
- the SHA-1 hash of the public key. Such fingerprints can easily be
- verified by using telephone or other external communication channels.
-
- All implementations SHOULD provide an option to not accept host keys
- that cannot be verified.
-
- We believe that ease of use is critical to end-user acceptance of
- security solutions, and no improvement in security is gained if the
- new solutions are not used. Thus, providing the option not to check
- the server host key is believed to improve the overall security of
- the Internet, even though it reduces the security of the protocol in
- configurations where it is allowed.
-
-4.2 Extensibility
-
- We believe that the protocol will evolve over time, and some
- organizations will want to use their own encryption, authentication
- and/or key exchange methods. Central registration of all extensions
- is cumbersome, especially for experimental or classified features.
- On the other hand, having no central registration leads to conflicts
- in method identifiers, making interoperability difficult.
-
- We have chosen to identify algorithms, methods, formats, and
- extension protocols with textual names that are of a specific format.
- DNS names are used to create local namespaces where experimental or
- classified extensions can be defined without fear of conflicts with
- other implementations.
-
- One design goal has been to keep the base protocol as simple as
- possible, and to require as few algorithms as possible. However, all
- implementations MUST support a minimal set of algorithms to ensure
- interoperability (this does not imply that the local policy on all
- hosts would necessary allow these algorithms). The mandatory
- algorithms are specified in the relevant protocol documents.
-
- Additional algorithms, methods, formats, and extension protocols can
- be defined in separate drafts. See Section Algorithm Naming (Section
- 6) for more information.
-
-4.3 Policy Issues
-
- The protocol allows full negotiation of encryption, integrity, key
- exchange, compression, and public key algorithms and formats.
- Encryption, integrity, public key, and compression algorithms can be
-
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- different for each direction.
-
- The following policy issues SHOULD be addressed in the configuration
- mechanisms of each implementation:
- o Encryption, integrity, and compression algorithms, separately for
- each direction. The policy MUST specify which is the preferred
- algorithm (e.g. the first algorithm listed in each category).
- o Public key algorithms and key exchange method to be used for host
- authentication. The existence of trusted host keys for different
- public key algorithms also affects this choice.
- o The authentication methods that are to be required by the server
- for each user. The server's policy MAY require multiple
- authentication for some or all users. The required algorithms MAY
- depend on the location where the user is trying to log in from.
- o The operations that the user is allowed to perform using the
- connection protocol. Some issues are related to security; for
- example, the policy SHOULD NOT allow the server to start sessions
- or run commands on the client machine, and MUST NOT allow
- connections to the authentication agent unless forwarding such
- connections has been requested. Other issues, such as which TCP/
- IP ports can be forwarded and by whom, are clearly issues of local
- policy. Many of these issues may involve traversing or bypassing
- firewalls, and are interrelated with the local security policy.
-
-4.4 Security Properties
-
- The primary goal of the SSH protocol is improved security on the
- Internet. It attempts to do this in a way that is easy to deploy,
- even at the cost of absolute security.
- o All encryption, integrity, and public key algorithms used are
- well-known, well-established algorithms.
- o All algorithms are used with cryptographically sound key sizes
- that are believed to provide protection against even the strongest
- cryptanalytic attacks for decades.
- o All algorithms are negotiated, and in case some algorithm is
- broken, it is easy to switch to some other algorithm without
- modifying the base protocol.
-
- Specific concessions were made to make wide-spread fast deployment
- easier. The particular case where this comes up is verifying that
- the server host key really belongs to the desired host; the protocol
- allows the verification to be left out (but this is NOT RECOMMENDED).
- This is believed to significantly improve usability in the short
- term, until widespread Internet public key infrastructures emerge.
-
-4.5 Packet Size and Overhead
-
- Some readers will worry about the increase in packet size due to new
-
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- headers, padding, and MAC. The minimum packet size is in the order
- of 28 bytes (depending on negotiated algorithms). The increase is
- negligible for large packets, but very significant for one-byte
- packets (telnet-type sessions). There are, however, several factors
- that make this a non-issue in almost all cases:
- o The minimum size of a TCP/IP header is 32 bytes. Thus, the
- increase is actually from 33 to 51 bytes (roughly).
- o The minimum size of the data field of an Ethernet packet is 46
- bytes [RFC-894]. Thus, the increase is no more than 5 bytes. When
- Ethernet headers are considered, the increase is less than 10
- percent.
- o The total fraction of telnet-type data in the Internet is
- negligible, even with increased packet sizes.
-
- The only environment where the packet size increase is likely to have
- a significant effect is PPP [RFC-1134] over slow modem lines (PPP
- compresses the TCP/IP headers, emphasizing the increase in packet
- size). However, with modern modems, the time needed to transfer is in
- the order of 2 milliseconds, which is a lot faster than people can
- type.
-
- There are also issues related to the maximum packet size. To
- minimize delays in screen updates, one does not want excessively
- large packets for interactive sessions. The maximum packet size is
- negotiated separately for each channel.
-
-4.6 Localization and Character Set Support
-
- For the most part, the SSH protocols do not directly pass text that
- would be displayed to the user. However, there are some places where
- such data might be passed. When applicable, the character set for the
- data MUST be explicitly specified. In most places, ISO 10646 with
- UTF-8 encoding is used [RFC-2279]. When applicable, a field is also
- provided for a language tag [RFC-3066].
-
- One big issue is the character set of the interactive session. There
- is no clear solution, as different applications may display data in
- different formats. Different types of terminal emulation may also be
- employed in the client, and the character set to be used is
- effectively determined by the terminal emulation. Thus, no place is
- provided for directly specifying the character set or encoding for
- terminal session data. However, the terminal emulation type (e.g.
- "vt100") is transmitted to the remote site, and it implicitly
- specifies the character set and encoding. Applications typically use
- the terminal type to determine what character set they use, or the
- character set is determined using some external means. The terminal
- emulation may also allow configuring the default character set. In
- any case, the character set for the terminal session is considered
-
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- primarily a client local issue.
-
- Internal names used to identify algorithms or protocols are normally
- never displayed to users, and must be in US-ASCII.
-
- The client and server user names are inherently constrained by what
- the server is prepared to accept. They might, however, occasionally
- be displayed in logs, reports, etc. They MUST be encoded using ISO
- 10646 UTF-8, but other encodings may be required in some cases. It
- is up to the server to decide how to map user names to accepted user
- names. Straight bit-wise binary comparison is RECOMMENDED.
-
- For localization purposes, the protocol attempts to minimize the
- number of textual messages transmitted. When present, such messages
- typically relate to errors, debugging information, or some externally
- configured data. For data that is normally displayed, it SHOULD be
- possible to fetch a localized message instead of the transmitted
- message by using a numerical code. The remaining messages SHOULD be
- configurable.
-
-5. Data Type Representations Used in the SSH Protocols
- byte
-
- A byte represents an arbitrary 8-bit value (octet) [RFC-1700].
- Fixed length data is sometimes represented as an array of bytes,
- written byte[n], where n is the number of bytes in the array.
-
- boolean
-
- A boolean value is stored as a single byte. The value 0
- represents FALSE, and the value 1 represents TRUE. All non-zero
- values MUST be interpreted as TRUE; however, applications MUST NOT
- store values other than 0 and 1.
-
- uint32
-
- Represents a 32-bit unsigned integer. Stored as four bytes in the
- order of decreasing significance (network byte order). For
- example, the value 699921578 (0x29b7f4aa) is stored as 29 b7 f4
- aa.
-
- uint64
-
- Represents a 64-bit unsigned integer. Stored as eight bytes in
- the order of decreasing significance (network byte order).
-
-
-
-
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- string
-
- Arbitrary length binary string. Strings are allowed to contain
- arbitrary binary data, including null characters and 8-bit
- characters. They are stored as a uint32 containing its length
- (number of bytes that follow) and zero (= empty string) or more
- bytes that are the value of the string. Terminating null
- characters are not used.
-
- Strings are also used to store text. In that case, US-ASCII is
- used for internal names, and ISO-10646 UTF-8 for text that might
- be displayed to the user. The terminating null character SHOULD
- NOT normally be stored in the string.
-
- For example, the US-ASCII string "testing" is represented as 00 00
- 00 07 t e s t i n g. The UTF8 mapping does not alter the encoding
- of US-ASCII characters.
-
- mpint
-
- Represents multiple precision integers in two's complement format,
- stored as a string, 8 bits per byte, MSB first. Negative numbers
- have the value 1 as the most significant bit of the first byte of
- the data partition. If the most significant bit would be set for a
- positive number, the number MUST be preceded by a zero byte.
- Unnecessary leading bytes with the value 0 or 255 MUST NOT be
- included. The value zero MUST be stored as a string with zero
- bytes of data.
-
- By convention, a number that is used in modular computations in
- Z_n SHOULD be represented in the range 0 <= x < n.
-
- Examples:
- value (hex) representation (hex)
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
- 0 00 00 00 00
- 9a378f9b2e332a7 00 00 00 08 09 a3 78 f9 b2 e3 32 a7
- 80 00 00 00 02 00 80
- -1234 00 00 00 02 ed cc
- -deadbeef 00 00 00 05 ff 21 52 41 11
-
-
-
- name-list
-
- A string containing a comma separated list of names. A name list
- is represented as a uint32 containing its length (number of bytes
- that follow) followed by a comma-separated list of zero or more
-
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- names. A name MUST be non-zero length, and it MUST NOT contain a
- comma (','). Context may impose additional restrictions on the
- names; for example, the names in a list may have to be valid
- algorithm identifier (see Algorithm Naming below), or [RFC-3066]
- language tags. The order of the names in a list may or may not be
- significant, also depending on the context where the list is is
- used. Terminating NUL characters are not used, neither for the
- individual names, nor for the list as a whole.
-
- Examples:
- value representation (hex)
- ---------------------------------------
- (), the empty list 00 00 00 00
- ("zlib") 00 00 00 04 7a 6c 69 62
- ("zlib", "none") 00 00 00 09 7a 6c 69 62 2c 6e 6f 6e 65
-
-
-
-
-6. Algorithm Naming
-
- The SSH protocols refer to particular hash, encryption, integrity,
- compression, and key exchange algorithms or protocols by names.
- There are some standard algorithms that all implementations MUST
- support. There are also algorithms that are defined in the protocol
- specification but are OPTIONAL. Furthermore, it is expected that
- some organizations will want to use their own algorithms.
-
- In this protocol, all algorithm identifiers MUST be printable
- US-ASCII non-empty strings no longer than 64 characters. Names MUST
- be case-sensitive.
-
- There are two formats for algorithm names:
- o Names that do not contain an at-sign (@) are reserved to be
- assigned by IETF consensus (RFCs). Examples include `3des-cbc',
- `sha-1', `hmac-sha1', and `zlib' (the quotes are not part of the
- name). Names of this format MUST NOT be used without first
- registering them. Registered names MUST NOT contain an at-sign
- (@) or a comma (,).
- o Anyone can define additional algorithms by using names in the
- format name@domainname, e.g. "[email protected]". The
- format of the part preceding the at sign is not specified; it MUST
- consist of US-ASCII characters except at-sign and comma. The part
- following the at-sign MUST be a valid fully qualified internet
- domain name [RFC-1034] controlled by the person or organization
- defining the name. It is up to each domain how it manages its
- local namespace.
-
-
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-7. Message Numbers
-
- SSH packets have message numbers in the range 1 to 255. These numbers
- have been allocated as follows:
-
-
- Transport layer protocol:
-
- 1 to 19 Transport layer generic (e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug,
- etc.)
- 20 to 29 Algorithm negotiation
- 30 to 49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for
- different authentication methods)
-
- User authentication protocol:
-
- 50 to 59 User authentication generic
- 60 to 79 User authentication method specific (numbers can be
- reused for different authentication methods)
-
- Connection protocol:
-
- 80 to 89 Connection protocol generic
- 90 to 127 Channel related messages
-
- Reserved for client protocols:
-
- 128 to 191 Reserved
-
- Local extensions:
-
- 192 to 255 Local extensions
-
-
-
-8. IANA Considerations
-
- The initial state of the IANA registry is detailed in [SSH-NUMBERS].
-
- Allocation of the following types of names in the SSH protocols is
- assigned by IETF consensus:
- o SSH encryption algorithm names,
- o SSH MAC algorithm names,
- o SSH public key algorithm names (public key algorithm also implies
- encoding and signature/encryption capability),
- o SSH key exchange method names, and
- o SSH protocol (service) names.
-
-
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- These names MUST be printable US-ASCII strings, and MUST NOT contain
- the characters at-sign ('@'), comma (','), or whitespace or control
- characters (ASCII codes 32 or less). Names are case-sensitive, and
- MUST NOT be longer than 64 characters.
-
- Names with the at-sign ('@') in them are allocated by the owner of
- DNS name after the at-sign (hierarchical allocation in [RFC-2343]),
- otherwise the same restrictions as above.
-
- Each category of names listed above has a separate namespace.
- However, using the same name in multiple categories SHOULD be avoided
- to minimize confusion.
-
- Message numbers (see Section Message Numbers (Section 7)) in the
- range of 0..191 are allocated via IETF consensus; message numbers in
- the 192..255 range (the "Local extensions" set) are reserved for
- private use.
-
-9. Security Considerations
-
- In order to make the entire body of Security Considerations more
- accessible, Security Considerations for the transport,
- authentication, and connection documents have been gathered here.
-
- The transport protocol [1] provides a confidential channel over an
- insecure network. It performs server host authentication, key
- exchange, encryption, and integrity protection. It also derives a
- unique session id that may be used by higher-level protocols.
-
- The authentication protocol [2] provides a suite of mechanisms which
- can be used to authenticate the client user to the server.
- Individual mechanisms specified in the in authentication protocol use
- the session id provided by the transport protocol and/or depend on
- the security and integrity guarantees of the transport protocol.
-
- The connection protocol [3] specifies a mechanism to multiplex
- multiple streams [channels] of data over the confidential and
- authenticated transport. It also specifies channels for accessing an
- interactive shell, for 'proxy-forwarding' various external protocols
- over the secure transport (including arbitrary TCP/IP protocols), and
- for accessing secure 'subsystems' on the server host.
-
-9.1 Pseudo-Random Number Generation
-
- This protocol binds each session key to the session by including
- random, session specific data in the hash used to produce session
- keys. Special care should be taken to ensure that all of the random
- numbers are of good quality. If the random data here (e.g., DH
-
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- parameters) are pseudo-random then the pseudo-random number generator
- should be cryptographically secure (i.e., its next output not easily
- guessed even when knowing all previous outputs) and, furthermore,
- proper entropy needs to be added to the pseudo-random number
- generator. RFC 1750 [1750] offers suggestions for sources of random
- numbers and entropy. Implementors should note the importance of
- entropy and the well-meant, anecdotal warning about the difficulty in
- properly implementing pseudo-random number generating functions.
-
- The amount of entropy available to a given client or server may
- sometimes be less than what is required. In this case one must
- either resort to pseudo-random number generation regardless of
- insufficient entropy or refuse to run the protocol. The latter is
- preferable.
-
-9.2 Transport
-
-9.2.1 Confidentiality
-
- It is beyond the scope of this document and the Secure Shell Working
- Group to analyze or recommend specific ciphers other than the ones
- which have been established and accepted within the industry. At the
- time of this writing, ciphers commonly in use include 3DES, ARCFOUR,
- twofish, serpent and blowfish. AES has been accepted by The
- published as a US Federal Information Processing Standards [FIPS-197]
- and the cryptographic community as being acceptable for this purpose
- as well has accepted AES. As always, implementors and users should
- check current literature to ensure that no recent vulnerabilities
- have been found in ciphers used within products. Implementors should
- also check to see which ciphers are considered to be relatively
- stronger than others and should recommend their use to users over
- relatively weaker ciphers. It would be considered good form for an
- implementation to politely and unobtrusively notify a user that a
- stronger cipher is available and should be used when a weaker one is
- actively chosen.
-
- The "none" cipher is provided for debugging and SHOULD NOT be used
- except for that purpose. It's cryptographic properties are
- sufficiently described in RFC 2410, which will show that its use does
- not meet the intent of this protocol.
-
- The relative merits of these and other ciphers may also be found in
- current literature. Two references that may provide information on
- the subject are [SCHNEIER] and [KAUFMAN,PERLMAN,SPECINER]. Both of
- these describe the CBC mode of operation of certain ciphers and the
- weakness of this scheme. Essentially, this mode is theoretically
- vulnerable to chosen cipher-text attacks because of the high
- predictability of the start of packet sequence. However, this attack
-
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- is still deemed difficult and not considered fully practicable
- especially if relatively longer block sizes are used.
-
- Additionally, another CBC mode attack may be mitigated through the
- insertion of packets containing SSH_MSG_IGNORE. Without this
- technique, a specific attack may be successful. For this attack
- (commonly known as the Rogaway attack
- [ROGAWAY],[DAI],[BELLARE,KOHNO,NAMPREMPRE]) to work, the attacker
- would need to know the IV of the next block that is going to be
- encrypted. In CBC mode that is the output of the encryption of the
- previous block. If the attacker does not have any way to see the
- packet yet (i.e it is in the internal buffers of the ssh
- implementation or even in the kernel) then this attack will not work.
- If the last packet has been sent out to the network (i.e the attacker
- has access to it) then he can use the attack.
-
- In the optimal case an implementor would need to add an extra packet
- only if the packet has been sent out onto the network and there are
- no other packets waiting for transmission. Implementors may wish to
- check to see if there are any unsent packets awaiting transmission,
- but unfortunately it is not normally easy to obtain this information
- from the kernel or buffers. If there are not, then a packet
- containing SSH_MSG_IGNORE SHOULD be sent. If a new packet is added
- to the stream every time the attacker knows the IV that is supposed
- to be used for the next packet, then the attacker will not be able to
- guess the correct IV, thus the attack will never be successfull.
-
- As an example, consider the following case:
-
-
- Client Server
- ------ ------
- TCP(seq=x, len=500) ->
- contains Record 1
-
- [500 ms passes, no ACK]
-
- TCP(seq=x, len=1000) ->
- contains Records 1,2
-
- ACK
-
-
- 1. The Nagle algorithm + TCP retransmits mean that the two records
- get coalesced into a single TCP segment
- 2. Record 2 is *not* at the beginning of the TCP segment and never
- will be, since it gets ACKed.
-
-
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- 3. Yet, the attack is possible because Record 1 has already been
- seen.
-
- As this example indicates, it's totally unsafe to use the existence
- of unflushed data in the TCP buffers proper as a guide to whether you
- need an empty packet, since when you do the second write(), the
- buffers will contain the un-ACKed Record 1.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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- On the other hand, it's perfectly safe to have the following
- situation:
-
-
- Client Server
- ------ ------
- TCP(seq=x, len=500) ->
- contains SSH_MSG_IGNORE
-
- TCP(seq=y, len=500) ->
- contains Data
-
- Provided that the IV for second SSH Record is fixed after the data for
- the Data packet is determined -i.e. you do:
- read from user
- encrypt null packet
- encrypt data packet
-
-
-9.2.2 Data Integrity
-
- This protocol does allow the Data Integrity mechanism to be disabled.
- Implementors SHOULD be wary of exposing this feature for any purpose
- other than debugging. Users and administrators SHOULD be explicitly
- warned anytime the "none" MAC is enabled.
-
- So long as the "none" MAC is not used, this protocol provides data
- integrity.
-
- Because MACs use a 32 bit sequence number, they might start to leak
- information after 2**32 packets have been sent. However, following
- the rekeying recommendations should prevent this attack. The
- transport protocol [1] recommends rekeying after one gigabyte of
- data, and the smallest possible packet is 16 bytes. Therefore,
- rekeying SHOULD happen after 2**28 packets at the very most.
-
-9.2.3 Replay
-
- The use of a MAC other than 'none' provides integrity and
- authentication. In addition, the transport protocol provides a
- unique session identifier (bound in part to pseudo-random data that
- is part of the algorithm and key exchange process) that can be used
- by higher level protocols to bind data to a given session and prevent
- replay of data from prior sessions. For example, the authentication
- protocol uses this to prevent replay of signatures from previous
- sessions. Because public key authentication exchanges are
- cryptographically bound to the session (i.e., to the initial key
- exchange) they cannot be successfully replayed in other sessions.
-
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- Note that the session ID can be made public without harming the
- security of the protocol.
-
- If two session happen to have the same session ID [hash of key
- exchanges] then packets from one can be replayed against the other.
- It must be stressed that the chances of such an occurrence are,
- needless to say, minimal when using modern cryptographic methods.
- This is all the more so true when specifying larger hash function
- outputs and DH parameters.
-
- Replay detection using monotonically increasing sequence numbers as
- input to the MAC, or HMAC in some cases, is described in [RFC2085] />
- [RFC2246], [RFC2743], [RFC1964], [RFC2025], and [RFC1510]. The
- underlying construct is discussed in [RFC2104]. Essentially a
- different sequence number in each packet ensures that at least this
- one input to the MAC function will be unique and will provide a
- nonrecurring MAC output that is not predictable to an attacker. If
- the session stays active long enough, however, this sequence number
- will wrap. This event may provide an attacker an opportunity to
- replay a previously recorded packet with an identical sequence number
- but only if the peers have not rekeyed since the transmission of the
- first packet with that sequence number. If the peers have rekeyed,
- then the replay will be detected as the MAC check will fail. For
- this reason, it must be emphasized that peers MUST rekey before a
- wrap of the sequence numbers. Naturally, if an attacker does attempt
- to replay a captured packet before the peers have rekeyed, then the
- receiver of the duplicate packet will not be able to validate the MAC
- and it will be discarded. The reason that the MAC will fail is
- because the receiver will formulate a MAC based upon the packet
- contents, the shared secret, and the expected sequence number. Since
- the replayed packet will not be using that expected sequence number
- (the sequence number of the replayed packet will have already been
- passed by the receiver) then the calculated MAC will not match the
- MAC received with the packet.
-
-9.2.4 Man-in-the-middle
-
- This protocol makes no assumptions nor provisions for an
- infrastructure or means for distributing the public keys of hosts. It
- is expected that this protocol will sometimes be used without first
- verifying the association between the server host key and the server
- host name. Such usage is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.
- This section describes this and encourages administrators and users
- to understand the importance of verifying this association before any
- session is initiated.
-
- There are three cases of man-in-the-middle attacks to consider. The
- first is where an attacker places a device between the client and the
-
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- server before the session is initiated. In this case, the attack
- device is trying to mimic the legitimate server and will offer its
- public key to the client when the client initiates a session. If it
- were to offer the public key of the server, then it would not be able
- to decrypt or sign the transmissions between the legitimate server
- and the client unless it also had access to the private-key of the
- host. The attack device will also, simultaneously to this, initiate
- a session to the legitimate server masquerading itself as the client.
- If the public key of the server had been securely distributed to the
- client prior to that session initiation, the key offered to the
- client by the attack device will not match the key stored on the
- client. In that case, the user SHOULD be given a warning that the
- offered host key does not match the host key cached on the client.
- As described in Section 3.1 of [ARCH], the user may be free to accept
- the new key and continue the session. It is RECOMMENDED that the
- warning provide sufficient information to the user of the client
- device so they may make an informed decision. If the user chooses to
- continue the session with the stored public-key of the server (not
- the public-key offered at the start of the session), then the session
- specific data between the attacker and server will be different
- between the client-to-attacker session and the attacker-to-server
- sessions due to the randomness discussed above. From this, the
- attacker will not be able to make this attack work since the attacker
- will not be able to correctly sign packets containing this session
- specific data from the server since he does not have the private key
- of that server.
-
- The second case that should be considered is similar to the first
- case in that it also happens at the time of connection but this case
- points out the need for the secure distribution of server public
- keys. If the server public keys are not securely distributed then
- the client cannot know if it is talking to the intended server. An
- attacker may use social engineering techniques to pass off server
- keys to unsuspecting users and may then place a man-in-the-middle
- attack device between the legitimate server and the clients. If this
- is allowed to happen then the clients will form client-to-attacker
- sessions and the attacker will form attacker-to-server sessions and
- will be able to monitor and manipulate all of the traffic between the
- clients and the legitimate servers. Server administrators are
- encouraged to make host key fingerprints available for checking by
- some means whose security does not rely on the integrity of the
- actual host keys. Possible mechanisms are discussed in Section 3.1
- of [SSH-ARCH] and may also include secured Web pages, physical pieces
- of paper, etc. Implementors SHOULD provide recommendations on how
- best to do this with their implementation. Because the protocol is
- extensible, future extensions to the protocol may provide better
- mechanisms for dealing with the need to know the server's host key
- before connecting. For example, making the host key fingerprint
-
-
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- available through a secure DNS lookup, or using kerberos over gssapi
- during key exchange to authenticate the server are possibilities.
-
- In the third man-in-the-middle case, attackers may attempt to
- manipulate packets in transit between peers after the session has
- been established. As described in the Replay part of this section, a
- successful attack of this nature is very improbable. As in the
- Replay section, this reasoning does assume that the MAC is secure and
- that it is infeasible to construct inputs to a MAC algorithm to give
- a known output. This is discussed in much greater detail in Section
- 6 of RFC 2104. If the MAC algorithm has a vulnerability or is weak
- enough, then the attacker may be able to specify certain inputs to
- yield a known MAC. With that they may be able to alter the contents
- of a packet in transit. Alternatively the attacker may be able to
- exploit the algorithm vulnerability or weakness to find the shared
- secret by reviewing the MACs from captured packets. In either of
- those cases, an attacker could construct a packet or packets that
- could be inserted into an SSH stream. To prevent that, implementors
- are encouraged to utilize commonly accepted MAC algorithms and
- administrators are encouraged to watch current literature and
- discussions of cryptography to ensure that they are not using a MAC
- algorithm that has a recently found vulnerability or weakness.
-
- In summary, the use of this protocol without a reliable association
- of the binding between a host and its host keys is inherently
- insecure and is NOT RECOMMENDED. It may however be necessary in
- non-security critical environments, and will still provide protection
- against passive attacks. Implementors of protocols and applications
- running on top of this protocol should keep this possibility in mind.
-
-9.2.5 Denial-of-service
-
- This protocol is designed to be used over a reliable transport. If
- transmission errors or message manipulation occur, the connection is
- closed. The connection SHOULD be re-established if this occurs.
- Denial of service attacks of this type ("wire cutter") are almost
- impossible to avoid.
-
- In addition, this protocol is vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks
- because an attacker can force the server to go through the CPU and
- memory intensive tasks of connection setup and key exchange without
- authenticating. Implementors SHOULD provide features that make this
- more difficult. For example, only allowing connections from a subset
- of IPs known to have valid users.
-
-9.2.6 Covert Channels
-
- The protocol was not designed to eliminate covert channels. For
-
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- example, the padding, SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages, and several other
- places in the protocol can be used to pass covert information, and
- the recipient has no reliable way to verify whether such information
- is being sent.
-
-9.2.7 Forward Secrecy
-
- It should be noted that the Diffie-Hellman key exchanges may provide
- perfect forward secrecy (PFS). PFS is essentially defined as the
- cryptographic property of a key-establishment protocol in which the
- compromise of a session key or long-term private key after a given
- session does not cause the compromise of any earlier session. [ANSI
- T1.523-2001] SSHv2 sessions resulting from a key exchange using
- diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 are secure even if private keying/
- authentication material is later revealed, but not if the session
- keys are revealed. So, given this definition of PFS, SSHv2 does have
- PFS. It is hoped that all other key exchange mechanisms proposed and
- used in the future will also provide PFS. This property is not
- commuted to any of the applications or protocols using SSH as a
- transport however. The transport layer of SSH provides
- confidentiality for password authentication and other methods that
- rely on secret data.
-
- Of course, if the DH private parameters for the client and server are
- revealed then the session key is revealed, but these items can be
- thrown away after the key exchange completes. It's worth pointing
- out that these items should not be allowed to end up on swap space
- and that they should be erased from memory as soon as the key
- exchange completes.
-
-9.3 Authentication Protocol
-
- The purpose of this protocol is to perform client user
- authentication. It assumes that this run over a secure transport
- layer protocol, which has already authenticated the server machine,
- established an encrypted communications channel, and computed a
- unique session identifier for this session.
-
- Several authentication methods with different security
- characteristics are allowed. It is up to the server's local policy
- to decide which methods (or combinations of methods) it is willing to
- accept for each user. Authentication is no stronger than the weakest
- combination allowed.
-
- The server may go into a "sleep" period after repeated unsuccessful
- authentication attempts to make key search more difficult for
- attackers. Care should be taken so that this doesn't become a
- self-denial of service vector.
-
-
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-9.3.1 Weak Transport
-
- If the transport layer does not provide confidentiality,
- authentication methods that rely on secret data SHOULD be disabled.
- If it does not provide strong integrity protection, requests to
- change authentication data (e.g. a password change) SHOULD be
- disabled to prevent an attacker from modifying the ciphertext
- without being noticed, or rendering the new authentication data
- unusable (denial of service).
-
- The assumption as stated above that the Authentication Protocol only
- run over a secure transport that has previously authenticated the
- server is very important to note. People deploying SSH are reminded
- of the consequences of man-in-the-middle attacks if the client does
- not have a very strong a priori association of the server with the
- host key of that server. Specifically for the case of the
- Authentication Protocol the client may form a session to a
- man-in-the-middle attack device and divulge user credentials such as
- their username and password. Even in the cases of authentication
- where no user credentials are divulged, an attacker may still gain
- information they shouldn't have by capturing key-strokes in much the
- same way that a honeypot works.
-
-9.3.2 Debug messages
-
- Special care should be taken when designing debug messages. These
- messages may reveal surprising amounts of information about the host
- if not properly designed. Debug messages can be disabled (during
- user authentication phase) if high security is required.
- Administrators of host machines should make all attempts to
- compartmentalize all event notification messages and protect them
- from unwarranted observation. Developers should be aware of the
- sensitive nature of some of the normal event messages and debug
- messages and may want to provide guidance to administrators on ways
- to keep this information away from unauthorized people. Developers
- should consider minimizing the amount of sensitive information
- obtainable by users during the authentication phase in accordance
- with the local policies. For this reason, it is RECOMMENDED that
- debug messages be initially disabled at the time of deployment and
- require an active decision by an administrator to allow them to be
- enabled. It is also RECOMMENDED that a message expressing this
- concern be presented to the administrator of a system when the action
- is taken to enable debugging messages.
-
-9.3.3 Local security policy
-
- Implementer MUST ensure that the credentials provided validate the
- professed user and also MUST ensure that the local policy of the
-
-
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- server permits the user the access requested. In particular, because
- of the flexible nature of the SSH connection protocol, it may not be
- possible to determine the local security policy, if any, that should
- apply at the time of authentication because the kind of service being
- requested is not clear at that instant. For example, local policy
- might allow a user to access files on the server, but not start an
- interactive shell. However, during the authentication protocol, it is
- not known whether the user will be accessing files or attempting to
- use an interactive shell, or even both. In any event, where local
- security policy for the server host exists, it MUST be applied and
- enforced correctly.
-
- Implementors are encouraged to provide a default local policy and
- make its parameters known to administrators and users. At the
- discretion of the implementors, this default policy may be along the
- lines of 'anything goes' where there are no restrictions placed upon
- users, or it may be along the lines of 'excessively restrictive' in
- which case the administrators will have to actively make changes to
- this policy to meet their needs. Alternatively, it may be some
- attempt at providing something practical and immediately useful to
- the administrators of the system so they don't have to put in much
- effort to get SSH working. Whatever choice is made MUST be applied
- and enforced as required above.
-
-9.3.4 Public key authentication
-
- The use of public-key authentication assumes that the client host has
- not been compromised. It also assumes that the private-key of the
- server host has not been compromised.
-
- This risk can be mitigated by the use of passphrases on private keys;
- however, this is not an enforceable policy. The use of smartcards,
- or other technology to make passphrases an enforceable policy is
- suggested.
-
- The server could require both password and public-key authentication,
- however, this requires the client to expose its password to the
- server (see section on password authentication below.)
-
-9.3.5 Password authentication
-
- The password mechanism as specified in the authentication protocol
- assumes that the server has not been compromised. If the server has
- been compromised, using password authentication will reveal a valid
- username / password combination to the attacker, which may lead to
- further compromises.
-
- This vulnerability can be mitigated by using an alternative form of
-
-
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- authentication. For example, public-key authentication makes no
- assumptions about security on the server.
-
-9.3.6 Host based authentication
-
- Host based authentication assumes that the client has not been
- compromised. There are no mitigating strategies, other than to use
- host based authentication in combination with another authentication
- method.
-
-9.4 Connection protocol
-
-9.4.1 End point security
-
- End point security is assumed by the connection protocol. If the
- server has been compromised, any terminal sessions, port forwarding,
- or systems accessed on the host are compromised. There are no
- mitigating factors for this.
-
- If the client end point has been compromised, and the server fails to
- stop the attacker at the authentication protocol, all services
- exposed (either as subsystems or through forwarding) will be
- vulnerable to attack. Implementors SHOULD provide mechanisms for
- administrators to control which services are exposed to limit the
- vulnerability of other services.
-
- These controls might include controlling which machines and ports can
- be target in 'port-forwarding' operations, which users are allowed to
- use interactive shell facilities, or which users are allowed to use
- exposed subsystems.
-
-9.4.2 Proxy forwarding
-
- The SSH connection protocol allows for proxy forwarding of other
- protocols such as SNMP, POP3, and HTTP. This may be a concern for
- network administrators who wish to control the access of certain
- applications by users located outside of their physical location.
- Essentially, the forwarding of these protocols may violate site
- specific security policies as they may be undetectably tunneled
- through a firewall. Implementors SHOULD provide an administrative
- mechanism to control the proxy forwarding functionality so that site
- specific security policies may be upheld.
-
- In addition, a reverse proxy forwarding functionality is available,
- which again can be used to bypass firewall controls.
-
- As indicated above, end-point security is assumed during proxy
- forwarding operations. Failure of end-point security will compromise
-
-
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- all data passed over proxy forwarding.
-
-9.4.3 X11 forwarding
-
- Another form of proxy forwarding provided by the ssh connection
- protocol is the forwarding of the X11 protocol. If end-point
- security has been compromised, X11 forwarding may allow attacks
- against the X11 server. Users and administrators should, as a matter
- of course, use appropriate X11 security mechanisms to prevent
- unauthorized use of the X11 server. Implementors, administrators and
- users who wish to further explore the security mechanisms of X11 are
- invited to read [SCHEIFLER] and analyze previously reported problems
- with the interactions between SSH forwarding and X11 in CERT
- vulnerabilities VU#363181 and VU#118892 [CERT].
-
- X11 display forwarding with SSH, by itself, is not sufficient to
- correct well known problems with X11 security [VENEMA]. However, X11
- display forwarding in SSHv2 (or other, secure protocols), combined
- with actual and pseudo-displays which accept connections only over
- local IPC mechanisms authorized by permissions or ACLs, does correct
- many X11 security problems as long as the "none" MAC is not used. It
- is RECOMMENDED that X11 display implementations default to allowing
- display opens only over local IPC. It is RECOMMENDED that SSHv2
- server implementations that support X11 forwarding default to
- allowing display opens only over local IPC. On single-user systems
- it might be reasonable to default to allowing local display opens
- over TCP/IP.
-
- Implementors of the X11 forwarding protocol SHOULD implement the
- magic cookie access checking spoofing mechanism as described in
- [ssh-connect] as an additional mechanism to prevent unauthorized use
- of the proxy.
-
-Normative References
-
- [SSH-ARCH]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Protocol Architecture", I-D
- draft-ietf-architecture-15.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-TRANS]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Transport Layer Protocol", I-D
- draft-ietf-transport-17.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-USERAUTH]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Authentication Protocol", I-D
- draft-ietf-userauth-18.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-CONNECT]
-
-
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-
-
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Connection Protocol", I-D
- draft-ietf-connect-18.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-NUMBERS]
- Lehtinen, S. and D. Moffat, "SSH Protocol Assigned
- Numbers", I-D draft-ietf-secsh-assignednumbers-05.txt, Oct
- 2003.
-
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
- Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
-
-Informative References
-
- [FIPS-186]
- Federal Information Processing Standards Publication,
- "FIPS PUB 186, Digital Signature Standard", May 1994.
-
- [FIPS-197]
- National Institue of Standards and Technology, "FIPS 197,
- Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard",
- November 2001.
-
- [ANSI T1.523-2001]
- American National Standards Insitute, Inc., "Telecom
- Glossary 2000", February 2001.
-
- [SCHEIFLER]
- Scheifler, R., "X Window System : The Complete Reference
- to Xlib, X Protocol, Icccm, Xlfd, 3rd edition.", Digital
- Press ISBN 1555580882, Feburary 1992.
-
- [RFC0854] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol
- Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, May 1983.
-
- [RFC0894] Hornig, C., "Standard for the transmission of IP datagrams
- over Ethernet networks", STD 41, RFC 894, April 1984.
-
- [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
- STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
-
- [RFC1134] Perkins, D., "Point-to-Point Protocol: A proposal for
- multi-protocol transmission of datagrams over
- Point-to-Point links", RFC 1134, November 1989.
-
- [RFC1282] Kantor, B., "BSD Rlogin", RFC 1282, December 1991.
-
- [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and B. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network
- Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993.
-
-
-
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-
-Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003
-
-
- [RFC1700] Reynolds, J. and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", RFC 1700,
- October 1994.
-
- [RFC1750] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness
- Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.
-
- [RFC3066] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of
- Languages", BCP 47, RFC 3066, January 2001.
-
- [RFC1964] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC
- 1964, June 1996.
-
- [RFC2025] Adams, C., "The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism
- (SPKM)", RFC 2025, October 1996.
-
- [RFC2085] Oehler, M. and R. Glenn, "HMAC-MD5 IP Authentication with
- Replay Prevention", RFC 2085, February 1997.
-
- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
- Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
- February 1997.
-
- [RFC2246] Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A.
- and P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246,
- January 1999.
-
- [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
- 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
-
- [RFC2410] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and
- Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, November 1998.
-
- [RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
- IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
- October 1998.
-
- [RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
- Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
-
- [SCHNEIER]
- Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition:
- protocols algorithms and source in code in C", 1996.
-
- [KAUFMAN,PERLMAN,SPECINER]
- Kaufman, C., Perlman, R. and M. Speciner, "Network
- Security: PRIVATE Communication in a PUBLIC World", 1995.
-
- [CERT] CERT Coordination Center, The., "http://www.cert.org/nav/
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 26]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Protocol Architecture Oct 2003
-
-
- index_red.html".
-
- [VENEMA] Venema, W., "Murphy's Law and Computer Security",
- Proceedings of 6th USENIX Security Symposium, San Jose CA
- http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/
- sec96/venema.html, July 1996.
-
- [ROGAWAY] Rogaway, P., "Problems with Proposed IP Cryptography",
- Unpublished paper http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/
- papers/draft-rogaway-ipsec-comments-00.txt, 1996.
-
- [DAI] Dai, W., "An attack against SSH2 protocol", Email to the
- SECSH Working Group [email protected] ftp://
- ftp.ietf.org/ietf-mail-archive/secsh/2002-02.mail, Feb
- 2002.
-
- [BELLARE,KOHNO,NAMPREMPRE]
- Bellaire, M., Kohno, T. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated
- Encryption in SSH: Fixing the SSH Binary Packet Protocol",
- , Sept 2002.
-
-
-Authors' Addresses
-
- Tatu Ylonen
- SSH Communications Security Corp
- Fredrikinkatu 42
- HELSINKI FIN-00100
- Finland
-
-
-
- Darren J. Moffat (editor)
- Sun Microsystems, Inc
- 17 Network Circle
- Menlo Park CA 94025
- USA
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-Intellectual Property Statement
-
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- pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
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- This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
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-5 701 M
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-(Expires: March 31, 2004 D. Moffat, Editor, Ed.) s
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-( Sun Microsystems, Inc) s
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-( SSH Connection Protocol) s
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-( draft-ietf-secsh-connect-18.txt) s
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-( time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference) s
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-( material or to cite them other than as "work in progress.") s
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-( The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://) s
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-( www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.) s
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-( The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at) s
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-( http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.) s
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-( This Internet-Draft will expire on March 31, 2004.) s
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-(Copyright Notice) s
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-( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2003\). All Rights Reserved.) s
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-(Abstract) s
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-( SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network) s
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-( services over an insecure network.) s
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-( This document describes the SSH Connection Protocol. It provides) s
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-( interactive login sessions, remote execution of commands, forwarded) s
-5 228 M
-( TCP/IP connections, and forwarded X11 connections. All of these) s
-5 217 M
-( channels are multiplexed into a single encrypted tunnel.) s
-5 195 M
-( The SSH Connection Protocol has been designed to run on top of the) s
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-( SSH transport layer and user authentication protocols.) s
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-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 1]) s
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-( 1. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3) s
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-( 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3) s
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-( 5.3 Closing a Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6) s
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-( 5.4 Channel-Specific Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7) s
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-( 6.5 Starting a Shell or a Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10) s
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-( 6.6 Session Data Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11) s
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-( 6.7 Window Dimension Change Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12) s
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-( 6.8 Local Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12) s
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-( 6.9 Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12) s
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-( 6.10 Returning Exit Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13) s
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-( 7. TCP/IP Port Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14) s
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-( 7.1 Requesting Port Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14) s
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-( 7.2 TCP/IP Forwarding Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15) s
-5 393 M
-( 8. Encoding of Terminal Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16) s
-5 382 M
-( 9. Summary of Message Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18) s
-5 371 M
-( 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18) s
-5 360 M
-( 11. iana cONSiderations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19) s
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-( 12. Intellectual Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19) s
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-( Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19) s
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-( Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20) s
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-( Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20) s
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-(1. Contributors) s
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-( The major original contributors of this document were: Tatu Ylonen,) s
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-( Tero Kivinen, Timo J. Rinne, Sami Lehtinen \(all of SSH Communications) s
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-( Security Corp\), and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen \(University of) s
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-( Jyvaskyla\)) s
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-( The document editor is: [email protected]. Comments on this) s
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-( internet draft should be sent to the IETF SECSH working group,) s
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-( details at: http://ietf.org/html.charters/secsh-charter.html) s
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-(2. Introduction) s
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-( TCP/IP connections, and forwarded X11 connections. The service name) s
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-( for this protocol is "ssh-connection".) s
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-( This document should be read only after reading the SSH architecture) s
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-( document [SSH-ARCH]. This document freely uses terminology and) s
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-( notation from the architecture document without reference or further) s
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-( explanation.) s
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-(3. Conventions Used in This Document) s
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-( The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",) s
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-( and "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as) s
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-( document [SSH-ARCH].) s
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-( The architecture document also discusses the algorithm naming) s
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-( conventions that MUST be used with the SSH protocols.) s
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-(4. Global Requests) s
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-( remote end "globally", independent of any channels. An example is a) s
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-( requests use the following format.) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( Request names follow the DNS extensibility naming convention outlined) s
-5 679 M
-( in [SSH-ARCH].) s
-5 657 M
-( The recipient will respond to this message with) s
-5 646 M
-( SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS or SSH_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE if `want reply' is) s
-5 635 M
-( TRUE.) s
-5 613 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) s
-5 602 M
-( ..... response specific data) s
-5 580 M
-( Usually the response specific data is non-existent.) s
-5 558 M
-( If the recipient does not recognize or support the request, it simply) s
-5 547 M
-( responds with SSH_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE.) s
-5 525 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) s
-5 492 M
-(5. Channel Mechanism) s
-5 470 M
-( All terminal sessions, forwarded connections, etc. are channels.) s
-5 459 M
-( Either side may open a channel. Multiple channels are multiplexed) s
-5 448 M
-( into a single connection.) s
-5 426 M
-( Channels are identified by numbers at each end. The number referring) s
-5 415 M
-( to a channel may be different on each side. Requests to open a) s
-5 404 M
-( channel contain the sender's channel number. Any other) s
-5 393 M
-( channel-related messages contain the recipient's channel number for) s
-5 382 M
-( the channel.) s
-5 360 M
-( Channels are flow-controlled. No data may be sent to a channel until) s
-5 349 M
-( a message is received to indicate that window space is available.) s
-5 327 M
-(5.1 Opening a Channel) s
-5 305 M
-( When either side wishes to open a new channel, it allocates a local) s
-5 294 M
-( number for the channel. It then sends the following message to the) s
-5 283 M
-( other side, and includes the local channel number and initial window) s
-5 272 M
-( size in the message.) s
-5 250 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN) s
-5 239 M
-( string channel type \(restricted to US-ASCII\)) s
-5 228 M
-( uint32 sender channel) s
-5 217 M
-( uint32 initial window size) s
-5 206 M
-( uint32 maximum packet size) s
-5 195 M
-( ... channel type specific data follows) s
-5 173 M
-( The channel type is a name as described in the SSH architecture) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 4]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( document, with similar extension mechanisms. `sender channel' is a) s
-5 679 M
-( local identifier for the channel used by the sender of this message.) s
-5 668 M
-( `initial window size' specifies how many bytes of channel data can be) s
-5 657 M
-( sent to the sender of this message without adjusting the window.) s
-5 646 M
-( `Maximum packet size' specifies the maximum size of an individual) s
-5 635 M
-( data packet that can be sent to the sender \(for example, one might) s
-5 624 M
-( want to use smaller packets for interactive connections to get better) s
-5 613 M
-( interactive response on slow links\).) s
-5 591 M
-( The remote side then decides whether it can open the channel, and) s
-5 580 M
-( responds with either) s
-5 558 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) s
-5 547 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 536 M
-( uint32 sender channel) s
-5 525 M
-( uint32 initial window size) s
-5 514 M
-( uint32 maximum packet size) s
-5 503 M
-( ... channel type specific data follows) s
-5 481 M
-( where `recipient channel' is the channel number given in the original) s
-5 470 M
-( open request, and `sender channel' is the channel number allocated by) s
-5 459 M
-( the other side, or) s
-5 437 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE) s
-5 426 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 415 M
-( uint32 reason code) s
-5 404 M
-( string additional textual information \(ISO-10646 UTF-8 [RFC2279]\)) s
-5 393 M
-( string language tag \(as defined in [RFC3066]\)) s
-5 371 M
-( If the recipient of the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN message does not support) s
-5 360 M
-( the specified channel type, it simply responds with) s
-5 349 M
-( SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE. The client MAY show the additional) s
-5 338 M
-( information to the user. If this is done, the client software should) s
-5 327 M
-( take the precautions discussed in [SSH-ARCH].) s
-5 305 M
-( The following reason codes are defined:) s
-5 283 M
-( #define SSH_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1) s
-5 272 M
-( #define SSH_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2) s
-5 261 M
-( #define SSH_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3) s
-5 250 M
-( #define SSH_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4) s
-5 217 M
-(5.2 Data Transfer) s
-5 195 M
-( The window size specifies how many bytes the other party can send) s
-5 184 M
-( before it must wait for the window to be adjusted. Both parties use) s
-5 173 M
-( the following message to adjust the window.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 5]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST) s
-5 679 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 668 M
-( uint32 bytes to add) s
-5 646 M
-( After receiving this message, the recipient MAY send the given number) s
-5 635 M
-( of bytes more than it was previously allowed to send; the window size) s
-5 624 M
-( is incremented.) s
-5 602 M
-( Data transfer is done with messages of the following type.) s
-5 580 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA) s
-5 569 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 558 M
-( string data) s
-5 536 M
-( The maximum amount of data allowed is the current window size. The) s
-5 525 M
-( window size is decremented by the amount of data sent. Both parties) s
-5 514 M
-( MAY ignore all extra data sent after the allowed window is empty.) s
-5 492 M
-( Additionally, some channels can transfer several types of data. An) s
-5 481 M
-( example of this is stderr data from interactive sessions. Such data) s
-5 470 M
-( can be passed with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA messages, where a) s
-5 459 M
-( separate integer specifies the type of the data. The available types) s
-5 448 M
-( and their interpretation depend on the type of the channel.) s
-5 426 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA) s
-5 415 M
-( uint32 recipient_channel) s
-5 404 M
-( uint32 data_type_code) s
-5 393 M
-( string data) s
-5 371 M
-( Data sent with these messages consumes the same window as ordinary) s
-5 360 M
-( data.) s
-5 338 M
-( Currently, only the following type is defined.) s
-5 316 M
-( #define SSH_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1) s
-5 283 M
-(5.3 Closing a Channel) s
-5 261 M
-( When a party will no longer send more data to a channel, it SHOULD) s
-5 250 M
-( send SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF.) s
-5 228 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF) s
-5 217 M
-( uint32 recipient_channel) s
-5 195 M
-( No explicit response is sent to this message; however, the) s
-5 184 M
-( application may send EOF to whatever is at the other end of the) s
-5 173 M
-( channel. Note that the channel remains open after this message, and) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 6]) s
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-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
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-/user_header_p false def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( more data may still be sent in the other direction. This message) s
-5 679 M
-( does not consume window space and can be sent even if no window space) s
-5 668 M
-( is available.) s
-5 646 M
-( When either party wishes to terminate the channel, it sends) s
-5 635 M
-( SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE. Upon receiving this message, a party MUST) s
-5 624 M
-( send back a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE unless it has already sent this) s
-5 613 M
-( message for the channel. The channel is considered closed for a) s
-5 602 M
-( party when it has both sent and received SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, and) s
-5 591 M
-( the party may then reuse the channel number. A party MAY send) s
-5 580 M
-( SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE without having sent or received) s
-5 569 M
-( SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF.) s
-5 547 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE) s
-5 536 M
-( uint32 recipient_channel) s
-5 514 M
-( This message does not consume window space and can be sent even if no) s
-5 503 M
-( window space is available.) s
-5 481 M
-( It is recommended that any data sent before this message is delivered) s
-5 470 M
-( to the actual destination, if possible.) s
-5 448 M
-(5.4 Channel-Specific Requests) s
-5 426 M
-( Many channel types have extensions that are specific to that) s
-5 415 M
-( particular channel type. An example is requesting a pty \(pseudo) s
-5 404 M
-( terminal\) for an interactive session.) s
-5 382 M
-( All channel-specific requests use the following format.) s
-5 360 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) s
-5 349 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 338 M
-( string request type \(restricted to US-ASCII\)) s
-5 327 M
-( boolean want reply) s
-5 316 M
-( ... type-specific data) s
-5 294 M
-( If want reply is FALSE, no response will be sent to the request.) s
-5 283 M
-( Otherwise, the recipient responds with either SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) s
-5 272 M
-( or SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, or request-specific continuation) s
-5 261 M
-( messages. If the request is not recognized or is not supported for) s
-5 250 M
-( the channel, SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE is returned.) s
-5 228 M
-( This message does not consume window space and can be sent even if no) s
-5 217 M
-( window space is available. Request types are local to each channel) s
-5 206 M
-( type.) s
-5 184 M
-( The client is allowed to send further messages without waiting for) s
-5 173 M
-( the response to the request.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 7]) s
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-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/pagenum 8 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( request type names follow the DNS extensibility naming convention) s
-5 679 M
-( outlined in [SSH-ARCH]) s
-5 657 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) s
-5 646 M
-( uint32 recipient_channel) s
-5 613 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) s
-5 602 M
-( uint32 recipient_channel) s
-5 580 M
-( These messages do not consume window space and can be sent even if no) s
-5 569 M
-( window space is available.) s
-5 547 M
-(6. Interactive Sessions) s
-5 525 M
-( A session is a remote execution of a program. The program may be a) s
-5 514 M
-( shell, an application, a system command, or some built-in subsystem.) s
-5 503 M
-( It may or may not have a tty, and may or may not involve X11) s
-5 492 M
-( forwarding. Multiple sessions can be active simultaneously.) s
-5 470 M
-(6.1 Opening a Session) s
-5 448 M
-( A session is started by sending the following message.) s
-5 426 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN) s
-5 415 M
-( string "session") s
-5 404 M
-( uint32 sender channel) s
-5 393 M
-( uint32 initial window size) s
-5 382 M
-( uint32 maximum packet size) s
-5 360 M
-( Client implementations SHOULD reject any session channel open) s
-5 349 M
-( requests to make it more difficult for a corrupt server to attack the) s
-5 338 M
-( client.) s
-5 316 M
-(6.2 Requesting a Pseudo-Terminal) s
-5 294 M
-( A pseudo-terminal can be allocated for the session by sending the) s
-5 283 M
-( following message.) s
-5 261 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) s
-5 250 M
-( uint32 recipient_channel) s
-5 239 M
-( string "pty-req") s
-5 228 M
-( boolean want_reply) s
-5 217 M
-( string TERM environment variable value \(e.g., vt100\)) s
-5 206 M
-( uint32 terminal width, characters \(e.g., 80\)) s
-5 195 M
-( uint32 terminal height, rows \(e.g., 24\)) s
-5 184 M
-( uint32 terminal width, pixels \(e.g., 640\)) s
-5 173 M
-( uint32 terminal height, pixels \(e.g., 480\)) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 8]) s
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-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
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-/pagenum 9 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( string encoded terminal modes) s
-5 668 M
-( The encoding of terminal modes is described in Section Encoding of) s
-5 657 M
-( Terminal Modes \(Section 8\). Zero dimension parameters MUST be) s
-5 646 M
-( ignored. The character/row dimensions override the pixel dimensions) s
-5 635 M
-( \(when nonzero\). Pixel dimensions refer to the drawable area of the) s
-5 624 M
-( window.) s
-5 602 M
-( The dimension parameters are only informational.) s
-5 580 M
-( The client SHOULD ignore pty requests.) s
-5 558 M
-(6.3 X11 Forwarding) s
-5 536 M
-(6.3.1 Requesting X11 Forwarding) s
-5 514 M
-( X11 forwarding may be requested for a session by sending) s
-5 492 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) s
-5 481 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 470 M
-( string "x11-req") s
-5 459 M
-( boolean want reply) s
-5 448 M
-( boolean single connection) s
-5 437 M
-( string x11 authentication protocol) s
-5 426 M
-( string x11 authentication cookie) s
-5 415 M
-( uint32 x11 screen number) s
-5 393 M
-( It is recommended that the authentication cookie that is sent be a) s
-5 382 M
-( fake, random cookie, and that the cookie is checked and replaced by) s
-5 371 M
-( the real cookie when a connection request is received.) s
-5 349 M
-( X11 connection forwarding should stop when the session channel is) s
-5 338 M
-( closed; however, already opened forwardings should not be) s
-5 327 M
-( automatically closed when the session channel is closed.) s
-5 305 M
-( If `single connection' is TRUE, only a single connection should be) s
-5 294 M
-( forwarded. No more connections will be forwarded after the first, or) s
-5 283 M
-( after the session channel has been closed.) s
-5 261 M
-( The "x11 authentication protocol" is the name of the X11) s
-5 250 M
-( authentication method used, e.g. "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1".) s
-5 228 M
-( The x11 authentication cookie MUST be hexadecimal encoded.) s
-5 206 M
-( X Protocol is documented in [SCHEIFLER].) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 9]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(6.3.2 X11 Channels) s
-5 668 M
-( X11 channels are opened with a channel open request. The resulting) s
-5 657 M
-( channels are independent of the session, and closing the session) s
-5 646 M
-( channel does not close the forwarded X11 channels.) s
-5 624 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN) s
-5 613 M
-( string "x11") s
-5 602 M
-( uint32 sender channel) s
-5 591 M
-( uint32 initial window size) s
-5 580 M
-( uint32 maximum packet size) s
-5 569 M
-( string originator address \(e.g. "192.168.7.38"\)) s
-5 558 M
-( uint32 originator port) s
-5 536 M
-( The recipient should respond with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION) s
-5 525 M
-( or SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE.) s
-5 503 M
-( Implementations MUST reject any X11 channel open requests if they) s
-5 492 M
-( have not requested X11 forwarding.) s
-5 470 M
-(6.4 Environment Variable Passing) s
-5 448 M
-( Environment variables may be passed to the shell/command to be) s
-5 437 M
-( started later. Uncontrolled setting of environment variables in a) s
-5 426 M
-( privileged process can be a security hazard. It is recommended that) s
-5 415 M
-( implementations either maintain a list of allowable variable names or) s
-5 404 M
-( only set environment variables after the server process has dropped) s
-5 393 M
-( sufficient privileges.) s
-5 371 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) s
-5 360 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 349 M
-( string "env") s
-5 338 M
-( boolean want reply) s
-5 327 M
-( string variable name) s
-5 316 M
-( string variable value) s
-5 283 M
-(6.5 Starting a Shell or a Command) s
-5 261 M
-( Once the session has been set up, a program is started at the remote) s
-5 250 M
-( end. The program can be a shell, an application program or a) s
-5 239 M
-( subsystem with a host-independent name. Only one of these requests) s
-5 228 M
-( can succeed per channel.) s
-5 206 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) s
-5 195 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 184 M
-( string "shell") s
-5 173 M
-( boolean want reply) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 10]) s
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-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( This message will request the user's default shell \(typically defined) s
-5 679 M
-( in /etc/passwd in UNIX systems\) to be started at the other end.) s
-5 657 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) s
-5 646 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 635 M
-( string "exec") s
-5 624 M
-( boolean want reply) s
-5 613 M
-( string command) s
-5 591 M
-( This message will request the server to start the execution of the) s
-5 580 M
-( given command. The command string may contain a path. Normal) s
-5 569 M
-( precautions MUST be taken to prevent the execution of unauthorized) s
-5 558 M
-( commands.) s
-5 536 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) s
-5 525 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 514 M
-( string "subsystem") s
-5 503 M
-( boolean want reply) s
-5 492 M
-( string subsystem name) s
-5 470 M
-( This last form executes a predefined subsystem. It is expected that) s
-5 459 M
-( these will include a general file transfer mechanism, and possibly) s
-5 448 M
-( other features. Implementations may also allow configuring more such) s
-5 437 M
-( mechanisms. As the user's shell is usually used to execute the) s
-5 426 M
-( subsystem, it is advisable for the subsystem protocol to have a) s
-5 415 M
-( "magic cookie" at the beginning of the protocol transaction to) s
-5 404 M
-( distinguish it from arbitrary output generated by shell) s
-5 393 M
-( initialization scripts etc. This spurious output from the shell may) s
-5 382 M
-( be filtered out either at the server or at the client.) s
-5 360 M
-( The server SHOULD not halt the execution of the protocol stack when) s
-5 349 M
-( starting a shell or a program. All input and output from these SHOULD) s
-5 338 M
-( be redirected to the channel or to the encrypted tunnel.) s
-5 316 M
-( It is RECOMMENDED to request and check the reply for these messages.) s
-5 305 M
-( The client SHOULD ignore these messages.) s
-5 283 M
-( Subsystem names follow the DNS extensibility naming convention) s
-5 272 M
-( outlined in [SSH-ARCH].) s
-5 250 M
-(6.6 Session Data Transfer) s
-5 228 M
-( Data transfer for a session is done using SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA and) s
-5 217 M
-( SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA packets and the window mechanism. The) s
-5 206 M
-( extended data type SSH_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR has been defined for) s
-5 195 M
-( stderr data.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 11]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(6.7 Window Dimension Change Message) s
-5 668 M
-( When the window \(terminal\) size changes on the client side, it MAY) s
-5 657 M
-( send a message to the other side to inform it of the new dimensions.) s
-5 635 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) s
-5 624 M
-( uint32 recipient_channel) s
-5 613 M
-( string "window-change") s
-5 602 M
-( boolean FALSE) s
-5 591 M
-( uint32 terminal width, columns) s
-5 580 M
-( uint32 terminal height, rows) s
-5 569 M
-( uint32 terminal width, pixels) s
-5 558 M
-( uint32 terminal height, pixels) s
-5 536 M
-( No response SHOULD be sent to this message.) s
-5 514 M
-(6.8 Local Flow Control) s
-5 492 M
-( On many systems, it is possible to determine if a pseudo-terminal is) s
-5 481 M
-( using control-S/control-Q flow control. When flow control is) s
-5 470 M
-( allowed, it is often desirable to do the flow control at the client) s
-5 459 M
-( end to speed up responses to user requests. This is facilitated by) s
-5 448 M
-( the following notification. Initially, the server is responsible for) s
-5 437 M
-( flow control. \(Here, again, client means the side originating the) s
-5 426 M
-( session, and server means the other side.\)) s
-5 404 M
-( The message below is used by the server to inform the client when it) s
-5 393 M
-( can or cannot perform flow control \(control-S/control-Q processing\).) s
-5 382 M
-( If `client can do' is TRUE, the client is allowed to do flow control) s
-5 371 M
-( using control-S and control-Q. The client MAY ignore this message.) s
-5 349 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) s
-5 338 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 327 M
-( string "xon-xoff") s
-5 316 M
-( boolean FALSE) s
-5 305 M
-( boolean client can do) s
-5 283 M
-( No response is sent to this message.) s
-5 261 M
-(6.9 Signals) s
-5 239 M
-( A signal can be delivered to the remote process/service using the) s
-5 228 M
-( following message. Some systems may not implement signals, in which) s
-5 217 M
-( case they SHOULD ignore this message.) s
-5 195 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) s
-5 184 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 173 M
-( string "signal") s
-5 129 M
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( boolean FALSE) s
-5 679 M
-( string signal name without the "SIG" prefix.) s
-5 657 M
-( Signal names will be encoded as discussed in the "exit-signal") s
-5 646 M
-( SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST.) s
-5 624 M
-(6.10 Returning Exit Status) s
-5 602 M
-( When the command running at the other end terminates, the following) s
-5 591 M
-( message can be sent to return the exit status of the command.) s
-5 580 M
-( Returning the status is RECOMMENDED. No acknowledgment is sent for) s
-5 569 M
-( this message. The channel needs to be closed with) s
-5 558 M
-( SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE after this message.) s
-5 536 M
-( The client MAY ignore these messages.) s
-5 514 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) s
-5 503 M
-( uint32 recipient_channel) s
-5 492 M
-( string "exit-status") s
-5 481 M
-( boolean FALSE) s
-5 470 M
-( uint32 exit_status) s
-5 448 M
-( The remote command may also terminate violently due to a signal.) s
-5 437 M
-( Such a condition can be indicated by the following message. A zero) s
-5 426 M
-( exit_status usually means that the command terminated successfully.) s
-5 404 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST) s
-5 393 M
-( uint32 recipient channel) s
-5 382 M
-( string "exit-signal") s
-5 371 M
-( boolean FALSE) s
-5 360 M
-( string signal name without the "SIG" prefix.) s
-5 349 M
-( boolean core dumped) s
-5 338 M
-( string error message \(ISO-10646 UTF-8\)) s
-5 327 M
-( string language tag \(as defined in [RFC3066]\)) s
-5 305 M
-( The signal name is one of the following \(these are from [POSIX]\)) s
-5 283 M
-( ABRT) s
-5 272 M
-( ALRM) s
-5 261 M
-( FPE) s
-5 250 M
-( HUP) s
-5 239 M
-( ILL) s
-5 228 M
-( INT) s
-5 217 M
-( KILL) s
-5 206 M
-( PIPE) s
-5 195 M
-( QUIT) s
-5 184 M
-( SEGV) s
-5 173 M
-( TERM) s
-5 129 M
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( USR1) s
-5 679 M
-( USR2) s
-5 657 M
-( Additional signal names MAY be sent in the format "sig-name@xyz",) s
-5 646 M
-( where `sig-name' and `xyz' may be anything a particular implementor) s
-5 635 M
-( wants \(except the `@' sign\). However, it is suggested that if a) s
-5 624 M
-( `configure' script is used, the non-standard signal names it finds be) s
-5 613 M
-( encoded as "[email protected]", where `SIG' is the signal name) s
-5 602 M
-( without the "SIG" prefix, and `xyz' be the host type, as determined) s
-5 591 M
-( by `config.guess'.) s
-5 569 M
-( The `error message' contains an additional explanation of the error) s
-5 558 M
-( message. The message may consist of multiple lines. The client) s
-5 547 M
-( software MAY display this message to the user. If this is done, the) s
-5 536 M
-( client software should take the precautions discussed in [SSH-ARCH].) s
-5 514 M
-(7. TCP/IP Port Forwarding) s
-5 492 M
-(7.1 Requesting Port Forwarding) s
-5 470 M
-( A party need not explicitly request forwardings from its own end to) s
-5 459 M
-( the other direction. However, if it wishes that connections to a) s
-5 448 M
-( port on the other side be forwarded to the local side, it must) s
-5 437 M
-( explicitly request this.) s
-5 404 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST) s
-5 393 M
-( string "tcpip-forward") s
-5 382 M
-( boolean want reply) s
-5 371 M
-( string address to bind \(e.g. "0.0.0.0"\)) s
-5 360 M
-( uint32 port number to bind) s
-5 338 M
-( `Address to bind' and `port number to bind' specify the IP address) s
-5 327 M
-( and port to which the socket to be listened is bound. The address) s
-5 316 M
-( should be "0.0.0.0" if connections are allowed from anywhere. \(Note) s
-5 305 M
-( that the client can still filter connections based on information) s
-5 294 M
-( passed in the open request.\)) s
-5 272 M
-( Implementations should only allow forwarding privileged ports if the) s
-5 261 M
-( user has been authenticated as a privileged user.) s
-5 239 M
-( Client implementations SHOULD reject these messages; they are) s
-5 228 M
-( normally only sent by the client.) s
-5 195 M
-( If a client passes 0 as port number to bind and has want reply TRUE) s
-5 184 M
-( then the server allocates the next available unprivileged port number) s
-5 173 M
-( and replies with the following message, otherwise there is no) s
-5 129 M
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( response specific data.) s
-5 657 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST_SUCCESS) s
-5 646 M
-( uint32 port that was bound on the server) s
-5 624 M
-( A port forwarding can be cancelled with the following message. Note) s
-5 613 M
-( that channel open requests may be received until a reply to this) s
-5 602 M
-( message is received.) s
-5 580 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST) s
-5 569 M
-( string "cancel-tcpip-forward") s
-5 558 M
-( boolean want reply) s
-5 547 M
-( string address_to_bind \(e.g. "127.0.0.1"\)) s
-5 536 M
-( uint32 port number to bind) s
-5 514 M
-( Client implementations SHOULD reject these messages; they are) s
-5 503 M
-( normally only sent by the client.) s
-5 481 M
-(7.2 TCP/IP Forwarding Channels) s
-5 459 M
-( When a connection comes to a port for which remote forwarding has) s
-5 448 M
-( been requested, a channel is opened to forward the port to the other) s
-5 437 M
-( side.) s
-5 415 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN) s
-5 404 M
-( string "forwarded-tcpip") s
-5 393 M
-( uint32 sender channel) s
-5 382 M
-( uint32 initial window size) s
-5 371 M
-( uint32 maximum packet size) s
-5 360 M
-( string address that was connected) s
-5 349 M
-( uint32 port that was connected) s
-5 338 M
-( string originator IP address) s
-5 327 M
-( uint32 originator port) s
-5 305 M
-( Implementations MUST reject these messages unless they have) s
-5 294 M
-( previously requested a remote TCP/IP port forwarding with the given) s
-5 283 M
-( port number.) s
-5 261 M
-( When a connection comes to a locally forwarded TCP/IP port, the) s
-5 250 M
-( following packet is sent to the other side. Note that these messages) s
-5 239 M
-( MAY be sent also for ports for which no forwarding has been) s
-5 228 M
-( explicitly requested. The receiving side must decide whether to) s
-5 217 M
-( allow the forwarding.) s
-5 195 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN) s
-5 184 M
-( string "direct-tcpip") s
-5 173 M
-( uint32 sender channel) s
-5 129 M
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-PStoPSxform concat
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( uint32 initial window size) s
-5 679 M
-( uint32 maximum packet size) s
-5 668 M
-( string host to connect) s
-5 657 M
-( uint32 port to connect) s
-5 646 M
-( string originator IP address) s
-5 635 M
-( uint32 originator port) s
-5 613 M
-( `Host to connect' and `port to connect' specify the TCP/IP host and) s
-5 602 M
-( port where the recipient should connect the channel. `Host to) s
-5 591 M
-( connect' may be either a domain name or a numeric IP address.) s
-5 569 M
-( `Originator IP address' is the numeric IP address of the machine) s
-5 558 M
-( where the connection request comes from, and `originator port' is the) s
-5 547 M
-( port on the originator host from where the connection came from.) s
-5 525 M
-( Forwarded TCP/IP channels are independent of any sessions, and) s
-5 514 M
-( closing a session channel does not in any way imply that forwarded) s
-5 503 M
-( connections should be closed.) s
-5 481 M
-( Client implementations SHOULD reject direct TCP/IP open requests for) s
-5 470 M
-( security reasons.) s
-5 448 M
-(8. Encoding of Terminal Modes) s
-5 426 M
-( Terminal modes \(as passed in a pty request\) are encoded into a byte) s
-5 415 M
-( stream. It is intended that the coding be portable across different) s
-5 404 M
-( environments.) s
-5 382 M
-( The tty mode description is a stream of bytes. The stream consists) s
-5 371 M
-( of opcode-argument pairs. It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END \(0\).) s
-5 360 M
-( Opcodes 1 to 159 have a single uint32 argument. Opcodes 160 to 255) s
-5 349 M
-( are not yet defined, and cause parsing to stop \(they should only be) s
-5 338 M
-( used after any other data\).) s
-5 316 M
-( The client SHOULD put in the stream any modes it knows about, and the) s
-5 305 M
-( server MAY ignore any modes it does not know about. This allows some) s
-5 294 M
-( degree of machine-independence, at least between systems that use a) s
-5 283 M
-( POSIX-like tty interface. The protocol can support other systems as) s
-5 272 M
-( well, but the client may need to fill reasonable values for a number) s
-5 261 M
-( of parameters so the server pty gets set to a reasonable mode \(the) s
-5 250 M
-( server leaves all unspecified mode bits in their default values, and) s
-5 239 M
-( only some combinations make sense\).) s
-5 217 M
-( The following opcodes have been defined. The naming of opcodes) s
-5 206 M
-( mostly follows the POSIX terminal mode flags.) s
-5 184 M
-( 0 TTY_OP_END Indicates end of options.) s
-5 173 M
-( 1 VINTR Interrupt character; 255 if none. Similarly for the) s
-5 129 M
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( other characters. Not all of these characters are) s
-5 679 M
-( supported on all systems.) s
-5 668 M
-( 2 VQUIT The quit character \(sends SIGQUIT signal on POSIX) s
-5 657 M
-( systems\).) s
-5 646 M
-( 3 VERASE Erase the character to left of the cursor.) s
-5 635 M
-( 4 VKILL Kill the current input line.) s
-5 624 M
-( 5 VEOF End-of-file character \(sends EOF from the terminal\).) s
-5 613 M
-( 6 VEOL End-of-line character in addition to carriage return) s
-5 602 M
-( and/or linefeed.) s
-5 591 M
-( 7 VEOL2 Additional end-of-line character.) s
-5 580 M
-( 8 VSTART Continues paused output \(normally control-Q\).) s
-5 569 M
-( 9 VSTOP Pauses output \(normally control-S\).) s
-5 558 M
-( 10 VSUSP Suspends the current program.) s
-5 547 M
-( 11 VDSUSP Another suspend character.) s
-5 536 M
-( 12 VREPRINT Reprints the current input line.) s
-5 525 M
-( 13 VWERASE Erases a word left of cursor.) s
-5 514 M
-( 14 VLNEXT Enter the next character typed literally, even if it) s
-5 503 M
-( is a special character) s
-5 492 M
-( 15 VFLUSH Character to flush output.) s
-5 481 M
-( 16 VSWTCH Switch to a different shell layer.) s
-5 470 M
-( 17 VSTATUS Prints system status line \(load, command, pid etc\).) s
-5 459 M
-( 18 VDISCARD Toggles the flushing of terminal output.) s
-5 448 M
-( 30 IGNPAR The ignore parity flag. The parameter SHOULD be 0 if) s
-5 437 M
-( this flag is FALSE set, and 1 if it is TRUE.) s
-5 426 M
-( 31 PARMRK Mark parity and framing errors.) s
-5 415 M
-( 32 INPCK Enable checking of parity errors.) s
-5 404 M
-( 33 ISTRIP Strip 8th bit off characters.) s
-5 393 M
-( 34 INLCR Map NL into CR on input.) s
-5 382 M
-( 35 IGNCR Ignore CR on input.) s
-5 371 M
-( 36 ICRNL Map CR to NL on input.) s
-5 360 M
-( 37 IUCLC Translate uppercase characters to lowercase.) s
-5 349 M
-( 38 IXON Enable output flow control.) s
-5 338 M
-( 39 IXANY Any char will restart after stop.) s
-5 327 M
-( 40 IXOFF Enable input flow control.) s
-5 316 M
-( 41 IMAXBEL Ring bell on input queue full.) s
-5 305 M
-( 50 ISIG Enable signals INTR, QUIT, [D]SUSP.) s
-5 294 M
-( 51 ICANON Canonicalize input lines.) s
-5 283 M
-( 52 XCASE Enable input and output of uppercase characters by) s
-5 272 M
-( preceding their lowercase equivalents with `\\'.) s
-5 261 M
-( 53 ECHO Enable echoing.) s
-5 250 M
-( 54 ECHOE Visually erase chars.) s
-5 239 M
-( 55 ECHOK Kill character discards current line.) s
-5 228 M
-( 56 ECHONL Echo NL even if ECHO is off.) s
-5 217 M
-( 57 NOFLSH Don't flush after interrupt.) s
-5 206 M
-( 58 TOSTOP Stop background jobs from output.) s
-5 195 M
-( 59 IEXTEN Enable extensions.) s
-5 184 M
-( 60 ECHOCTL Echo control characters as ^\(Char\).) s
-5 173 M
-( 61 ECHOKE Visual erase for line kill.) s
-5 129 M
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( 62 PENDIN Retype pending input.) s
-5 679 M
-( 70 OPOST Enable output processing.) s
-5 668 M
-( 71 OLCUC Convert lowercase to uppercase.) s
-5 657 M
-( 72 ONLCR Map NL to CR-NL.) s
-5 646 M
-( 73 OCRNL Translate carriage return to newline \(output\).) s
-5 635 M
-( 74 ONOCR Translate newline to carriage return-newline) s
-5 624 M
-( \(output\).) s
-5 613 M
-( 75 ONLRET Newline performs a carriage return \(output\).) s
-5 602 M
-( 90 CS7 7 bit mode.) s
-5 591 M
-( 91 CS8 8 bit mode.) s
-5 580 M
-( 92 PARENB Parity enable.) s
-5 569 M
-( 93 PARODD Odd parity, else even.) s
-5 547 M
-( 128 TTY_OP_ISPEED Specifies the input baud rate in bits per second.) s
-5 536 M
-( 129 TTY_OP_OSPEED Specifies the output baud rate in bits per second.) s
-5 503 M
-(9. Summary of Message Numbers) s
-5 481 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80) s
-5 470 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81) s
-5 459 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82) s
-5 448 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90) s
-5 437 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91) s
-5 426 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92) s
-5 415 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93) s
-5 404 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94) s
-5 393 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95) s
-5 382 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96) s
-5 371 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97) s
-5 360 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98) s
-5 349 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99) s
-5 338 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100) s
-5 305 M
-(10. Security Considerations) s
-5 283 M
-( This protocol is assumed to run on top of a secure, authenticated) s
-5 272 M
-( transport. User authentication and protection against network-level) s
-5 261 M
-( attacks are assumed to be provided by the underlying protocols.) s
-5 239 M
-( It is RECOMMENDED that implementations disable all the potentially) s
-5 228 M
-( dangerous features \(e.g. agent forwarding, X11 forwarding, and TCP/IP) s
-5 217 M
-( forwarding\) if the host key has changed.) s
-5 195 M
-( Full security considerations for this protocol are provided in) s
-5 184 M
-( Section 8 of [SSH-ARCH]) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 18]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(11. iana cONSiderations) s
-5 668 M
-( This document is part of a set, the IANA considerations for the SSH) s
-5 657 M
-( protocol as defined in [SSH-ARCH], [SSH-TRANS], [SSH-USERAUTH],) s
-5 646 M
-( [SSH-CONNECT] are detailed in [SSH-NUMBERS].) s
-5 624 M
-(12. Intellectual Property) s
-5 602 M
-( The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any) s
-5 591 M
-( intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to) s
-5 580 M
-( pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in) s
-5 569 M
-( this document or the extent to which any license under such rights) s
-5 558 M
-( might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it) s
-5 547 M
-( has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the) s
-5 536 M
-( IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and) s
-5 525 M
-( standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of) s
-5 514 M
-( claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of) s
-5 503 M
-( licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to) s
-5 492 M
-( obtain a general license or permission for the use of such) s
-5 481 M
-( proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can) s
-5 470 M
-( be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.) s
-5 448 M
-( The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in) s
-5 437 M
-( regard to some or all of the specification contained in this) s
-5 426 M
-( document. For more information consult the online list of claimed) s
-5 415 M
-( rights.) s
-5 393 M
-(Normative References) s
-5 371 M
-( [SSH-ARCH]) s
-5 360 M
-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Protocol Architecture", I-D) s
-5 349 M
-( draft-ietf-architecture-15.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 327 M
-( [SSH-TRANS]) s
-5 316 M
-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Transport Layer Protocol", I-D) s
-5 305 M
-( draft-ietf-transport-17.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 283 M
-( [SSH-USERAUTH]) s
-5 272 M
-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Authentication Protocol", I-D) s
-5 261 M
-( draft-ietf-userauth-18.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 239 M
-( [SSH-CONNECT]) s
-5 228 M
-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Connection Protocol", I-D) s
-5 217 M
-( draft-ietf-connect-18.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 195 M
-( [SSH-NUMBERS]) s
-5 184 M
-( Lehtinen, S. and D. Moffat, "SSH Protocol Assigned) s
-5 173 M
-( Numbers", I-D draft-ietf-secsh-assignednumbers-05.txt, Oct) s
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-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
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-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
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-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( 2003.) s
-5 668 M
-( [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate) s
-5 657 M
-( Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.) s
-5 635 M
-(Informative References) s
-5 613 M
-( [RFC3066] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of) s
-5 602 M
-( Languages", BCP 47, RFC 3066, January 2001.) s
-5 580 M
-( [RFC1884] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing) s
-5 569 M
-( Architecture", RFC 1884, December 1995.) s
-5 547 M
-( [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO) s
-5 536 M
-( 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.) s
-5 514 M
-( [SCHEIFLER]) s
-5 503 M
-( Scheifler, R., "X Window System : The Complete Reference) s
-5 492 M
-( to Xlib, X Protocol, Icccm, Xlfd, 3rd edition.", Digital) s
-5 481 M
-( Press ISBN 1555580882, Feburary 1992.) s
-5 459 M
-( [POSIX] ISO/IEC, 9945-1., "Information technology -- Portable) s
-5 448 M
-( Operating System Interface \(POSIX\)-Part 1: System) s
-5 437 M
-( Application Program Interface \(API\) C Language", ANSI/IEE) s
-5 426 M
-( Std 1003.1, July 1996.) s
-5 393 M
-(Authors' Addresses) s
-5 371 M
-( Tatu Ylonen) s
-5 360 M
-( SSH Communications Security Corp) s
-5 349 M
-( Fredrikinkatu 42) s
-5 338 M
-( HELSINKI FIN-00100) s
-5 327 M
-( Finland) s
-5 305 M
-( EMail: [email protected]) s
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-( Darren J. Moffat \(editor\)) s
-5 261 M
-( Sun Microsystems, Inc) s
-5 250 M
-( 17 Network Circle) s
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-( Menlo Park CA 94025) s
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-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
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-/fname () def
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-5 668 M
-( The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any) s
-5 657 M
-( intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to) s
-5 646 M
-( pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in) s
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-5 613 M
-( has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the) s
-5 602 M
-( IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and) s
-5 591 M
-( standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of) s
-5 580 M
-( claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of) s
-5 569 M
-( licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to) s
-5 558 M
-( obtain a general license or permission for the use of such) s
-5 547 M
-( proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can) s
-5 536 M
-( be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.) s
-5 514 M
-( The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any) s
-5 503 M
-( copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary) s
-5 492 M
-( rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice) s
-5 481 M
-( this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive) s
-5 470 M
-( Director.) s
-5 448 M
-( The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in) s
-5 437 M
-( regard to some or all of the specification contained in this) s
-5 426 M
-( document. For more information consult the online list of claimed) s
-5 415 M
-( rights.) s
-5 382 M
-(Full Copyright Statement) s
-5 360 M
-( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2003\). All Rights Reserved.) s
-5 338 M
-( This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to) s
-5 327 M
-( others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it) s
-5 316 M
-( or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published) s
-5 305 M
-( and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any) s
-5 294 M
-( kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are) s
-5 283 M
-( included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this) s
-5 272 M
-( document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing) s
-5 261 M
-( the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other) s
-5 250 M
-( Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of) s
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-( copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be) s
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-( followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than) s
-5 206 M
-( English.) s
-5 184 M
-( The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be) s
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-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/ftail () def
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-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
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-( This document and the information contained herein is provided on an) s
-5 679 M
-( "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING) s
-5 668 M
-( TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING) s
-5 657 M
-( BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION) s
-5 646 M
-( HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF) s
-5 635 M
-( MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.) s
-5 602 M
-(Acknowledgment) s
-5 580 M
-( Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the) s
-5 569 M
-( Internet Society.) s
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-%%EOF
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-connect-18.txt b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-connect-18.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 1cb8ad6409..0000000000
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-connect-18.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1232 +0,0 @@
-
-
-
-Network Working Group T. Ylonen
-Internet-Draft SSH Communications Security Corp
-Expires: March 31, 2004 D. Moffat, Editor, Ed.
- Sun Microsystems, Inc
- Oct 2003
-
-
- SSH Connection Protocol
- draft-ietf-secsh-connect-18.txt
-
-Status of this Memo
-
- This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
- all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
-
- Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
- Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
- groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
-
- Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
- and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
- time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
- material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
-
- The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
- www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
-
- The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
- http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
-
- This Internet-Draft will expire on March 31, 2004.
-
-Copyright Notice
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
-
-Abstract
-
- SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network
- services over an insecure network.
-
- This document describes the SSH Connection Protocol. It provides
- interactive login sessions, remote execution of commands, forwarded
- TCP/IP connections, and forwarded X11 connections. All of these
- channels are multiplexed into a single encrypted tunnel.
-
- The SSH Connection Protocol has been designed to run on top of the
- SSH transport layer and user authentication protocols.
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 1]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
-Table of Contents
-
- 1. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 3. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 4. Global Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 5. Channel Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 5.1 Opening a Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 5.2 Data Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 5.3 Closing a Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 5.4 Channel-Specific Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 6. Interactive Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 6.1 Opening a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 6.2 Requesting a Pseudo-Terminal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 6.3 X11 Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 6.3.1 Requesting X11 Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 6.3.2 X11 Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 6.4 Environment Variable Passing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 6.5 Starting a Shell or a Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 6.6 Session Data Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 6.7 Window Dimension Change Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 6.8 Local Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 6.9 Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 6.10 Returning Exit Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
- 7. TCP/IP Port Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
- 7.1 Requesting Port Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
- 7.2 TCP/IP Forwarding Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
- 8. Encoding of Terminal Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
- 9. Summary of Message Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
- 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
- 11. iana cONSiderations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
- 12. Intellectual Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
- Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
- Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
- Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
- Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 21
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 2]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
-1. Contributors
-
- The major original contributors of this document were: Tatu Ylonen,
- Tero Kivinen, Timo J. Rinne, Sami Lehtinen (all of SSH Communications
- Security Corp), and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen (University of
- Jyvaskyla)
-
- The document editor is: [email protected]. Comments on this
- internet draft should be sent to the IETF SECSH working group,
- details at: http://ietf.org/html.charters/secsh-charter.html
-
-2. Introduction
-
- The SSH Connection Protocol has been designed to run on top of the
- SSH transport layer and user authentication protocols. It provides
- interactive login sessions, remote execution of commands, forwarded
- TCP/IP connections, and forwarded X11 connections. The service name
- for this protocol is "ssh-connection".
-
- This document should be read only after reading the SSH architecture
- document [SSH-ARCH]. This document freely uses terminology and
- notation from the architecture document without reference or further
- explanation.
-
-3. Conventions Used in This Document
-
- The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
- and "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as
- described in [RFC2119].
-
- The used data types and terminology are specified in the architecture
- document [SSH-ARCH].
-
- The architecture document also discusses the algorithm naming
- conventions that MUST be used with the SSH protocols.
-
-4. Global Requests
-
- There are several kinds of requests that affect the state of the
- remote end "globally", independent of any channels. An example is a
- request to start TCP/IP forwarding for a specific port. All such
- requests use the following format.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
- string request name (restricted to US-ASCII)
- boolean want reply
- ... request-specific data follows
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 3]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- Request names follow the DNS extensibility naming convention outlined
- in [SSH-ARCH].
-
- The recipient will respond to this message with
- SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS or SSH_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE if `want reply' is
- TRUE.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
- ..... response specific data
-
- Usually the response specific data is non-existent.
-
- If the recipient does not recognize or support the request, it simply
- responds with SSH_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE
-
-
-5. Channel Mechanism
-
- All terminal sessions, forwarded connections, etc. are channels.
- Either side may open a channel. Multiple channels are multiplexed
- into a single connection.
-
- Channels are identified by numbers at each end. The number referring
- to a channel may be different on each side. Requests to open a
- channel contain the sender's channel number. Any other
- channel-related messages contain the recipient's channel number for
- the channel.
-
- Channels are flow-controlled. No data may be sent to a channel until
- a message is received to indicate that window space is available.
-
-5.1 Opening a Channel
-
- When either side wishes to open a new channel, it allocates a local
- number for the channel. It then sends the following message to the
- other side, and includes the local channel number and initial window
- size in the message.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
- string channel type (restricted to US-ASCII)
- uint32 sender channel
- uint32 initial window size
- uint32 maximum packet size
- ... channel type specific data follows
-
- The channel type is a name as described in the SSH architecture
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 4]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- document, with similar extension mechanisms. `sender channel' is a
- local identifier for the channel used by the sender of this message.
- `initial window size' specifies how many bytes of channel data can be
- sent to the sender of this message without adjusting the window.
- `Maximum packet size' specifies the maximum size of an individual
- data packet that can be sent to the sender (for example, one might
- want to use smaller packets for interactive connections to get better
- interactive response on slow links).
-
- The remote side then decides whether it can open the channel, and
- responds with either
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
- uint32 recipient channel
- uint32 sender channel
- uint32 initial window size
- uint32 maximum packet size
- ... channel type specific data follows
-
- where `recipient channel' is the channel number given in the original
- open request, and `sender channel' is the channel number allocated by
- the other side, or
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE
- uint32 recipient channel
- uint32 reason code
- string additional textual information (ISO-10646 UTF-8 [RFC2279])
- string language tag (as defined in [RFC3066])
-
- If the recipient of the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN message does not support
- the specified channel type, it simply responds with
- SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE. The client MAY show the additional
- information to the user. If this is done, the client software should
- take the precautions discussed in [SSH-ARCH].
-
- The following reason codes are defined:
-
- #define SSH_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1
- #define SSH_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2
- #define SSH_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3
- #define SSH_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4
-
-
-5.2 Data Transfer
-
- The window size specifies how many bytes the other party can send
- before it must wait for the window to be adjusted. Both parties use
- the following message to adjust the window.
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 5]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
- uint32 recipient channel
- uint32 bytes to add
-
- After receiving this message, the recipient MAY send the given number
- of bytes more than it was previously allowed to send; the window size
- is incremented.
-
- Data transfer is done with messages of the following type.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
- uint32 recipient channel
- string data
-
- The maximum amount of data allowed is the current window size. The
- window size is decremented by the amount of data sent. Both parties
- MAY ignore all extra data sent after the allowed window is empty.
-
- Additionally, some channels can transfer several types of data. An
- example of this is stderr data from interactive sessions. Such data
- can be passed with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA messages, where a
- separate integer specifies the type of the data. The available types
- and their interpretation depend on the type of the channel.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA
- uint32 recipient_channel
- uint32 data_type_code
- string data
-
- Data sent with these messages consumes the same window as ordinary
- data.
-
- Currently, only the following type is defined.
-
- #define SSH_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1
-
-
-5.3 Closing a Channel
-
- When a party will no longer send more data to a channel, it SHOULD
- send SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
- uint32 recipient_channel
-
- No explicit response is sent to this message; however, the
- application may send EOF to whatever is at the other end of the
- channel. Note that the channel remains open after this message, and
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 6]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- more data may still be sent in the other direction. This message
- does not consume window space and can be sent even if no window space
- is available.
-
- When either party wishes to terminate the channel, it sends
- SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE. Upon receiving this message, a party MUST
- send back a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE unless it has already sent this
- message for the channel. The channel is considered closed for a
- party when it has both sent and received SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, and
- the party may then reuse the channel number. A party MAY send
- SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE without having sent or received
- SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
- uint32 recipient_channel
-
- This message does not consume window space and can be sent even if no
- window space is available.
-
- It is recommended that any data sent before this message is delivered
- to the actual destination, if possible.
-
-5.4 Channel-Specific Requests
-
- Many channel types have extensions that are specific to that
- particular channel type. An example is requesting a pty (pseudo
- terminal) for an interactive session.
-
- All channel-specific requests use the following format.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient channel
- string request type (restricted to US-ASCII)
- boolean want reply
- ... type-specific data
-
- If want reply is FALSE, no response will be sent to the request.
- Otherwise, the recipient responds with either SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
- or SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, or request-specific continuation
- messages. If the request is not recognized or is not supported for
- the channel, SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE is returned.
-
- This message does not consume window space and can be sent even if no
- window space is available. Request types are local to each channel
- type.
-
- The client is allowed to send further messages without waiting for
- the response to the request.
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 7]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- request type names follow the DNS extensibility naming convention
- outlined in [SSH-ARCH]
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS
- uint32 recipient_channel
-
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE
- uint32 recipient_channel
-
- These messages do not consume window space and can be sent even if no
- window space is available.
-
-6. Interactive Sessions
-
- A session is a remote execution of a program. The program may be a
- shell, an application, a system command, or some built-in subsystem.
- It may or may not have a tty, and may or may not involve X11
- forwarding. Multiple sessions can be active simultaneously.
-
-6.1 Opening a Session
-
- A session is started by sending the following message.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
- string "session"
- uint32 sender channel
- uint32 initial window size
- uint32 maximum packet size
-
- Client implementations SHOULD reject any session channel open
- requests to make it more difficult for a corrupt server to attack the
- client.
-
-6.2 Requesting a Pseudo-Terminal
-
- A pseudo-terminal can be allocated for the session by sending the
- following message.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient_channel
- string "pty-req"
- boolean want_reply
- string TERM environment variable value (e.g., vt100)
- uint32 terminal width, characters (e.g., 80)
- uint32 terminal height, rows (e.g., 24)
- uint32 terminal width, pixels (e.g., 640)
- uint32 terminal height, pixels (e.g., 480)
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 8]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- string encoded terminal modes
-
- The encoding of terminal modes is described in Section Encoding of
- Terminal Modes (Section 8). Zero dimension parameters MUST be
- ignored. The character/row dimensions override the pixel dimensions
- (when nonzero). Pixel dimensions refer to the drawable area of the
- window.
-
- The dimension parameters are only informational.
-
- The client SHOULD ignore pty requests.
-
-6.3 X11 Forwarding
-
-6.3.1 Requesting X11 Forwarding
-
- X11 forwarding may be requested for a session by sending
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient channel
- string "x11-req"
- boolean want reply
- boolean single connection
- string x11 authentication protocol
- string x11 authentication cookie
- uint32 x11 screen number
-
- It is recommended that the authentication cookie that is sent be a
- fake, random cookie, and that the cookie is checked and replaced by
- the real cookie when a connection request is received.
-
- X11 connection forwarding should stop when the session channel is
- closed; however, already opened forwardings should not be
- automatically closed when the session channel is closed.
-
- If `single connection' is TRUE, only a single connection should be
- forwarded. No more connections will be forwarded after the first, or
- after the session channel has been closed.
-
- The "x11 authentication protocol" is the name of the X11
- authentication method used, e.g. "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1".
-
- The x11 authentication cookie MUST be hexadecimal encoded.
-
- X Protocol is documented in [SCHEIFLER].
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-6.3.2 X11 Channels
-
- X11 channels are opened with a channel open request. The resulting
- channels are independent of the session, and closing the session
- channel does not close the forwarded X11 channels.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
- string "x11"
- uint32 sender channel
- uint32 initial window size
- uint32 maximum packet size
- string originator address (e.g. "192.168.7.38")
- uint32 originator port
-
- The recipient should respond with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION
- or SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE.
-
- Implementations MUST reject any X11 channel open requests if they
- have not requested X11 forwarding.
-
-6.4 Environment Variable Passing
-
- Environment variables may be passed to the shell/command to be
- started later. Uncontrolled setting of environment variables in a
- privileged process can be a security hazard. It is recommended that
- implementations either maintain a list of allowable variable names or
- only set environment variables after the server process has dropped
- sufficient privileges.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient channel
- string "env"
- boolean want reply
- string variable name
- string variable value
-
-
-6.5 Starting a Shell or a Command
-
- Once the session has been set up, a program is started at the remote
- end. The program can be a shell, an application program or a
- subsystem with a host-independent name. Only one of these requests
- can succeed per channel.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient channel
- string "shell"
- boolean want reply
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
- This message will request the user's default shell (typically defined
- in /etc/passwd in UNIX systems) to be started at the other end.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient channel
- string "exec"
- boolean want reply
- string command
-
- This message will request the server to start the execution of the
- given command. The command string may contain a path. Normal
- precautions MUST be taken to prevent the execution of unauthorized
- commands.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient channel
- string "subsystem"
- boolean want reply
- string subsystem name
-
- This last form executes a predefined subsystem. It is expected that
- these will include a general file transfer mechanism, and possibly
- other features. Implementations may also allow configuring more such
- mechanisms. As the user's shell is usually used to execute the
- subsystem, it is advisable for the subsystem protocol to have a
- "magic cookie" at the beginning of the protocol transaction to
- distinguish it from arbitrary output generated by shell
- initialization scripts etc. This spurious output from the shell may
- be filtered out either at the server or at the client.
-
- The server SHOULD not halt the execution of the protocol stack when
- starting a shell or a program. All input and output from these SHOULD
- be redirected to the channel or to the encrypted tunnel.
-
- It is RECOMMENDED to request and check the reply for these messages.
- The client SHOULD ignore these messages.
-
- Subsystem names follow the DNS extensibility naming convention
- outlined in [SSH-ARCH].
-
-6.6 Session Data Transfer
-
- Data transfer for a session is done using SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA and
- SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA packets and the window mechanism. The
- extended data type SSH_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR has been defined for
- stderr data.
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
-
-6.7 Window Dimension Change Message
-
- When the window (terminal) size changes on the client side, it MAY
- send a message to the other side to inform it of the new dimensions.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient_channel
- string "window-change"
- boolean FALSE
- uint32 terminal width, columns
- uint32 terminal height, rows
- uint32 terminal width, pixels
- uint32 terminal height, pixels
-
- No response SHOULD be sent to this message.
-
-6.8 Local Flow Control
-
- On many systems, it is possible to determine if a pseudo-terminal is
- using control-S/control-Q flow control. When flow control is
- allowed, it is often desirable to do the flow control at the client
- end to speed up responses to user requests. This is facilitated by
- the following notification. Initially, the server is responsible for
- flow control. (Here, again, client means the side originating the
- session, and server means the other side.)
-
- The message below is used by the server to inform the client when it
- can or cannot perform flow control (control-S/control-Q processing).
- If `client can do' is TRUE, the client is allowed to do flow control
- using control-S and control-Q. The client MAY ignore this message.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient channel
- string "xon-xoff"
- boolean FALSE
- boolean client can do
-
- No response is sent to this message.
-
-6.9 Signals
-
- A signal can be delivered to the remote process/service using the
- following message. Some systems may not implement signals, in which
- case they SHOULD ignore this message.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient channel
- string "signal"
-
-
-
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-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- boolean FALSE
- string signal name without the "SIG" prefix.
-
- Signal names will be encoded as discussed in the "exit-signal"
- SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST.
-
-6.10 Returning Exit Status
-
- When the command running at the other end terminates, the following
- message can be sent to return the exit status of the command.
- Returning the status is RECOMMENDED. No acknowledgment is sent for
- this message. The channel needs to be closed with
- SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE after this message.
-
- The client MAY ignore these messages.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient_channel
- string "exit-status"
- boolean FALSE
- uint32 exit_status
-
- The remote command may also terminate violently due to a signal.
- Such a condition can be indicated by the following message. A zero
- exit_status usually means that the command terminated successfully.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
- uint32 recipient channel
- string "exit-signal"
- boolean FALSE
- string signal name without the "SIG" prefix.
- boolean core dumped
- string error message (ISO-10646 UTF-8)
- string language tag (as defined in [RFC3066])
-
- The signal name is one of the following (these are from [POSIX])
-
- ABRT
- ALRM
- FPE
- HUP
- ILL
- INT
- KILL
- PIPE
- QUIT
- SEGV
- TERM
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 13]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- USR1
- USR2
-
- Additional signal names MAY be sent in the format "sig-name@xyz",
- where `sig-name' and `xyz' may be anything a particular implementor
- wants (except the `@' sign). However, it is suggested that if a
- `configure' script is used, the non-standard signal names it finds be
- encoded as "[email protected]", where `SIG' is the signal name
- without the "SIG" prefix, and `xyz' be the host type, as determined
- by `config.guess'.
-
- The `error message' contains an additional explanation of the error
- message. The message may consist of multiple lines. The client
- software MAY display this message to the user. If this is done, the
- client software should take the precautions discussed in [SSH-ARCH].
-
-7. TCP/IP Port Forwarding
-
-7.1 Requesting Port Forwarding
-
- A party need not explicitly request forwardings from its own end to
- the other direction. However, if it wishes that connections to a
- port on the other side be forwarded to the local side, it must
- explicitly request this.
-
-
- byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
- string "tcpip-forward"
- boolean want reply
- string address to bind (e.g. "0.0.0.0")
- uint32 port number to bind
-
- `Address to bind' and `port number to bind' specify the IP address
- and port to which the socket to be listened is bound. The address
- should be "0.0.0.0" if connections are allowed from anywhere. (Note
- that the client can still filter connections based on information
- passed in the open request.)
-
- Implementations should only allow forwarding privileged ports if the
- user has been authenticated as a privileged user.
-
- Client implementations SHOULD reject these messages; they are
- normally only sent by the client.
-
-
- If a client passes 0 as port number to bind and has want reply TRUE
- then the server allocates the next available unprivileged port number
- and replies with the following message, otherwise there is no
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 14]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- response specific data.
-
-
- byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST_SUCCESS
- uint32 port that was bound on the server
-
- A port forwarding can be cancelled with the following message. Note
- that channel open requests may be received until a reply to this
- message is received.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
- string "cancel-tcpip-forward"
- boolean want reply
- string address_to_bind (e.g. "127.0.0.1")
- uint32 port number to bind
-
- Client implementations SHOULD reject these messages; they are
- normally only sent by the client.
-
-7.2 TCP/IP Forwarding Channels
-
- When a connection comes to a port for which remote forwarding has
- been requested, a channel is opened to forward the port to the other
- side.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
- string "forwarded-tcpip"
- uint32 sender channel
- uint32 initial window size
- uint32 maximum packet size
- string address that was connected
- uint32 port that was connected
- string originator IP address
- uint32 originator port
-
- Implementations MUST reject these messages unless they have
- previously requested a remote TCP/IP port forwarding with the given
- port number.
-
- When a connection comes to a locally forwarded TCP/IP port, the
- following packet is sent to the other side. Note that these messages
- MAY be sent also for ports for which no forwarding has been
- explicitly requested. The receiving side must decide whether to
- allow the forwarding.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
- string "direct-tcpip"
- uint32 sender channel
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 15]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- uint32 initial window size
- uint32 maximum packet size
- string host to connect
- uint32 port to connect
- string originator IP address
- uint32 originator port
-
- `Host to connect' and `port to connect' specify the TCP/IP host and
- port where the recipient should connect the channel. `Host to
- connect' may be either a domain name or a numeric IP address.
-
- `Originator IP address' is the numeric IP address of the machine
- where the connection request comes from, and `originator port' is the
- port on the originator host from where the connection came from.
-
- Forwarded TCP/IP channels are independent of any sessions, and
- closing a session channel does not in any way imply that forwarded
- connections should be closed.
-
- Client implementations SHOULD reject direct TCP/IP open requests for
- security reasons.
-
-8. Encoding of Terminal Modes
-
- Terminal modes (as passed in a pty request) are encoded into a byte
- stream. It is intended that the coding be portable across different
- environments.
-
- The tty mode description is a stream of bytes. The stream consists
- of opcode-argument pairs. It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END (0).
- Opcodes 1 to 159 have a single uint32 argument. Opcodes 160 to 255
- are not yet defined, and cause parsing to stop (they should only be
- used after any other data).
-
- The client SHOULD put in the stream any modes it knows about, and the
- server MAY ignore any modes it does not know about. This allows some
- degree of machine-independence, at least between systems that use a
- POSIX-like tty interface. The protocol can support other systems as
- well, but the client may need to fill reasonable values for a number
- of parameters so the server pty gets set to a reasonable mode (the
- server leaves all unspecified mode bits in their default values, and
- only some combinations make sense).
-
- The following opcodes have been defined. The naming of opcodes
- mostly follows the POSIX terminal mode flags.
-
- 0 TTY_OP_END Indicates end of options.
- 1 VINTR Interrupt character; 255 if none. Similarly for the
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 16]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- other characters. Not all of these characters are
- supported on all systems.
- 2 VQUIT The quit character (sends SIGQUIT signal on POSIX
- systems).
- 3 VERASE Erase the character to left of the cursor.
- 4 VKILL Kill the current input line.
- 5 VEOF End-of-file character (sends EOF from the terminal).
- 6 VEOL End-of-line character in addition to carriage return
- and/or linefeed.
- 7 VEOL2 Additional end-of-line character.
- 8 VSTART Continues paused output (normally control-Q).
- 9 VSTOP Pauses output (normally control-S).
- 10 VSUSP Suspends the current program.
- 11 VDSUSP Another suspend character.
- 12 VREPRINT Reprints the current input line.
- 13 VWERASE Erases a word left of cursor.
- 14 VLNEXT Enter the next character typed literally, even if it
- is a special character
- 15 VFLUSH Character to flush output.
- 16 VSWTCH Switch to a different shell layer.
- 17 VSTATUS Prints system status line (load, command, pid etc).
- 18 VDISCARD Toggles the flushing of terminal output.
- 30 IGNPAR The ignore parity flag. The parameter SHOULD be 0 if
- this flag is FALSE set, and 1 if it is TRUE.
- 31 PARMRK Mark parity and framing errors.
- 32 INPCK Enable checking of parity errors.
- 33 ISTRIP Strip 8th bit off characters.
- 34 INLCR Map NL into CR on input.
- 35 IGNCR Ignore CR on input.
- 36 ICRNL Map CR to NL on input.
- 37 IUCLC Translate uppercase characters to lowercase.
- 38 IXON Enable output flow control.
- 39 IXANY Any char will restart after stop.
- 40 IXOFF Enable input flow control.
- 41 IMAXBEL Ring bell on input queue full.
- 50 ISIG Enable signals INTR, QUIT, [D]SUSP.
- 51 ICANON Canonicalize input lines.
- 52 XCASE Enable input and output of uppercase characters by
- preceding their lowercase equivalents with `\'.
- 53 ECHO Enable echoing.
- 54 ECHOE Visually erase chars.
- 55 ECHOK Kill character discards current line.
- 56 ECHONL Echo NL even if ECHO is off.
- 57 NOFLSH Don't flush after interrupt.
- 58 TOSTOP Stop background jobs from output.
- 59 IEXTEN Enable extensions.
- 60 ECHOCTL Echo control characters as ^(Char).
- 61 ECHOKE Visual erase for line kill.
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 17]
-
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-
-
- 62 PENDIN Retype pending input.
- 70 OPOST Enable output processing.
- 71 OLCUC Convert lowercase to uppercase.
- 72 ONLCR Map NL to CR-NL.
- 73 OCRNL Translate carriage return to newline (output).
- 74 ONOCR Translate newline to carriage return-newline
- (output).
- 75 ONLRET Newline performs a carriage return (output).
- 90 CS7 7 bit mode.
- 91 CS8 8 bit mode.
- 92 PARENB Parity enable.
- 93 PARODD Odd parity, else even.
-
- 128 TTY_OP_ISPEED Specifies the input baud rate in bits per second.
- 129 TTY_OP_OSPEED Specifies the output baud rate in bits per second.
-
-
-9. Summary of Message Numbers
-
- #define SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80
- #define SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81
- #define SSH_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82
- #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90
- #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91
- #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92
- #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93
- #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94
- #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95
- #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96
- #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97
- #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98
- #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99
- #define SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100
-
-
-10. Security Considerations
-
- This protocol is assumed to run on top of a secure, authenticated
- transport. User authentication and protection against network-level
- attacks are assumed to be provided by the underlying protocols.
-
- It is RECOMMENDED that implementations disable all the potentially
- dangerous features (e.g. agent forwarding, X11 forwarding, and TCP/IP
- forwarding) if the host key has changed.
-
- Full security considerations for this protocol are provided in
- Section 8 of [SSH-ARCH]
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 18]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
-11. iana cONSiderations
-
- This document is part of a set, the IANA considerations for the SSH
- protocol as defined in [SSH-ARCH], [SSH-TRANS], [SSH-USERAUTH],
- [SSH-CONNECT] are detailed in [SSH-NUMBERS].
-
-12. Intellectual Property
-
- The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
- intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
- pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
- this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
- might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
- has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
- IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
- standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
- claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
- licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
- obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
- proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can
- be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
-
- The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
- regard to some or all of the specification contained in this
- document. For more information consult the online list of claimed
- rights.
-
-Normative References
-
- [SSH-ARCH]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Protocol Architecture", I-D
- draft-ietf-architecture-15.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-TRANS]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Transport Layer Protocol", I-D
- draft-ietf-transport-17.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-USERAUTH]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Authentication Protocol", I-D
- draft-ietf-userauth-18.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-CONNECT]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Connection Protocol", I-D
- draft-ietf-connect-18.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-NUMBERS]
- Lehtinen, S. and D. Moffat, "SSH Protocol Assigned
- Numbers", I-D draft-ietf-secsh-assignednumbers-05.txt, Oct
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 19]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- 2003.
-
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
- Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
-
-Informative References
-
- [RFC3066] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of
- Languages", BCP 47, RFC 3066, January 2001.
-
- [RFC1884] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
- Architecture", RFC 1884, December 1995.
-
- [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
- 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
-
- [SCHEIFLER]
- Scheifler, R., "X Window System : The Complete Reference
- to Xlib, X Protocol, Icccm, Xlfd, 3rd edition.", Digital
- Press ISBN 1555580882, Feburary 1992.
-
- [POSIX] ISO/IEC, 9945-1., "Information technology -- Portable
- Operating System Interface (POSIX)-Part 1: System
- Application Program Interface (API) C Language", ANSI/IEE
- Std 1003.1, July 1996.
-
-
-Authors' Addresses
-
- Tatu Ylonen
- SSH Communications Security Corp
- Fredrikinkatu 42
- HELSINKI FIN-00100
- Finland
-
-
-
- Darren J. Moffat (editor)
- Sun Microsystems, Inc
- 17 Network Circle
- Menlo Park CA 94025
- USA
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 20]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
-Intellectual Property Statement
-
- The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
- intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
- pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
- this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
- might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
- has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
- IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
- standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
- claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
- licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
- obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
- proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
- be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
-
- The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
- copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
- rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
- this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
- Director.
-
- The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
- regard to some or all of the specification contained in this
- document. For more information consult the online list of claimed
- rights.
-
-
-Full Copyright Statement
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
-
- This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
- others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
- or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
- and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
- kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
- included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
- document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
- the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
- Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
- developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
- copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
- followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
- English.
-
- The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
- revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 21]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Connection Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
- "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
- TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
- BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
- HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
-
-
-Acknowledgment
-
- Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
- Internet Society.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 22] \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.2.ps b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.2.ps
deleted file mode 100644
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--- a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.2.ps
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2853 +0,0 @@
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-5 701 M
-(Network Working Group T. Ylonen) s
-5 690 M
-(Internet-Draft S. Lehtinen) s
-5 679 M
-(Expires: April 1, 2002 SSH Communications Security Corp) s
-5 668 M
-( October 2001) s
-5 635 M
-( SSH File Transfer Protocol) s
-5 624 M
-( draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt) s
-5 602 M
-(Status of this Memo) s
-5 580 M
-( This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with) s
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-( all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.) s
-5 547 M
-( Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering) s
-5 536 M
-( Task Force \(IETF\), its areas, and its working groups. Note that) s
-5 525 M
-( other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-) s
-5 514 M
-( Drafts.) s
-5 492 M
-( Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months) s
-5 481 M
-( and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any) s
-5 470 M
-( time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference) s
-5 459 M
-( material or to cite them other than as "work in progress.") s
-5 437 M
-( The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://) s
-5 426 M
-( www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.) s
-5 404 M
-( The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at) s
-5 393 M
-( http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.) s
-5 371 M
-( This Internet-Draft will expire on April 1, 2002.) s
-5 349 M
-(Copyright Notice) s
-5 327 M
-( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2001\). All Rights Reserved.) s
-5 305 M
-(Abstract) s
-5 283 M
-( The SSH File Transfer Protocol provides secure file transfer) s
-5 272 M
-( functionality over any reliable data stream. It is the standard file) s
-5 261 M
-( transfer protocol for use with the SSH2 protocol. This document) s
-5 250 M
-( describes the file transfer protocol and its interface to the SSH2) s
-5 239 M
-( protocol suite.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 1]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(Table of Contents) s
-5 668 M
-( 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3) s
-5 657 M
-( 2. Use with the SSH Connection Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . 4) s
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-( 3. General Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5) s
-5 635 M
-( 4. Protocol Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7) s
-5 624 M
-( 5. File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8) s
-5 613 M
-( 6. Requests From the Client to the Server . . . . . . . . . . . 10) s
-5 602 M
-( 6.1 Request Synchronization and Reordering . . . . . . . . . . . 10) s
-5 591 M
-( 6.2 File Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11) s
-5 580 M
-( 6.3 Opening, Creating, and Closing Files . . . . . . . . . . . . 11) s
-5 569 M
-( 6.4 Reading and Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13) s
-5 558 M
-( 6.5 Removing and Renaming Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14) s
-5 547 M
-( 6.6 Creating and Deleting Directories . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15) s
-5 536 M
-( 6.7 Scanning Directories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15) s
-5 525 M
-( 6.8 Retrieving File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16) s
-5 514 M
-( 6.9 Setting File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17) s
-5 503 M
-( 6.10 Dealing with Symbolic links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18) s
-5 492 M
-( 6.11 Canonicalizing the Server-Side Path Name . . . . . . . . . . 18) s
-5 481 M
-( 7. Responses from the Server to the Client . . . . . . . . . . 20) s
-5 470 M
-( 8. Vendor-Specific Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24) s
-5 459 M
-( 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25) s
-5 448 M
-( 10. Changes from previous protocol versions . . . . . . . . . . 26) s
-5 437 M
-( 10.1 Changes between versions 3 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26) s
-5 426 M
-( 10.2 Changes between versions 2 and 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26) s
-5 415 M
-( 10.3 Changes between versions 1 and 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26) s
-5 404 M
-( 11. Trademark Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27) s
-5 393 M
-( References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28) s
-5 382 M
-( Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28) s
-5 371 M
-( Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 2]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(1. Introduction) s
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-( This protocol provides secure file transfer \(and more generally file) s
-5 657 M
-( system access\) functionality over a reliable data stream, such as a) s
-5 646 M
-( channel in the SSH2 protocol [3].) s
-5 624 M
-( This protocol is designed so that it could be used to implement a) s
-5 613 M
-( secure remote file system service, as well as a secure file transfer) s
-5 602 M
-( service.) s
-5 580 M
-( This protocol assumes that it runs over a secure channel, and that) s
-5 569 M
-( the server has already authenticated the user at the client end, and) s
-5 558 M
-( that the identity of the client user is externally available to the) s
-5 547 M
-( server implementation.) s
-5 525 M
-( In general, this protocol follows a simple request-response model.) s
-5 514 M
-( Each request and response contains a sequence number and multiple) s
-5 503 M
-( requests may be pending simultaneously. There are a relatively large) s
-5 492 M
-( number of different request messages, but a small number of possible) s
-5 481 M
-( response messages. Each request has one or more response messages) s
-5 470 M
-( that may be returned in result \(e.g., a read either returns data or) s
-5 459 M
-( reports error status\).) s
-5 437 M
-( The packet format descriptions in this specification follow the) s
-5 426 M
-( notation presented in the secsh architecture draft.[3].) s
-5 404 M
-( Even though this protocol is described in the context of the SSH2) s
-5 393 M
-( protocol, this protocol is general and independent of the rest of the) s
-5 382 M
-( SSH2 protocol suite. It could be used in a number of different) s
-5 371 M
-( applications, such as secure file transfer over TLS RFC 2246 [1] and) s
-5 360 M
-( transfer of management information in VPN applications.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 3]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(2. Use with the SSH Connection Protocol) s
-5 668 M
-( When used with the SSH2 Protocol suite, this protocol is intended to) s
-5 657 M
-( be used from the SSH Connection Protocol [5] as a subsystem, as) s
-5 646 M
-( described in section ``Starting a Shell or a Command''. The) s
-5 635 M
-( subsystem name used with this protocol is "sftp".) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 4]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(3. General Packet Format) s
-5 668 M
-( All packets transmitted over the secure connection are of the) s
-5 657 M
-( following format:) s
-5 635 M
-( uint32 length) s
-5 624 M
-( byte type) s
-5 613 M
-( byte[length - 1] data payload) s
-5 591 M
-( That is, they are just data preceded by 32-bit length and 8-bit type) s
-5 580 M
-( fields. The `length' is the length of the data area, and does not) s
-5 569 M
-( include the `length' field itself. The format and interpretation of) s
-5 558 M
-( the data area depends on the packet type.) s
-5 536 M
-( All packet descriptions below only specify the packet type and the) s
-5 525 M
-( data that goes into the data field. Thus, they should be prefixed by) s
-5 514 M
-( the `length' and `type' fields.) s
-5 492 M
-( The maximum size of a packet is in practice determined by the client) s
-5 481 M
-( \(the maximum size of read or write requests that it sends, plus a few) s
-5 470 M
-( bytes of packet overhead\). All servers SHOULD support packets of at) s
-5 459 M
-( least 34000 bytes \(where the packet size refers to the full length,) s
-5 448 M
-( including the header above\). This should allow for reads and writes) s
-5 437 M
-( of at most 32768 bytes.) s
-5 415 M
-( There is no limit on the number of outstanding \(non-acknowledged\)) s
-5 404 M
-( requests that the client may send to the server. In practice this is) s
-5 393 M
-( limited by the buffering available on the data stream and the queuing) s
-5 382 M
-( performed by the server. If the server's queues are full, it should) s
-5 371 M
-( not read any more data from the stream, and flow control will prevent) s
-5 360 M
-( the client from sending more requests. Note, however, that while) s
-5 349 M
-( there is no restriction on the protocol level, the client's API may) s
-5 338 M
-( provide a limit in order to prevent infinite queuing of outgoing) s
-5 327 M
-( requests at the client.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 5]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-( The following values are defined for packet types.) s
-5 668 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_INIT 1) s
-5 657 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_VERSION 2) s
-5 646 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_OPEN 3) s
-5 635 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_CLOSE 4) s
-5 624 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_READ 5) s
-5 613 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_WRITE 6) s
-5 602 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_LSTAT 7) s
-5 591 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_FSTAT 8) s
-5 580 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_SETSTAT 9) s
-5 569 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT 10) s
-5 558 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_OPENDIR 11) s
-5 547 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_READDIR 12) s
-5 536 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_REMOVE 13) s
-5 525 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_MKDIR 14) s
-5 514 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_RMDIR 15) s
-5 503 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_REALPATH 16) s
-5 492 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_STAT 17) s
-5 481 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_RENAME 18) s
-5 470 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_READLINK 19) s
-5 459 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_SYMLINK 20) s
-5 448 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_STATUS 101) s
-5 437 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_HANDLE 102) s
-5 426 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_DATA 103) s
-5 415 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_NAME 104) s
-5 404 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_ATTRS 105) s
-5 393 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_EXTENDED 200) s
-5 382 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY 201) s
-5 360 M
-( Additional packet types should only be defined if the protocol) s
-5 349 M
-( version number \(see Section ``Protocol Initialization''\) is) s
-5 338 M
-( incremented, and their use MUST be negotiated using the version) s
-5 327 M
-( number. However, the SSH_FXP_EXTENDED and SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) s
-5 316 M
-( packets can be used to implement vendor-specific extensions. See) s
-5 305 M
-( Section ``Vendor-Specific-Extensions'' for more details.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 6]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(4. Protocol Initialization) s
-5 668 M
-( When the file transfer protocol starts, it first sends a SSH_FXP_INIT) s
-5 657 M
-( \(including its version number\) packet to the server. The server) s
-5 646 M
-( responds with a SSH_FXP_VERSION packet, supplying the lowest of its) s
-5 635 M
-( own and the client's version number. Both parties should from then) s
-5 624 M
-( on adhere to particular version of the protocol.) s
-5 602 M
-( The SSH_FXP_INIT packet \(from client to server\) has the following) s
-5 591 M
-( data:) s
-5 569 M
-( uint32 version) s
-5 558 M
-( <extension data>) s
-5 536 M
-( The SSH_FXP_VERSION packet \(from server to client\) has the following) s
-5 525 M
-( data:) s
-5 503 M
-( uint32 version) s
-5 492 M
-( <extension data>) s
-5 470 M
-( The version number of the protocol specified in this document is 3.) s
-5 459 M
-( The version number should be incremented for each incompatible) s
-5 448 M
-( revision of this protocol.) s
-5 426 M
-( The extension data in the above packets may be empty, or may be a) s
-5 415 M
-( sequence of) s
-5 393 M
-( string extension_name) s
-5 382 M
-( string extension_data) s
-5 360 M
-( pairs \(both strings MUST always be present if one is, but the) s
-5 349 M
-( `extension_data' string may be of zero length\). If present, these) s
-5 338 M
-( strings indicate extensions to the baseline protocol. The) s
-5 327 M
-( `extension_name' field\(s\) identify the name of the extension. The) s
-5 316 M
-( name should be of the form "name@domain", where the domain is the DNS) s
-5 305 M
-( domain name of the organization defining the extension. Additional) s
-5 294 M
-( names that are not of this format may be defined later by the IETF.) s
-5 283 M
-( Implementations MUST silently ignore any extensions whose name they) s
-5 272 M
-( do not recognize.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 7]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(5. File Attributes) s
-5 668 M
-( A new compound data type is defined for encoding file attributes. It) s
-5 657 M
-( is basically just a combination of elementary types, but is defined) s
-5 646 M
-( once because of the non-trivial description of the fields and to) s
-5 635 M
-( ensure maintainability.) s
-5 613 M
-( The same encoding is used both when returning file attributes from) s
-5 602 M
-( the server and when sending file attributes to the server. When) s
-5 591 M
-( sending it to the server, the flags field specifies which attributes) s
-5 580 M
-( are included, and the server will use default values for the) s
-5 569 M
-( remaining attributes \(or will not modify the values of remaining) s
-5 558 M
-( attributes\). When receiving attributes from the server, the flags) s
-5 547 M
-( specify which attributes are included in the returned data. The) s
-5 536 M
-( server normally returns all attributes it knows about.) s
-5 514 M
-( uint32 flags) s
-5 503 M
-( uint64 size present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) s
-5 492 M
-( uint32 uid present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) s
-5 481 M
-( uint32 gid present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) s
-5 470 M
-( uint32 permissions present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) s
-5 459 M
-( uint32 atime present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ACMODTIME) s
-5 448 M
-( uint32 mtime present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ACMODTIME) s
-5 437 M
-( uint32 extended_count present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED) s
-5 426 M
-( string extended_type) s
-5 415 M
-( string extended_data) s
-5 404 M
-( ... more extended data \(extended_type - extended_data pairs\),) s
-5 393 M
-( so that number of pairs equals extended_count) s
-5 371 M
-( The `flags' specify which of the fields are present. Those fields) s
-5 360 M
-( for which the corresponding flag is not set are not present \(not) s
-5 349 M
-( included in the packet\). New flags can only be added by incrementing) s
-5 338 M
-( the protocol version number \(or by using the extension mechanism) s
-5 327 M
-( described below\).) s
-5 305 M
-( The `size' field specifies the size of the file in bytes.) s
-5 283 M
-( The `uid' and `gid' fields contain numeric Unix-like user and group) s
-5 272 M
-( identifiers, respectively.) s
-5 250 M
-( The `permissions' field contains a bit mask of file permissions as) s
-5 239 M
-( defined by posix [1].) s
-5 217 M
-( The `atime' and `mtime' contain the access and modification times of) s
-5 206 M
-( the files, respectively. They are represented as seconds from Jan 1,) s
-5 195 M
-( 1970 in UTC.) s
-5 173 M
-( The SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED flag provides a general extension) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 8]) s
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-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-( mechanism for vendor-specific extensions. If the flag is specified,) s
-5 679 M
-( then the `extended_count' field is present. It specifies the number) s
-5 668 M
-( of extended_type-extended_data pairs that follow. Each of these) s
-5 657 M
-( pairs specifies an extended attribute. For each of the attributes,) s
-5 646 M
-( the extended_type field should be a string of the format) s
-5 635 M
-( "name@domain", where "domain" is a valid, registered domain name and) s
-5 624 M
-( "name" identifies the method. The IETF may later standardize certain) s
-5 613 M
-( names that deviate from this format \(e.g., that do not contain the) s
-5 602 M
-( "@" sign\). The interpretation of `extended_data' depends on the) s
-5 591 M
-( type. Implementations SHOULD ignore extended data fields that they) s
-5 580 M
-( do not understand.) s
-5 558 M
-( Additional fields can be added to the attributes by either defining) s
-5 547 M
-( additional bits to the flags field to indicate their presence, or by) s
-5 536 M
-( defining extended attributes for them. The extended attributes) s
-5 525 M
-( mechanism is recommended for most purposes; additional flags bits) s
-5 514 M
-( should only be defined by an IETF standards action that also) s
-5 503 M
-( increments the protocol version number. The use of such new fields) s
-5 492 M
-( MUST be negotiated by the version number in the protocol exchange.) s
-5 481 M
-( It is a protocol error if a packet with unsupported protocol bits is) s
-5 470 M
-( received.) s
-5 448 M
-( The flags bits are defined to have the following values:) s
-5 426 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE 0x00000001) s
-5 415 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID 0x00000002) s
-5 404 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS 0x00000004) s
-5 393 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME 0x00000008) s
-5 382 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED 0x80000000) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 9]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(6. Requests From the Client to the Server) s
-5 668 M
-( Requests from the client to the server represent the various file) s
-5 657 M
-( system operations. Each request begins with an `id' field, which is) s
-5 646 M
-( a 32-bit identifier identifying the request \(selected by the client\).) s
-5 635 M
-( The same identifier will be returned in the response to the request.) s
-5 624 M
-( One possible implementation of it is a monotonically increasing) s
-5 613 M
-( request sequence number \(modulo 2^32\).) s
-5 591 M
-( Many operations in the protocol operate on open files. The) s
-5 580 M
-( SSH_FXP_OPEN request can return a file handle \(which is an opaque) s
-5 569 M
-( variable-length string\) which may be used to access the file later) s
-5 558 M
-( \(e.g. in a read operation\). The client MUST NOT send requests the) s
-5 547 M
-( server with bogus or closed handles. However, the server MUST) s
-5 536 M
-( perform adequate checks on the handle in order to avoid security) s
-5 525 M
-( risks due to fabricated handles.) s
-5 503 M
-( This design allows either stateful and stateless server) s
-5 492 M
-( implementation, as well as an implementation which caches state) s
-5 481 M
-( between requests but may also flush it. The contents of the file) s
-5 470 M
-( handle string are entirely up to the server and its design. The) s
-5 459 M
-( client should not modify or attempt to interpret the file handle) s
-5 448 M
-( strings.) s
-5 426 M
-( The file handle strings MUST NOT be longer than 256 bytes.) s
-5 404 M
-(6.1 Request Synchronization and Reordering) s
-5 382 M
-( The protocol and implementations MUST process requests relating to) s
-5 371 M
-( the same file in the order in which they are received. In other) s
-5 360 M
-( words, if an application submits multiple requests to the server, the) s
-5 349 M
-( results in the responses will be the same as if it had sent the) s
-5 338 M
-( requests one at a time and waited for the response in each case. For) s
-5 327 M
-( example, the server may process non-overlapping read/write requests) s
-5 316 M
-( to the same file in parallel, but overlapping reads and writes cannot) s
-5 305 M
-( be reordered or parallelized. However, there are no ordering) s
-5 294 M
-( restrictions on the server for processing requests from two different) s
-5 283 M
-( file transfer connections. The server may interleave and parallelize) s
-5 272 M
-( them at will.) s
-5 250 M
-( There are no restrictions on the order in which responses to) s
-5 239 M
-( outstanding requests are delivered to the client, except that the) s
-5 228 M
-( server must ensure fairness in the sense that processing of no) s
-5 217 M
-( request will be indefinitely delayed even if the client is sending) s
-5 206 M
-( other requests so that there are multiple outstanding requests all) s
-5 195 M
-( the time.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 10]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(6.2 File Names) s
-5 668 M
-( This protocol represents file names as strings. File names are) s
-5 657 M
-( assumed to use the slash \('/'\) character as a directory separator.) s
-5 635 M
-( File names starting with a slash are "absolute", and are relative to) s
-5 624 M
-( the root of the file system. Names starting with any other character) s
-5 613 M
-( are relative to the user's default directory \(home directory\). Note) s
-5 602 M
-( that identifying the user is assumed to take place outside of this) s
-5 591 M
-( protocol.) s
-5 569 M
-( Servers SHOULD interpret a path name component ".." as referring to) s
-5 558 M
-( the parent directory, and "." as referring to the current directory.) s
-5 547 M
-( If the server implementation limits access to certain parts of the) s
-5 536 M
-( file system, it must be extra careful in parsing file names when) s
-5 525 M
-( enforcing such restrictions. There have been numerous reported) s
-5 514 M
-( security bugs where a ".." in a path name has allowed access outside) s
-5 503 M
-( the intended area.) s
-5 481 M
-( An empty path name is valid, and it refers to the user's default) s
-5 470 M
-( directory \(usually the user's home directory\).) s
-5 448 M
-( Otherwise, no syntax is defined for file names by this specification.) s
-5 437 M
-( Clients should not make any other assumptions; however, they can) s
-5 426 M
-( splice path name components returned by SSH_FXP_READDIR together) s
-5 415 M
-( using a slash \('/'\) as the separator, and that will work as expected.) s
-5 393 M
-( It is understood that the lack of well-defined semantics for file) s
-5 382 M
-( names may cause interoperability problems between clients and servers) s
-5 371 M
-( using radically different operating systems. However, this approach) s
-5 360 M
-( is known to work acceptably with most systems, and alternative) s
-5 349 M
-( approaches that e.g. treat file names as sequences of structured) s
-5 338 M
-( components are quite complicated.) s
-5 316 M
-(6.3 Opening, Creating, and Closing Files) s
-5 294 M
-( Files are opened and created using the SSH_FXP_OPEN message, whose) s
-5 283 M
-( data part is as follows:) s
-5 261 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 250 M
-( string filename) s
-5 239 M
-( uint32 pflags) s
-5 228 M
-( ATTRS attrs) s
-5 206 M
-( The `id' field is the request identifier as for all requests.) s
-5 184 M
-( The `filename' field specifies the file name. See Section ``File) s
-5 173 M
-( Names'' for more information.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 11]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-( The `pflags' field is a bitmask. The following bits have been) s
-5 679 M
-( defined.) s
-5 657 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_READ 0x00000001) s
-5 646 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_WRITE 0x00000002) s
-5 635 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_APPEND 0x00000004) s
-5 624 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_CREAT 0x00000008) s
-5 613 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_TRUNC 0x00000010) s
-5 602 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_EXCL 0x00000020) s
-5 580 M
-( These have the following meanings:) s
-5 558 M
-( SSH_FXF_READ) s
-5 547 M
-( Open the file for reading.) s
-5 525 M
-( SSH_FXF_WRITE) s
-5 514 M
-( Open the file for writing. If both this and SSH_FXF_READ are) s
-5 503 M
-( specified, the file is opened for both reading and writing.) s
-5 481 M
-( SSH_FXF_APPEND) s
-5 470 M
-( Force all writes to append data at the end of the file.) s
-5 448 M
-( SSH_FXF_CREAT) s
-5 437 M
-( If this flag is specified, then a new file will be created if one) s
-5 426 M
-( does not already exist \(if O_TRUNC is specified, the new file will) s
-5 415 M
-( be truncated to zero length if it previously exists\).) s
-5 393 M
-( SSH_FXF_TRUNC) s
-5 382 M
-( Forces an existing file with the same name to be truncated to zero) s
-5 371 M
-( length when creating a file by specifying SSH_FXF_CREAT.) s
-5 360 M
-( SSH_FXF_CREAT MUST also be specified if this flag is used.) s
-5 338 M
-( SSH_FXF_EXCL) s
-5 327 M
-( Causes the request to fail if the named file already exists.) s
-5 316 M
-( SSH_FXF_CREAT MUST also be specified if this flag is used.) s
-5 294 M
-( The `attrs' field specifies the initial attributes for the file.) s
-5 283 M
-( Default values will be used for those attributes that are not) s
-5 272 M
-( specified. See Section ``File Attributes'' for more information.) s
-5 250 M
-( Regardless the server operating system, the file will always be) s
-5 239 M
-( opened in "binary" mode \(i.e., no translations between different) s
-5 228 M
-( character sets and newline encodings\).) s
-5 206 M
-( The response to this message will be either SSH_FXP_HANDLE \(if the) s
-5 195 M
-( operation is successful\) or SSH_FXP_STATUS \(if the operation fails\).) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 12]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-( A file is closed by using the SSH_FXP_CLOSE request. Its data field) s
-5 679 M
-( has the following format:) s
-5 657 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 646 M
-( string handle) s
-5 624 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is a handle) s
-5 613 M
-( previously returned in the response to SSH_FXP_OPEN or) s
-5 602 M
-( SSH_FXP_OPENDIR. The handle becomes invalid immediately after this) s
-5 591 M
-( request has been sent.) s
-5 569 M
-( The response to this request will be a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. One) s
-5 558 M
-( should note that on some server platforms even a close can fail.) s
-5 547 M
-( This can happen e.g. if the server operating system caches writes,) s
-5 536 M
-( and an error occurs while flushing cached writes during the close.) s
-5 514 M
-(6.4 Reading and Writing) s
-5 492 M
-( Once a file has been opened, it can be read using the SSH_FXP_READ) s
-5 481 M
-( message, which has the following format:) s
-5 459 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 448 M
-( string handle) s
-5 437 M
-( uint64 offset) s
-5 426 M
-( uint32 len) s
-5 404 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `handle' is an open file handle) s
-5 393 M
-( returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN, `offset' is the offset \(in bytes\) relative) s
-5 382 M
-( to the beginning of the file from where to start reading, and `len') s
-5 371 M
-( is the maximum number of bytes to read.) s
-5 349 M
-( In response to this request, the server will read as many bytes as it) s
-5 338 M
-( can from the file \(up to `len'\), and return them in a SSH_FXP_DATA) s
-5 327 M
-( message. If an error occurs or EOF is encountered before reading any) s
-5 316 M
-( data, the server will respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS. For normal disk) s
-5 305 M
-( files, it is guaranteed that this will read the specified number of) s
-5 294 M
-( bytes, or up to end of file. For e.g. device files this may return) s
-5 283 M
-( fewer bytes than requested.) s
-5 261 M
-( Writing to a file is achieved using the SSH_FXP_WRITE message, which) s
-5 250 M
-( has the following format:) s
-5 228 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 217 M
-( string handle) s
-5 206 M
-( uint64 offset) s
-5 195 M
-( string data) s
-5 173 M
-( where `id' is a request identifier, `handle' is a file handle) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 13]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-( returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN, `offset' is the offset \(in bytes\) from the) s
-5 679 M
-( beginning of the file where to start writing, and `data' is the data) s
-5 668 M
-( to be written.) s
-5 646 M
-( The write will extend the file if writing beyond the end of the file.) s
-5 635 M
-( It is legal to write way beyond the end of the file; the semantics) s
-5 624 M
-( are to write zeroes from the end of the file to the specified offset) s
-5 613 M
-( and then the data. On most operating systems, such writes do not) s
-5 602 M
-( allocate disk space but instead leave "holes" in the file.) s
-5 580 M
-( The server responds to a write request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.) s
-5 558 M
-(6.5 Removing and Renaming Files) s
-5 536 M
-( Files can be removed using the SSH_FXP_REMOVE message. It has the) s
-5 525 M
-( following format:) s
-5 503 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 492 M
-( string filename) s
-5 470 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier and `filename' is the name of) s
-5 459 M
-( the file to be removed. See Section ``File Names'' for more) s
-5 448 M
-( information. This request cannot be used to remove directories.) s
-5 426 M
-( The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS) s
-5 415 M
-( message.) s
-5 393 M
-( Files \(and directories\) can be renamed using the SSH_FXP_RENAME) s
-5 382 M
-( message. Its data is as follows:) s
-5 360 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 349 M
-( string oldpath) s
-5 338 M
-( string newpath) s
-5 316 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `oldpath' is the name of an) s
-5 305 M
-( existing file or directory, and `newpath' is the new name for the) s
-5 294 M
-( file or directory. It is an error if there already exists a file) s
-5 283 M
-( with the name specified by newpath. The server may also fail rename) s
-5 272 M
-( requests in other situations, for example if `oldpath' and `newpath') s
-5 261 M
-( point to different file systems on the server.) s
-5 239 M
-( The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS) s
-5 228 M
-( message.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 14]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(6.6 Creating and Deleting Directories) s
-5 668 M
-( New directories can be created using the SSH_FXP_MKDIR request. It) s
-5 657 M
-( has the following format:) s
-5 635 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 624 M
-( string path) s
-5 613 M
-( ATTRS attrs) s
-5 591 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `path' and `attrs' specifies) s
-5 580 M
-( the modifications to be made to its attributes. See Section ``File) s
-5 569 M
-( Names'' for more information on file names. Attributes are discussed) s
-5 558 M
-( in more detail in Section ``File Attributes''. specifies the) s
-5 547 M
-( directory to be created. An error will be returned if a file or) s
-5 536 M
-( directory with the specified path already exists. The server will) s
-5 525 M
-( respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.) s
-5 503 M
-( Directories can be removed using the SSH_FXP_RMDIR request, which) s
-5 492 M
-( has the following format:) s
-5 470 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 459 M
-( string path) s
-5 437 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `path' specifies the) s
-5 426 M
-( directory to be removed. See Section ``File Names'' for more) s
-5 415 M
-( information on file names. An error will be returned if no directory) s
-5 404 M
-( with the specified path exists, or if the specified directory is not) s
-5 393 M
-( empty, or if the path specified a file system object other than a) s
-5 382 M
-( directory. The server responds to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS) s
-5 371 M
-( message.) s
-5 349 M
-(6.7 Scanning Directories) s
-5 327 M
-( The files in a directory can be listed using the SSH_FXP_OPENDIR and) s
-5 316 M
-( SSH_FXP_READDIR requests. Each SSH_FXP_READDIR request returns one) s
-5 305 M
-( or more file names with full file attributes for each file. The) s
-5 294 M
-( client should call SSH_FXP_READDIR repeatedly until it has found the) s
-5 283 M
-( file it is looking for or until the server responds with a) s
-5 272 M
-( SSH_FXP_STATUS message indicating an error \(normally SSH_FX_EOF if) s
-5 261 M
-( there are no more files in the directory\). The client should then) s
-5 250 M
-( close the handle using the SSH_FXP_CLOSE request.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 15]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-( The SSH_FXP_OPENDIR opens a directory for reading. It has the) s
-5 679 M
-( following format:) s
-5 657 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 646 M
-( string path) s
-5 624 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier and `path' is the path name of) s
-5 613 M
-( the directory to be listed \(without any trailing slash\). See Section) s
-5 602 M
-( ``File Names'' for more information on file names. This will return) s
-5 591 M
-( an error if the path does not specify a directory or if the directory) s
-5 580 M
-( is not readable. The server will respond to this request with either) s
-5 569 M
-( a SSH_FXP_HANDLE or a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.) s
-5 547 M
-( Once the directory has been successfully opened, files \(and) s
-5 536 M
-( directories\) contained in it can be listed using SSH_FXP_READDIR) s
-5 525 M
-( requests. These are of the format) s
-5 503 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 492 M
-( string handle) s
-5 470 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is a handle) s
-5 459 M
-( returned by SSH_FXP_OPENDIR. \(It is a protocol error to attempt to) s
-5 448 M
-( use an ordinary file handle returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN.\)) s
-5 426 M
-( The server responds to this request with either a SSH_FXP_NAME or a) s
-5 415 M
-( SSH_FXP_STATUS message. One or more names may be returned at a time.) s
-5 404 M
-( Full status information is returned for each name in order to speed) s
-5 393 M
-( up typical directory listings.) s
-5 371 M
-( When the client no longer wishes to read more names from the) s
-5 360 M
-( directory, it SHOULD call SSH_FXP_CLOSE for the handle. The handle) s
-5 349 M
-( should be closed regardless of whether an error has occurred or not.) s
-5 327 M
-(6.8 Retrieving File Attributes) s
-5 305 M
-( Very often, file attributes are automatically returned by) s
-5 294 M
-( SSH_FXP_READDIR. However, sometimes there is need to specifically) s
-5 283 M
-( retrieve the attributes for a named file. This can be done using the) s
-5 272 M
-( SSH_FXP_STAT, SSH_FXP_LSTAT and SSH_FXP_FSTAT requests.) s
-5 250 M
-( SSH_FXP_STAT and SSH_FXP_LSTAT only differ in that SSH_FXP_STAT) s
-5 239 M
-( follows symbolic links on the server, whereas SSH_FXP_LSTAT does not) s
-5 228 M
-( follow symbolic links. Both have the same format:) s
-5 206 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 195 M
-( string path) s
-5 173 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `path' specifies the file) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 16]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-( system object for which status is to be returned. The server) s
-5 679 M
-( responds to this request with either SSH_FXP_ATTRS or SSH_FXP_STATUS.) s
-5 657 M
-( SSH_FXP_FSTAT differs from the others in that it returns status) s
-5 646 M
-( information for an open file \(identified by the file handle\). Its) s
-5 635 M
-( format is as follows:) s
-5 613 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 602 M
-( string handle) s
-5 580 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier and `handle' is a file handle) s
-5 569 M
-( returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN. The server responds to this request with) s
-5 558 M
-( SSH_FXP_ATTRS or SSH_FXP_STATUS.) s
-5 536 M
-(6.9 Setting File Attributes) s
-5 514 M
-( File attributes may be modified using the SSH_FXP_SETSTAT and) s
-5 503 M
-( SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT requests. These requests are used for operations) s
-5 492 M
-( such as changing the ownership, permissions or access times, as well) s
-5 481 M
-( as for truncating a file.) s
-5 459 M
-( The SSH_FXP_SETSTAT request is of the following format:) s
-5 437 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 426 M
-( string path) s
-5 415 M
-( ATTRS attrs) s
-5 393 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `path' specifies the file) s
-5 382 M
-( system object \(e.g. file or directory\) whose attributes are to be) s
-5 371 M
-( modified, and `attrs' specifies the modifications to be made to its) s
-5 360 M
-( attributes. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section) s
-5 349 M
-( ``File Attributes''.) s
-5 327 M
-( An error will be returned if the specified file system object does) s
-5 316 M
-( not exist or the user does not have sufficient rights to modify the) s
-5 305 M
-( specified attributes. The server responds to this request with a) s
-5 294 M
-( SSH_FXP_STATUS message.) s
-5 272 M
-( The SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT request modifies the attributes of a file which) s
-5 261 M
-( is already open. It has the following format:) s
-5 239 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 228 M
-( string handle) s
-5 217 M
-( ATTRS attrs) s
-5 195 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `handle' \(MUST be returned by) s
-5 184 M
-( SSH_FXP_OPEN\) identifies the file whose attributes are to be) s
-5 173 M
-( modified, and `attrs' specifies the modifications to be made to its) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 17]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-( attributes. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section) s
-5 679 M
-( ``File Attributes''. The server will respond to this request with) s
-5 668 M
-( SSH_FXP_STATUS.) s
-5 646 M
-(6.10 Dealing with Symbolic links) s
-5 624 M
-( The SSH_FXP_READLINK request may be used to read the target of a) s
-5 613 M
-( symbolic link. It would have a data part as follows:) s
-5 591 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 580 M
-( string path) s
-5 558 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier and `path' specifies the path) s
-5 547 M
-( name of the symlink to be read.) s
-5 525 M
-( The server will respond with a SSH_FXP_NAME packet containing only) s
-5 514 M
-( one name and a dummy attributes value. The name in the returned) s
-5 503 M
-( packet contains the target of the link. If an error occurs, the) s
-5 492 M
-( server may respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS.) s
-5 470 M
-( The SSH_FXP_SYMLINK request will create a symbolic link on the) s
-5 459 M
-( server. It is of the following format) s
-5 437 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 426 M
-( string linkpath) s
-5 415 M
-( string targetpath) s
-5 393 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `linkpath' specifies the path) s
-5 382 M
-( name of the symlink to be created and `targetpath' specifies the) s
-5 371 M
-( target of the symlink. The server shall respond with a) s
-5 360 M
-( SSH_FXP_STATUS indicating either success \(SSH_FX_OK\) or an error) s
-5 349 M
-( condition.) s
-5 327 M
-(6.11 Canonicalizing the Server-Side Path Name) s
-5 305 M
-( The SSH_FXP_REALPATH request can be used to have the server) s
-5 294 M
-( canonicalize any given path name to an absolute path. This is useful) s
-5 283 M
-( for converting path names containing ".." components or relative) s
-5 272 M
-( pathnames without a leading slash into absolute paths. The format of) s
-5 261 M
-( the request is as follows:) s
-5 239 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 228 M
-( string path) s
-5 206 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier and `path' specifies the path) s
-5 195 M
-( name to be canonicalized. The server will respond with a) s
-5 184 M
-( SSH_FXP_NAME packet containing only one name and a dummy attributes) s
-5 173 M
-( value. The name is the returned packet will be in canonical form.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 18]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-( If an error occurs, the server may also respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 19]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(7. Responses from the Server to the Client) s
-5 668 M
-( The server responds to the client using one of a few response) s
-5 657 M
-( packets. All requests can return a SSH_FXP_STATUS response upon) s
-5 646 M
-( failure. When the operation is successful, any of the responses may) s
-5 635 M
-( be returned \(depending on the operation\). If no data needs to be) s
-5 624 M
-( returned to the client, the SSH_FXP_STATUS response with SSH_FX_OK) s
-5 613 M
-( status is appropriate. Otherwise, the SSH_FXP_HANDLE message is used) s
-5 602 M
-( to return a file handle \(for SSH_FXP_OPEN and SSH_FXP_OPENDIR) s
-5 591 M
-( requests\), SSH_FXP_DATA is used to return data from SSH_FXP_READ,) s
-5 580 M
-( SSH_FXP_NAME is used to return one or more file names from a) s
-5 569 M
-( SSH_FXP_READDIR or SSH_FXP_REALPATH request, and SSH_FXP_ATTRS is) s
-5 558 M
-( used to return file attributes from SSH_FXP_STAT, SSH_FXP_LSTAT, and) s
-5 547 M
-( SSH_FXP_FSTAT requests.) s
-5 525 M
-( Exactly one response will be returned for each request. Each) s
-5 514 M
-( response packet contains a request identifier which can be used to) s
-5 503 M
-( match each response with the corresponding request. Note that it is) s
-5 492 M
-( legal to have several requests outstanding simultaneously, and the) s
-5 481 M
-( server is allowed to send responses to them in a different order from) s
-5 470 M
-( the order in which the requests were sent \(the result of their) s
-5 459 M
-( execution, however, is guaranteed to be as if they had been processed) s
-5 448 M
-( one at a time in the order in which the requests were sent\).) s
-5 426 M
-( Response packets are of the same general format as request packets.) s
-5 415 M
-( Each response packet begins with the request identifier.) s
-5 393 M
-( The format of the data portion of the SSH_FXP_STATUS response is as) s
-5 382 M
-( follows:) s
-5 360 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 349 M
-( uint32 error/status code) s
-5 338 M
-( string error message \(ISO-10646 UTF-8 [RFC-2279]\)) s
-5 327 M
-( string language tag \(as defined in [RFC-1766]\)) s
-5 305 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `error/status code') s
-5 294 M
-( indicates the result of the requested operation. The value SSH_FX_OK) s
-5 283 M
-( indicates success, and all other values indicate failure.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 20]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-( Currently, the following values are defined \(other values may be) s
-5 679 M
-( defined by future versions of this protocol\):) s
-5 657 M
-( #define SSH_FX_OK 0) s
-5 646 M
-( #define SSH_FX_EOF 1) s
-5 635 M
-( #define SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE 2) s
-5 624 M
-( #define SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED 3) s
-5 613 M
-( #define SSH_FX_FAILURE 4) s
-5 602 M
-( #define SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE 5) s
-5 591 M
-( #define SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION 6) s
-5 580 M
-( #define SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST 7) s
-5 569 M
-( #define SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED 8) s
-5 547 M
-( SSH_FX_OK) s
-5 536 M
-( Indicates successful completion of the operation.) s
-5 514 M
-( SSH_FX_EOF) s
-5 503 M
-( indicates end-of-file condition; for SSH_FX_READ it means that no) s
-5 492 M
-( more data is available in the file, and for SSH_FX_READDIR it) s
-5 481 M
-( indicates that no more files are contained in the directory.) s
-5 459 M
-( SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) s
-5 448 M
-( is returned when a reference is made to a file which should exist) s
-5 437 M
-( but doesn't.) s
-5 415 M
-( SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED) s
-5 404 M
-( is returned when the authenticated user does not have sufficient) s
-5 393 M
-( permissions to perform the operation.) s
-5 371 M
-( SSH_FX_FAILURE) s
-5 360 M
-( is a generic catch-all error message; it should be returned if an) s
-5 349 M
-( error occurs for which there is no more specific error code) s
-5 338 M
-( defined.) s
-5 316 M
-( SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE) s
-5 305 M
-( may be returned if a badly formatted packet or protocol) s
-5 294 M
-( incompatibility is detected.) s
-5 272 M
-( SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION) s
-5 261 M
-( is a pseudo-error which indicates that the client has no) s
-5 250 M
-( connection to the server \(it can only be generated locally by the) s
-5 239 M
-( client, and MUST NOT be returned by servers\).) s
-5 217 M
-( SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST) s
-5 206 M
-( is a pseudo-error which indicates that the connection to the) s
-5 195 M
-( server has been lost \(it can only be generated locally by the) s
-5 184 M
-( client, and MUST NOT be returned by servers\).) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 21]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-( SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED) s
-5 679 M
-( indicates that an attempt was made to perform an operation which) s
-5 668 M
-( is not supported for the server \(it may be generated locally by) s
-5 657 M
-( the client if e.g. the version number exchange indicates that a) s
-5 646 M
-( required feature is not supported by the server, or it may be) s
-5 635 M
-( returned by the server if the server does not implement an) s
-5 624 M
-( operation\).) s
-5 602 M
-( The SSH_FXP_HANDLE response has the following format:) s
-5 580 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 569 M
-( string handle) s
-5 547 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is an arbitrary) s
-5 536 M
-( string that identifies an open file or directory on the server. The) s
-5 525 M
-( handle is opaque to the client; the client MUST NOT attempt to) s
-5 514 M
-( interpret or modify it in any way. The length of the handle string) s
-5 503 M
-( MUST NOT exceed 256 data bytes.) s
-5 481 M
-( The SSH_FXP_DATA response has the following format:) s
-5 459 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 448 M
-( string data) s
-5 426 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `data' is an arbitrary byte) s
-5 415 M
-( string containing the requested data. The data string may be at most) s
-5 404 M
-( the number of bytes requested in a SSH_FXP_READ request, but may also) s
-5 393 M
-( be shorter if end of file is reached or if the read is from something) s
-5 382 M
-( other than a regular file.) s
-5 360 M
-( The SSH_FXP_NAME response has the following format:) s
-5 338 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 327 M
-( uint32 count) s
-5 316 M
-( repeats count times:) s
-5 305 M
-( string filename) s
-5 294 M
-( string longname) s
-5 283 M
-( ATTRS attrs) s
-5 261 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `count' is the number of names) s
-5 250 M
-( returned in this response, and the remaining fields repeat `count') s
-5 239 M
-( times \(so that all three fields are first included for the first) s
-5 228 M
-( file, then for the second file, etc\). In the repeated part,) s
-5 217 M
-( `filename' is a file name being returned \(for SSH_FXP_READDIR, it) s
-5 206 M
-( will be a relative name within the directory, without any path) s
-5 195 M
-( components; for SSH_FXP_REALPATH it will be an absolute path name\),) s
-5 184 M
-( `longname' is an expanded format for the file name, similar to what) s
-5 173 M
-( is returned by "ls -l" on Unix systems, and `attrs' is the attributes) s
-5 129 M
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-( of the file as described in Section ``File Attributes''.) s
-5 668 M
-( The format of the `longname' field is unspecified by this protocol.) s
-5 657 M
-( It MUST be suitable for use in the output of a directory listing) s
-5 646 M
-( command \(in fact, the recommended operation for a directory listing) s
-5 635 M
-( command is to simply display this data\). However, clients SHOULD NOT) s
-5 624 M
-( attempt to parse the longname field for file attributes; they SHOULD) s
-5 613 M
-( use the attrs field instead.) s
-5 591 M
-( The recommended format for the longname field is as follows:) s
-5 569 M
-( -rwxr-xr-x 1 mjos staff 348911 Mar 25 14:29 t-filexfer) s
-5 558 M
-( 1234567890 123 12345678 12345678 12345678 123456789012) s
-5 536 M
-( Here, the first line is sample output, and the second field indicates) s
-5 525 M
-( widths of the various fields. Fields are separated by spaces. The) s
-5 514 M
-( first field lists file permissions for user, group, and others; the) s
-5 503 M
-( second field is link count; the third field is the name of the user) s
-5 492 M
-( who owns the file; the fourth field is the name of the group that) s
-5 481 M
-( owns the file; the fifth field is the size of the file in bytes; the) s
-5 470 M
-( sixth field \(which actually may contain spaces, but is fixed to 12) s
-5 459 M
-( characters\) is the file modification time, and the seventh field is) s
-5 448 M
-( the file name. Each field is specified to be a minimum of certain) s
-5 437 M
-( number of character positions \(indicated by the second line above\),) s
-5 426 M
-( but may also be longer if the data does not fit in the specified) s
-5 415 M
-( length.) s
-5 393 M
-( The SSH_FXP_ATTRS response has the following format:) s
-5 371 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 360 M
-( ATTRS attrs) s
-5 338 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `attrs' is the returned) s
-5 327 M
-( file attributes as described in Section ``File Attributes''.) s
-5 129 M
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(8. Vendor-Specific Extensions) s
-5 668 M
-( The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request provides a generic extension mechanism) s
-5 657 M
-( for adding vendor-specific commands. The request has the following) s
-5 646 M
-( format:) s
-5 624 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 613 M
-( string extended-request) s
-5 602 M
-( ... any request-specific data ...) s
-5 580 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `extended-request' is a) s
-5 569 M
-( string of the format "name@domain", where domain is an internet) s
-5 558 M
-( domain name of the vendor defining the request. The rest of the) s
-5 547 M
-( request is completely vendor-specific, and servers should only) s
-5 536 M
-( attempt to interpret it if they recognize the `extended-request') s
-5 525 M
-( name.) s
-5 503 M
-( The server may respond to such requests using any of the response) s
-5 492 M
-( packets defined in Section ``Responses from the Server to the) s
-5 481 M
-( Client''. Additionally, the server may also respond with a) s
-5 470 M
-( SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY packet, as defined below. If the server does) s
-5 459 M
-( not recognize the `extended-request' name, then the server MUST) s
-5 448 M
-( respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS with error/status set to) s
-5 437 M
-( SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED.) s
-5 415 M
-( The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY packet can be used to carry arbitrary) s
-5 404 M
-( extension-specific data from the server to the client. It is of the) s
-5 393 M
-( following format:) s
-5 371 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 360 M
-( ... any request-specific data ...) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 24]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(9. Security Considerations) s
-5 668 M
-( This protocol assumes that it is run over a secure channel and that) s
-5 657 M
-( the endpoints of the channel have been authenticated. Thus, this) s
-5 646 M
-( protocol assumes that it is externally protected from network-level) s
-5 635 M
-( attacks.) s
-5 613 M
-( This protocol provides file system access to arbitrary files on the) s
-5 602 M
-( server \(only constrained by the server implementation\). It is the) s
-5 591 M
-( responsibility of the server implementation to enforce any access) s
-5 580 M
-( controls that may be required to limit the access allowed for any) s
-5 569 M
-( particular user \(the user being authenticated externally to this) s
-5 558 M
-( protocol, typically using the SSH User Authentication Protocol [6].) s
-5 536 M
-( Care must be taken in the server implementation to check the validity) s
-5 525 M
-( of received file handle strings. The server should not rely on them) s
-5 514 M
-( directly; it MUST check the validity of each handle before relying on) s
-5 503 M
-( it.) s
-5 129 M
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(10. Changes from previous protocol versions) s
-5 668 M
-( The SSH File Transfer Protocol has changed over time, before it's) s
-5 657 M
-( standardization. The following is a description of the incompatible) s
-5 646 M
-( changes between different versions.) s
-5 624 M
-(10.1 Changes between versions 3 and 2) s
-5 602 M
-( o The SSH_FXP_READLINK and SSH_FXP_SYMLINK messages were added.) s
-5 580 M
-( o The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED and SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY messages were) s
-5 569 M
-( added.) s
-5 547 M
-( o The SSH_FXP_STATUS message was changed to include fields `error) s
-5 536 M
-( message' and `language tag'.) s
-5 503 M
-(10.2 Changes between versions 2 and 1) s
-5 481 M
-( o The SSH_FXP_RENAME message was added.) s
-5 448 M
-(10.3 Changes between versions 1 and 0) s
-5 426 M
-( o Implementation changes, no actual protocol changes.) s
-5 129 M
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(11. Trademark Issues) s
-5 668 M
-( "ssh" is a registered trademark of SSH Communications Security Corp) s
-5 657 M
-( in the United States and/or other countries.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 27]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(References) s
-5 668 M
-( [1] Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A. and) s
-5 657 M
-( P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246, January) s
-5 646 M
-( 1999.) s
-5 624 M
-( [2] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Information) s
-5 613 M
-( Technology - Portable Operating System Interface \(POSIX\) - Part) s
-5 602 M
-( 1: System Application Program Interface \(API\) [C Language]",) s
-5 591 M
-( IEEE Standard 1003.2, 1996.) s
-5 569 M
-( [3] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.) s
-5 558 M
-( Lehtinen, "SSH Protocol Architecture", draft-ietf-secsh-) s
-5 547 M
-( architecture-09 \(work in progress\), July 2001.) s
-5 525 M
-( [4] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.) s
-5 514 M
-( Lehtinen, "SSH Protocol Transport Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-) s
-5 503 M
-( architecture-09 \(work in progress\), July 2001.) s
-5 481 M
-( [5] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.) s
-5 470 M
-( Lehtinen, "SSH Connection Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-connect-11) s
-5 459 M
-( \(work in progress\), July 2001.) s
-5 437 M
-( [6] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.) s
-5 426 M
-( Lehtinen, "SSH Authentication Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-) s
-5 415 M
-( userauth-11 \(work in progress\), July 2001.) s
-5 382 M
-(Authors' Addresses) s
-5 360 M
-( Tatu Ylonen) s
-5 349 M
-( SSH Communications Security Corp) s
-5 338 M
-( Fredrikinkatu 42) s
-5 327 M
-( HELSINKI FIN-00100) s
-5 316 M
-( Finland) s
-5 294 M
-( EMail: [email protected]) s
-5 261 M
-( Sami Lehtinen) s
-5 250 M
-( SSH Communications Security Corp) s
-5 239 M
-( Fredrikinkatu 42) s
-5 228 M
-( HELSINKI FIN-00100) s
-5 217 M
-( Finland) s
-5 195 M
-( EMail: [email protected]) s
-5 129 M
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001) s
-5 690 M
-(Full Copyright Statement) s
-5 668 M
-( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2001\). All Rights Reserved.) s
-5 646 M
-( This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to) s
-5 635 M
-( others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it) s
-5 624 M
-( or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published) s
-5 613 M
-( and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any) s
-5 602 M
-( kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are) s
-5 591 M
-( included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this) s
-5 580 M
-( document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing) s
-5 569 M
-( the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other) s
-5 558 M
-( Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of) s
-5 547 M
-( developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for) s
-5 536 M
-( copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be) s
-5 525 M
-( followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than) s
-5 514 M
-( English.) s
-5 492 M
-( The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be) s
-5 481 M
-( revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.) s
-5 459 M
-( This document and the information contained herein is provided on an) s
-5 448 M
-( "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING) s
-5 437 M
-( TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING) s
-5 426 M
-( BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION) s
-5 415 M
-( HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF) s
-5 404 M
-( MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.) s
-5 382 M
-(Acknowledgement) s
-5 360 M
-( Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the) s
-5 349 M
-( Internet Society.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 29]) s
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diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index c4ec8c1125..0000000000
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1627 +0,0 @@
-
-
-
-Network Working Group T. Ylonen
-Internet-Draft S. Lehtinen
-Expires: April 1, 2002 SSH Communications Security Corp
- October 2001
-
-
- SSH File Transfer Protocol
- draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
-
-Status of this Memo
-
- This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
- all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
-
- Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
- Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
- Drafts.
-
- Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
- and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
- time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
- material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
-
- The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
- www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
-
- The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
- http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
-
- This Internet-Draft will expire on April 1, 2002.
-
-Copyright Notice
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
-
-Abstract
-
- The SSH File Transfer Protocol provides secure file transfer
- functionality over any reliable data stream. It is the standard file
- transfer protocol for use with the SSH2 protocol. This document
- describes the file transfer protocol and its interface to the SSH2
- protocol suite.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 1]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001
-
-
-Table of Contents
-
- 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 2. Use with the SSH Connection Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 3. General Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 4. Protocol Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 5. File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 6. Requests From the Client to the Server . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 6.1 Request Synchronization and Reordering . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 6.2 File Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 6.3 Opening, Creating, and Closing Files . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 6.4 Reading and Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
- 6.5 Removing and Renaming Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
- 6.6 Creating and Deleting Directories . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
- 6.7 Scanning Directories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
- 6.8 Retrieving File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
- 6.9 Setting File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
- 6.10 Dealing with Symbolic links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
- 6.11 Canonicalizing the Server-Side Path Name . . . . . . . . . . 18
- 7. Responses from the Server to the Client . . . . . . . . . . 20
- 8. Vendor-Specific Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
- 10. Changes from previous protocol versions . . . . . . . . . . 26
- 10.1 Changes between versions 3 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
- 10.2 Changes between versions 2 and 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
- 10.3 Changes between versions 1 and 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
- 11. Trademark Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
- References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
- Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
- Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
-
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-
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-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 2]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001
-
-
-1. Introduction
-
- This protocol provides secure file transfer (and more generally file
- system access) functionality over a reliable data stream, such as a
- channel in the SSH2 protocol [3].
-
- This protocol is designed so that it could be used to implement a
- secure remote file system service, as well as a secure file transfer
- service.
-
- This protocol assumes that it runs over a secure channel, and that
- the server has already authenticated the user at the client end, and
- that the identity of the client user is externally available to the
- server implementation.
-
- In general, this protocol follows a simple request-response model.
- Each request and response contains a sequence number and multiple
- requests may be pending simultaneously. There are a relatively large
- number of different request messages, but a small number of possible
- response messages. Each request has one or more response messages
- that may be returned in result (e.g., a read either returns data or
- reports error status).
-
- The packet format descriptions in this specification follow the
- notation presented in the secsh architecture draft.[3].
-
- Even though this protocol is described in the context of the SSH2
- protocol, this protocol is general and independent of the rest of the
- SSH2 protocol suite. It could be used in a number of different
- applications, such as secure file transfer over TLS RFC 2246 [1] and
- transfer of management information in VPN applications.
-
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-Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 3]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001
-
-
-2. Use with the SSH Connection Protocol
-
- When used with the SSH2 Protocol suite, this protocol is intended to
- be used from the SSH Connection Protocol [5] as a subsystem, as
- described in section ``Starting a Shell or a Command''. The
- subsystem name used with this protocol is "sftp".
-
-
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-Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 4]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001
-
-
-3. General Packet Format
-
- All packets transmitted over the secure connection are of the
- following format:
-
- uint32 length
- byte type
- byte[length - 1] data payload
-
- That is, they are just data preceded by 32-bit length and 8-bit type
- fields. The `length' is the length of the data area, and does not
- include the `length' field itself. The format and interpretation of
- the data area depends on the packet type.
-
- All packet descriptions below only specify the packet type and the
- data that goes into the data field. Thus, they should be prefixed by
- the `length' and `type' fields.
-
- The maximum size of a packet is in practice determined by the client
- (the maximum size of read or write requests that it sends, plus a few
- bytes of packet overhead). All servers SHOULD support packets of at
- least 34000 bytes (where the packet size refers to the full length,
- including the header above). This should allow for reads and writes
- of at most 32768 bytes.
-
- There is no limit on the number of outstanding (non-acknowledged)
- requests that the client may send to the server. In practice this is
- limited by the buffering available on the data stream and the queuing
- performed by the server. If the server's queues are full, it should
- not read any more data from the stream, and flow control will prevent
- the client from sending more requests. Note, however, that while
- there is no restriction on the protocol level, the client's API may
- provide a limit in order to prevent infinite queuing of outgoing
- requests at the client.
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
- The following values are defined for packet types.
-
- #define SSH_FXP_INIT 1
- #define SSH_FXP_VERSION 2
- #define SSH_FXP_OPEN 3
- #define SSH_FXP_CLOSE 4
- #define SSH_FXP_READ 5
- #define SSH_FXP_WRITE 6
- #define SSH_FXP_LSTAT 7
- #define SSH_FXP_FSTAT 8
- #define SSH_FXP_SETSTAT 9
- #define SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT 10
- #define SSH_FXP_OPENDIR 11
- #define SSH_FXP_READDIR 12
- #define SSH_FXP_REMOVE 13
- #define SSH_FXP_MKDIR 14
- #define SSH_FXP_RMDIR 15
- #define SSH_FXP_REALPATH 16
- #define SSH_FXP_STAT 17
- #define SSH_FXP_RENAME 18
- #define SSH_FXP_READLINK 19
- #define SSH_FXP_SYMLINK 20
- #define SSH_FXP_STATUS 101
- #define SSH_FXP_HANDLE 102
- #define SSH_FXP_DATA 103
- #define SSH_FXP_NAME 104
- #define SSH_FXP_ATTRS 105
- #define SSH_FXP_EXTENDED 200
- #define SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY 201
-
- Additional packet types should only be defined if the protocol
- version number (see Section ``Protocol Initialization'') is
- incremented, and their use MUST be negotiated using the version
- number. However, the SSH_FXP_EXTENDED and SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY
- packets can be used to implement vendor-specific extensions. See
- Section ``Vendor-Specific-Extensions'' for more details.
-
-
-
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-
-4. Protocol Initialization
-
- When the file transfer protocol starts, it first sends a SSH_FXP_INIT
- (including its version number) packet to the server. The server
- responds with a SSH_FXP_VERSION packet, supplying the lowest of its
- own and the client's version number. Both parties should from then
- on adhere to particular version of the protocol.
-
- The SSH_FXP_INIT packet (from client to server) has the following
- data:
-
- uint32 version
- <extension data>
-
- The SSH_FXP_VERSION packet (from server to client) has the following
- data:
-
- uint32 version
- <extension data>
-
- The version number of the protocol specified in this document is 3.
- The version number should be incremented for each incompatible
- revision of this protocol.
-
- The extension data in the above packets may be empty, or may be a
- sequence of
-
- string extension_name
- string extension_data
-
- pairs (both strings MUST always be present if one is, but the
- `extension_data' string may be of zero length). If present, these
- strings indicate extensions to the baseline protocol. The
- `extension_name' field(s) identify the name of the extension. The
- name should be of the form "name@domain", where the domain is the DNS
- domain name of the organization defining the extension. Additional
- names that are not of this format may be defined later by the IETF.
- Implementations MUST silently ignore any extensions whose name they
- do not recognize.
-
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-
-5. File Attributes
-
- A new compound data type is defined for encoding file attributes. It
- is basically just a combination of elementary types, but is defined
- once because of the non-trivial description of the fields and to
- ensure maintainability.
-
- The same encoding is used both when returning file attributes from
- the server and when sending file attributes to the server. When
- sending it to the server, the flags field specifies which attributes
- are included, and the server will use default values for the
- remaining attributes (or will not modify the values of remaining
- attributes). When receiving attributes from the server, the flags
- specify which attributes are included in the returned data. The
- server normally returns all attributes it knows about.
-
- uint32 flags
- uint64 size present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE
- uint32 uid present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID
- uint32 gid present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID
- uint32 permissions present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS
- uint32 atime present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ACMODTIME
- uint32 mtime present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ACMODTIME
- uint32 extended_count present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED
- string extended_type
- string extended_data
- ... more extended data (extended_type - extended_data pairs),
- so that number of pairs equals extended_count
-
- The `flags' specify which of the fields are present. Those fields
- for which the corresponding flag is not set are not present (not
- included in the packet). New flags can only be added by incrementing
- the protocol version number (or by using the extension mechanism
- described below).
-
- The `size' field specifies the size of the file in bytes.
-
- The `uid' and `gid' fields contain numeric Unix-like user and group
- identifiers, respectively.
-
- The `permissions' field contains a bit mask of file permissions as
- defined by posix [1].
-
- The `atime' and `mtime' contain the access and modification times of
- the files, respectively. They are represented as seconds from Jan 1,
- 1970 in UTC.
-
- The SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED flag provides a general extension
-
-
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-
- mechanism for vendor-specific extensions. If the flag is specified,
- then the `extended_count' field is present. It specifies the number
- of extended_type-extended_data pairs that follow. Each of these
- pairs specifies an extended attribute. For each of the attributes,
- the extended_type field should be a string of the format
- "name@domain", where "domain" is a valid, registered domain name and
- "name" identifies the method. The IETF may later standardize certain
- names that deviate from this format (e.g., that do not contain the
- "@" sign). The interpretation of `extended_data' depends on the
- type. Implementations SHOULD ignore extended data fields that they
- do not understand.
-
- Additional fields can be added to the attributes by either defining
- additional bits to the flags field to indicate their presence, or by
- defining extended attributes for them. The extended attributes
- mechanism is recommended for most purposes; additional flags bits
- should only be defined by an IETF standards action that also
- increments the protocol version number. The use of such new fields
- MUST be negotiated by the version number in the protocol exchange.
- It is a protocol error if a packet with unsupported protocol bits is
- received.
-
- The flags bits are defined to have the following values:
-
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE 0x00000001
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID 0x00000002
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS 0x00000004
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME 0x00000008
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED 0x80000000
-
-
-
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-
-6. Requests From the Client to the Server
-
- Requests from the client to the server represent the various file
- system operations. Each request begins with an `id' field, which is
- a 32-bit identifier identifying the request (selected by the client).
- The same identifier will be returned in the response to the request.
- One possible implementation of it is a monotonically increasing
- request sequence number (modulo 2^32).
-
- Many operations in the protocol operate on open files. The
- SSH_FXP_OPEN request can return a file handle (which is an opaque
- variable-length string) which may be used to access the file later
- (e.g. in a read operation). The client MUST NOT send requests the
- server with bogus or closed handles. However, the server MUST
- perform adequate checks on the handle in order to avoid security
- risks due to fabricated handles.
-
- This design allows either stateful and stateless server
- implementation, as well as an implementation which caches state
- between requests but may also flush it. The contents of the file
- handle string are entirely up to the server and its design. The
- client should not modify or attempt to interpret the file handle
- strings.
-
- The file handle strings MUST NOT be longer than 256 bytes.
-
-6.1 Request Synchronization and Reordering
-
- The protocol and implementations MUST process requests relating to
- the same file in the order in which they are received. In other
- words, if an application submits multiple requests to the server, the
- results in the responses will be the same as if it had sent the
- requests one at a time and waited for the response in each case. For
- example, the server may process non-overlapping read/write requests
- to the same file in parallel, but overlapping reads and writes cannot
- be reordered or parallelized. However, there are no ordering
- restrictions on the server for processing requests from two different
- file transfer connections. The server may interleave and parallelize
- them at will.
-
- There are no restrictions on the order in which responses to
- outstanding requests are delivered to the client, except that the
- server must ensure fairness in the sense that processing of no
- request will be indefinitely delayed even if the client is sending
- other requests so that there are multiple outstanding requests all
- the time.
-
-
-
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-
-6.2 File Names
-
- This protocol represents file names as strings. File names are
- assumed to use the slash ('/') character as a directory separator.
-
- File names starting with a slash are "absolute", and are relative to
- the root of the file system. Names starting with any other character
- are relative to the user's default directory (home directory). Note
- that identifying the user is assumed to take place outside of this
- protocol.
-
- Servers SHOULD interpret a path name component ".." as referring to
- the parent directory, and "." as referring to the current directory.
- If the server implementation limits access to certain parts of the
- file system, it must be extra careful in parsing file names when
- enforcing such restrictions. There have been numerous reported
- security bugs where a ".." in a path name has allowed access outside
- the intended area.
-
- An empty path name is valid, and it refers to the user's default
- directory (usually the user's home directory).
-
- Otherwise, no syntax is defined for file names by this specification.
- Clients should not make any other assumptions; however, they can
- splice path name components returned by SSH_FXP_READDIR together
- using a slash ('/') as the separator, and that will work as expected.
-
- It is understood that the lack of well-defined semantics for file
- names may cause interoperability problems between clients and servers
- using radically different operating systems. However, this approach
- is known to work acceptably with most systems, and alternative
- approaches that e.g. treat file names as sequences of structured
- components are quite complicated.
-
-6.3 Opening, Creating, and Closing Files
-
- Files are opened and created using the SSH_FXP_OPEN message, whose
- data part is as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string filename
- uint32 pflags
- ATTRS attrs
-
- The `id' field is the request identifier as for all requests.
-
- The `filename' field specifies the file name. See Section ``File
- Names'' for more information.
-
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-
- The `pflags' field is a bitmask. The following bits have been
- defined.
-
- #define SSH_FXF_READ 0x00000001
- #define SSH_FXF_WRITE 0x00000002
- #define SSH_FXF_APPEND 0x00000004
- #define SSH_FXF_CREAT 0x00000008
- #define SSH_FXF_TRUNC 0x00000010
- #define SSH_FXF_EXCL 0x00000020
-
- These have the following meanings:
-
- SSH_FXF_READ
- Open the file for reading.
-
- SSH_FXF_WRITE
- Open the file for writing. If both this and SSH_FXF_READ are
- specified, the file is opened for both reading and writing.
-
- SSH_FXF_APPEND
- Force all writes to append data at the end of the file.
-
- SSH_FXF_CREAT
- If this flag is specified, then a new file will be created if one
- does not already exist (if O_TRUNC is specified, the new file will
- be truncated to zero length if it previously exists).
-
- SSH_FXF_TRUNC
- Forces an existing file with the same name to be truncated to zero
- length when creating a file by specifying SSH_FXF_CREAT.
- SSH_FXF_CREAT MUST also be specified if this flag is used.
-
- SSH_FXF_EXCL
- Causes the request to fail if the named file already exists.
- SSH_FXF_CREAT MUST also be specified if this flag is used.
-
- The `attrs' field specifies the initial attributes for the file.
- Default values will be used for those attributes that are not
- specified. See Section ``File Attributes'' for more information.
-
- Regardless the server operating system, the file will always be
- opened in "binary" mode (i.e., no translations between different
- character sets and newline encodings).
-
- The response to this message will be either SSH_FXP_HANDLE (if the
- operation is successful) or SSH_FXP_STATUS (if the operation fails).
-
-
-
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-
- A file is closed by using the SSH_FXP_CLOSE request. Its data field
- has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is a handle
- previously returned in the response to SSH_FXP_OPEN or
- SSH_FXP_OPENDIR. The handle becomes invalid immediately after this
- request has been sent.
-
- The response to this request will be a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. One
- should note that on some server platforms even a close can fail.
- This can happen e.g. if the server operating system caches writes,
- and an error occurs while flushing cached writes during the close.
-
-6.4 Reading and Writing
-
- Once a file has been opened, it can be read using the SSH_FXP_READ
- message, which has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
- uint64 offset
- uint32 len
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `handle' is an open file handle
- returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN, `offset' is the offset (in bytes) relative
- to the beginning of the file from where to start reading, and `len'
- is the maximum number of bytes to read.
-
- In response to this request, the server will read as many bytes as it
- can from the file (up to `len'), and return them in a SSH_FXP_DATA
- message. If an error occurs or EOF is encountered before reading any
- data, the server will respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS. For normal disk
- files, it is guaranteed that this will read the specified number of
- bytes, or up to end of file. For e.g. device files this may return
- fewer bytes than requested.
-
- Writing to a file is achieved using the SSH_FXP_WRITE message, which
- has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
- uint64 offset
- string data
-
- where `id' is a request identifier, `handle' is a file handle
-
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- returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN, `offset' is the offset (in bytes) from the
- beginning of the file where to start writing, and `data' is the data
- to be written.
-
- The write will extend the file if writing beyond the end of the file.
- It is legal to write way beyond the end of the file; the semantics
- are to write zeroes from the end of the file to the specified offset
- and then the data. On most operating systems, such writes do not
- allocate disk space but instead leave "holes" in the file.
-
- The server responds to a write request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-
-6.5 Removing and Renaming Files
-
- Files can be removed using the SSH_FXP_REMOVE message. It has the
- following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string filename
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `filename' is the name of
- the file to be removed. See Section ``File Names'' for more
- information. This request cannot be used to remove directories.
-
- The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS
- message.
-
- Files (and directories) can be renamed using the SSH_FXP_RENAME
- message. Its data is as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string oldpath
- string newpath
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `oldpath' is the name of an
- existing file or directory, and `newpath' is the new name for the
- file or directory. It is an error if there already exists a file
- with the name specified by newpath. The server may also fail rename
- requests in other situations, for example if `oldpath' and `newpath'
- point to different file systems on the server.
-
- The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS
- message.
-
-
-
-
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-
-6.6 Creating and Deleting Directories
-
- New directories can be created using the SSH_FXP_MKDIR request. It
- has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `path' and `attrs' specifies
- the modifications to be made to its attributes. See Section ``File
- Names'' for more information on file names. Attributes are discussed
- in more detail in Section ``File Attributes''. specifies the
- directory to be created. An error will be returned if a file or
- directory with the specified path already exists. The server will
- respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-
- Directories can be removed using the SSH_FXP_RMDIR request, which
- has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `path' specifies the
- directory to be removed. See Section ``File Names'' for more
- information on file names. An error will be returned if no directory
- with the specified path exists, or if the specified directory is not
- empty, or if the path specified a file system object other than a
- directory. The server responds to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS
- message.
-
-6.7 Scanning Directories
-
- The files in a directory can be listed using the SSH_FXP_OPENDIR and
- SSH_FXP_READDIR requests. Each SSH_FXP_READDIR request returns one
- or more file names with full file attributes for each file. The
- client should call SSH_FXP_READDIR repeatedly until it has found the
- file it is looking for or until the server responds with a
- SSH_FXP_STATUS message indicating an error (normally SSH_FX_EOF if
- there are no more files in the directory). The client should then
- close the handle using the SSH_FXP_CLOSE request.
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
- The SSH_FXP_OPENDIR opens a directory for reading. It has the
- following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `path' is the path name of
- the directory to be listed (without any trailing slash). See Section
- ``File Names'' for more information on file names. This will return
- an error if the path does not specify a directory or if the directory
- is not readable. The server will respond to this request with either
- a SSH_FXP_HANDLE or a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-
- Once the directory has been successfully opened, files (and
- directories) contained in it can be listed using SSH_FXP_READDIR
- requests. These are of the format
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is a handle
- returned by SSH_FXP_OPENDIR. (It is a protocol error to attempt to
- use an ordinary file handle returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN.)
-
- The server responds to this request with either a SSH_FXP_NAME or a
- SSH_FXP_STATUS message. One or more names may be returned at a time.
- Full status information is returned for each name in order to speed
- up typical directory listings.
-
- When the client no longer wishes to read more names from the
- directory, it SHOULD call SSH_FXP_CLOSE for the handle. The handle
- should be closed regardless of whether an error has occurred or not.
-
-6.8 Retrieving File Attributes
-
- Very often, file attributes are automatically returned by
- SSH_FXP_READDIR. However, sometimes there is need to specifically
- retrieve the attributes for a named file. This can be done using the
- SSH_FXP_STAT, SSH_FXP_LSTAT and SSH_FXP_FSTAT requests.
-
- SSH_FXP_STAT and SSH_FXP_LSTAT only differ in that SSH_FXP_STAT
- follows symbolic links on the server, whereas SSH_FXP_LSTAT does not
- follow symbolic links. Both have the same format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `path' specifies the file
-
-
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- system object for which status is to be returned. The server
- responds to this request with either SSH_FXP_ATTRS or SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
- SSH_FXP_FSTAT differs from the others in that it returns status
- information for an open file (identified by the file handle). Its
- format is as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `handle' is a file handle
- returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN. The server responds to this request with
- SSH_FXP_ATTRS or SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
-6.9 Setting File Attributes
-
- File attributes may be modified using the SSH_FXP_SETSTAT and
- SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT requests. These requests are used for operations
- such as changing the ownership, permissions or access times, as well
- as for truncating a file.
-
- The SSH_FXP_SETSTAT request is of the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `path' specifies the file
- system object (e.g. file or directory) whose attributes are to be
- modified, and `attrs' specifies the modifications to be made to its
- attributes. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section
- ``File Attributes''.
-
- An error will be returned if the specified file system object does
- not exist or the user does not have sufficient rights to modify the
- specified attributes. The server responds to this request with a
- SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-
- The SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT request modifies the attributes of a file which
- is already open. It has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `handle' (MUST be returned by
- SSH_FXP_OPEN) identifies the file whose attributes are to be
- modified, and `attrs' specifies the modifications to be made to its
-
-
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-
- attributes. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section
- ``File Attributes''. The server will respond to this request with
- SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
-6.10 Dealing with Symbolic links
-
- The SSH_FXP_READLINK request may be used to read the target of a
- symbolic link. It would have a data part as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string path
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `path' specifies the path
- name of the symlink to be read.
-
- The server will respond with a SSH_FXP_NAME packet containing only
- one name and a dummy attributes value. The name in the returned
- packet contains the target of the link. If an error occurs, the
- server may respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
- The SSH_FXP_SYMLINK request will create a symbolic link on the
- server. It is of the following format
-
- uint32 id
- string linkpath
- string targetpath
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `linkpath' specifies the path
- name of the symlink to be created and `targetpath' specifies the
- target of the symlink. The server shall respond with a
- SSH_FXP_STATUS indicating either success (SSH_FX_OK) or an error
- condition.
-
-6.11 Canonicalizing the Server-Side Path Name
-
- The SSH_FXP_REALPATH request can be used to have the server
- canonicalize any given path name to an absolute path. This is useful
- for converting path names containing ".." components or relative
- pathnames without a leading slash into absolute paths. The format of
- the request is as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string path
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `path' specifies the path
- name to be canonicalized. The server will respond with a
- SSH_FXP_NAME packet containing only one name and a dummy attributes
- value. The name is the returned packet will be in canonical form.
-
-
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- If an error occurs, the server may also respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS.
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-
-
-7. Responses from the Server to the Client
-
- The server responds to the client using one of a few response
- packets. All requests can return a SSH_FXP_STATUS response upon
- failure. When the operation is successful, any of the responses may
- be returned (depending on the operation). If no data needs to be
- returned to the client, the SSH_FXP_STATUS response with SSH_FX_OK
- status is appropriate. Otherwise, the SSH_FXP_HANDLE message is used
- to return a file handle (for SSH_FXP_OPEN and SSH_FXP_OPENDIR
- requests), SSH_FXP_DATA is used to return data from SSH_FXP_READ,
- SSH_FXP_NAME is used to return one or more file names from a
- SSH_FXP_READDIR or SSH_FXP_REALPATH request, and SSH_FXP_ATTRS is
- used to return file attributes from SSH_FXP_STAT, SSH_FXP_LSTAT, and
- SSH_FXP_FSTAT requests.
-
- Exactly one response will be returned for each request. Each
- response packet contains a request identifier which can be used to
- match each response with the corresponding request. Note that it is
- legal to have several requests outstanding simultaneously, and the
- server is allowed to send responses to them in a different order from
- the order in which the requests were sent (the result of their
- execution, however, is guaranteed to be as if they had been processed
- one at a time in the order in which the requests were sent).
-
- Response packets are of the same general format as request packets.
- Each response packet begins with the request identifier.
-
- The format of the data portion of the SSH_FXP_STATUS response is as
- follows:
-
- uint32 id
- uint32 error/status code
- string error message (ISO-10646 UTF-8 [RFC-2279])
- string language tag (as defined in [RFC-1766])
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `error/status code'
- indicates the result of the requested operation. The value SSH_FX_OK
- indicates success, and all other values indicate failure.
-
-
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-
-
- Currently, the following values are defined (other values may be
- defined by future versions of this protocol):
-
- #define SSH_FX_OK 0
- #define SSH_FX_EOF 1
- #define SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE 2
- #define SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED 3
- #define SSH_FX_FAILURE 4
- #define SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE 5
- #define SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION 6
- #define SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST 7
- #define SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED 8
-
- SSH_FX_OK
- Indicates successful completion of the operation.
-
- SSH_FX_EOF
- indicates end-of-file condition; for SSH_FX_READ it means that no
- more data is available in the file, and for SSH_FX_READDIR it
- indicates that no more files are contained in the directory.
-
- SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE
- is returned when a reference is made to a file which should exist
- but doesn't.
-
- SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED
- is returned when the authenticated user does not have sufficient
- permissions to perform the operation.
-
- SSH_FX_FAILURE
- is a generic catch-all error message; it should be returned if an
- error occurs for which there is no more specific error code
- defined.
-
- SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE
- may be returned if a badly formatted packet or protocol
- incompatibility is detected.
-
- SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION
- is a pseudo-error which indicates that the client has no
- connection to the server (it can only be generated locally by the
- client, and MUST NOT be returned by servers).
-
- SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST
- is a pseudo-error which indicates that the connection to the
- server has been lost (it can only be generated locally by the
- client, and MUST NOT be returned by servers).
-
-
-
-
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-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001
-
-
- SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED
- indicates that an attempt was made to perform an operation which
- is not supported for the server (it may be generated locally by
- the client if e.g. the version number exchange indicates that a
- required feature is not supported by the server, or it may be
- returned by the server if the server does not implement an
- operation).
-
- The SSH_FXP_HANDLE response has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is an arbitrary
- string that identifies an open file or directory on the server. The
- handle is opaque to the client; the client MUST NOT attempt to
- interpret or modify it in any way. The length of the handle string
- MUST NOT exceed 256 data bytes.
-
- The SSH_FXP_DATA response has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string data
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `data' is an arbitrary byte
- string containing the requested data. The data string may be at most
- the number of bytes requested in a SSH_FXP_READ request, but may also
- be shorter if end of file is reached or if the read is from something
- other than a regular file.
-
- The SSH_FXP_NAME response has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- uint32 count
- repeats count times:
- string filename
- string longname
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `count' is the number of names
- returned in this response, and the remaining fields repeat `count'
- times (so that all three fields are first included for the first
- file, then for the second file, etc). In the repeated part,
- `filename' is a file name being returned (for SSH_FXP_READDIR, it
- will be a relative name within the directory, without any path
- components; for SSH_FXP_REALPATH it will be an absolute path name),
- `longname' is an expanded format for the file name, similar to what
- is returned by "ls -l" on Unix systems, and `attrs' is the attributes
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 22]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001
-
-
- of the file as described in Section ``File Attributes''.
-
- The format of the `longname' field is unspecified by this protocol.
- It MUST be suitable for use in the output of a directory listing
- command (in fact, the recommended operation for a directory listing
- command is to simply display this data). However, clients SHOULD NOT
- attempt to parse the longname field for file attributes; they SHOULD
- use the attrs field instead.
-
- The recommended format for the longname field is as follows:
-
- -rwxr-xr-x 1 mjos staff 348911 Mar 25 14:29 t-filexfer
- 1234567890 123 12345678 12345678 12345678 123456789012
-
- Here, the first line is sample output, and the second field indicates
- widths of the various fields. Fields are separated by spaces. The
- first field lists file permissions for user, group, and others; the
- second field is link count; the third field is the name of the user
- who owns the file; the fourth field is the name of the group that
- owns the file; the fifth field is the size of the file in bytes; the
- sixth field (which actually may contain spaces, but is fixed to 12
- characters) is the file modification time, and the seventh field is
- the file name. Each field is specified to be a minimum of certain
- number of character positions (indicated by the second line above),
- but may also be longer if the data does not fit in the specified
- length.
-
- The SSH_FXP_ATTRS response has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `attrs' is the returned
- file attributes as described in Section ``File Attributes''.
-
-
-
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-
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-
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-
-
-Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 23]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001
-
-
-8. Vendor-Specific Extensions
-
- The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request provides a generic extension mechanism
- for adding vendor-specific commands. The request has the following
- format:
-
- uint32 id
- string extended-request
- ... any request-specific data ...
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `extended-request' is a
- string of the format "name@domain", where domain is an internet
- domain name of the vendor defining the request. The rest of the
- request is completely vendor-specific, and servers should only
- attempt to interpret it if they recognize the `extended-request'
- name.
-
- The server may respond to such requests using any of the response
- packets defined in Section ``Responses from the Server to the
- Client''. Additionally, the server may also respond with a
- SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY packet, as defined below. If the server does
- not recognize the `extended-request' name, then the server MUST
- respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS with error/status set to
- SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED.
-
- The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY packet can be used to carry arbitrary
- extension-specific data from the server to the client. It is of the
- following format:
-
- uint32 id
- ... any request-specific data ...
-
-
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-
-Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 24]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001
-
-
-9. Security Considerations
-
- This protocol assumes that it is run over a secure channel and that
- the endpoints of the channel have been authenticated. Thus, this
- protocol assumes that it is externally protected from network-level
- attacks.
-
- This protocol provides file system access to arbitrary files on the
- server (only constrained by the server implementation). It is the
- responsibility of the server implementation to enforce any access
- controls that may be required to limit the access allowed for any
- particular user (the user being authenticated externally to this
- protocol, typically using the SSH User Authentication Protocol [6].
-
- Care must be taken in the server implementation to check the validity
- of received file handle strings. The server should not rely on them
- directly; it MUST check the validity of each handle before relying on
- it.
-
-
-
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-Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 25]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001
-
-
-10. Changes from previous protocol versions
-
- The SSH File Transfer Protocol has changed over time, before it's
- standardization. The following is a description of the incompatible
- changes between different versions.
-
-10.1 Changes between versions 3 and 2
-
- o The SSH_FXP_READLINK and SSH_FXP_SYMLINK messages were added.
-
- o The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED and SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY messages were
- added.
-
- o The SSH_FXP_STATUS message was changed to include fields `error
- message' and `language tag'.
-
-
-10.2 Changes between versions 2 and 1
-
- o The SSH_FXP_RENAME message was added.
-
-
-10.3 Changes between versions 1 and 0
-
- o Implementation changes, no actual protocol changes.
-
-
-
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-Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 26]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001
-
-
-11. Trademark Issues
-
- "ssh" is a registered trademark of SSH Communications Security Corp
- in the United States and/or other countries.
-
-
-
-
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-Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 27]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001
-
-
-References
-
- [1] Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A. and
- P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246, January
- 1999.
-
- [2] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Information
- Technology - Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) - Part
- 1: System Application Program Interface (API) [C Language]",
- IEEE Standard 1003.2, 1996.
-
- [3] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.
- Lehtinen, "SSH Protocol Architecture", draft-ietf-secsh-
- architecture-09 (work in progress), July 2001.
-
- [4] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.
- Lehtinen, "SSH Protocol Transport Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-
- architecture-09 (work in progress), July 2001.
-
- [5] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.
- Lehtinen, "SSH Connection Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-connect-11
- (work in progress), July 2001.
-
- [6] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.
- Lehtinen, "SSH Authentication Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-
- userauth-11 (work in progress), July 2001.
-
-
-Authors' Addresses
-
- Tatu Ylonen
- SSH Communications Security Corp
- Fredrikinkatu 42
- HELSINKI FIN-00100
- Finland
-
-
-
- Sami Lehtinen
- SSH Communications Security Corp
- Fredrikinkatu 42
- HELSINKI FIN-00100
- Finland
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 28]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2001
-
-
-Full Copyright Statement
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
-
- This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
- others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
- or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
- and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
- kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
- included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
- document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
- the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
- Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
- developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
- copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
- followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
- English.
-
- The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
- revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
-
- This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
- "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
- TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
- BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
- HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
-
-Acknowledgement
-
- Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
- Internet Society.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Lehtinen Expires April 1, 2002 [Page 29]
-
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-
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-03.2.ps b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-03.2.ps
deleted file mode 100644
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-(Secure Shell Working Group J. Galbraith) s
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-(Internet-Draft VanDyke Software) s
-5 679 M
-(Expires: April 16, 2003 T. Ylonen) s
-5 668 M
-( S. Lehtinen) s
-5 657 M
-( SSH Communications Security Corp) s
-5 646 M
-( October 16, 2002) s
-5 613 M
-( SSH File Transfer Protocol) s
-5 602 M
-( draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-03.txt) s
-5 580 M
-(Status of this Memo) s
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-( This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with) s
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-( all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.) s
-5 525 M
-( Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering) s
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-( Task Force \(IETF\), its areas, and its working groups. Note that) s
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-( other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-) s
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-( Drafts.) s
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-( Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months) s
-5 459 M
-( and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any) s
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-( time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference) s
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-( material or to cite them other than as "work in progress.") s
-5 415 M
-( The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://) s
-5 404 M
-( www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.) s
-5 382 M
-( The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at) s
-5 371 M
-( http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.) s
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-( This Internet-Draft will expire on April 16, 2003.) s
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-(Copyright Notice) s
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-( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2002\). All Rights Reserved.) s
-5 283 M
-(Abstract) s
-5 261 M
-( The SSH File Transfer Protocol provides secure file transfer) s
-5 250 M
-( functionality over any reliable data stream. It is the standard file) s
-5 239 M
-( transfer protocol for use with the SSH2 protocol. This document) s
-5 228 M
-( describes the file transfer protocol and its interface to the SSH2) s
-5 217 M
-( protocol suite.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 1]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(Table of Contents) s
-5 668 M
-( 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3) s
-5 657 M
-( 2. Use with the SSH Connection Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 4) s
-5 646 M
-( 3. General Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5) s
-5 635 M
-( 4. Protocol Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7) s
-5 624 M
-( 4.1 Client Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7) s
-5 613 M
-( 4.2 Server Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7) s
-5 602 M
-( 4.3 Determining Server Newline Convention . . . . . . . . . . 8) s
-5 591 M
-( 5. File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9) s
-5 580 M
-( 5.1 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9) s
-5 569 M
-( 5.2 Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10) s
-5 558 M
-( 5.3 Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10) s
-5 547 M
-( 5.4 Owner and Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10) s
-5 536 M
-( 5.5 Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11) s
-5 525 M
-( 5.6 Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11) s
-5 514 M
-( 5.7 ACL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11) s
-5 503 M
-( 5.8 Extended attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12) s
-5 492 M
-( 6. Requests From the Client to the Server . . . . . . . . . . 13) s
-5 481 M
-( 6.1 Request Synchronization and Reordering . . . . . . . . . . 13) s
-5 470 M
-( 6.2 File Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14) s
-5 459 M
-( 6.3 Opening, Creating, and Closing Files . . . . . . . . . . . 14) s
-5 448 M
-( 6.4 Reading and Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17) s
-5 437 M
-( 6.5 Removing and Renaming Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18) s
-5 426 M
-( 6.6 Creating and Deleting Directories . . . . . . . . . . . . 19) s
-5 415 M
-( 6.7 Scanning Directories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19) s
-5 404 M
-( 6.8 Retrieving File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20) s
-5 393 M
-( 6.9 Setting File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21) s
-5 382 M
-( 6.10 Dealing with Symbolic links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22) s
-5 371 M
-( 6.11 Canonicalizing the Server-Side Path Name . . . . . . . . . 23) s
-5 360 M
-( 6.11.1 Best practice for dealing with paths . . . . . . . . . . . 23) s
-5 349 M
-( 7. Responses from the Server to the Client . . . . . . . . . 24) s
-5 338 M
-( 8. Vendor-Specific Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28) s
-5 327 M
-( 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29) s
-5 316 M
-( 10. Changes from previous protocol versions . . . . . . . . . 30) s
-5 305 M
-( 10.1 Changes between versions 4 and 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30) s
-5 294 M
-( 10.2 Changes between versions 3 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31) s
-5 283 M
-( 10.3 Changes between versions 2 and 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31) s
-5 272 M
-( 10.4 Changes between versions 1 and 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31) s
-5 261 M
-( 11. Trademark Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32) s
-5 250 M
-( References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33) s
-5 239 M
-( Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33) s
-5 228 M
-( Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35) s
-5 129 M
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(1. Introduction) s
-5 668 M
-( This protocol provides secure file transfer \(and more generally file) s
-5 657 M
-( system access\) functionality over a reliable data stream, such as a) s
-5 646 M
-( channel in the SSH2 protocol [5].) s
-5 624 M
-( This protocol is designed so that it could be used to implement a) s
-5 613 M
-( secure remote file system service, as well as a secure file transfer) s
-5 602 M
-( service.) s
-5 580 M
-( This protocol assumes that it runs over a secure channel, and that) s
-5 569 M
-( the server has already authenticated the user at the client end, and) s
-5 558 M
-( that the identity of the client user is externally available to the) s
-5 547 M
-( server implementation.) s
-5 525 M
-( In general, this protocol follows a simple request-response model.) s
-5 514 M
-( Each request and response contains a sequence number and multiple) s
-5 503 M
-( requests may be pending simultaneously. There are a relatively large) s
-5 492 M
-( number of different request messages, but a small number of possible) s
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-( response messages. Each request has one or more response messages) s
-5 470 M
-( that may be returned in result \(e.g., a read either returns data or) s
-5 459 M
-( reports error status\).) s
-5 437 M
-( The packet format descriptions in this specification follow the) s
-5 426 M
-( notation presented in the secsh architecture draft. [5]) s
-5 404 M
-( Even though this protocol is described in the context of the SSH2) s
-5 393 M
-( protocol, this protocol is general and independent of the rest of the) s
-5 382 M
-( SSH2 protocol suite. It could be used in a number of different) s
-5 371 M
-( applications, such as secure file transfer over TLS RFC 2246 [1] and) s
-5 360 M
-( transfer of management information in VPN applications.) s
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-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 3]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(2. Use with the SSH Connection Protocol) s
-5 668 M
-( When used with the SSH2 Protocol suite, this protocol is intended to) s
-5 657 M
-( be used from the SSH Connection Protocol [7] as a subsystem, as) s
-5 646 M
-( described in section ``Starting a Shell or a Command''. The) s
-5 635 M
-( subsystem name used with this protocol is "sftp".) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(3. General Packet Format) s
-5 668 M
-( All packets transmitted over the secure connection are of the) s
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-( following format:) s
-5 635 M
-( uint32 length) s
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-( byte type) s
-5 613 M
-( byte[length - 1] data payload) s
-5 591 M
-( That is, they are just data preceded by 32-bit length and 8-bit type) s
-5 580 M
-( fields. The `length' is the length of the data area, and does not) s
-5 569 M
-( include the `length' field itself. The format and interpretation of) s
-5 558 M
-( the data area depends on the packet type.) s
-5 536 M
-( All packet descriptions below only specify the packet type and the) s
-5 525 M
-( data that goes into the data field. Thus, they should be prefixed by) s
-5 514 M
-( the `length' and `type' fields.) s
-5 492 M
-( The maximum size of a packet is in practice determined by the client) s
-5 481 M
-( \(the maximum size of read or write requests that it sends, plus a few) s
-5 470 M
-( bytes of packet overhead\). All servers SHOULD support packets of at) s
-5 459 M
-( least 34000 bytes \(where the packet size refers to the full length,) s
-5 448 M
-( including the header above\). This should allow for reads and writes) s
-5 437 M
-( of at most 32768 bytes.) s
-5 415 M
-( There is no limit on the number of outstanding \(non-acknowledged\)) s
-5 404 M
-( requests that the client may send to the server. In practice this is) s
-5 393 M
-( limited by the buffering available on the data stream and the queuing) s
-5 382 M
-( performed by the server. If the server's queues are full, it should) s
-5 371 M
-( not read any more data from the stream, and flow control will prevent) s
-5 360 M
-( the client from sending more requests. Note, however, that while) s
-5 349 M
-( there is no restriction on the protocol level, the client's API may) s
-5 338 M
-( provide a limit in order to prevent infinite queuing of outgoing) s
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-( requests at the client.) s
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-( The following values are defined for packet types.) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_INIT 1) s
-5 679 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_VERSION 2) s
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-( #define SSH_FXP_OPEN 3) s
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-( #define SSH_FXP_CLOSE 4) s
-5 646 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_READ 5) s
-5 635 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_WRITE 6) s
-5 624 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_LSTAT 7) s
-5 613 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_FSTAT 8) s
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-( #define SSH_FXP_SETSTAT 9) s
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-( #define SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT 10) s
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-( #define SSH_FXP_OPENDIR 11) s
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-( #define SSH_FXP_READDIR 12) s
-5 558 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_REMOVE 13) s
-5 547 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_MKDIR 14) s
-5 536 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_RMDIR 15) s
-5 525 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_REALPATH 16) s
-5 514 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_STAT 17) s
-5 503 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_RENAME 18) s
-5 492 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_READLINK 19) s
-5 481 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_SYMLINK 20) s
-5 459 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_STATUS 101) s
-5 448 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_HANDLE 102) s
-5 437 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_DATA 103) s
-5 426 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_NAME 104) s
-5 415 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_ATTRS 105) s
-5 393 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_EXTENDED 200) s
-5 382 M
-( #define SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY 201) s
-5 360 M
-( RESERVED_FOR_EXTENSIONS 210-255) s
-5 338 M
-( Additional packet types should only be defined if the protocol) s
-5 327 M
-( version number \(see Section ``Protocol Initialization''\) is) s
-5 316 M
-( incremented, and their use MUST be negotiated using the version) s
-5 305 M
-( number. However, the SSH_FXP_EXTENDED and SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) s
-5 294 M
-( packets can be used to implement vendor-specific extensions. See) s
-5 283 M
-( Section ``Vendor-Specific-Extensions'' for more details.) s
-5 129 M
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(4. Protocol Initialization) s
-5 668 M
-( When the file transfer protocol starts, the client first sends a) s
-5 657 M
-( SSH_FXP_INIT \(including its version number\) packet to the server.) s
-5 646 M
-( The server responds with a SSH_FXP_VERSION packet, supplying the) s
-5 635 M
-( lowest of its own and the client's version number. Both parties) s
-5 624 M
-( should from then on adhere to particular version of the protocol.) s
-5 602 M
-( The version number of the protocol specified in this document is 4.) s
-5 591 M
-( The version number should be incremented for each incompatible) s
-5 580 M
-( revision of this protocol.) s
-5 558 M
-(4.1 Client Initialization) s
-5 536 M
-( The SSH_FXP_INIT packet \(from client to server\) has the following) s
-5 525 M
-( data:) s
-5 503 M
-( uint32 version) s
-5 481 M
-( Version 3 of this protocol allowed clients to include extensions in) s
-5 470 M
-( the SSH_FXP_INIT packet; however, this can cause interoperability) s
-5 459 M
-( problems with version 1 and version 2 servers because the client must) s
-5 448 M
-( send this packet before knowing the servers version.) s
-5 426 M
-( In this version of the protocol, clients MUST use the) s
-5 415 M
-( SSH_FXP_EXTENDED packet to send extensions to the server after) s
-5 404 M
-( version exchange has completed. Clients MUST NOT include extensions) s
-5 393 M
-( in the version packet. This will prevent interoperability problems) s
-5 382 M
-( with older servers) s
-5 360 M
-(4.2 Server Initialization) s
-5 338 M
-( The SSH_FXP_VERSION packet \(from server to client\) has the following) s
-5 327 M
-( data:) s
-5 305 M
-( uint32 version) s
-5 294 M
-( <extension data>) s
-5 272 M
-( 'version' is the lower of the protocol version supported by the) s
-5 261 M
-( server and the version number received from the client.) s
-5 239 M
-( The extension data may be empty, or may be a sequence of) s
-5 217 M
-( string extension_name) s
-5 206 M
-( string extension_data) s
-5 184 M
-( pairs \(both strings MUST always be present if one is, but the) s
-5 173 M
-( `extension_data' string may be of zero length\). If present, these) s
-5 129 M
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( strings indicate extensions to the baseline protocol. The) s
-5 679 M
-( `extension_name' field\(s\) identify the name of the extension. The) s
-5 668 M
-( name should be of the form "name@domain", where the domain is the DNS) s
-5 657 M
-( domain name of the organization defining the extension. Additional) s
-5 646 M
-( names that are not of this format may be defined later by the IETF.) s
-5 635 M
-( Implementations MUST silently ignore any extensions whose name they) s
-5 624 M
-( do not recognize.) s
-5 602 M
-(4.3 Determining Server Newline Convention) s
-5 580 M
-( In order to correctly process text files in a cross platform) s
-5 569 M
-( compatible way, the newline convention must be converted from that of) s
-5 558 M
-( the server to that of the client, or, during an upload, from that of) s
-5 547 M
-( the client to that of the server.) s
-5 525 M
-( Versions 3 and prior of this protocol made no provisions for) s
-5 514 M
-( processing text files. Many clients implemented some sort of) s
-5 503 M
-( conversion algorithm, but without either a 'canonical' on the wire) s
-5 492 M
-( format or knowledge of the servers newline convention, correct) s
-5 481 M
-( conversion was not always possible.) s
-5 459 M
-( Starting with Version 4, the SSH_FXF_TEXT file open flag \(Section) s
-5 448 M
-( 6.3\) makes it possible to request that the server translate a file to) s
-5 437 M
-( a 'canonical' on the wire format. This format uses \\r\\n as the line) s
-5 426 M
-( separator.) s
-5 404 M
-( Servers for systems using multiple newline characters \(for example,) s
-5 393 M
-( Mac OS X or VMS\) or systems using counted records, MUST translate to) s
-5 382 M
-( the canonical form.) s
-5 360 M
-( However, to ease the burden of implementation on servers that use a) s
-5 349 M
-( single, simple separator sequence, the following extension allows the) s
-5 338 M
-( canonical format to be changed.) s
-5 316 M
-( string "newline") s
-5 305 M
-( string new-canonical-separator \(usually "\\r" or "\\n" or "\\r\\n"\)) s
-5 283 M
-( All clients MUST support this extension.) s
-5 261 M
-( When processing text files, clients SHOULD NOT translate any) s
-5 250 M
-( character or sequence that is not an exact match of the servers) s
-5 239 M
-( newline separator.) s
-5 217 M
-( In particular, if the newline sequence being used is the canonical) s
-5 206 M
-( "\\r\\n" sequence, a lone \\r or a lone \\n SHOULD be written through) s
-5 195 M
-( without change.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 8]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(5. File Attributes) s
-5 668 M
-( A new compound data type is defined for encoding file attributes.) s
-5 657 M
-( The same encoding is used both when returning file attributes from) s
-5 646 M
-( the server and when sending file attributes to the server. When) s
-5 635 M
-( sending it to the server, the flags field specifies which attributes) s
-5 624 M
-( are included, and the server will use default values for the) s
-5 613 M
-( remaining attributes \(or will not modify the values of remaining) s
-5 602 M
-( attributes\). When receiving attributes from the server, the flags) s
-5 591 M
-( specify which attributes are included in the returned data. The) s
-5 580 M
-( server normally returns all attributes it knows about.) s
-5 558 M
-( uint32 flags) s
-5 547 M
-( byte type always present) s
-5 536 M
-( uint64 size present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) s
-5 525 M
-( string owner present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_OWNERGROUP) s
-5 514 M
-( string group present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_OWNERGROUP) s
-5 503 M
-( uint32 permissions present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) s
-5 492 M
-( uint32 atime present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACCESSTIME) s
-5 481 M
-( uint32 createtime present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_CREATETIME) s
-5 470 M
-( uint32 mtime present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_MODIFYTIME) s
-5 459 M
-( string acl present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACL) s
-5 448 M
-( uint32 extended_count present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED) s
-5 437 M
-( string extended_type) s
-5 426 M
-( string extended_data) s
-5 415 M
-( ... more extended data \(extended_type - extended_data pairs\),) s
-5 404 M
-( so that number of pairs equals extended_count) s
-5 371 M
-(5.1 Flags) s
-5 349 M
-( The `flags' specify which of the fields are present. Those fields) s
-5 338 M
-( for which the corresponding flag is not set are not present \(not) s
-5 327 M
-( included in the packet\). New flags can only be added by incrementing) s
-5 316 M
-( the protocol version number \(or by using the extension mechanism) s
-5 305 M
-( described below\).) s
-5 283 M
-( The flags bits are defined to have the following values:) s
-5 261 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE 0x00000001) s
-5 250 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS 0x00000004) s
-5 239 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACCESSTIME 0x00000008) s
-5 228 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_CREATETIME 0x00000010) s
-5 217 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_MODIFYTIME 0x00000020) s
-5 206 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACL 0x00000040) s
-5 195 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_OWNERGROUP 0x00000080) s
-5 184 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED 0x80000000) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 9]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( In previous versions of this protocol flags value 0x00000002 was) s
-5 679 M
-( SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID. This value is now unused, and OWNERGROUP) s
-5 668 M
-( was given a new value in order to ease implementation burden.) s
-5 657 M
-( 0x00000002 MUST NOT appear in the mask. Some future version of this) s
-5 646 M
-( protocol may reuse flag 0x00000002.) s
-5 624 M
-(5.2 Type) s
-5 602 M
-( The type field is always present. The following types are defined:) s
-5 580 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_REGULAR 1) s
-5 569 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_DIRECTORY 2) s
-5 558 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_SYMLINK 3) s
-5 547 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_SPECIAL 4) s
-5 536 M
-( #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_UNKNOWN 5) s
-5 514 M
-( On a POSIX system, these values would be derived from the permission) s
-5 503 M
-( field.) s
-5 481 M
-(5.3 Size) s
-5 459 M
-( The `size' field specifies the size of the file on disk, in bytes.) s
-5 448 M
-( If it is present during file creation, it should be considered a hint) s
-5 437 M
-( as to the files eventual size.) s
-5 415 M
-( Files opened with the SSH_FXF_TEXT flag may have a size that is) s
-5 404 M
-( greater or less than the value of the size field.) s
-5 382 M
-(5.4 Owner and Group) s
-5 360 M
-( The `owner' and `group' fields are represented as UTF-8 strings; this) s
-5 349 M
-( is the form used by NFS v4. See NFS version 4 Protocol. [3] The) s
-5 338 M
-( following text is selected quotations from section 5.6.) s
-5 316 M
-( To avoid a representation that is tied to a particular underlying) s
-5 305 M
-( implementation at the client or server, the use of UTF-8 strings has) s
-5 294 M
-( been chosen. The string should be of the form user@dns_domain".) s
-5 283 M
-( This will allow for a client and server that do not use the same) s
-5 272 M
-( local representation the ability to translate to a common syntax that) s
-5 261 M
-( can be interpreted by both. In the case where there is no) s
-5 250 M
-( translation available to the client or server, the attribute value) s
-5 239 M
-( must be constructed without the "@". Therefore, the absence of the @) s
-5 228 M
-( from the owner or owner_group attribute signifies that no translation) s
-5 217 M
-( was available and the receiver of the attribute should not place any) s
-5 206 M
-( special meaning with the attribute value. Even though the attribute) s
-5 195 M
-( value can not be translated, it may still be useful. In the case of) s
-5 184 M
-( a client, the attribute string may be used for local display of) s
-5 173 M
-( ownership.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 10]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(5.5 Permissions) s
-5 668 M
-( The `permissions' field contains a bit mask of file permissions as) s
-5 657 M
-( defined by POSIX [1].) s
-5 635 M
-(5.6 Times) s
-5 613 M
-( The 'atime', 'createtime', and 'mtime' contain the access, creation,) s
-5 602 M
-( and modification times of the files, respectively. They are) s
-5 591 M
-( represented as seconds from Jan 1, 1970 in UTC.) s
-5 569 M
-(5.7 ACL) s
-5 547 M
-( The 'ACL' field contains an ACL similar to that defined in section) s
-5 536 M
-( 5.9 of NFS version 4 Protocol [3].) s
-5 514 M
-( uint32 ace-count) s
-5 492 M
-( repeated ace-count time:) s
-5 481 M
-( uint32 ace-type) s
-5 470 M
-( uint32 ace-flag) s
-5 459 M
-( uint32 ace-mask) s
-5 448 M
-( string who [UTF-8]) s
-5 426 M
-( ace-type is one of the following four values \(taken from NFS Version) s
-5 415 M
-( 4 Protocol [3]:) s
-5 393 M
-( const ACE4_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000000;) s
-5 382 M
-( const ACE4_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000001;) s
-5 371 M
-( const ACE4_SYSTEM_AUDIT_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000002;) s
-5 360 M
-( const ACE4_SYSTEM_ALARM_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000003;) s
-5 338 M
-( ace-flag is a combination of the following flag values. See NFS) s
-5 327 M
-( Version 4 Protocol [3] section 5.9.2:) s
-5 305 M
-( const ACE4_FILE_INHERIT_ACE = 0x00000001;) s
-5 294 M
-( const ACE4_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE = 0x00000002;) s
-5 283 M
-( const ACE4_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE = 0x00000004;) s
-5 272 M
-( const ACE4_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE = 0x00000008;) s
-5 261 M
-( const ACE4_SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG = 0x00000010;) s
-5 250 M
-( const ACE4_FAILED_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG = 0x00000020;) s
-5 239 M
-( const ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP = 0x00000040;) s
-5 217 M
-( ace-mask is any combination of the following flags \(taken from NFS) s
-5 206 M
-( Version 4 Protocol [3] section 5.9.3:) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 11]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( const ACE4_READ_DATA = 0x00000001;) s
-5 679 M
-( const ACE4_LIST_DIRECTORY = 0x00000001;) s
-5 668 M
-( const ACE4_WRITE_DATA = 0x00000002;) s
-5 657 M
-( const ACE4_ADD_FILE = 0x00000002;) s
-5 646 M
-( const ACE4_APPEND_DATA = 0x00000004;) s
-5 635 M
-( const ACE4_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY = 0x00000004;) s
-5 624 M
-( const ACE4_READ_NAMED_ATTRS = 0x00000008;) s
-5 613 M
-( const ACE4_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS = 0x00000010;) s
-5 602 M
-( const ACE4_EXECUTE = 0x00000020;) s
-5 591 M
-( const ACE4_DELETE_CHILD = 0x00000040;) s
-5 580 M
-( const ACE4_READ_ATTRIBUTES = 0x00000080;) s
-5 569 M
-( const ACE4_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES = 0x00000100;) s
-5 558 M
-( const ACE4_DELETE = 0x00010000;) s
-5 547 M
-( const ACE4_READ_ACL = 0x00020000;) s
-5 536 M
-( const ACE4_WRITE_ACL = 0x00040000;) s
-5 525 M
-( const ACE4_WRITE_OWNER = 0x00080000;) s
-5 514 M
-( const ACE4_SYNCHRONIZE = 0x00100000;) s
-5 492 M
-( who is a UTF-8 string of the form described in 'Owner and Group') s
-5 481 M
-( \(Section 5.4\)) s
-5 459 M
-(5.8 Extended attributes) s
-5 437 M
-( The SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED flag provides a general extension) s
-5 426 M
-( mechanism for vendor-specific extensions. If the flag is specified,) s
-5 415 M
-( then the `extended_count' field is present. It specifies the number) s
-5 404 M
-( of extended_type-extended_data pairs that follow. Each of these) s
-5 393 M
-( pairs specifies an extended attribute. For each of the attributes,) s
-5 382 M
-( the extended_type field should be a string of the format) s
-5 371 M
-( "name@domain", where "domain" is a valid, registered domain name and) s
-5 360 M
-( "name" identifies the method. The IETF may later standardize certain) s
-5 349 M
-( names that deviate from this format \(e.g., that do not contain the) s
-5 338 M
-( "@" sign\). The interpretation of `extended_data' depends on the) s
-5 327 M
-( type. Implementations SHOULD ignore extended data fields that they) s
-5 316 M
-( do not understand.) s
-5 294 M
-( Additional fields can be added to the attributes by either defining) s
-5 283 M
-( additional bits to the flags field to indicate their presence, or by) s
-5 272 M
-( defining extended attributes for them. The extended attributes) s
-5 261 M
-( mechanism is recommended for most purposes; additional flags bits) s
-5 250 M
-( should only be defined by an IETF standards action that also) s
-5 239 M
-( increments the protocol version number. The use of such new fields) s
-5 228 M
-( MUST be negotiated by the version number in the protocol exchange.) s
-5 217 M
-( It is a protocol error if a packet with unsupported protocol bits is) s
-5 206 M
-( received.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 12]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(6. Requests From the Client to the Server) s
-5 668 M
-( Requests from the client to the server represent the various file) s
-5 657 M
-( system operations. Each request begins with an `id' field, which is) s
-5 646 M
-( a 32-bit identifier identifying the request \(selected by the client\).) s
-5 635 M
-( The same identifier will be returned in the response to the request.) s
-5 624 M
-( One possible implementation is a monotonically increasing request) s
-5 613 M
-( sequence number \(modulo 2^32\).) s
-5 591 M
-( Many operations in the protocol operate on open files. The) s
-5 580 M
-( SSH_FXP_OPEN request can return a file handle \(which is an opaque) s
-5 569 M
-( variable-length string\) which may be used to access the file later) s
-5 558 M
-( \(e.g. in a read operation\). The client MUST NOT send requests the) s
-5 547 M
-( server with bogus or closed handles. However, the server MUST) s
-5 536 M
-( perform adequate checks on the handle in order to avoid security) s
-5 525 M
-( risks due to fabricated handles.) s
-5 503 M
-( This design allows either stateful and stateless server) s
-5 492 M
-( implementation, as well as an implementation which caches state) s
-5 481 M
-( between requests but may also flush it. The contents of the file) s
-5 470 M
-( handle string are entirely up to the server and its design. The) s
-5 459 M
-( client should not modify or attempt to interpret the file handle) s
-5 448 M
-( strings.) s
-5 426 M
-( The file handle strings MUST NOT be longer than 256 bytes.) s
-5 404 M
-(6.1 Request Synchronization and Reordering) s
-5 382 M
-( The protocol and implementations MUST process requests relating to) s
-5 371 M
-( the same file in the order in which they are received. In other) s
-5 360 M
-( words, if an application submits multiple requests to the server, the) s
-5 349 M
-( results in the responses will be the same as if it had sent the) s
-5 338 M
-( requests one at a time and waited for the response in each case. For) s
-5 327 M
-( example, the server may process non-overlapping read/write requests) s
-5 316 M
-( to the same file in parallel, but overlapping reads and writes cannot) s
-5 305 M
-( be reordered or parallelized. However, there are no ordering) s
-5 294 M
-( restrictions on the server for processing requests from two different) s
-5 283 M
-( file transfer connections. The server may interleave and parallelize) s
-5 272 M
-( them at will.) s
-5 250 M
-( There are no restrictions on the order in which responses to) s
-5 239 M
-( outstanding requests are delivered to the client, except that the) s
-5 228 M
-( server must ensure fairness in the sense that processing of no) s
-5 217 M
-( request will be indefinitely delayed even if the client is sending) s
-5 206 M
-( other requests so that there are multiple outstanding requests all) s
-5 195 M
-( the time.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 13]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(6.2 File Names) s
-5 668 M
-( This protocol represents file names as strings. File names are) s
-5 657 M
-( assumed to use the slash \('/'\) character as a directory separator.) s
-5 635 M
-( File names starting with a slash are "absolute", and are relative to) s
-5 624 M
-( the root of the file system. Names starting with any other character) s
-5 613 M
-( are relative to the user's default directory \(home directory\). Note) s
-5 602 M
-( that identifying the user is assumed to take place outside of this) s
-5 591 M
-( protocol.) s
-5 569 M
-( Servers SHOULD interpret a path name component ".." as referring to) s
-5 558 M
-( the parent directory, and "." as referring to the current directory.) s
-5 547 M
-( If the server implementation limits access to certain parts of the) s
-5 536 M
-( file system, it must be extra careful in parsing file names when) s
-5 525 M
-( enforcing such restrictions. There have been numerous reported) s
-5 514 M
-( security bugs where a ".." in a path name has allowed access outside) s
-5 503 M
-( the intended area.) s
-5 481 M
-( An empty path name is valid, and it refers to the user's default) s
-5 470 M
-( directory \(usually the user's home directory\).) s
-5 448 M
-( Otherwise, no syntax is defined for file names by this specification.) s
-5 437 M
-( Clients should not make any other assumptions; however, they can) s
-5 426 M
-( splice path name components returned by SSH_FXP_READDIR together) s
-5 415 M
-( using a slash \('/'\) as the separator, and that will work as expected.) s
-5 393 M
-( In order to comply with IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages) s
-5 382 M
-( [2], all filenames are to be encoded in UTF-8. The shortest valid) s
-5 371 M
-( UTF-8 encoding of the UNICODE data MUST be used. The server is) s
-5 360 M
-( responsible for converting the UNICODE data to whatever canonical) s
-5 349 M
-( form it requires.) s
-5 327 M
-( For example, if the server requires that precomposed characters) s
-5 316 M
-( always be used, the server MUST NOT assume the filename as sent by) s
-5 305 M
-( the client has this attribute, but must do this normalization itself.) s
-5 283 M
-( It is understood that the lack of well-defined semantics for file) s
-5 272 M
-( names may cause interoperability problems between clients and servers) s
-5 261 M
-( using radically different operating systems. However, this approach) s
-5 250 M
-( is known to work acceptably with most systems, and alternative) s
-5 239 M
-( approaches that e.g. treat file names as sequences of structured) s
-5 228 M
-( components are quite complicated.) s
-5 206 M
-(6.3 Opening, Creating, and Closing Files) s
-5 184 M
-( Files are opened and created using the SSH_FXP_OPEN message, whose) s
-5 173 M
-( data part is as follows:) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 14]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 679 M
-( string filename [UTF-8]) s
-5 668 M
-( uint32 pflags) s
-5 657 M
-( ATTRS attrs) s
-5 635 M
-( The `id' field is the request identifier as for all requests.) s
-5 613 M
-( The `filename' field specifies the file name. See Section ``File) s
-5 602 M
-( Names'' for more information.) s
-5 580 M
-( The `pflags' field is a bitmask. The following bits have been) s
-5 569 M
-( defined.) s
-5 547 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_READ 0x00000001) s
-5 536 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_WRITE 0x00000002) s
-5 525 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_APPEND 0x00000004) s
-5 514 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_CREAT 0x00000008) s
-5 503 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_TRUNC 0x00000010) s
-5 492 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_EXCL 0x00000020) s
-5 481 M
-( #define SSH_FXF_TEXT 0x00000040) s
-5 459 M
-( These have the following meanings:) s
-5 437 M
-( SSH_FXF_READ) s
-5 426 M
-( Open the file for reading.) s
-5 404 M
-( SSH_FXF_WRITE) s
-5 393 M
-( Open the file for writing. If both this and SSH_FXF_READ are) s
-5 382 M
-( specified, the file is opened for both reading and writing.) s
-5 360 M
-( SSH_FXF_APPEND) s
-5 349 M
-( Force all writes to append data at the end of the file. The) s
-5 338 M
-( offset parameter to write will be ignored.) s
-5 316 M
-( SSH_FXF_CREAT) s
-5 305 M
-( If this flag is specified, then a new file will be created if one) s
-5 294 M
-( does not already exist \(if O_TRUNC is specified, the new file will) s
-5 283 M
-( be truncated to zero length if it previously exists\).) s
-5 261 M
-( SSH_FXF_TRUNC) s
-5 250 M
-( Forces an existing file with the same name to be truncated to zero) s
-5 239 M
-( length when creating a file by specifying SSH_FXF_CREAT.) s
-5 228 M
-( SSH_FXF_CREAT MUST also be specified if this flag is used.) s
-5 206 M
-( SSH_FXF_EXCL) s
-5 195 M
-( Causes the request to fail if the named file already exists.) s
-5 184 M
-( SSH_FXF_CREAT MUST also be specified if this flag is used.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 15]) s
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-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
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-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( SSH_FXF_TEXT) s
-5 679 M
-( Indicates that the server should treat the file as text and) s
-5 668 M
-( convert it to the canonical newline convention in use. \(See) s
-5 657 M
-( Determining Server Newline Convention. \(Section 4.3\)) s
-5 635 M
-( When a file is opened with the FXF_TEXT flag, the offset field in) s
-5 624 M
-( both the read and write function are ignored.) s
-5 602 M
-( Servers MUST correctly process multiple parallel reads and writes) s
-5 591 M
-( correctly in this mode. Naturally, it is permissible for them to) s
-5 580 M
-( do this by serializing the requests. It would not be possible for) s
-5 569 M
-( a client to reliably detect a server that does not implement) s
-5 558 M
-( parallel writes in time to prevent damage.) s
-5 536 M
-( Clients SHOULD use the SSH_FXF_APPEND flag to append data to a) s
-5 525 M
-( text file rather then using write with a calculated offset.) s
-5 503 M
-( To support seeks on text file the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED) s
-5 492 M
-( packet is defined.) s
-5 448 M
-( string "text-seek") s
-5 437 M
-( string file-handle) s
-5 426 M
-( uint64 line-number) s
-5 404 M
-( line-number is the index of the line number to seek to, where byte) s
-5 393 M
-( 0 in the file is line number 0, and the byte directly following) s
-5 382 M
-( the first newline sequence in the file is line number 1 and so on.) s
-5 360 M
-( The response to a "text-seek" request is an SSH_FXP_STATUS) s
-5 349 M
-( message.) s
-5 327 M
-( An attempt to seek past the end-of-file should result in a) s
-5 316 M
-( SSH_FX_EOF status.) s
-5 294 M
-( Servers SHOULD support at least one "text-seek" in order to) s
-5 283 M
-( support resume. However, a client MUST be prepared to receive) s
-5 272 M
-( SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED when attempting a "text-seek" operation.) s
-5 261 M
-( The client can then try a fall-back strategy, if it has one.) s
-5 239 M
-( Clients MUST be prepared to handle SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED returned) s
-5 228 M
-( for read or write operations that are not sequential.) s
-5 206 M
-( The `attrs' field specifies the initial attributes for the file.) s
-5 195 M
-( Default values will be used for those attributes that are not) s
-5 184 M
-( specified. See Section ``File Attributes'' for more information.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 16]) s
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-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( The response to this message will be either SSH_FXP_HANDLE \(if the) s
-5 679 M
-( operation is successful\) or SSH_FXP_STATUS \(if the operation fails\).) s
-5 657 M
-( A file is closed by using the SSH_FXP_CLOSE request. Its data field) s
-5 646 M
-( has the following format:) s
-5 624 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 613 M
-( string handle) s
-5 591 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is a handle) s
-5 580 M
-( previously returned in the response to SSH_FXP_OPEN or) s
-5 569 M
-( SSH_FXP_OPENDIR. The handle becomes invalid immediately after this) s
-5 558 M
-( request has been sent.) s
-5 536 M
-( The response to this request will be a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. One) s
-5 525 M
-( should note that on some server platforms even a close can fail.) s
-5 514 M
-( This can happen e.g. if the server operating system caches writes,) s
-5 503 M
-( and an error occurs while flushing cached writes during the close.) s
-5 481 M
-(6.4 Reading and Writing) s
-5 459 M
-( Once a file has been opened, it can be read using the SSH_FXP_READ) s
-5 448 M
-( message, which has the following format:) s
-5 426 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 415 M
-( string handle) s
-5 404 M
-( uint64 offset) s
-5 393 M
-( uint32 len) s
-5 371 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `handle' is an open file handle) s
-5 360 M
-( returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN, `offset' is the offset \(in bytes\) relative) s
-5 349 M
-( to the beginning of the file from where to start reading, and `len') s
-5 338 M
-( is the maximum number of bytes to read.) s
-5 316 M
-( In response to this request, the server will read as many bytes as it) s
-5 305 M
-( can from the file \(up to `len'\), and return them in a SSH_FXP_DATA) s
-5 294 M
-( message. If an error occurs or EOF is encountered before reading any) s
-5 283 M
-( data, the server will respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS. For normal disk) s
-5 272 M
-( files, it is guaranteed that this will read the specified number of) s
-5 261 M
-( bytes, or up to end of file. For e.g. device files this may return) s
-5 250 M
-( fewer bytes than requested.) s
-5 228 M
-( Writing to a file is achieved using the SSH_FXP_WRITE message, which) s
-5 217 M
-( has the following format:) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 17]) s
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-PStoPSxform concat
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-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 679 M
-( string handle) s
-5 668 M
-( uint64 offset) s
-5 657 M
-( string data) s
-5 635 M
-( where `id' is a request identifier, `handle' is a file handle) s
-5 624 M
-( returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN, `offset' is the offset \(in bytes\) from the) s
-5 613 M
-( beginning of the file where to start writing, and `data' is the data) s
-5 602 M
-( to be written.) s
-5 580 M
-( The write will extend the file if writing beyond the end of the file.) s
-5 569 M
-( It is legal to write way beyond the end of the file; the semantics) s
-5 558 M
-( are to write zeroes from the end of the file to the specified offset) s
-5 547 M
-( and then the data. On most operating systems, such writes do not) s
-5 536 M
-( allocate disk space but instead leave "holes" in the file.) s
-5 514 M
-( The server responds to a write request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.) s
-5 492 M
-(6.5 Removing and Renaming Files) s
-5 470 M
-( Files can be removed using the SSH_FXP_REMOVE message. It has the) s
-5 459 M
-( following format:) s
-5 437 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 426 M
-( string filename [UTF-8]) s
-5 404 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier and `filename' is the name of) s
-5 393 M
-( the file to be removed. See Section ``File Names'' for more) s
-5 382 M
-( information. This request cannot be used to remove directories.) s
-5 360 M
-( The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS) s
-5 349 M
-( message.) s
-5 327 M
-( Files \(and directories\) can be renamed using the SSH_FXP_RENAME) s
-5 316 M
-( message. Its data is as follows:) s
-5 294 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 283 M
-( string oldpath [UTF-8]) s
-5 272 M
-( string newpath [UTF-8]) s
-5 250 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `oldpath' is the name of an) s
-5 239 M
-( existing file or directory, and `newpath' is the new name for the) s
-5 228 M
-( file or directory. It is an error if there already exists a file) s
-5 217 M
-( with the name specified by newpath. The server may also fail rename) s
-5 206 M
-( requests in other situations, for example if `oldpath' and `newpath') s
-5 195 M
-( point to different file systems on the server.) s
-5 173 M
-( The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 18]) s
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-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
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-/pagenum 19 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
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-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( message.) s
-5 668 M
-(6.6 Creating and Deleting Directories) s
-5 646 M
-( New directories can be created using the SSH_FXP_MKDIR request. It) s
-5 635 M
-( has the following format:) s
-5 613 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 602 M
-( string path [UTF-8]) s
-5 591 M
-( ATTRS attrs) s
-5 569 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier.) s
-5 547 M
-( `path' specifies the directory to be created. See Section ``File) s
-5 536 M
-( Names'' for more information on file names.) s
-5 514 M
-( `attrs' specifies the attributes that should be applied to it upon) s
-5 503 M
-( creation. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section ``File) s
-5 492 M
-( Attributes''.) s
-5 470 M
-( The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS) s
-5 459 M
-( message. If a file or directory with the specified path already) s
-5 448 M
-( exists, an error will be returned.) s
-5 426 M
-( Directories can be removed using the SSH_FXP_RMDIR request, which has) s
-5 415 M
-( the following format:) s
-5 393 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 382 M
-( string path [UTF-8]) s
-5 360 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `path' specifies the) s
-5 349 M
-( directory to be removed. See Section ``File Names'' for more) s
-5 338 M
-( information on file names.) s
-5 316 M
-( The server responds to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.) s
-5 305 M
-( Errors may be returned from this operation for various reasons,) s
-5 294 M
-( including, but not limited to, the path does not exist, the path does) s
-5 283 M
-( not refer to a directory object, the directory is not empty, or the) s
-5 272 M
-( user has insufficient access or permission to perform the requested) s
-5 261 M
-( operation.) s
-5 239 M
-(6.7 Scanning Directories) s
-5 217 M
-( The files in a directory can be listed using the SSH_FXP_OPENDIR and) s
-5 206 M
-( SSH_FXP_READDIR requests. Each SSH_FXP_READDIR request returns one) s
-5 195 M
-( or more file names with full file attributes for each file. The) s
-5 184 M
-( client should call SSH_FXP_READDIR repeatedly until it has found the) s
-5 173 M
-( file it is looking for or until the server responds with a) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 19]) s
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-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/pagenum 20 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( SSH_FXP_STATUS message indicating an error \(normally SSH_FX_EOF if) s
-5 679 M
-( there are no more files in the directory\). The client should then) s
-5 668 M
-( close the handle using the SSH_FXP_CLOSE request.) s
-5 646 M
-( The SSH_FXP_OPENDIR opens a directory for reading. It has the) s
-5 635 M
-( following format:) s
-5 613 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 602 M
-( string path [UTF-8]) s
-5 580 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier and `path' is the path name of) s
-5 569 M
-( the directory to be listed \(without any trailing slash\). See Section) s
-5 558 M
-( ``File Names'' for more information on file names. This will return) s
-5 547 M
-( an error if the path does not specify a directory or if the directory) s
-5 536 M
-( is not readable. The server will respond to this request with either) s
-5 525 M
-( a SSH_FXP_HANDLE or a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.) s
-5 503 M
-( Once the directory has been successfully opened, files \(and) s
-5 492 M
-( directories\) contained in it can be listed using SSH_FXP_READDIR) s
-5 481 M
-( requests. These are of the format) s
-5 459 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 448 M
-( string handle) s
-5 426 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is a handle) s
-5 415 M
-( returned by SSH_FXP_OPENDIR. \(It is a protocol error to attempt to) s
-5 404 M
-( use an ordinary file handle returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN.\)) s
-5 382 M
-( The server responds to this request with either a SSH_FXP_NAME or a) s
-5 371 M
-( SSH_FXP_STATUS message. One or more names may be returned at a time.) s
-5 360 M
-( Full status information is returned for each name in order to speed) s
-5 349 M
-( up typical directory listings.) s
-5 327 M
-( If there are no more names available to be read, the server MUST) s
-5 316 M
-( respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message with error code of SSH_FX_EOF.) s
-5 294 M
-( When the client no longer wishes to read more names from the) s
-5 283 M
-( directory, it SHOULD call SSH_FXP_CLOSE for the handle. The handle) s
-5 272 M
-( should be closed regardless of whether an error has occurred or not.) s
-5 250 M
-(6.8 Retrieving File Attributes) s
-5 228 M
-( Very often, file attributes are automatically returned by) s
-5 217 M
-( SSH_FXP_READDIR. However, sometimes there is need to specifically) s
-5 206 M
-( retrieve the attributes for a named file. This can be done using the) s
-5 195 M
-( SSH_FXP_STAT, SSH_FXP_LSTAT and SSH_FXP_FSTAT requests.) s
-5 173 M
-( SSH_FXP_STAT and SSH_FXP_LSTAT only differ in that SSH_FXP_STAT) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 20]) s
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-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/pagenum 21 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( follows symbolic links on the server, whereas SSH_FXP_LSTAT does not) s
-5 679 M
-( follow symbolic links. Both have the same format:) s
-5 657 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 646 M
-( string path [UTF-8]) s
-5 635 M
-( uint32 flags) s
-5 613 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `path' specifies the file) s
-5 602 M
-( system object for which status is to be returned. The server) s
-5 591 M
-( responds to this request with either SSH_FXP_ATTRS or SSH_FXP_STATUS.) s
-5 569 M
-( The flags field specify the attribute flags in which the client has) s
-5 558 M
-( particular interest. This is a hint to the server. For example,) s
-5 547 M
-( because retrieving owner / group and acl information can be an) s
-5 536 M
-( expensive operation under some operating systems, the server may) s
-5 525 M
-( choose not to retrieve this information unless the client expresses a) s
-5 514 M
-( specific interest in it.) s
-5 492 M
-( The client has no guarantee the server will provide all the fields) s
-5 481 M
-( that it has expressed an interest in.) s
-5 459 M
-( SSH_FXP_FSTAT differs from the others in that it returns status) s
-5 448 M
-( information for an open file \(identified by the file handle\). Its) s
-5 437 M
-( format is as follows:) s
-5 415 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 404 M
-( string handle) s
-5 393 M
-( uint32 flags) s
-5 371 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier and `handle' is a file handle) s
-5 360 M
-( returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN. The server responds to this request with) s
-5 349 M
-( SSH_FXP_ATTRS or SSH_FXP_STATUS.) s
-5 327 M
-(6.9 Setting File Attributes) s
-5 305 M
-( File attributes may be modified using the SSH_FXP_SETSTAT and) s
-5 294 M
-( SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT requests. These requests are used for operations) s
-5 283 M
-( such as changing the ownership, permissions or access times, as well) s
-5 272 M
-( as for truncating a file.) s
-5 250 M
-( The SSH_FXP_SETSTAT request is of the following format:) s
-5 228 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 217 M
-( string path [UTF-8]) s
-5 206 M
-( ATTRS attrs) s
-5 184 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `path' specifies the file) s
-5 173 M
-( system object \(e.g. file or directory\) whose attributes are to be) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 21]) s
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-/pagenum 22 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( modified, and `attrs' specifies the modifications to be made to its) s
-5 679 M
-( attributes. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section) s
-5 668 M
-( ``File Attributes''.) s
-5 646 M
-( An error will be returned if the specified file system object does) s
-5 635 M
-( not exist or the user does not have sufficient rights to modify the) s
-5 624 M
-( specified attributes. The server responds to this request with a) s
-5 613 M
-( SSH_FXP_STATUS message.) s
-5 591 M
-( The SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT request modifies the attributes of a file which) s
-5 580 M
-( is already open. It has the following format:) s
-5 558 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 547 M
-( string handle) s
-5 536 M
-( ATTRS attrs) s
-5 514 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `handle' \(MUST be returned by) s
-5 503 M
-( SSH_FXP_OPEN\) identifies the file whose attributes are to be) s
-5 492 M
-( modified, and `attrs' specifies the modifications to be made to its) s
-5 481 M
-( attributes. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section) s
-5 470 M
-( ``File Attributes''. The server will respond to this request with) s
-5 459 M
-( SSH_FXP_STATUS.) s
-5 437 M
-(6.10 Dealing with Symbolic links) s
-5 415 M
-( The SSH_FXP_READLINK request may be used to read the target of a) s
-5 404 M
-( symbolic link. It would have a data part as follows:) s
-5 382 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 371 M
-( string path [UTF-8]) s
-5 349 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier and `path' specifies the path) s
-5 338 M
-( name of the symlink to be read.) s
-5 316 M
-( The server will respond with a SSH_FXP_NAME packet containing only) s
-5 305 M
-( one name and a dummy attributes value. The name in the returned) s
-5 294 M
-( packet contains the target of the link. If an error occurs, the) s
-5 283 M
-( server may respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS.) s
-5 261 M
-( The SSH_FXP_SYMLINK request will create a symbolic link on the) s
-5 250 M
-( server. It is of the following format) s
-5 228 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 217 M
-( string linkpath [UTF-8]) s
-5 206 M
-( string targetpath [UTF-8]) s
-5 184 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `linkpath' specifies the path) s
-5 173 M
-( name of the symlink to be created and `targetpath' specifies the) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 22]) s
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- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 23 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( target of the symlink. The server shall respond with a) s
-5 679 M
-( SSH_FXP_STATUS indicating either success \(SSH_FX_OK\) or an error) s
-5 668 M
-( condition.) s
-5 646 M
-(6.11 Canonicalizing the Server-Side Path Name) s
-5 624 M
-( The SSH_FXP_REALPATH request can be used to have the server) s
-5 613 M
-( canonicalize any given path name to an absolute path. This is useful) s
-5 602 M
-( for converting path names containing ".." components or relative) s
-5 591 M
-( pathnames without a leading slash into absolute paths. The format of) s
-5 580 M
-( the request is as follows:) s
-5 558 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 547 M
-( string path [UTF-8]) s
-5 525 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier and `path' specifies the path) s
-5 514 M
-( name to be canonicalized. The server will respond with a) s
-5 503 M
-( SSH_FXP_NAME packet containing the name in canonical form and a dummy) s
-5 492 M
-( attributes value. If an error occurs, the server may also respond) s
-5 481 M
-( with SSH_FXP_STATUS.) s
-5 459 M
-(6.11.1 Best practice for dealing with paths) s
-5 437 M
-( The client SHOULD treat the results of SSH_FXP_REALPATH as a) s
-5 426 M
-( canonical absolute path, even if the path does not appear to be) s
-5 415 M
-( absolute. A client that use REALPATH\("."\) and treats the result as) s
-5 404 M
-( absolute, even if there is no leading slash, will continue to) s
-5 393 M
-( function correctly, even when talking to a Windows NT or VMS style) s
-5 382 M
-( system, where absolute paths may not begin with a slash.) s
-5 360 M
-( For example, if the client wishes to change directory up, and the) s
-5 349 M
-( server has returned "c:/x/y/z" from REALPATH, the client SHOULD use) s
-5 338 M
-( "c:/x/y/z/..".) s
-5 316 M
-( As a second example, if the client wishes to open the file "x.txt" in) s
-5 305 M
-( the current directory, and server has returned "dka100:/x/y/z" as the) s
-5 294 M
-( canonical path of the directory, the client SHOULD open "dka100:/x/y/) s
-5 283 M
-( z/x.txt") s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 23]) s
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-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(7. Responses from the Server to the Client) s
-5 668 M
-( The server responds to the client using one of a few response) s
-5 657 M
-( packets. All requests can return a SSH_FXP_STATUS response upon) s
-5 646 M
-( failure. When the operation is successful, any of the responses may) s
-5 635 M
-( be returned \(depending on the operation\). If no data needs to be) s
-5 624 M
-( returned to the client, the SSH_FXP_STATUS response with SSH_FX_OK) s
-5 613 M
-( status is appropriate. Otherwise, the SSH_FXP_HANDLE message is used) s
-5 602 M
-( to return a file handle \(for SSH_FXP_OPEN and SSH_FXP_OPENDIR) s
-5 591 M
-( requests\), SSH_FXP_DATA is used to return data from SSH_FXP_READ,) s
-5 580 M
-( SSH_FXP_NAME is used to return one or more file names from a) s
-5 569 M
-( SSH_FXP_READDIR or SSH_FXP_REALPATH request, and SSH_FXP_ATTRS is) s
-5 558 M
-( used to return file attributes from SSH_FXP_STAT, SSH_FXP_LSTAT, and) s
-5 547 M
-( SSH_FXP_FSTAT requests.) s
-5 525 M
-( Exactly one response will be returned for each request. Each) s
-5 514 M
-( response packet contains a request identifier which can be used to) s
-5 503 M
-( match each response with the corresponding request. Note that it is) s
-5 492 M
-( legal to have several requests outstanding simultaneously, and the) s
-5 481 M
-( server is allowed to send responses to them in a different order from) s
-5 470 M
-( the order in which the requests were sent \(the result of their) s
-5 459 M
-( execution, however, is guaranteed to be as if they had been processed) s
-5 448 M
-( one at a time in the order in which the requests were sent\).) s
-5 426 M
-( Response packets are of the same general format as request packets.) s
-5 415 M
-( Each response packet begins with the request identifier.) s
-5 393 M
-( The format of the data portion of the SSH_FXP_STATUS response is as) s
-5 382 M
-( follows:) s
-5 360 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 349 M
-( uint32 error/status code) s
-5 338 M
-( string error message \(ISO-10646 UTF-8 [RFC-2279]\)) s
-5 327 M
-( string language tag \(as defined in [RFC-1766]\)) s
-5 305 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `error/status code') s
-5 294 M
-( indicates the result of the requested operation. The value SSH_FX_OK) s
-5 283 M
-( indicates success, and all other values indicate failure.) s
-5 261 M
-( Currently, the following values are defined \(other values may be) s
-5 250 M
-( defined by future versions of this protocol\):) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 24]) s
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-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/pagenum 25 def
-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( #define SSH_FX_OK 0) s
-5 679 M
-( #define SSH_FX_EOF 1) s
-5 668 M
-( #define SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE 2) s
-5 657 M
-( #define SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED 3) s
-5 646 M
-( #define SSH_FX_FAILURE 4) s
-5 635 M
-( #define SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE 5) s
-5 624 M
-( #define SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION 6) s
-5 613 M
-( #define SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST 7) s
-5 602 M
-( #define SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED 8) s
-5 591 M
-( #define SSH_FX_INVALID_HANDLE 9) s
-5 580 M
-( #define SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_PATH 10) s
-5 569 M
-( #define SSH_FX_FILE_ALREADY_EXISTS 11) s
-5 558 M
-( #define SSH_FX_WRITE_PROTECT 12) s
-5 536 M
-( SSH_FX_OK) s
-5 525 M
-( Indicates successful completion of the operation.) s
-5 503 M
-( SSH_FX_EOF) s
-5 492 M
-( indicates end-of-file condition; for SSH_FX_READ it means that no) s
-5 481 M
-( more data is available in the file, and for SSH_FX_READDIR it) s
-5 470 M
-( indicates that no more files are contained in the directory.) s
-5 448 M
-( SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) s
-5 437 M
-( is returned when a reference is made to a file which does not) s
-5 426 M
-( exist.) s
-5 404 M
-( SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED) s
-5 393 M
-( is returned when the authenticated user does not have sufficient) s
-5 382 M
-( permissions to perform the operation.) s
-5 360 M
-( SSH_FX_FAILURE) s
-5 349 M
-( is a generic catch-all error message; it should be returned if an) s
-5 338 M
-( error occurs for which there is no more specific error code) s
-5 327 M
-( defined.) s
-5 305 M
-( SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE) s
-5 294 M
-( may be returned if a badly formatted packet or protocol) s
-5 283 M
-( incompatibility is detected.) s
-5 261 M
-( SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION) s
-5 250 M
-( is a pseudo-error which indicates that the client has no) s
-5 239 M
-( connection to the server \(it can only be generated locally by the) s
-5 228 M
-( client, and MUST NOT be returned by servers\).) s
-5 206 M
-( SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST) s
-5 195 M
-( is a pseudo-error which indicates that the connection to the) s
-5 184 M
-( server has been lost \(it can only be generated locally by the) s
-5 173 M
-( client, and MUST NOT be returned by servers\).) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 25]) s
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-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/pagenum 26 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED) s
-5 679 M
-( indicates that an attempt was made to perform an operation which) s
-5 668 M
-( is not supported for the server \(it may be generated locally by) s
-5 657 M
-( the client if e.g. the version number exchange indicates that a) s
-5 646 M
-( required feature is not supported by the server, or it may be) s
-5 635 M
-( returned by the server if the server does not implement an) s
-5 624 M
-( operation\).) s
-5 602 M
-( SSH_FX_INVALID_HANDLE) s
-5 591 M
-( The handle value was invalid.) s
-5 569 M
-( SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_PATH) s
-5 558 M
-( The file path does not exist or is invalid.) s
-5 536 M
-( SSH_FX_FILE_ALREADY_EXISTS) s
-5 525 M
-( The file already exists.) s
-5 503 M
-( SSH_FX_WRITE_PROTECT) s
-5 492 M
-( The file is on read only media, or the media is write protected.) s
-5 470 M
-( The SSH_FXP_HANDLE response has the following format:) s
-5 448 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 437 M
-( string handle) s
-5 415 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is an arbitrary) s
-5 404 M
-( string that identifies an open file or directory on the server. The) s
-5 393 M
-( handle is opaque to the client; the client MUST NOT attempt to) s
-5 382 M
-( interpret or modify it in any way. The length of the handle string) s
-5 371 M
-( MUST NOT exceed 256 data bytes.) s
-5 349 M
-( The SSH_FXP_DATA response has the following format:) s
-5 327 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 316 M
-( string data) s
-5 294 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `data' is an arbitrary byte) s
-5 283 M
-( string containing the requested data. The data string may be at most) s
-5 272 M
-( the number of bytes requested in a SSH_FXP_READ request, but may also) s
-5 261 M
-( be shorter if end of file is reached or if the read is from something) s
-5 250 M
-( other than a regular file.) s
-5 228 M
-( The SSH_FXP_NAME response has the following format:) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 26]) s
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-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
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-/pagenum 27 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 679 M
-( uint32 count) s
-5 668 M
-( repeats count times:) s
-5 657 M
-( string filename [UTF-8]) s
-5 646 M
-( ATTRS attrs) s
-5 624 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, `count' is the number of names) s
-5 613 M
-( returned in this response, and the remaining fields repeat `count') s
-5 602 M
-( times \(so that all three fields are first included for the first) s
-5 591 M
-( file, then for the second file, etc\). In the repeated part,) s
-5 580 M
-( `filename' is a file name being returned \(for SSH_FXP_READDIR, it) s
-5 569 M
-( will be a relative name within the directory, without any path) s
-5 558 M
-( components; for SSH_FXP_REALPATH it will be an absolute path name\),) s
-5 547 M
-( and `attrs' is the attributes of the file as described in Section) s
-5 536 M
-( ``File Attributes''.) s
-5 514 M
-( The SSH_FXP_ATTRS response has the following format:) s
-5 492 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 481 M
-( ATTRS attrs) s
-5 459 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `attrs' is the returned) s
-5 448 M
-( file attributes as described in Section ``File Attributes''.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 27]) s
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-PStoPSxform concat
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-/pagenum 28 def
-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(8. Vendor-Specific Extensions) s
-5 668 M
-( The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request provides a generic extension mechanism) s
-5 657 M
-( for adding vendor-specific commands. The request has the following) s
-5 646 M
-( format:) s
-5 624 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 613 M
-( string extended-request) s
-5 602 M
-( ... any request-specific data ...) s
-5 580 M
-( where `id' is the request identifier, and `extended-request' is a) s
-5 569 M
-( string of the format "name@domain", where domain is an internet) s
-5 558 M
-( domain name of the vendor defining the request. The rest of the) s
-5 547 M
-( request is completely vendor-specific, and servers should only) s
-5 536 M
-( attempt to interpret it if they recognize the `extended-request') s
-5 525 M
-( name.) s
-5 503 M
-( The server may respond to such requests using any of the response) s
-5 492 M
-( packets defined in Section ``Responses from the Server to the) s
-5 481 M
-( Client''. Additionally, the server may also respond with a) s
-5 470 M
-( SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY packet, as defined below. If the server does) s
-5 459 M
-( not recognize the `extended-request' name, then the server MUST) s
-5 448 M
-( respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS with error/status set to) s
-5 437 M
-( SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED.) s
-5 415 M
-( The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY packet can be used to carry arbitrary) s
-5 404 M
-( extension-specific data from the server to the client. It is of the) s
-5 393 M
-( following format:) s
-5 371 M
-( uint32 id) s
-5 360 M
-( ... any request-specific data ...) s
-5 338 M
-( There is a range of packet types reserved for use by extensions. In) s
-5 327 M
-( order to avoid collision, extensions that turn on the use of) s
-5 316 M
-( additional packet types should determine those numbers dynamically.) s
-5 294 M
-( The suggested way of doing this is have an extension request from the) s
-5 283 M
-( client to the server that enables the extension; the extension) s
-5 272 M
-( response from the server to the client would specify the actual type) s
-5 261 M
-( values to use, in additional to any other data.) s
-5 239 M
-( Extension authors should be mindful of the limited range of packet) s
-5 228 M
-( types available \(there are only 45 values available\) and avoid) s
-5 217 M
-( requiring a new packet type where possible.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 28]) s
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-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/pagenum 29 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(9. Security Considerations) s
-5 668 M
-( This protocol assumes that it is run over a secure channel and that) s
-5 657 M
-( the endpoints of the channel have been authenticated. Thus, this) s
-5 646 M
-( protocol assumes that it is externally protected from network-level) s
-5 635 M
-( attacks.) s
-5 613 M
-( This protocol provides file system access to arbitrary files on the) s
-5 602 M
-( server \(only constrained by the server implementation\). It is the) s
-5 591 M
-( responsibility of the server implementation to enforce any access) s
-5 580 M
-( controls that may be required to limit the access allowed for any) s
-5 569 M
-( particular user \(the user being authenticated externally to this) s
-5 558 M
-( protocol, typically using the SSH User Authentication Protocol [8].) s
-5 536 M
-( Care must be taken in the server implementation to check the validity) s
-5 525 M
-( of received file handle strings. The server should not rely on them) s
-5 514 M
-( directly; it MUST check the validity of each handle before relying on) s
-5 503 M
-( it.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 29]) s
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-PStoPSxform concat
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-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(10. Changes from previous protocol versions) s
-5 668 M
-( The SSH File Transfer Protocol has changed over time, before it's) s
-5 657 M
-( standardization. The following is a description of the incompatible) s
-5 646 M
-( changes between different versions.) s
-5 624 M
-(10.1 Changes between versions 4 and 3) s
-5 602 M
-( Many of the changes between version 4 and version 3 are to the) s
-5 591 M
-( attribute structure to make it more flexible for non-unix platforms.) s
-5 569 M
-( o Make all filenames UTF-8.) s
-5 547 M
-( o Added 'newline' extension.) s
-5 525 M
-( o Made file attribute owner and group strings so they can actually) s
-5 514 M
-( be used on disparate systems.) s
-5 492 M
-( o Added createtime field, and added separate flags for atime,) s
-5 481 M
-( createtime, and mtime so they can be set separately.) s
-5 459 M
-( o Split the file type out of the permissions field and into it's own) s
-5 448 M
-( field \(which is always present.\)) s
-5 426 M
-( o Added acl attribute.) s
-5 404 M
-( o Added SSH_FXF_TEXT file open flag.) s
-5 382 M
-( o Added flags field to the get stat commands so that the client can) s
-5 371 M
-( specifically request information the server might not normally) s
-5 360 M
-( included for performance reasons.) s
-5 338 M
-( o Removed the long filename from the names structure-- it can now be) s
-5 327 M
-( built from information available in the attrs structure.) s
-5 305 M
-( o Added reserved range of packet numbers for extensions.) s
-5 283 M
-( o Added several additional error codes.) s
-5 261 M
-( o Change the way version negotiate works slightly. Previously, if) s
-5 250 M
-( the client version were higher than the server version, the server) s
-5 239 M
-( was supposed to 'echo back' the clients version. The server now) s
-5 228 M
-( sends it's own version and the lower of the two is considered to) s
-5 217 M
-( be the one in use.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 30]) s
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-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(10.2 Changes between versions 3 and 2) s
-5 668 M
-( o The SSH_FXP_READLINK and SSH_FXP_SYMLINK messages were added.) s
-5 646 M
-( o The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED and SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY messages were) s
-5 635 M
-( added.) s
-5 613 M
-( o The SSH_FXP_STATUS message was changed to include fields `error) s
-5 602 M
-( message' and `language tag'.) s
-5 569 M
-(10.3 Changes between versions 2 and 1) s
-5 547 M
-( o The SSH_FXP_RENAME message was added.) s
-5 514 M
-(10.4 Changes between versions 1 and 0) s
-5 492 M
-( o Implementation changes, no actual protocol changes.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 31]) s
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-PStoPSxform concat
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-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(11. Trademark Issues) s
-5 668 M
-( "ssh" is a registered trademark of SSH Communications Security Corp) s
-5 657 M
-( in the United States and/or other countries.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 32]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 33 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(References) s
-5 668 M
-( [1] Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A. and) s
-5 657 M
-( P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246, January) s
-5 646 M
-( 1999.) s
-5 624 M
-( [2] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages",) s
-5 613 M
-( BCP 18, RFC 2277, January 1998.) s
-5 591 M
-( [3] Shepler, S., Callaghan, B., Robinson, D., Thurlow, R., Beame,) s
-5 580 M
-( C., Eisler, M. and D. Noveck, "NFS version 4 Protocol", RFC) s
-5 569 M
-( 3010, December 2000.) s
-5 547 M
-( [4] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Information) s
-5 536 M
-( Technology - Portable Operating System Interface \(POSIX\) - Part) s
-5 525 M
-( 1: System Application Program Interface \(API\) [C Language]",) s
-5 514 M
-( IEEE Standard 1003.2, 1996.) s
-5 492 M
-( [5] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.) s
-5 481 M
-( Lehtinen, "SSH Protocol Architecture", draft-ietf-secsh-) s
-5 470 M
-( architecture-13 \(work in progress\), September 2002.) s
-5 448 M
-( [6] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.) s
-5 437 M
-( Lehtinen, "SSH Protocol Transport Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-) s
-5 426 M
-( transport-15 \(work in progress\), September 2002.) s
-5 404 M
-( [7] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.) s
-5 393 M
-( Lehtinen, "SSH Connection Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-connect-16) s
-5 382 M
-( \(work in progress\), September 2002.) s
-5 360 M
-( [8] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.) s
-5 349 M
-( Lehtinen, "SSH Authentication Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-) s
-5 338 M
-( userauth-16 \(work in progress\), September 2002.) s
-5 305 M
-(Authors' Addresses) s
-5 283 M
-( Joseph Galbraith) s
-5 272 M
-( VanDyke Software) s
-5 261 M
-( 4848 Tramway Ridge Blvd) s
-5 250 M
-( Suite 101) s
-5 239 M
-( Albuquerque, NM 87111) s
-5 228 M
-( US) s
-5 206 M
-( Phone: +1 505 332 5700) s
-5 195 M
-( EMail: [email protected]) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 33]) s
-_R
-S
-PStoPSsaved restore
-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 421.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 34 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( Tatu Ylonen) s
-5 679 M
-( SSH Communications Security Corp) s
-5 668 M
-( Fredrikinkatu 42) s
-5 657 M
-( HELSINKI FIN-00100) s
-5 646 M
-( Finland) s
-5 624 M
-( EMail: [email protected]) s
-5 591 M
-( Sami Lehtinen) s
-5 580 M
-( SSH Communications Security Corp) s
-5 569 M
-( Fredrikinkatu 42) s
-5 558 M
-( HELSINKI FIN-00100) s
-5 547 M
-( Finland) s
-5 525 M
-( EMail: [email protected]) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 34]) s
-_R
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-595.000000 0.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 35 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(Full Copyright Statement) s
-5 668 M
-( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2002\). All Rights Reserved.) s
-5 646 M
-( This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to) s
-5 635 M
-( others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it) s
-5 624 M
-( or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published) s
-5 613 M
-( and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any) s
-5 602 M
-( kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are) s
-5 591 M
-( included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this) s
-5 580 M
-( document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing) s
-5 569 M
-( the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other) s
-5 558 M
-( Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of) s
-5 547 M
-( developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for) s
-5 536 M
-( copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be) s
-5 525 M
-( followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than) s
-5 514 M
-( English.) s
-5 492 M
-( The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be) s
-5 481 M
-( revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.) s
-5 459 M
-( This document and the information contained herein is provided on an) s
-5 448 M
-( "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING) s
-5 437 M
-( TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING) s
-5 426 M
-( BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION) s
-5 415 M
-( HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF) s
-5 404 M
-( MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.) s
-5 382 M
-(Acknowledgement) s
-5 360 M
-( Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the) s
-5 349 M
-( Internet Society.) s
-5 129 M
-(Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 35]) s
-_R
-S
-PStoPSsaved restore
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-595.000000 421.271378 translate
-90 rotate
-0.706651 dup scale
-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 36 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-_R
-S
-PStoPSsaved restore
-%%Trailer
-%%Pages: 36
-%%DocumentNeededResources: font Courier-Bold Courier
-%%EOF
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-03.txt b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-03.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 83960ae976..0000000000
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-03.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1962 +0,0 @@
-
-
-
-Secure Shell Working Group J. Galbraith
-Internet-Draft VanDyke Software
-Expires: April 16, 2003 T. Ylonen
- S. Lehtinen
- SSH Communications Security Corp
- October 16, 2002
-
-
- SSH File Transfer Protocol
- draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-03.txt
-
-Status of this Memo
-
- This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
- all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
-
- Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
- Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
- Drafts.
-
- Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
- and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
- time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
- material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
-
- The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
- www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
-
- The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
- http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
-
- This Internet-Draft will expire on April 16, 2003.
-
-Copyright Notice
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
-
-Abstract
-
- The SSH File Transfer Protocol provides secure file transfer
- functionality over any reliable data stream. It is the standard file
- transfer protocol for use with the SSH2 protocol. This document
- describes the file transfer protocol and its interface to the SSH2
- protocol suite.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 1]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002
-
-
-Table of Contents
-
- 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 2. Use with the SSH Connection Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 3. General Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 4. Protocol Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 4.1 Client Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 4.2 Server Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 4.3 Determining Server Newline Convention . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 5. File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 5.1 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 5.2 Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 5.3 Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 5.4 Owner and Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 5.5 Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 5.6 Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 5.7 ACL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 5.8 Extended attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 6. Requests From the Client to the Server . . . . . . . . . . 13
- 6.1 Request Synchronization and Reordering . . . . . . . . . . 13
- 6.2 File Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
- 6.3 Opening, Creating, and Closing Files . . . . . . . . . . . 14
- 6.4 Reading and Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
- 6.5 Removing and Renaming Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
- 6.6 Creating and Deleting Directories . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
- 6.7 Scanning Directories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
- 6.8 Retrieving File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
- 6.9 Setting File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 6.10 Dealing with Symbolic links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
- 6.11 Canonicalizing the Server-Side Path Name . . . . . . . . . 23
- 6.11.1 Best practice for dealing with paths . . . . . . . . . . . 23
- 7. Responses from the Server to the Client . . . . . . . . . 24
- 8. Vendor-Specific Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
- 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
- 10. Changes from previous protocol versions . . . . . . . . . 30
- 10.1 Changes between versions 4 and 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
- 10.2 Changes between versions 3 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
- 10.3 Changes between versions 2 and 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
- 10.4 Changes between versions 1 and 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
- 11. Trademark Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
- References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
- Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
- Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 2]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002
-
-
-1. Introduction
-
- This protocol provides secure file transfer (and more generally file
- system access) functionality over a reliable data stream, such as a
- channel in the SSH2 protocol [5].
-
- This protocol is designed so that it could be used to implement a
- secure remote file system service, as well as a secure file transfer
- service.
-
- This protocol assumes that it runs over a secure channel, and that
- the server has already authenticated the user at the client end, and
- that the identity of the client user is externally available to the
- server implementation.
-
- In general, this protocol follows a simple request-response model.
- Each request and response contains a sequence number and multiple
- requests may be pending simultaneously. There are a relatively large
- number of different request messages, but a small number of possible
- response messages. Each request has one or more response messages
- that may be returned in result (e.g., a read either returns data or
- reports error status).
-
- The packet format descriptions in this specification follow the
- notation presented in the secsh architecture draft. [5]
-
- Even though this protocol is described in the context of the SSH2
- protocol, this protocol is general and independent of the rest of the
- SSH2 protocol suite. It could be used in a number of different
- applications, such as secure file transfer over TLS RFC 2246 [1] and
- transfer of management information in VPN applications.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 3]
-
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-
-
-2. Use with the SSH Connection Protocol
-
- When used with the SSH2 Protocol suite, this protocol is intended to
- be used from the SSH Connection Protocol [7] as a subsystem, as
- described in section ``Starting a Shell or a Command''. The
- subsystem name used with this protocol is "sftp".
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
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-
-Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 4]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002
-
-
-3. General Packet Format
-
- All packets transmitted over the secure connection are of the
- following format:
-
- uint32 length
- byte type
- byte[length - 1] data payload
-
- That is, they are just data preceded by 32-bit length and 8-bit type
- fields. The `length' is the length of the data area, and does not
- include the `length' field itself. The format and interpretation of
- the data area depends on the packet type.
-
- All packet descriptions below only specify the packet type and the
- data that goes into the data field. Thus, they should be prefixed by
- the `length' and `type' fields.
-
- The maximum size of a packet is in practice determined by the client
- (the maximum size of read or write requests that it sends, plus a few
- bytes of packet overhead). All servers SHOULD support packets of at
- least 34000 bytes (where the packet size refers to the full length,
- including the header above). This should allow for reads and writes
- of at most 32768 bytes.
-
- There is no limit on the number of outstanding (non-acknowledged)
- requests that the client may send to the server. In practice this is
- limited by the buffering available on the data stream and the queuing
- performed by the server. If the server's queues are full, it should
- not read any more data from the stream, and flow control will prevent
- the client from sending more requests. Note, however, that while
- there is no restriction on the protocol level, the client's API may
- provide a limit in order to prevent infinite queuing of outgoing
- requests at the client.
-
- The following values are defined for packet types.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 5]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002
-
-
- #define SSH_FXP_INIT 1
- #define SSH_FXP_VERSION 2
- #define SSH_FXP_OPEN 3
- #define SSH_FXP_CLOSE 4
- #define SSH_FXP_READ 5
- #define SSH_FXP_WRITE 6
- #define SSH_FXP_LSTAT 7
- #define SSH_FXP_FSTAT 8
- #define SSH_FXP_SETSTAT 9
- #define SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT 10
- #define SSH_FXP_OPENDIR 11
- #define SSH_FXP_READDIR 12
- #define SSH_FXP_REMOVE 13
- #define SSH_FXP_MKDIR 14
- #define SSH_FXP_RMDIR 15
- #define SSH_FXP_REALPATH 16
- #define SSH_FXP_STAT 17
- #define SSH_FXP_RENAME 18
- #define SSH_FXP_READLINK 19
- #define SSH_FXP_SYMLINK 20
-
- #define SSH_FXP_STATUS 101
- #define SSH_FXP_HANDLE 102
- #define SSH_FXP_DATA 103
- #define SSH_FXP_NAME 104
- #define SSH_FXP_ATTRS 105
-
- #define SSH_FXP_EXTENDED 200
- #define SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY 201
-
- RESERVED_FOR_EXTENSIONS 210-255
-
- Additional packet types should only be defined if the protocol
- version number (see Section ``Protocol Initialization'') is
- incremented, and their use MUST be negotiated using the version
- number. However, the SSH_FXP_EXTENDED and SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY
- packets can be used to implement vendor-specific extensions. See
- Section ``Vendor-Specific-Extensions'' for more details.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-4. Protocol Initialization
-
- When the file transfer protocol starts, the client first sends a
- SSH_FXP_INIT (including its version number) packet to the server.
- The server responds with a SSH_FXP_VERSION packet, supplying the
- lowest of its own and the client's version number. Both parties
- should from then on adhere to particular version of the protocol.
-
- The version number of the protocol specified in this document is 4.
- The version number should be incremented for each incompatible
- revision of this protocol.
-
-4.1 Client Initialization
-
- The SSH_FXP_INIT packet (from client to server) has the following
- data:
-
- uint32 version
-
- Version 3 of this protocol allowed clients to include extensions in
- the SSH_FXP_INIT packet; however, this can cause interoperability
- problems with version 1 and version 2 servers because the client must
- send this packet before knowing the servers version.
-
- In this version of the protocol, clients MUST use the
- SSH_FXP_EXTENDED packet to send extensions to the server after
- version exchange has completed. Clients MUST NOT include extensions
- in the version packet. This will prevent interoperability problems
- with older servers
-
-4.2 Server Initialization
-
- The SSH_FXP_VERSION packet (from server to client) has the following
- data:
-
- uint32 version
- <extension data>
-
- 'version' is the lower of the protocol version supported by the
- server and the version number received from the client.
-
- The extension data may be empty, or may be a sequence of
-
- string extension_name
- string extension_data
-
- pairs (both strings MUST always be present if one is, but the
- `extension_data' string may be of zero length). If present, these
-
-
-
-Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 7]
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-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002
-
-
- strings indicate extensions to the baseline protocol. The
- `extension_name' field(s) identify the name of the extension. The
- name should be of the form "name@domain", where the domain is the DNS
- domain name of the organization defining the extension. Additional
- names that are not of this format may be defined later by the IETF.
- Implementations MUST silently ignore any extensions whose name they
- do not recognize.
-
-4.3 Determining Server Newline Convention
-
- In order to correctly process text files in a cross platform
- compatible way, the newline convention must be converted from that of
- the server to that of the client, or, during an upload, from that of
- the client to that of the server.
-
- Versions 3 and prior of this protocol made no provisions for
- processing text files. Many clients implemented some sort of
- conversion algorithm, but without either a 'canonical' on the wire
- format or knowledge of the servers newline convention, correct
- conversion was not always possible.
-
- Starting with Version 4, the SSH_FXF_TEXT file open flag (Section
- 6.3) makes it possible to request that the server translate a file to
- a 'canonical' on the wire format. This format uses \r\n as the line
- separator.
-
- Servers for systems using multiple newline characters (for example,
- Mac OS X or VMS) or systems using counted records, MUST translate to
- the canonical form.
-
- However, to ease the burden of implementation on servers that use a
- single, simple separator sequence, the following extension allows the
- canonical format to be changed.
-
- string "newline"
- string new-canonical-separator (usually "\r" or "\n" or "\r\n")
-
- All clients MUST support this extension.
-
- When processing text files, clients SHOULD NOT translate any
- character or sequence that is not an exact match of the servers
- newline separator.
-
- In particular, if the newline sequence being used is the canonical
- "\r\n" sequence, a lone \r or a lone \n SHOULD be written through
- without change.
-
-
-
-
-
-Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 8]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002
-
-
-5. File Attributes
-
- A new compound data type is defined for encoding file attributes.
- The same encoding is used both when returning file attributes from
- the server and when sending file attributes to the server. When
- sending it to the server, the flags field specifies which attributes
- are included, and the server will use default values for the
- remaining attributes (or will not modify the values of remaining
- attributes). When receiving attributes from the server, the flags
- specify which attributes are included in the returned data. The
- server normally returns all attributes it knows about.
-
- uint32 flags
- byte type always present
- uint64 size present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE
- string owner present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_OWNERGROUP
- string group present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_OWNERGROUP
- uint32 permissions present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS
- uint32 atime present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACCESSTIME
- uint32 createtime present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_CREATETIME
- uint32 mtime present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_MODIFYTIME
- string acl present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACL
- uint32 extended_count present only if flag SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED
- string extended_type
- string extended_data
- ... more extended data (extended_type - extended_data pairs),
- so that number of pairs equals extended_count
-
-
-5.1 Flags
-
- The `flags' specify which of the fields are present. Those fields
- for which the corresponding flag is not set are not present (not
- included in the packet). New flags can only be added by incrementing
- the protocol version number (or by using the extension mechanism
- described below).
-
- The flags bits are defined to have the following values:
-
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE 0x00000001
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS 0x00000004
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACCESSTIME 0x00000008
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_CREATETIME 0x00000010
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_MODIFYTIME 0x00000020
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACL 0x00000040
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_OWNERGROUP 0x00000080
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED 0x80000000
-
-
-
-
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-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol October 2002
-
-
- In previous versions of this protocol flags value 0x00000002 was
- SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID. This value is now unused, and OWNERGROUP
- was given a new value in order to ease implementation burden.
- 0x00000002 MUST NOT appear in the mask. Some future version of this
- protocol may reuse flag 0x00000002.
-
-5.2 Type
-
- The type field is always present. The following types are defined:
-
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_REGULAR 1
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_DIRECTORY 2
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_SYMLINK 3
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_SPECIAL 4
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_UNKNOWN 5
-
- On a POSIX system, these values would be derived from the permission
- field.
-
-5.3 Size
-
- The `size' field specifies the size of the file on disk, in bytes.
- If it is present during file creation, it should be considered a hint
- as to the files eventual size.
-
- Files opened with the SSH_FXF_TEXT flag may have a size that is
- greater or less than the value of the size field.
-
-5.4 Owner and Group
-
- The `owner' and `group' fields are represented as UTF-8 strings; this
- is the form used by NFS v4. See NFS version 4 Protocol. [3] The
- following text is selected quotations from section 5.6.
-
- To avoid a representation that is tied to a particular underlying
- implementation at the client or server, the use of UTF-8 strings has
- been chosen. The string should be of the form user@dns_domain".
- This will allow for a client and server that do not use the same
- local representation the ability to translate to a common syntax that
- can be interpreted by both. In the case where there is no
- translation available to the client or server, the attribute value
- must be constructed without the "@". Therefore, the absence of the @
- from the owner or owner_group attribute signifies that no translation
- was available and the receiver of the attribute should not place any
- special meaning with the attribute value. Even though the attribute
- value can not be translated, it may still be useful. In the case of
- a client, the attribute string may be used for local display of
- ownership.
-
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-
-5.5 Permissions
-
- The `permissions' field contains a bit mask of file permissions as
- defined by POSIX [1].
-
-5.6 Times
-
- The 'atime', 'createtime', and 'mtime' contain the access, creation,
- and modification times of the files, respectively. They are
- represented as seconds from Jan 1, 1970 in UTC.
-
-5.7 ACL
-
- The 'ACL' field contains an ACL similar to that defined in section
- 5.9 of NFS version 4 Protocol [3].
-
- uint32 ace-count
-
- repeated ace-count time:
- uint32 ace-type
- uint32 ace-flag
- uint32 ace-mask
- string who [UTF-8]
-
- ace-type is one of the following four values (taken from NFS Version
- 4 Protocol [3]:
-
- const ACE4_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000000;
- const ACE4_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000001;
- const ACE4_SYSTEM_AUDIT_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000002;
- const ACE4_SYSTEM_ALARM_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000003;
-
- ace-flag is a combination of the following flag values. See NFS
- Version 4 Protocol [3] section 5.9.2:
-
- const ACE4_FILE_INHERIT_ACE = 0x00000001;
- const ACE4_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE = 0x00000002;
- const ACE4_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE = 0x00000004;
- const ACE4_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE = 0x00000008;
- const ACE4_SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG = 0x00000010;
- const ACE4_FAILED_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG = 0x00000020;
- const ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP = 0x00000040;
-
- ace-mask is any combination of the following flags (taken from NFS
- Version 4 Protocol [3] section 5.9.3:
-
-
-
-
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-
- const ACE4_READ_DATA = 0x00000001;
- const ACE4_LIST_DIRECTORY = 0x00000001;
- const ACE4_WRITE_DATA = 0x00000002;
- const ACE4_ADD_FILE = 0x00000002;
- const ACE4_APPEND_DATA = 0x00000004;
- const ACE4_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY = 0x00000004;
- const ACE4_READ_NAMED_ATTRS = 0x00000008;
- const ACE4_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS = 0x00000010;
- const ACE4_EXECUTE = 0x00000020;
- const ACE4_DELETE_CHILD = 0x00000040;
- const ACE4_READ_ATTRIBUTES = 0x00000080;
- const ACE4_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES = 0x00000100;
- const ACE4_DELETE = 0x00010000;
- const ACE4_READ_ACL = 0x00020000;
- const ACE4_WRITE_ACL = 0x00040000;
- const ACE4_WRITE_OWNER = 0x00080000;
- const ACE4_SYNCHRONIZE = 0x00100000;
-
- who is a UTF-8 string of the form described in 'Owner and Group'
- (Section 5.4)
-
-5.8 Extended attributes
-
- The SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED flag provides a general extension
- mechanism for vendor-specific extensions. If the flag is specified,
- then the `extended_count' field is present. It specifies the number
- of extended_type-extended_data pairs that follow. Each of these
- pairs specifies an extended attribute. For each of the attributes,
- the extended_type field should be a string of the format
- "name@domain", where "domain" is a valid, registered domain name and
- "name" identifies the method. The IETF may later standardize certain
- names that deviate from this format (e.g., that do not contain the
- "@" sign). The interpretation of `extended_data' depends on the
- type. Implementations SHOULD ignore extended data fields that they
- do not understand.
-
- Additional fields can be added to the attributes by either defining
- additional bits to the flags field to indicate their presence, or by
- defining extended attributes for them. The extended attributes
- mechanism is recommended for most purposes; additional flags bits
- should only be defined by an IETF standards action that also
- increments the protocol version number. The use of such new fields
- MUST be negotiated by the version number in the protocol exchange.
- It is a protocol error if a packet with unsupported protocol bits is
- received.
-
-
-
-
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-
-6. Requests From the Client to the Server
-
- Requests from the client to the server represent the various file
- system operations. Each request begins with an `id' field, which is
- a 32-bit identifier identifying the request (selected by the client).
- The same identifier will be returned in the response to the request.
- One possible implementation is a monotonically increasing request
- sequence number (modulo 2^32).
-
- Many operations in the protocol operate on open files. The
- SSH_FXP_OPEN request can return a file handle (which is an opaque
- variable-length string) which may be used to access the file later
- (e.g. in a read operation). The client MUST NOT send requests the
- server with bogus or closed handles. However, the server MUST
- perform adequate checks on the handle in order to avoid security
- risks due to fabricated handles.
-
- This design allows either stateful and stateless server
- implementation, as well as an implementation which caches state
- between requests but may also flush it. The contents of the file
- handle string are entirely up to the server and its design. The
- client should not modify or attempt to interpret the file handle
- strings.
-
- The file handle strings MUST NOT be longer than 256 bytes.
-
-6.1 Request Synchronization and Reordering
-
- The protocol and implementations MUST process requests relating to
- the same file in the order in which they are received. In other
- words, if an application submits multiple requests to the server, the
- results in the responses will be the same as if it had sent the
- requests one at a time and waited for the response in each case. For
- example, the server may process non-overlapping read/write requests
- to the same file in parallel, but overlapping reads and writes cannot
- be reordered or parallelized. However, there are no ordering
- restrictions on the server for processing requests from two different
- file transfer connections. The server may interleave and parallelize
- them at will.
-
- There are no restrictions on the order in which responses to
- outstanding requests are delivered to the client, except that the
- server must ensure fairness in the sense that processing of no
- request will be indefinitely delayed even if the client is sending
- other requests so that there are multiple outstanding requests all
- the time.
-
-
-
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-
-6.2 File Names
-
- This protocol represents file names as strings. File names are
- assumed to use the slash ('/') character as a directory separator.
-
- File names starting with a slash are "absolute", and are relative to
- the root of the file system. Names starting with any other character
- are relative to the user's default directory (home directory). Note
- that identifying the user is assumed to take place outside of this
- protocol.
-
- Servers SHOULD interpret a path name component ".." as referring to
- the parent directory, and "." as referring to the current directory.
- If the server implementation limits access to certain parts of the
- file system, it must be extra careful in parsing file names when
- enforcing such restrictions. There have been numerous reported
- security bugs where a ".." in a path name has allowed access outside
- the intended area.
-
- An empty path name is valid, and it refers to the user's default
- directory (usually the user's home directory).
-
- Otherwise, no syntax is defined for file names by this specification.
- Clients should not make any other assumptions; however, they can
- splice path name components returned by SSH_FXP_READDIR together
- using a slash ('/') as the separator, and that will work as expected.
-
- In order to comply with IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages
- [2], all filenames are to be encoded in UTF-8. The shortest valid
- UTF-8 encoding of the UNICODE data MUST be used. The server is
- responsible for converting the UNICODE data to whatever canonical
- form it requires.
-
- For example, if the server requires that precomposed characters
- always be used, the server MUST NOT assume the filename as sent by
- the client has this attribute, but must do this normalization itself.
-
- It is understood that the lack of well-defined semantics for file
- names may cause interoperability problems between clients and servers
- using radically different operating systems. However, this approach
- is known to work acceptably with most systems, and alternative
- approaches that e.g. treat file names as sequences of structured
- components are quite complicated.
-
-6.3 Opening, Creating, and Closing Files
-
- Files are opened and created using the SSH_FXP_OPEN message, whose
- data part is as follows:
-
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- uint32 id
- string filename [UTF-8]
- uint32 pflags
- ATTRS attrs
-
- The `id' field is the request identifier as for all requests.
-
- The `filename' field specifies the file name. See Section ``File
- Names'' for more information.
-
- The `pflags' field is a bitmask. The following bits have been
- defined.
-
- #define SSH_FXF_READ 0x00000001
- #define SSH_FXF_WRITE 0x00000002
- #define SSH_FXF_APPEND 0x00000004
- #define SSH_FXF_CREAT 0x00000008
- #define SSH_FXF_TRUNC 0x00000010
- #define SSH_FXF_EXCL 0x00000020
- #define SSH_FXF_TEXT 0x00000040
-
- These have the following meanings:
-
- SSH_FXF_READ
- Open the file for reading.
-
- SSH_FXF_WRITE
- Open the file for writing. If both this and SSH_FXF_READ are
- specified, the file is opened for both reading and writing.
-
- SSH_FXF_APPEND
- Force all writes to append data at the end of the file. The
- offset parameter to write will be ignored.
-
- SSH_FXF_CREAT
- If this flag is specified, then a new file will be created if one
- does not already exist (if O_TRUNC is specified, the new file will
- be truncated to zero length if it previously exists).
-
- SSH_FXF_TRUNC
- Forces an existing file with the same name to be truncated to zero
- length when creating a file by specifying SSH_FXF_CREAT.
- SSH_FXF_CREAT MUST also be specified if this flag is used.
-
- SSH_FXF_EXCL
- Causes the request to fail if the named file already exists.
- SSH_FXF_CREAT MUST also be specified if this flag is used.
-
-
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- SSH_FXF_TEXT
- Indicates that the server should treat the file as text and
- convert it to the canonical newline convention in use. (See
- Determining Server Newline Convention. (Section 4.3)
-
- When a file is opened with the FXF_TEXT flag, the offset field in
- both the read and write function are ignored.
-
- Servers MUST correctly process multiple parallel reads and writes
- correctly in this mode. Naturally, it is permissible for them to
- do this by serializing the requests. It would not be possible for
- a client to reliably detect a server that does not implement
- parallel writes in time to prevent damage.
-
- Clients SHOULD use the SSH_FXF_APPEND flag to append data to a
- text file rather then using write with a calculated offset.
-
- To support seeks on text file the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED
- packet is defined.
-
-
-
- string "text-seek"
- string file-handle
- uint64 line-number
-
- line-number is the index of the line number to seek to, where byte
- 0 in the file is line number 0, and the byte directly following
- the first newline sequence in the file is line number 1 and so on.
-
- The response to a "text-seek" request is an SSH_FXP_STATUS
- message.
-
- An attempt to seek past the end-of-file should result in a
- SSH_FX_EOF status.
-
- Servers SHOULD support at least one "text-seek" in order to
- support resume. However, a client MUST be prepared to receive
- SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED when attempting a "text-seek" operation.
- The client can then try a fall-back strategy, if it has one.
-
- Clients MUST be prepared to handle SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED returned
- for read or write operations that are not sequential.
-
- The `attrs' field specifies the initial attributes for the file.
- Default values will be used for those attributes that are not
- specified. See Section ``File Attributes'' for more information.
-
-
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-
- The response to this message will be either SSH_FXP_HANDLE (if the
- operation is successful) or SSH_FXP_STATUS (if the operation fails).
-
- A file is closed by using the SSH_FXP_CLOSE request. Its data field
- has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is a handle
- previously returned in the response to SSH_FXP_OPEN or
- SSH_FXP_OPENDIR. The handle becomes invalid immediately after this
- request has been sent.
-
- The response to this request will be a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. One
- should note that on some server platforms even a close can fail.
- This can happen e.g. if the server operating system caches writes,
- and an error occurs while flushing cached writes during the close.
-
-6.4 Reading and Writing
-
- Once a file has been opened, it can be read using the SSH_FXP_READ
- message, which has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
- uint64 offset
- uint32 len
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `handle' is an open file handle
- returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN, `offset' is the offset (in bytes) relative
- to the beginning of the file from where to start reading, and `len'
- is the maximum number of bytes to read.
-
- In response to this request, the server will read as many bytes as it
- can from the file (up to `len'), and return them in a SSH_FXP_DATA
- message. If an error occurs or EOF is encountered before reading any
- data, the server will respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS. For normal disk
- files, it is guaranteed that this will read the specified number of
- bytes, or up to end of file. For e.g. device files this may return
- fewer bytes than requested.
-
- Writing to a file is achieved using the SSH_FXP_WRITE message, which
- has the following format:
-
-
-
-
-
-
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- uint32 id
- string handle
- uint64 offset
- string data
-
- where `id' is a request identifier, `handle' is a file handle
- returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN, `offset' is the offset (in bytes) from the
- beginning of the file where to start writing, and `data' is the data
- to be written.
-
- The write will extend the file if writing beyond the end of the file.
- It is legal to write way beyond the end of the file; the semantics
- are to write zeroes from the end of the file to the specified offset
- and then the data. On most operating systems, such writes do not
- allocate disk space but instead leave "holes" in the file.
-
- The server responds to a write request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-
-6.5 Removing and Renaming Files
-
- Files can be removed using the SSH_FXP_REMOVE message. It has the
- following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string filename [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `filename' is the name of
- the file to be removed. See Section ``File Names'' for more
- information. This request cannot be used to remove directories.
-
- The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS
- message.
-
- Files (and directories) can be renamed using the SSH_FXP_RENAME
- message. Its data is as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string oldpath [UTF-8]
- string newpath [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `oldpath' is the name of an
- existing file or directory, and `newpath' is the new name for the
- file or directory. It is an error if there already exists a file
- with the name specified by newpath. The server may also fail rename
- requests in other situations, for example if `oldpath' and `newpath'
- point to different file systems on the server.
-
- The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS
-
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- message.
-
-6.6 Creating and Deleting Directories
-
- New directories can be created using the SSH_FXP_MKDIR request. It
- has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier.
-
- `path' specifies the directory to be created. See Section ``File
- Names'' for more information on file names.
-
- `attrs' specifies the attributes that should be applied to it upon
- creation. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section ``File
- Attributes''.
-
- The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS
- message. If a file or directory with the specified path already
- exists, an error will be returned.
-
- Directories can be removed using the SSH_FXP_RMDIR request, which has
- the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `path' specifies the
- directory to be removed. See Section ``File Names'' for more
- information on file names.
-
- The server responds to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
- Errors may be returned from this operation for various reasons,
- including, but not limited to, the path does not exist, the path does
- not refer to a directory object, the directory is not empty, or the
- user has insufficient access or permission to perform the requested
- operation.
-
-6.7 Scanning Directories
-
- The files in a directory can be listed using the SSH_FXP_OPENDIR and
- SSH_FXP_READDIR requests. Each SSH_FXP_READDIR request returns one
- or more file names with full file attributes for each file. The
- client should call SSH_FXP_READDIR repeatedly until it has found the
- file it is looking for or until the server responds with a
-
-
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- SSH_FXP_STATUS message indicating an error (normally SSH_FX_EOF if
- there are no more files in the directory). The client should then
- close the handle using the SSH_FXP_CLOSE request.
-
- The SSH_FXP_OPENDIR opens a directory for reading. It has the
- following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `path' is the path name of
- the directory to be listed (without any trailing slash). See Section
- ``File Names'' for more information on file names. This will return
- an error if the path does not specify a directory or if the directory
- is not readable. The server will respond to this request with either
- a SSH_FXP_HANDLE or a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-
- Once the directory has been successfully opened, files (and
- directories) contained in it can be listed using SSH_FXP_READDIR
- requests. These are of the format
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is a handle
- returned by SSH_FXP_OPENDIR. (It is a protocol error to attempt to
- use an ordinary file handle returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN.)
-
- The server responds to this request with either a SSH_FXP_NAME or a
- SSH_FXP_STATUS message. One or more names may be returned at a time.
- Full status information is returned for each name in order to speed
- up typical directory listings.
-
- If there are no more names available to be read, the server MUST
- respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message with error code of SSH_FX_EOF.
-
- When the client no longer wishes to read more names from the
- directory, it SHOULD call SSH_FXP_CLOSE for the handle. The handle
- should be closed regardless of whether an error has occurred or not.
-
-6.8 Retrieving File Attributes
-
- Very often, file attributes are automatically returned by
- SSH_FXP_READDIR. However, sometimes there is need to specifically
- retrieve the attributes for a named file. This can be done using the
- SSH_FXP_STAT, SSH_FXP_LSTAT and SSH_FXP_FSTAT requests.
-
- SSH_FXP_STAT and SSH_FXP_LSTAT only differ in that SSH_FXP_STAT
-
-
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- follows symbolic links on the server, whereas SSH_FXP_LSTAT does not
- follow symbolic links. Both have the same format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
- uint32 flags
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `path' specifies the file
- system object for which status is to be returned. The server
- responds to this request with either SSH_FXP_ATTRS or SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
- The flags field specify the attribute flags in which the client has
- particular interest. This is a hint to the server. For example,
- because retrieving owner / group and acl information can be an
- expensive operation under some operating systems, the server may
- choose not to retrieve this information unless the client expresses a
- specific interest in it.
-
- The client has no guarantee the server will provide all the fields
- that it has expressed an interest in.
-
- SSH_FXP_FSTAT differs from the others in that it returns status
- information for an open file (identified by the file handle). Its
- format is as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
- uint32 flags
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `handle' is a file handle
- returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN. The server responds to this request with
- SSH_FXP_ATTRS or SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
-6.9 Setting File Attributes
-
- File attributes may be modified using the SSH_FXP_SETSTAT and
- SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT requests. These requests are used for operations
- such as changing the ownership, permissions or access times, as well
- as for truncating a file.
-
- The SSH_FXP_SETSTAT request is of the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `path' specifies the file
- system object (e.g. file or directory) whose attributes are to be
-
-
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- modified, and `attrs' specifies the modifications to be made to its
- attributes. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section
- ``File Attributes''.
-
- An error will be returned if the specified file system object does
- not exist or the user does not have sufficient rights to modify the
- specified attributes. The server responds to this request with a
- SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-
- The SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT request modifies the attributes of a file which
- is already open. It has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `handle' (MUST be returned by
- SSH_FXP_OPEN) identifies the file whose attributes are to be
- modified, and `attrs' specifies the modifications to be made to its
- attributes. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section
- ``File Attributes''. The server will respond to this request with
- SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
-6.10 Dealing with Symbolic links
-
- The SSH_FXP_READLINK request may be used to read the target of a
- symbolic link. It would have a data part as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `path' specifies the path
- name of the symlink to be read.
-
- The server will respond with a SSH_FXP_NAME packet containing only
- one name and a dummy attributes value. The name in the returned
- packet contains the target of the link. If an error occurs, the
- server may respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
- The SSH_FXP_SYMLINK request will create a symbolic link on the
- server. It is of the following format
-
- uint32 id
- string linkpath [UTF-8]
- string targetpath [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `linkpath' specifies the path
- name of the symlink to be created and `targetpath' specifies the
-
-
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- target of the symlink. The server shall respond with a
- SSH_FXP_STATUS indicating either success (SSH_FX_OK) or an error
- condition.
-
-6.11 Canonicalizing the Server-Side Path Name
-
- The SSH_FXP_REALPATH request can be used to have the server
- canonicalize any given path name to an absolute path. This is useful
- for converting path names containing ".." components or relative
- pathnames without a leading slash into absolute paths. The format of
- the request is as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `path' specifies the path
- name to be canonicalized. The server will respond with a
- SSH_FXP_NAME packet containing the name in canonical form and a dummy
- attributes value. If an error occurs, the server may also respond
- with SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
-6.11.1 Best practice for dealing with paths
-
- The client SHOULD treat the results of SSH_FXP_REALPATH as a
- canonical absolute path, even if the path does not appear to be
- absolute. A client that use REALPATH(".") and treats the result as
- absolute, even if there is no leading slash, will continue to
- function correctly, even when talking to a Windows NT or VMS style
- system, where absolute paths may not begin with a slash.
-
- For example, if the client wishes to change directory up, and the
- server has returned "c:/x/y/z" from REALPATH, the client SHOULD use
- "c:/x/y/z/..".
-
- As a second example, if the client wishes to open the file "x.txt" in
- the current directory, and server has returned "dka100:/x/y/z" as the
- canonical path of the directory, the client SHOULD open "dka100:/x/y/
- z/x.txt"
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-7. Responses from the Server to the Client
-
- The server responds to the client using one of a few response
- packets. All requests can return a SSH_FXP_STATUS response upon
- failure. When the operation is successful, any of the responses may
- be returned (depending on the operation). If no data needs to be
- returned to the client, the SSH_FXP_STATUS response with SSH_FX_OK
- status is appropriate. Otherwise, the SSH_FXP_HANDLE message is used
- to return a file handle (for SSH_FXP_OPEN and SSH_FXP_OPENDIR
- requests), SSH_FXP_DATA is used to return data from SSH_FXP_READ,
- SSH_FXP_NAME is used to return one or more file names from a
- SSH_FXP_READDIR or SSH_FXP_REALPATH request, and SSH_FXP_ATTRS is
- used to return file attributes from SSH_FXP_STAT, SSH_FXP_LSTAT, and
- SSH_FXP_FSTAT requests.
-
- Exactly one response will be returned for each request. Each
- response packet contains a request identifier which can be used to
- match each response with the corresponding request. Note that it is
- legal to have several requests outstanding simultaneously, and the
- server is allowed to send responses to them in a different order from
- the order in which the requests were sent (the result of their
- execution, however, is guaranteed to be as if they had been processed
- one at a time in the order in which the requests were sent).
-
- Response packets are of the same general format as request packets.
- Each response packet begins with the request identifier.
-
- The format of the data portion of the SSH_FXP_STATUS response is as
- follows:
-
- uint32 id
- uint32 error/status code
- string error message (ISO-10646 UTF-8 [RFC-2279])
- string language tag (as defined in [RFC-1766])
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `error/status code'
- indicates the result of the requested operation. The value SSH_FX_OK
- indicates success, and all other values indicate failure.
-
- Currently, the following values are defined (other values may be
- defined by future versions of this protocol):
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
- #define SSH_FX_OK 0
- #define SSH_FX_EOF 1
- #define SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE 2
- #define SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED 3
- #define SSH_FX_FAILURE 4
- #define SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE 5
- #define SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION 6
- #define SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST 7
- #define SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED 8
- #define SSH_FX_INVALID_HANDLE 9
- #define SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_PATH 10
- #define SSH_FX_FILE_ALREADY_EXISTS 11
- #define SSH_FX_WRITE_PROTECT 12
-
- SSH_FX_OK
- Indicates successful completion of the operation.
-
- SSH_FX_EOF
- indicates end-of-file condition; for SSH_FX_READ it means that no
- more data is available in the file, and for SSH_FX_READDIR it
- indicates that no more files are contained in the directory.
-
- SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE
- is returned when a reference is made to a file which does not
- exist.
-
- SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED
- is returned when the authenticated user does not have sufficient
- permissions to perform the operation.
-
- SSH_FX_FAILURE
- is a generic catch-all error message; it should be returned if an
- error occurs for which there is no more specific error code
- defined.
-
- SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE
- may be returned if a badly formatted packet or protocol
- incompatibility is detected.
-
- SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION
- is a pseudo-error which indicates that the client has no
- connection to the server (it can only be generated locally by the
- client, and MUST NOT be returned by servers).
-
- SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST
- is a pseudo-error which indicates that the connection to the
- server has been lost (it can only be generated locally by the
- client, and MUST NOT be returned by servers).
-
-
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-
-
- SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED
- indicates that an attempt was made to perform an operation which
- is not supported for the server (it may be generated locally by
- the client if e.g. the version number exchange indicates that a
- required feature is not supported by the server, or it may be
- returned by the server if the server does not implement an
- operation).
-
- SSH_FX_INVALID_HANDLE
- The handle value was invalid.
-
- SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_PATH
- The file path does not exist or is invalid.
-
- SSH_FX_FILE_ALREADY_EXISTS
- The file already exists.
-
- SSH_FX_WRITE_PROTECT
- The file is on read only media, or the media is write protected.
-
- The SSH_FXP_HANDLE response has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is an arbitrary
- string that identifies an open file or directory on the server. The
- handle is opaque to the client; the client MUST NOT attempt to
- interpret or modify it in any way. The length of the handle string
- MUST NOT exceed 256 data bytes.
-
- The SSH_FXP_DATA response has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string data
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `data' is an arbitrary byte
- string containing the requested data. The data string may be at most
- the number of bytes requested in a SSH_FXP_READ request, but may also
- be shorter if end of file is reached or if the read is from something
- other than a regular file.
-
- The SSH_FXP_NAME response has the following format:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
- uint32 id
- uint32 count
- repeats count times:
- string filename [UTF-8]
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `count' is the number of names
- returned in this response, and the remaining fields repeat `count'
- times (so that all three fields are first included for the first
- file, then for the second file, etc). In the repeated part,
- `filename' is a file name being returned (for SSH_FXP_READDIR, it
- will be a relative name within the directory, without any path
- components; for SSH_FXP_REALPATH it will be an absolute path name),
- and `attrs' is the attributes of the file as described in Section
- ``File Attributes''.
-
- The SSH_FXP_ATTRS response has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `attrs' is the returned
- file attributes as described in Section ``File Attributes''.
-
-
-
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-
-
-8. Vendor-Specific Extensions
-
- The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request provides a generic extension mechanism
- for adding vendor-specific commands. The request has the following
- format:
-
- uint32 id
- string extended-request
- ... any request-specific data ...
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `extended-request' is a
- string of the format "name@domain", where domain is an internet
- domain name of the vendor defining the request. The rest of the
- request is completely vendor-specific, and servers should only
- attempt to interpret it if they recognize the `extended-request'
- name.
-
- The server may respond to such requests using any of the response
- packets defined in Section ``Responses from the Server to the
- Client''. Additionally, the server may also respond with a
- SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY packet, as defined below. If the server does
- not recognize the `extended-request' name, then the server MUST
- respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS with error/status set to
- SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED.
-
- The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY packet can be used to carry arbitrary
- extension-specific data from the server to the client. It is of the
- following format:
-
- uint32 id
- ... any request-specific data ...
-
- There is a range of packet types reserved for use by extensions. In
- order to avoid collision, extensions that turn on the use of
- additional packet types should determine those numbers dynamically.
-
- The suggested way of doing this is have an extension request from the
- client to the server that enables the extension; the extension
- response from the server to the client would specify the actual type
- values to use, in additional to any other data.
-
- Extension authors should be mindful of the limited range of packet
- types available (there are only 45 values available) and avoid
- requiring a new packet type where possible.
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-9. Security Considerations
-
- This protocol assumes that it is run over a secure channel and that
- the endpoints of the channel have been authenticated. Thus, this
- protocol assumes that it is externally protected from network-level
- attacks.
-
- This protocol provides file system access to arbitrary files on the
- server (only constrained by the server implementation). It is the
- responsibility of the server implementation to enforce any access
- controls that may be required to limit the access allowed for any
- particular user (the user being authenticated externally to this
- protocol, typically using the SSH User Authentication Protocol [8].
-
- Care must be taken in the server implementation to check the validity
- of received file handle strings. The server should not rely on them
- directly; it MUST check the validity of each handle before relying on
- it.
-
-
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-
-
-10. Changes from previous protocol versions
-
- The SSH File Transfer Protocol has changed over time, before it's
- standardization. The following is a description of the incompatible
- changes between different versions.
-
-10.1 Changes between versions 4 and 3
-
- Many of the changes between version 4 and version 3 are to the
- attribute structure to make it more flexible for non-unix platforms.
-
- o Make all filenames UTF-8.
-
- o Added 'newline' extension.
-
- o Made file attribute owner and group strings so they can actually
- be used on disparate systems.
-
- o Added createtime field, and added separate flags for atime,
- createtime, and mtime so they can be set separately.
-
- o Split the file type out of the permissions field and into it's own
- field (which is always present.)
-
- o Added acl attribute.
-
- o Added SSH_FXF_TEXT file open flag.
-
- o Added flags field to the get stat commands so that the client can
- specifically request information the server might not normally
- included for performance reasons.
-
- o Removed the long filename from the names structure-- it can now be
- built from information available in the attrs structure.
-
- o Added reserved range of packet numbers for extensions.
-
- o Added several additional error codes.
-
- o Change the way version negotiate works slightly. Previously, if
- the client version were higher than the server version, the server
- was supposed to 'echo back' the clients version. The server now
- sends it's own version and the lower of the two is considered to
- be the one in use.
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-10.2 Changes between versions 3 and 2
-
- o The SSH_FXP_READLINK and SSH_FXP_SYMLINK messages were added.
-
- o The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED and SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY messages were
- added.
-
- o The SSH_FXP_STATUS message was changed to include fields `error
- message' and `language tag'.
-
-
-10.3 Changes between versions 2 and 1
-
- o The SSH_FXP_RENAME message was added.
-
-
-10.4 Changes between versions 1 and 0
-
- o Implementation changes, no actual protocol changes.
-
-
-
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-
-
-11. Trademark Issues
-
- "ssh" is a registered trademark of SSH Communications Security Corp
- in the United States and/or other countries.
-
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-
-
-References
-
- [1] Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A. and
- P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246, January
- 1999.
-
- [2] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages",
- BCP 18, RFC 2277, January 1998.
-
- [3] Shepler, S., Callaghan, B., Robinson, D., Thurlow, R., Beame,
- C., Eisler, M. and D. Noveck, "NFS version 4 Protocol", RFC
- 3010, December 2000.
-
- [4] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Information
- Technology - Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) - Part
- 1: System Application Program Interface (API) [C Language]",
- IEEE Standard 1003.2, 1996.
-
- [5] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.
- Lehtinen, "SSH Protocol Architecture", draft-ietf-secsh-
- architecture-13 (work in progress), September 2002.
-
- [6] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.
- Lehtinen, "SSH Protocol Transport Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-
- transport-15 (work in progress), September 2002.
-
- [7] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.
- Lehtinen, "SSH Connection Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-connect-16
- (work in progress), September 2002.
-
- [8] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.
- Lehtinen, "SSH Authentication Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-
- userauth-16 (work in progress), September 2002.
-
-
-Authors' Addresses
-
- Joseph Galbraith
- VanDyke Software
- 4848 Tramway Ridge Blvd
- Suite 101
- Albuquerque, NM 87111
- US
-
- Phone: +1 505 332 5700
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
- Tatu Ylonen
- SSH Communications Security Corp
- Fredrikinkatu 42
- HELSINKI FIN-00100
- Finland
-
-
-
- Sami Lehtinen
- SSH Communications Security Corp
- Fredrikinkatu 42
- HELSINKI FIN-00100
- Finland
-
-
-
-
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-
-Full Copyright Statement
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
-
- This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
- others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
- or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
- and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
- kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
- included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
- document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
- the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
- Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
- developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
- copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
- followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
- English.
-
- The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
- revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
-
- This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
- "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
- TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
- BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
- HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
-
-Acknowledgement
-
- Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
- Internet Society.
-
-
-
-
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-Galbraith, et al. Expires April 16, 2003 [Page 35]
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diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-04.txt b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-04.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 9f51883cd2..0000000000
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-04.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2130 +0,0 @@
-
-
-
-Secure Shell Working Group J. Galbraith
-Internet-Draft VanDyke Software
-Expires: June 18, 2003 T. Ylonen
- S. Lehtinen
- SSH Communications Security Corp
- December 18, 2002
-
-
- SSH File Transfer Protocol
- draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-04.txt
-
-Status of this Memo
-
- This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
- all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
-
- Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
- Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
- other groups may also distribute working documents as
- Internet-Drafts.
-
- Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
- and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
- time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
- material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
-
- The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
- www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
-
- The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
- http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
-
- This Internet-Draft will expire on June 18, 2003.
-
-Copyright Notice
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
-
-Abstract
-
- The SSH File Transfer Protocol provides secure file transfer
- functionality over any reliable data stream. It is the standard file
- transfer protocol for use with the SSH2 protocol. This document
- describes the file transfer protocol and its interface to the SSH2
- protocol suite.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Galbraith, et al. Expires June 18, 2003 [Page 1]
-
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-
-
-Table of Contents
-
- 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 2. Use with the SSH Connection Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 3. General Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 3.1 The use of stderr in the server . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 4. Protocol Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 4.1 Client Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 4.2 Server Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
- 4.3 Determining Server Newline Convention . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 5. File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 5.1 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 5.2 Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 5.3 Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 5.4 Owner and Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 5.5 Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 5.6 Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 5.7 ACL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- 5.8 Extended attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
- 6. Requests From the Client to the Server . . . . . . . . . . 15
- 6.1 Request Synchronization and Reordering . . . . . . . . . . 15
- 6.2 File Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
- 6.3 Opening, Creating, and Closing Files . . . . . . . . . . . 16
- 6.4 Reading and Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
- 6.5 Removing and Renaming Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
- 6.6 Creating and Deleting Directories . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 6.7 Scanning Directories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 6.8 Retrieving File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
- 6.9 Setting File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
- 6.10 Dealing with Symbolic links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- 6.11 Canonicalizing the Server-Side Path Name . . . . . . . . . 25
- 6.11.1 Best practice for dealing with paths . . . . . . . . . . . 25
- 7. Responses from the Server to the Client . . . . . . . . . 26
- 8. Vendor-Specific Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
- 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
- 10. Changes from previous protocol versions . . . . . . . . . 32
- 10.1 Changes between versions 4 and 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
- 10.2 Changes between versions 3 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
- 10.3 Changes between versions 2 and 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
- 10.4 Changes between versions 1 and 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
- 11. Trademark Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
- References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
- Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
- Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . 37
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-1. Introduction
-
- This protocol provides secure file transfer (and more generally file
- system access) functionality over a reliable data stream, such as a
- channel in the SSH2 protocol [5].
-
- This protocol is designed so that it could be used to implement a
- secure remote file system service, as well as a secure file transfer
- service.
-
- This protocol assumes that it runs over a secure channel, and that
- the server has already authenticated the user at the client end, and
- that the identity of the client user is externally available to the
- server implementation.
-
- In general, this protocol follows a simple request-response model.
- Each request and response contains a sequence number and multiple
- requests may be pending simultaneously. There are a relatively large
- number of different request messages, but a small number of possible
- response messages. Each request has one or more response messages
- that may be returned in result (e.g., a read either returns data or
- reports error status).
-
- The packet format descriptions in this specification follow the
- notation presented in the secsh architecture draft. [5]
-
- Even though this protocol is described in the context of the SSH2
- protocol, this protocol is general and independent of the rest of the
- SSH2 protocol suite. It could be used in a number of different
- applications, such as secure file transfer over TLS RFC 2246 [1] and
- transfer of management information in VPN applications.
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-2. Use with the SSH Connection Protocol
-
- When used with the SSH2 Protocol suite, this protocol is intended to
- be used from the SSH Connection Protocol [7] as a subsystem, as
- described in section ``Starting a Shell or a Command''. The
- subsystem name used with this protocol is "sftp".
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-3. General Packet Format
-
- All packets transmitted over the secure connection are of the
- following format:
-
- uint32 length
- byte type
- byte[length - 1] data payload
-
- That is, they are just data preceded by 32-bit length and 8-bit type
- fields. The `length' is the length of the data area, and does not
- include the `length' field itself. The format and interpretation of
- the data area depends on the packet type.
-
- All packet descriptions below only specify the packet type and the
- data that goes into the data field. Thus, they should be prefixed by
- the `length' and `type' fields.
-
- The maximum size of a packet is in practice determined by the client
- (the maximum size of read or write requests that it sends, plus a few
- bytes of packet overhead). All servers SHOULD support packets of at
- least 34000 bytes (where the packet size refers to the full length,
- including the header above). This should allow for reads and writes
- of at most 32768 bytes.
-
- There is no limit on the number of outstanding (non-acknowledged)
- requests that the client may send to the server. In practice this is
- limited by the buffering available on the data stream and the queuing
- performed by the server. If the server's queues are full, it should
- not read any more data from the stream, and flow control will prevent
- the client from sending more requests. Note, however, that while
- there is no restriction on the protocol level, the client's API may
- provide a limit in order to prevent infinite queuing of outgoing
- requests at the client.
-
- The following values are defined for packet types.
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- #define SSH_FXP_INIT 1
- #define SSH_FXP_VERSION 2
- #define SSH_FXP_OPEN 3
- #define SSH_FXP_CLOSE 4
- #define SSH_FXP_READ 5
- #define SSH_FXP_WRITE 6
- #define SSH_FXP_LSTAT 7
- #define SSH_FXP_FSTAT 8
- #define SSH_FXP_SETSTAT 9
- #define SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT 10
- #define SSH_FXP_OPENDIR 11
- #define SSH_FXP_READDIR 12
- #define SSH_FXP_REMOVE 13
- #define SSH_FXP_MKDIR 14
- #define SSH_FXP_RMDIR 15
- #define SSH_FXP_REALPATH 16
- #define SSH_FXP_STAT 17
- #define SSH_FXP_RENAME 18
- #define SSH_FXP_READLINK 19
- #define SSH_FXP_SYMLINK 20
-
- #define SSH_FXP_STATUS 101
- #define SSH_FXP_HANDLE 102
- #define SSH_FXP_DATA 103
- #define SSH_FXP_NAME 104
- #define SSH_FXP_ATTRS 105
-
- #define SSH_FXP_EXTENDED 200
- #define SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY 201
-
- RESERVED_FOR_EXTENSIONS 210-255
-
- Additional packet types should only be defined if the protocol
- version number (see Section ``Protocol Initialization'') is
- incremented, and their use MUST be negotiated using the version
- number. However, the SSH_FXP_EXTENDED and SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY
- packets can be used to implement vendor-specific extensions. See
- Section ``Vendor-Specific-Extensions'' for more details.
-
-3.1 The use of stderr in the server
-
- Packets are sent and received on stdout and stdin. Data sent on
- stderr by the server SHOULD be considered debug or supplemental error
- information, and MAY be displayed to the user.
-
- For example, during initialization, there is no client request
- active, so errors or warning information cannot be sent to the client
- as part of the SFTP protocol at this early stage. However, the
-
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- errors or warnings MAY be sent as stderr text.
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-4. Protocol Initialization
-
- When the file transfer protocol starts, the client first sends a
- SSH_FXP_INIT (including its version number) packet to the server.
- The server responds with a SSH_FXP_VERSION packet, supplying the
- lowest of its own and the client's version number. Both parties
- should from then on adhere to particular version of the protocol.
-
- The version number of the protocol specified in this document is 4.
- The version number should be incremented for each incompatible
- revision of this protocol.
-
-4.1 Client Initialization
-
- The SSH_FXP_INIT packet (from client to server) has the following
- data:
-
- uint32 version
-
- Version 3 of this protocol allowed clients to include extensions in
- the SSH_FXP_INIT packet; however, this can cause interoperability
- problems with version 1 and version 2 servers because the client must
- send this packet before knowing the servers version.
-
- In this version of the protocol, clients MUST use the
- SSH_FXP_EXTENDED packet to send extensions to the server after
- version exchange has completed. Clients MUST NOT include extensions
- in the version packet. This will prevent interoperability problems
- with older servers
-
-4.2 Server Initialization
-
- The SSH_FXP_VERSION packet (from server to client) has the following
- data:
-
- uint32 version
- <extension data>
-
- 'version' is the lower of the protocol version supported by the
- server and the version number received from the client.
-
- The extension data may be empty, or may be a sequence of
-
- string extension_name
- string extension_data
-
- pairs (both strings MUST always be present if one is, but the
- `extension_data' string may be of zero length). If present, these
-
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- strings indicate extensions to the baseline protocol. The
- `extension_name' field(s) identify the name of the extension. The
- name should be of the form "name@domain", where the domain is the DNS
- domain name of the organization defining the extension. Additional
- names that are not of this format may be defined later by the IETF.
- Implementations MUST silently ignore any extensions whose name they
- do not recognize.
-
-4.3 Determining Server Newline Convention
-
- In order to correctly process text files in a cross platform
- compatible way, the newline convention must be converted from that of
- the server to that of the client, or, during an upload, from that of
- the client to that of the server.
-
- Versions 3 and prior of this protocol made no provisions for
- processing text files. Many clients implemented some sort of
- conversion algorithm, but without either a 'canonical' on the wire
- format or knowledge of the servers newline convention, correct
- conversion was not always possible.
-
- Starting with Version 4, the SSH_FXF_TEXT file open flag (Section
- 6.3) makes it possible to request that the server translate a file to
- a 'canonical' on the wire format. This format uses \r\n as the line
- separator.
-
- Servers for systems using multiple newline characters (for example,
- Mac OS X or VMS) or systems using counted records, MUST translate to
- the canonical form.
-
- However, to ease the burden of implementation on servers that use a
- single, simple separator sequence, the following extension allows the
- canonical format to be changed.
-
- string "newline"
- string new-canonical-separator (usually "\r" or "\n" or "\r\n")
-
- All clients MUST support this extension.
-
- When processing text files, clients SHOULD NOT translate any
- character or sequence that is not an exact match of the servers
- newline separator.
-
- In particular, if the newline sequence being used is the canonical
- "\r\n" sequence, a lone \r or a lone \n SHOULD be written through
- without change.
-
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-5. File Attributes
-
- A new compound data type is defined for encoding file attributes.
- The same encoding is used both when returning file attributes from
- the server and when sending file attributes to the server. When
- sending it to the server, the flags field specifies which attributes
- are included, and the server will use default values for the
- remaining attributes (or will not modify the values of remaining
- attributes). When receiving attributes from the server, the flags
- specify which attributes are included in the returned data. The
- server normally returns all attributes it knows about.
-
- uint32 flags
- byte type always present
- uint64 size present only if flag SIZE
- string owner present only if flag OWNERGROUP
- string group present only if flag OWNERGROUP
- uint32 permissions present only if flag PERMISSIONS
- uint64 atime present only if flag ACCESSTIME
- uint32 atime_nseconds present only if flag SUBSECOND_TIMES
- uint64 createtime present only if flag CREATETIME
- uint32 createtime_nseconds present only if flag SUBSECOND_TIMES
- uint64 mtime present only if flag MODIFYTIME
- uint32 mtime_nseconds present only if flag SUBSECOND_TIMES
- string acl present only if flag ACL
- uint32 extended_count present only if flag EXTENDED
- string extended_type
- string extended_data
- ... more extended data (extended_type - extended_data pairs),
- so that number of pairs equals extended_count
-
-
-5.1 Flags
-
- The `flags' specify which of the fields are present. Those fields
- for which the corresponding flag is not set are not present (not
- included in the packet). New flags can only be added by incrementing
- the protocol version number (or by using the extension mechanism
- described below).
-
- The flags bits are defined to have the following values:
-
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- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE 0x00000001
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS 0x00000040
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACCESSTIME 0x00000008
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_CREATETIME 0x00000010
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_MODIFYTIME 0x00000020
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACL 0x00000040
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_OWNERGROUP 0x00000080
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_SUBSECOND_TIMES 0x00000100
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED 0x80000000
-
- In previous versions of this protocol flags value 0x00000002 was
- SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID. This value is now unused, and OWNERGROUP
- was given a new value in order to ease implementation burden.
- 0x00000002 MUST NOT appear in the mask. Some future version of this
- protocol may reuse flag 0x00000002.
-
-5.2 Type
-
- The type field is always present. The following types are defined:
-
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_REGULAR 1
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_DIRECTORY 2
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_SYMLINK 3
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_SPECIAL 4
- #define SSH_FILEXFER_TYPE_UNKNOWN 5
-
- On a POSIX system, these values would be derived from the permission
- field.
-
-5.3 Size
-
- The `size' field specifies the size of the file on disk, in bytes.
- If it is present during file creation, it should be considered a hint
- as to the files eventual size.
-
- Files opened with the SSH_FXF_TEXT flag may have a size that is
- greater or less than the value of the size field.
-
-5.4 Owner and Group
-
- The `owner' and `group' fields are represented as UTF-8 strings; this
- is the form used by NFS v4. See NFS version 4 Protocol. [3] The
- following text is selected quotations from section 5.6.
-
- To avoid a representation that is tied to a particular underlying
- implementation at the client or server, the use of UTF-8 strings has
- been chosen. The string should be of the form user@dns_domain".
- This will allow for a client and server that do not use the same
-
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- local representation the ability to translate to a common syntax that
- can be interpreted by both. In the case where there is no
- translation available to the client or server, the attribute value
- must be constructed without the "@". Therefore, the absence of the @
- from the owner or owner_group attribute signifies that no translation
- was available and the receiver of the attribute should not place any
- special meaning with the attribute value. Even though the attribute
- value can not be translated, it may still be useful. In the case of
- a client, the attribute string may be used for local display of
- ownership.
-
-5.5 Permissions
-
- The `permissions' field contains a bit mask of file permissions as
- defined by POSIX [1].
-
-5.6 Times
-
- The 'atime', 'createtime', and 'mtime' contain the access, creation,
- and modification times of the files, respectively. They are
- represented as seconds from Jan 1, 1970 in UTC.
-
- A negative value indicates number of seconds before Jan 1, 1970. In
- both cases, if the SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_SUBSECOND_TIMES flag is set, the
- nseconds field is to be added to the seconds field for the final time
- representation. For example, if the time to be represented is
- one-half second before 0 hour January 1, 1970, the seconds field
- would have a value of negative one (-1) and the nseconds fields would
- have a value of one-half second (500000000). Values greater than
- 999,999,999 for nseconds are considered invalid.
-
-5.7 ACL
-
- The 'ACL' field contains an ACL similar to that defined in section
- 5.9 of NFS version 4 Protocol [3].
-
- uint32 ace-count
-
- repeated ace-count time:
- uint32 ace-type
- uint32 ace-flag
- uint32 ace-mask
- string who [UTF-8]
-
- ace-type is one of the following four values (taken from NFS Version
- 4 Protocol [3]:
-
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- const ACE4_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000000;
- const ACE4_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000001;
- const ACE4_SYSTEM_AUDIT_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000002;
- const ACE4_SYSTEM_ALARM_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000003;
-
- ace-flag is a combination of the following flag values. See NFS
- Version 4 Protocol [3] section 5.9.2:
-
- const ACE4_FILE_INHERIT_ACE = 0x00000001;
- const ACE4_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE = 0x00000002;
- const ACE4_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE = 0x00000004;
- const ACE4_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE = 0x00000008;
- const ACE4_SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG = 0x00000010;
- const ACE4_FAILED_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG = 0x00000020;
- const ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP = 0x00000040;
-
- ace-mask is any combination of the following flags (taken from NFS
- Version 4 Protocol [3] section 5.9.3:
-
- const ACE4_READ_DATA = 0x00000001;
- const ACE4_LIST_DIRECTORY = 0x00000001;
- const ACE4_WRITE_DATA = 0x00000002;
- const ACE4_ADD_FILE = 0x00000002;
- const ACE4_APPEND_DATA = 0x00000004;
- const ACE4_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY = 0x00000004;
- const ACE4_READ_NAMED_ATTRS = 0x00000008;
- const ACE4_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS = 0x00000010;
- const ACE4_EXECUTE = 0x00000020;
- const ACE4_DELETE_CHILD = 0x00000040;
- const ACE4_READ_ATTRIBUTES = 0x00000080;
- const ACE4_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES = 0x00000100;
- const ACE4_DELETE = 0x00010000;
- const ACE4_READ_ACL = 0x00020000;
- const ACE4_WRITE_ACL = 0x00040000;
- const ACE4_WRITE_OWNER = 0x00080000;
- const ACE4_SYNCHRONIZE = 0x00100000;
-
- who is a UTF-8 string of the form described in 'Owner and Group'
- (Section 5.4)
-
- Also, as per '5.9.4 ACE who' [3] there are several identifiers that
- need to be understood universally. Some of these identifiers cannot
- be understood when an client access the server, but have meaning when
- a local process accesses the file. The ability to display and modify
- these permissions is permitted over SFTP.
-
- OWNER The owner of the file.
-
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- GROUP The group associated with the file.
-
- EVERYONE The world.
-
- INTERACTIVE Accessed from an interactive terminal.
-
- NETWORK Accessed via the network.
-
- DIALUP Accessed as a dialup user to the server.
-
- BATCH Accessed from a batch job.
-
- ANONYMOUS Accessed without any authentication.
-
- AUTHENTICATED Any authenticated user (opposite of ANONYMOUS).
-
- SERVICE Access from a system service.
-
- To avoid conflict, these special identifiers are distinguish by an
- appended "@" and should appear in the form "xxxx@" (note: no domain
- name after the "@"). For example: ANONYMOUS@.
-
-5.8 Extended attributes
-
- The SSH_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED flag provides a general extension
- mechanism for vendor-specific extensions. If the flag is specified,
- then the `extended_count' field is present. It specifies the number
- of extended_type-extended_data pairs that follow. Each of these
- pairs specifies an extended attribute. For each of the attributes,
- the extended_type field should be a string of the format
- "name@domain", where "domain" is a valid, registered domain name and
- "name" identifies the method. The IETF may later standardize certain
- names that deviate from this format (e.g., that do not contain the
- "@" sign). The interpretation of `extended_data' depends on the
- type. Implementations SHOULD ignore extended data fields that they
- do not understand.
-
- Additional fields can be added to the attributes by either defining
- additional bits to the flags field to indicate their presence, or by
- defining extended attributes for them. The extended attributes
- mechanism is recommended for most purposes; additional flags bits
- should only be defined by an IETF standards action that also
- increments the protocol version number. The use of such new fields
- MUST be negotiated by the version number in the protocol exchange.
- It is a protocol error if a packet with unsupported protocol bits is
- received.
-
-
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-6. Requests From the Client to the Server
-
- Requests from the client to the server represent the various file
- system operations. Each request begins with an `id' field, which is
- a 32-bit identifier identifying the request (selected by the client).
- The same identifier will be returned in the response to the request.
- One possible implementation is a monotonically increasing request
- sequence number (modulo 2^32).
-
- Many operations in the protocol operate on open files. The
- SSH_FXP_OPEN request can return a file handle (which is an opaque
- variable-length string) which may be used to access the file later
- (e.g. in a read operation). The client MUST NOT send requests the
- server with bogus or closed handles. However, the server MUST
- perform adequate checks on the handle in order to avoid security
- risks due to fabricated handles.
-
- This design allows either stateful and stateless server
- implementation, as well as an implementation which caches state
- between requests but may also flush it. The contents of the file
- handle string are entirely up to the server and its design. The
- client should not modify or attempt to interpret the file handle
- strings.
-
- The file handle strings MUST NOT be longer than 256 bytes.
-
-6.1 Request Synchronization and Reordering
-
- The protocol and implementations MUST process requests relating to
- the same file in the order in which they are received. In other
- words, if an application submits multiple requests to the server, the
- results in the responses will be the same as if it had sent the
- requests one at a time and waited for the response in each case. For
- example, the server may process non-overlapping read/write requests
- to the same file in parallel, but overlapping reads and writes cannot
- be reordered or parallelized. However, there are no ordering
- restrictions on the server for processing requests from two different
- file transfer connections. The server may interleave and parallelize
- them at will.
-
- There are no restrictions on the order in which responses to
- outstanding requests are delivered to the client, except that the
- server must ensure fairness in the sense that processing of no
- request will be indefinitely delayed even if the client is sending
- other requests so that there are multiple outstanding requests all
- the time.
-
-
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-6.2 File Names
-
- This protocol represents file names as strings. File names are
- assumed to use the slash ('/') character as a directory separator.
-
- File names starting with a slash are "absolute", and are relative to
- the root of the file system. Names starting with any other character
- are relative to the user's default directory (home directory). Note
- that identifying the user is assumed to take place outside of this
- protocol.
-
- Servers SHOULD interpret a path name component ".." as referring to
- the parent directory, and "." as referring to the current directory.
- If the server implementation limits access to certain parts of the
- file system, it must be extra careful in parsing file names when
- enforcing such restrictions. There have been numerous reported
- security bugs where a ".." in a path name has allowed access outside
- the intended area.
-
- An empty path name is valid, and it refers to the user's default
- directory (usually the user's home directory).
-
- Otherwise, no syntax is defined for file names by this specification.
- Clients should not make any other assumptions; however, they can
- splice path name components returned by SSH_FXP_READDIR together
- using a slash ('/') as the separator, and that will work as expected.
-
- In order to comply with IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages
- [2], all filenames are to be encoded in UTF-8. The shortest valid
- UTF-8 encoding of the UNICODE data MUST be used. The server is
- responsible for converting the UNICODE data to whatever canonical
- form it requires.
-
- For example, if the server requires that precomposed characters
- always be used, the server MUST NOT assume the filename as sent by
- the client has this attribute, but must do this normalization itself.
-
- It is understood that the lack of well-defined semantics for file
- names may cause interoperability problems between clients and servers
- using radically different operating systems. However, this approach
- is known to work acceptably with most systems, and alternative
- approaches that e.g. treat file names as sequences of structured
- components are quite complicated.
-
-6.3 Opening, Creating, and Closing Files
-
- Files are opened and created using the SSH_FXP_OPEN message, whose
- data part is as follows:
-
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- uint32 id
- string filename [UTF-8]
- uint32 pflags
- ATTRS attrs
-
- The `id' field is the request identifier as for all requests.
-
- The `filename' field specifies the file name. See Section ``File
- Names'' for more information.
-
- The `pflags' field is a bitmask. The following bits have been
- defined.
-
- #define SSH_FXF_READ 0x00000001
- #define SSH_FXF_WRITE 0x00000002
- #define SSH_FXF_APPEND 0x00000004
- #define SSH_FXF_CREAT 0x00000008
- #define SSH_FXF_TRUNC 0x00000010
- #define SSH_FXF_EXCL 0x00000020
- #define SSH_FXF_TEXT 0x00000040
-
- These have the following meanings:
-
- SSH_FXF_READ
- Open the file for reading.
-
- SSH_FXF_WRITE
- Open the file for writing. If both this and SSH_FXF_READ are
- specified, the file is opened for both reading and writing.
-
- SSH_FXF_APPEND
- Force all writes to append data at the end of the file. The
- offset parameter to write will be ignored.
-
- SSH_FXF_CREAT
- If this flag is specified, then a new file will be created if one
- does not already exist (if O_TRUNC is specified, the new file will
- be truncated to zero length if it previously exists).
-
- SSH_FXF_TRUNC
- Forces an existing file with the same name to be truncated to zero
- length when creating a file by specifying SSH_FXF_CREAT.
- SSH_FXF_CREAT MUST also be specified if this flag is used.
-
- SSH_FXF_EXCL
- Causes the request to fail if the named file already exists.
- SSH_FXF_CREAT MUST also be specified if this flag is used.
-
-
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- SSH_FXF_TEXT
- Indicates that the server should treat the file as text and
- convert it to the canonical newline convention in use. (See
- Determining Server Newline Convention. (Section 4.3)
-
- When a file is opened with the FXF_TEXT flag, the offset field in
- both the read and write function are ignored.
-
- Servers MUST correctly process multiple parallel reads and writes
- correctly in this mode. Naturally, it is permissible for them to
- do this by serializing the requests. It would not be possible for
- a client to reliably detect a server that does not implement
- parallel writes in time to prevent damage.
-
- Clients SHOULD use the SSH_FXF_APPEND flag to append data to a
- text file rather then using write with a calculated offset.
-
- To support seeks on text file the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED
- packet is defined.
-
-
-
- string "text-seek"
- string file-handle
- uint64 line-number
-
- line-number is the index of the line number to seek to, where byte
- 0 in the file is line number 0, and the byte directly following
- the first newline sequence in the file is line number 1 and so on.
-
- The response to a "text-seek" request is an SSH_FXP_STATUS
- message.
-
- An attempt to seek past the end-of-file should result in a
- SSH_FX_EOF status.
-
- Servers SHOULD support at least one "text-seek" in order to
- support resume. However, a client MUST be prepared to receive
- SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED when attempting a "text-seek" operation.
- The client can then try a fall-back strategy, if it has one.
-
- Clients MUST be prepared to handle SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED returned
- for read or write operations that are not sequential.
-
- The `attrs' field specifies the initial attributes for the file.
- Default values will be used for those attributes that are not
- specified. See Section ``File Attributes'' for more information.
-
-
-
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-
- The response to this message will be either SSH_FXP_HANDLE (if the
- operation is successful) or SSH_FXP_STATUS (if the operation fails).
-
- A file is closed by using the SSH_FXP_CLOSE request. Its data field
- has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is a handle
- previously returned in the response to SSH_FXP_OPEN or
- SSH_FXP_OPENDIR. The handle becomes invalid immediately after this
- request has been sent.
-
- The response to this request will be a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. One
- should note that on some server platforms even a close can fail.
- This can happen e.g. if the server operating system caches writes,
- and an error occurs while flushing cached writes during the close.
-
-6.4 Reading and Writing
-
- Once a file has been opened, it can be read using the following
- message:
-
- byte SSH_FXP_READ
- uint32 id
- string handle
- uint64 offset
- uint32 len
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `handle' is an open file handle
- returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN, `offset' is the offset (in bytes) relative
- to the beginning of the file from where to start reading, and `len'
- is the maximum number of bytes to read.
-
- In response to this request, the server will read as many bytes as it
- can from the file (up to `len'), and return them in a SSH_FXP_DATA
- message. If an error occurs or EOF is encountered before reading any
- data, the server will respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
- For normal disk files, it is normally guaranteed that this will read
- the specified number of bytes, or up to end of file. However, if the
- read length is very long, the server may truncate it if it doesn't
- support packets of that length. See General Packet Format (Section
- 3).
-
- For e.g. device files this may return fewer bytes than requested.
-
-
-
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-
- Writing to a file is achieved using the following message:
-
- byte SSH_FXP_WRITE
- uint32 id
- string handle
- uint64 offset
- string data
-
- where `id' is a request identifier, `handle' is a file handle
- returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN, `offset' is the offset (in bytes) from the
- beginning of the file where to start writing, and `data' is the data
- to be written.
-
- The write will extend the file if writing beyond the end of the file.
- It is legal to write way beyond the end of the file; the semantics
- are to write zeroes from the end of the file to the specified offset
- and then the data. On most operating systems, such writes do not
- allocate disk space but instead leave "holes" in the file.
-
- The server responds to a write request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-
-6.5 Removing and Renaming Files
-
- Files can be removed using the SSH_FXP_REMOVE message. It has the
- following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string filename [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `filename' is the name of
- the file to be removed. See Section ``File Names'' for more
- information. This request cannot be used to remove directories.
-
- The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS
- message.
-
- Files (and directories) can be renamed using the SSH_FXP_RENAME
- message. Its data is as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string oldpath [UTF-8]
- string newpath [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `oldpath' is the name of an
- existing file or directory, and `newpath' is the new name for the
- file or directory. It is an error if there already exists a file
- with the name specified by newpath. The server may also fail rename
- requests in other situations, for example if `oldpath' and `newpath'
-
-
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-
- point to different file systems on the server.
-
- The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS
- message.
-
-6.6 Creating and Deleting Directories
-
- New directories can be created using the SSH_FXP_MKDIR request. It
- has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier.
-
- `path' specifies the directory to be created. See Section ``File
- Names'' for more information on file names.
-
- `attrs' specifies the attributes that should be applied to it upon
- creation. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section ``File
- Attributes''.
-
- The server will respond to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS
- message. If a file or directory with the specified path already
- exists, an error will be returned.
-
- Directories can be removed using the SSH_FXP_RMDIR request, which has
- the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `path' specifies the
- directory to be removed. See Section ``File Names'' for more
- information on file names.
-
- The server responds to this request with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
- Errors may be returned from this operation for various reasons,
- including, but not limited to, the path does not exist, the path does
- not refer to a directory object, the directory is not empty, or the
- user has insufficient access or permission to perform the requested
- operation.
-
-6.7 Scanning Directories
-
- The files in a directory can be listed using the SSH_FXP_OPENDIR and
- SSH_FXP_READDIR requests. Each SSH_FXP_READDIR request returns one
-
-
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-
- or more file names with full file attributes for each file. The
- client should call SSH_FXP_READDIR repeatedly until it has found the
- file it is looking for or until the server responds with a
- SSH_FXP_STATUS message indicating an error (normally SSH_FX_EOF if
- there are no more files in the directory). The client should then
- close the handle using the SSH_FXP_CLOSE request.
-
- The SSH_FXP_OPENDIR opens a directory for reading. It has the
- following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `path' is the path name of
- the directory to be listed (without any trailing slash). See Section
- ``File Names'' for more information on file names. This will return
- an error if the path does not specify a directory or if the directory
- is not readable. The server will respond to this request with either
- a SSH_FXP_HANDLE or a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-
- Once the directory has been successfully opened, files (and
- directories) contained in it can be listed using SSH_FXP_READDIR
- requests. These are of the format
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is a handle
- returned by SSH_FXP_OPENDIR. (It is a protocol error to attempt to
- use an ordinary file handle returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN.)
-
- The server responds to this request with either a SSH_FXP_NAME or a
- SSH_FXP_STATUS message. One or more names may be returned at a time.
- Full status information is returned for each name in order to speed
- up typical directory listings.
-
- If there are no more names available to be read, the server MUST
- respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message with error code of SSH_FX_EOF.
-
- When the client no longer wishes to read more names from the
- directory, it SHOULD call SSH_FXP_CLOSE for the handle. The handle
- should be closed regardless of whether an error has occurred or not.
-
-6.8 Retrieving File Attributes
-
- Very often, file attributes are automatically returned by
- SSH_FXP_READDIR. However, sometimes there is need to specifically
- retrieve the attributes for a named file. This can be done using the
-
-
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-
- SSH_FXP_STAT, SSH_FXP_LSTAT and SSH_FXP_FSTAT requests.
-
- SSH_FXP_STAT and SSH_FXP_LSTAT only differ in that SSH_FXP_STAT
- follows symbolic links on the server, whereas SSH_FXP_LSTAT does not
- follow symbolic links. Both have the same format:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
- uint32 flags
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `path' specifies the file
- system object for which status is to be returned. The server
- responds to this request with either SSH_FXP_ATTRS or SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
- The flags field specify the attribute flags in which the client has
- particular interest. This is a hint to the server. For example,
- because retrieving owner / group and acl information can be an
- expensive operation under some operating systems, the server may
- choose not to retrieve this information unless the client expresses a
- specific interest in it.
-
- The client has no guarantee the server will provide all the fields
- that it has expressed an interest in.
-
- SSH_FXP_FSTAT differs from the others in that it returns status
- information for an open file (identified by the file handle). Its
- format is as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
- uint32 flags
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `handle' is a file handle
- returned by SSH_FXP_OPEN. The server responds to this request with
- SSH_FXP_ATTRS or SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
-6.9 Setting File Attributes
-
- File attributes may be modified using the SSH_FXP_SETSTAT and
- SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT requests. These requests are used for operations
- such as changing the ownership, permissions or access times, as well
- as for truncating a file.
-
- The SSH_FXP_SETSTAT request is of the following format:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `path' specifies the file
- system object (e.g. file or directory) whose attributes are to be
- modified, and `attrs' specifies the modifications to be made to its
- attributes. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section
- ``File Attributes''.
-
- An error will be returned if the specified file system object does
- not exist or the user does not have sufficient rights to modify the
- specified attributes. The server responds to this request with a
- SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
-
- The SSH_FXP_FSETSTAT request modifies the attributes of a file which
- is already open. It has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `handle' (MUST be returned by
- SSH_FXP_OPEN) identifies the file whose attributes are to be
- modified, and `attrs' specifies the modifications to be made to its
- attributes. Attributes are discussed in more detail in Section
- ``File Attributes''. The server will respond to this request with
- SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
-6.10 Dealing with Symbolic links
-
- The SSH_FXP_READLINK request may be used to read the target of a
- symbolic link. It would have a data part as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `path' specifies the path
- name of the symlink to be read.
-
- The server will respond with a SSH_FXP_NAME packet containing only
- one name and a dummy attributes value. The name in the returned
- packet contains the target of the link. If an error occurs, the
- server may respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
- The SSH_FXP_SYMLINK request will create a symbolic link on the
- server. It is of the following format
-
-
-
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-
- uint32 id
- string linkpath [UTF-8]
- string targetpath [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `linkpath' specifies the path
- name of the symlink to be created and `targetpath' specifies the
- target of the symlink. The server shall respond with a
- SSH_FXP_STATUS indicating either success (SSH_FX_OK) or an error
- condition.
-
-6.11 Canonicalizing the Server-Side Path Name
-
- The SSH_FXP_REALPATH request can be used to have the server
- canonicalize any given path name to an absolute path. This is useful
- for converting path names containing ".." components or relative
- pathnames without a leading slash into absolute paths. The format of
- the request is as follows:
-
- uint32 id
- string path [UTF-8]
-
- where `id' is the request identifier and `path' specifies the path
- name to be canonicalized. The server will respond with a
- SSH_FXP_NAME packet containing the name in canonical form and a dummy
- attributes value. If an error occurs, the server may also respond
- with SSH_FXP_STATUS.
-
-6.11.1 Best practice for dealing with paths
-
- The client SHOULD treat the results of SSH_FXP_REALPATH as a
- canonical absolute path, even if the path does not appear to be
- absolute. A client that use REALPATH(".") and treats the result as
- absolute, even if there is no leading slash, will continue to
- function correctly, even when talking to a Windows NT or VMS style
- system, where absolute paths may not begin with a slash.
-
- For example, if the client wishes to change directory up, and the
- server has returned "c:/x/y/z" from REALPATH, the client SHOULD use
- "c:/x/y/z/..".
-
- As a second example, if the client wishes to open the file "x.txt" in
- the current directory, and server has returned "dka100:/x/y/z" as the
- canonical path of the directory, the client SHOULD open "dka100:/x/y/
- z/x.txt"
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-7. Responses from the Server to the Client
-
- The server responds to the client using one of a few response
- packets. All requests can return a SSH_FXP_STATUS response upon
- failure. When the operation is successful, any of the responses may
- be returned (depending on the operation). If no data needs to be
- returned to the client, the SSH_FXP_STATUS response with SSH_FX_OK
- status is appropriate. Otherwise, the SSH_FXP_HANDLE message is used
- to return a file handle (for SSH_FXP_OPEN and SSH_FXP_OPENDIR
- requests), SSH_FXP_DATA is used to return data from SSH_FXP_READ,
- SSH_FXP_NAME is used to return one or more file names from a
- SSH_FXP_READDIR or SSH_FXP_REALPATH request, and SSH_FXP_ATTRS is
- used to return file attributes from SSH_FXP_STAT, SSH_FXP_LSTAT, and
- SSH_FXP_FSTAT requests.
-
- Exactly one response will be returned for each request. Each
- response packet contains a request identifier which can be used to
- match each response with the corresponding request. Note that it is
- legal to have several requests outstanding simultaneously, and the
- server is allowed to send responses to them in a different order from
- the order in which the requests were sent (the result of their
- execution, however, is guaranteed to be as if they had been processed
- one at a time in the order in which the requests were sent).
-
- Response packets are of the same general format as request packets.
- Each response packet begins with the request identifier.
-
- The format of the data portion of the SSH_FXP_STATUS response is as
- follows:
-
- uint32 id
- uint32 error/status code
- string error message (ISO-10646 UTF-8 [RFC-2279])
- string language tag (as defined in [RFC-1766])
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `error/status code'
- indicates the result of the requested operation. The value SSH_FX_OK
- indicates success, and all other values indicate failure.
-
- Currently, the following values are defined (other values may be
- defined by future versions of this protocol):
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
- #define SSH_FX_OK 0
- #define SSH_FX_EOF 1
- #define SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE 2
- #define SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED 3
- #define SSH_FX_FAILURE 4
- #define SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE 5
- #define SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION 6
- #define SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST 7
- #define SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED 8
- #define SSH_FX_INVALID_HANDLE 9
- #define SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_PATH 10
- #define SSH_FX_FILE_ALREADY_EXISTS 11
- #define SSH_FX_WRITE_PROTECT 12
- #define SSH_FX_NO_MEDIA 13
-
- SSH_FX_OK
- Indicates successful completion of the operation.
-
- SSH_FX_EOF
- indicates end-of-file condition; for SSH_FX_READ it means that no
- more data is available in the file, and for SSH_FX_READDIR it
- indicates that no more files are contained in the directory.
-
- SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE
- is returned when a reference is made to a file which does not
- exist.
-
- SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED
- is returned when the authenticated user does not have sufficient
- permissions to perform the operation.
-
- SSH_FX_FAILURE
- is a generic catch-all error message; it should be returned if an
- error occurs for which there is no more specific error code
- defined.
-
- SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE
- may be returned if a badly formatted packet or protocol
- incompatibility is detected.
-
- SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION
- is a pseudo-error which indicates that the client has no
- connection to the server (it can only be generated locally by the
- client, and MUST NOT be returned by servers).
-
- SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST
- is a pseudo-error which indicates that the connection to the
- server has been lost (it can only be generated locally by the
-
-
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- client, and MUST NOT be returned by servers).
-
- SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED
- indicates that an attempt was made to perform an operation which
- is not supported for the server (it may be generated locally by
- the client if e.g. the version number exchange indicates that a
- required feature is not supported by the server, or it may be
- returned by the server if the server does not implement an
- operation).
-
- SSH_FX_INVALID_HANDLE
- The handle value was invalid.
-
- SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_PATH
- The file path does not exist or is invalid.
-
- SSH_FX_FILE_ALREADY_EXISTS
- The file already exists.
-
- SSH_FX_WRITE_PROTECT
- The file is on read only media, or the media is write protected.
-
- SSH_FX_NO_MEDIA
- The requested operation can not be completed because there is no
- media available in the drive.
-
- The SSH_FXP_HANDLE response has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string handle
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `handle' is an arbitrary
- string that identifies an open file or directory on the server. The
- handle is opaque to the client; the client MUST NOT attempt to
- interpret or modify it in any way. The length of the handle string
- MUST NOT exceed 256 data bytes.
-
- The SSH_FXP_DATA response has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- string data
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `data' is an arbitrary byte
- string containing the requested data. The data string may be at most
- the number of bytes requested in a SSH_FXP_READ request, but may also
- be shorter if end of file is reached or if the read is from something
- other than a regular file.
-
-
-
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-
- The SSH_FXP_NAME response has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- uint32 count
- repeats count times:
- string filename [UTF-8]
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, `count' is the number of names
- returned in this response, and the remaining fields repeat `count'
- times (so that all three fields are first included for the first
- file, then for the second file, etc). In the repeated part,
- `filename' is a file name being returned (for SSH_FXP_READDIR, it
- will be a relative name within the directory, without any path
- components; for SSH_FXP_REALPATH it will be an absolute path name),
- and `attrs' is the attributes of the file as described in Section
- ``File Attributes''.
-
- The SSH_FXP_ATTRS response has the following format:
-
- uint32 id
- ATTRS attrs
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `attrs' is the returned
- file attributes as described in Section ``File Attributes''.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-8. Vendor-Specific Extensions
-
- The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request provides a generic extension mechanism
- for adding vendor-specific commands. The request has the following
- format:
-
- uint32 id
- string extended-request
- ... any request-specific data ...
-
- where `id' is the request identifier, and `extended-request' is a
- string of the format "name@domain", where domain is an internet
- domain name of the vendor defining the request. The rest of the
- request is completely vendor-specific, and servers should only
- attempt to interpret it if they recognize the `extended-request'
- name.
-
- The server may respond to such requests using any of the response
- packets defined in Section ``Responses from the Server to the
- Client''. Additionally, the server may also respond with a
- SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY packet, as defined below. If the server does
- not recognize the `extended-request' name, then the server MUST
- respond with SSH_FXP_STATUS with error/status set to
- SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED.
-
- The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY packet can be used to carry arbitrary
- extension-specific data from the server to the client. It is of the
- following format:
-
- uint32 id
- ... any request-specific data ...
-
- There is a range of packet types reserved for use by extensions. In
- order to avoid collision, extensions that turn on the use of
- additional packet types should determine those numbers dynamically.
-
- The suggested way of doing this is have an extension request from the
- client to the server that enables the extension; the extension
- response from the server to the client would specify the actual type
- values to use, in additional to any other data.
-
- Extension authors should be mindful of the limited range of packet
- types available (there are only 45 values available) and avoid
- requiring a new packet type where possible.
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-9. Security Considerations
-
- This protocol assumes that it is run over a secure channel and that
- the endpoints of the channel have been authenticated. Thus, this
- protocol assumes that it is externally protected from network-level
- attacks.
-
- This protocol provides file system access to arbitrary files on the
- server (only constrained by the server implementation). It is the
- responsibility of the server implementation to enforce any access
- controls that may be required to limit the access allowed for any
- particular user (the user being authenticated externally to this
- protocol, typically using the SSH User Authentication Protocol [8].
-
- Care must be taken in the server implementation to check the validity
- of received file handle strings. The server should not rely on them
- directly; it MUST check the validity of each handle before relying on
- it.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-10. Changes from previous protocol versions
-
- The SSH File Transfer Protocol has changed over time, before it's
- standardization. The following is a description of the incompatible
- changes between different versions.
-
-10.1 Changes between versions 4 and 3
-
- Many of the changes between version 4 and version 3 are to the
- attribute structure to make it more flexible for non-unix platforms.
-
- o Clarify the use of stderr by the server.
-
- o Clarify handling of very large read requests by the server.
-
- o Make all filenames UTF-8.
-
- o Added 'newline' extension.
-
- o Made time fields 64 bit, and optionally have nanosecond resultion.
-
- o Made file attribute owner and group strings so they can actually
- be used on disparate systems.
-
- o Added createtime field, and added separate flags for atime,
- createtime, and mtime so they can be set separately.
-
- o Split the file type out of the permissions field and into it's own
- field (which is always present.)
-
- o Added acl attribute.
-
- o Added SSH_FXF_TEXT file open flag.
-
- o Added flags field to the get stat commands so that the client can
- specifically request information the server might not normally
- included for performance reasons.
-
- o Removed the long filename from the names structure-- it can now be
- built from information available in the attrs structure.
-
- o Added reserved range of packet numbers for extensions.
-
- o Added several additional error codes.
-
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-Galbraith, et al. Expires June 18, 2003 [Page 32]
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-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol December 2002
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-10.2 Changes between versions 3 and 2
-
- o The SSH_FXP_READLINK and SSH_FXP_SYMLINK messages were added.
-
- o The SSH_FXP_EXTENDED and SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY messages were
- added.
-
- o The SSH_FXP_STATUS message was changed to include fields `error
- message' and `language tag'.
-
-
-10.3 Changes between versions 2 and 1
-
- o The SSH_FXP_RENAME message was added.
-
-
-10.4 Changes between versions 1 and 0
-
- o Implementation changes, no actual protocol changes.
-
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-Galbraith, et al. Expires June 18, 2003 [Page 33]
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-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol December 2002
-
-
-11. Trademark Issues
-
- "ssh" is a registered trademark of SSH Communications Security Corp
- in the United States and/or other countries.
-
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-Galbraith, et al. Expires June 18, 2003 [Page 34]
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-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol December 2002
-
-
-References
-
- [1] Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A. and
- P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246, January
- 1999.
-
- [2] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages",
- BCP 18, RFC 2277, January 1998.
-
- [3] Shepler, S., Callaghan, B., Robinson, D., Thurlow, R., Beame,
- C., Eisler, M. and D. Noveck, "NFS version 4 Protocol", RFC
- 3010, December 2000.
-
- [4] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Information
- Technology - Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) - Part
- 1: System Application Program Interface (API) [C Language]",
- IEEE Standard 1003.2, 1996.
-
- [5] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.
- Lehtinen, "SSH Protocol Architecture",
- draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-13 (work in progress), September
- 2002.
-
- [6] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.
- Lehtinen, "SSH Protocol Transport Protocol",
- draft-ietf-secsh-transport-15 (work in progress), September
- 2002.
-
- [7] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.
- Lehtinen, "SSH Connection Protocol", draft-ietf-secsh-connect-16
- (work in progress), September 2002.
-
- [8] Rinne, T., Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. and S.
- Lehtinen, "SSH Authentication Protocol",
- draft-ietf-secsh-userauth-16 (work in progress), September 2002.
-
-
-Authors' Addresses
-
- Joseph Galbraith
- VanDyke Software
- 4848 Tramway Ridge Blvd
- Suite 101
- Albuquerque, NM 87111
- US
-
- Phone: +1 505 332 5700
-
-
-
-Galbraith, et al. Expires June 18, 2003 [Page 35]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol December 2002
-
-
- Tatu Ylonen
- SSH Communications Security Corp
- Fredrikinkatu 42
- HELSINKI FIN-00100
- Finland
-
-
-
- Sami Lehtinen
- SSH Communications Security Corp
- Fredrikinkatu 42
- HELSINKI FIN-00100
- Finland
-
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-Galbraith, et al. Expires June 18, 2003 [Page 36]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol December 2002
-
-
-Intellectual Property Statement
-
- The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
- intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
- pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
- this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
- might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
- has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
- IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
- standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
- claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
- licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
- obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
- proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
- be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
-
- The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
- copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
- rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
- this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
- Director.
-
-
-Full Copyright Statement
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
-
- This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
- others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
- or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
- and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
- kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
- included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
- document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
- the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
- Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
- developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
- copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
- followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
- English.
-
- The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
- revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.
-
- This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
- "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
- TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
- BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
-
-
-
-Galbraith, et al. Expires June 18, 2003 [Page 37]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH File Transfer Protocol December 2002
-
-
- HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
-
-
-Acknowledgement
-
- Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
- Internet Society.
-
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diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-transport-17.2.ps b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-transport-17.2.ps
deleted file mode 100644
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-( groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.) s
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-( Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months) s
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-( and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any) s
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-( time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference) s
-5 459 M
-( material or to cite them other than as "work in progress.") s
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-( The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://) s
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-( http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.) s
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-( This Internet-Draft will expire on March 31, 2004.) s
-5 349 M
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-( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2003\). All Rights Reserved.) s
-5 305 M
-(Abstract) s
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-( SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network) s
-5 272 M
-( services over an insecure network.) s
-5 250 M
-( This document describes the SSH transport layer protocol which) s
-5 239 M
-( typically runs on top of TCP/IP. The protocol can be used as a basis) s
-5 228 M
-( for a number of secure network services. It provides strong) s
-5 217 M
-( encryption, server authentication, and integrity protection. It may) s
-5 206 M
-( also provide compression.) s
-5 184 M
-( Key exchange method, public key algorithm, symmetric encryption) s
-5 173 M
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-( This document also describes the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method) s
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-( 3. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3) s
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-( 4. Connection Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3) s
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-( 4.1 Use over TCP/IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4) s
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-( 4.2 Protocol Version Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4) s
-5 536 M
-( 4.3 Compatibility With Old SSH Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . 4) s
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-( 4.3.1 Old Client, New Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5) s
-5 514 M
-( 4.3.2 New Client, Old Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5) s
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-( 5. Binary Packet Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5) s
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-( 5.1 Maximum Packet Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6) s
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-( 5.2 Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7) s
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-( 5.3 Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7) s
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-( 5.4 Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9) s
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-( 5.5 Key Exchange Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10) s
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-( 5.6 Public Key Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11) s
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-( 6. Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13) s
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-( 6.1 Algorithm Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13) s
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-( 6.2 Output from Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16) s
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-( 6.3 Taking Keys Into Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17) s
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-( 7. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18) s
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-( 7.1 diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19) s
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-( 8. Key Re-Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20) s
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-( 9. Service Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21) s
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-( 10. Additional Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21) s
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-( 10.1 Disconnection Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22) s
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-( 10.2 Ignored Data Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22) s
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-( 10.3 Debug Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23) s
-5 294 M
-( 10.4 Reserved Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23) s
-5 283 M
-( 11. Summary of Message Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23) s
-5 272 M
-( 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24) s
-5 261 M
-( 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24) s
-5 250 M
-( 14. Intellectual Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24) s
-5 239 M
-( 15. Additional Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24) s
-5 228 M
-( Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26) s
-5 217 M
-( Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25) s
-5 206 M
-( Informative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25) s
-5 195 M
-( A. Contibutors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27) s
-5 184 M
-( Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 28) s
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-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 2]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(1. Contributors) s
-5 668 M
-( The major original contributors of this document were: Tatu Ylonen,) s
-5 657 M
-( Tero Kivinen, Timo J. Rinne, Sami Lehtinen \(all of SSH Communications) s
-5 646 M
-( Security Corp\), and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen \(University of) s
-5 635 M
-( Jyvaskyla\)) s
-5 613 M
-( The document editor is: [email protected]. Comments on this) s
-5 602 M
-( internet draft should be sent to the IETF SECSH working group,) s
-5 591 M
-( details at: http://ietf.org/html.charters/secsh-charter.html) s
-5 569 M
-(2. Introduction) s
-5 547 M
-( The SSH transport layer is a secure low level transport protocol. It) s
-5 536 M
-( provides strong encryption, cryptographic host authentication, and) s
-5 525 M
-( integrity protection.) s
-5 503 M
-( Authentication in this protocol level is host-based; this protocol) s
-5 492 M
-( does not perform user authentication. A higher level protocol for) s
-5 481 M
-( user authentication can be designed on top of this protocol.) s
-5 459 M
-( The protocol has been designed to be simple, flexible, to allow) s
-5 448 M
-( parameter negotiation, and to minimize the number of round-trips.) s
-5 437 M
-( Key exchange method, public key algorithm, symmetric encryption) s
-5 426 M
-( algorithm, message authentication algorithm, and hash algorithm are) s
-5 415 M
-( all negotiated. It is expected that in most environments, only 2) s
-5 404 M
-( round-trips will be needed for full key exchange, server) s
-5 393 M
-( authentication, service request, and acceptance notification of) s
-5 382 M
-( service request. The worst case is 3 round-trips.) s
-5 360 M
-(3. Conventions Used in This Document) s
-5 338 M
-( The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",) s
-5 327 M
-( and "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as) s
-5 316 M
-( described in [RFC2119].) s
-5 294 M
-( The used data types and terminology are specified in the architecture) s
-5 283 M
-( document [SSH-ARCH].) s
-5 261 M
-( The architecture document also discusses the algorithm naming) s
-5 250 M
-( conventions that MUST be used with the SSH protocols.) s
-5 228 M
-(4. Connection Setup) s
-5 206 M
-( SSH works over any 8-bit clean, binary-transparent transport. The) s
-5 195 M
-( underlying transport SHOULD protect against transmission errors as) s
-5 184 M
-( such errors cause the SSH connection to terminate.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 3]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( The client initiates the connection.) s
-5 668 M
-(4.1 Use over TCP/IP) s
-5 646 M
-( When used over TCP/IP, the server normally listens for connections on) s
-5 635 M
-( port 22. This port number has been registered with the IANA, and has) s
-5 624 M
-( been officially assigned for SSH.) s
-5 602 M
-(4.2 Protocol Version Exchange) s
-5 580 M
-( When the connection has been established, both sides MUST send an) s
-5 569 M
-( identification string of the form "SSH-protoversion-softwareversion) s
-5 558 M
-( comments", followed by carriage return and newline characters \(ASCII) s
-5 547 M
-( 13 and 10, respectively\). Both sides MUST be able to process) s
-5 536 M
-( identification strings without carriage return character. No null) s
-5 525 M
-( character is sent. The maximum length of the string is 255) s
-5 514 M
-( characters, including the carriage return and newline.) s
-5 492 M
-( The part of the identification string preceding carriage return and) s
-5 481 M
-( newline is used in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange \(see Section) s
-5 470 M
-( Section 7\).) s
-5 448 M
-( The server MAY send other lines of data before sending the version) s
-5 437 M
-( string. Each line SHOULD be terminated by a carriage return and) s
-5 426 M
-( newline. Such lines MUST NOT begin with "SSH-", and SHOULD be) s
-5 415 M
-( encoded in ISO-10646 UTF-8 [RFC2279] \(language is not specified\).) s
-5 404 M
-( Clients MUST be able to process such lines; they MAY be silently) s
-5 393 M
-( ignored, or MAY be displayed to the client user; if they are) s
-5 382 M
-( displayed, control character filtering discussed in [SSH-ARCH] SHOULD) s
-5 371 M
-( be used. The primary use of this feature is to allow TCP-wrappers to) s
-5 360 M
-( display an error message before disconnecting.) s
-5 338 M
-( Version strings MUST consist of printable US-ASCII characters, not) s
-5 327 M
-( including whitespaces or a minus sign \(-\). The version string is) s
-5 316 M
-( primarily used to trigger compatibility extensions and to indicate) s
-5 305 M
-( the capabilities of an implementation. The comment string should) s
-5 294 M
-( contain additional information that might be useful in solving user) s
-5 283 M
-( problems.) s
-5 261 M
-( The protocol version described in this document is 2.0.) s
-5 239 M
-( Key exchange will begin immediately after sending this identifier.) s
-5 228 M
-( All packets following the identification string SHALL use the binary) s
-5 217 M
-( packet protocol, to be described below.) s
-5 195 M
-(4.3 Compatibility With Old SSH Versions) s
-5 173 M
-( During the transition period, it is important to be able to work in a) s
-5 129 M
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( way that is compatible with the installed SSH clients and servers) s
-5 679 M
-( that use an older version of the protocol. Information in this) s
-5 668 M
-( section is only relevant for implementations supporting compatibility) s
-5 657 M
-( with SSH versions 1.x. There is no standards track or informational) s
-5 646 M
-( draft available that defines the SSH 1.x protocol. The only known) s
-5 635 M
-( documentation of the 1.x protocol is contained in README files that) s
-5 624 M
-( are shipped along with the source code.) s
-5 602 M
-(4.3.1 Old Client, New Server) s
-5 580 M
-( Server implementations MAY support a configurable "compatibility") s
-5 569 M
-( flag that enables compatibility with old versions. When this flag is) s
-5 558 M
-( on, the server SHOULD identify its protocol version as "1.99".) s
-5 547 M
-( Clients using protocol 2.0 MUST be able to identify this as identical) s
-5 536 M
-( to "2.0". In this mode the server SHOULD NOT send the carriage) s
-5 525 M
-( return character \(ASCII 13\) after the version identification string.) s
-5 503 M
-( In the compatibility mode the server SHOULD NOT send any further data) s
-5 492 M
-( after its initialization string until it has received an) s
-5 481 M
-( identification string from the client. The server can then determine) s
-5 470 M
-( whether the client is using an old protocol, and can revert to the) s
-5 459 M
-( old protocol if required. In the compatibility mode, the server MUST) s
-5 448 M
-( NOT send additional data before the version string.) s
-5 426 M
-( When compatibility with old clients is not needed, the server MAY) s
-5 415 M
-( send its initial key exchange data immediately after the) s
-5 404 M
-( identification string.) s
-5 382 M
-(4.3.2 New Client, Old Server) s
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-( Since the new client MAY immediately send additional data after its) s
-5 349 M
-( identification string \(before receiving server's identification\), the) s
-5 338 M
-( old protocol may already have been corrupted when the client learns) s
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-( that the server is old. When this happens, the client SHOULD close) s
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-( the connection to the server, and reconnect using the old protocol.) s
-5 294 M
-(5. Binary Packet Protocol) s
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-( Each packet is in the following format:) s
-5 250 M
-( uint32 packet_length) s
-5 239 M
-( byte padding_length) s
-5 228 M
-( byte[n1] payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1) s
-5 217 M
-( byte[n2] random padding; n2 = padding_length) s
-5 206 M
-( byte[m] mac \(message authentication code\); m = mac_length) s
-5 184 M
-( packet_length) s
-5 129 M
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( The length of the packet \(bytes\), not including MAC or the) s
-5 679 M
-( packet_length field itself.) s
-5 657 M
-( padding_length) s
-5 646 M
-( Length of padding \(bytes\).) s
-5 624 M
-( payload) s
-5 613 M
-( The useful contents of the packet. If compression has been) s
-5 602 M
-( negotiated, this field is compressed. Initially, compression) s
-5 591 M
-( MUST be "none".) s
-5 569 M
-( random padding) s
-5 558 M
-( Arbitrary-length padding, such that the total length of) s
-5 547 M
-( \(packet_length || padding_length || payload || padding\) is a) s
-5 536 M
-( multiple of the cipher block size or 8, whichever is larger.) s
-5 525 M
-( There MUST be at least four bytes of padding. The padding) s
-5 514 M
-( SHOULD consist of random bytes. The maximum amount of padding) s
-5 503 M
-( is 255 bytes.) s
-5 481 M
-( mac) s
-5 470 M
-( Message authentication code. If message authentication has) s
-5 459 M
-( been negotiated, this field contains the MAC bytes. Initially,) s
-5 448 M
-( the MAC algorithm MUST be "none".) s
-5 415 M
-( Note that length of the concatenation of packet length, padding) s
-5 404 M
-( length, payload, and padding MUST be a multiple of the cipher block) s
-5 393 M
-( size or 8, whichever is larger. This constraint MUST be enforced) s
-5 382 M
-( even when using stream ciphers. Note that the packet length field is) s
-5 371 M
-( also encrypted, and processing it requires special care when sending) s
-5 360 M
-( or receiving packets.) s
-5 338 M
-( The minimum size of a packet is 16 \(or the cipher block size,) s
-5 327 M
-( whichever is larger\) bytes \(plus MAC\); implementations SHOULD decrypt) s
-5 316 M
-( the length after receiving the first 8 \(or cipher block size,) s
-5 305 M
-( whichever is larger\) bytes of a packet.) s
-5 283 M
-(5.1 Maximum Packet Length) s
-5 261 M
-( All implementations MUST be able to process packets with uncompressed) s
-5 250 M
-( payload length of 32768 bytes or less and total packet size of 35000) s
-5 239 M
-( bytes or less \(including length, padding length, payload, padding,) s
-5 228 M
-( and MAC.\). The maximum of 35000 bytes is an arbitrary chosen value) s
-5 217 M
-( larger than uncompressed size. Implementations SHOULD support longer) s
-5 206 M
-( packets, where they might be needed, e.g. if an implementation wants) s
-5 195 M
-( to send a very large number of certificates. Such packets MAY be) s
-5 184 M
-( sent if the version string indicates that the other party is able to) s
-5 173 M
-( process them. However, implementations SHOULD check that the packet) s
-5 129 M
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( length is reasonable for the implementation to avoid) s
-5 679 M
-( denial-of-service and/or buffer overflow attacks.) s
-5 657 M
-(5.2 Compression) s
-5 635 M
-( If compression has been negotiated, the payload field \(and only it\)) s
-5 624 M
-( will be compressed using the negotiated algorithm. The length field) s
-5 613 M
-( and MAC will be computed from the compressed payload. Encryption will) s
-5 602 M
-( be done after compression.) s
-5 580 M
-( Compression MAY be stateful, depending on the method. Compression) s
-5 569 M
-( MUST be independent for each direction, and implementations MUST) s
-5 558 M
-( allow independently choosing the algorithm for each direction.) s
-5 536 M
-( The following compression methods are currently defined:) s
-5 514 M
-( none REQUIRED no compression) s
-5 503 M
-( zlib OPTIONAL ZLIB \(LZ77\) compression) s
-5 481 M
-( The "zlib" compression is described in [RFC1950] and in [RFC1951].) s
-5 470 M
-( The compression context is initialized after each key exchange, and) s
-5 459 M
-( is passed from one packet to the next with only a partial flush being) s
-5 448 M
-( performed at the end of each packet. A partial flush means that the) s
-5 437 M
-( current compressed block is ended and all data will be output. If the) s
-5 426 M
-( current block is not a stored block, one or more empty blocks are) s
-5 415 M
-( added after the current block to ensure that there are at least 8) s
-5 404 M
-( bits counting from the start of the end-of-block code of the current) s
-5 393 M
-( block to the end of the packet payload.) s
-5 371 M
-( Additional methods may be defined as specified in [SSH-ARCH].) s
-5 349 M
-(5.3 Encryption) s
-5 327 M
-( An encryption algorithm and a key will be negotiated during the key) s
-5 316 M
-( exchange. When encryption is in effect, the packet length, padding) s
-5 305 M
-( length, payload and padding fields of each packet MUST be encrypted) s
-5 294 M
-( with the given algorithm.) s
-5 272 M
-( The encrypted data in all packets sent in one direction SHOULD be) s
-5 261 M
-( considered a single data stream. For example, initialization vectors) s
-5 250 M
-( SHOULD be passed from the end of one packet to the beginning of the) s
-5 239 M
-( next packet. All ciphers SHOULD use keys with an effective key length) s
-5 228 M
-( of 128 bits or more.) s
-5 206 M
-( The ciphers in each direction MUST run independently of each other,) s
-5 195 M
-( and implementations MUST allow independently choosing the algorithm) s
-5 184 M
-( for each direction \(if multiple algorithms are allowed by local) s
-5 173 M
-( policy\).) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( The following ciphers are currently defined:) s
-5 668 M
-( 3des-cbc REQUIRED three-key 3DES in CBC mode) s
-5 657 M
-( blowfish-cbc OPTIONALi Blowfish in CBC mode) s
-5 646 M
-( twofish256-cbc OPTIONAL Twofish in CBC mode,) s
-5 635 M
-( with 256-bit key) s
-5 624 M
-( twofish-cbc OPTIONAL alias for "twofish256-cbc" \(this) s
-5 613 M
-( is being retained for) s
-5 602 M
-( historical reasons\)) s
-5 591 M
-( twofish192-cbc OPTIONAL Twofish with 192-bit key) s
-5 580 M
-( twofish128-cbc OPTIONAL Twofish with 128-bit key) s
-5 569 M
-( aes256-cbc OPTIONAL AES \(Rijndael\) in CBC mode,) s
-5 558 M
-( with 256-bit key) s
-5 547 M
-( aes192-cbc OPTIONAL AES with 192-bit key) s
-5 536 M
-( aes128-cbc RECOMMENDED AES with 128-bit key) s
-5 525 M
-( serpent256-cbc OPTIONAL Serpent in CBC mode, with) s
-5 514 M
-( 256-bit key) s
-5 503 M
-( serpent192-cbc OPTIONAL Serpent with 192-bit key) s
-5 492 M
-( serpent128-cbc OPTIONAL Serpent with 128-bit key) s
-5 481 M
-( arcfour OPTIONAL the ARCFOUR stream cipher) s
-5 470 M
-( idea-cbc OPTIONAL IDEA in CBC mode) s
-5 459 M
-( cast128-cbc OPTIONAL CAST-128 in CBC mode) s
-5 448 M
-( none OPTIONAL no encryption; NOT RECOMMENDED) s
-5 426 M
-( The "3des-cbc" cipher is three-key triple-DES) s
-5 415 M
-( \(encrypt-decrypt-encrypt\), where the first 8 bytes of the key are) s
-5 404 M
-( used for the first encryption, the next 8 bytes for the decryption,) s
-5 393 M
-( and the following 8 bytes for the final encryption. This requires 24) s
-5 382 M
-( bytes of key data \(of which 168 bits are actually used\). To) s
-5 371 M
-( implement CBC mode, outer chaining MUST be used \(i.e., there is only) s
-5 360 M
-( one initialization vector\). This is a block cipher with 8 byte) s
-5 349 M
-( blocks. This algorithm is defined in [FIPS-46-3]) s
-5 327 M
-( The "blowfish-cbc" cipher is Blowfish in CBC mode, with 128 bit keys) s
-5 316 M
-( [SCHNEIER]. This is a block cipher with 8 byte blocks.) s
-5 294 M
-( The "twofish-cbc" or "twofish256-cbc" cipher is Twofish in CBC mode,) s
-5 283 M
-( with 256 bit keys as described [TWOFISH]. This is a block cipher with) s
-5 272 M
-( 16 byte blocks.) s
-5 250 M
-( The "twofish192-cbc" cipher. Same as above but with 192-bit key.) s
-5 228 M
-( The "twofish128-cbc" cipher. Same as above but with 128-bit key.) s
-5 206 M
-( The "aes256-cbc" cipher is AES \(Advanced Encryption Standard\)) s
-5 195 M
-( [FIPS-197], formerly Rijndael, in CBC mode. This version uses 256-bit) s
-5 184 M
-( key.) s
-5 129 M
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-userdict/PStoPSsaved save put
-PStoPSmatrix setmatrix
-595.000000 0.271378 translate
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-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 9 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( The "aes192-cbc" cipher. Same as above but with 192-bit key.) s
-5 668 M
-( The "aes128-cbc" cipher. Same as above but with 128-bit key.) s
-5 646 M
-( The "serpent256-cbc" cipher in CBC mode, with 256-bit key as) s
-5 635 M
-( described in the Serpent AES submission.) s
-5 613 M
-( The "serpent192-cbc" cipher. Same as above but with 192-bit key.) s
-5 591 M
-( The "serpent128-cbc" cipher. Same as above but with 128-bit key.) s
-5 569 M
-( The "arcfour" is the Arcfour stream cipher with 128 bit keys. The) s
-5 558 M
-( Arcfour cipher is believed to be compatible with the RC4 cipher) s
-5 547 M
-( [SCHNEIER]. RC4 is a registered trademark of RSA Data Security Inc.) s
-5 536 M
-( Arcfour \(and RC4\) has problems with weak keys, and should be used) s
-5 525 M
-( with caution.) s
-5 503 M
-( The "idea-cbc" cipher is the IDEA cipher in CBC mode [SCHNEIER].) s
-5 481 M
-( The "cast128-cbc" cipher is the CAST-128 cipher in CBC mode) s
-5 470 M
-( [RFC2144].) s
-5 448 M
-( The "none" algorithm specifies that no encryption is to be done.) s
-5 437 M
-( Note that this method provides no confidentiality protection, and it) s
-5 426 M
-( is not recommended. Some functionality \(e.g. password) s
-5 415 M
-( authentication\) may be disabled for security reasons if this cipher) s
-5 404 M
-( is chosen.) s
-5 382 M
-( Additional methods may be defined as specified in [SSH-ARCH].) s
-5 360 M
-(5.4 Data Integrity) s
-5 338 M
-( Data integrity is protected by including with each packet a message) s
-5 327 M
-( authentication code \(MAC\) that is computed from a shared secret,) s
-5 316 M
-( packet sequence number, and the contents of the packet.) s
-5 294 M
-( The message authentication algorithm and key are negotiated during) s
-5 283 M
-( key exchange. Initially, no MAC will be in effect, and its length) s
-5 272 M
-( MUST be zero. After key exchange, the selected MAC will be computed) s
-5 261 M
-( before encryption from the concatenation of packet data:) s
-5 239 M
-( mac = MAC\(key, sequence_number || unencrypted_packet\)) s
-5 217 M
-( where unencrypted_packet is the entire packet without MAC \(the length) s
-5 206 M
-( fields, payload and padding\), and sequence_number is an implicit) s
-5 195 M
-( packet sequence number represented as uint32. The sequence number is) s
-5 184 M
-( initialized to zero for the first packet, and is incremented after) s
-5 173 M
-( every packet \(regardless of whether encryption or MAC is in use\). It) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 9]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 10 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( is never reset, even if keys/algorithms are renegotiated later. It) s
-5 679 M
-( wraps around to zero after every 2^32 packets. The packet sequence) s
-5 668 M
-( number itself is not included in the packet sent over the wire.) s
-5 646 M
-( The MAC algorithms for each direction MUST run independently, and) s
-5 635 M
-( implementations MUST allow choosing the algorithm independently for) s
-5 624 M
-( both directions.) s
-5 602 M
-( The MAC bytes resulting from the MAC algorithm MUST be transmitted) s
-5 591 M
-( without encryption as the last part of the packet. The number of MAC) s
-5 580 M
-( bytes depends on the algorithm chosen.) s
-5 558 M
-( The following MAC algorithms are currently defined:) s
-5 536 M
-( hmac-sha1 REQUIRED HMAC-SHA1 \(digest length = key) s
-5 525 M
-( length = 20\)) s
-5 514 M
-( hmac-sha1-96 RECOMMENDED first 96 bits of HMAC-SHA1 \(digest) s
-5 503 M
-( length = 12, key length = 20\)) s
-5 492 M
-( hmac-md5 OPTIONAL HMAC-MD5 \(digest length = key) s
-5 481 M
-( length = 16\)) s
-5 470 M
-( hmac-md5-96 OPTIONAL first 96 bits of HMAC-MD5 \(digest) s
-5 459 M
-( length = 12, key length = 16\)) s
-5 448 M
-( none OPTIONAL no MAC; NOT RECOMMENDED) s
-5 426 M
-( Figure 1) s
-5 404 M
-( The "hmac-*" algorithms are described in [RFC2104] The "*-n" MACs use) s
-5 393 M
-( only the first n bits of the resulting value.) s
-5 371 M
-( The hash algorithms are described in [SCHNEIER].) s
-5 349 M
-( Additional methods may be defined as specified in [SSH-ARCH].) s
-5 327 M
-(5.5 Key Exchange Methods) s
-5 305 M
-( The key exchange method specifies how one-time session keys are) s
-5 294 M
-( generated for encryption and for authentication, and how the server) s
-5 283 M
-( authentication is done.) s
-5 261 M
-( Only one REQUIRED key exchange method has been defined:) s
-5 239 M
-( diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 REQUIRED) s
-5 217 M
-( This method is described later in this document.) s
-5 195 M
-( Additional methods may be defined as specified in [SSH-ARCH].) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 10]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 11 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(5.6 Public Key Algorithms) s
-5 668 M
-( This protocol has been designed to be able to operate with almost any) s
-5 657 M
-( public key format, encoding, and algorithm \(signature and/or) s
-5 646 M
-( encryption\).) s
-5 624 M
-( There are several aspects that define a public key type:) s
-5 613 M
-( o Key format: how is the key encoded and how are certificates) s
-5 602 M
-( represented. The key blobs in this protocol MAY contain) s
-5 591 M
-( certificates in addition to keys.) s
-5 580 M
-( o Signature and/or encryption algorithms. Some key types may not) s
-5 569 M
-( support both signing and encryption. Key usage may also be) s
-5 558 M
-( restricted by policy statements in e.g. certificates. In this) s
-5 547 M
-( case, different key types SHOULD be defined for the different) s
-5 536 M
-( policy alternatives.) s
-5 525 M
-( o Encoding of signatures and/or encrypted data. This includes but is) s
-5 514 M
-( not limited to padding, byte order, and data formats.) s
-5 492 M
-( The following public key and/or certificate formats are currently defined:) s
-5 470 M
-( ssh-dss REQUIRED sign Raw DSS Key) s
-5 459 M
-( ssh-rsa RECOMMENDED sign Raw RSA Key) s
-5 448 M
-( x509v3-sign-rsa OPTIONAL sign X.509 certificates \(RSA key\)) s
-5 437 M
-( x509v3-sign-dss OPTIONAL sign X.509 certificates \(DSS key\)) s
-5 426 M
-( spki-sign-rsa OPTIONAL sign SPKI certificates \(RSA key\)) s
-5 415 M
-( spki-sign-dss OPTIONAL sign SPKI certificates \(DSS key\)) s
-5 404 M
-( pgp-sign-rsa OPTIONAL sign OpenPGP certificates \(RSA key\)) s
-5 393 M
-( pgp-sign-dss OPTIONAL sign OpenPGP certificates \(DSS key\)) s
-5 371 M
-( Additional key types may be defined as specified in [SSH-ARCH].) s
-5 349 M
-( The key type MUST always be explicitly known \(from algorithm) s
-5 338 M
-( negotiation or some other source\). It is not normally included in) s
-5 327 M
-( the key blob.) s
-5 305 M
-( Certificates and public keys are encoded as follows:) s
-5 283 M
-( string certificate or public key format identifier) s
-5 272 M
-( byte[n] key/certificate data) s
-5 250 M
-( The certificate part may have be a zero length string, but a public) s
-5 239 M
-( key is required. This is the public key that will be used for) s
-5 228 M
-( authentication; the certificate sequence contained in the certificate) s
-5 217 M
-( blob can be used to provide authorization.) s
-5 195 M
-( Public key / certifcate formats that do not explicitly specify a) s
-5 184 M
-( signature format identifier MUST use the public key / certificate) s
-5 173 M
-( format identifier as the signature identifier.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 11]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 12 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( Signatures are encoded as follows:) s
-5 679 M
-( string signature format identifier \(as specified by the) s
-5 668 M
-( public key / cert format\)) s
-5 657 M
-( byte[n] signature blob in format specific encoding.) s
-5 624 M
-( The "ssh-dss" key format has the following specific encoding:) s
-5 602 M
-( string "ssh-dss") s
-5 591 M
-( mpint p) s
-5 580 M
-( mpint q) s
-5 569 M
-( mpint g) s
-5 558 M
-( mpint y) s
-5 536 M
-( Here the p, q, g, and y parameters form the signature key blob.) s
-5 514 M
-( Signing and verifying using this key format is done according to the) s
-5 503 M
-( Digital Signature Standard [FIPS-186] using the SHA-1 hash. A) s
-5 492 M
-( description can also be found in [SCHNEIER].) s
-5 470 M
-( The resulting signature is encoded as follows:) s
-5 448 M
-( string "ssh-dss") s
-5 437 M
-( string dss_signature_blob) s
-5 415 M
-( dss_signature_blob is encoded as a string containing r followed by s) s
-5 404 M
-( \(which are 160 bits long integers, without lengths or padding,) s
-5 393 M
-( unsigned and in network byte order\).) s
-5 371 M
-( The "ssh-rsa" key format has the following specific encoding:) s
-5 349 M
-( string "ssh-rsa") s
-5 338 M
-( mpint e) s
-5 327 M
-( mpint n) s
-5 305 M
-( Here the e and n parameters form the signature key blob.) s
-5 283 M
-( Signing and verifying using this key format is done according to) s
-5 272 M
-( [SCHNEIER] and [PKCS1] using the SHA-1 hash.) s
-5 250 M
-( The resulting signature is encoded as follows:) s
-5 228 M
-( string "ssh-rsa") s
-5 217 M
-( string rsa_signature_blob) s
-5 195 M
-( rsa_signature_blob is encoded as a string containing s \(which is an) s
-5 184 M
-( integer, without lengths or padding, unsigned and in network byte) s
-5 173 M
-( order\).) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 12]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 13 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( The "spki-sign-rsa" method indicates that the certificate blob) s
-5 679 M
-( contains a sequence of SPKI certificates. The format of SPKI) s
-5 668 M
-( certificates is described in [RFC2693]. This method indicates that) s
-5 657 M
-( the key \(or one of the keys in the certificate\) is an RSA-key.) s
-5 635 M
-( The "spki-sign-dss". As above, but indicates that the key \(or one of) s
-5 624 M
-( the keys in the certificate\) is a DSS-key.) s
-5 602 M
-( The "pgp-sign-rsa" method indicates the certificates, the public key,) s
-5 591 M
-( and the signature are in OpenPGP compatible binary format) s
-5 580 M
-( \([RFC2440]\). This method indicates that the key is an RSA-key.) s
-5 558 M
-( The "pgp-sign-dss". As above, but indicates that the key is a) s
-5 547 M
-( DSS-key.) s
-5 525 M
-(6. Key Exchange) s
-5 503 M
-( Key exchange begins by each side sending lists of supported) s
-5 492 M
-( algorithms. Each side has a preferred algorithm in each category, and) s
-5 481 M
-( it is assumed that most implementations at any given time will use) s
-5 470 M
-( the same preferred algorithm. Each side MAY guess which algorithm) s
-5 459 M
-( the other side is using, and MAY send an initial key exchange packet) s
-5 448 M
-( according to the algorithm if appropriate for the preferred method.) s
-5 426 M
-( Guess is considered wrong, if:) s
-5 415 M
-( o the kex algorithm and/or the host key algorithm is guessed wrong) s
-5 404 M
-( \(server and client have different preferred algorithm\), or) s
-5 393 M
-( o if any of the other algorithms cannot be agreed upon \(the) s
-5 382 M
-( procedure is defined below in Section Section 6.1\).) s
-5 360 M
-( Otherwise, the guess is considered to be right and the optimistically) s
-5 349 M
-( sent packet MUST be handled as the first key exchange packet.) s
-5 327 M
-( However, if the guess was wrong, and a packet was optimistically sent) s
-5 316 M
-( by one or both parties, such packets MUST be ignored \(even if the) s
-5 305 M
-( error in the guess would not affect the contents of the initial) s
-5 294 M
-( packet\(s\)\), and the appropriate side MUST send the correct initial) s
-5 283 M
-( packet.) s
-5 261 M
-( Server authentication in the key exchange MAY be implicit. After a) s
-5 250 M
-( key exchange with implicit server authentication, the client MUST) s
-5 239 M
-( wait for response to its service request message before sending any) s
-5 228 M
-( further data.) s
-5 206 M
-(6.1 Algorithm Negotiation) s
-5 184 M
-( Key exchange begins by each side sending the following packet:) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 13]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 14 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_KEXINIT) s
-5 679 M
-( byte[16] cookie \(random bytes\)) s
-5 668 M
-( string kex_algorithms) s
-5 657 M
-( string server_host_key_algorithms) s
-5 646 M
-( string encryption_algorithms_client_to_server) s
-5 635 M
-( string encryption_algorithms_server_to_client) s
-5 624 M
-( string mac_algorithms_client_to_server) s
-5 613 M
-( string mac_algorithms_server_to_client) s
-5 602 M
-( string compression_algorithms_client_to_server) s
-5 591 M
-( string compression_algorithms_server_to_client) s
-5 580 M
-( string languages_client_to_server) s
-5 569 M
-( string languages_server_to_client) s
-5 558 M
-( boolean first_kex_packet_follows) s
-5 547 M
-( uint32 0 \(reserved for future extension\)) s
-5 525 M
-( Each of the algorithm strings MUST be a comma-separated list of) s
-5 514 M
-( algorithm names \(see ''Algorithm Naming'' in [SSH-ARCH]\). Each) s
-5 503 M
-( supported \(allowed\) algorithm MUST be listed in order of preference.) s
-5 481 M
-( The first algorithm in each list MUST be the preferred \(guessed\)) s
-5 470 M
-( algorithm. Each string MUST contain at least one algorithm name.) s
-5 437 M
-( cookie) s
-5 426 M
-( The cookie MUST be a random value generated by the sender. Its) s
-5 415 M
-( purpose is to make it impossible for either side to fully) s
-5 404 M
-( determine the keys and the session identifier.) s
-5 382 M
-( kex_algorithms) s
-5 371 M
-( Key exchange algorithms were defined above. The first) s
-5 360 M
-( algorithm MUST be the preferred \(and guessed\) algorithm. If) s
-5 349 M
-( both sides make the same guess, that algorithm MUST be used.) s
-5 338 M
-( Otherwise, the following algorithm MUST be used to choose a key) s
-5 327 M
-( exchange method: iterate over client's kex algorithms, one at a) s
-5 316 M
-( time. Choose the first algorithm that satisfies the following) s
-5 305 M
-( conditions:) s
-5 294 M
-( + the server also supports the algorithm,) s
-5 283 M
-( + if the algorithm requires an encryption-capable host key,) s
-5 272 M
-( there is an encryption-capable algorithm on the server's) s
-5 261 M
-( server_host_key_algorithms that is also supported by the) s
-5 250 M
-( client, and) s
-5 239 M
-( + if the algorithm requires a signature-capable host key,) s
-5 228 M
-( there is a signature-capable algorithm on the server's) s
-5 217 M
-( server_host_key_algorithms that is also supported by the) s
-5 206 M
-( client.) s
-5 195 M
-( + If no algorithm satisfying all these conditions can be) s
-5 184 M
-( found, the connection fails, and both sides MUST disconnect.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 14]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
-75 0 translate
-/pagenum 15 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( server_host_key_algorithms) s
-5 679 M
-( List of the algorithms supported for the server host key. The) s
-5 668 M
-( server lists the algorithms for which it has host keys; the) s
-5 657 M
-( client lists the algorithms that it is willing to accept.) s
-5 646 M
-( \(There MAY be multiple host keys for a host, possibly with) s
-5 635 M
-( different algorithms.\)) s
-5 613 M
-( Some host keys may not support both signatures and encryption) s
-5 602 M
-( \(this can be determined from the algorithm\), and thus not all) s
-5 591 M
-( host keys are valid for all key exchange methods.) s
-5 569 M
-( Algorithm selection depends on whether the chosen key exchange) s
-5 558 M
-( algorithm requires a signature or encryption capable host key.) s
-5 547 M
-( It MUST be possible to determine this from the public key) s
-5 536 M
-( algorithm name. The first algorithm on the client's list that) s
-5 525 M
-( satisfies the requirements and is also supported by the server) s
-5 514 M
-( MUST be chosen. If there is no such algorithm, both sides MUST) s
-5 503 M
-( disconnect.) s
-5 481 M
-( encryption_algorithms) s
-5 470 M
-( Lists the acceptable symmetric encryption algorithms in order) s
-5 459 M
-( of preference. The chosen encryption algorithm to each) s
-5 448 M
-( direction MUST be the first algorithm on the client's list) s
-5 437 M
-( that is also on the server's list. If there is no such) s
-5 426 M
-( algorithm, both sides MUST disconnect.) s
-5 404 M
-( Note that "none" must be explicitly listed if it is to be) s
-5 393 M
-( acceptable. The defined algorithm names are listed in Section) s
-5 382 M
-( Section 5.3.) s
-5 360 M
-( mac_algorithms) s
-5 349 M
-( Lists the acceptable MAC algorithms in order of preference.) s
-5 338 M
-( The chosen MAC algorithm MUST be the first algorithm on the) s
-5 327 M
-( client's list that is also on the server's list. If there is) s
-5 316 M
-( no such algorithm, both sides MUST disconnect.) s
-5 294 M
-( Note that "none" must be explicitly listed if it is to be) s
-5 283 M
-( acceptable. The MAC algorithm names are listed in Section) s
-5 272 M
-( Figure 1.) s
-5 250 M
-( compression_algorithms) s
-5 239 M
-( Lists the acceptable compression algorithms in order of) s
-5 228 M
-( preference. The chosen compression algorithm MUST be the first) s
-5 217 M
-( algorithm on the client's list that is also on the server's) s
-5 206 M
-( list. If there is no such algorithm, both sides MUST) s
-5 195 M
-( disconnect.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 15]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
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- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
-_S
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-/pagenum 16 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
-/user_header_p false def
-%%EndPageSetup
-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( Note that "none" must be explicitly listed if it is to be) s
-5 679 M
-( acceptable. The compression algorithm names are listed in) s
-5 668 M
-( Section Section 5.2.) s
-5 646 M
-( languages) s
-5 635 M
-( This is a comma-separated list of language tags in order of) s
-5 624 M
-( preference [RFC3066]. Both parties MAY ignore this list. If) s
-5 613 M
-( there are no language preferences, this list SHOULD be empty.) s
-5 602 M
-( Language tags SHOULD NOT be present unless they are known to be) s
-5 591 M
-( needed by the sending party.) s
-5 569 M
-( first_kex_packet_follows) s
-5 558 M
-( Indicates whether a guessed key exchange packet follows. If a) s
-5 547 M
-( guessed packet will be sent, this MUST be TRUE. If no guessed) s
-5 536 M
-( packet will be sent, this MUST be FALSE.) s
-5 514 M
-( After receiving the SSH_MSG_KEXINIT packet from the other side,) s
-5 503 M
-( each party will know whether their guess was right. If the) s
-5 492 M
-( other party's guess was wrong, and this field was TRUE, the) s
-5 481 M
-( next packet MUST be silently ignored, and both sides MUST then) s
-5 470 M
-( act as determined by the negotiated key exchange method. If) s
-5 459 M
-( the guess was right, key exchange MUST continue using the) s
-5 448 M
-( guessed packet.) s
-5 426 M
-( After the KEXINIT packet exchange, the key exchange algorithm is run.) s
-5 415 M
-( It may involve several packet exchanges, as specified by the key) s
-5 404 M
-( exchange method.) s
-5 382 M
-(6.2 Output from Key Exchange) s
-5 360 M
-( The key exchange produces two values: a shared secret K, and an) s
-5 349 M
-( exchange hash H. Encryption and authentication keys are derived from) s
-5 338 M
-( these. The exchange hash H from the first key exchange is) s
-5 327 M
-( additionally used as the session identifier, which is a unique) s
-5 316 M
-( identifier for this connection. It is used by authentication methods) s
-5 305 M
-( as a part of the data that is signed as a proof of possession of a) s
-5 294 M
-( private key. Once computed, the session identifier is not changed,) s
-5 283 M
-( even if keys are later re-exchanged.) s
-5 250 M
-( Each key exchange method specifies a hash function that is used in) s
-5 239 M
-( the key exchange. The same hash algorithm MUST be used in key) s
-5 228 M
-( derivation. Here, we'll call it HASH.) s
-5 195 M
-( Encryption keys MUST be computed as HASH of a known value and K as) s
-5 184 M
-( follows:) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 16]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
- 595.000000 0 rlineto 0 842.000000 rlineto -595.000000 0 rlineto
- closepath}put initclip
-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( o Initial IV client to server: HASH\(K || H || "A" || session_id\)) s
-5 679 M
-( \(Here K is encoded as mpint and "A" as byte and session_id as raw) s
-5 668 M
-( data."A" means the single character A, ASCII 65\).) s
-5 657 M
-( o Initial IV server to client: HASH\(K || H || "B" || session_id\)) s
-5 646 M
-( o Encryption key client to server: HASH\(K || H || "C" || session_id\)) s
-5 635 M
-( o Encryption key server to client: HASH\(K || H || "D" || session_id\)) s
-5 624 M
-( o Integrity key client to server: HASH\(K || H || "E" || session_id\)) s
-5 613 M
-( o Integrity key server to client: HASH\(K || H || "F" || session_id\)) s
-5 591 M
-( Key data MUST be taken from the beginning of the hash output. 128) s
-5 580 M
-( bits \(16 bytes\) MUST be used for algorithms with variable-length) s
-5 569 M
-( keys. The only variable key length algorithm defined in this document) s
-5 558 M
-( is arcfour\). For other algorithms, as many bytes as are needed are) s
-5 547 M
-( taken from the beginning of the hash value. If the key length needed) s
-5 536 M
-( is longer than the output of the HASH, the key is extended by) s
-5 525 M
-( computing HASH of the concatenation of K and H and the entire key so) s
-5 514 M
-( far, and appending the resulting bytes \(as many as HASH generates\) to) s
-5 503 M
-( the key. This process is repeated until enough key material is) s
-5 492 M
-( available; the key is taken from the beginning of this value. In) s
-5 481 M
-( other words:) s
-5 459 M
-( K1 = HASH\(K || H || X || session_id\) \(X is e.g. "A"\)) s
-5 448 M
-( K2 = HASH\(K || H || K1\)) s
-5 437 M
-( K3 = HASH\(K || H || K1 || K2\)) s
-5 426 M
-( ...) s
-5 415 M
-( key = K1 || K2 || K3 || ...) s
-5 393 M
-( This process will lose entropy if the amount of entropy in K is) s
-5 382 M
-( larger than the internal state size of HASH.) s
-5 360 M
-(6.3 Taking Keys Into Use) s
-5 338 M
-( Key exchange ends by each side sending an SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS message.) s
-5 327 M
-( This message is sent with the old keys and algorithms. All messages) s
-5 316 M
-( sent after this message MUST use the new keys and algorithms.) s
-5 283 M
-( When this message is received, the new keys and algorithms MUST be) s
-5 272 M
-( taken into use for receiving.) s
-5 239 M
-( This message is the only valid message after key exchange, in) s
-5 228 M
-( addition to SSH_MSG_DEBUG, SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT and SSH_MSG_IGNORE) s
-5 217 M
-( messages. The purpose of this message is to ensure that a party is) s
-5 206 M
-( able to respond with a disconnect message that the other party can) s
-5 195 M
-( understand if something goes wrong with the key exchange.) s
-5 184 M
-( Implementations MUST NOT accept any other messages after key exchange) s
-5 173 M
-( before receiving SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 17]) s
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-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/pagenum 18 def
-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS) s
-5 657 M
-(7. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange) s
-5 635 M
-( The Diffie-Hellman key exchange provides a shared secret that can not) s
-5 624 M
-( be determined by either party alone. The key exchange is combined) s
-5 613 M
-( with a signature with the host key to provide host authentication.) s
-5 580 M
-( In the following description \(C is the client, S is the server; p is) s
-5 569 M
-( a large safe prime, g is a generator for a subgroup of GF\(p\), and q) s
-5 558 M
-( is the order of the subgroup; V_S is S's version string; V_C is C's) s
-5 547 M
-( version string; K_S is S's public host key; I_C is C's KEXINIT) s
-5 536 M
-( message and I_S S's KEXINIT message which have been exchanged before) s
-5 525 M
-( this part begins\):) s
-5 492 M
-( 1. C generates a random number x \(1 < x < q\) and computes e = g^x) s
-5 481 M
-( mod p. C sends "e" to S.) s
-5 459 M
-( 2. S generates a random number y \(0 < y < q\) and computes f = g^y) s
-5 448 M
-( mod p. S receives "e". It computes K = e^y mod p, H = hash\(V_C) s
-5 437 M
-( || V_S || I_C || I_S || K_S || e || f || K\) \(these elements are) s
-5 426 M
-( encoded according to their types; see below\), and signature s on) s
-5 415 M
-( H with its private host key. S sends "K_S || f || s" to C. The) s
-5 404 M
-( signing operation may involve a second hashing operation.) s
-5 382 M
-( 3. C verifies that K_S really is the host key for S \(e.g. using) s
-5 371 M
-( certificates or a local database\). C is also allowed to accept) s
-5 360 M
-( the key without verification; however, doing so will render the) s
-5 349 M
-( protocol insecure against active attacks \(but may be desirable) s
-5 338 M
-( for practical reasons in the short term in many environments\). C) s
-5 327 M
-( then computes K = f^x mod p, H = hash\(V_C || V_S || I_C || I_S ||) s
-5 316 M
-( K_S || e || f || K\), and verifies the signature s on H.) s
-5 294 M
-( Either side MUST NOT send or accept e or f values that are not in the) s
-5 283 M
-( range [1, p-1]. If this condition is violated, the key exchange) s
-5 272 M
-( fails.) s
-5 239 M
-( This is implemented with the following messages. The hash algorithm) s
-5 228 M
-( for computing the exchange hash is defined by the method name, and is) s
-5 217 M
-( called HASH. The public key algorithm for signing is negotiated with) s
-5 206 M
-( the KEXINIT messages.) s
-5 184 M
-( First, the client sends the following:) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 18]) s
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-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT) s
-5 679 M
-( mpint e) s
-5 646 M
-( The server responds with the following:) s
-5 624 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY) s
-5 613 M
-( string server public host key and certificates \(K_S\)) s
-5 602 M
-( mpint f) s
-5 591 M
-( string signature of H) s
-5 569 M
-( The hash H is computed as the HASH hash of the concatenation of the) s
-5 558 M
-( following:) s
-5 536 M
-( string V_C, the client's version string \(CR and NL excluded\)) s
-5 525 M
-( string V_S, the server's version string \(CR and NL excluded\)) s
-5 514 M
-( string I_C, the payload of the client's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT) s
-5 503 M
-( string I_S, the payload of the server's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT) s
-5 492 M
-( string K_S, the host key) s
-5 481 M
-( mpint e, exchange value sent by the client) s
-5 470 M
-( mpint f, exchange value sent by the server) s
-5 459 M
-( mpint K, the shared secret) s
-5 437 M
-( This value is called the exchange hash, and it is used to) s
-5 426 M
-( authenticate the key exchange. The exchange hash SHOULD be kept) s
-5 415 M
-( secret.) s
-5 382 M
-( The signature algorithm MUST be applied over H, not the original) s
-5 371 M
-( data. Most signature algorithms include hashing and additional) s
-5 360 M
-( padding. For example, "ssh-dss" specifies SHA-1 hashing; in that) s
-5 349 M
-( case, the data is first hashed with HASH to compute H, and H is then) s
-5 338 M
-( hashed with SHA-1 as part of the signing operation.) s
-5 316 M
-(7.1 diffie-hellman-group1-sha1) s
-5 294 M
-( The "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" method specifies Diffie-Hellman key) s
-5 283 M
-( exchange with SHA-1 as HASH, and Oakley group 14 [RFC3526] \(2048-bit) s
-5 272 M
-( MODP Group\). It is included below in hexadecimal and decimal.) s
-5 250 M
-( The prime p is equal to 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * floor\( 2^894 Pi +) s
-5 239 M
-( 129093 \). Its hexadecimal value is:) s
-5 217 M
-( FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1) s
-5 206 M
-( 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD) s
-5 195 M
-( EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245) s
-5 184 M
-( E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED) s
-5 173 M
-( EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 19]) s
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-userdict/PStoPSmatrix matrix currentmatrix put
-userdict/PStoPSclip{0 0 moveto
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- closepath}put initclip
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/pagenum 20 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
-/ftail () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF.) s
-5 668 M
-( In decimal, this value is:) s
-5 646 M
-( 179769313486231590770839156793787453197860296048756011706444) s
-5 635 M
-( 423684197180216158519368947833795864925541502180565485980503) s
-5 624 M
-( 646440548199239100050792877003355816639229553136239076508735) s
-5 613 M
-( 759914822574862575007425302077447712589550957937778424442426) s
-5 602 M
-( 617334727629299387668709205606050270810842907692932019128194) s
-5 591 M
-( 467627007.) s
-5 569 M
-( The generator used with this prime is g = 2. The group order q is \(p) s
-5 558 M
-( - 1\) / 2.) s
-5 536 M
-(8. Key Re-Exchange) s
-5 514 M
-( Key re-exchange is started by sending an SSH_MSG_KEXINIT packet when) s
-5 503 M
-( not already doing a key exchange \(as described in Section Section) s
-5 492 M
-( 6.1\). When this message is received, a party MUST respond with its) s
-5 481 M
-( own SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message except when the received SSH_MSG_KEXINIT) s
-5 470 M
-( already was a reply. Either party MAY initiate the re-exchange, but) s
-5 459 M
-( roles MUST NOT be changed \(i.e., the server remains the server, and) s
-5 448 M
-( the client remains the client\).) s
-5 415 M
-( Key re-exchange is performed using whatever encryption was in effect) s
-5 404 M
-( when the exchange was started. Encryption, compression, and MAC) s
-5 393 M
-( methods are not changed before a new SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS is sent after) s
-5 382 M
-( the key exchange \(as in the initial key exchange\). Re-exchange is) s
-5 371 M
-( processed identically to the initial key exchange, except for the) s
-5 360 M
-( session identifier that will remain unchanged. It is permissible to) s
-5 349 M
-( change some or all of the algorithms during the re-exchange. Host) s
-5 338 M
-( keys can also change. All keys and initialization vectors are) s
-5 327 M
-( recomputed after the exchange. Compression and encryption contexts) s
-5 316 M
-( are reset.) s
-5 283 M
-( It is recommended that the keys are changed after each gigabyte of) s
-5 272 M
-( transmitted data or after each hour of connection time, whichever) s
-5 261 M
-( comes sooner. However, since the re-exchange is a public key) s
-5 250 M
-( operation, it requires a fair amount of processing power and should) s
-5 239 M
-( not be performed too often.) s
-5 206 M
-( More application data may be sent after the SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS packet) s
-5 195 M
-( has been sent; key exchange does not affect the protocols that lie) s
-5 184 M
-( above the SSH transport layer.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 20]) s
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-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/pagenum 21 def
-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(9. Service Request) s
-5 668 M
-( After the key exchange, the client requests a service. The service is) s
-5 657 M
-( identified by a name. The format of names and procedures for defining) s
-5 646 M
-( new names are defined in [SSH-ARCH].) s
-5 613 M
-( Currently, the following names have been reserved:) s
-5 591 M
-( ssh-userauth) s
-5 580 M
-( ssh-connection) s
-5 558 M
-( Similar local naming policy is applied to the service names, as is) s
-5 547 M
-( applied to the algorithm names; a local service should use the) s
-5 536 M
-( "servicename@domain" syntax.) s
-5 514 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST) s
-5 503 M
-( string service name) s
-5 481 M
-( If the server rejects the service request, it SHOULD send an) s
-5 470 M
-( appropriate SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT message and MUST disconnect.) s
-5 437 M
-( When the service starts, it may have access to the session identifier) s
-5 426 M
-( generated during the key exchange.) s
-5 393 M
-( If the server supports the service \(and permits the client to use) s
-5 382 M
-( it\), it MUST respond with the following:) s
-5 360 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) s
-5 349 M
-( string service name) s
-5 327 M
-( Message numbers used by services should be in the area reserved for) s
-5 316 M
-( them \(see Section 6 in [SSH-ARCH]\). The transport level will) s
-5 305 M
-( continue to process its own messages.) s
-5 272 M
-( Note that after a key exchange with implicit server authentication,) s
-5 261 M
-( the client MUST wait for response to its service request message) s
-5 250 M
-( before sending any further data.) s
-5 228 M
-(10. Additional Messages) s
-5 206 M
-( Either party may send any of the following messages at any time.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 21]) s
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-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/fname () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(10.1 Disconnection Message) s
-5 668 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT) s
-5 657 M
-( uint32 reason code) s
-5 646 M
-( string description [RFC2279]) s
-5 635 M
-( string language tag [RFC3066]) s
-5 613 M
-( This message causes immediate termination of the connection. All) s
-5 602 M
-( implementations MUST be able to process this message; they SHOULD be) s
-5 591 M
-( able to send this message.) s
-5 569 M
-( The sender MUST NOT send or receive any data after this message, and) s
-5 558 M
-( the recipient MUST NOT accept any data after receiving this message.) s
-5 547 M
-( The description field gives a more specific explanation in a) s
-5 536 M
-( human-readable form. The error code gives the reason in a more) s
-5 525 M
-( machine-readable format \(suitable for localization\), and can have the) s
-5 514 M
-( following values:) s
-5 492 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1) s
-5 481 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2) s
-5 470 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3) s
-5 459 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_RESERVED 4) s
-5 448 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5) s
-5 437 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6) s
-5 426 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7) s
-5 415 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8) s
-5 404 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9) s
-5 393 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10) s
-5 382 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11) s
-5 371 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12) s
-5 360 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13) s
-5 349 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14) s
-5 338 M
-( #define SSH_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15) s
-5 316 M
-( If the description string is displayed, control character filtering) s
-5 305 M
-( discussed in [SSH-ARCH] should be used to avoid attacks by sending) s
-5 294 M
-( terminal control characters.) s
-5 272 M
-(10.2 Ignored Data Message) s
-5 250 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE) s
-5 239 M
-( string data) s
-5 217 M
-( All implementations MUST understand \(and ignore\) this message at any) s
-5 206 M
-( time \(after receiving the protocol version\). No implementation is) s
-5 195 M
-( required to send them. This message can be used as an additional) s
-5 184 M
-( protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 22]) s
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-/showpage{}def/copypage{}def/erasepage{}def
-PStoPSxform concat
-%%BeginPageSetup
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-/pagenum 23 def
-/fname () def
-/fdir () def
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(10.3 Debug Message) s
-5 668 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_DEBUG) s
-5 657 M
-( boolean always_display) s
-5 646 M
-( string message [RFC2279]) s
-5 635 M
-( string language tag [RFC3066]) s
-5 613 M
-( All implementations MUST understand this message, but they are) s
-5 602 M
-( allowed to ignore it. This message is used to pass the other side) s
-5 591 M
-( information that may help debugging. If always_display is TRUE, the) s
-5 580 M
-( message SHOULD be displayed. Otherwise, it SHOULD NOT be displayed) s
-5 569 M
-( unless debugging information has been explicitly requested by the) s
-5 558 M
-( user.) s
-5 525 M
-( The message doesn't need to contain a newline. It is, however,) s
-5 514 M
-( allowed to consist of multiple lines separated by CRLF \(Carriage) s
-5 503 M
-( Return - Line Feed\) pairs.) s
-5 470 M
-( If the message string is displayed, terminal control character) s
-5 459 M
-( filtering discussed in [SSH-ARCH] should be used to avoid attacks by) s
-5 448 M
-( sending terminal control characters.) s
-5 426 M
-(10.4 Reserved Messages) s
-5 404 M
-( An implementation MUST respond to all unrecognized messages with an) s
-5 393 M
-( SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED message in the order in which the messages were) s
-5 382 M
-( received. Such messages MUST be otherwise ignored. Later protocol) s
-5 371 M
-( versions may define other meanings for these message types.) s
-5 349 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED) s
-5 338 M
-( uint32 packet sequence number of rejected message) s
-5 305 M
-(11. Summary of Message Numbers) s
-5 283 M
-( The following message numbers have been defined in this protocol:) s
-5 261 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT 1) s
-5 250 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_IGNORE 2) s
-5 239 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3) s
-5 228 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_DEBUG 4) s
-5 217 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5) s
-5 206 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6) s
-5 184 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_KEXINIT 20) s
-5 173 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS 21) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
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-( /* Numbers 30-49 used for kex packets.) s
-5 679 M
-( Different kex methods may reuse message numbers in) s
-5 668 M
-( this range. */) s
-5 646 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30) s
-5 635 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31) s
-5 602 M
-(12. IANA Considerations) s
-5 580 M
-( This document is part of a set, the IANA considerations for the SSH) s
-5 569 M
-( protocol as defined in [SSH-ARCH], [SSH-TRANS], [SSH-USERAUTH],) s
-5 558 M
-( [SSH-CONNECT] are detailed in [SSH-NUMBERS].) s
-5 536 M
-(13. Security Considerations) s
-5 514 M
-( This protocol provides a secure encrypted channel over an insecure) s
-5 503 M
-( network. It performs server host authentication, key exchange,) s
-5 492 M
-( encryption, and integrity protection. It also derives a unique) s
-5 481 M
-( session id that may be used by higher-level protocols.) s
-5 459 M
-( Full security considerations for this protocol are provided in) s
-5 448 M
-( Section 8 of [SSH-ARCH]) s
-5 426 M
-(14. Intellectual Property) s
-5 404 M
-( The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any) s
-5 393 M
-( intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to) s
-5 382 M
-( pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in) s
-5 371 M
-( this document or the extent to which any license under such rights) s
-5 360 M
-( might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it) s
-5 349 M
-( has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the) s
-5 338 M
-( IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and) s
-5 327 M
-( standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of) s
-5 316 M
-( claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of) s
-5 305 M
-( licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to) s
-5 294 M
-( obtain a general license or permission for the use of such) s
-5 283 M
-( proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can) s
-5 272 M
-( be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.) s
-5 250 M
-( The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in) s
-5 239 M
-( regard to some or all of the specification contained in this) s
-5 228 M
-( document. For more information consult the online list of claimed) s
-5 217 M
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-5 195 M
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-5 173 M
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
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-5 679 M
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-5 657 M
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-5 635 M
-( [SSH-ARCH]) s
-5 624 M
-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Protocol Architecture", I-D) s
-5 613 M
-( draft-ietf-architecture-15.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 591 M
-( [SSH-TRANS]) s
-5 580 M
-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Transport Layer Protocol", I-D) s
-5 569 M
-( draft-ietf-transport-17.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 547 M
-( [SSH-USERAUTH]) s
-5 536 M
-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Authentication Protocol", I-D) s
-5 525 M
-( draft-ietf-userauth-18.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 503 M
-( [SSH-CONNECT]) s
-5 492 M
-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Connection Protocol", I-D) s
-5 481 M
-( draft-ietf-connect-18.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 459 M
-( [SSH-NUMBERS]) s
-5 448 M
-( Lehtinen, S. and D. Moffat, "SSH Protocol Assigned) s
-5 437 M
-( Numbers", I-D draft-ietf-secsh-assignednumbers-05.txt, Oct) s
-5 426 M
-( 2003.) s
-5 404 M
-( [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate) s
-5 393 M
-( Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.) s
-5 371 M
-(Informative) s
-5 349 M
-( [FIPS-186]) s
-5 338 M
-( Federal Information Processing Standards Publication,) s
-5 327 M
-( "FIPS PUB 186, Digital Signature Standard", May 1994.) s
-5 305 M
-( [FIPS-197]) s
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-( NIST, "FIPS PUB 197 Advanced Encryption Standard \(AES\)",) s
-5 283 M
-( November 2001.) s
-5 261 M
-( [FIPS-46-3]) s
-5 250 M
-( U.S. Dept. of Commerce, "FIPS PUB 46-3, Data Encryption) s
-5 239 M
-( Standard \(DES\)", October 1999.) s
-5 217 M
-( [RFC2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, T. and D. Solo, "Internet) s
-5 206 M
-( X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL) s
-5 195 M
-( Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-( STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.) s
-5 668 M
-( [RFC3066] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of) s
-5 657 M
-( Languages", BCP 47, RFC 3066, January 2001.) s
-5 635 M
-( [RFC1950] Deutsch, L. and J-L. Gailly, "ZLIB Compressed Data Format) s
-5 624 M
-( Specification version 3.3", RFC 1950, May 1996.) s
-5 602 M
-( [RFC1951] Deutsch, P., "DEFLATE Compressed Data Format Specification) s
-5 591 M
-( version 1.3", RFC 1951, May 1996.) s
-5 569 M
-( [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO) s
-5 558 M
-( 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.) s
-5 536 M
-( [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC:) s
-5 525 M
-( Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,) s
-5 514 M
-( February 1997.) s
-5 492 M
-( [RFC2144] Adams, C., "The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm", RFC 2144,) s
-5 481 M
-( May 1997.) s
-5 459 M
-( [RFC2440] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H. and R. Thayer,) s
-5 448 M
-( "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440, November 1998.) s
-5 426 M
-( [RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas,) s
-5 415 M
-( B. and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,) s
-5 404 M
-( September 1999.) s
-5 382 M
-( [RFC3526] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential \(MODP\)) s
-5 371 M
-( Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange \(IKE\)",) s
-5 360 M
-( RFC 3526, May 2003.) s
-5 338 M
-( [SCHNEIER]) s
-5 327 M
-( Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition:) s
-5 316 M
-( protocols algorithms and source in code in C", 1996.) s
-5 294 M
-( [TWOFISH] Schneier, B., "The Twofish Encryptions Algorithm: A) s
-5 283 M
-( 128-Bit Block Cipher, 1st Edition", March 1999.) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(Authors' Addresses) s
-5 668 M
-( Tatu Ylonen) s
-5 657 M
-( SSH Communications Security Corp) s
-5 646 M
-( Fredrikinkatu 42) s
-5 635 M
-( HELSINKI FIN-00100) s
-5 624 M
-( Finland) s
-5 602 M
-( EMail: [email protected]) s
-5 569 M
-( Darren J. Moffat \(editor\)) s
-5 558 M
-( Sun Microsystems, Inc) s
-5 547 M
-( 17 Network Circle) s
-5 536 M
-( Menlo Park 95025) s
-5 525 M
-( USA) s
-5 503 M
-( EMail: [email protected]) s
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-(Appendix A. Contibutors) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
-5 690 M
-(Intellectual Property Statement) s
-5 668 M
-( The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any) s
-5 657 M
-( intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to) s
-5 646 M
-( pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in) s
-5 635 M
-( this document or the extent to which any license under such rights) s
-5 624 M
-( might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it) s
-5 613 M
-( has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the) s
-5 602 M
-( IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and) s
-5 591 M
-( standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of) s
-5 580 M
-( claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of) s
-5 569 M
-( licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to) s
-5 558 M
-( obtain a general license or permission for the use of such) s
-5 547 M
-( proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can) s
-5 536 M
-( be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.) s
-5 514 M
-( The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any) s
-5 503 M
-( copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary) s
-5 492 M
-( rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice) s
-5 481 M
-( this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive) s
-5 470 M
-( Director.) s
-5 448 M
-( The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in) s
-5 437 M
-( regard to some or all of the specification contained in this) s
-5 426 M
-( document. For more information consult the online list of claimed) s
-5 415 M
-( rights.) s
-5 382 M
-(Full Copyright Statement) s
-5 360 M
-( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2003\). All Rights Reserved.) s
-5 338 M
-( This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to) s
-5 327 M
-( others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it) s
-5 316 M
-( or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published) s
-5 305 M
-( and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any) s
-5 294 M
-( kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are) s
-5 283 M
-( included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this) s
-5 272 M
-( document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing) s
-5 261 M
-( the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other) s
-5 250 M
-( Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of) s
-5 239 M
-( developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for) s
-5 228 M
-( copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be) s
-5 217 M
-( followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than) s
-5 206 M
-( English.) s
-5 184 M
-( The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be) s
-5 173 M
-( revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003) s
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-5 668 M
-( TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING) s
-5 657 M
-( BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION) s
-5 646 M
-( HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF) s
-5 635 M
-( MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.) s
-5 602 M
-(Acknowledgment) s
-5 580 M
-( Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the) s
-5 569 M
-( Internet Society.) s
-5 129 M
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-%%EOF
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-transport-17.txt b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-transport-17.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 9073ea52b2..0000000000
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-transport-17.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1624 +0,0 @@
-
-
-
-Network Working Group T. Ylonen
-Internet-Draft SSH Communications Security Corp
-Expires: March 31, 2004 D. Moffat, Editor, Ed.
- Sun Microsystems, Inc
- Oct 2003
-
-
- SSH Transport Layer Protocol
- draft-ietf-secsh-transport-17.txt
-
-Status of this Memo
-
- This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
- all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
-
- Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
- Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
- groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
-
- Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
- and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
- time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
- material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
-
- The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
- www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
-
- The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
- http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
-
- This Internet-Draft will expire on March 31, 2004.
-
-Copyright Notice
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
-
-Abstract
-
- SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network
- services over an insecure network.
-
- This document describes the SSH transport layer protocol which
- typically runs on top of TCP/IP. The protocol can be used as a basis
- for a number of secure network services. It provides strong
- encryption, server authentication, and integrity protection. It may
- also provide compression.
-
- Key exchange method, public key algorithm, symmetric encryption
- algorithm, message authentication algorithm, and hash algorithm are
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 1]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- all negotiated.
-
- This document also describes the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method
- and the minimal set of algorithms that are needed to implement the
- SSH transport layer protocol.
-
-Table of Contents
-
- 1. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 3. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 4. Connection Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 4.1 Use over TCP/IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 4.2 Protocol Version Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 4.3 Compatibility With Old SSH Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 4.3.1 Old Client, New Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 4.3.2 New Client, Old Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 5. Binary Packet Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 5.1 Maximum Packet Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 5.2 Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 5.3 Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 5.4 Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 5.5 Key Exchange Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 5.6 Public Key Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 6. Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
- 6.1 Algorithm Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
- 6.2 Output from Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
- 6.3 Taking Keys Into Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
- 7. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
- 7.1 diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
- 8. Key Re-Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
- 9. Service Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 10. Additional Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 10.1 Disconnection Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
- 10.2 Ignored Data Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
- 10.3 Debug Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
- 10.4 Reserved Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
- 11. Summary of Message Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
- 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- 14. Intellectual Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- 15. Additional Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
- Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
- Informative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
- A. Contibutors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
- Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 28
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 2]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
-1. Contributors
-
- The major original contributors of this document were: Tatu Ylonen,
- Tero Kivinen, Timo J. Rinne, Sami Lehtinen (all of SSH Communications
- Security Corp), and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen (University of
- Jyvaskyla)
-
- The document editor is: [email protected]. Comments on this
- internet draft should be sent to the IETF SECSH working group,
- details at: http://ietf.org/html.charters/secsh-charter.html
-
-2. Introduction
-
- The SSH transport layer is a secure low level transport protocol. It
- provides strong encryption, cryptographic host authentication, and
- integrity protection.
-
- Authentication in this protocol level is host-based; this protocol
- does not perform user authentication. A higher level protocol for
- user authentication can be designed on top of this protocol.
-
- The protocol has been designed to be simple, flexible, to allow
- parameter negotiation, and to minimize the number of round-trips.
- Key exchange method, public key algorithm, symmetric encryption
- algorithm, message authentication algorithm, and hash algorithm are
- all negotiated. It is expected that in most environments, only 2
- round-trips will be needed for full key exchange, server
- authentication, service request, and acceptance notification of
- service request. The worst case is 3 round-trips.
-
-3. Conventions Used in This Document
-
- The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
- and "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as
- described in [RFC2119].
-
- The used data types and terminology are specified in the architecture
- document [SSH-ARCH].
-
- The architecture document also discusses the algorithm naming
- conventions that MUST be used with the SSH protocols.
-
-4. Connection Setup
-
- SSH works over any 8-bit clean, binary-transparent transport. The
- underlying transport SHOULD protect against transmission errors as
- such errors cause the SSH connection to terminate.
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 3]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- The client initiates the connection.
-
-4.1 Use over TCP/IP
-
- When used over TCP/IP, the server normally listens for connections on
- port 22. This port number has been registered with the IANA, and has
- been officially assigned for SSH.
-
-4.2 Protocol Version Exchange
-
- When the connection has been established, both sides MUST send an
- identification string of the form "SSH-protoversion-softwareversion
- comments", followed by carriage return and newline characters (ASCII
- 13 and 10, respectively). Both sides MUST be able to process
- identification strings without carriage return character. No null
- character is sent. The maximum length of the string is 255
- characters, including the carriage return and newline.
-
- The part of the identification string preceding carriage return and
- newline is used in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange (see Section
- Section 7).
-
- The server MAY send other lines of data before sending the version
- string. Each line SHOULD be terminated by a carriage return and
- newline. Such lines MUST NOT begin with "SSH-", and SHOULD be
- encoded in ISO-10646 UTF-8 [RFC2279] (language is not specified).
- Clients MUST be able to process such lines; they MAY be silently
- ignored, or MAY be displayed to the client user; if they are
- displayed, control character filtering discussed in [SSH-ARCH] SHOULD
- be used. The primary use of this feature is to allow TCP-wrappers to
- display an error message before disconnecting.
-
- Version strings MUST consist of printable US-ASCII characters, not
- including whitespaces or a minus sign (-). The version string is
- primarily used to trigger compatibility extensions and to indicate
- the capabilities of an implementation. The comment string should
- contain additional information that might be useful in solving user
- problems.
-
- The protocol version described in this document is 2.0.
-
- Key exchange will begin immediately after sending this identifier.
- All packets following the identification string SHALL use the binary
- packet protocol, to be described below.
-
-4.3 Compatibility With Old SSH Versions
-
- During the transition period, it is important to be able to work in a
-
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- way that is compatible with the installed SSH clients and servers
- that use an older version of the protocol. Information in this
- section is only relevant for implementations supporting compatibility
- with SSH versions 1.x. There is no standards track or informational
- draft available that defines the SSH 1.x protocol. The only known
- documentation of the 1.x protocol is contained in README files that
- are shipped along with the source code.
-
-4.3.1 Old Client, New Server
-
- Server implementations MAY support a configurable "compatibility"
- flag that enables compatibility with old versions. When this flag is
- on, the server SHOULD identify its protocol version as "1.99".
- Clients using protocol 2.0 MUST be able to identify this as identical
- to "2.0". In this mode the server SHOULD NOT send the carriage
- return character (ASCII 13) after the version identification string.
-
- In the compatibility mode the server SHOULD NOT send any further data
- after its initialization string until it has received an
- identification string from the client. The server can then determine
- whether the client is using an old protocol, and can revert to the
- old protocol if required. In the compatibility mode, the server MUST
- NOT send additional data before the version string.
-
- When compatibility with old clients is not needed, the server MAY
- send its initial key exchange data immediately after the
- identification string.
-
-4.3.2 New Client, Old Server
-
- Since the new client MAY immediately send additional data after its
- identification string (before receiving server's identification), the
- old protocol may already have been corrupted when the client learns
- that the server is old. When this happens, the client SHOULD close
- the connection to the server, and reconnect using the old protocol.
-
-5. Binary Packet Protocol
-
- Each packet is in the following format:
-
- uint32 packet_length
- byte padding_length
- byte[n1] payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
- byte[n2] random padding; n2 = padding_length
- byte[m] mac (message authentication code); m = mac_length
-
- packet_length
-
-
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- The length of the packet (bytes), not including MAC or the
- packet_length field itself.
-
- padding_length
- Length of padding (bytes).
-
- payload
- The useful contents of the packet. If compression has been
- negotiated, this field is compressed. Initially, compression
- MUST be "none".
-
- random padding
- Arbitrary-length padding, such that the total length of
- (packet_length || padding_length || payload || padding) is a
- multiple of the cipher block size or 8, whichever is larger.
- There MUST be at least four bytes of padding. The padding
- SHOULD consist of random bytes. The maximum amount of padding
- is 255 bytes.
-
- mac
- Message authentication code. If message authentication has
- been negotiated, this field contains the MAC bytes. Initially,
- the MAC algorithm MUST be "none".
-
-
- Note that length of the concatenation of packet length, padding
- length, payload, and padding MUST be a multiple of the cipher block
- size or 8, whichever is larger. This constraint MUST be enforced
- even when using stream ciphers. Note that the packet length field is
- also encrypted, and processing it requires special care when sending
- or receiving packets.
-
- The minimum size of a packet is 16 (or the cipher block size,
- whichever is larger) bytes (plus MAC); implementations SHOULD decrypt
- the length after receiving the first 8 (or cipher block size,
- whichever is larger) bytes of a packet.
-
-5.1 Maximum Packet Length
-
- All implementations MUST be able to process packets with uncompressed
- payload length of 32768 bytes or less and total packet size of 35000
- bytes or less (including length, padding length, payload, padding,
- and MAC.). The maximum of 35000 bytes is an arbitrary chosen value
- larger than uncompressed size. Implementations SHOULD support longer
- packets, where they might be needed, e.g. if an implementation wants
- to send a very large number of certificates. Such packets MAY be
- sent if the version string indicates that the other party is able to
- process them. However, implementations SHOULD check that the packet
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- length is reasonable for the implementation to avoid
- denial-of-service and/or buffer overflow attacks.
-
-5.2 Compression
-
- If compression has been negotiated, the payload field (and only it)
- will be compressed using the negotiated algorithm. The length field
- and MAC will be computed from the compressed payload. Encryption will
- be done after compression.
-
- Compression MAY be stateful, depending on the method. Compression
- MUST be independent for each direction, and implementations MUST
- allow independently choosing the algorithm for each direction.
-
- The following compression methods are currently defined:
-
- none REQUIRED no compression
- zlib OPTIONAL ZLIB (LZ77) compression
-
- The "zlib" compression is described in [RFC1950] and in [RFC1951].
- The compression context is initialized after each key exchange, and
- is passed from one packet to the next with only a partial flush being
- performed at the end of each packet. A partial flush means that the
- current compressed block is ended and all data will be output. If the
- current block is not a stored block, one or more empty blocks are
- added after the current block to ensure that there are at least 8
- bits counting from the start of the end-of-block code of the current
- block to the end of the packet payload.
-
- Additional methods may be defined as specified in [SSH-ARCH].
-
-5.3 Encryption
-
- An encryption algorithm and a key will be negotiated during the key
- exchange. When encryption is in effect, the packet length, padding
- length, payload and padding fields of each packet MUST be encrypted
- with the given algorithm.
-
- The encrypted data in all packets sent in one direction SHOULD be
- considered a single data stream. For example, initialization vectors
- SHOULD be passed from the end of one packet to the beginning of the
- next packet. All ciphers SHOULD use keys with an effective key length
- of 128 bits or more.
-
- The ciphers in each direction MUST run independently of each other,
- and implementations MUST allow independently choosing the algorithm
- for each direction (if multiple algorithms are allowed by local
- policy).
-
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- The following ciphers are currently defined:
-
- 3des-cbc REQUIRED three-key 3DES in CBC mode
- blowfish-cbc OPTIONALi Blowfish in CBC mode
- twofish256-cbc OPTIONAL Twofish in CBC mode,
- with 256-bit key
- twofish-cbc OPTIONAL alias for "twofish256-cbc" (this
- is being retained for
- historical reasons)
- twofish192-cbc OPTIONAL Twofish with 192-bit key
- twofish128-cbc OPTIONAL Twofish with 128-bit key
- aes256-cbc OPTIONAL AES (Rijndael) in CBC mode,
- with 256-bit key
- aes192-cbc OPTIONAL AES with 192-bit key
- aes128-cbc RECOMMENDED AES with 128-bit key
- serpent256-cbc OPTIONAL Serpent in CBC mode, with
- 256-bit key
- serpent192-cbc OPTIONAL Serpent with 192-bit key
- serpent128-cbc OPTIONAL Serpent with 128-bit key
- arcfour OPTIONAL the ARCFOUR stream cipher
- idea-cbc OPTIONAL IDEA in CBC mode
- cast128-cbc OPTIONAL CAST-128 in CBC mode
- none OPTIONAL no encryption; NOT RECOMMENDED
-
- The "3des-cbc" cipher is three-key triple-DES
- (encrypt-decrypt-encrypt), where the first 8 bytes of the key are
- used for the first encryption, the next 8 bytes for the decryption,
- and the following 8 bytes for the final encryption. This requires 24
- bytes of key data (of which 168 bits are actually used). To
- implement CBC mode, outer chaining MUST be used (i.e., there is only
- one initialization vector). This is a block cipher with 8 byte
- blocks. This algorithm is defined in [FIPS-46-3]
-
- The "blowfish-cbc" cipher is Blowfish in CBC mode, with 128 bit keys
- [SCHNEIER]. This is a block cipher with 8 byte blocks.
-
- The "twofish-cbc" or "twofish256-cbc" cipher is Twofish in CBC mode,
- with 256 bit keys as described [TWOFISH]. This is a block cipher with
- 16 byte blocks.
-
- The "twofish192-cbc" cipher. Same as above but with 192-bit key.
-
- The "twofish128-cbc" cipher. Same as above but with 128-bit key.
-
- The "aes256-cbc" cipher is AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
- [FIPS-197], formerly Rijndael, in CBC mode. This version uses 256-bit
- key.
-
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- The "aes192-cbc" cipher. Same as above but with 192-bit key.
-
- The "aes128-cbc" cipher. Same as above but with 128-bit key.
-
- The "serpent256-cbc" cipher in CBC mode, with 256-bit key as
- described in the Serpent AES submission.
-
- The "serpent192-cbc" cipher. Same as above but with 192-bit key.
-
- The "serpent128-cbc" cipher. Same as above but with 128-bit key.
-
- The "arcfour" is the Arcfour stream cipher with 128 bit keys. The
- Arcfour cipher is believed to be compatible with the RC4 cipher
- [SCHNEIER]. RC4 is a registered trademark of RSA Data Security Inc.
- Arcfour (and RC4) has problems with weak keys, and should be used
- with caution.
-
- The "idea-cbc" cipher is the IDEA cipher in CBC mode [SCHNEIER].
-
- The "cast128-cbc" cipher is the CAST-128 cipher in CBC mode
- [RFC2144].
-
- The "none" algorithm specifies that no encryption is to be done.
- Note that this method provides no confidentiality protection, and it
- is not recommended. Some functionality (e.g. password
- authentication) may be disabled for security reasons if this cipher
- is chosen.
-
- Additional methods may be defined as specified in [SSH-ARCH].
-
-5.4 Data Integrity
-
- Data integrity is protected by including with each packet a message
- authentication code (MAC) that is computed from a shared secret,
- packet sequence number, and the contents of the packet.
-
- The message authentication algorithm and key are negotiated during
- key exchange. Initially, no MAC will be in effect, and its length
- MUST be zero. After key exchange, the selected MAC will be computed
- before encryption from the concatenation of packet data:
-
- mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || unencrypted_packet)
-
- where unencrypted_packet is the entire packet without MAC (the length
- fields, payload and padding), and sequence_number is an implicit
- packet sequence number represented as uint32. The sequence number is
- initialized to zero for the first packet, and is incremented after
- every packet (regardless of whether encryption or MAC is in use). It
-
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- is never reset, even if keys/algorithms are renegotiated later. It
- wraps around to zero after every 2^32 packets. The packet sequence
- number itself is not included in the packet sent over the wire.
-
- The MAC algorithms for each direction MUST run independently, and
- implementations MUST allow choosing the algorithm independently for
- both directions.
-
- The MAC bytes resulting from the MAC algorithm MUST be transmitted
- without encryption as the last part of the packet. The number of MAC
- bytes depends on the algorithm chosen.
-
- The following MAC algorithms are currently defined:
-
- hmac-sha1 REQUIRED HMAC-SHA1 (digest length = key
- length = 20)
- hmac-sha1-96 RECOMMENDED first 96 bits of HMAC-SHA1 (digest
- length = 12, key length = 20)
- hmac-md5 OPTIONAL HMAC-MD5 (digest length = key
- length = 16)
- hmac-md5-96 OPTIONAL first 96 bits of HMAC-MD5 (digest
- length = 12, key length = 16)
- none OPTIONAL no MAC; NOT RECOMMENDED
-
- Figure 1
-
- The "hmac-*" algorithms are described in [RFC2104] The "*-n" MACs use
- only the first n bits of the resulting value.
-
- The hash algorithms are described in [SCHNEIER].
-
- Additional methods may be defined as specified in [SSH-ARCH].
-
-5.5 Key Exchange Methods
-
- The key exchange method specifies how one-time session keys are
- generated for encryption and for authentication, and how the server
- authentication is done.
-
- Only one REQUIRED key exchange method has been defined:
-
- diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 REQUIRED
-
- This method is described later in this document.
-
- Additional methods may be defined as specified in [SSH-ARCH].
-
-
-
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-5.6 Public Key Algorithms
-
- This protocol has been designed to be able to operate with almost any
- public key format, encoding, and algorithm (signature and/or
- encryption).
-
- There are several aspects that define a public key type:
- o Key format: how is the key encoded and how are certificates
- represented. The key blobs in this protocol MAY contain
- certificates in addition to keys.
- o Signature and/or encryption algorithms. Some key types may not
- support both signing and encryption. Key usage may also be
- restricted by policy statements in e.g. certificates. In this
- case, different key types SHOULD be defined for the different
- policy alternatives.
- o Encoding of signatures and/or encrypted data. This includes but is
- not limited to padding, byte order, and data formats.
-
- The following public key and/or certificate formats are currently defined:
-
- ssh-dss REQUIRED sign Raw DSS Key
- ssh-rsa RECOMMENDED sign Raw RSA Key
- x509v3-sign-rsa OPTIONAL sign X.509 certificates (RSA key)
- x509v3-sign-dss OPTIONAL sign X.509 certificates (DSS key)
- spki-sign-rsa OPTIONAL sign SPKI certificates (RSA key)
- spki-sign-dss OPTIONAL sign SPKI certificates (DSS key)
- pgp-sign-rsa OPTIONAL sign OpenPGP certificates (RSA key)
- pgp-sign-dss OPTIONAL sign OpenPGP certificates (DSS key)
-
- Additional key types may be defined as specified in [SSH-ARCH].
-
- The key type MUST always be explicitly known (from algorithm
- negotiation or some other source). It is not normally included in
- the key blob.
-
- Certificates and public keys are encoded as follows:
-
- string certificate or public key format identifier
- byte[n] key/certificate data
-
- The certificate part may have be a zero length string, but a public
- key is required. This is the public key that will be used for
- authentication; the certificate sequence contained in the certificate
- blob can be used to provide authorization.
-
- Public key / certifcate formats that do not explicitly specify a
- signature format identifier MUST use the public key / certificate
- format identifier as the signature identifier.
-
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- Signatures are encoded as follows:
- string signature format identifier (as specified by the
- public key / cert format)
- byte[n] signature blob in format specific encoding.
-
-
- The "ssh-dss" key format has the following specific encoding:
-
- string "ssh-dss"
- mpint p
- mpint q
- mpint g
- mpint y
-
- Here the p, q, g, and y parameters form the signature key blob.
-
- Signing and verifying using this key format is done according to the
- Digital Signature Standard [FIPS-186] using the SHA-1 hash. A
- description can also be found in [SCHNEIER].
-
- The resulting signature is encoded as follows:
-
- string "ssh-dss"
- string dss_signature_blob
-
- dss_signature_blob is encoded as a string containing r followed by s
- (which are 160 bits long integers, without lengths or padding,
- unsigned and in network byte order).
-
- The "ssh-rsa" key format has the following specific encoding:
-
- string "ssh-rsa"
- mpint e
- mpint n
-
- Here the e and n parameters form the signature key blob.
-
- Signing and verifying using this key format is done according to
- [SCHNEIER] and [PKCS1] using the SHA-1 hash.
-
- The resulting signature is encoded as follows:
-
- string "ssh-rsa"
- string rsa_signature_blob
-
- rsa_signature_blob is encoded as a string containing s (which is an
- integer, without lengths or padding, unsigned and in network byte
- order).
-
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- The "spki-sign-rsa" method indicates that the certificate blob
- contains a sequence of SPKI certificates. The format of SPKI
- certificates is described in [RFC2693]. This method indicates that
- the key (or one of the keys in the certificate) is an RSA-key.
-
- The "spki-sign-dss". As above, but indicates that the key (or one of
- the keys in the certificate) is a DSS-key.
-
- The "pgp-sign-rsa" method indicates the certificates, the public key,
- and the signature are in OpenPGP compatible binary format
- ([RFC2440]). This method indicates that the key is an RSA-key.
-
- The "pgp-sign-dss". As above, but indicates that the key is a
- DSS-key.
-
-6. Key Exchange
-
- Key exchange begins by each side sending lists of supported
- algorithms. Each side has a preferred algorithm in each category, and
- it is assumed that most implementations at any given time will use
- the same preferred algorithm. Each side MAY guess which algorithm
- the other side is using, and MAY send an initial key exchange packet
- according to the algorithm if appropriate for the preferred method.
-
- Guess is considered wrong, if:
- o the kex algorithm and/or the host key algorithm is guessed wrong
- (server and client have different preferred algorithm), or
- o if any of the other algorithms cannot be agreed upon (the
- procedure is defined below in Section Section 6.1).
-
- Otherwise, the guess is considered to be right and the optimistically
- sent packet MUST be handled as the first key exchange packet.
-
- However, if the guess was wrong, and a packet was optimistically sent
- by one or both parties, such packets MUST be ignored (even if the
- error in the guess would not affect the contents of the initial
- packet(s)), and the appropriate side MUST send the correct initial
- packet.
-
- Server authentication in the key exchange MAY be implicit. After a
- key exchange with implicit server authentication, the client MUST
- wait for response to its service request message before sending any
- further data.
-
-6.1 Algorithm Negotiation
-
- Key exchange begins by each side sending the following packet:
-
-
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- byte SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
- byte[16] cookie (random bytes)
- string kex_algorithms
- string server_host_key_algorithms
- string encryption_algorithms_client_to_server
- string encryption_algorithms_server_to_client
- string mac_algorithms_client_to_server
- string mac_algorithms_server_to_client
- string compression_algorithms_client_to_server
- string compression_algorithms_server_to_client
- string languages_client_to_server
- string languages_server_to_client
- boolean first_kex_packet_follows
- uint32 0 (reserved for future extension)
-
- Each of the algorithm strings MUST be a comma-separated list of
- algorithm names (see ''Algorithm Naming'' in [SSH-ARCH]). Each
- supported (allowed) algorithm MUST be listed in order of preference.
-
- The first algorithm in each list MUST be the preferred (guessed)
- algorithm. Each string MUST contain at least one algorithm name.
-
-
- cookie
- The cookie MUST be a random value generated by the sender. Its
- purpose is to make it impossible for either side to fully
- determine the keys and the session identifier.
-
- kex_algorithms
- Key exchange algorithms were defined above. The first
- algorithm MUST be the preferred (and guessed) algorithm. If
- both sides make the same guess, that algorithm MUST be used.
- Otherwise, the following algorithm MUST be used to choose a key
- exchange method: iterate over client's kex algorithms, one at a
- time. Choose the first algorithm that satisfies the following
- conditions:
- + the server also supports the algorithm,
- + if the algorithm requires an encryption-capable host key,
- there is an encryption-capable algorithm on the server's
- server_host_key_algorithms that is also supported by the
- client, and
- + if the algorithm requires a signature-capable host key,
- there is a signature-capable algorithm on the server's
- server_host_key_algorithms that is also supported by the
- client.
- + If no algorithm satisfying all these conditions can be
- found, the connection fails, and both sides MUST disconnect.
-
-
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- server_host_key_algorithms
- List of the algorithms supported for the server host key. The
- server lists the algorithms for which it has host keys; the
- client lists the algorithms that it is willing to accept.
- (There MAY be multiple host keys for a host, possibly with
- different algorithms.)
-
- Some host keys may not support both signatures and encryption
- (this can be determined from the algorithm), and thus not all
- host keys are valid for all key exchange methods.
-
- Algorithm selection depends on whether the chosen key exchange
- algorithm requires a signature or encryption capable host key.
- It MUST be possible to determine this from the public key
- algorithm name. The first algorithm on the client's list that
- satisfies the requirements and is also supported by the server
- MUST be chosen. If there is no such algorithm, both sides MUST
- disconnect.
-
- encryption_algorithms
- Lists the acceptable symmetric encryption algorithms in order
- of preference. The chosen encryption algorithm to each
- direction MUST be the first algorithm on the client's list
- that is also on the server's list. If there is no such
- algorithm, both sides MUST disconnect.
-
- Note that "none" must be explicitly listed if it is to be
- acceptable. The defined algorithm names are listed in Section
- Section 5.3.
-
- mac_algorithms
- Lists the acceptable MAC algorithms in order of preference.
- The chosen MAC algorithm MUST be the first algorithm on the
- client's list that is also on the server's list. If there is
- no such algorithm, both sides MUST disconnect.
-
- Note that "none" must be explicitly listed if it is to be
- acceptable. The MAC algorithm names are listed in Section
- Figure 1.
-
- compression_algorithms
- Lists the acceptable compression algorithms in order of
- preference. The chosen compression algorithm MUST be the first
- algorithm on the client's list that is also on the server's
- list. If there is no such algorithm, both sides MUST
- disconnect.
-
-
-
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- Note that "none" must be explicitly listed if it is to be
- acceptable. The compression algorithm names are listed in
- Section Section 5.2.
-
- languages
- This is a comma-separated list of language tags in order of
- preference [RFC3066]. Both parties MAY ignore this list. If
- there are no language preferences, this list SHOULD be empty.
- Language tags SHOULD NOT be present unless they are known to be
- needed by the sending party.
-
- first_kex_packet_follows
- Indicates whether a guessed key exchange packet follows. If a
- guessed packet will be sent, this MUST be TRUE. If no guessed
- packet will be sent, this MUST be FALSE.
-
- After receiving the SSH_MSG_KEXINIT packet from the other side,
- each party will know whether their guess was right. If the
- other party's guess was wrong, and this field was TRUE, the
- next packet MUST be silently ignored, and both sides MUST then
- act as determined by the negotiated key exchange method. If
- the guess was right, key exchange MUST continue using the
- guessed packet.
-
- After the KEXINIT packet exchange, the key exchange algorithm is run.
- It may involve several packet exchanges, as specified by the key
- exchange method.
-
-6.2 Output from Key Exchange
-
- The key exchange produces two values: a shared secret K, and an
- exchange hash H. Encryption and authentication keys are derived from
- these. The exchange hash H from the first key exchange is
- additionally used as the session identifier, which is a unique
- identifier for this connection. It is used by authentication methods
- as a part of the data that is signed as a proof of possession of a
- private key. Once computed, the session identifier is not changed,
- even if keys are later re-exchanged.
-
-
- Each key exchange method specifies a hash function that is used in
- the key exchange. The same hash algorithm MUST be used in key
- derivation. Here, we'll call it HASH.
-
-
- Encryption keys MUST be computed as HASH of a known value and K as
- follows:
-
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- o Initial IV client to server: HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id)
- (Here K is encoded as mpint and "A" as byte and session_id as raw
- data."A" means the single character A, ASCII 65).
- o Initial IV server to client: HASH(K || H || "B" || session_id)
- o Encryption key client to server: HASH(K || H || "C" || session_id)
- o Encryption key server to client: HASH(K || H || "D" || session_id)
- o Integrity key client to server: HASH(K || H || "E" || session_id)
- o Integrity key server to client: HASH(K || H || "F" || session_id)
-
- Key data MUST be taken from the beginning of the hash output. 128
- bits (16 bytes) MUST be used for algorithms with variable-length
- keys. The only variable key length algorithm defined in this document
- is arcfour). For other algorithms, as many bytes as are needed are
- taken from the beginning of the hash value. If the key length needed
- is longer than the output of the HASH, the key is extended by
- computing HASH of the concatenation of K and H and the entire key so
- far, and appending the resulting bytes (as many as HASH generates) to
- the key. This process is repeated until enough key material is
- available; the key is taken from the beginning of this value. In
- other words:
-
- K1 = HASH(K || H || X || session_id) (X is e.g. "A")
- K2 = HASH(K || H || K1)
- K3 = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2)
- ...
- key = K1 || K2 || K3 || ...
-
- This process will lose entropy if the amount of entropy in K is
- larger than the internal state size of HASH.
-
-6.3 Taking Keys Into Use
-
- Key exchange ends by each side sending an SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS message.
- This message is sent with the old keys and algorithms. All messages
- sent after this message MUST use the new keys and algorithms.
-
-
- When this message is received, the new keys and algorithms MUST be
- taken into use for receiving.
-
-
- This message is the only valid message after key exchange, in
- addition to SSH_MSG_DEBUG, SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT and SSH_MSG_IGNORE
- messages. The purpose of this message is to ensure that a party is
- able to respond with a disconnect message that the other party can
- understand if something goes wrong with the key exchange.
- Implementations MUST NOT accept any other messages after key exchange
- before receiving SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS.
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 17]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- byte SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS
-
-
-7. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
-
- The Diffie-Hellman key exchange provides a shared secret that can not
- be determined by either party alone. The key exchange is combined
- with a signature with the host key to provide host authentication.
-
-
- In the following description (C is the client, S is the server; p is
- a large safe prime, g is a generator for a subgroup of GF(p), and q
- is the order of the subgroup; V_S is S's version string; V_C is C's
- version string; K_S is S's public host key; I_C is C's KEXINIT
- message and I_S S's KEXINIT message which have been exchanged before
- this part begins):
-
-
- 1. C generates a random number x (1 < x < q) and computes e = g^x
- mod p. C sends "e" to S.
-
- 2. S generates a random number y (0 < y < q) and computes f = g^y
- mod p. S receives "e". It computes K = e^y mod p, H = hash(V_C
- || V_S || I_C || I_S || K_S || e || f || K) (these elements are
- encoded according to their types; see below), and signature s on
- H with its private host key. S sends "K_S || f || s" to C. The
- signing operation may involve a second hashing operation.
-
- 3. C verifies that K_S really is the host key for S (e.g. using
- certificates or a local database). C is also allowed to accept
- the key without verification; however, doing so will render the
- protocol insecure against active attacks (but may be desirable
- for practical reasons in the short term in many environments). C
- then computes K = f^x mod p, H = hash(V_C || V_S || I_C || I_S ||
- K_S || e || f || K), and verifies the signature s on H.
-
- Either side MUST NOT send or accept e or f values that are not in the
- range [1, p-1]. If this condition is violated, the key exchange
- fails.
-
-
- This is implemented with the following messages. The hash algorithm
- for computing the exchange hash is defined by the method name, and is
- called HASH. The public key algorithm for signing is negotiated with
- the KEXINIT messages.
-
- First, the client sends the following:
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 18]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- byte SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT
- mpint e
-
-
- The server responds with the following:
-
- byte SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY
- string server public host key and certificates (K_S)
- mpint f
- string signature of H
-
- The hash H is computed as the HASH hash of the concatenation of the
- following:
-
- string V_C, the client's version string (CR and NL excluded)
- string V_S, the server's version string (CR and NL excluded)
- string I_C, the payload of the client's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
- string I_S, the payload of the server's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
- string K_S, the host key
- mpint e, exchange value sent by the client
- mpint f, exchange value sent by the server
- mpint K, the shared secret
-
- This value is called the exchange hash, and it is used to
- authenticate the key exchange. The exchange hash SHOULD be kept
- secret.
-
-
- The signature algorithm MUST be applied over H, not the original
- data. Most signature algorithms include hashing and additional
- padding. For example, "ssh-dss" specifies SHA-1 hashing; in that
- case, the data is first hashed with HASH to compute H, and H is then
- hashed with SHA-1 as part of the signing operation.
-
-7.1 diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
-
- The "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" method specifies Diffie-Hellman key
- exchange with SHA-1 as HASH, and Oakley group 14 [RFC3526] (2048-bit
- MODP Group). It is included below in hexadecimal and decimal.
-
- The prime p is equal to 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * floor( 2^894 Pi +
- 129093 ). Its hexadecimal value is:
-
- FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
- 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
- EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
- E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED
- EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 19]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF.
-
- In decimal, this value is:
-
- 179769313486231590770839156793787453197860296048756011706444
- 423684197180216158519368947833795864925541502180565485980503
- 646440548199239100050792877003355816639229553136239076508735
- 759914822574862575007425302077447712589550957937778424442426
- 617334727629299387668709205606050270810842907692932019128194
- 467627007.
-
- The generator used with this prime is g = 2. The group order q is (p
- - 1) / 2.
-
-8. Key Re-Exchange
-
- Key re-exchange is started by sending an SSH_MSG_KEXINIT packet when
- not already doing a key exchange (as described in Section Section
- 6.1). When this message is received, a party MUST respond with its
- own SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message except when the received SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
- already was a reply. Either party MAY initiate the re-exchange, but
- roles MUST NOT be changed (i.e., the server remains the server, and
- the client remains the client).
-
-
- Key re-exchange is performed using whatever encryption was in effect
- when the exchange was started. Encryption, compression, and MAC
- methods are not changed before a new SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS is sent after
- the key exchange (as in the initial key exchange). Re-exchange is
- processed identically to the initial key exchange, except for the
- session identifier that will remain unchanged. It is permissible to
- change some or all of the algorithms during the re-exchange. Host
- keys can also change. All keys and initialization vectors are
- recomputed after the exchange. Compression and encryption contexts
- are reset.
-
-
- It is recommended that the keys are changed after each gigabyte of
- transmitted data or after each hour of connection time, whichever
- comes sooner. However, since the re-exchange is a public key
- operation, it requires a fair amount of processing power and should
- not be performed too often.
-
-
- More application data may be sent after the SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS packet
- has been sent; key exchange does not affect the protocols that lie
- above the SSH transport layer.
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 20]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
-9. Service Request
-
- After the key exchange, the client requests a service. The service is
- identified by a name. The format of names and procedures for defining
- new names are defined in [SSH-ARCH].
-
-
- Currently, the following names have been reserved:
-
- ssh-userauth
- ssh-connection
-
- Similar local naming policy is applied to the service names, as is
- applied to the algorithm names; a local service should use the
- "servicename@domain" syntax.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST
- string service name
-
- If the server rejects the service request, it SHOULD send an
- appropriate SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT message and MUST disconnect.
-
-
- When the service starts, it may have access to the session identifier
- generated during the key exchange.
-
-
- If the server supports the service (and permits the client to use
- it), it MUST respond with the following:
-
- byte SSH_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT
- string service name
-
- Message numbers used by services should be in the area reserved for
- them (see Section 6 in [SSH-ARCH]). The transport level will
- continue to process its own messages.
-
-
- Note that after a key exchange with implicit server authentication,
- the client MUST wait for response to its service request message
- before sending any further data.
-
-10. Additional Messages
-
- Either party may send any of the following messages at any time.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 21]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
-10.1 Disconnection Message
-
- byte SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT
- uint32 reason code
- string description [RFC2279]
- string language tag [RFC3066]
-
- This message causes immediate termination of the connection. All
- implementations MUST be able to process this message; they SHOULD be
- able to send this message.
-
- The sender MUST NOT send or receive any data after this message, and
- the recipient MUST NOT accept any data after receiving this message.
- The description field gives a more specific explanation in a
- human-readable form. The error code gives the reason in a more
- machine-readable format (suitable for localization), and can have the
- following values:
-
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_RESERVED 4
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14
- #define SSH_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15
-
- If the description string is displayed, control character filtering
- discussed in [SSH-ARCH] should be used to avoid attacks by sending
- terminal control characters.
-
-10.2 Ignored Data Message
-
- byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE
- string data
-
- All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
- time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
- required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
- protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 22]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
-10.3 Debug Message
-
- byte SSH_MSG_DEBUG
- boolean always_display
- string message [RFC2279]
- string language tag [RFC3066]
-
- All implementations MUST understand this message, but they are
- allowed to ignore it. This message is used to pass the other side
- information that may help debugging. If always_display is TRUE, the
- message SHOULD be displayed. Otherwise, it SHOULD NOT be displayed
- unless debugging information has been explicitly requested by the
- user.
-
-
- The message doesn't need to contain a newline. It is, however,
- allowed to consist of multiple lines separated by CRLF (Carriage
- Return - Line Feed) pairs.
-
-
- If the message string is displayed, terminal control character
- filtering discussed in [SSH-ARCH] should be used to avoid attacks by
- sending terminal control characters.
-
-10.4 Reserved Messages
-
- An implementation MUST respond to all unrecognized messages with an
- SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED message in the order in which the messages were
- received. Such messages MUST be otherwise ignored. Later protocol
- versions may define other meanings for these message types.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED
- uint32 packet sequence number of rejected message
-
-
-11. Summary of Message Numbers
-
- The following message numbers have been defined in this protocol:
-
- #define SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT 1
- #define SSH_MSG_IGNORE 2
- #define SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3
- #define SSH_MSG_DEBUG 4
- #define SSH_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5
- #define SSH_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6
-
- #define SSH_MSG_KEXINIT 20
- #define SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS 21
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 23]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- /* Numbers 30-49 used for kex packets.
- Different kex methods may reuse message numbers in
- this range. */
-
- #define SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30
- #define SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31
-
-
-12. IANA Considerations
-
- This document is part of a set, the IANA considerations for the SSH
- protocol as defined in [SSH-ARCH], [SSH-TRANS], [SSH-USERAUTH],
- [SSH-CONNECT] are detailed in [SSH-NUMBERS].
-
-13. Security Considerations
-
- This protocol provides a secure encrypted channel over an insecure
- network. It performs server host authentication, key exchange,
- encryption, and integrity protection. It also derives a unique
- session id that may be used by higher-level protocols.
-
- Full security considerations for this protocol are provided in
- Section 8 of [SSH-ARCH]
-
-14. Intellectual Property
-
- The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
- intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
- pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
- this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
- might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
- has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
- IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
- standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
- claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
- licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
- obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
- proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can
- be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
-
- The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
- regard to some or all of the specification contained in this
- document. For more information consult the online list of claimed
- rights.
-
-15. Additional Information
-
- The current document editor is: [email protected]. Comments on
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 24]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- this internet draft should be sent to the IETF SECSH working group,
- details at: http://ietf.org/html.charters/secsh-charter.html
-
-Normative
-
- [SSH-ARCH]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Protocol Architecture", I-D
- draft-ietf-architecture-15.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-TRANS]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Transport Layer Protocol", I-D
- draft-ietf-transport-17.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-USERAUTH]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Authentication Protocol", I-D
- draft-ietf-userauth-18.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-CONNECT]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Connection Protocol", I-D
- draft-ietf-connect-18.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-NUMBERS]
- Lehtinen, S. and D. Moffat, "SSH Protocol Assigned
- Numbers", I-D draft-ietf-secsh-assignednumbers-05.txt, Oct
- 2003.
-
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
- Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
-
-Informative
-
- [FIPS-186]
- Federal Information Processing Standards Publication,
- "FIPS PUB 186, Digital Signature Standard", May 1994.
-
- [FIPS-197]
- NIST, "FIPS PUB 197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)",
- November 2001.
-
- [FIPS-46-3]
- U.S. Dept. of Commerce, "FIPS PUB 46-3, Data Encryption
- Standard (DES)", October 1999.
-
- [RFC2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, T. and D. Solo, "Internet
- X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL
- Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.
-
- [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 25]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
-
- [RFC3066] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of
- Languages", BCP 47, RFC 3066, January 2001.
-
- [RFC1950] Deutsch, L. and J-L. Gailly, "ZLIB Compressed Data Format
- Specification version 3.3", RFC 1950, May 1996.
-
- [RFC1951] Deutsch, P., "DEFLATE Compressed Data Format Specification
- version 1.3", RFC 1951, May 1996.
-
- [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
- 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
-
- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
- Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
- February 1997.
-
- [RFC2144] Adams, C., "The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm", RFC 2144,
- May 1997.
-
- [RFC2440] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H. and R. Thayer,
- "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440, November 1998.
-
- [RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas,
- B. and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,
- September 1999.
-
- [RFC3526] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP)
- Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
- RFC 3526, May 2003.
-
- [SCHNEIER]
- Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition:
- protocols algorithms and source in code in C", 1996.
-
- [TWOFISH] Schneier, B., "The Twofish Encryptions Algorithm: A
- 128-Bit Block Cipher, 1st Edition", March 1999.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 26]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
-Authors' Addresses
-
- Tatu Ylonen
- SSH Communications Security Corp
- Fredrikinkatu 42
- HELSINKI FIN-00100
- Finland
-
-
-
- Darren J. Moffat (editor)
- Sun Microsystems, Inc
- 17 Network Circle
- Menlo Park 95025
- USA
-
-
-Appendix A. Contibutors
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 27]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
-Intellectual Property Statement
-
- The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
- intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
- pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
- this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
- might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
- has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
- IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
- standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
- claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
- licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
- obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
- proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
- be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
-
- The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
- copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
- rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
- this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
- Director.
-
- The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
- regard to some or all of the specification contained in this
- document. For more information consult the online list of claimed
- rights.
-
-
-Full Copyright Statement
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
-
- This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
- others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
- or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
- and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
- kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
- included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
- document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
- the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
- Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
- developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
- copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
- followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
- English.
-
- The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
- revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 28]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Transport Layer Protocol Oct 2003
-
-
- This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
- "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
- TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
- BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
- HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
-
-
-Acknowledgment
-
- Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
- Internet Society.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-Ylonen & Moffat, Editor Expires March 31, 2004 [Page 29] \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-userauth-18.2.ps b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-userauth-18.2.ps
deleted file mode 100644
index be5799dbce..0000000000
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-userauth-18.2.ps
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1881 +0,0 @@
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-(Network Working Group T. Ylonen) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Communications Security Corp) s
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-(Expires: March 2, 2003 D. Moffat, Ed.) s
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-( Sun Microsystems, Inc) s
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-( September 2002) s
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-( SSH Authentication Protocol) s
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-( draft-ietf-secsh-userauth-18.txt) s
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-(Status of this Memo) s
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-5 492 M
-( Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months) s
-5 481 M
-( and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any) s
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-( time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference) s
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-( material or to cite them other than as "work in progress.") s
-5 437 M
-( The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://) s
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-( www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.) s
-5 404 M
-( The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at) s
-5 393 M
-( http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.) s
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-( This Internet-Draft will expire on March 2, 2003.) s
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-(Copyright Notice) s
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-( Copyright \(C\) The Internet Society \(2002\). All Rights Reserved.) s
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-(Abstract) s
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-( SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network) s
-5 272 M
-( services over an insecure network. This document describes the SSH) s
-5 261 M
-( authentication protocol framework and public key, password, and) s
-5 250 M
-( host-based client authentication methods. Additional authentication) s
-5 239 M
-( methods are described in separate documents. The SSH authentication) s
-5 228 M
-( protocol runs on top of the SSH transport layer protocol and provides) s
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-( a single authenticated tunnel for the SSH connection protocol.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 1]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002) s
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-(Table of Contents) s
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-( 1. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3) s
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-( 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3) s
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-( 3.1.2 Responses to Authentication Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . 5) s
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-( 3.1.3 The "none" Authentication Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6) s
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-( 3.1.4 Completion of User Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6) s
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-( 3.1.5 Banner Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7) s
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-( 3.2 Authentication Protocol Message Numbers . . . . . . . . . . 7) s
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-( 3.3 Public Key Authentication Method: publickey . . . . . . . . 8) s
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-( 3.4 Password Authentication Method: password . . . . . . . . . . 10) s
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-( 3.5 Host-Based Authentication: hostbased . . . . . . . . . . . . 11) s
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-( 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12) s
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-( Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(1. Contributors) s
-5 668 M
-( The major original contributors of this document were: Tatu Ylonen,) s
-5 657 M
-( Tero Kivinen, Timo J. Rinne, Sami Lehtinen \(all of SSH Communications) s
-5 646 M
-( Security Corp\), and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen \(University of) s
-5 635 M
-( Jyvaskyla\)) s
-5 613 M
-( The document editor is: [email protected]. Comments on this) s
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-( internet draft should be sent to the IETF SECSH working group,) s
-5 591 M
-( details at: http://ietf.org/html.charters/secsh-charter.html) s
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-(2. Introduction) s
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-( The SSH authentication protocol is a general-purpose user) s
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-( authentication protocol. It is intended to be run over the SSH) s
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-( transport layer protocol [SSH-TRANS]. This protocol assumes that the) s
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-( underlying protocols provide integrity and confidentiality) s
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-( protection.) s
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-( This document should be read only after reading the SSH architecture) s
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-( document [SSH-ARCH]. This document freely uses terminology and) s
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-( notation from the architecture document without reference or further) s
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-( explanation.) s
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-( The service name for this protocol is "ssh-userauth".) s
-5 404 M
-( When this protocol starts, it receives the session identifier from) s
-5 393 M
-( the lower-level protocol \(this is the exchange hash H from the first) s
-5 382 M
-( key exchange\). The session identifier uniquely identifies this) s
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-( session and is suitable for signing in order to prove ownership of a) s
-5 360 M
-( private key. This protocol also needs to know whether the lower-level) s
-5 349 M
-( protocol provides confidentiality protection.) s
-5 327 M
-(3. Conventions Used in This Document) s
-5 305 M
-( The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",) s
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-( and "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as) s
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-( described in [RFC2119]) s
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-( The used data types and terminology are specified in the architecture) s
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-( document [SSH-ARCH]) s
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-( The architecture document also discusses the algorithm naming) s
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-( conventions that MUST be used with the SSH protocols.) s
-5 195 M
-(3.1 The Authentication Protocol Framework) s
-5 173 M
-( The server drives the authentication by telling the client which) s
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-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 3]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( authentication methods can be used to continue the exchange at any) s
-5 679 M
-( given time. The client has the freedom to try the methods listed by) s
-5 668 M
-( the server in any order. This gives the server complete control over) s
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-( the authentication process if desired, but also gives enough) s
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-5 635 M
-( most convenient for the user, when multiple methods are offered by) s
-5 624 M
-( the server.) s
-5 602 M
-( Authentication methods are identified by their name, as defined in) s
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-( supported. However, it MAY be sent by the client. The server MUST) s
-5 569 M
-( always reject this request, unless the client is to be allowed in) s
-5 558 M
-( without any authentication, in which case the server MUST accept this) s
-5 547 M
-( request. The main purpose of sending this request is to get the list) s
-5 536 M
-( of supported methods from the server.) s
-5 514 M
-( The server SHOULD have a timeout for authentication, and disconnect) s
-5 503 M
-( if the authentication has not been accepted within the timeout) s
-5 492 M
-( period. The RECOMMENDED timeout period is 10 minutes. Additionally,) s
-5 481 M
-( the implementation SHOULD limit the number of failed authentication) s
-5 470 M
-( attempts a client may perform in a single session \(the RECOMMENDED) s
-5 459 M
-( limit is 20 attempts\). If the threshold is exceeded, the server) s
-5 448 M
-( SHOULD disconnect.) s
-5 426 M
-(3.1.1 Authentication Requests) s
-5 404 M
-( All authentication requests MUST use the following message format.) s
-5 393 M
-( Only the first few fields are defined; the remaining fields depend on) s
-5 382 M
-( the authentication method.) s
-5 360 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) s
-5 349 M
-( string user name \(in ISO-10646 UTF-8 encoding [RFC2279]\)) s
-5 338 M
-( string service name \(in US-ASCII\)) s
-5 327 M
-( string method name \(US-ASCII\)) s
-5 316 M
-( The rest of the packet is method-specific.) s
-5 294 M
-( The user name and service are repeated in every new authentication) s
-5 283 M
-( attempt, and MAY change. The server implementation MUST carefully) s
-5 272 M
-( check them in every message, and MUST flush any accumulated) s
-5 261 M
-( authentication states if they change. If it is unable to flush some) s
-5 250 M
-( authentication state, it MUST disconnect if the user or service name) s
-5 239 M
-( changes.) s
-5 217 M
-( The service name specifies the service to start after authentication.) s
-5 206 M
-( There may be several different authenticated services provided. If) s
-5 195 M
-( the requested service is not available, the server MAY disconnect) s
-5 184 M
-( immediately or at any later time. Sending a proper disconnect) s
-5 173 M
-( message is RECOMMENDED. In any case, if the service does not exist,) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 4]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( authentication MUST NOT be accepted.) s
-5 668 M
-( If the requested user does not exist, the server MAY disconnect, or) s
-5 657 M
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-5 602 M
-( While there is usually little point for clients to send requests that) s
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-( an error, and the server SHOULD simply reject requests that it does) s
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-( not recognize.) s
-5 547 M
-( An authentication request MAY result in a further exchange of) s
-5 536 M
-( messages. All such messages depend on the authentication method) s
-5 525 M
-( used, and the client MAY at any time continue with a new) s
-5 514 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST message, in which case the server MUST) s
-5 503 M
-( abandon the previous authentication attempt and continue with the new) s
-5 492 M
-( one.) s
-5 470 M
-(3.1.2 Responses to Authentication Requests) s
-5 448 M
-( If the server rejects the authentication request, it MUST respond) s
-5 437 M
-( with the following:) s
-5 415 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE) s
-5 404 M
-( string authentications that can continue) s
-5 393 M
-( boolean partial success) s
-5 371 M
-( "Authentications that can continue" is a comma-separated list of) s
-5 360 M
-( authentication method names that may productively continue the) s
-5 349 M
-( authentication dialog.) s
-5 327 M
-( It is RECOMMENDED that servers only include those methods in the list) s
-5 316 M
-( that are actually useful. However, it is not illegal to include) s
-5 305 M
-( methods that cannot be used to authenticate the user.) s
-5 283 M
-( Already successfully completed authentications SHOULD NOT be included) s
-5 272 M
-( in the list, unless they really should be performed again for some) s
-5 261 M
-( reason.) s
-5 239 M
-( "Partial success" MUST be TRUE if the authentication request to which) s
-5 228 M
-( this is a response was successful. It MUST be FALSE if the request) s
-5 217 M
-( was not successfully processed.) s
-5 195 M
-( When the server accepts authentication, it MUST respond with the) s
-5 184 M
-( following:) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 5]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS) s
-5 668 M
-( Note that this is not sent after each step in a multi-method) s
-5 657 M
-( authentication sequence, but only when the authentication is) s
-5 646 M
-( complete.) s
-5 624 M
-( The client MAY send several authentication requests without waiting) s
-5 613 M
-( for responses from previous requests. The server MUST process each) s
-5 602 M
-( request completely and acknowledge any failed requests with a) s
-5 591 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message before processing the next request.) s
-5 569 M
-( A request that results in further exchange of messages will be) s
-5 558 M
-( aborted by a second request. It is not possible to send a second) s
-5 547 M
-( request without waiting for a response from the server, if the first) s
-5 536 M
-( request will result in further exchange of messages. No) s
-5 525 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message will be sent for the aborted method.) s
-5 503 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS MUST be sent only once. When) s
-5 492 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS has been sent, any further authentication) s
-5 481 M
-( requests received after that SHOULD be silently ignored.) s
-5 459 M
-( Any non-authentication messages sent by the client after the request) s
-5 448 M
-( that resulted in SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS being sent MUST be passed) s
-5 437 M
-( to the service being run on top of this protocol. Such messages can) s
-5 426 M
-( be identified by their message numbers \(see Section Message Numbers) s
-5 415 M
-( \(Section 3.2\)\).) s
-5 393 M
-(3.1.3 The "none" Authentication Request) s
-5 371 M
-( A client may request a list of authentication methods that may) s
-5 360 M
-( continue by using the "none" authentication method.) s
-5 338 M
-( If no authentication at all is needed for the user, the server MUST) s
-5 327 M
-( return SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS. Otherwise, the server MUST return) s
-5 316 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE and MAY return with it a list of) s
-5 305 M
-( authentication methods that can continue.) s
-5 283 M
-( This method MUST NOT be listed as supported by the server.) s
-5 261 M
-(3.1.4 Completion of User Authentication) s
-5 239 M
-( Authentication is complete when the server has responded with) s
-5 228 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS; all authentication related messages) s
-5 217 M
-( received after sending this message SHOULD be silently ignored.) s
-5 195 M
-( After sending SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, the server starts the) s
-5 184 M
-( requested service.) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 6]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002) s
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-(3.1.5 Banner Message) s
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-( In some jurisdictions, sending a warning message before) s
-5 657 M
-( authentication may be relevant for getting legal protection. Many) s
-5 646 M
-( UNIX machines, for example, normally display text from `/etc/issue',) s
-5 635 M
-( or use "tcp wrappers" or similar software to display a banner before) s
-5 624 M
-( issuing a login prompt.) s
-5 602 M
-( The SSH server may send a SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER message at any time) s
-5 591 M
-( before authentication is successful. This message contains text to) s
-5 580 M
-( be displayed to the client user before authentication is attempted.) s
-5 569 M
-( The format is as follows:) s
-5 547 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER) s
-5 536 M
-( string message \(ISO-10646 UTF-8\)) s
-5 525 M
-( string language tag \(as defined in [RFC3066]\)) s
-5 503 M
-( The client SHOULD by default display the message on the screen.) s
-5 492 M
-( However, since the message is likely to be sent for every login) s
-5 481 M
-( attempt, and since some client software will need to open a separate) s
-5 470 M
-( window for this warning, the client software may allow the user to) s
-5 459 M
-( explicitly disable the display of banners from the server. The) s
-5 448 M
-( message may consist of multiple lines.) s
-5 426 M
-( If the message string is displayed, control character filtering) s
-5 415 M
-( discussed in [SSH-ARCH] SHOULD be used to avoid attacks by sending) s
-5 404 M
-( terminal control characters.) s
-5 382 M
-(3.2 Authentication Protocol Message Numbers) s
-5 360 M
-( All message numbers used by this authentication protocol are in the) s
-5 349 M
-( range from 50 to 79, which is part of the range reserved for) s
-5 338 M
-( protocols running on top of the SSH transport layer protocol.) s
-5 316 M
-( Message numbers of 80 and higher are reserved for protocols running) s
-5 305 M
-( after this authentication protocol, so receiving one of them before) s
-5 294 M
-( authentication is complete is an error, to which the server MUST) s
-5 283 M
-( respond by disconnecting \(preferably with a proper disconnect message) s
-5 272 M
-( sent first to ease troubleshooting\).) s
-5 250 M
-( After successful authentication, such messages are passed to the) s
-5 239 M
-( higher-level service.) s
-5 217 M
-( These are the general authentication message codes:) s
-5 195 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50) s
-5 184 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51) s
-5 173 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 7]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53) s
-5 668 M
-( In addition to the above, there is a range of message numbers) s
-5 657 M
-( \(60..79\) reserved for method-specific messages. These messages are) s
-5 646 M
-( only sent by the server \(client sends only SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) s
-5 635 M
-( messages\). Different authentication methods reuse the same message) s
-5 624 M
-( numbers.) s
-5 602 M
-(3.3 Public Key Authentication Method: publickey) s
-5 580 M
-( The only REQUIRED authentication method is public key authentication.) s
-5 569 M
-( All implementations MUST support this method; however, not all users) s
-5 558 M
-( need to have public keys, and most local policies are not likely to) s
-5 547 M
-( require public key authentication for all users in the near future.) s
-5 525 M
-( With this method, the possession of a private key serves as) s
-5 514 M
-( authentication. This method works by sending a signature created) s
-5 503 M
-( with a private key of the user. The server MUST check that the key) s
-5 492 M
-( is a valid authenticator for the user, and MUST check that the) s
-5 481 M
-( signature is valid. If both hold, the authentication request MUST be) s
-5 470 M
-( accepted; otherwise it MUST be rejected. \(Note that the server MAY) s
-5 459 M
-( require additional authentications after successful authentication.\)) s
-5 437 M
-( Private keys are often stored in an encrypted form at the client) s
-5 426 M
-( host, and the user must supply a passphrase before the signature can) s
-5 415 M
-( be generated. Even if they are not, the signing operation involves) s
-5 404 M
-( some expensive computation. To avoid unnecessary processing and user) s
-5 393 M
-( interaction, the following message is provided for querying whether) s
-5 382 M
-( authentication using the key would be acceptable.) s
-5 360 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) s
-5 349 M
-( string user name) s
-5 338 M
-( string service) s
-5 327 M
-( string "publickey") s
-5 316 M
-( boolean FALSE) s
-5 305 M
-( string public key algorithm name) s
-5 294 M
-( string public key blob) s
-5 272 M
-( Public key algorithms are defined in the transport layer) s
-5 261 M
-( specification [SSH-TRANS]. The public key blob may contain) s
-5 250 M
-( certificates.) s
-5 228 M
-( Any public key algorithm may be offered for use in authentication.) s
-5 217 M
-( In particular, the list is not constrained by what was negotiated) s
-5 206 M
-( during key exchange. If the server does not support some algorithm,) s
-5 195 M
-( it MUST simply reject the request.) s
-5 173 M
-( The server MUST respond to this message with either) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 8]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE or with the following:) s
-5 668 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK) s
-5 657 M
-( string public key algorithm name from the request) s
-5 646 M
-( string public key blob from the request) s
-5 624 M
-( To perform actual authentication, the client MAY then send a) s
-5 613 M
-( signature generated using the private key. The client MAY send the) s
-5 602 M
-( signature directly without first verifying whether the key is) s
-5 591 M
-( acceptable. The signature is sent using the following packet:) s
-5 569 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) s
-5 558 M
-( string user name) s
-5 547 M
-( string service) s
-5 536 M
-( string "publickey") s
-5 525 M
-( boolean TRUE) s
-5 514 M
-( string public key algorithm name) s
-5 503 M
-( string public key to be used for authentication) s
-5 492 M
-( string signature) s
-5 470 M
-( Signature is a signature by the corresponding private key over the) s
-5 459 M
-( following data, in the following order:) s
-5 437 M
-( string session identifier) s
-5 426 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) s
-5 415 M
-( string user name) s
-5 404 M
-( string service) s
-5 393 M
-( string "publickey") s
-5 382 M
-( boolean TRUE) s
-5 371 M
-( string public key algorithm name) s
-5 360 M
-( string public key to be used for authentication) s
-5 338 M
-( When the server receives this message, it MUST check whether the) s
-5 327 M
-( supplied key is acceptable for authentication, and if so, it MUST) s
-5 316 M
-( check whether the signature is correct.) s
-5 294 M
-( If both checks succeed, this method is successful. Note that the) s
-5 283 M
-( server may require additional authentications. The server MUST) s
-5 272 M
-( respond with SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS \(if no more authentications are) s
-5 261 M
-( needed\), or SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE \(if the request failed, or more) s
-5 250 M
-( authentications are needed\).) s
-5 228 M
-( The following method-specific message numbers are used by the) s
-5 217 M
-( publickey authentication method.) s
-5 195 M
-( /* Key-based */) s
-5 184 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 9]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002) s
-5 690 M
-(3.4 Password Authentication Method: password) s
-5 668 M
-( Password authentication uses the following packets. Note that a) s
-5 657 M
-( server MAY request the user to change the password. All) s
-5 646 M
-( implementations SHOULD support password authentication.) s
-5 624 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) s
-5 613 M
-( string user name) s
-5 602 M
-( string service) s
-5 591 M
-( string "password") s
-5 580 M
-( boolean FALSE) s
-5 569 M
-( string plaintext password \(ISO-10646 UTF-8\)) s
-5 547 M
-( Note that the password is encoded in ISO-10646 UTF-8. It is up to) s
-5 536 M
-( the server how it interprets the password and validates it against) s
-5 525 M
-( the password database. However, if the client reads the password in) s
-5 514 M
-( some other encoding \(e.g., ISO 8859-1 \(ISO Latin1\)\), it MUST convert) s
-5 503 M
-( the password to ISO-10646 UTF-8 before transmitting, and the server) s
-5 492 M
-( MUST convert the password to the encoding used on that system for) s
-5 481 M
-( passwords.) s
-5 459 M
-( Note that even though the cleartext password is transmitted in the) s
-5 448 M
-( packet, the entire packet is encrypted by the transport layer. Both) s
-5 437 M
-( the server and the client should check whether the underlying) s
-5 426 M
-( transport layer provides confidentiality \(i.e., if encryption is) s
-5 415 M
-( being used\). If no confidentiality is provided \(none cipher\),) s
-5 404 M
-( password authentication SHOULD be disabled. If there is no) s
-5 393 M
-( confidentiality or no MAC, password change SHOULD be disabled.) s
-5 371 M
-( Normally, the server responds to this message with success or) s
-5 360 M
-( failure. However, if the password has expired the server SHOULD) s
-5 349 M
-( indicate this by responding with SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ.) s
-5 338 M
-( In anycase the server MUST NOT allow an expired password to be used) s
-5 327 M
-( for authentication.) s
-5 305 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ) s
-5 294 M
-( string prompt \(ISO-10646 UTF-8\)) s
-5 283 M
-( string language tag \(as defined in [RFC3066]\)) s
-5 261 M
-( In this case, the client MAY continue with a different authentication) s
-5 250 M
-( method, or request a new password from the user and retry password) s
-5 239 M
-( authentication using the following message. The client MAY also send) s
-5 228 M
-( this message instead of the normal password authentication request) s
-5 217 M
-( without the server asking for it.) s
-5 195 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) s
-5 184 M
-( string user name) s
-5 173 M
-( string service) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 10]) s
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-5 723 M
-(Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( string "password") s
-5 679 M
-( boolean TRUE) s
-5 668 M
-( string plaintext old password \(ISO-10646 UTF-8\)) s
-5 657 M
-( string plaintext new password \(ISO-10646 UTF-8\)) s
-5 635 M
-( The server must reply to request message with) s
-5 624 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, or another) s
-5 613 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ. The meaning of these is as) s
-5 602 M
-( follows:) s
-5 580 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS The password has been changed, and) s
-5 569 M
-( authentication has been successfully completed.) s
-5 547 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE with partial success The password has) s
-5 536 M
-( been changed, but more authentications are needed.) s
-5 514 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE without partial success The password has) s
-5 503 M
-( not been changed. Either password changing was not supported, or) s
-5 492 M
-( the old password was bad. Note that if the server has already) s
-5 481 M
-( sent SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, we know that it supports) s
-5 470 M
-( changing the password.) s
-5 448 M
-( SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_CHANGEREQ The password was not changed because) s
-5 437 M
-( the new password was not acceptable \(e.g. too easy to guess\).) s
-5 415 M
-( The following method-specific message numbers are used by the) s
-5 404 M
-( password authentication method.) s
-5 382 M
-( #define SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60) s
-5 349 M
-(3.5 Host-Based Authentication: hostbased) s
-5 327 M
-( Some sites wish to allow authentication based on the host where the) s
-5 316 M
-( user is coming from, and the user name on the remote host. While) s
-5 305 M
-( this form of authentication is not suitable for high-security sites,) s
-5 294 M
-( it can be very convenient in many environments. This form of) s
-5 283 M
-( authentication is OPTIONAL. When used, special care SHOULD be taken) s
-5 272 M
-( to prevent a regular user from obtaining the private host key.) s
-5 250 M
-( The client requests this form of authentication by sending the) s
-5 239 M
-( following message. It is similar to the UNIX "rhosts" and) s
-5 228 M
-( "hosts.equiv" styles of authentication, except that the identity of) s
-5 217 M
-( the client host is checked more rigorously.) s
-5 195 M
-( This method works by having the client send a signature created with) s
-5 184 M
-( the private key of the client host, which the server checks with that) s
-5 173 M
-( host's public key. Once the client host's identity is established,) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 11]) s
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-(Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002) s
-5 690 M
-( authorization \(but no further authentication\) is performed based on) s
-5 679 M
-( the user names on the server and the client, and the client host) s
-5 668 M
-( name.) s
-5 646 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) s
-5 635 M
-( string user name) s
-5 624 M
-( string service) s
-5 613 M
-( string "hostbased") s
-5 602 M
-( string public key algorithm for host key) s
-5 591 M
-( string public host key and certificates for client host) s
-5 580 M
-( string client host name \(FQDN; US-ASCII\)) s
-5 569 M
-( string user name on the client host \(ISO-10646 UTF-8\)) s
-5 558 M
-( string signature) s
-5 536 M
-( Public key algorithm names for use in "public key algorithm for host) s
-5 525 M
-( key" are defined in the transport layer specification. The "public) s
-5 514 M
-( host key for client host" may include certificates.) s
-5 492 M
-( Signature is a signature with the private host key of the following) s
-5 481 M
-( data, in this order:) s
-5 459 M
-( string session identifier) s
-5 448 M
-( byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) s
-5 437 M
-( string user name) s
-5 426 M
-( string service) s
-5 415 M
-( string "hostbased") s
-5 404 M
-( string public key algorithm for host key) s
-5 393 M
-( string public host key and certificates for client host) s
-5 382 M
-( string client host name \(FQDN; US-ASCII\)) s
-5 371 M
-( string user name on the client host\(ISO-10646 UTF-8\)) s
-5 349 M
-( The server MUST verify that the host key actually belongs to the) s
-5 338 M
-( client host named in the message, that the given user on that host is) s
-5 327 M
-( allowed to log in, and that the signature is a valid signature on the) s
-5 316 M
-( appropriate value by the given host key. The server MAY ignore the) s
-5 305 M
-( client user name, if it wants to authenticate only the client host.) s
-5 283 M
-( It is RECOMMENDED that whenever possible, the server perform) s
-5 272 M
-( additional checks to verify that the network address obtained from) s
-5 261 M
-( the \(untrusted\) network matches the given client host name. This) s
-5 250 M
-( makes exploiting compromised host keys more difficult. Note that) s
-5 239 M
-( this may require special handling for connections coming through a) s
-5 228 M
-( firewall.) s
-5 206 M
-(4. Security Considerations) s
-5 184 M
-( The purpose of this protocol is to perform client user) s
-5 173 M
-( authentication. It assumed that this runs over a secure transport) s
-5 129 M
-(Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 12]) s
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-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Transport Layer Protocol", I-D) s
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-( draft-ietf-transport-17.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 481 M
-( [SSH-USERAUTH]) s
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-( Ylonen, T., "SSH Authentication Protocol", I-D) s
-5 459 M
-( draft-ietf-userauth-18.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 437 M
-( [SSH-CONNECT]) s
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-( draft-ietf-connect-18.txt, Oct 2003.) s
-5 393 M
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-5 371 M
-( Numbers", I-D draft-ietf-secsh-assignednumbers-05.txt, Oct) s
-5 360 M
-( 2003.) s
-5 338 M
-( [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate) s
-5 327 M
-( Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.) s
-5 305 M
-(Informative) s
-5 283 M
-( [RFC3066] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of) s
-5 272 M
-( Languages", BCP 47, RFC 3066, January 2001.) s
-5 250 M
-( [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO) s
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-( 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.) s
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-( SSH Communications Security Corp) s
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-( The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any) s
-5 657 M
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-5 580 M
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-5 547 M
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-5 514 M
-( The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any) s
-5 503 M
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-5 492 M
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-5 470 M
-( Director.) s
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-( The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in) s
-5 437 M
-( regard to some or all of the specification contained in this) s
-5 426 M
-( document. For more information consult the online list of claimed) s
-5 415 M
-( rights.) s
-5 382 M
-(Full Copyright Statement) s
-5 360 M
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-5 327 M
-( others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it) s
-5 316 M
-( or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published) s
-5 305 M
-( and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any) s
-5 294 M
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-( followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than) s
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-( TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING) s
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-( HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF) s
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-( MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.) s
-5 602 M
-(Acknowledgment) s
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diff --git a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-userauth-18.txt b/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-userauth-18.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 9dae578a35..0000000000
--- a/lib/ssh/doc/standard/draft-ietf-secsh-userauth-18.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,896 +0,0 @@
-
-
-
-Network Working Group T. Ylonen
-Internet-Draft SSH Communications Security Corp
-Expires: March 2, 2003 D. Moffat, Ed.
- Sun Microsystems, Inc
- September 2002
-
-
- SSH Authentication Protocol
- draft-ietf-secsh-userauth-18.txt
-
-Status of this Memo
-
- This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
- all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
-
- Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
- Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
- groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
-
- Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
- and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
- time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
- material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
-
- The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
- www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
-
- The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
- http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
-
- This Internet-Draft will expire on March 2, 2003.
-
-Copyright Notice
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
-
-Abstract
-
- SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network
- services over an insecure network. This document describes the SSH
- authentication protocol framework and public key, password, and
- host-based client authentication methods. Additional authentication
- methods are described in separate documents. The SSH authentication
- protocol runs on top of the SSH transport layer protocol and provides
- a single authenticated tunnel for the SSH connection protocol.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 1]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002
-
-
-Table of Contents
-
- 1. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 3. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 3.1 The Authentication Protocol Framework . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 3.1.1 Authentication Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
- 3.1.2 Responses to Authentication Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 3.1.3 The "none" Authentication Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 3.1.4 Completion of User Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 3.1.5 Banner Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 3.2 Authentication Protocol Message Numbers . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 3.3 Public Key Authentication Method: publickey . . . . . . . . 8
- 3.4 Password Authentication Method: password . . . . . . . . . . 10
- 3.5 Host-Based Authentication: hostbased . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
- Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
- Informative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
- Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
- Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 15
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 2]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002
-
-
-1. Contributors
-
- The major original contributors of this document were: Tatu Ylonen,
- Tero Kivinen, Timo J. Rinne, Sami Lehtinen (all of SSH Communications
- Security Corp), and Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen (University of
- Jyvaskyla)
-
- The document editor is: [email protected]. Comments on this
- internet draft should be sent to the IETF SECSH working group,
- details at: http://ietf.org/html.charters/secsh-charter.html
-
-2. Introduction
-
- The SSH authentication protocol is a general-purpose user
- authentication protocol. It is intended to be run over the SSH
- transport layer protocol [SSH-TRANS]. This protocol assumes that the
- underlying protocols provide integrity and confidentiality
- protection.
-
- This document should be read only after reading the SSH architecture
- document [SSH-ARCH]. This document freely uses terminology and
- notation from the architecture document without reference or further
- explanation.
-
- The service name for this protocol is "ssh-userauth".
-
- When this protocol starts, it receives the session identifier from
- the lower-level protocol (this is the exchange hash H from the first
- key exchange). The session identifier uniquely identifies this
- session and is suitable for signing in order to prove ownership of a
- private key. This protocol also needs to know whether the lower-level
- protocol provides confidentiality protection.
-
-3. Conventions Used in This Document
-
- The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
- and "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as
- described in [RFC2119]
-
- The used data types and terminology are specified in the architecture
- document [SSH-ARCH]
-
- The architecture document also discusses the algorithm naming
- conventions that MUST be used with the SSH protocols.
-
-3.1 The Authentication Protocol Framework
-
- The server drives the authentication by telling the client which
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 3]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002
-
-
- authentication methods can be used to continue the exchange at any
- given time. The client has the freedom to try the methods listed by
- the server in any order. This gives the server complete control over
- the authentication process if desired, but also gives enough
- flexibility for the client to use the methods it supports or that are
- most convenient for the user, when multiple methods are offered by
- the server.
-
- Authentication methods are identified by their name, as defined in
- [SSH-ARCH]. The "none" method is reserved, and MUST NOT be listed as
- supported. However, it MAY be sent by the client. The server MUST
- always reject this request, unless the client is to be allowed in
- without any authentication, in which case the server MUST accept this
- request. The main purpose of sending this request is to get the list
- of supported methods from the server.
-
- The server SHOULD have a timeout for authentication, and disconnect
- if the authentication has not been accepted within the timeout
- period. The RECOMMENDED timeout period is 10 minutes. Additionally,
- the implementation SHOULD limit the number of failed authentication
- attempts a client may perform in a single session (the RECOMMENDED
- limit is 20 attempts). If the threshold is exceeded, the server
- SHOULD disconnect.
-
-3.1.1 Authentication Requests
-
- All authentication requests MUST use the following message format.
- Only the first few fields are defined; the remaining fields depend on
- the authentication method.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
- string user name (in ISO-10646 UTF-8 encoding [RFC2279])
- string service name (in US-ASCII)
- string method name (US-ASCII)
- The rest of the packet is method-specific.
-
- The user name and service are repeated in every new authentication
- attempt, and MAY change. The server implementation MUST carefully
- check them in every message, and MUST flush any accumulated
- authentication states if they change. If it is unable to flush some
- authentication state, it MUST disconnect if the user or service name
- changes.
-
- The service name specifies the service to start after authentication.
- There may be several different authenticated services provided. If
- the requested service is not available, the server MAY disconnect
- immediately or at any later time. Sending a proper disconnect
- message is RECOMMENDED. In any case, if the service does not exist,
-
-
-
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-
-
- authentication MUST NOT be accepted.
-
- If the requested user does not exist, the server MAY disconnect, or
- MAY send a bogus list of acceptable authentication methods, but never
- accept any. This makes it possible for the server to avoid
- disclosing information on which accounts exist. In any case, if the
- user does not exist, the authentication request MUST NOT be accepted.
-
- While there is usually little point for clients to send requests that
- the server does not list as acceptable, sending such requests is not
- an error, and the server SHOULD simply reject requests that it does
- not recognize.
-
- An authentication request MAY result in a further exchange of
- messages. All such messages depend on the authentication method
- used, and the client MAY at any time continue with a new
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST message, in which case the server MUST
- abandon the previous authentication attempt and continue with the new
- one.
-
-3.1.2 Responses to Authentication Requests
-
- If the server rejects the authentication request, it MUST respond
- with the following:
-
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
- string authentications that can continue
- boolean partial success
-
- "Authentications that can continue" is a comma-separated list of
- authentication method names that may productively continue the
- authentication dialog.
-
- It is RECOMMENDED that servers only include those methods in the list
- that are actually useful. However, it is not illegal to include
- methods that cannot be used to authenticate the user.
-
- Already successfully completed authentications SHOULD NOT be included
- in the list, unless they really should be performed again for some
- reason.
-
- "Partial success" MUST be TRUE if the authentication request to which
- this is a response was successful. It MUST be FALSE if the request
- was not successfully processed.
-
- When the server accepts authentication, it MUST respond with the
- following:
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 5]
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-Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002
-
-
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS
-
- Note that this is not sent after each step in a multi-method
- authentication sequence, but only when the authentication is
- complete.
-
- The client MAY send several authentication requests without waiting
- for responses from previous requests. The server MUST process each
- request completely and acknowledge any failed requests with a
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message before processing the next request.
-
- A request that results in further exchange of messages will be
- aborted by a second request. It is not possible to send a second
- request without waiting for a response from the server, if the first
- request will result in further exchange of messages. No
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message will be sent for the aborted method.
-
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS MUST be sent only once. When
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS has been sent, any further authentication
- requests received after that SHOULD be silently ignored.
-
- Any non-authentication messages sent by the client after the request
- that resulted in SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS being sent MUST be passed
- to the service being run on top of this protocol. Such messages can
- be identified by their message numbers (see Section Message Numbers
- (Section 3.2)).
-
-3.1.3 The "none" Authentication Request
-
- A client may request a list of authentication methods that may
- continue by using the "none" authentication method.
-
- If no authentication at all is needed for the user, the server MUST
- return SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS. Otherwise, the server MUST return
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE and MAY return with it a list of
- authentication methods that can continue.
-
- This method MUST NOT be listed as supported by the server.
-
-3.1.4 Completion of User Authentication
-
- Authentication is complete when the server has responded with
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS; all authentication related messages
- received after sending this message SHOULD be silently ignored.
-
- After sending SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, the server starts the
- requested service.
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 6]
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-
-
-3.1.5 Banner Message
-
- In some jurisdictions, sending a warning message before
- authentication may be relevant for getting legal protection. Many
- UNIX machines, for example, normally display text from `/etc/issue',
- or use "tcp wrappers" or similar software to display a banner before
- issuing a login prompt.
-
- The SSH server may send a SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER message at any time
- before authentication is successful. This message contains text to
- be displayed to the client user before authentication is attempted.
- The format is as follows:
-
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER
- string message (ISO-10646 UTF-8)
- string language tag (as defined in [RFC3066])
-
- The client SHOULD by default display the message on the screen.
- However, since the message is likely to be sent for every login
- attempt, and since some client software will need to open a separate
- window for this warning, the client software may allow the user to
- explicitly disable the display of banners from the server. The
- message may consist of multiple lines.
-
- If the message string is displayed, control character filtering
- discussed in [SSH-ARCH] SHOULD be used to avoid attacks by sending
- terminal control characters.
-
-3.2 Authentication Protocol Message Numbers
-
- All message numbers used by this authentication protocol are in the
- range from 50 to 79, which is part of the range reserved for
- protocols running on top of the SSH transport layer protocol.
-
- Message numbers of 80 and higher are reserved for protocols running
- after this authentication protocol, so receiving one of them before
- authentication is complete is an error, to which the server MUST
- respond by disconnecting (preferably with a proper disconnect message
- sent first to ease troubleshooting).
-
- After successful authentication, such messages are passed to the
- higher-level service.
-
- These are the general authentication message codes:
-
- #define SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50
- #define SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51
- #define SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 7]
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-Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002
-
-
- #define SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53
-
- In addition to the above, there is a range of message numbers
- (60..79) reserved for method-specific messages. These messages are
- only sent by the server (client sends only SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
- messages). Different authentication methods reuse the same message
- numbers.
-
-3.3 Public Key Authentication Method: publickey
-
- The only REQUIRED authentication method is public key authentication.
- All implementations MUST support this method; however, not all users
- need to have public keys, and most local policies are not likely to
- require public key authentication for all users in the near future.
-
- With this method, the possession of a private key serves as
- authentication. This method works by sending a signature created
- with a private key of the user. The server MUST check that the key
- is a valid authenticator for the user, and MUST check that the
- signature is valid. If both hold, the authentication request MUST be
- accepted; otherwise it MUST be rejected. (Note that the server MAY
- require additional authentications after successful authentication.)
-
- Private keys are often stored in an encrypted form at the client
- host, and the user must supply a passphrase before the signature can
- be generated. Even if they are not, the signing operation involves
- some expensive computation. To avoid unnecessary processing and user
- interaction, the following message is provided for querying whether
- authentication using the key would be acceptable.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
- string user name
- string service
- string "publickey"
- boolean FALSE
- string public key algorithm name
- string public key blob
-
- Public key algorithms are defined in the transport layer
- specification [SSH-TRANS]. The public key blob may contain
- certificates.
-
- Any public key algorithm may be offered for use in authentication.
- In particular, the list is not constrained by what was negotiated
- during key exchange. If the server does not support some algorithm,
- it MUST simply reject the request.
-
- The server MUST respond to this message with either
-
-
-
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-
-
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE or with the following:
-
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK
- string public key algorithm name from the request
- string public key blob from the request
-
- To perform actual authentication, the client MAY then send a
- signature generated using the private key. The client MAY send the
- signature directly without first verifying whether the key is
- acceptable. The signature is sent using the following packet:
-
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
- string user name
- string service
- string "publickey"
- boolean TRUE
- string public key algorithm name
- string public key to be used for authentication
- string signature
-
- Signature is a signature by the corresponding private key over the
- following data, in the following order:
-
- string session identifier
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
- string user name
- string service
- string "publickey"
- boolean TRUE
- string public key algorithm name
- string public key to be used for authentication
-
- When the server receives this message, it MUST check whether the
- supplied key is acceptable for authentication, and if so, it MUST
- check whether the signature is correct.
-
- If both checks succeed, this method is successful. Note that the
- server may require additional authentications. The server MUST
- respond with SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS (if no more authentications are
- needed), or SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE (if the request failed, or more
- authentications are needed).
-
- The following method-specific message numbers are used by the
- publickey authentication method.
-
- /* Key-based */
- #define SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 9]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002
-
-
-3.4 Password Authentication Method: password
-
- Password authentication uses the following packets. Note that a
- server MAY request the user to change the password. All
- implementations SHOULD support password authentication.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
- string user name
- string service
- string "password"
- boolean FALSE
- string plaintext password (ISO-10646 UTF-8)
-
- Note that the password is encoded in ISO-10646 UTF-8. It is up to
- the server how it interprets the password and validates it against
- the password database. However, if the client reads the password in
- some other encoding (e.g., ISO 8859-1 (ISO Latin1)), it MUST convert
- the password to ISO-10646 UTF-8 before transmitting, and the server
- MUST convert the password to the encoding used on that system for
- passwords.
-
- Note that even though the cleartext password is transmitted in the
- packet, the entire packet is encrypted by the transport layer. Both
- the server and the client should check whether the underlying
- transport layer provides confidentiality (i.e., if encryption is
- being used). If no confidentiality is provided (none cipher),
- password authentication SHOULD be disabled. If there is no
- confidentiality or no MAC, password change SHOULD be disabled.
-
- Normally, the server responds to this message with success or
- failure. However, if the password has expired the server SHOULD
- indicate this by responding with SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ.
- In anycase the server MUST NOT allow an expired password to be used
- for authentication.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ
- string prompt (ISO-10646 UTF-8)
- string language tag (as defined in [RFC3066])
-
- In this case, the client MAY continue with a different authentication
- method, or request a new password from the user and retry password
- authentication using the following message. The client MAY also send
- this message instead of the normal password authentication request
- without the server asking for it.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
- string user name
- string service
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 10]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002
-
-
- string "password"
- boolean TRUE
- string plaintext old password (ISO-10646 UTF-8)
- string plaintext new password (ISO-10646 UTF-8)
-
- The server must reply to request message with
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, or another
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ. The meaning of these is as
- follows:
-
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS The password has been changed, and
- authentication has been successfully completed.
-
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE with partial success The password has
- been changed, but more authentications are needed.
-
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE without partial success The password has
- not been changed. Either password changing was not supported, or
- the old password was bad. Note that if the server has already
- sent SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, we know that it supports
- changing the password.
-
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_CHANGEREQ The password was not changed because
- the new password was not acceptable (e.g. too easy to guess).
-
- The following method-specific message numbers are used by the
- password authentication method.
-
- #define SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60
-
-
-3.5 Host-Based Authentication: hostbased
-
- Some sites wish to allow authentication based on the host where the
- user is coming from, and the user name on the remote host. While
- this form of authentication is not suitable for high-security sites,
- it can be very convenient in many environments. This form of
- authentication is OPTIONAL. When used, special care SHOULD be taken
- to prevent a regular user from obtaining the private host key.
-
- The client requests this form of authentication by sending the
- following message. It is similar to the UNIX "rhosts" and
- "hosts.equiv" styles of authentication, except that the identity of
- the client host is checked more rigorously.
-
- This method works by having the client send a signature created with
- the private key of the client host, which the server checks with that
- host's public key. Once the client host's identity is established,
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 11]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002
-
-
- authorization (but no further authentication) is performed based on
- the user names on the server and the client, and the client host
- name.
-
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
- string user name
- string service
- string "hostbased"
- string public key algorithm for host key
- string public host key and certificates for client host
- string client host name (FQDN; US-ASCII)
- string user name on the client host (ISO-10646 UTF-8)
- string signature
-
- Public key algorithm names for use in "public key algorithm for host
- key" are defined in the transport layer specification. The "public
- host key for client host" may include certificates.
-
- Signature is a signature with the private host key of the following
- data, in this order:
-
- string session identifier
- byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
- string user name
- string service
- string "hostbased"
- string public key algorithm for host key
- string public host key and certificates for client host
- string client host name (FQDN; US-ASCII)
- string user name on the client host(ISO-10646 UTF-8)
-
- The server MUST verify that the host key actually belongs to the
- client host named in the message, that the given user on that host is
- allowed to log in, and that the signature is a valid signature on the
- appropriate value by the given host key. The server MAY ignore the
- client user name, if it wants to authenticate only the client host.
-
- It is RECOMMENDED that whenever possible, the server perform
- additional checks to verify that the network address obtained from
- the (untrusted) network matches the given client host name. This
- makes exploiting compromised host keys more difficult. Note that
- this may require special handling for connections coming through a
- firewall.
-
-4. Security Considerations
-
- The purpose of this protocol is to perform client user
- authentication. It assumed that this runs over a secure transport
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 12]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002
-
-
- layer protocol, which has already authenticated the server machine,
- established an encrypted communications channel, and computed a
- unique session identifier for this session. The transport layer
- provides forward secrecy for password authentication and other
- methods that rely on secret data.
-
- Full security considerations for this protocol are provided in
- Section 8 of [SSH-ARCH]
-
-Normative
-
- [SSH-ARCH]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Protocol Architecture", I-D
- draft-ietf-architecture-15.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-TRANS]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Transport Layer Protocol", I-D
- draft-ietf-transport-17.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-USERAUTH]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Authentication Protocol", I-D
- draft-ietf-userauth-18.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-CONNECT]
- Ylonen, T., "SSH Connection Protocol", I-D
- draft-ietf-connect-18.txt, Oct 2003.
-
- [SSH-NUMBERS]
- Lehtinen, S. and D. Moffat, "SSH Protocol Assigned
- Numbers", I-D draft-ietf-secsh-assignednumbers-05.txt, Oct
- 2003.
-
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
- Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
-
-Informative
-
- [RFC3066] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of
- Languages", BCP 47, RFC 3066, January 2001.
-
- [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
- 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 13]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002
-
-
-Authors' Addresses
-
- Tatu Ylonen
- SSH Communications Security Corp
- Fredrikinkatu 42
- HELSINKI FIN-00100
- Finland
-
-
-
- Darren J. Moffat (editor)
- Sun Microsystems, Inc
- 17 Network Circle
- Menlo Park 95025
- USA
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 14]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002
-
-
-Intellectual Property Statement
-
- The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
- intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
- pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
- this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
- might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
- has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
- IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
- standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
- claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
- licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
- obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
- proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
- be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
-
- The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
- copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
- rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
- this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
- Director.
-
- The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
- regard to some or all of the specification contained in this
- document. For more information consult the online list of claimed
- rights.
-
-
-Full Copyright Statement
-
- Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
-
- This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
- others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
- or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
- and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
- kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
- included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
- document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
- the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
- Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
- developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
- copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
- followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
- English.
-
- The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
- revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.
-
-
-
-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 15]
-
-Internet-Draft SSH Authentication Protocol September 2002
-
-
- This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
- "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
- TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
- BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
- HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
-
-
-Acknowledgment
-
- Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
- Internet Society.
-
-
-
-
-
-
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-
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-
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-Ylonen & Moffat Expires March 2, 2003 [Page 16] \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh.erl
index 132de71aed..bb50e436a3 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh.erl
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
default_algorithms/0,
stop_listener/1, stop_listener/2, stop_listener/3,
stop_daemon/1, stop_daemon/2, stop_daemon/3,
- shell/1, shell/2, shell/3]).
+ shell/1, shell/2, shell/3
+ ]).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec start() -> ok | {error, term()}.
@@ -117,9 +118,9 @@ channel_info(ConnectionRef, ChannelId, Options) ->
ssh_connection_handler:channel_info(ConnectionRef, ChannelId, Options).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec daemon(integer()) -> {ok, pid()}.
--spec daemon(integer(), proplists:proplist()) -> {ok, pid()}.
--spec daemon(any | inet:ip_address(), integer(), proplists:proplist()) -> {ok, pid()}.
+-spec daemon(integer()) -> {ok, pid()} | {error, term()}.
+-spec daemon(integer(), proplists:proplist()) -> {ok, pid()} | {error, term()}.
+-spec daemon(any | inet:ip_address(), integer(), proplists:proplist()) -> {ok, pid()} | {error, term()}.
%% Description: Starts a server listening for SSH connections
%% on the given port.
@@ -234,10 +235,27 @@ start_daemon(Host, Port, Options, Inet) ->
{error, _Reason} = Error ->
Error;
{SocketOptions, SshOptions}->
- do_start_daemon(Host, Port,[{role, server} |SshOptions] , [Inet | SocketOptions])
+ try
+ do_start_daemon(Host, Port,[{role, server} |SshOptions] , [Inet | SocketOptions])
+ catch
+ throw:bad_fd -> {error,bad_fd};
+ _C:_E -> {error,{cannot_start_daemon,_C,_E}}
+ end
end.
-do_start_daemon(Host, Port, Options, SocketOptions) ->
+do_start_daemon(Host0, Port0, Options, SocketOptions) ->
+ {Host,Port} = try
+ case proplists:get_value(fd, SocketOptions) of
+ undefined ->
+ {Host0,Port0};
+ Fd when Port0==0 ->
+ find_hostport(Fd);
+ _ ->
+ {Host0,Port0}
+ end
+ catch
+ _:_ -> throw(bad_fd)
+ end,
Profile = proplists:get_value(profile, Options, ?DEFAULT_PROFILE),
case ssh_system_sup:system_supervisor(Host, Port, Profile) of
undefined ->
@@ -271,6 +289,22 @@ do_start_daemon(Host, Port, Options, SocketOptions) ->
end
end.
+find_hostport(Fd) ->
+ %% Using internal functions inet:open/8 and inet:close/0.
+ %% Don't try this at home unless you know what you are doing!
+ {ok,S} = inet:open(Fd, {0,0,0,0}, 0, [], tcp, inet, stream, inet_tcp),
+ {ok, HostPort} = inet:sockname(S),
+ ok = inet:close(S),
+ HostPort.
+
+%% find_port(Fd) ->
+%% %% Hack....
+%% {ok,TmpSock} = gen_tcp:listen(0,[{fd,Fd}]),
+%% {ok, {_,ThePort}} = inet:sockname(TmpSock),
+%% gen_tcp:close(TmpSock),
+%% ThePort.
+
+
handle_options(Opts) ->
try handle_option(algs_compatibility(proplists:unfold(Opts)), [], []) of
{Inet, Ssh} ->
@@ -337,6 +371,8 @@ handle_option([{pwdfun, _} = Opt | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
handle_option([{key_cb, _} = Opt | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
+handle_option([{keyboard_interact_fun, _} = Opt | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
+ handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
%%Backwards compatibility
handle_option([{allow_user_interaction, Value} | Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option({user_interaction, Value}) | SshOptions]);
@@ -385,12 +421,15 @@ handle_option([{rekey_limit, _} = Opt|Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
handle_option([{max_sessions, _} = Opt|Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
+handle_option([{max_channels, _} = Opt|Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
+ handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
handle_option([{negotiation_timeout, _} = Opt|Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
handle_option([{parallel_login, _} = Opt|Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
-handle_option([parallel_login|Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
- handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option({parallel_login,true}) | SshOptions]);
+%% (Is handled by proplists:unfold above:)
+%% handle_option([parallel_login|Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
+%% handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option({parallel_login,true}) | SshOptions]);
handle_option([{minimal_remote_max_packet_size, _} = Opt|Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
handle_option(Rest, SocketOptions, [handle_ssh_option(Opt) | SshOptions]);
handle_option([{id_string, _ID} = Opt|Rest], SocketOptions, SshOptions) ->
@@ -417,32 +456,74 @@ handle_ssh_option({user_interaction, Value} = Opt) when is_boolean(Value) ->
Opt;
handle_ssh_option({preferred_algorithms,[_|_]} = Opt) ->
handle_pref_algs(Opt);
-handle_ssh_option({dh_gex_groups,L=[{I1,I2,I3}|_]}) when is_integer(I1), I1>0,
- is_integer(I2), I2>0,
- is_integer(I3), I3>0 ->
- {dh_gex_groups, lists:map(fun({N,G,P}) -> {N,{G,P}} end, L)};
-handle_ssh_option({dh_gex_groups,{file,File=[C|_]}}=Opt) when is_integer(C), C>0 ->
- %% A string, (file name)
- case file:consult(File) of
- {ok, List} ->
- try handle_ssh_option({dh_gex_groups,List}) of
- {dh_gex_groups,_} = NewOpt ->
- NewOpt
- catch
- _:_ ->
- throw({error, {{eoptions, Opt}, "Bad format in file"}})
- end;
- Error ->
- throw({error, {{eoptions, Opt},{"Error reading file",Error}}})
- end;
+
+handle_ssh_option({dh_gex_groups,L0}) when is_list(L0) ->
+ {dh_gex_groups,
+ collect_per_size(
+ lists:foldl(
+ fun({N,G,P}, Acc) when is_integer(N),N>0,
+ is_integer(G),G>0,
+ is_integer(P),P>0 ->
+ [{N,{G,P}} | Acc];
+ ({N,{G,P}}, Acc) when is_integer(N),N>0,
+ is_integer(G),G>0,
+ is_integer(P),P>0 ->
+ [{N,{G,P}} | Acc];
+ ({N,GPs}, Acc) when is_list(GPs) ->
+ lists:foldr(fun({Gi,Pi}, Acci) when is_integer(Gi),Gi>0,
+ is_integer(Pi),Pi>0 ->
+ [{N,{Gi,Pi}} | Acci]
+ end, Acc, GPs)
+ end, [], L0))};
+
+handle_ssh_option({dh_gex_groups,{Tag,File=[C|_]}}=Opt) when is_integer(C), C>0,
+ Tag == file ;
+ Tag == ssh_moduli_file ->
+ {ok,GroupDefs} =
+ case Tag of
+ file ->
+ file:consult(File);
+ ssh_moduli_file ->
+ case file:open(File,[read]) of
+ {ok,D} ->
+ try
+ {ok,Moduli} = read_moduli_file(D, 1, []),
+ file:close(D),
+ {ok, Moduli}
+ catch
+ _:_ ->
+ throw({error, {{eoptions, Opt}, "Bad format in file "++File}})
+ end;
+ {error,enoent} ->
+ throw({error, {{eoptions, Opt}, "File not found:"++File}});
+ {error,Error} ->
+ throw({error, {{eoptions, Opt}, io_lib:format("Error reading file ~s: ~p",[File,Error])}})
+ end
+ end,
+
+ try
+ handle_ssh_option({dh_gex_groups,GroupDefs})
+ catch
+ _:_ ->
+ throw({error, {{eoptions, Opt}, "Bad format in file: "++File}})
+ end;
+
+
+handle_ssh_option({dh_gex_limits,{Min,Max}} = Opt) when is_integer(Min), Min>0,
+ is_integer(Max), Max>=Min ->
+ %% Server
+ Opt;
handle_ssh_option({dh_gex_limits,{Min,I,Max}} = Opt) when is_integer(Min), Min>0,
is_integer(I), I>=Min,
is_integer(Max), Max>=I ->
+ %% Client
Opt;
handle_ssh_option({connect_timeout, Value} = Opt) when is_integer(Value); Value == infinity ->
Opt;
handle_ssh_option({max_sessions, Value} = Opt) when is_integer(Value), Value>0 ->
Opt;
+handle_ssh_option({max_channels, Value} = Opt) when is_integer(Value), Value>0 ->
+ Opt;
handle_ssh_option({negotiation_timeout, Value} = Opt) when is_integer(Value); Value == infinity ->
Opt;
handle_ssh_option({parallel_login, Value} = Opt) when Value==true ; Value==false ->
@@ -457,10 +538,14 @@ handle_ssh_option({password, Value} = Opt) when is_list(Value) ->
Opt;
handle_ssh_option({user_passwords, Value} = Opt) when is_list(Value)->
Opt;
-handle_ssh_option({pwdfun, Value} = Opt) when is_function(Value) ->
+handle_ssh_option({pwdfun, Value} = Opt) when is_function(Value,2) ->
+ Opt;
+handle_ssh_option({pwdfun, Value} = Opt) when is_function(Value,4) ->
Opt;
handle_ssh_option({key_cb, Value} = Opt) when is_atom(Value) ->
Opt;
+handle_ssh_option({keyboard_interact_fun, Value} = Opt) when is_function(Value,3) ->
+ Opt;
handle_ssh_option({compression, Value} = Opt) when is_atom(Value) ->
Opt;
handle_ssh_option({exec, {Module, Function, _}} = Opt) when is_atom(Module),
@@ -655,3 +740,33 @@ directory_exist_readable(Dir) ->
+collect_per_size(L) ->
+ lists:foldr(
+ fun({Sz,GP}, [{Sz,GPs}|Acc]) -> [{Sz,[GP|GPs]}|Acc];
+ ({Sz,GP}, Acc) -> [{Sz,[GP]}|Acc]
+ end, [], lists:sort(L)).
+
+read_moduli_file(D, I, Acc) ->
+ case io:get_line(D,"") of
+ {error,Error} ->
+ {error,Error};
+ eof ->
+ {ok, Acc};
+ "#" ++ _ -> read_moduli_file(D, I+1, Acc);
+ <<"#",_/binary>> -> read_moduli_file(D, I+1, Acc);
+ Data ->
+ Line = if is_binary(Data) -> binary_to_list(Data);
+ is_list(Data) -> Data
+ end,
+ try
+ [_Time,_Type,_Tests,_Tries,Size,G,P] = string:tokens(Line," \r\n"),
+ M = {list_to_integer(Size),
+ {list_to_integer(G), list_to_integer(P,16)}
+ },
+ read_moduli_file(D, I+1, [M|Acc])
+ catch
+ _:_ ->
+ read_moduli_file(D, I+1, Acc)
+ end
+ end.
+
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl
index 462c98f503..8efc743b67 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh.hrl
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
-define(SSH_DEFAULT_PORT, 22).
-define(SSH_MAX_PACKET_SIZE, (256*1024)).
--define(SSH_LENGHT_INDICATOR_SIZE, 4).
-define(REKEY_TIMOUT, 3600000).
-define(REKEY_DATA_TIMOUT, 60000).
-define(DEFAULT_PROFILE, default).
@@ -37,13 +36,16 @@
-define(FALSE, 0).
-define(TRUE, 1).
%% basic binary constructors
--define(BOOLEAN(X), X:8/unsigned-big-integer).
--define(BYTE(X), X:8/unsigned-big-integer).
--define(UINT16(X), X:16/unsigned-big-integer).
--define(UINT32(X), X:32/unsigned-big-integer).
--define(UINT64(X), X:64/unsigned-big-integer).
+-define(BOOLEAN(X), (X):8/unsigned-big-integer).
+-define(BYTE(X), (X):8/unsigned-big-integer).
+-define(UINT16(X), (X):16/unsigned-big-integer).
+-define(UINT32(X), (X):32/unsigned-big-integer).
+-define(UINT64(X), (X):64/unsigned-big-integer).
-define(STRING(X), ?UINT32((size(X))), (X)/binary).
+-define(DEC_BIN(X,Len), ?UINT32(Len), X:Len/binary ).
+-define(DEC_MPINT(I,Len), ?UINT32(Len), I:Len/big-signed-integer-unit:8 ).
+
%% building macros
-define(boolean(X),
case X of
@@ -133,9 +135,9 @@
userauth_supported_methods, % string() eg "keyboard-interactive,password"
userauth_methods, % list( string() ) eg ["keyboard-interactive", "password"]
kb_tries_left = 0, % integer(), num tries left for "keyboard-interactive"
- kb_data,
userauth_preference,
available_host_keys,
+ pwdfun_user_state,
authenticated = false
}).
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_acceptor.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_acceptor.erl
index c5ad1d7b6c..d94dedf1bf 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_acceptor.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_acceptor.erl
@@ -56,7 +56,12 @@ acceptor_init(Parent, Port, Address, SockOpts, Opts, AcceptTimeout) ->
error
end.
-do_socket_listen(Callback, Port, Opts) ->
+do_socket_listen(Callback, Port0, Opts) ->
+ Port =
+ case proplists:get_value(fd, Opts) of
+ undefined -> Port0;
+ _ -> 0
+ end,
case Callback:listen(Port, Opts) of
{error, nxdomain} ->
Callback:listen(Port, lists:delete(inet6, Opts));
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.erl
index a91b8c200e..4967a2e4cd 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.erl
@@ -31,8 +31,7 @@
-export([publickey_msg/1, password_msg/1, keyboard_interactive_msg/1,
service_request_msg/1, init_userauth_request_msg/1,
userauth_request_msg/1, handle_userauth_request/3,
- handle_userauth_info_request/3, handle_userauth_info_response/2,
- default_public_key_algorithms/0
+ handle_userauth_info_request/3, handle_userauth_info_response/2
]).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -42,27 +41,29 @@ publickey_msg([Alg, #ssh{user = User,
session_id = SessionId,
service = Service,
opts = Opts} = Ssh]) ->
-
Hash = sha, %% Maybe option?!
KeyCb = proplists:get_value(key_cb, Opts, ssh_file),
-
case KeyCb:user_key(Alg, Opts) of
- {ok, Key} ->
- StrAlgo = algorithm_string(Alg),
- PubKeyBlob = encode_public_key(Key),
- SigData = build_sig_data(SessionId,
- User, Service, PubKeyBlob, StrAlgo),
- Sig = ssh_transport:sign(SigData, Hash, Key),
- SigBlob = list_to_binary([?string(StrAlgo), ?binary(Sig)]),
- ssh_transport:ssh_packet(
- #ssh_msg_userauth_request{user = User,
- service = Service,
- method = "publickey",
- data = [?TRUE,
- ?string(StrAlgo),
- ?binary(PubKeyBlob),
- ?binary(SigBlob)]},
- Ssh);
+ {ok, PrivKey} ->
+ StrAlgo = atom_to_list(Alg),
+ case encode_public_key(StrAlgo, ssh_transport:extract_public_key(PrivKey)) of
+ not_ok ->
+ not_ok;
+ PubKeyBlob ->
+ SigData = build_sig_data(SessionId,
+ User, Service, PubKeyBlob, StrAlgo),
+ Sig = ssh_transport:sign(SigData, Hash, PrivKey),
+ SigBlob = list_to_binary([?string(StrAlgo), ?binary(Sig)]),
+ ssh_transport:ssh_packet(
+ #ssh_msg_userauth_request{user = User,
+ service = Service,
+ method = "publickey",
+ data = [?TRUE,
+ ?string(StrAlgo),
+ ?binary(PubKeyBlob),
+ ?binary(SigBlob)]},
+ Ssh)
+ end;
_Error ->
not_ok
end.
@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ init_userauth_request_msg(#ssh{opts = Opts} = Ssh) ->
Algs = proplists:get_value(public_key,
proplists:get_value(preferred_algorithms, Opts, []),
- default_public_key_algorithms()),
+ ssh_transport:default_algorithms(public_key)),
Prefs = method_preference(Algs),
ssh_transport:ssh_packet(Msg, Ssh#ssh{user = User,
userauth_preference = Prefs,
@@ -153,7 +154,7 @@ userauth_request_msg(#ssh{userauth_methods = Methods,
not_ok ->
userauth_request_msg(Ssh);
Result ->
- Result
+ {Pref,Result}
end;
false ->
userauth_request_msg(Ssh)
@@ -173,15 +174,15 @@ handle_userauth_request(#ssh_msg_userauth_request{user = User,
#ssh{opts = Opts,
userauth_supported_methods = Methods} = Ssh) ->
Password = unicode:characters_to_list(BinPwd),
- case check_password(User, Password, Opts) of
- true ->
+ case check_password(User, Password, Opts, Ssh) of
+ {true,Ssh1} ->
{authorized, User,
- ssh_transport:ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_userauth_success{}, Ssh)};
- false ->
+ ssh_transport:ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_userauth_success{}, Ssh1)};
+ {false,Ssh1} ->
{not_authorized, {User, {error,"Bad user or password"}},
ssh_transport:ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_userauth_failure{
authentications = Methods,
- partial_success = false}, Ssh)}
+ partial_success = false}, Ssh1)}
end;
handle_userauth_request(#ssh_msg_userauth_request{user = User,
@@ -299,8 +300,7 @@ handle_userauth_request(#ssh_msg_userauth_request{user = User,
>>
},
{not_authorized, {User, undefined},
- ssh_transport:ssh_packet(Msg, Ssh#ssh{user = User,
- kb_data = Msg
+ ssh_transport:ssh_packet(Msg, Ssh#ssh{user = User
})}
end;
@@ -313,6 +313,8 @@ handle_userauth_request(#ssh_msg_userauth_request{user = User,
#ssh_msg_userauth_failure{authentications = Methods,
partial_success = false}, Ssh)}.
+
+
handle_userauth_info_request(
#ssh_msg_userauth_info_request{name = Name,
instruction = Instr,
@@ -330,36 +332,19 @@ handle_userauth_info_request(
handle_userauth_info_response(#ssh_msg_userauth_info_response{num_responses = 1,
data = <<?UINT32(Sz), Password:Sz/binary>>},
#ssh{opts = Opts,
- kb_tries_left = KbTriesLeft0,
- kb_data = InfoMsg,
+ kb_tries_left = KbTriesLeft,
user = User,
userauth_supported_methods = Methods} = Ssh) ->
- KbTriesLeft = KbTriesLeft0 - 1,
- case check_password(User, unicode:characters_to_list(Password), Opts) of
- true ->
+ case check_password(User, unicode:characters_to_list(Password), Opts, Ssh) of
+ {true,Ssh1} ->
{authorized, User,
- ssh_transport:ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_userauth_success{}, Ssh)};
- false when KbTriesLeft > 0 ->
- UserAuthInfoMsg =
- InfoMsg#ssh_msg_userauth_info_request{
- name = "",
- instruction =
- lists:concat(
- ["Bad user or password, try again. ",
- integer_to_list(KbTriesLeft),
- " tries left."])
- },
- {not_authorized, {User, undefined},
- ssh_transport:ssh_packet(UserAuthInfoMsg,
- Ssh#ssh{kb_tries_left = KbTriesLeft})};
-
- false ->
+ ssh_transport:ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_userauth_success{}, Ssh1)};
+ {false,Ssh1} ->
{not_authorized, {User, {error,"Bad user or password"}},
ssh_transport:ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_userauth_failure{
authentications = Methods,
partial_success = false},
- Ssh#ssh{kb_data = undefined,
- kb_tries_left = 0}
+ Ssh1#ssh{kb_tries_left = max(KbTriesLeft-1, 0)}
)}
end;
@@ -371,8 +356,6 @@ handle_userauth_info_response(#ssh_msg_userauth_info_response{},
language = "en"}).
-default_public_key_algorithms() -> ?PREFERRED_PK_ALGS.
-
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -381,6 +364,11 @@ method_preference(Algs) ->
[{"publickey", ?MODULE, publickey_msg, [A]} | Acc]
end,
[{"password", ?MODULE, password_msg, []},
+ {"keyboard-interactive", ?MODULE, keyboard_interactive_msg, []},
+ {"keyboard-interactive", ?MODULE, keyboard_interactive_msg, []},
+ {"keyboard-interactive", ?MODULE, keyboard_interactive_msg, []},
+ {"keyboard-interactive", ?MODULE, keyboard_interactive_msg, []},
+ {"keyboard-interactive", ?MODULE, keyboard_interactive_msg, []},
{"keyboard-interactive", ?MODULE, keyboard_interactive_msg, []}
],
Algs).
@@ -404,13 +392,34 @@ user_name(Opts) ->
{ok, User}
end.
-check_password(User, Password, Opts) ->
+check_password(User, Password, Opts, Ssh) ->
case proplists:get_value(pwdfun, Opts) of
undefined ->
Static = get_password_option(Opts, User),
- Password == Static;
- Cheker ->
- Cheker(User, Password)
+ {Password == Static, Ssh};
+
+ Checker when is_function(Checker,2) ->
+ {Checker(User, Password), Ssh};
+
+ Checker when is_function(Checker,4) ->
+ #ssh{pwdfun_user_state = PrivateState,
+ peer = {_,PeerAddr={_,_}}
+ } = Ssh,
+ case Checker(User, Password, PeerAddr, PrivateState) of
+ true ->
+ {true,Ssh};
+ false ->
+ {false,Ssh};
+ {true,NewState} ->
+ {true, Ssh#ssh{pwdfun_user_state=NewState}};
+ {false,NewState} ->
+ {false, Ssh#ssh{pwdfun_user_state=NewState}};
+ disconnect ->
+ throw(#ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE,
+ description =
+ "Unable to connect using the available authentication methods",
+ language = ""})
+ end
end.
get_password_option(Opts, User) ->
@@ -447,10 +456,7 @@ build_sig_data(SessionId, User, Service, KeyBlob, Alg) ->
?binary(KeyBlob)],
list_to_binary(Sig).
-algorithm_string('ssh-rsa') ->
- "ssh-rsa";
-algorithm_string('ssh-dss') ->
- "ssh-dss".
+
decode_keyboard_interactive_prompts(_NumPrompts, Data) ->
ssh_message:decode_keyboard_interactive_prompts(Data, []).
@@ -471,14 +477,14 @@ keyboard_interact_get_responses(false, undefined, undefined, _, _, _, [Prompt|_]
ssh_no_io:read_line(Prompt, Opts); %% Throws error as keyboard interaction is not allowed
keyboard_interact_get_responses(true, undefined, _,IoCb, Name, Instr, PromptInfos, Opts, _) ->
keyboard_interact(IoCb, Name, Instr, PromptInfos, Opts);
-keyboard_interact_get_responses(true, Fun, _, Name, Instr, PromptInfos, _, _, NumPrompts) ->
+keyboard_interact_get_responses(true, Fun, _Pwd, _IoCb, Name, Instr, PromptInfos, _Opts, NumPrompts) ->
keyboard_interact_fun(Fun, Name, Instr, PromptInfos, NumPrompts).
keyboard_interact(IoCb, Name, Instr, Prompts, Opts) ->
- if Name /= "" -> IoCb:format("~s", [Name]);
+ if Name /= "" -> IoCb:format("~s~n", [Name]);
true -> ok
end,
- if Instr /= "" -> IoCb:format("~s", [Instr]);
+ if Instr /= "" -> IoCb:format("~s~n", [Instr]);
true -> ok
end,
lists:map(fun({Prompt, true}) -> IoCb:read_line(Prompt, Opts);
@@ -501,23 +507,18 @@ keyboard_interact_fun(KbdInteractFun, Name, Instr, PromptInfos, NumPrompts) ->
language = "en"}})
end.
-decode_public_key_v2(<<?UINT32(Len0), _:Len0/binary,
- ?UINT32(Len1), E:Len1/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
- ?UINT32(Len2), N:Len2/big-signed-integer-unit:8>>
- ,"ssh-rsa") ->
- {ok, #'RSAPublicKey'{publicExponent = E, modulus = N}};
-decode_public_key_v2(<<?UINT32(Len0), _:Len0/binary,
- ?UINT32(Len1), P:Len1/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
- ?UINT32(Len2), Q:Len2/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
- ?UINT32(Len3), G:Len3/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
- ?UINT32(Len4), Y:Len4/big-signed-integer-unit:8>>
- , "ssh-dss") ->
- {ok, {Y, #'Dss-Parms'{p = P, q = Q, g = G}}};
-
-decode_public_key_v2(_, _) ->
- {error, bad_format}.
-
-encode_public_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{publicExponent = E, modulus = N}) ->
- ssh_bits:encode(["ssh-rsa",E,N], [string,mpint,mpint]);
-encode_public_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{p = P, q = Q, g = G, y = Y}) ->
- ssh_bits:encode(["ssh-dss",P,Q,G,Y], [string,mpint,mpint,mpint,mpint]).
+decode_public_key_v2(Bin, _Type) ->
+ try
+ public_key:ssh_decode(Bin, ssh2_pubkey)
+ of
+ Key -> {ok, Key}
+ catch
+ _:_ -> {error, bad_format}
+ end.
+
+encode_public_key(_Alg, Key) ->
+ try
+ public_key:ssh_encode(Key, ssh2_pubkey)
+ catch
+ _:_ -> not_ok
+ end.
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.hrl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.hrl
index 71f222f6d7..5197a42fa4 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.hrl
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@
-define(SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS, "publickey,keyboard-interactive,password").
--define(PREFERRED_PK_ALGS, ['ssh-rsa','ssh-dss']).
-
-define(SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, 50).
-define(SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, 51).
-define(SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, 52).
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connect.hrl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connect.hrl
index 6db89c5d80..9f9f3de8fa 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connect.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connect.hrl
@@ -248,6 +248,9 @@
local_id, %% local channel id
recv_window_size,
+ recv_window_pending = 0, %% Sum of window size updates that has not
+ %% yet been sent. This limits the number
+ %% of sent update msgs.
recv_packet_size,
recv_close = false,
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection.erl
index 64d2113125..a34478732c 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection.erl
@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ handle_msg(#ssh_msg_channel_request{recipient_channel = ChannelId,
ReplyMsg = {subsystem, ChannelId, WantReply, binary_to_list(SsName)},
try
- {ok, Pid} = start_subsytem(SsName, Connection, Channel0, ReplyMsg),
+ {ok, Pid} = start_subsystem(SsName, Connection, Channel0, ReplyMsg),
erlang:monitor(process, Pid),
Channel = Channel0#channel{user = Pid},
ssh_channel:cache_update(Cache, Channel),
@@ -935,14 +935,27 @@ encode_ip(Addr) when is_list(Addr) ->
end
end.
-start_channel(Cb, Id, Args, SubSysSup) ->
- start_channel(Cb, Id, Args, SubSysSup, undefined).
+start_channel(Cb, Id, Args, SubSysSup, Opts) ->
+ start_channel(Cb, Id, Args, SubSysSup, undefined, Opts).
-start_channel(Cb, Id, Args, SubSysSup, Exec) ->
+start_channel(Cb, Id, Args, SubSysSup, Exec, Opts) ->
ChildSpec = child_spec(Cb, Id, Args, Exec),
ChannelSup = ssh_subsystem_sup:channel_supervisor(SubSysSup),
+ assert_limit_num_channels_not_exceeded(ChannelSup, Opts),
ssh_channel_sup:start_child(ChannelSup, ChildSpec).
+assert_limit_num_channels_not_exceeded(ChannelSup, Opts) ->
+ MaxNumChannels = proplists:get_value(max_channels, Opts, infinity),
+ NumChannels = length([x || {_,_,worker,[ssh_channel]} <-
+ supervisor:which_children(ChannelSup)]),
+ if
+ %% Note that NumChannels is BEFORE starting a new one
+ NumChannels < MaxNumChannels ->
+ ok;
+ true ->
+ throw(max_num_channels_exceeded)
+ end.
+
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -998,17 +1011,19 @@ child_spec(Callback, Id, Args, Exec) ->
start_cli(#connection{cli_spec = no_cli}, _) ->
{error, cli_disabled};
-start_cli(#connection{cli_spec = {CbModule, Args}, exec = Exec,
+start_cli(#connection{options = Options,
+ cli_spec = {CbModule, Args},
+ exec = Exec,
sub_system_supervisor = SubSysSup}, ChannelId) ->
- start_channel(CbModule, ChannelId, Args, SubSysSup, Exec).
+ start_channel(CbModule, ChannelId, Args, SubSysSup, Exec, Options).
-start_subsytem(BinName, #connection{options = Options,
+start_subsystem(BinName, #connection{options = Options,
sub_system_supervisor = SubSysSup},
#channel{local_id = ChannelId}, _ReplyMsg) ->
Name = binary_to_list(BinName),
case check_subsystem(Name, Options) of
{Callback, Opts} when is_atom(Callback), Callback =/= none ->
- start_channel(Callback, ChannelId, Opts, SubSysSup);
+ start_channel(Callback, ChannelId, Opts, SubSysSup, Options);
{Other, _} when Other =/= none ->
{error, legacy_option_not_supported}
end.
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl
index fcd66b80c0..68062209fc 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_connection_handler.erl
@@ -49,7 +49,10 @@
-export([hello/2, kexinit/2, key_exchange/2,
key_exchange_dh_gex_init/2, key_exchange_dh_gex_reply/2,
new_keys/2,
- userauth/2, connected/2,
+ service_request/2, connected/2,
+ userauth/2,
+ userauth_keyboard_interactive/2,
+ userauth_keyboard_interactive_info_response/2,
error/2]).
-export([init/1, handle_event/3,
@@ -82,7 +85,12 @@
recbuf
}).
--type state_name() :: hello | kexinit | key_exchange | new_keys | userauth | connection.
+-type state_name() :: hello | kexinit | key_exchange | key_exchange_dh_gex_init |
+ key_exchange_dh_gex_reply | new_keys | service_request |
+ userauth | userauth_keyboard_interactive |
+ userauth_keyboard_interactive_info_response |
+ connection.
+
-type gen_fsm_state_return() :: {next_state, state_name(), term()} |
{next_state, state_name(), term(), timeout()} |
{stop, term(), term()}.
@@ -474,28 +482,30 @@ new_keys(#ssh_msg_newkeys{} = Msg, #state{ssh_params = Ssh0} = State0) ->
after_new_keys(next_packet(State0#state{ssh_params = Ssh})).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec userauth(#ssh_msg_service_request{} | #ssh_msg_service_accept{} |
- #ssh_msg_userauth_request{} | #ssh_msg_userauth_info_request{} |
- #ssh_msg_userauth_info_response{} | #ssh_msg_userauth_success{} |
- #ssh_msg_userauth_failure{} | #ssh_msg_userauth_banner{},
- #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
+-spec service_request(#ssh_msg_service_request{} | #ssh_msg_service_accept{},
+ #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-userauth(#ssh_msg_service_request{name = "ssh-userauth"} = Msg,
+service_request(#ssh_msg_service_request{name = "ssh-userauth"} = Msg,
#state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = server,
session_id = SessionId} = Ssh0} = State) ->
{ok, {Reply, Ssh}} = ssh_auth:handle_userauth_request(Msg, SessionId, Ssh0),
send_msg(Reply, State),
{next_state, userauth, next_packet(State#state{ssh_params = Ssh})};
-userauth(#ssh_msg_service_accept{name = "ssh-userauth"},
- #state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = client,
- service = "ssh-userauth"} = Ssh0} =
- State) ->
+service_request(#ssh_msg_service_accept{name = "ssh-userauth"},
+ #state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = client,
+ service = "ssh-userauth"} = Ssh0} =
+ State) ->
{Msg, Ssh} = ssh_auth:init_userauth_request_msg(Ssh0),
send_msg(Msg, State),
- {next_state, userauth, next_packet(State#state{auth_user = Ssh#ssh.user, ssh_params = Ssh})};
+ {next_state, userauth, next_packet(State#state{auth_user = Ssh#ssh.user, ssh_params = Ssh})}.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec userauth(#ssh_msg_userauth_request{} | #ssh_msg_userauth_info_request{} |
+ #ssh_msg_userauth_info_response{} | #ssh_msg_userauth_success{} |
+ #ssh_msg_userauth_failure{} | #ssh_msg_userauth_banner{},
+ #state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
userauth(#ssh_msg_userauth_request{service = "ssh-connection",
method = "none"} = Msg,
#state{ssh_params = #ssh{session_id = SessionId, role = server,
@@ -520,7 +530,11 @@ userauth(#ssh_msg_userauth_request{service = "ssh-connection",
Pid ! ssh_connected,
connected_fun(User, Address, Method, Opts),
{next_state, connected,
- next_packet(State#state{auth_user = User, ssh_params = Ssh})};
+ next_packet(State#state{auth_user = User, ssh_params = Ssh#ssh{authenticated = true}})};
+ {not_authorized, {User, Reason}, {Reply, Ssh}} when Method == "keyboard-interactive" ->
+ retry_fun(User, Address, Reason, Opts),
+ send_msg(Reply, State),
+ {next_state, userauth_keyboard_interactive, next_packet(State#state{ssh_params = Ssh})};
{not_authorized, {User, Reason}, {Reply, Ssh}} ->
retry_fun(User, Address, Reason, Opts),
send_msg(Reply, State),
@@ -530,30 +544,6 @@ userauth(#ssh_msg_userauth_request{service = "ssh-connection",
userauth(Msg#ssh_msg_userauth_request{method="none"}, State)
end;
-userauth(#ssh_msg_userauth_info_request{} = Msg,
- #state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = client,
- io_cb = IoCb} = Ssh0} = State) ->
- {ok, {Reply, Ssh}} = ssh_auth:handle_userauth_info_request(Msg, IoCb, Ssh0),
- send_msg(Reply, State),
- {next_state, userauth, next_packet(State#state{ssh_params = Ssh})};
-
-userauth(#ssh_msg_userauth_info_response{} = Msg,
- #state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = server,
- peer = {_, Address}} = Ssh0,
- opts = Opts, starter = Pid} = State) ->
- case ssh_auth:handle_userauth_info_response(Msg, Ssh0) of
- {authorized, User, {Reply, Ssh}} ->
- send_msg(Reply, State),
- Pid ! ssh_connected,
- connected_fun(User, Address, "keyboard-interactive", Opts),
- {next_state, connected,
- next_packet(State#state{auth_user = User, ssh_params = Ssh})};
- {not_authorized, {User, Reason}, {Reply, Ssh}} ->
- retry_fun(User, Address, Reason, Opts),
- send_msg(Reply, State),
- {next_state, userauth, next_packet(State#state{ssh_params = Ssh})}
- end;
-
userauth(#ssh_msg_userauth_success{}, #state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = client} = Ssh,
starter = Pid} = State) ->
Pid ! ssh_connected,
@@ -580,19 +570,25 @@ userauth(#ssh_msg_userauth_failure{authentications = Methodes},
{disconnect, DisconnectMsg, {Msg, Ssh}} ->
send_msg(Msg, State),
handle_disconnect(DisconnectMsg, State#state{ssh_params = Ssh});
- {Msg, Ssh} ->
+ {"keyboard-interactive", {Msg, Ssh}} ->
+ send_msg(Msg, State),
+ {next_state, userauth_keyboard_interactive, next_packet(State#state{ssh_params = Ssh})};
+ {_Method, {Msg, Ssh}} ->
send_msg(Msg, State),
{next_state, userauth, next_packet(State#state{ssh_params = Ssh})}
end;
%% The prefered authentication method failed try next method
-userauth(#ssh_msg_userauth_failure{},
+userauth(#ssh_msg_userauth_failure{},
#state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = client} = Ssh0} = State) ->
case ssh_auth:userauth_request_msg(Ssh0) of
{disconnect, DisconnectMsg,{Msg, Ssh}} ->
send_msg(Msg, State),
handle_disconnect(DisconnectMsg, State#state{ssh_params = Ssh});
- {Msg, Ssh} ->
+ {"keyboard-interactive", {Msg, Ssh}} ->
+ send_msg(Msg, State),
+ {next_state, userauth_keyboard_interactive, next_packet(State#state{ssh_params = Ssh})};
+ {_Method, {Msg, Ssh}} ->
send_msg(Msg, State),
{next_state, userauth, next_packet(State#state{ssh_params = Ssh})}
end;
@@ -607,6 +603,50 @@ userauth(#ssh_msg_userauth_banner{message = Msg},
io:format("~s", [Msg]),
{next_state, userauth, next_packet(State)}.
+
+
+userauth_keyboard_interactive(#ssh_msg_userauth_info_request{} = Msg,
+ #state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = client,
+ io_cb = IoCb} = Ssh0} = State) ->
+ {ok, {Reply, Ssh}} = ssh_auth:handle_userauth_info_request(Msg, IoCb, Ssh0),
+ send_msg(Reply, State),
+ {next_state, userauth_keyboard_interactive_info_response, next_packet(State#state{ssh_params = Ssh})};
+
+userauth_keyboard_interactive(#ssh_msg_userauth_info_response{} = Msg,
+ #state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = server,
+ peer = {_, Address}} = Ssh0,
+ opts = Opts, starter = Pid} = State) ->
+ case ssh_auth:handle_userauth_info_response(Msg, Ssh0) of
+ {authorized, User, {Reply, Ssh}} ->
+ send_msg(Reply, State),
+ Pid ! ssh_connected,
+ connected_fun(User, Address, "keyboard-interactive", Opts),
+ {next_state, connected,
+ next_packet(State#state{auth_user = User, ssh_params = Ssh#ssh{authenticated = true}})};
+ {not_authorized, {User, Reason}, {Reply, Ssh}} ->
+ retry_fun(User, Address, Reason, Opts),
+ send_msg(Reply, State),
+ {next_state, userauth, next_packet(State#state{ssh_params = Ssh})}
+ end;
+userauth_keyboard_interactive(Msg = #ssh_msg_userauth_failure{},
+ #state{ssh_params = Ssh0 =
+ #ssh{role = client,
+ userauth_preference = Prefs0}}
+ = State) ->
+ Prefs = [{Method,M,F,A} || {Method,M,F,A} <- Prefs0,
+ Method =/= "keyboard-interactive"],
+ userauth(Msg, State#state{ssh_params = Ssh0#ssh{userauth_preference=Prefs}}).
+
+
+
+userauth_keyboard_interactive_info_response(Msg=#ssh_msg_userauth_failure{},
+ #state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = client}} = State) ->
+ userauth(Msg, State);
+
+userauth_keyboard_interactive_info_response(Msg=#ssh_msg_userauth_success{},
+ #state{ssh_params = #ssh{role = client}} = State) ->
+ userauth(Msg, State).
+
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec connected({#ssh_msg_kexinit{}, binary()}, %%| %% #ssh_msg_kexdh_init{},
#state{}) -> gen_fsm_state_return().
@@ -691,13 +731,28 @@ handle_event({adjust_window, ChannelId, Bytes}, StateName,
#connection{channel_cache = Cache}} = State0) ->
State =
case ssh_channel:cache_lookup(Cache, ChannelId) of
- #channel{recv_window_size = WinSize, remote_id = Id} = Channel ->
- ssh_channel:cache_update(Cache, Channel#channel{recv_window_size =
- WinSize + Bytes}),
- Msg = ssh_connection:channel_adjust_window_msg(Id, Bytes),
+ #channel{recv_window_size = WinSize,
+ recv_window_pending = Pending,
+ recv_packet_size = PktSize} = Channel
+ when (WinSize-Bytes) >= 2*PktSize ->
+ %% The peer can send at least two more *full* packet, no hurry.
+ ssh_channel:cache_update(Cache,
+ Channel#channel{recv_window_pending = Pending + Bytes}),
+ State0;
+
+ #channel{recv_window_size = WinSize,
+ recv_window_pending = Pending,
+ remote_id = Id} = Channel ->
+ %% Now we have to update the window - we can't receive so many more pkts
+ ssh_channel:cache_update(Cache,
+ Channel#channel{recv_window_size =
+ WinSize + Bytes + Pending,
+ recv_window_pending = 0}),
+ Msg = ssh_connection:channel_adjust_window_msg(Id, Bytes + Pending),
send_replies([{connection_reply, Msg}], State0);
- undefined ->
- State0
+
+ undefined ->
+ State0
end,
{next_state, StateName, next_packet(State)};
@@ -930,57 +985,39 @@ handle_info({Protocol, Socket, Info}, hello,
transport_protocol = Protocol} = State) ->
event({info_line, Info}, hello, State);
-handle_info({Protocol, Socket, Data}, Statename,
+handle_info({Protocol, Socket, Data}, StateName,
#state{socket = Socket,
transport_protocol = Protocol,
- ssh_params = #ssh{decrypt_block_size = BlockSize,
- recv_mac_size = MacSize} = Ssh0,
- decoded_data_buffer = <<>>,
- encoded_data_buffer = EncData0} = State0) ->
-
- %% Implementations SHOULD decrypt the length after receiving the
- %% first 8 (or cipher block size, whichever is larger) bytes of a
- %% packet. (RFC 4253: Section 6 - Binary Packet Protocol)
- case size(EncData0) + size(Data) >= erlang:max(8, BlockSize) of
- true ->
- {Ssh, SshPacketLen, DecData, EncData} =
-
- ssh_transport:decrypt_first_block(<<EncData0/binary,
- Data/binary>>, Ssh0),
- case SshPacketLen > ?SSH_MAX_PACKET_SIZE of
- true ->
- DisconnectMsg =
- #ssh_msg_disconnect{code =
- ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
- description = "Bad packet length "
- ++ integer_to_list(SshPacketLen),
- language = "en"},
- handle_disconnect(DisconnectMsg, State0);
- false ->
- RemainingSshPacketLen =
- (SshPacketLen + ?SSH_LENGHT_INDICATOR_SIZE) -
- BlockSize + MacSize,
- State = State0#state{ssh_params = Ssh},
- handle_ssh_packet_data(RemainingSshPacketLen,
- DecData, EncData, Statename,
- State)
- end;
- false ->
- {next_state, Statename,
- next_packet(State0#state{encoded_data_buffer =
- <<EncData0/binary, Data/binary>>})}
+ ssh_params = Ssh0,
+ decoded_data_buffer = DecData0,
+ encoded_data_buffer = EncData0,
+ undecoded_packet_length = RemainingSshPacketLen0} = State0) ->
+ Encoded = <<EncData0/binary, Data/binary>>,
+ case ssh_transport:handle_packet_part(DecData0, Encoded, RemainingSshPacketLen0, Ssh0) of
+ {get_more, DecBytes, EncDataRest, RemainingSshPacketLen, Ssh1} ->
+ {next_state, StateName,
+ next_packet(State0#state{encoded_data_buffer = EncDataRest,
+ decoded_data_buffer = DecBytes,
+ undecoded_packet_length = RemainingSshPacketLen,
+ ssh_params = Ssh1})};
+ {decoded, MsgBytes, EncDataRest, Ssh1} ->
+ generate_event(MsgBytes, StateName,
+ State0#state{ssh_params = Ssh1,
+ %% Important to be set for
+ %% next_packet
+%%% FIXME: the following three seem to always be set in generate_event!
+ decoded_data_buffer = <<>>,
+ undecoded_packet_length = undefined,
+ encoded_data_buffer = EncDataRest},
+ EncDataRest);
+ {bad_mac, Ssh1} ->
+ DisconnectMsg =
+ #ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
+ description = "Bad mac",
+ language = ""},
+ handle_disconnect(DisconnectMsg, State0#state{ssh_params=Ssh1})
end;
-
-handle_info({Protocol, Socket, Data}, Statename,
- #state{socket = Socket,
- transport_protocol = Protocol,
- decoded_data_buffer = DecData,
- encoded_data_buffer = EncData,
- undecoded_packet_length = Len} =
- State) when is_integer(Len) ->
- handle_ssh_packet_data(Len, DecData, <<EncData/binary, Data/binary>>,
- Statename, State);
-
+
handle_info({CloseTag, _Socket}, _StateName,
#state{transport_close_tag = CloseTag,
ssh_params = #ssh{role = _Role, opts = _Opts}} = State) ->
@@ -1058,7 +1095,7 @@ handle_info(UnexpectedMessage, StateName, #state{opts = Opts,
terminate(normal, _, #state{transport_cb = Transport,
connection_state = Connection,
socket = Socket}) ->
- terminate_subsytem(Connection),
+ terminate_subsystem(Connection),
(catch Transport:close(Socket)),
ok;
@@ -1087,7 +1124,7 @@ terminate({shutdown, _}, StateName, State) ->
terminate(Reason, StateName, #state{ssh_params = Ssh0, starter = _Pid,
connection_state = Connection} = State) ->
- terminate_subsytem(Connection),
+ terminate_subsystem(Connection),
log_error(Reason),
DisconnectMsg =
#ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION,
@@ -1098,10 +1135,10 @@ terminate(Reason, StateName, #state{ssh_params = Ssh0, starter = _Pid,
terminate(normal, StateName, State#state{ssh_params = Ssh}).
-terminate_subsytem(#connection{system_supervisor = SysSup,
+terminate_subsystem(#connection{system_supervisor = SysSup,
sub_system_supervisor = SubSysSup}) when is_pid(SubSysSup) ->
ssh_system_sup:stop_subsystem(SysSup, SubSysSup);
-terminate_subsytem(_) ->
+terminate_subsystem(_) ->
ok.
format_status(normal, [_, State]) ->
@@ -1236,9 +1273,9 @@ supported_host_keys(client, _, Options) ->
proplists:get_value(preferred_algorithms,Options,[])
) of
undefined ->
- ssh_auth:default_public_key_algorithms();
+ ssh_transport:default_algorithms(public_key);
L ->
- L -- (L--ssh_auth:default_public_key_algorithms())
+ L -- (L--ssh_transport:default_algorithms(public_key))
end
of
[] ->
@@ -1250,21 +1287,17 @@ supported_host_keys(client, _, Options) ->
{stop, {shutdown, Reason}}
end;
supported_host_keys(server, KeyCb, Options) ->
- Algs=
[atom_to_list(A) || A <- proplists:get_value(public_key,
proplists:get_value(preferred_algorithms,Options,[]),
- ssh_auth:default_public_key_algorithms()
+ ssh_transport:default_algorithms(public_key)
),
available_host_key(KeyCb, A, Options)
- ],
- Algs.
-
+ ].
%% Alg :: atom()
available_host_key(KeyCb, Alg, Opts) ->
element(1, catch KeyCb:host_key(Alg, Opts)) == ok.
-
send_msg(Msg, #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport}) ->
Transport:send(Socket, Msg).
@@ -1563,10 +1596,10 @@ after_new_keys(#state{renegotiate = false,
ssh_params = #ssh{role = client} = Ssh0} = State) ->
{Msg, Ssh} = ssh_auth:service_request_msg(Ssh0),
send_msg(Msg, State),
- {next_state, userauth, State#state{ssh_params = Ssh}};
+ {next_state, service_request, State#state{ssh_params = Ssh}};
after_new_keys(#state{renegotiate = false,
ssh_params = #ssh{role = server}} = State) ->
- {next_state, userauth, State}.
+ {next_state, service_request, State}.
after_new_keys_events({sync, _Event, From}, {stop, _Reason, _StateData}=Terminator) ->
gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, closed}),
@@ -1595,57 +1628,6 @@ after_new_keys_events({connection_reply, _Data} = Reply, {StateName, State}) ->
NewState = send_replies([Reply], State),
{next_state, StateName, NewState}.
-handle_ssh_packet_data(RemainingSshPacketLen, DecData, EncData, StateName,
- State) ->
- EncSize = size(EncData),
- case RemainingSshPacketLen > EncSize of
- true ->
- {next_state, StateName,
- next_packet(State#state{decoded_data_buffer = DecData,
- encoded_data_buffer = EncData,
- undecoded_packet_length =
- RemainingSshPacketLen})};
- false ->
- handle_ssh_packet(RemainingSshPacketLen, StateName,
- State#state{decoded_data_buffer = DecData,
- encoded_data_buffer = EncData})
-
- end.
-
-handle_ssh_packet(Length, StateName, #state{decoded_data_buffer = DecData0,
- encoded_data_buffer = EncData0,
- ssh_params = Ssh0,
- transport_protocol = _Protocol,
- socket = _Socket} = State0) ->
- try
- {Ssh1, DecData, EncData, Mac} =
- ssh_transport:unpack(EncData0, Length, Ssh0),
- SshPacket = <<DecData0/binary, DecData/binary>>,
- case ssh_transport:is_valid_mac(Mac, SshPacket, Ssh1) of
- true ->
- PacketData = ssh_transport:msg_data(SshPacket),
- {Ssh1, Msg} = ssh_transport:decompress(Ssh1, PacketData),
- generate_event(Msg, StateName,
- State0#state{ssh_params = Ssh1,
- %% Important to be set for
- %% next_packet
- decoded_data_buffer = <<>>},
- EncData);
- false ->
- DisconnectMsg =
- #ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
- description = "Bad mac",
- language = "en"},
- handle_disconnect(DisconnectMsg, State0)
- end
- catch _:_ ->
- Disconnect =
- #ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
- description = "Bad input",
- language = "en"},
- handle_disconnect(Disconnect, State0)
- end.
-
handle_disconnect(DisconnectMsg, State) ->
handle_disconnect(own, DisconnectMsg, State).
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_file.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_file.erl
index b98a8a8410..3e066c453d 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_file.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_file.erl
@@ -52,8 +52,20 @@ host_key(Algorithm, Opts) ->
%% so probably we could hardcod Password = ignore, but
%% we keep it as an undocumented option for now.
Password = proplists:get_value(identity_pass_phrase(Algorithm), Opts, ignore),
- decode(File, Password).
-
+ case decode(File, Password) of
+ {ok,Key} ->
+ case {Key,Algorithm} of
+ {#'RSAPrivateKey'{}, 'ssh-rsa'} -> {ok,Key};
+ {#'DSAPrivateKey'{}, 'ssh-dss'} -> {ok,Key};
+ {#'ECPrivateKey'{parameters = {namedCurve, ?'secp256r1'}}, 'ecdsa-sha2-nistp256'} -> {ok,Key};
+ {#'ECPrivateKey'{parameters = {namedCurve, ?'secp384r1'}}, 'ecdsa-sha2-nistp384'} -> {ok,Key};
+ {#'ECPrivateKey'{parameters = {namedCurve, ?'secp521r1'}}, 'ecdsa-sha2-nistp521'} -> {ok,Key};
+ _ ->
+ {error,bad_keytype_in_file}
+ end;
+ Other ->
+ Other
+ end.
is_auth_key(Key, User,Opts) ->
case lookup_user_key(Key, User, Opts) of
@@ -81,16 +93,15 @@ user_key(Algorithm, Opts) ->
%% Internal functions %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-file_base_name('ssh-rsa') ->
- "ssh_host_rsa_key";
-file_base_name('ssh-dss') ->
- "ssh_host_dsa_key";
-file_base_name(_) ->
- "ssh_host_key".
+file_base_name('ssh-rsa' ) -> "ssh_host_rsa_key";
+file_base_name('ssh-dss' ) -> "ssh_host_dsa_key";
+file_base_name('ecdsa-sha2-nistp256') -> "ssh_host_ecdsa_key";
+file_base_name('ecdsa-sha2-nistp384') -> "ssh_host_ecdsa_key";
+file_base_name('ecdsa-sha2-nistp521') -> "ssh_host_ecdsa_key";
+file_base_name(_ ) -> "ssh_host_key".
decode(File, Password) ->
- try
- {ok, decode_ssh_file(read_ssh_file(File), Password)}
+ try {ok, decode_ssh_file(read_ssh_file(File), Password)}
catch
throw:Reason ->
{error, Reason};
@@ -210,29 +221,32 @@ do_lookup_host_key(KeyToMatch, Host, Alg, Opts) ->
{ok, Fd} ->
Res = lookup_host_key_fd(Fd, KeyToMatch, Host, Alg),
file:close(Fd),
- {ok, Res};
- {error, enoent} -> {error, not_found};
- Error -> Error
+ Res;
+ {error, enoent} ->
+ {error, not_found};
+ Error ->
+ Error
end.
-identity_key_filename('ssh-dss') ->
- "id_dsa";
-identity_key_filename('ssh-rsa') ->
- "id_rsa".
-
-identity_pass_phrase("ssh-dss") ->
- dsa_pass_phrase;
-identity_pass_phrase('ssh-dss') ->
- dsa_pass_phrase;
-identity_pass_phrase('ssh-rsa') ->
- rsa_pass_phrase;
-identity_pass_phrase("ssh-rsa") ->
- rsa_pass_phrase.
-
+identity_key_filename('ssh-dss' ) -> "id_dsa";
+identity_key_filename('ssh-rsa' ) -> "id_rsa";
+identity_key_filename('ecdsa-sha2-nistp256') -> "id_ecdsa";
+identity_key_filename('ecdsa-sha2-nistp384') -> "id_ecdsa";
+identity_key_filename('ecdsa-sha2-nistp521') -> "id_ecdsa".
+
+identity_pass_phrase("ssh-dss" ) -> dsa_pass_phrase;
+identity_pass_phrase("ssh-rsa" ) -> rsa_pass_phrase;
+identity_pass_phrase("ecdsa-sha2-"++_) -> ecdsa_pass_phrase;
+identity_pass_phrase(P) when is_atom(P) ->
+ identity_pass_phrase(atom_to_list(P)).
+
lookup_host_key_fd(Fd, KeyToMatch, Host, KeyType) ->
case io:get_line(Fd, '') of
eof ->
{error, not_found};
+ {error,Error} ->
+ %% Rare... For example NFS errors
+ {error,Error};
Line ->
case ssh_decode_line(Line, known_hosts) of
[{Key, Attributes}] ->
@@ -253,7 +267,7 @@ handle_host(Fd, KeyToMatch, Host, HostList, Key, KeyType) ->
Host1 = host_name(Host),
case lists:member(Host1, HostList) andalso key_match(Key, KeyType) of
true when KeyToMatch == Key ->
- Key;
+ {ok,Key};
_ ->
lookup_host_key_fd(Fd, KeyToMatch, Host, KeyType)
end.
@@ -267,6 +281,13 @@ key_match(#'RSAPublicKey'{}, 'ssh-rsa') ->
true;
key_match({_, #'Dss-Parms'{}}, 'ssh-dss') ->
true;
+key_match({#'ECPoint'{},{namedCurve,Curve}}, Alg) ->
+ case atom_to_list(Alg) of
+ "ecdsa-sha2-"++IdS ->
+ Curve == public_key:ssh_curvename2oid(list_to_binary(IdS));
+ _ ->
+ false
+ end;
key_match(_, _) ->
false.
@@ -293,6 +314,9 @@ lookup_user_key_fd(Fd, Key) ->
case io:get_line(Fd, '') of
eof ->
{error, not_found};
+ {error,Error} ->
+ %% Rare... For example NFS errors
+ {error,Error};
Line ->
case ssh_decode_line(Line, auth_keys) of
[{AuthKey, _}] ->
@@ -312,8 +336,18 @@ is_auth_key(Key, Key) ->
is_auth_key(_,_) ->
false.
-default_user_dir()->
- {ok,[[Home|_]]} = init:get_argument(home),
+
+default_user_dir() ->
+ try
+ default_user_dir(os:getenv("HOME"))
+ catch
+ _:_ ->
+ default_user_dir(init:get_argument(home))
+ end.
+
+default_user_dir({ok,[[Home|_]]}) ->
+ default_user_dir(Home);
+default_user_dir(Home) when is_list(Home) ->
UserDir = filename:join(Home, ".ssh"),
ok = filelib:ensure_dir(filename:join(UserDir, "dummy")),
{ok,Info} = file:read_file_info(UserDir),
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_message.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_message.erl
index cb1dcb67c5..b6c4496be2 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_message.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_message.erl
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
-include("ssh_auth.hrl").
-include("ssh_transport.hrl").
--export([encode/1, decode/1, encode_host_key/1, decode_keyboard_interactive_prompts/2]).
+-export([encode/1, decode/1, decode_keyboard_interactive_prompts/2]).
encode(#ssh_msg_global_request{
name = Name,
@@ -227,8 +227,8 @@ encode(#ssh_msg_kexdh_reply{
f = F,
h_sig = Signature
}) ->
- EncKey = encode_host_key(Key),
- EncSign = encode_sign(Key, Signature),
+ EncKey = public_key:ssh_encode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
+ EncSign = encode_signature(Key, Signature),
ssh_bits:encode([?SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, EncKey, F, EncSign], [byte, binary, mpint, binary]);
encode(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_request{
@@ -255,16 +255,16 @@ encode(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_reply{
f = F,
h_sig = Signature
}) ->
- EncKey = encode_host_key(Key),
- EncSign = encode_sign(Key, Signature),
+ EncKey = public_key:ssh_encode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
+ EncSign = encode_signature(Key, Signature),
ssh_bits:encode([?SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, EncKey, F, EncSign], [byte, binary, mpint, binary]);
encode(#ssh_msg_kex_ecdh_init{q_c = Q_c}) ->
ssh_bits:encode([?SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, Q_c], [byte, mpint]);
encode(#ssh_msg_kex_ecdh_reply{public_host_key = Key, q_s = Q_s, h_sig = Sign}) ->
- EncKey = encode_host_key(Key),
- EncSign = encode_sign(Key, Sign),
+ EncKey = public_key:ssh_encode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
+ EncSign = encode_signature(Key, Sign),
ssh_bits:encode([?SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, EncKey, Q_s, EncSign], [byte, binary, mpint, binary]);
encode(#ssh_msg_ignore{data = Data}) ->
@@ -280,8 +280,7 @@ encode(#ssh_msg_debug{always_display = Bool,
%% Connection Messages
-decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST), ?UINT32(Len), Name:Len/binary,
- ?BYTE(Bool), Data/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST), ?DEC_BIN(Name,__0), ?BYTE(Bool), Data/binary>>) ->
#ssh_msg_global_request{
name = Name,
want_reply = erl_boolean(Bool),
@@ -292,8 +291,7 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS), Data/binary>>) ->
decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_request_failure{};
decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN),
- ?UINT32(Len), Type:Len/binary,
- ?UINT32(Sender), ?UINT32(Window), ?UINT32(Max),
+ ?DEC_BIN(Type,__0), ?UINT32(Sender), ?UINT32(Window), ?UINT32(Max),
Data/binary>>) ->
#ssh_msg_channel_open{
channel_type = binary_to_list(Type),
@@ -313,7 +311,7 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION), ?UINT32(Recipient), ?UINT32(
data = Data
};
decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE), ?UINT32(Recipient), ?UINT32(Reason),
- ?UINT32(Len0), Desc:Len0/binary, ?UINT32(Len1), Lang:Len1/binary >>) ->
+ ?DEC_BIN(Desc,__0), ?DEC_BIN(Lang,__1) >> ) ->
#ssh_msg_channel_open_failure{
recipient_channel = Recipient,
reason = Reason,
@@ -326,13 +324,13 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST), ?UINT32(Recipient), ?UINT32(Byte
bytes_to_add = Bytes
};
-decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA), ?UINT32(Recipient), ?UINT32(Len), Data:Len/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA), ?UINT32(Recipient), ?DEC_BIN(Data,__0)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_channel_data{
recipient_channel = Recipient,
data = Data
};
decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA), ?UINT32(Recipient),
- ?UINT32(DataType), ?UINT32(Len), Data:Len/binary>>) ->
+ ?UINT32(DataType), ?DEC_BIN(Data,__0)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_channel_extended_data{
recipient_channel = Recipient,
data_type_code = DataType,
@@ -347,8 +345,7 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE), ?UINT32(Recipient)>>) ->
recipient_channel = Recipient
};
decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST), ?UINT32(Recipient),
- ?UINT32(Len), RequestType:Len/binary,
- ?BYTE(Bool), Data/binary>>) ->
+ ?DEC_BIN(RequestType,__0), ?BYTE(Bool), Data/binary>>) ->
#ssh_msg_channel_request{
recipient_channel = Recipient,
request_type = unicode:characters_to_list(RequestType),
@@ -366,9 +363,7 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE), ?UINT32(Recipient)>>) ->
%%% Auth Messages
decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST),
- ?UINT32(Len0), User:Len0/binary,
- ?UINT32(Len1), Service:Len1/binary,
- ?UINT32(Len2), Method:Len2/binary,
+ ?DEC_BIN(User,__0), ?DEC_BIN(Service,__1), ?DEC_BIN(Method,__2),
Data/binary>>) ->
#ssh_msg_userauth_request{
user = unicode:characters_to_list(User),
@@ -378,7 +373,7 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST),
};
decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE),
- ?UINT32(Len0), Auths:Len0/binary,
+ ?DEC_BIN(Auths,__0),
?BYTE(Bool)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_userauth_failure {
authentications = unicode:characters_to_list(Auths),
@@ -388,16 +383,14 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE),
decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_userauth_success{};
-decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER),
- ?UINT32(Len0), Banner:Len0/binary,
- ?UINT32(Len1), Lang:Len1/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER), ?DEC_BIN(Banner,__0), ?DEC_BIN(Lang,__1) >>) ->
#ssh_msg_userauth_banner{
message = Banner,
language = Lang
};
-decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST), ?UINT32(Len0), Name:Len0/binary,
- ?UINT32(Len1), Inst:Len1/binary, ?UINT32(Len2), Lang:Len2/binary,
+decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST),
+ ?DEC_BIN(Name,__0), ?DEC_BIN(Inst,__1), ?DEC_BIN(Lang,__2),
?UINT32(NumPromtps), Data/binary>>) ->
#ssh_msg_userauth_info_request{
name = Name,
@@ -407,15 +400,14 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST), ?UINT32(Len0), Name:Len0/binary,
data = Data};
%%% Unhandled message, also masked by same 1:st byte value as ?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST:
-decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ), ?UINT32(Len0), Prompt:Len0/binary,
- ?UINT32(Len1), Lang:Len1/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ), ?DEC_BIN(Prompt,__0), ?DEC_BIN(Lang,__1) >>) ->
#ssh_msg_userauth_passwd_changereq{
prompt = Prompt,
languge = Lang
};
%%% Unhandled message, also masked by same 1:st byte value as ?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST:
-decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK), ?UINT32(Len), Alg:Len/binary, KeyBlob/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK), ?DEC_BIN(Alg,__0), KeyBlob/binary>>) ->
#ssh_msg_userauth_pk_ok{
algorithm_name = Alg,
key_blob = KeyBlob
@@ -430,18 +422,15 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE), ?UINT32(Num), Data/binary>>) ->
decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEXINIT), Cookie:128, Data/binary>>) ->
decode_kex_init(Data, [Cookie, ssh_msg_kexinit], 10);
-decode(<<"dh",?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT), ?UINT32(Len), E:Len/big-signed-integer-unit:8>>) ->
+decode(<<"dh",?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEXDH_INIT), ?DEC_MPINT(E,__0)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_kexdh_init{e = E
};
-decode(<<"dh", ?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY),
- ?UINT32(Len0), Key:Len0/binary,
- ?UINT32(Len1), F:Len1/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
- ?UINT32(Len2), Hashsign:Len2/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<"dh", ?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY), ?DEC_BIN(Key,__0), ?DEC_MPINT(F,__1), ?DEC_BIN(Hashsign,__2)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_kexdh_reply{
- public_host_key = decode_host_key(Key),
+ public_host_key = public_key:ssh_decode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
f = F,
- h_sig = decode_sign(Hashsign)
+ h_sig = decode_signature(Hashsign)
};
decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST), ?UINT32(Min), ?UINT32(N), ?UINT32(Max)>>) ->
@@ -456,57 +445,48 @@ decode(<<"dh_gex",?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD), ?UINT32(N)>>) ->
n = N
};
-decode(<<"dh_gex",?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP),
- ?UINT32(Len0), Prime:Len0/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
- ?UINT32(Len1), Generator:Len1/big-signed-integer-unit:8>>) ->
+decode(<<"dh_gex",?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP), ?DEC_MPINT(Prime,__0), ?DEC_MPINT(Generator,__1) >>) ->
#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_group{
p = Prime,
g = Generator
};
-decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT), ?UINT32(Len), E:Len/big-signed-integer-unit:8>>) ->
+decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT), ?DEC_MPINT(E,__0)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_init{
e = E
};
-decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY),
- ?UINT32(Len0), Key:Len0/binary,
- ?UINT32(Len1), F:Len1/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
- ?UINT32(Len2), Hashsign:Len2/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY), ?DEC_BIN(Key,__0), ?DEC_MPINT(F,__1), ?DEC_BIN(Hashsign,__2)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_reply{
- public_host_key = decode_host_key(Key),
+ public_host_key = public_key:ssh_decode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
f = F,
- h_sig = decode_sign(Hashsign)
+ h_sig = decode_signature(Hashsign)
};
-decode(<<"ecdh",?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT),
- ?UINT32(Len0), Q_c:Len0/big-signed-integer-unit:8>>) ->
+decode(<<"ecdh",?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT), ?DEC_MPINT(Q_c,__0)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_kex_ecdh_init{
q_c = Q_c
};
decode(<<"ecdh",?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY),
- ?UINT32(Len1), Key:Len1/binary,
- ?UINT32(Len2), Q_s:Len2/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
- ?UINT32(Len3), Sig:Len3/binary>>) ->
+ ?DEC_BIN(Key,__1), ?DEC_MPINT(Q_s,__2), ?DEC_BIN(Sig,__3)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_kex_ecdh_reply{
- public_host_key = decode_host_key(Key),
+ public_host_key = public_key:ssh_decode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
q_s = Q_s,
- h_sig = decode_sign(Sig)
+ h_sig = decode_signature(Sig)
};
-decode(<<?SSH_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, ?UINT32(Len0), Service:Len0/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<?SSH_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, ?DEC_BIN(Service,__0)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_service_request{
name = unicode:characters_to_list(Service)
};
-decode(<<?SSH_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, ?UINT32(Len0), Service:Len0/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<?SSH_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, ?DEC_BIN(Service,__0)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_service_accept{
name = unicode:characters_to_list(Service)
};
-decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT), ?UINT32(Code),
- ?UINT32(Len0), Desc:Len0/binary, ?UINT32(Len1), Lang:Len1/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT), ?UINT32(Code), ?DEC_BIN(Desc,__0), ?DEC_BIN(Lang,__1)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_disconnect{
code = Code,
description = unicode:characters_to_list(Desc),
@@ -514,8 +494,7 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT), ?UINT32(Code),
};
%% Accept bad disconnects from ancient openssh clients that doesn't send language tag. Use english as a work-around.
-decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT), ?UINT32(Code),
- ?UINT32(Len0), Desc:Len0/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT), ?UINT32(Code), ?DEC_BIN(Desc,__0)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_disconnect{
code = Code,
description = unicode:characters_to_list(Desc),
@@ -525,21 +504,25 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT), ?UINT32(Code),
decode(<<?SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS>>) ->
#ssh_msg_newkeys{};
-decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_IGNORE), ?UINT32(Len), Data:Len/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_IGNORE), ?DEC_BIN(Data,__0)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_ignore{data = Data};
decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED), ?UINT32(Seq)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_unimplemented{sequence = Seq};
-decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_DEBUG), ?BYTE(Bool), ?UINT32(Len0), Msg:Len0/binary,
- ?UINT32(Len1), Lang:Len1/binary>>) ->
+decode(<<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_DEBUG), ?BYTE(Bool), ?DEC_BIN(Msg,__0), ?DEC_BIN(Lang,__1)>>) ->
#ssh_msg_debug{always_display = erl_boolean(Bool),
message = Msg,
language = Lang}.
+%%%================================================================
+%%%
+%%% Helper functions
+%%%
+
decode_keyboard_interactive_prompts(<<>>, Acc) ->
lists:reverse(Acc);
-decode_keyboard_interactive_prompts(<<?UINT32(Len), Prompt:Len/binary, ?BYTE(Bool), Bin/binary>>,
+decode_keyboard_interactive_prompts(<<?DEC_BIN(Prompt,__0), ?BYTE(Bool), Bin/binary>>,
Acc) ->
decode_keyboard_interactive_prompts(Bin, [{Prompt, erl_boolean(Bool)} | Acc]).
@@ -555,43 +538,25 @@ decode_kex_init(<<?BYTE(Bool)>>, Acc, 0) ->
%% See rfc 4253 7.1
X = 0,
list_to_tuple(lists:reverse([X, erl_boolean(Bool) | Acc]));
-decode_kex_init(<<?UINT32(Len), Data:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc, N) ->
+decode_kex_init(<<?DEC_BIN(Data,__0), Rest/binary>>, Acc, N) ->
Names = string:tokens(unicode:characters_to_list(Data), ","),
decode_kex_init(Rest, [Names | Acc], N -1).
+%%%================================================================
+%%%
+%%% Signature decode/encode
+%%%
-decode_sign(<<?UINT32(Len), _Alg:Len/binary, ?UINT32(_), Signature/binary>>) ->
+decode_signature(<<?DEC_BIN(_Alg,__0), ?UINT32(_), Signature/binary>>) ->
Signature.
-decode_host_key(<<?UINT32(Len), Alg:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>) ->
- decode_host_key(Alg, Rest).
-
-decode_host_key(<<"ssh-rsa">>, <<?UINT32(Len0), E:Len0/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
- ?UINT32(Len1), N:Len1/big-signed-integer-unit:8>>) ->
- #'RSAPublicKey'{publicExponent = E,
- modulus = N};
-
-decode_host_key(<<"ssh-dss">>,
- <<?UINT32(Len0), P:Len0/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
- ?UINT32(Len1), Q:Len1/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
- ?UINT32(Len2), G:Len2/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
- ?UINT32(Len3), Y:Len3/big-signed-integer-unit:8>>) ->
- {Y, #'Dss-Parms'{p = P,
- q = Q,
- g = G}}.
-
-encode_host_key(#'RSAPublicKey'{modulus = N, publicExponent = E}) ->
- ssh_bits:encode(["ssh-rsa", E, N], [string, mpint, mpint]);
-encode_host_key({Y, #'Dss-Parms'{p = P, q = Q, g = G}}) ->
- ssh_bits:encode(["ssh-dss", P, Q, G, Y],
- [string, mpint, mpint, mpint, mpint]);
-encode_host_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{modulus = N, publicExponent = E}) ->
- ssh_bits:encode(["ssh-rsa", E, N], [string, mpint, mpint]);
-encode_host_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{y = Y, p = P, q = Q, g = G}) ->
- ssh_bits:encode(["ssh-dss", P, Q, G, Y],
- [string, mpint, mpint, mpint, mpint]).
-encode_sign(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}, Signature) ->
+
+encode_signature(#'RSAPublicKey'{}, Signature) ->
ssh_bits:encode(["ssh-rsa", Signature],[string, binary]);
-encode_sign(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}, Signature) ->
- ssh_bits:encode(["ssh-dss", Signature],[string, binary]).
+encode_signature({_, #'Dss-Parms'{}}, Signature) ->
+ ssh_bits:encode(["ssh-dss", Signature],[string, binary]);
+encode_signature({#'ECPoint'{}, {namedCurve,OID}}, Signature) ->
+ CurveName = public_key:oid2ssh_curvename(OID),
+ ssh_bits:encode([<<"ecdsa-sha2-",CurveName/binary>>, Signature], [binary,binary]).
+
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl
index a6549f1c73..819cba697e 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
-include("ssh.hrl").
-include("ssh_xfer.hrl").
+-include("ssh_connect.hrl"). %% For ?DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE and ?DEFAULT_WINDOW_SIZE
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% External exports
@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@
file_handler, % atom() - callback module
file_state, % state for the file callback module
max_files, % integer >= 0 max no files sent during READDIR
+ options, % from the subsystem declaration
handles % list of open handles
%% handle is either {<int>, directory, {Path, unread|eof}} or
%% {<int>, file, {Path, IoDevice}}
@@ -121,6 +123,7 @@ init(Options) ->
MaxLength = proplists:get_value(max_files, Options, 0),
Vsn = proplists:get_value(sftpd_vsn, Options, 5),
{ok, State#state{cwd = CWD, root = Root, max_files = MaxLength,
+ options = Options,
handles = [], pending = <<>>,
xf = #ssh_xfer{vsn = Vsn, ext = []}}}.
@@ -164,7 +167,9 @@ handle_ssh_msg({ssh_cm, _, {exit_status, ChannelId, Status}}, State) ->
%% Description: Handles other messages
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
handle_msg({ssh_channel_up, ChannelId, ConnectionManager},
- #state{xf =Xf} = State) ->
+ #state{xf = Xf,
+ options = Options} = State) ->
+ maybe_increase_recv_window(ConnectionManager, ChannelId, Options),
{ok, State#state{xf = Xf#ssh_xfer{cm = ConnectionManager,
channel = ChannelId}}}.
@@ -934,3 +939,18 @@ rename(Path, Path2, ReqId, State0) ->
{Status, FS1} = FileMod:rename(Path, Path2, FS0),
State1 = State0#state{file_state = FS1},
send_status(Status, ReqId, State1).
+
+
+maybe_increase_recv_window(ConnectionManager, ChannelId, Options) ->
+ WantedRecvWindowSize =
+ proplists:get_value(recv_window_size, Options, 1000000),
+ NumPkts = WantedRecvWindowSize div ?DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE,
+ Increment = NumPkts*?DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE - ?DEFAULT_WINDOW_SIZE,
+
+ if
+ Increment > 0 ->
+ ssh_connection:adjust_window(ConnectionManager, ChannelId,
+ Increment);
+ Increment =< 0 ->
+ do_nothing
+ end.
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl
index 2b6f0a3cdc..041e86bae1 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.erl
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@
-include("ssh.hrl").
-export([versions/2, hello_version_msg/1]).
--export([next_seqnum/1, decrypt_first_block/2, decrypt_blocks/3,
+-export([next_seqnum/1,
supported_algorithms/0, supported_algorithms/1,
default_algorithms/0, default_algorithms/1,
- is_valid_mac/3,
+ handle_packet_part/4,
handle_hello_version/1,
key_exchange_init_msg/1,
key_init/3, new_keys_message/1,
@@ -44,9 +44,14 @@
handle_kexdh_reply/2,
handle_kex_ecdh_init/2,
handle_kex_ecdh_reply/2,
- unpack/3, decompress/2, ssh_packet/2, pack/2, msg_data/1,
+ extract_public_key/1,
+ ssh_packet/2, pack/2,
sign/3, verify/4]).
+%%% For test suites
+-export([pack/3]).
+-export([decompress/2, decrypt_blocks/3, is_valid_mac/3 ]). % FIXME: remove
+
%%%----------------------------------------------------------------------------
%%%
%%% There is a difference between supported and default algorithms. The
@@ -65,11 +70,15 @@ default_algorithms() -> [{K,default_algorithms(K)} || K <- algo_classes()].
algo_classes() -> [kex, public_key, cipher, mac, compression].
-default_algorithms(compression) ->
- %% Do not announce '[email protected]' because there seem to be problems
- supported_algorithms(compression, same(['[email protected]']));
+
+default_algorithms(cipher) ->
+ supported_algorithms(cipher, same(['AEAD_AES_128_GCM',
+ 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM']));
+default_algorithms(mac) ->
+ supported_algorithms(mac, same(['AEAD_AES_128_GCM',
+ 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM']));
default_algorithms(Alg) ->
- supported_algorithms(Alg).
+ supported_algorithms(Alg, []).
supported_algorithms() -> [{K,supported_algorithms(K)} || K <- algo_classes()].
@@ -79,58 +88,50 @@ supported_algorithms(kex) ->
[
{'ecdh-sha2-nistp256', [{public_keys,ecdh}, {ec_curve,secp256r1}, {hashs,sha256}]},
{'ecdh-sha2-nistp384', [{public_keys,ecdh}, {ec_curve,secp384r1}, {hashs,sha384}]},
+ {'diffie-hellman-group14-sha1', [{public_keys,dh}, {hashs,sha}]},
+ {'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256', [{public_keys,dh}, {hashs,sha256}]},
+ {'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1', [{public_keys,dh}, {hashs,sha}]},
{'ecdh-sha2-nistp521', [{public_keys,ecdh}, {ec_curve,secp521r1}, {hashs,sha512}]},
- {'diffie-hellman-group14-sha1', [{public_keys,dh}, {hashs,sha}]},
- {'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256', [{public_keys,dh}, {hashs,sha256}]},
- {'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1', [{public_keys,dh}, {hashs,sha}]},
- {'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1', [{public_keys,dh}, {hashs,sha}]}
+ {'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1', [{public_keys,dh}, {hashs,sha}]}
]);
supported_algorithms(public_key) ->
- ssh_auth:default_public_key_algorithms();
+ select_crypto_supported(
+ [{'ecdsa-sha2-nistp256', [{public_keys,ecdsa}, {hashs,sha256}, {ec_curve,secp256r1}]},
+ {'ecdsa-sha2-nistp384', [{public_keys,ecdsa}, {hashs,sha384}, {ec_curve,secp384r1}]},
+ {'ecdsa-sha2-nistp521', [{public_keys,ecdsa}, {hashs,sha512}, {ec_curve,secp521r1}]},
+ {'ssh-rsa', [{public_keys,rsa}, {hashs,sha} ]},
+ {'ssh-dss', [{public_keys,dss}, {hashs,sha} ]}
+ ]);
+
supported_algorithms(cipher) ->
same(
select_crypto_supported(
- [{'aes128-ctr', [{ciphers,aes_ctr}]},
- {'aes128-cbc', [{ciphers,aes_cbc128}]},
- {'3des-cbc', [{ciphers,des3_cbc}]}
+ [{'aes256-ctr', [{ciphers,{aes_ctr,256}}]},
+ {'aes192-ctr', [{ciphers,{aes_ctr,192}}]},
+ {'aes128-ctr', [{ciphers,{aes_ctr,128}}]},
+ {'aes128-cbc', [{ciphers,aes_cbc128}]},
+ {'[email protected]', [{ciphers,{aes_gcm,128}}]},
+ {'[email protected]', [{ciphers,{aes_gcm,256}}]},
+ {'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', [{ciphers,{aes_gcm,128}}]},
+ {'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', [{ciphers,{aes_gcm,256}}]},
+ {'3des-cbc', [{ciphers,des3_cbc}]}
]
));
supported_algorithms(mac) ->
same(
select_crypto_supported(
- [{'hmac-sha2-512', [{hashs,sha512}]},
- {'hmac-sha2-256', [{hashs,sha256}]},
- {'hmac-sha1', [{hashs,sha}]}
+ [{'hmac-sha2-256', [{hashs,sha256}]},
+ {'hmac-sha2-512', [{hashs,sha512}]},
+ {'hmac-sha1', [{hashs,sha}]},
+ {'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', [{ciphers,{aes_gcm,128}}]},
+ {'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', [{ciphers,{aes_gcm,256}}]}
]
));
supported_algorithms(compression) ->
- same(['none','zlib','[email protected]']).
-
-
-supported_algorithms(Key, [{client2server,BL1},{server2client,BL2}]) ->
- [{client2server,As1},{server2client,As2}] = supported_algorithms(Key),
- [{client2server,As1--BL1},{server2client,As2--BL2}];
-supported_algorithms(Key, BlackList) ->
- supported_algorithms(Key) -- BlackList.
-
-select_crypto_supported(L) ->
- Sup = [{ec_curve,crypto_supported_curves()} | crypto:supports()],
- [Name || {Name,CryptoRequires} <- L,
- crypto_supported(CryptoRequires, Sup)].
-
-crypto_supported_curves() ->
- try crypto:ec_curves()
- catch _:_ -> []
- end.
-
-crypto_supported(Conditions, Supported) ->
- lists:all( fun({Tag,CryptoName}) ->
- lists:member(CryptoName, proplists:get_value(Tag,Supported,[]))
- end, Conditions).
-
-
-same(Algs) -> [{client2server,Algs}, {server2client,Algs}].
-
+ same(['none',
+ 'zlib'
+ ]).
%%%----------------------------------------------------------------------------
versions(client, Options)->
@@ -170,12 +171,6 @@ hello_version_msg(Data) ->
next_seqnum(SeqNum) ->
(SeqNum + 1) band 16#ffffffff.
-decrypt_first_block(Bin, #ssh{decrypt_block_size = BlockSize} = Ssh0) ->
- <<EncBlock:BlockSize/binary, EncData/binary>> = Bin,
- {Ssh, <<?UINT32(PacketLen), _/binary>> = DecData} =
- decrypt(Ssh0, EncBlock),
- {Ssh, PacketLen, DecData, EncData}.
-
decrypt_blocks(Bin, Length, Ssh0) ->
<<EncBlocks:Length/binary, EncData/binary>> = Bin,
{Ssh, DecData} = decrypt(Ssh0, EncBlocks),
@@ -303,9 +298,7 @@ verify_algorithm(#alg{encrypt = undefined}) -> false;
verify_algorithm(#alg{decrypt = undefined}) -> false;
verify_algorithm(#alg{compress = undefined}) -> false;
verify_algorithm(#alg{decompress = undefined}) -> false;
-
-verify_algorithm(#alg{kex = Kex}) -> lists:member(Kex, supported_algorithms(kex));
-verify_algorithm(_) -> false.
+verify_algorithm(#alg{kex = Kex}) -> lists:member(Kex, supported_algorithms(kex)).
%%%----------------------------------------------------------------
%%%
@@ -319,11 +312,12 @@ key_exchange_first_msg(Kex, Ssh0) when Kex == 'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1' ;
{ok, SshPacket,
Ssh1#ssh{keyex_key = {{Private, Public}, {G, P}}}};
-key_exchange_first_msg(Kex, Ssh0) when Kex == 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1' ;
- Kex == 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256' ->
- Min = ?DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_MIN,
- NBits = ?DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_NBITS,
- Max = ?DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_MAX,
+key_exchange_first_msg(Kex, Ssh0=#ssh{opts=Opts}) when Kex == 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1' ;
+ Kex == 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256' ->
+ {Min,NBits,Max} =
+ proplists:get_value(dh_gex_limits, Opts, {?DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_MIN,
+ ?DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_NBITS,
+ ?DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_MAX}),
{SshPacket, Ssh1} =
ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_request{min = Min,
n = NBits,
@@ -354,13 +348,15 @@ handle_kexdh_init(#ssh_msg_kexdh_init{e = E},
1=<E, E=<(P-1) ->
{Public, Private} = generate_key(dh, [P,G]),
K = compute_key(dh, E, Private, [P,G]),
- Key = get_host_key(Ssh0),
- H = kex_h(Ssh0, Key, E, Public, K),
- H_SIG = sign_host_key(Ssh0, Key, H),
- {SshPacket, Ssh1} = ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_kexdh_reply{public_host_key = Key,
- f = Public,
- h_sig = H_SIG
- }, Ssh0),
+ MyPrivHostKey = get_host_key(Ssh0),
+ MyPubHostKey = extract_public_key(MyPrivHostKey),
+ H = kex_h(Ssh0, MyPubHostKey, E, Public, K),
+ H_SIG = sign_host_key(Ssh0, MyPrivHostKey, H),
+ {SshPacket, Ssh1} =
+ ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_kexdh_reply{public_host_key = MyPubHostKey,
+ f = Public,
+ h_sig = H_SIG
+ }, Ssh0),
{ok, SshPacket, Ssh1#ssh{keyex_key = {{Private, Public}, {G, P}},
shared_secret = K,
exchanged_hash = H,
@@ -375,7 +371,7 @@ handle_kexdh_init(#ssh_msg_kexdh_init{e = E},
})
end.
-handle_kexdh_reply(#ssh_msg_kexdh_reply{public_host_key = HostKey,
+handle_kexdh_reply(#ssh_msg_kexdh_reply{public_host_key = PeerPubHostKey,
f = F,
h_sig = H_SIG},
#ssh{keyex_key = {{Private, Public}, {G, P}}} = Ssh0) ->
@@ -383,9 +379,9 @@ handle_kexdh_reply(#ssh_msg_kexdh_reply{public_host_key = HostKey,
if
1=<F, F=<(P-1)->
K = compute_key(dh, F, Private, [P,G]),
- H = kex_h(Ssh0, HostKey, Public, F, K),
+ H = kex_h(Ssh0, PeerPubHostKey, Public, F, K),
- case verify_host_key(Ssh0, HostKey, H, H_SIG) of
+ case verify_host_key(Ssh0, PeerPubHostKey, H, H_SIG) of
ok ->
{SshPacket, Ssh} = ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_newkeys{}, Ssh0),
{ok, SshPacket, Ssh#ssh{shared_secret = K,
@@ -414,19 +410,29 @@ handle_kexdh_reply(#ssh_msg_kexdh_reply{public_host_key = HostKey,
%%%
%%% diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
%%%
-handle_kex_dh_gex_request(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_request{min = Min,
+handle_kex_dh_gex_request(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_request{min = Min0,
n = NBits,
- max = Max},
- Ssh0=#ssh{opts=Opts}) when Min=<NBits, NBits=<Max ->
+ max = Max0},
+ Ssh0=#ssh{opts=Opts}) when Min0=<NBits, NBits=<Max0 ->
%% server
- {G, P} = dh_gex_group(Min, NBits, Max, proplists:get_value(dh_gex_groups,Opts)),
- {Public, Private} = generate_key(dh, [P,G]),
- {SshPacket, Ssh} =
- ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_group{p = P, g = G}, Ssh0),
- {ok, SshPacket,
- Ssh#ssh{keyex_key = {{Private, Public}, {G, P}},
- keyex_info = {Min, Max, NBits}
- }};
+ {Min, Max} = adjust_gex_min_max(Min0, Max0, Opts),
+ case public_key:dh_gex_group(Min, NBits, Max,
+ proplists:get_value(dh_gex_groups,Opts)) of
+ {ok, {_Sz, {G,P}}} ->
+ {Public, Private} = generate_key(dh, [P,G]),
+ {SshPacket, Ssh} =
+ ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_group{p = P, g = G}, Ssh0),
+ {ok, SshPacket,
+ Ssh#ssh{keyex_key = {{Private, Public}, {G, P}},
+ keyex_info = {Min, Max, NBits}
+ }};
+ {error,_} ->
+ throw(#ssh_msg_disconnect{
+ code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
+ description = "No possible diffie-hellman-group-exchange group found",
+ language = ""})
+ end;
+
handle_kex_dh_gex_request(_, _) ->
throw({{error,bad_ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_request},
#ssh_msg_disconnect{
@@ -435,6 +441,26 @@ handle_kex_dh_gex_request(_, _) ->
language = ""}
}).
+
+adjust_gex_min_max(Min0, Max0, Opts) ->
+ case proplists:get_value(dh_gex_limits, Opts) of
+ undefined ->
+ {Min0, Max0};
+ {Min1, Max1} ->
+ Min2 = max(Min0, Min1),
+ Max2 = min(Max0, Max1),
+ if
+ Min2 =< Max2 ->
+ {Min2, Max2};
+ Max2 < Min2 ->
+ throw(#ssh_msg_disconnect{
+ code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
+ description = "No possible diffie-hellman-group-exchange group possible",
+ language = ""})
+ end
+ end.
+
+
handle_kex_dh_gex_group(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_group{p = P, g = G}, Ssh0) ->
%% client
{Public, Private} = generate_key(dh, [P,G]),
@@ -454,11 +480,12 @@ handle_kex_dh_gex_init(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_init{e = E},
K = compute_key(dh, E, Private, [P,G]),
if
1<K, K<(P-1) ->
- HostKey = get_host_key(Ssh0),
- H = kex_h(Ssh0, HostKey, Min, NBits, Max, P, G, E, Public, K),
- H_SIG = sign_host_key(Ssh0, HostKey, H),
+ MyPrivHostKey = get_host_key(Ssh0),
+ MyPubHostKey = extract_public_key(MyPrivHostKey),
+ H = kex_h(Ssh0, MyPubHostKey, Min, NBits, Max, P, G, E, Public, K),
+ H_SIG = sign_host_key(Ssh0, MyPrivHostKey, H),
{SshPacket, Ssh} =
- ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_reply{public_host_key = HostKey,
+ ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_reply{public_host_key = MyPubHostKey,
f = Public,
h_sig = H_SIG}, Ssh0),
{ok, SshPacket, Ssh#ssh{shared_secret = K,
@@ -482,7 +509,7 @@ handle_kex_dh_gex_init(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_init{e = E},
})
end.
-handle_kex_dh_gex_reply(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_reply{public_host_key = HostKey,
+handle_kex_dh_gex_reply(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_reply{public_host_key = PeerPubHostKey,
f = F,
h_sig = H_SIG},
#ssh{keyex_key = {{Private, Public}, {G, P}},
@@ -494,9 +521,9 @@ handle_kex_dh_gex_reply(#ssh_msg_kex_dh_gex_reply{public_host_key = HostKey,
K = compute_key(dh, F, Private, [P,G]),
if
1<K, K<(P-1) ->
- H = kex_h(Ssh0, HostKey, Min, NBits, Max, P, G, Public, F, K),
+ H = kex_h(Ssh0, PeerPubHostKey, Min, NBits, Max, P, G, Public, F, K),
- case verify_host_key(Ssh0, HostKey, H, H_SIG) of
+ case verify_host_key(Ssh0, PeerPubHostKey, H, H_SIG) of
ok ->
{SshPacket, Ssh} = ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_newkeys{}, Ssh0),
{ok, SshPacket, Ssh#ssh{shared_secret = K,
@@ -535,24 +562,26 @@ handle_kex_ecdh_init(#ssh_msg_kex_ecdh_init{q_c = PeerPublic},
Ssh0 = #ssh{algorithms = #alg{kex=Kex}}) ->
%% at server
Curve = ecdh_curve(Kex),
- case ecdh_validate_public_key(PeerPublic, Curve) of
- true ->
- {MyPublic, MyPrivate} = generate_key(ecdh, Curve),
- K = compute_key(ecdh, PeerPublic, MyPrivate, Curve),
- HostKey = get_host_key(Ssh0),
- H = kex_h(Ssh0, Curve, HostKey, PeerPublic, MyPublic, K),
- H_SIG = sign_host_key(Ssh0, HostKey, H),
+ {MyPublic, MyPrivate} = generate_key(ecdh, Curve),
+ try
+ compute_key(ecdh, PeerPublic, MyPrivate, Curve)
+ of
+ K ->
+ MyPrivHostKey = get_host_key(Ssh0),
+ MyPubHostKey = extract_public_key(MyPrivHostKey),
+ H = kex_h(Ssh0, Curve, MyPubHostKey, PeerPublic, MyPublic, K),
+ H_SIG = sign_host_key(Ssh0, MyPrivHostKey, H),
{SshPacket, Ssh1} =
- ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_kex_ecdh_reply{public_host_key = HostKey,
+ ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_kex_ecdh_reply{public_host_key = MyPubHostKey,
q_s = MyPublic,
h_sig = H_SIG},
Ssh0),
{ok, SshPacket, Ssh1#ssh{keyex_key = {{MyPublic,MyPrivate},Curve},
shared_secret = K,
exchanged_hash = H,
- session_id = sid(Ssh1, H)}};
-
- false ->
+ session_id = sid(Ssh1, H)}}
+ catch
+ _:_ ->
throw({{error,invalid_peer_public_key},
#ssh_msg_disconnect{
code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED,
@@ -561,17 +590,18 @@ handle_kex_ecdh_init(#ssh_msg_kex_ecdh_init{q_c = PeerPublic},
})
end.
-handle_kex_ecdh_reply(#ssh_msg_kex_ecdh_reply{public_host_key = HostKey,
+handle_kex_ecdh_reply(#ssh_msg_kex_ecdh_reply{public_host_key = PeerPubHostKey,
q_s = PeerPublic,
h_sig = H_SIG},
#ssh{keyex_key = {{MyPublic,MyPrivate}, Curve}} = Ssh0
) ->
%% at client
- case ecdh_validate_public_key(PeerPublic, Curve) of
- true ->
- K = compute_key(ecdh, PeerPublic, MyPrivate, Curve),
- H = kex_h(Ssh0, Curve, HostKey, MyPublic, PeerPublic, K),
- case verify_host_key(Ssh0, HostKey, H, H_SIG) of
+ try
+ compute_key(ecdh, PeerPublic, MyPrivate, Curve)
+ of
+ K ->
+ H = kex_h(Ssh0, Curve, PeerPubHostKey, MyPublic, PeerPublic, K),
+ case verify_host_key(Ssh0, PeerPubHostKey, H, H_SIG) of
ok ->
{SshPacket, Ssh} = ssh_packet(#ssh_msg_newkeys{}, Ssh0),
{ok, SshPacket, Ssh#ssh{shared_secret = K,
@@ -584,9 +614,9 @@ handle_kex_ecdh_reply(#ssh_msg_kex_ecdh_reply{public_host_key = HostKey,
description = "Key exchange failed",
language = ""}
})
- end;
-
- false ->
+ end
+ catch
+ _:_ ->
throw({{error,invalid_peer_public_key},
#ssh_msg_disconnect{
code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED,
@@ -596,8 +626,6 @@ handle_kex_ecdh_reply(#ssh_msg_kex_ecdh_reply{public_host_key = HostKey,
end.
-ecdh_validate_public_key(_, _) -> true. % FIXME: Far too many false positives :)
-
%%%----------------------------------------------------------------
handle_new_keys(#ssh_msg_newkeys{}, Ssh0) ->
try install_alg(Ssh0) of
@@ -623,33 +651,49 @@ get_host_key(SSH) ->
#ssh{key_cb = Mod, opts = Opts, algorithms = ALG} = SSH,
case Mod:host_key(ALG#alg.hkey, Opts) of
- {ok, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key} ->
- Key;
- {ok, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key} ->
- Key;
+ {ok, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key} -> Key;
+ {ok, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key} -> Key;
+ {ok, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = Key} -> Key;
Result ->
exit({error, {Result, unsupported_key_type}})
end.
-sign_host_key(_Ssh, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Private, H) ->
- Hash = sha,
- _Signature = sign(H, Hash, Private);
-sign_host_key(_Ssh, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Private, H) ->
- Hash = sha,
- _RawSignature = sign(H, Hash, Private).
+sign_host_key(_Ssh, PrivateKey, H) ->
+ sign(H, sign_host_key_sha(PrivateKey), PrivateKey).
+
+sign_host_key_sha(#'ECPrivateKey'{parameters = {namedCurve,OID}}) -> sha(OID);
+sign_host_key_sha(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> sha;
+sign_host_key_sha(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) -> sha.
+
+
+extract_public_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{modulus = N, publicExponent = E}) ->
+ #'RSAPublicKey'{modulus = N, publicExponent = E};
+extract_public_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{y = Y, p = P, q = Q, g = G}) ->
+ {Y, #'Dss-Parms'{p=P, q=Q, g=G}};
+extract_public_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{parameters = {namedCurve,OID},
+ publicKey = Q}) ->
+ {#'ECPoint'{point=Q}, {namedCurve,OID}}.
+
verify_host_key(SSH, PublicKey, Digest, Signature) ->
- case verify(Digest, sha, Signature, PublicKey) of
+ case verify(Digest, host_key_sha(PublicKey), Signature, PublicKey) of
false ->
{error, bad_signature};
true ->
known_host_key(SSH, PublicKey, public_algo(PublicKey))
end.
-public_algo(#'RSAPublicKey'{}) ->
- 'ssh-rsa';
-public_algo({_, #'Dss-Parms'{}}) ->
- 'ssh-dss'.
+
+host_key_sha(#'RSAPublicKey'{}) -> sha;
+host_key_sha({_, #'Dss-Parms'{}}) -> sha;
+host_key_sha({#'ECPoint'{},{namedCurve,OID}}) -> sha(OID).
+
+public_algo(#'RSAPublicKey'{}) -> 'ssh-rsa';
+public_algo({_, #'Dss-Parms'{}}) -> 'ssh-dss';
+public_algo({#'ECPoint'{},{namedCurve,OID}}) ->
+ Curve = public_key:oid2ssh_curvename(OID),
+ list_to_atom("ecdsa-sha2-" ++ binary_to_list(Curve)).
+
accepted_host(Ssh, PeerName, Opts) ->
case proplists:get_value(silently_accept_hosts, Opts, false) of
@@ -682,8 +726,12 @@ known_host_key(#ssh{opts = Opts, key_cb = Mod, peer = Peer} = Ssh,
%% The first algorithm in each list MUST be the preferred (guessed)
%% algorithm. Each string MUST contain at least one algorithm name.
select_algorithm(Role, Client, Server) ->
- {Encrypt, Decrypt} = select_encrypt_decrypt(Role, Client, Server),
- {SendMac, RecvMac} = select_send_recv_mac(Role, Client, Server),
+ {Encrypt0, Decrypt0} = select_encrypt_decrypt(Role, Client, Server),
+ {SendMac0, RecvMac0} = select_send_recv_mac(Role, Client, Server),
+
+ {Encrypt, SendMac} = aead_gcm_simultan(Encrypt0, SendMac0),
+ {Decrypt, RecvMac} = aead_gcm_simultan(Decrypt0, RecvMac0),
+
{Compression, Decompression} =
select_compression_decompression(Role, Client, Server),
@@ -714,6 +762,38 @@ select_algorithm(Role, Client, Server) ->
s_lng = S_Lng},
{ok, Alg}.
+
+%%% It is an agreed problem with RFC 5674 that if the selection is
+%%% Cipher = AEAD_AES_x_GCM and
+%%% Mac = AEAD_AES_y_GCM (where x =/= y)
+%%% then it is undefined what length should be selected.
+%%%
+%%% If only one of the two lengths (128,256) is available, I claim that
+%%% there is no such ambiguity.
+
+%%% From https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/plain/PROTOCOL
+%%% (read Nov 20, 2015)
+%%% 1.6 transport: AES-GCM
+%%%
+%%% OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647.
+%%% Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange
+%%% the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows:
+%%%
+%%% AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms
+%%% "[email protected]" or "[email protected]" and never as
+%%% an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher
+%%% the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be
+%%% a matching MAC.
+
+aead_gcm_simultan('[email protected]', _) -> {'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM'};
+aead_gcm_simultan('[email protected]', _) -> {'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM'};
+aead_gcm_simultan('AEAD_AES_128_GCM', _) -> {'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM'};
+aead_gcm_simultan('AEAD_AES_256_GCM', _) -> {'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM'};
+aead_gcm_simultan(_, 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM') -> {'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM'};
+aead_gcm_simultan(_, 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM') -> {'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM'};
+aead_gcm_simultan(Cipher, Mac) -> {Cipher,Mac}.
+
+
select_encrypt_decrypt(client, Client, Server) ->
Encrypt =
select(Client#ssh_msg_kexinit.encryption_algorithms_client_to_server,
@@ -748,18 +828,18 @@ select_compression_decompression(client, Client, Server) ->
Compression =
select(Client#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_client_to_server,
Server#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_client_to_server),
- Decomprssion =
+ Decompression =
select(Client#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_server_to_client,
Server#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_server_to_client),
- {Compression, Decomprssion};
+ {Compression, Decompression};
select_compression_decompression(server, Client, Server) ->
- Decomprssion =
+ Decompression =
select(Client#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_client_to_server,
Server#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_client_to_server),
Compression =
select(Client#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_server_to_client,
Server#ssh_msg_kexinit.compression_algorithms_server_to_client),
- {Compression, Decomprssion}.
+ {Compression, Decompression}.
install_alg(SSH) ->
SSH1 = alg_final(SSH),
@@ -830,13 +910,45 @@ ssh_packet(Msg, Ssh) ->
BinMsg = ssh_message:encode(Msg),
pack(BinMsg, Ssh).
-pack(Data0, #ssh{encrypt_block_size = BlockSize,
- send_sequence = SeqNum, send_mac = MacAlg,
- send_mac_key = MacKey,
- random_length_padding = RandomLengthPadding}
- = Ssh0) when is_binary(Data0) ->
- {Ssh1, Data} = compress(Ssh0, Data0),
- PL = (BlockSize - ((4 + 1 + size(Data)) rem BlockSize)) rem BlockSize,
+pack(Data, Ssh=#ssh{}) ->
+ pack(Data, Ssh, 0).
+
+%%% Note: pack/3 is only to be called from tests that wants
+%%% to deliberetly send packets with wrong PacketLength!
+%%% Use pack/2 for all other purposes!
+pack(PlainText,
+ #ssh{send_sequence = SeqNum,
+ send_mac = MacAlg,
+ send_mac_key = MacKey,
+ encrypt = CryptoAlg} = Ssh0, PacketLenDeviationForTests) when is_binary(PlainText) ->
+
+ {Ssh1, CompressedPlainText} = compress(Ssh0, PlainText),
+ {EcryptedPacket, MAC, Ssh3} =
+ case pkt_type(CryptoAlg) of
+ common ->
+ PaddingLen = padding_length(4+1+size(CompressedPlainText), Ssh0),
+ Padding = ssh_bits:random(PaddingLen),
+ PlainPacketLen = 1 + PaddingLen + size(CompressedPlainText) + PacketLenDeviationForTests,
+ PlainPacketData = <<?UINT32(PlainPacketLen),?BYTE(PaddingLen), CompressedPlainText/binary, Padding/binary>>,
+ {Ssh2, EcryptedPacket0} = encrypt(Ssh1, PlainPacketData),
+ MAC0 = mac(MacAlg, MacKey, SeqNum, PlainPacketData),
+ {EcryptedPacket0, MAC0, Ssh2};
+ aead ->
+ PaddingLen = padding_length(1+size(CompressedPlainText), Ssh0),
+ Padding = ssh_bits:random(PaddingLen),
+ PlainPacketLen = 1 + PaddingLen + size(CompressedPlainText) + PacketLenDeviationForTests,
+ PlainPacketData = <<?BYTE(PaddingLen), CompressedPlainText/binary, Padding/binary>>,
+ {Ssh2, {EcryptedPacket0,MAC0}} = encrypt(Ssh1, {<<?UINT32(PlainPacketLen)>>,PlainPacketData}),
+ {<<?UINT32(PlainPacketLen),EcryptedPacket0/binary>>, MAC0, Ssh2}
+ end,
+ FinalPacket = [EcryptedPacket, MAC],
+ Ssh = Ssh3#ssh{send_sequence = (SeqNum+1) band 16#ffffffff},
+ {FinalPacket, Ssh}.
+
+
+padding_length(Size, #ssh{encrypt_block_size = BlockSize,
+ random_length_padding = RandomLengthPadding}) ->
+ PL = (BlockSize - (Size rem BlockSize)) rem BlockSize,
MinPaddingLen = if PL < 4 -> PL + BlockSize;
true -> PL
end,
@@ -845,50 +957,103 @@ pack(Data0, #ssh{encrypt_block_size = BlockSize,
ExtraPaddingLen = try crypto:rand_uniform(0,MaxExtraBlocks)*PadBlockSize
catch _:_ -> 0
end,
- PaddingLen = MinPaddingLen + ExtraPaddingLen,
- Padding = ssh_bits:random(PaddingLen),
- PacketLen = 1 + PaddingLen + size(Data),
- PacketData = <<?UINT32(PacketLen),?BYTE(PaddingLen),
- Data/binary, Padding/binary>>,
- {Ssh2, EncPacket} = encrypt(Ssh1, PacketData),
- MAC = mac(MacAlg, MacKey, SeqNum, PacketData),
- Packet = [EncPacket, MAC],
- Ssh = Ssh2#ssh{send_sequence = (SeqNum+1) band 16#ffffffff},
- {Packet, Ssh}.
-
-unpack(EncodedSoFar, ReminingLenght, #ssh{recv_mac_size = MacSize} = Ssh0) ->
- SshLength = ReminingLenght - MacSize,
- {NoMac, Mac, Rest} = case MacSize of
- 0 ->
- <<NoMac0:SshLength/binary,
- Rest0/binary>> = EncodedSoFar,
- {NoMac0, <<>>, Rest0};
- _ ->
- <<NoMac0:SshLength/binary,
- Mac0:MacSize/binary,
- Rest0/binary>> = EncodedSoFar,
- {NoMac0, Mac0, Rest0}
- end,
- {Ssh1, DecData, <<>>} =
- case SshLength of
- 0 ->
- {Ssh0, <<>>, <<>>};
- _ ->
- decrypt_blocks(NoMac, SshLength, Ssh0)
- end,
- {Ssh1, DecData, Rest, Mac}.
+ MinPaddingLen + ExtraPaddingLen.
+
+
+
+handle_packet_part(<<>>, Encrypted0, undefined, #ssh{decrypt = CryptoAlg} = Ssh0) ->
+ %% New ssh packet
+ case get_length(pkt_type(CryptoAlg), Encrypted0, Ssh0) of
+ get_more ->
+ %% too short to get the length
+ {get_more, <<>>, Encrypted0, undefined, Ssh0};
+
+ {ok, PacketLen, _, _, _} when PacketLen > ?SSH_MAX_PACKET_SIZE ->
+ %% far too long message than expected
+ throw(#ssh_msg_disconnect{code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
+ description = "Bad packet length "
+ ++ integer_to_list(PacketLen),
+ language = ""});
+
+ {ok, PacketLen, Decrypted, Encrypted1,
+ #ssh{recv_mac_size = MacSize} = Ssh1} ->
+ %% enough bytes so we got the length and can calculate how many
+ %% more bytes to expect for a full packet
+ TotalNeeded = (4 + PacketLen + MacSize),
+ handle_packet_part(Decrypted, Encrypted1, TotalNeeded, Ssh1)
+ end;
+
+handle_packet_part(DecryptedPfx, EncryptedBuffer, TotalNeeded, Ssh0)
+ when (size(DecryptedPfx)+size(EncryptedBuffer)) < TotalNeeded ->
+ %% need more bytes to finalize the packet
+ {get_more, DecryptedPfx, EncryptedBuffer, TotalNeeded, Ssh0};
+
+handle_packet_part(DecryptedPfx, EncryptedBuffer, TotalNeeded,
+ #ssh{recv_mac_size = MacSize,
+ decrypt = CryptoAlg} = Ssh0) ->
+ %% enough bytes to decode the packet.
+ DecryptLen = TotalNeeded - size(DecryptedPfx) - MacSize,
+ <<EncryptedSfx:DecryptLen/binary, Mac:MacSize/binary, NextPacketBytes/binary>> = EncryptedBuffer,
+ case pkt_type(CryptoAlg) of
+ common ->
+ {Ssh1, DecryptedSfx} = decrypt(Ssh0, EncryptedSfx),
+ DecryptedPacket = <<DecryptedPfx/binary, DecryptedSfx/binary>>,
+ case is_valid_mac(Mac, DecryptedPacket, Ssh1) of
+ false ->
+ {bad_mac, Ssh1};
+ true ->
+ {Ssh, DecompressedPayload} = decompress(Ssh1, payload(DecryptedPacket)),
+ {decoded, DecompressedPayload, NextPacketBytes, Ssh}
+ end;
+ aead ->
+ PacketLenBin = DecryptedPfx,
+ case decrypt(Ssh0, {PacketLenBin,EncryptedSfx,Mac}) of
+ {Ssh1, error} ->
+ {bad_mac, Ssh1};
+ {Ssh1, DecryptedSfx} ->
+ DecryptedPacket = <<DecryptedPfx/binary, DecryptedSfx/binary>>,
+ {Ssh, DecompressedPayload} = decompress(Ssh1, payload(DecryptedPacket)),
+ {decoded, DecompressedPayload, NextPacketBytes, Ssh}
+ end
+ end.
+
+
+get_length(common, EncryptedBuffer, #ssh{decrypt_block_size = BlockSize} = Ssh0) ->
+ case size(EncryptedBuffer) >= erlang:max(8, BlockSize) of
+ true ->
+ <<EncBlock:BlockSize/binary, EncryptedRest/binary>> = EncryptedBuffer,
+ {Ssh,
+ <<?UINT32(PacketLen),_/binary>> = Decrypted} = decrypt(Ssh0, EncBlock),
+ {ok, PacketLen, Decrypted, EncryptedRest, Ssh};
+ false ->
+ get_more
+ end;
+get_length(aead, EncryptedBuffer, Ssh) ->
+ case size(EncryptedBuffer) >= 4 of
+ true ->
+ <<?UINT32(PacketLen), EncryptedRest/binary>> = EncryptedBuffer,
+ {ok, PacketLen, <<?UINT32(PacketLen)>>, EncryptedRest, Ssh};
+ false ->
+ get_more
+ end.
-msg_data(PacketData) ->
- <<Len:32, PaddingLen:8, _/binary>> = PacketData,
- DataLen = Len - PaddingLen - 1,
- <<_:32, _:8, Data:DataLen/binary,
- _:PaddingLen/binary>> = PacketData,
- Data.
+pkt_type('AEAD_AES_128_GCM') -> aead;
+pkt_type('AEAD_AES_256_GCM') -> aead;
+pkt_type(_) -> common.
+
+payload(<<PacketLen:32, PaddingLen:8, PayloadAndPadding/binary>>) ->
+ PayloadLen = PacketLen - PaddingLen - 1,
+ <<Payload:PayloadLen/binary, _/binary>> = PayloadAndPadding,
+ Payload.
sign(SigData, Hash, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
DerSignature = public_key:sign(SigData, Hash, Key),
#'Dss-Sig-Value'{r = R, s = S} = public_key:der_decode('Dss-Sig-Value', DerSignature),
<<R:160/big-unsigned-integer, S:160/big-unsigned-integer>>;
+sign(SigData, Hash, Key = #'ECPrivateKey'{}) ->
+ DerEncodedSign = public_key:sign(SigData, Hash, Key),
+ #'ECDSA-Sig-Value'{r=R, s=S} = public_key:der_decode('ECDSA-Sig-Value', DerEncodedSign),
+ ssh_bits:encode([R,S], [mpint,mpint]);
sign(SigData, Hash, Key) ->
public_key:sign(SigData, Hash, Key).
@@ -896,60 +1061,48 @@ verify(PlainText, Hash, Sig, {_, #'Dss-Parms'{}} = Key) ->
<<R:160/big-unsigned-integer, S:160/big-unsigned-integer>> = Sig,
Signature = public_key:der_encode('Dss-Sig-Value', #'Dss-Sig-Value'{r = R, s = S}),
public_key:verify(PlainText, Hash, Signature, Key);
+verify(PlainText, Hash, Sig, {#'ECPoint'{},_} = Key) ->
+ <<?UINT32(Rlen),R:Rlen/big-signed-integer-unit:8,
+ ?UINT32(Slen),S:Slen/big-signed-integer-unit:8>> = Sig,
+ Sval = #'ECDSA-Sig-Value'{r=R, s=S},
+ DerEncodedSig = public_key:der_encode('ECDSA-Sig-Value',Sval),
+ public_key:verify(PlainText, Hash, DerEncodedSig, Key);
verify(PlainText, Hash, Sig, Key) ->
public_key:verify(PlainText, Hash, Sig, Key).
-%% public key algorithms
-%%
-%% ssh-dss REQUIRED sign Raw DSS Key
-%% ssh-rsa RECOMMENDED sign Raw RSA Key
-%% x509v3-sign-rsa OPTIONAL sign X.509 certificates (RSA key)
-%% x509v3-sign-dss OPTIONAL sign X.509 certificates (DSS key)
-%% spki-sign-rsa OPTIONAL sign SPKI certificates (RSA key)
-%% spki-sign-dss OPTIONAL sign SPKI certificates (DSS key)
-%% pgp-sign-rsa OPTIONAL sign OpenPGP certificates (RSA key)
-%% pgp-sign-dss OPTIONAL sign OpenPGP certificates (DSS key)
-%%
-
-%% key exchange
-%%
-%% diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 REQUIRED
-%% diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 REQUIRED
-%%
-%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-%% Encryption
%%
-%% chiphers
-%%
-%% 3des-cbc REQUIRED
-%% three-key 3DES in CBC mode
-%% blowfish-cbc OPTIONAL Blowfish in CBC mode
-%% twofish256-cbc OPTIONAL Twofish in CBC mode,
-%% with 256-bit key
-%% twofish-cbc OPTIONAL alias for "twofish256-cbc" (this
-%% is being retained for
-%% historical reasons)
-%% twofish192-cbc OPTIONAL Twofish with 192-bit key
-%% twofish128-cbc OPTIONAL Twofish with 128-bit key
-%% aes256-cbc OPTIONAL AES in CBC mode,
-%% with 256-bit key
-%% aes192-cbc OPTIONAL AES with 192-bit key
-%% aes128-cbc RECOMMENDED AES with 128-bit key
-%% serpent256-cbc OPTIONAL Serpent in CBC mode, with
-%% 256-bit key
-%% serpent192-cbc OPTIONAL Serpent with 192-bit key
-%% serpent128-cbc OPTIONAL Serpent with 128-bit key
-%% arcfour OPTIONAL the ARCFOUR stream cipher
-%% idea-cbc OPTIONAL IDEA in CBC mode
-%% cast128-cbc OPTIONAL CAST-128 in CBC mode
-%% none OPTIONAL no encryption; NOT RECOMMENDED
+%% Encryption
%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = none} = Ssh) ->
{ok, Ssh};
+encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', role = client} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 12*8),
+ <<K:16/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 128),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_block_size = 16,
+ encrypt_ctx = IV}};
+encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', role = server} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 12*8),
+ <<K:16/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 128),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_block_size = 16,
+ encrypt_ctx = IV}};
+encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', role = client} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 12*8),
+ <<K:32/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 256),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_block_size = 16,
+ encrypt_ctx = IV}};
+encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', role = server} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 12*8),
+ <<K:32/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 256),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_block_size = 16,
+ encrypt_ctx = IV}};
encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = '3des-cbc', role = client} = Ssh) ->
IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 64),
<<K1:8/binary, K2:8/binary, K3:8/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 192),
@@ -975,18 +1128,46 @@ encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes128-cbc', role = server} = Ssh) ->
encrypt_block_size = 16,
encrypt_ctx = IV}};
encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes128-ctr', role = client} = Ssh) ->
- IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 128),
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 128),
<<K:16/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 128),
State = crypto:stream_init(aes_ctr, K, IV),
{ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
encrypt_block_size = 16,
encrypt_ctx = State}};
+encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes192-ctr', role = client} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 128),
+ <<K:24/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 192),
+ State = crypto:stream_init(aes_ctr, K, IV),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_block_size = 16,
+ encrypt_ctx = State}};
+encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes256-ctr', role = client} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 128),
+ <<K:32/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 256),
+ State = crypto:stream_init(aes_ctr, K, IV),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_block_size = 16,
+ encrypt_ctx = State}};
encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes128-ctr', role = server} = Ssh) ->
- IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 128),
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 128),
<<K:16/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 128),
State = crypto:stream_init(aes_ctr, K, IV),
{ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
encrypt_block_size = 16,
+ encrypt_ctx = State}};
+encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes192-ctr', role = server} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 128),
+ <<K:24/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 192),
+ State = crypto:stream_init(aes_ctr, K, IV),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_block_size = 16,
+ encrypt_ctx = State}};
+encrypt_init(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes256-ctr', role = server} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 128),
+ <<K:32/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 256),
+ State = crypto:stream_init(aes_ctr, K, IV),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_block_size = 16,
encrypt_ctx = State}}.
encrypt_final(Ssh) ->
@@ -998,6 +1179,18 @@ encrypt_final(Ssh) ->
encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = none} = Ssh, Data) ->
{Ssh, Data};
+encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM',
+ encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_ctx = IV0} = Ssh, Data={_AAD,_Ptext}) ->
+ Enc = {_Ctext,_Ctag} = crypto:block_encrypt(aes_gcm, K, IV0, Data),
+ IV = next_gcm_iv(IV0),
+ {Ssh#ssh{encrypt_ctx = IV}, Enc};
+encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM',
+ encrypt_keys = K,
+ encrypt_ctx = IV0} = Ssh, Data={_AAD,_Ptext}) ->
+ Enc = {_Ctext,_Ctag} = crypto:block_encrypt(aes_gcm, K, IV0, Data),
+ IV = next_gcm_iv(IV0),
+ {Ssh#ssh{encrypt_ctx = IV}, Enc};
encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = '3des-cbc',
encrypt_keys = {K1,K2,K3},
encrypt_ctx = IV0} = Ssh, Data) ->
@@ -1013,6 +1206,14 @@ encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes128-cbc',
encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes128-ctr',
encrypt_ctx = State0} = Ssh, Data) ->
{State, Enc} = crypto:stream_encrypt(State0,Data),
+ {Ssh#ssh{encrypt_ctx = State}, Enc};
+encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes192-ctr',
+ encrypt_ctx = State0} = Ssh, Data) ->
+ {State, Enc} = crypto:stream_encrypt(State0,Data),
+ {Ssh#ssh{encrypt_ctx = State}, Enc};
+encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes256-ctr',
+ encrypt_ctx = State0} = Ssh, Data) ->
+ {State, Enc} = crypto:stream_encrypt(State0,Data),
{Ssh#ssh{encrypt_ctx = State}, Enc}.
@@ -1022,6 +1223,30 @@ encrypt(#ssh{encrypt = 'aes128-ctr',
decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = none} = Ssh) ->
{ok, Ssh};
+decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', role = client} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 12*8),
+ <<K:16/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 128),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_block_size = 16,
+ decrypt_ctx = IV}};
+decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM', role = server} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 12*8),
+ <<K:16/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 128),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_block_size = 16,
+ decrypt_ctx = IV}};
+decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', role = client} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 12*8),
+ <<K:32/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 256),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_block_size = 16,
+ decrypt_ctx = IV}};
+decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM', role = server} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 12*8),
+ <<K:32/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 256),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_block_size = 16,
+ decrypt_ctx = IV}};
decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = '3des-cbc', role = client} = Ssh) ->
{IV, KD} = {hash(Ssh, "B", 64),
hash(Ssh, "D", 192)},
@@ -1053,12 +1278,40 @@ decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'aes128-ctr', role = client} = Ssh) ->
{ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
decrypt_block_size = 16,
decrypt_ctx = State}};
+decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'aes192-ctr', role = client} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 128),
+ <<K:24/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 192),
+ State = crypto:stream_init(aes_ctr, K, IV),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_block_size = 16,
+ decrypt_ctx = State}};
+decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'aes256-ctr', role = client} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "B", 128),
+ <<K:32/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "D", 256),
+ State = crypto:stream_init(aes_ctr, K, IV),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_block_size = 16,
+ decrypt_ctx = State}};
decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'aes128-ctr', role = server} = Ssh) ->
IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 128),
<<K:16/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 128),
State = crypto:stream_init(aes_ctr, K, IV),
{ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
decrypt_block_size = 16,
+ decrypt_ctx = State}};
+decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'aes192-ctr', role = server} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 128),
+ <<K:24/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 192),
+ State = crypto:stream_init(aes_ctr, K, IV),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_block_size = 16,
+ decrypt_ctx = State}};
+decrypt_init(#ssh{decrypt = 'aes256-ctr', role = server} = Ssh) ->
+ IV = hash(Ssh, "A", 128),
+ <<K:32/binary>> = hash(Ssh, "C", 256),
+ State = crypto:stream_init(aes_ctr, K, IV),
+ {ok, Ssh#ssh{decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_block_size = 16,
decrypt_ctx = State}}.
@@ -1068,8 +1321,22 @@ decrypt_final(Ssh) ->
decrypt_ctx = undefined,
decrypt_block_size = 8}}.
+decrypt(Ssh, <<>>) ->
+ {Ssh, <<>>};
decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = none} = Ssh, Data) ->
{Ssh, Data};
+decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = 'AEAD_AES_128_GCM',
+ decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_ctx = IV0} = Ssh, Data = {_AAD,_Ctext,_Ctag}) ->
+ Dec = crypto:block_decrypt(aes_gcm, K, IV0, Data), % Dec = PlainText | error
+ IV = next_gcm_iv(IV0),
+ {Ssh#ssh{decrypt_ctx = IV}, Dec};
+decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = 'AEAD_AES_256_GCM',
+ decrypt_keys = K,
+ decrypt_ctx = IV0} = Ssh, Data = {_AAD,_Ctext,_Ctag}) ->
+ Dec = crypto:block_decrypt(aes_gcm, K, IV0, Data), % Dec = PlainText | error
+ IV = next_gcm_iv(IV0),
+ {Ssh#ssh{decrypt_ctx = IV}, Dec};
decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = '3des-cbc', decrypt_keys = Keys,
decrypt_ctx = IV0} = Ssh, Data) ->
{K1, K2, K3} = Keys,
@@ -1084,8 +1351,20 @@ decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = 'aes128-cbc', decrypt_keys = Key,
decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = 'aes128-ctr',
decrypt_ctx = State0} = Ssh, Data) ->
{State, Enc} = crypto:stream_decrypt(State0,Data),
+ {Ssh#ssh{decrypt_ctx = State}, Enc};
+decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = 'aes192-ctr',
+ decrypt_ctx = State0} = Ssh, Data) ->
+ {State, Enc} = crypto:stream_decrypt(State0,Data),
+ {Ssh#ssh{decrypt_ctx = State}, Enc};
+decrypt(#ssh{decrypt = 'aes256-ctr',
+ decrypt_ctx = State0} = Ssh, Data) ->
+ {State, Enc} = crypto:stream_decrypt(State0,Data),
{Ssh#ssh{decrypt_ctx = State}, Enc}.
+
+next_gcm_iv(<<Fixed:32, InvCtr:64>>) -> <<Fixed:32, (InvCtr+1):64>>.
+
+
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% Compression
%%
@@ -1168,43 +1447,48 @@ decompress(#ssh{decompress = '[email protected]', decompress_ctx = Context, authe
{Ssh, list_to_binary(Decompressed)}.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-%% MAC calculation
%%
-%% hmac-sha1 REQUIRED HMAC-SHA1 (digest length = key
-%% length = 20)
-%% hmac-sha1-96 RECOMMENDED first 96 bits of HMAC-SHA1 (digest
-%% length = 12, key length = 20)
-%% hmac-md5 OPTIONAL HMAC-MD5 (digest length = key
-%% length = 16)
-%% hmac-md5-96 OPTIONAL first 96 bits of HMAC-MD5 (digest
-%% length = 12, key length = 16)
-%% none OPTIONAL no MAC; NOT RECOMMENDED
+%% MAC calculation
%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
send_mac_init(SSH) ->
- case SSH#ssh.role of
- client ->
- KeySize =mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.send_mac),
- Key = hash(SSH, "E", KeySize),
- {ok, SSH#ssh { send_mac_key = Key }};
- server ->
- KeySize = mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.send_mac),
- Key = hash(SSH, "F", KeySize),
- {ok, SSH#ssh { send_mac_key = Key }}
+ case pkt_type(SSH#ssh.send_mac) of
+ common ->
+ case SSH#ssh.role of
+ client ->
+ KeySize = mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.send_mac),
+ Key = hash(SSH, "E", KeySize),
+ {ok, SSH#ssh { send_mac_key = Key }};
+ server ->
+ KeySize = mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.send_mac),
+ Key = hash(SSH, "F", KeySize),
+ {ok, SSH#ssh { send_mac_key = Key }}
+ end;
+ aead ->
+ %% Not applicable
+ {ok, SSH}
end.
send_mac_final(SSH) ->
- {ok, SSH#ssh { send_mac = none, send_mac_key = undefined }}.
+ {ok, SSH#ssh {send_mac = none,
+ send_mac_key = undefined }}.
+
recv_mac_init(SSH) ->
- case SSH#ssh.role of
- client ->
- Key = hash(SSH, "F", mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.recv_mac)),
- {ok, SSH#ssh { recv_mac_key = Key }};
- server ->
- Key = hash(SSH, "E", mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.recv_mac)),
- {ok, SSH#ssh { recv_mac_key = Key }}
+ case pkt_type(SSH#ssh.recv_mac) of
+ common ->
+ case SSH#ssh.role of
+ client ->
+ Key = hash(SSH, "F", mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.recv_mac)),
+ {ok, SSH#ssh { recv_mac_key = Key }};
+ server ->
+ Key = hash(SSH, "E", mac_key_size(SSH#ssh.recv_mac)),
+ {ok, SSH#ssh { recv_mac_key = Key }}
+ end;
+ aead ->
+ %% Not applicable
+ {ok, SSH}
end.
recv_mac_final(SSH) ->
@@ -1268,52 +1552,58 @@ hash(K, H, Ki, N, HASH) ->
hash(K, H, <<Ki/binary, Kj/binary>>, N-128, HASH).
kex_h(SSH, Key, E, F, K) ->
+ KeyBin = public_key:ssh_encode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
L = ssh_bits:encode([SSH#ssh.c_version, SSH#ssh.s_version,
SSH#ssh.c_keyinit, SSH#ssh.s_keyinit,
- ssh_message:encode_host_key(Key), E,F,K],
+ KeyBin, E,F,K],
[string,string,binary,binary,binary,
mpint,mpint,mpint]),
crypto:hash(sha((SSH#ssh.algorithms)#alg.kex), L).
%% crypto:hash(sha,L).
kex_h(SSH, Curve, Key, Q_c, Q_s, K) ->
+ KeyBin = public_key:ssh_encode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
L = ssh_bits:encode([SSH#ssh.c_version, SSH#ssh.s_version,
SSH#ssh.c_keyinit, SSH#ssh.s_keyinit,
- ssh_message:encode_host_key(Key), Q_c, Q_s, K],
+ KeyBin, Q_c, Q_s, K],
[string,string,binary,binary,binary,
mpint,mpint,mpint]),
crypto:hash(sha(Curve), L).
kex_h(SSH, Key, Min, NBits, Max, Prime, Gen, E, F, K) ->
L = if Min==-1; Max==-1 ->
+ KeyBin = public_key:ssh_encode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
Ts = [string,string,binary,binary,binary,
uint32,
mpint,mpint,mpint,mpint,mpint],
ssh_bits:encode([SSH#ssh.c_version,SSH#ssh.s_version,
SSH#ssh.c_keyinit,SSH#ssh.s_keyinit,
- ssh_message:encode_host_key(Key), NBits, Prime, Gen, E,F,K],
+ KeyBin, NBits, Prime, Gen, E,F,K],
Ts);
true ->
+ KeyBin = public_key:ssh_encode(Key, ssh2_pubkey),
Ts = [string,string,binary,binary,binary,
uint32,uint32,uint32,
mpint,mpint,mpint,mpint,mpint],
ssh_bits:encode([SSH#ssh.c_version,SSH#ssh.s_version,
SSH#ssh.c_keyinit,SSH#ssh.s_keyinit,
- ssh_message:encode_host_key(Key), Min, NBits, Max,
+ KeyBin, Min, NBits, Max,
Prime, Gen, E,F,K], Ts)
end,
crypto:hash(sha((SSH#ssh.algorithms)#alg.kex), L).
-sha('nistp256') -> sha256;
-sha('secp256r1')-> sha256;
-sha('nistp384') -> sha384;
-sha('secp384r1')-> sha384;
-sha('nistp521') -> sha512;
-sha('secp521r1')-> sha512;
+
+sha(secp256r1) -> sha256;
+sha(secp384r1) -> sha384;
+sha(secp521r1) -> sha512;
sha('diffie-hellman-group1-sha1') -> sha;
sha('diffie-hellman-group14-sha1') -> sha;
sha('diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1') -> sha;
-sha('diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256') -> sha256.
+sha('diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256') -> sha256;
+sha(?'secp256r1') -> sha(secp256r1);
+sha(?'secp384r1') -> sha(secp384r1);
+sha(?'secp521r1') -> sha(secp521r1).
+
mac_key_size('hmac-sha1') -> 20*8;
mac_key_size('hmac-sha1-96') -> 20*8;
@@ -1329,6 +1619,8 @@ mac_digest_size('hmac-md5') -> 20;
mac_digest_size('hmac-md5-96') -> 12;
mac_digest_size('hmac-sha2-256') -> 32;
mac_digest_size('hmac-sha2-512') -> 64;
+mac_digest_size('AEAD_AES_128_GCM') -> 16;
+mac_digest_size('AEAD_AES_256_GCM') -> 16;
mac_digest_size(none) -> 0.
peer_name({Host, _}) ->
@@ -1340,44 +1632,10 @@ peer_name({Host, _}) ->
%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-dh_group('diffie-hellman-group1-sha1') -> element(2, ?dh_group1);
-dh_group('diffie-hellman-group14-sha1') -> element(2, ?dh_group14).
-
-dh_gex_default_groups() -> ?dh_default_groups.
-
-
-dh_gex_group(Min, N, Max, undefined) ->
- dh_gex_group(Min, N, Max, dh_gex_default_groups());
-dh_gex_group(Min, N, Max, Groups) ->
- %% First try to find an exact match. If not an exact match, select the largest possible.
- {_,Group} =
- lists:foldl(
- fun(_, {I,G}) when I==N ->
- %% If we have an exact match already: use that one
- {I,G};
- ({I,G}, _) when I==N ->
- %% If we now found an exact match: use that very one
- {I,G};
- ({I,G}, {Imax,_Gmax}) when Min=<I,I=<Max, % a) {I,G} fullfills the requirements
- I>Imax -> % b) {I,G} is larger than current max
- %% A group within the limits and better than the one we have
- {I,G};
- (_, IGmax) ->
- %% Keep the one we have
- IGmax
- end, {-1,undefined}, Groups),
-
- case Group of
- undefined ->
- throw(#ssh_msg_disconnect{
- code = ?SSH_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR,
- description = "No possible diffie-hellman-group-exchange group found",
- language = ""});
- _ ->
- Group
- end.
-
+dh_group('diffie-hellman-group1-sha1') -> ?dh_group1;
+dh_group('diffie-hellman-group14-sha1') -> ?dh_group14.
+%%%----------------------------------------------------------------
generate_key(Algorithm, Args) ->
{Public,Private} = crypto:generate_key(Algorithm, Args),
{crypto:bytes_to_integer(Public), crypto:bytes_to_integer(Private)}.
@@ -1392,6 +1650,68 @@ ecdh_curve('ecdh-sha2-nistp256') -> secp256r1;
ecdh_curve('ecdh-sha2-nistp384') -> secp384r1;
ecdh_curve('ecdh-sha2-nistp521') -> secp521r1.
+
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+%%
+%% Utils for default_algorithms/1 and supported_algorithms/1
+%%
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+
+supported_algorithms(Key, [{client2server,BL1},{server2client,BL2}]) ->
+ [{client2server,As1},{server2client,As2}] = supported_algorithms(Key),
+ [{client2server,As1--BL1},{server2client,As2--BL2}];
+supported_algorithms(Key, BlackList) ->
+ supported_algorithms(Key) -- BlackList.
+
+
+select_crypto_supported(L) ->
+ Sup = [{ec_curve,crypto_supported_curves()} | crypto:supports()],
+ [Name || {Name,CryptoRequires} <- L,
+ crypto_supported(CryptoRequires, Sup)].
+
+crypto_supported_curves() ->
+ try crypto:ec_curves()
+ catch _:_ -> []
+ end.
+
+crypto_supported(Conditions, Supported) ->
+ lists:all( fun({Tag,CryptoName}) when is_atom(CryptoName) ->
+ crypto_name_supported(Tag,CryptoName,Supported);
+ ({Tag,{Name,Len}}) when is_integer(Len) ->
+ crypto_name_supported(Tag,Name,Supported) andalso
+ len_supported(Name,Len)
+ end, Conditions).
+
+crypto_name_supported(Tag, CryptoName, Supported) ->
+ lists:member(CryptoName, proplists:get_value(Tag,Supported,[])).
+
+len_supported(Name, Len) ->
+ try
+ case Name of
+ aes_ctr ->
+ {_, <<_/binary>>} =
+ %% Test encryption
+ crypto:stream_encrypt(crypto:stream_init(Name, <<0:Len>>, <<0:128>>), <<"">>);
+ aes_gcm ->
+ {<<_/binary>>, <<_/binary>>} =
+ crypto:block_encrypt(Name,
+ _Key = <<0:Len>>,
+ _IV = <<0:12/unsigned-unit:8>>,
+ {<<"AAD">>,"PT"})
+ end
+ of
+ _ -> true
+ catch
+ _:_ -> false
+ end.
+
+
+same(Algs) -> [{client2server,Algs}, {server2client,Algs}].
+
+
+%% default_algorithms(kex) -> % Example of how to disable an algorithm
+%% supported_algorithms(kex, ['ecdh-sha2-nistp521']);
+
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%
%% Other utils
diff --git a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.hrl b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.hrl
index 96ab1bb668..fd43326f0d 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssh/src/ssh_transport.hrl
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
-define(MAX_NUM_ALGORITHMS, 200).
-define(DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_MIN, 1024).
--define(DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_NBITS, 6144).
+-define(DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_NBITS, 2048).
-define(DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_MAX, 8192).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
@@ -229,39 +229,13 @@
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% rfc 2489, ch 6.2
+%%% Size 1024
-define(dh_group1,
- {1024,
- {2, 16#FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF}}).
+ {2, 16#FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF}).
%%% rfc 3526, ch3
+%%% Size 2048
-define(dh_group14,
- {2048,
- {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}}).
-
-%%% rfc 3526, ch4
--define(dh_group15,
- {3072,
- {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}}).
-
-%%% rfc 3526, ch5
--define(dh_group16,
- {4096,
- {2, 16#FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3BE39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA051015728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6BF12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200CBBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB3143DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D788719A10BDBA5B2699C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2233BA186515BE7ED1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127D5B05AA993B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934063199FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF}}).
-
-%%% rfc 3526, ch6
--define(dh_group17,
- {6144,
- {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}}).
-
-%%% rfc 3526, ch7
--define(dh_group18,
- {8192,
- {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}}).
-
--define(dh_default_groups, [?dh_group14,
- ?dh_group15,
- ?dh_group16,
- ?dh_group17,
- ?dh_group18] ).
+ {2, 16#FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3BE39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA051015728E5A8AACAA68FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF}).
-endif. % -ifdef(ssh_transport).
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE.erl
index e67fa2469f..f0ac92fef6 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE.erl
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
-module(ssh_algorithms_SUITE).
-include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl").
+-include_lib("ssh/src/ssh_transport.hrl").
%% Note: This directive should only be used in test suites.
-compile(export_all).
@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ groups() ->
],
AlgoTcSet =
- [{Alg, [], specific_test_cases(Tag,Alg,SshcAlgos,SshdAlgos)}
+ [{Alg, [parallel], specific_test_cases(Tag,Alg,SshcAlgos,SshdAlgos)}
|| {Tag,Algs} <- ErlAlgos ++ DoubleAlgos,
Alg <- Algs],
@@ -68,15 +69,26 @@ two_way_tags() -> [cipher,mac,compression].
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
init_per_suite(Config) ->
+ ct:log("os:getenv(\"HOME\") = ~p~n"
+ "init:get_argument(home) = ~p",
+ [os:getenv("HOME"), init:get_argument(home)]),
ct:log("~n~n"
"OS ssh:~n=======~n~p~n~n~n"
"Erl ssh:~n========~n~p~n~n~n"
"Installed ssh client:~n=====================~n~p~n~n~n"
- "Installed ssh server:~n=====================~n~p~n~n~n",
- [os:cmd("ssh -V"),
+ "Installed ssh server:~n=====================~n~p~n~n~n"
+ "Misc values:~n============~n"
+ " -- Default dh group exchange parameters ({min,def,max}): ~p~n"
+ " -- dh_default_groups: ~p~n"
+ " -- Max num algorithms: ~p~n"
+ ,[os:cmd("ssh -V"),
ssh:default_algorithms(),
ssh_test_lib:default_algorithms(sshc),
- ssh_test_lib:default_algorithms(sshd)]),
+ ssh_test_lib:default_algorithms(sshd),
+ {?DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_MIN,?DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_NBITS,?DEFAULT_DH_GROUP_MAX},
+ public_key:dh_gex_group_sizes(),
+ ?MAX_NUM_ALGORITHMS
+ ]),
ct:log("all() ->~n ~p.~n~ngroups()->~n ~p.~n",[all(),groups()]),
catch crypto:stop(),
case catch crypto:start() of
@@ -101,7 +113,8 @@ init_per_group(Group, Config) ->
Config;
false ->
%% An algorithm group
- [[{name,Tag}]|_] = ?config(tc_group_path, Config),
+ Tag = proplists:get_value(name,
+ hd(?config(tc_group_path, Config))),
Alg = Group,
PA =
case split(Alg) of
@@ -162,6 +175,52 @@ simple_exec(Config) ->
ssh_test_lib:std_simple_exec(Host, Port, Config).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Testing if no group matches
+simple_exec_groups_no_match_too_small(Config) ->
+ try simple_exec_group({400,500,600}, Config)
+ of
+ _ -> ct:fail("Exec though no group available")
+ catch
+ error:{badmatch,{error,"No possible diffie-hellman-group-exchange group found"}} ->
+ ok
+ end.
+
+simple_exec_groups_no_match_too_large(Config) ->
+ try simple_exec_group({9200,9500,9700}, Config)
+ of
+ _ -> ct:fail("Exec though no group available")
+ catch
+ error:{badmatch,{error,"No possible diffie-hellman-group-exchange group found"}} ->
+ ok
+ end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Testing all default groups
+simple_exec_groups(Config) ->
+ Sizes = interpolate( public_key:dh_gex_group_sizes() ),
+ lists:foreach(
+ fun(Sz) ->
+ ct:log("Try size ~p",[Sz]),
+ ct:comment(Sz),
+ case simple_exec_group(Sz, Config) of
+ expected -> ct:log("Size ~p ok",[Sz]);
+ _ -> ct:log("Size ~p not ok",[Sz])
+ end
+ end, Sizes),
+ ct:comment("~p",[lists:map(fun({_,I,_}) -> I;
+ (I) -> I
+ end,Sizes)]).
+
+
+interpolate([I1,I2|Is]) ->
+ OneThird = (I2-I1) div 3,
+ [I1,
+ {I1, I1 + OneThird, I2},
+ {I1, I1 + 2*OneThird, I2} | interpolate([I2|Is])];
+interpolate(Is) ->
+ Is.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Use the ssh client of the OS to connect
sshc_simple_exec(Config) ->
PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
@@ -254,6 +313,16 @@ specific_test_cases(Tag, Alg, SshcAlgos, SshdAlgos) ->
[sshd_simple_exec];
_ ->
[]
+ end ++
+ case {Tag,Alg} of
+ {kex,_} when Alg == 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1' ;
+ Alg == 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256' ->
+ [simple_exec_groups,
+ simple_exec_groups_no_match_too_large,
+ simple_exec_groups_no_match_too_small
+ ];
+ _ ->
+ []
end.
supports(Tag, Alg, Algos) ->
@@ -292,6 +361,16 @@ start_pubkey_daemon(Opts, Config) ->
setup_pubkey(Config) ->
DataDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
UserDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
- ssh_test_lib:setup_dsa_known_host(DataDir, UserDir),
+ ssh_test_lib:setup_dsa(DataDir, UserDir),
+ ssh_test_lib:setup_rsa(DataDir, UserDir),
+ ssh_test_lib:setup_ecdsa("256", DataDir, UserDir),
Config.
+
+simple_exec_group(I, Config) when is_integer(I) ->
+ simple_exec_group({I,I,I}, Config);
+simple_exec_group({Min,I,Max}, Config) ->
+ {Host,Port} = ?config(srvr_addr, Config),
+ ssh_test_lib:std_simple_exec(Host, Port, Config,
+ [{dh_gex_limits,{Min,I,Max}}]).
+
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4b1eb12eaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIJfCaBKIIKhjbJl5F8BedqlXOQYDX5ba9Skypllmx/w+oAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAE49RbK2xQ/19ji3uDPM7uT4692LbwWF1TiaA9vUuebMGazoW/98br
+N9xZu0L1AWwtEjs3kmJDTB7eJEGXnjUAcQ==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa.pub b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a0147e60fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBOPUWytsUP9fY4t7gzzO7k+Ovdi28FhdU4mgPb1LnmzBms6Fv/fG6zfcWbtC9QFsLRI7N5JiQ0we3iRBl541AHE= uabhnil@elxadlj3q32
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256 b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4b1eb12eaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIJfCaBKIIKhjbJl5F8BedqlXOQYDX5ba9Skypllmx/w+oAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAE49RbK2xQ/19ji3uDPM7uT4692LbwWF1TiaA9vUuebMGazoW/98br
+N9xZu0L1AWwtEjs3kmJDTB7eJEGXnjUAcQ==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256.pub b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a0147e60fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBOPUWytsUP9fY4t7gzzO7k+Ovdi28FhdU4mgPb1LnmzBms6Fv/fG6zfcWbtC9QFsLRI7N5JiQ0we3iRBl541AHE= uabhnil@elxadlj3q32
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256 b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2979ea88ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIMe4MDoit0t8RzSVPwkCBemQ9fhXL+xnTSAWISw8HNCioAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAEo2q7U3P6r0W5WGOLtM78UQtofM9UalEhiZeDdiyylsR/RR17Op0s
+VPGSADLmzzgcucLEKy17j2S+oz42VUJy5A==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256.pub b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..85dc419345
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_algorithms_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBKNqu1Nz+q9FuVhji7TO/FELaHzPVGpRIYmXg3YsspbEf0UdezqdLFTxkgAy5s84HLnCxCste49kvqM+NlVCcuQ= uabhnil@elxadlj3q32
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE.erl
index 51431da48e..0a5964c560 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE.erl
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
cli/1,
close/1,
daemon_already_started/1,
+ daemon_opt_fd/1,
+ multi_daemon_opt_fd/1,
double_close/1,
exec/1,
exec_compressed/1,
@@ -77,11 +79,16 @@ all() ->
appup_test,
{group, dsa_key},
{group, rsa_key},
+ {group, ecdsa_sha2_nistp256_key},
+ {group, ecdsa_sha2_nistp384_key},
+ {group, ecdsa_sha2_nistp521_key},
{group, dsa_pass_key},
{group, rsa_pass_key},
{group, internal_error},
daemon_already_started,
double_close,
+ daemon_opt_fd,
+ multi_daemon_opt_fd,
packet_size_zero,
ssh_info_print
].
@@ -89,6 +96,9 @@ all() ->
groups() ->
[{dsa_key, [], basic_tests()},
{rsa_key, [], basic_tests()},
+ {ecdsa_sha2_nistp256_key, [], basic_tests()},
+ {ecdsa_sha2_nistp384_key, [], basic_tests()},
+ {ecdsa_sha2_nistp521_key, [], basic_tests()},
{dsa_pass_key, [], [pass_phrase]},
{rsa_pass_key, [], [pass_phrase]},
{internal_error, [], [internal_error]}
@@ -117,8 +127,6 @@ end_per_suite(_Config) ->
ssh:stop(),
crypto:stop().
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-init_per_group(hardening_tests, Config) ->
- init_per_group(dsa_key, Config);
init_per_group(dsa_key, Config) ->
DataDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
@@ -129,6 +137,39 @@ init_per_group(rsa_key, Config) ->
PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
ssh_test_lib:setup_rsa(DataDir, PrivDir),
Config;
+init_per_group(ecdsa_sha2_nistp256_key, Config) ->
+ case lists:member('ecdsa-sha2-nistp256',
+ ssh_transport:default_algorithms(public_key)) of
+ true ->
+ DataDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
+ PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
+ ssh_test_lib:setup_ecdsa("256", DataDir, PrivDir),
+ Config;
+ false ->
+ {skip, unsupported_pub_key}
+ end;
+init_per_group(ecdsa_sha2_nistp384_key, Config) ->
+ case lists:member('ecdsa-sha2-nistp384',
+ ssh_transport:default_algorithms(public_key)) of
+ true ->
+ DataDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
+ PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
+ ssh_test_lib:setup_ecdsa("384", DataDir, PrivDir),
+ Config;
+ false ->
+ {skip, unsupported_pub_key}
+ end;
+init_per_group(ecdsa_sha2_nistp521_key, Config) ->
+ case lists:member('ecdsa-sha2-nistp521',
+ ssh_transport:default_algorithms(public_key)) of
+ true ->
+ DataDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
+ PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
+ ssh_test_lib:setup_ecdsa("521", DataDir, PrivDir),
+ Config;
+ false ->
+ {skip, unsupported_pub_key}
+ end;
init_per_group(rsa_pass_key, Config) ->
DataDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
@@ -190,8 +231,6 @@ init_per_group(dir_options, Config) ->
init_per_group(_, Config) ->
Config.
-end_per_group(hardening_tests, Config) ->
- end_per_group(dsa_key, Config);
end_per_group(dsa_key, Config) ->
PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
ssh_test_lib:clean_dsa(PrivDir),
@@ -362,30 +401,36 @@ exec(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Test that compression option works
exec_compressed(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
- process_flag(trap_exit, true),
- SystemDir = filename:join(?config(priv_dir, Config), system),
- UserDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
-
- {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SystemDir},{user_dir, UserDir},
- {preferred_algorithms,[{compression, [zlib]}]},
- {failfun, fun ssh_test_lib:failfun/2}]),
+ case ssh_test_lib:ssh_supports(zlib, compression) of
+ false ->
+ {skip, "zlib compression is not supported"};
+
+ true ->
+ process_flag(trap_exit, true),
+ SystemDir = filename:join(?config(priv_dir, Config), system),
+ UserDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
+
+ {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SystemDir},{user_dir, UserDir},
+ {preferred_algorithms,[{compression, [zlib]}]},
+ {failfun, fun ssh_test_lib:failfun/2}]),
- ConnectionRef =
- ssh_test_lib:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
- {user_dir, UserDir},
- {user_interaction, false}]),
- {ok, ChannelId} = ssh_connection:session_channel(ConnectionRef, infinity),
- success = ssh_connection:exec(ConnectionRef, ChannelId,
- "1+1.", infinity),
- Data = {ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {data, ChannelId, 0, <<"2\n">>}},
- case ssh_test_lib:receive_exec_result(Data) of
- expected ->
- ok;
- Other ->
- ct:fail(Other)
- end,
- ssh_test_lib:receive_exec_end(ConnectionRef, ChannelId),
- ssh:stop_daemon(Pid).
+ ConnectionRef =
+ ssh_test_lib:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user_dir, UserDir},
+ {user_interaction, false}]),
+ {ok, ChannelId} = ssh_connection:session_channel(ConnectionRef, infinity),
+ success = ssh_connection:exec(ConnectionRef, ChannelId,
+ "1+1.", infinity),
+ Data = {ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {data, ChannelId, 0, <<"2\n">>}},
+ case ssh_test_lib:receive_exec_result(Data) of
+ expected ->
+ ok;
+ Other ->
+ ct:fail(Other)
+ end,
+ ssh_test_lib:receive_exec_end(ConnectionRef, ChannelId),
+ ssh:stop_daemon(Pid)
+ end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Idle timeout test
@@ -428,6 +473,8 @@ shell(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
ErlShellStart ->
ct:log("Erlang shell start: ~p~n", [ErlShellStart]),
do_shell(IO, Shell)
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -456,11 +503,15 @@ cli(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef,
{data,0,0, <<"\r\nYou are accessing a dummy, type \"q\" to exit\r\n\n">>}} ->
ok = ssh_connection:send(ConnectionRef, ChannelId, <<"q">>)
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef,{closed, ChannelId}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -599,7 +650,7 @@ peername_sockname(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
host_equal(HostSockSrv, Host),
PortSockSrv = Port
after 10000 ->
- throw(timeout)
+ ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
host_equal(H1, H2) ->
@@ -633,7 +684,7 @@ close(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
{ssh_cm, Client,{closed, ChannelId}} ->
ok
after 5000 ->
- ct:fail(timeout)
+ ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -658,6 +709,68 @@ double_close(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
ok = ssh:close(CM).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+daemon_opt_fd(Config) ->
+ SystemDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
+ PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
+ UserDir = filename:join(PrivDir, nopubkey), % to make sure we don't use public-key-auth
+ file:make_dir(UserDir),
+
+ {ok,S1} = gen_tcp:listen(0,[]),
+ {ok,Fd1} = prim_inet:getfd(S1),
+
+ {ok,Pid1} = ssh:daemon(0, [{system_dir, SystemDir},
+ {fd,Fd1},
+ {user_dir, UserDir},
+ {user_passwords, [{"vego", "morot"}]},
+ {failfun, fun ssh_test_lib:failfun/2}]),
+
+ {ok,{_Host1,Port1}} = inet:sockname(S1),
+ {ok, C1} = ssh:connect("localhost", Port1, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user_dir, UserDir},
+ {user, "vego"},
+ {password, "morot"},
+ {user_interaction, false}]),
+ exit(C1, {shutdown, normal}),
+ ssh:stop_daemon(Pid1),
+ gen_tcp:close(S1).
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+multi_daemon_opt_fd(Config) ->
+ SystemDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
+ PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
+ UserDir = filename:join(PrivDir, nopubkey), % to make sure we don't use public-key-auth
+ file:make_dir(UserDir),
+
+ Test =
+ fun() ->
+ {ok,S} = gen_tcp:listen(0,[]),
+ {ok,Fd} = prim_inet:getfd(S),
+
+ {ok,Pid} = ssh:daemon(0, [{system_dir, SystemDir},
+ {fd,Fd},
+ {user_dir, UserDir},
+ {user_passwords, [{"vego", "morot"}]},
+ {failfun, fun ssh_test_lib:failfun/2}]),
+
+ {ok,{_Host,Port}} = inet:sockname(S),
+ {ok, C} = ssh:connect("localhost", Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user_dir, UserDir},
+ {user, "vego"},
+ {password, "morot"},
+ {user_interaction, false}]),
+ {S,Pid,C}
+ end,
+
+ Tests = [Test(),Test(),Test(),Test(),Test(),Test()],
+
+ [begin
+ gen_tcp:close(S),
+ ssh:stop_daemon(Pid),
+ exit(C, {shutdown, normal})
+ end || {S,Pid,C} <- Tests].
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
packet_size_zero(Config) ->
SystemDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
@@ -708,22 +821,28 @@ shell_unicode_string(Config) ->
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Test basic connection with openssh_zlib
openssh_zlib_basic_test(Config) ->
- SystemDir = filename:join(?config(priv_dir, Config), system),
- UserDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
+ case ssh_test_lib:ssh_supports(['[email protected]',none], compression) of
+ {false,L} ->
+ {skip, io_lib:format("~p compression is not supported",[L])};
- {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SystemDir},
- {user_dir, UserDir},
- {preferred_algorithms,[{compression, ['[email protected]']}]},
- {failfun, fun ssh_test_lib:failfun/2}]),
- ConnectionRef =
- ssh_test_lib:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
- {user_dir, UserDir},
- {user_interaction, false},
- {preferred_algorithms,[{compression, ['[email protected]',
- none]}]}
- ]),
- ok = ssh:close(ConnectionRef),
- ssh:stop_daemon(Pid).
+ true ->
+ SystemDir = filename:join(?config(priv_dir, Config), system),
+ UserDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
+
+ {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SystemDir},
+ {user_dir, UserDir},
+ {preferred_algorithms,[{compression, ['[email protected]']}]},
+ {failfun, fun ssh_test_lib:failfun/2}]),
+ ConnectionRef =
+ ssh_test_lib:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user_dir, UserDir},
+ {user_interaction, false},
+ {preferred_algorithms,[{compression, ['[email protected]',
+ none]}]}
+ ]),
+ ok = ssh:close(ConnectionRef),
+ ssh:stop_daemon(Pid)
+ end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
ssh_info_print(Config) ->
@@ -825,22 +944,32 @@ do_shell(IO, Shell) ->
receive
Echo0 ->
ct:log("Echo: ~p ~n", [Echo0])
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
receive
?NEWLINE ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
receive
Result0 = <<"2">> ->
ct:log("Result: ~p~n", [Result0])
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
receive
?NEWLINE ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
receive
ErlPrompt1 ->
ct:log("Erlang prompt: ~p~n", [ErlPrompt1])
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
exit(Shell, kill).
%%Does not seem to work in the testserver!
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256 b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4b1eb12eaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIJfCaBKIIKhjbJl5F8BedqlXOQYDX5ba9Skypllmx/w+oAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAE49RbK2xQ/19ji3uDPM7uT4692LbwWF1TiaA9vUuebMGazoW/98br
+N9xZu0L1AWwtEjs3kmJDTB7eJEGXnjUAcQ==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256.pub b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a0147e60fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa256.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBOPUWytsUP9fY4t7gzzO7k+Ovdi28FhdU4mgPb1LnmzBms6Fv/fG6zfcWbtC9QFsLRI7N5JiQ0we3iRBl541AHE= uabhnil@elxadlj3q32
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa384 b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa384
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4e8aa40959
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa384
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGkAgEBBDCYXb6OSAZyXRfLXOtMo43za197Hdc/T0YKjgQQjwDt6rlRwqTh7v7S
+PV2kXwNGdWigBwYFK4EEACKhZANiAARN2khlJUOOIiwsWHEALwDieeZR96qL4pUd
+ci7aeGaczdUK5jOA9D9zmBZtSYTfO8Cr7ekVghDlcWAIJ/BXcswgQwSEQ6wyfaTF
+8FYfyr4l3u9IirsnyaFzeIgeoNis8Gw=
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa384.pub b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa384.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..41e722e545
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa384.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBE3aSGUlQ44iLCxYcQAvAOJ55lH3qovilR1yLtp4ZpzN1QrmM4D0P3OYFm1JhN87wKvt6RWCEOVxYAgn8FdyzCBDBIRDrDJ9pMXwVh/KviXe70iKuyfJoXN4iB6g2KzwbA== uabhnil@elxadlj3q32
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa521 b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa521
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7196f46e97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa521
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHbAgEBBEFMadoz4ckEcClfqXa2tiUuYkJdDfwq+/iFQcpt8ESuEd26IY/vm47Q
+9UzbPkO4ou8xkNsQ3WvCRQBBWtn5O2kUU6AHBgUrgQQAI6GBiQOBhgAEAde5BRu5
+01/jS0jRk212xsb2DxPrxNpgp6IMCV8TA4Eps+8bSqHB091nLiBcP422HXYfuCd7
+XDjSs8ihcmhp0hCRASLqZR9EzW9W/SOt876May1Huj5X+WSO6RLe7vPn9vmf7kHf
+pip6m7M7qp2qGgQ3q2vRwS2K/O6156ohiOlmuuFs
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa521.pub b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa521.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8f059120bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/id_ecdsa521.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAHXuQUbudNf40tI0ZNtdsbG9g8T68TaYKeiDAlfEwOBKbPvG0qhwdPdZy4gXD+Nth12H7gne1w40rPIoXJoadIQkQEi6mUfRM1vVv0jrfO+jGstR7o+V/lkjukS3u7z5/b5n+5B36YqepuzO6qdqhoEN6tr0cEtivzuteeqIYjpZrrhbA== uabhnil@elxadlj3q32
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256 b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2979ea88ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIMe4MDoit0t8RzSVPwkCBemQ9fhXL+xnTSAWISw8HNCioAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAEo2q7U3P6r0W5WGOLtM78UQtofM9UalEhiZeDdiyylsR/RR17Op0s
+VPGSADLmzzgcucLEKy17j2S+oz42VUJy5A==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256.pub b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..85dc419345
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key256.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBKNqu1Nz+q9FuVhji7TO/FELaHzPVGpRIYmXg3YsspbEf0UdezqdLFTxkgAy5s84HLnCxCste49kvqM+NlVCcuQ= uabhnil@elxadlj3q32
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key384 b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key384
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fb1a862ded
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key384
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIGkAgEBBDArxbDfh3p1okrD9wQw6jJ4d4DdlBPD5GqXE8bIeRJiK41Sh40LgvPw
+mkqEDSXK++CgBwYFK4EEACKhZANiAAScl43Ih2lWTDKrSox5ve5uiTXil4smsup3
+CfS1XPjKxgBAmlfBim8izbdrT0BFdQzz2joduNMtpt61wO4rGs6jm0UP7Kim9PC7
+Hneb/99fIYopdMH5NMnk60zGO1uZ2vc=
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key384.pub b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key384.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..428d5fb7d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key384.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBJyXjciHaVZMMqtKjHm97m6JNeKXiyay6ncJ9LVc+MrGAECaV8GKbyLNt2tPQEV1DPPaOh240y2m3rXA7isazqObRQ/sqKb08Lsed5v/318hiil0wfk0yeTrTMY7W5na9w== uabhnil@elxadlj3q32
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key521 b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key521
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3e51ec2ecd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key521
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHcAgEBBEIB8O1BFkl2HQjQLRLonEZ97da/h39DMa9/0/hvPZWAI8gUPEQcHxRx
+U7b09p3Zh+EBbMFq8+1ae9ds+ZTxE4WFSvKgBwYFK4EEACOhgYkDgYYABAAlWVjq
+Bzg7Wt4gE6UNb1lRE2cnlmH2L/A5uo6qZRx5lPnSKOxEhxSb/Oay1+9d6KRdrh6/
+vlhd9SHDBhLcAPDvWgBnJIEj92Q3pXX4JtoitL0yl+SvvU+vUh966mzHShHzj8p5
+ccOgPkPNoA70yrpGzkIhPezpZOQdCaOXj/jFqNCTDg==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key521.pub b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key521.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..017a29f4da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_basic_SUITE_data/ssh_host_ecdsa_key521.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAAlWVjqBzg7Wt4gE6UNb1lRE2cnlmH2L/A5uo6qZRx5lPnSKOxEhxSb/Oay1+9d6KRdrh6/vlhd9SHDBhLcAPDvWgBnJIEj92Q3pXX4JtoitL0yl+SvvU+vUh966mzHShHzj8p5ccOgPkPNoA70yrpGzkIhPezpZOQdCaOXj/jFqNCTDg== uabhnil@elxadlj3q32
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_connection_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_connection_SUITE.erl
index fbcf06290a..1b93cc9c32 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_connection_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_connection_SUITE.erl
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ all() ->
gracefull_invalid_long_start,
gracefull_invalid_long_start_no_nl,
stop_listener,
- start_subsystem_on_closed_channel
+ start_subsystem_on_closed_channel,
+ max_channels_option
].
groups() ->
[{openssh, [], payload() ++ ptty()}].
@@ -119,20 +120,28 @@ simple_exec(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {data, ChannelId0, 0, <<"testing\n">>}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
%% receive close messages
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {eof, ChannelId0}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {exit_status, ChannelId0, 0}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef,{closed, ChannelId0}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -154,20 +163,28 @@ small_cat(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {data, ChannelId0, 0, Data}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
%% receive close messages
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {eof, ChannelId0}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {exit_status, ChannelId0, 0}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef,{closed, ChannelId0}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
big_cat() ->
@@ -211,11 +228,15 @@ big_cat(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
%% receive close messages (eof already consumed)
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {exit_status, ChannelId0, 0}} ->
- ok
+ ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef,{closed, ChannelId0}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -234,14 +255,20 @@ send_after_exit(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {eof, ChannelId0}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {exit_status, ChannelId0, _ExitStatus}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
receive
{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef,{closed, ChannelId0}} ->
ok
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
case ssh_connection:send(ConnectionRef, ChannelId0, Data, 2000) of
{error, closed} -> ok;
@@ -455,6 +482,8 @@ gracefull_invalid_version(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
{tcp_closed, S} ->
ok
end
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
gracefull_invalid_start(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
@@ -475,6 +504,8 @@ gracefull_invalid_start(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
{tcp_closed, S} ->
ok
end
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
gracefull_invalid_long_start(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
@@ -495,6 +526,8 @@ gracefull_invalid_long_start(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
{tcp_closed, S} ->
ok
end
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
@@ -516,6 +549,8 @@ gracefull_invalid_long_start_no_nl(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
{tcp_closed, S} ->
ok
end
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
stop_listener() ->
@@ -606,6 +641,88 @@ start_subsystem_on_closed_channel(Config) ->
ssh:stop_daemon(Pid).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+max_channels_option() ->
+ [{doc, "Test max_channels option"}].
+
+max_channels_option(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
+ PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
+ UserDir = filename:join(PrivDir, nopubkey), % to make sure we don't use public-key-auth
+ file:make_dir(UserDir),
+ SysDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
+ {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SysDir},
+ {user_dir, UserDir},
+ {password, "morot"},
+ {max_channels, 3},
+ {subsystems, [{"echo_n", {ssh_echo_server, [4000000]}}]}
+ ]),
+
+ ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user, "foo"},
+ {password, "morot"},
+ {user_interaction, true},
+ {user_dir, UserDir}]),
+
+ {ok, ChannelId0} = ssh_connection:session_channel(ConnectionRef, infinity),
+ {ok, ChannelId1} = ssh_connection:session_channel(ConnectionRef, infinity),
+ {ok, ChannelId2} = ssh_connection:session_channel(ConnectionRef, infinity),
+ {ok, ChannelId3} = ssh_connection:session_channel(ConnectionRef, infinity),
+ {ok, ChannelId4} = ssh_connection:session_channel(ConnectionRef, infinity),
+ {ok, ChannelId5} = ssh_connection:session_channel(ConnectionRef, infinity),
+ {ok, _ChannelId6} = ssh_connection:session_channel(ConnectionRef, infinity),
+
+ %%%---- shell
+ ok = ssh_connection:shell(ConnectionRef,ChannelId0),
+ receive
+ {ssh_cm,ConnectionRef, {data, ChannelId0, 0, <<"Eshell",_/binary>>}} ->
+ ok
+ after 5000 ->
+ ct:fail("CLI Timeout")
+ end,
+
+ %%%---- subsystem "echo_n"
+ success = ssh_connection:subsystem(ConnectionRef, ChannelId1, "echo_n", infinity),
+
+ %%%---- exec #1
+ success = ssh_connection:exec(ConnectionRef, ChannelId2, "testing1.\n", infinity),
+ receive
+ {ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {data, ChannelId2, 0, <<"testing1",_/binary>>}} ->
+ ok
+ after 5000 ->
+ ct:fail("Exec #1 Timeout")
+ end,
+
+ %%%---- ptty
+ success = ssh_connection:ptty_alloc(ConnectionRef, ChannelId3, []),
+
+ %%%---- exec #2
+ failure = ssh_connection:exec(ConnectionRef, ChannelId4, "testing2.\n", infinity),
+
+ %%%---- close the shell
+ ok = ssh_connection:send(ConnectionRef, ChannelId0, "exit().\n", 5000),
+
+ %%%---- wait for the subsystem to terminate
+ receive
+ {ssh_cm,ConnectionRef,{closed,ChannelId0}} -> ok
+ after 5000 ->
+ ct:log("Timeout waiting for '{ssh_cm,~p,{closed,~p}}'~n"
+ "Message queue:~n~p",
+ [ConnectionRef,ChannelId0,erlang:process_info(self(),messages)]),
+ ct:fail("exit Timeout",[])
+ end,
+
+ %%%---- exec #3
+ success = ssh_connection:exec(ConnectionRef, ChannelId5, "testing3.\n", infinity),
+ receive
+ {ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {data, ChannelId5, 0, <<"testing3",_/binary>>}} ->
+ ok
+ after 5000 ->
+ ct:fail("Exec #3 Timeout")
+ end,
+
+ ssh:close(ConnectionRef),
+ ssh:stop_daemon(Pid).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Internal functions ------------------------------------------------
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
big_cat_rx(ConnectionRef, ChannelId) ->
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_options_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_options_SUITE.erl
index d64c78da35..6a201d401f 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_options_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_options_SUITE.erl
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@
max_sessions_ssh_connect_sequential/1,
server_password_option/1,
server_userpassword_option/1,
+ server_pwdfun_option/1,
+ server_pwdfun_4_option/1,
+ server_pwdfun_4_option_repeat/1,
ssh_connect_arg4_timeout/1,
ssh_connect_negtimeout_parallel/1,
ssh_connect_negtimeout_sequential/1,
@@ -83,6 +86,9 @@ all() ->
connectfun_disconnectfun_client,
server_password_option,
server_userpassword_option,
+ server_pwdfun_option,
+ server_pwdfun_4_option,
+ server_pwdfun_4_option_repeat,
{group, dir_options},
ssh_connect_timeout,
ssh_connect_arg4_timeout,
@@ -188,7 +194,9 @@ init_per_testcase(_TestCase, Config) ->
Config.
end_per_testcase(TestCase, Config) when TestCase == server_password_option;
- TestCase == server_userpassword_option ->
+ TestCase == server_userpassword_option;
+ TestCase == server_pwdfun_option;
+ TestCase == server_pwdfun_4_option ->
UserDir = filename:join(?config(priv_dir, Config), nopubkey),
ssh_test_lib:del_dirs(UserDir),
end_per_testcase(Config);
@@ -272,6 +280,157 @@ server_userpassword_option(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
ssh:stop_daemon(Pid).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% validate to server that uses the 'pwdfun' option
+server_pwdfun_option(Config) ->
+ PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
+ UserDir = filename:join(PrivDir, nopubkey), % to make sure we don't use public-key-auth
+ file:make_dir(UserDir),
+ SysDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
+ CHKPWD = fun("foo",Pwd) -> Pwd=="bar";
+ (_,_) -> false
+ end,
+ {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SysDir},
+ {user_dir, PrivDir},
+ {pwdfun,CHKPWD}]),
+ ConnectionRef =
+ ssh_test_lib:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user, "foo"},
+ {password, "bar"},
+ {user_interaction, false},
+ {user_dir, UserDir}]),
+ ssh:close(ConnectionRef),
+
+ Reason = "Unable to connect using the available authentication methods",
+
+ {error, Reason} =
+ ssh:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user, "foo"},
+ {password, "morot"},
+ {user_interaction, false},
+ {user_dir, UserDir}]),
+ {error, Reason} =
+ ssh:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user, "vego"},
+ {password, "foo"},
+ {user_interaction, false},
+ {user_dir, UserDir}]),
+ ssh:stop_daemon(Pid).
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% validate to server that uses the 'pwdfun/4' option
+server_pwdfun_4_option(Config) ->
+ PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
+ UserDir = filename:join(PrivDir, nopubkey), % to make sure we don't use public-key-auth
+ file:make_dir(UserDir),
+ SysDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
+ PWDFUN = fun("foo",Pwd,{_,_},undefined) -> Pwd=="bar";
+ ("fie",Pwd,{_,_},undefined) -> {Pwd=="bar",new_state};
+ ("bandit",_,_,_) -> disconnect;
+ (_,_,_,_) -> false
+ end,
+ {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SysDir},
+ {user_dir, PrivDir},
+ {pwdfun,PWDFUN}]),
+ ConnectionRef1 =
+ ssh_test_lib:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user, "foo"},
+ {password, "bar"},
+ {user_interaction, false},
+ {user_dir, UserDir}]),
+ ssh:close(ConnectionRef1),
+
+ ConnectionRef2 =
+ ssh_test_lib:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user, "fie"},
+ {password, "bar"},
+ {user_interaction, false},
+ {user_dir, UserDir}]),
+ ssh:close(ConnectionRef2),
+
+ Reason = "Unable to connect using the available authentication methods",
+
+ {error, Reason} =
+ ssh:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user, "foo"},
+ {password, "morot"},
+ {user_interaction, false},
+ {user_dir, UserDir}]),
+ {error, Reason} =
+ ssh:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user, "fie"},
+ {password, "morot"},
+ {user_interaction, false},
+ {user_dir, UserDir}]),
+ {error, Reason} =
+ ssh:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user, "vego"},
+ {password, "foo"},
+ {user_interaction, false},
+ {user_dir, UserDir}]),
+
+ {error, Reason} =
+ ssh:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user, "bandit"},
+ {password, "pwd breaking"},
+ {user_interaction, false},
+ {user_dir, UserDir}]),
+ ssh:stop_daemon(Pid).
+
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+server_pwdfun_4_option_repeat(Config) ->
+ PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
+ UserDir = filename:join(PrivDir, nopubkey), % to make sure we don't use public-key-auth
+ file:make_dir(UserDir),
+ SysDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
+ %% Test that the state works
+ Parent = self(),
+ PWDFUN = fun("foo",P="bar",_,S) -> Parent!{P,S},true;
+ (_,P,_,S=undefined) -> Parent!{P,S},{false,1};
+ (_,P,_,S) -> Parent!{P,S}, {false,S+1}
+ end,
+ {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SysDir},
+ {user_dir, PrivDir},
+ {auth_methods,"keyboard-interactive"},
+ {pwdfun,PWDFUN}]),
+
+ %% Try with passwords "incorrect", "Bad again" and finally "bar"
+ KIFFUN = fun(_,_,_) ->
+ K={k,self()},
+ case get(K) of
+ undefined ->
+ put(K,1),
+ ["incorrect"];
+ 2 ->
+ put(K,3),
+ ["bar"];
+ S->
+ put(K,S+1),
+ ["Bad again"]
+ end
+ end,
+
+ ConnectionRef2 =
+ ssh_test_lib:connect(Host, Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user, "foo"},
+ {keyboard_interact_fun, KIFFUN},
+ {user_dir, UserDir}]),
+ ssh:close(ConnectionRef2),
+ ssh:stop_daemon(Pid),
+
+ lists:foreach(fun(Expect) ->
+ receive
+ Expect -> ok;
+ Other -> ct:fail("Expect: ~p~nReceived ~p",[Expect,Other])
+ after
+ 2000 -> ct:fail("Timeout expecting ~p",[Expect])
+ end
+ end, [{"incorrect",undefined},
+ {"Bad again",1},
+ {"bar",2}]).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
system_dir_option(Config) ->
DirUnread = proplists:get_value(unreadable_dir,Config),
FileRead = proplists:get_value(readable_file,Config),
@@ -656,6 +815,8 @@ ssh_connect_arg4_timeout(_Config) ->
%% Get listening port
Port = receive
{port,Server,ServerPort} -> ServerPort
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
%% try to connect with a timeout, but "supervise" it
@@ -861,6 +1022,8 @@ ssh_connect_nonegtimeout_connected(Config, Parallel) ->
ct:sleep(round(Factor * NegTimeOut)),
one_shell_op(IO, NegTimeOut)
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
exit(Shell, kill).
@@ -869,13 +1032,13 @@ one_shell_op(IO, TimeOut) ->
ct:log("One shell op: Waiting for prompter"),
receive
ErlPrompt0 -> ct:log("Erlang prompt: ~p~n", [ErlPrompt0])
- after TimeOut -> ct:fail("Timeout waiting for promter")
+ after TimeOut -> ct:fail("Timeout waiting for promter")
end,
IO ! {input, self(), "2*3*7.\r\n"},
receive
Echo0 -> ct:log("Echo: ~p ~n", [Echo0])
- after TimeOut -> ct:fail("Timeout waiting for echo")
+ after TimeOut -> ct:fail("Timeout waiting for echo")
end,
receive
@@ -888,7 +1051,7 @@ one_shell_op(IO, TimeOut) ->
receive
Result0 -> ct:log("Result: ~p~n", [Result0])
- after TimeOut -> ct:fail("Timeout waiting for result")
+ after TimeOut -> ct:fail("Timeout waiting for result")
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1016,9 +1179,13 @@ fake_daemon(_Config) ->
{ok,S} = Rsa,
receive
{tcp, S, Id} -> Parent ! {id,self(),Id}
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end
end),
%% Get listening host and port
receive
{sockname,Server,ServerHost,ServerPort} -> {Server, ServerHost, ServerPort}
+ after
+ 10000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_protocol_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_protocol_SUITE.erl
index d8e99799e2..3a7f47c2dd 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_protocol_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_protocol_SUITE.erl
@@ -46,7 +46,10 @@ suite() ->
all() ->
[{group,tool_tests},
- {group,kex}
+ {group,kex},
+ {group,service_requests},
+ {group,packet_size_error},
+ {group,field_size_error}
].
groups() ->
@@ -55,13 +58,25 @@ groups() ->
lib_match,
lib_no_match
]},
+ {packet_size_error, [], [packet_length_too_large,
+ packet_length_too_short]},
+
+ {field_size_error, [], [service_name_length_too_large,
+ service_name_length_too_short]},
+
{kex, [], [no_common_alg_server_disconnects,
no_common_alg_client_disconnects,
- gex_client_init_default_noexact,
- gex_client_init_default_exact,
gex_client_init_option_groups,
+ gex_server_gex_limit,
+ gex_client_init_option_groups_moduli_file,
gex_client_init_option_groups_file
- ]}
+ ]},
+ {service_requests, [], [bad_service_name,
+ bad_long_service_name,
+ bad_very_long_service_name,
+ empty_service_name,
+ bad_service_name_then_correct
+ ]}
].
@@ -76,10 +91,10 @@ end_per_suite(Config) ->
init_per_testcase(no_common_alg_server_disconnects, Config) ->
start_std_daemon(Config, [{preferred_algorithms,[{public_key,['ssh-rsa']}]}]);
-init_per_testcase(TC, Config) when TC == gex_client_init_default_noexact ;
- TC == gex_client_init_default_exact ;
- TC == gex_client_init_option_groups ;
- TC == gex_client_init_option_groups_file ->
+init_per_testcase(TC, Config) when TC == gex_client_init_option_groups ;
+ TC == gex_client_init_option_groups_moduli_file ;
+ TC == gex_client_init_option_groups_file ;
+ TC == gex_server_gex_limit ->
Opts = case TC of
gex_client_init_option_groups ->
[{dh_gex_groups, [{2345, 3, 41}]}];
@@ -87,21 +102,31 @@ init_per_testcase(TC, Config) when TC == gex_client_init_default_noexact ;
DataDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
F = filename:join(DataDir, "dh_group_test"),
[{dh_gex_groups, {file,F}}];
+ gex_client_init_option_groups_moduli_file ->
+ DataDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
+ F = filename:join(DataDir, "dh_group_test.moduli"),
+ [{dh_gex_groups, {ssh_moduli_file,F}}];
+ gex_server_gex_limit ->
+ [{dh_gex_groups, [{ 500, 3, 18},
+ {1000, 7, 91},
+ {3000, 5, 61}]},
+ {dh_gex_limits,{500,1500}}
+ ];
_ ->
[]
end,
start_std_daemon(Config,
- [{preferred_algorithms, ssh_transport:supported_algorithms()}
+ [{preferred_algorithms, ssh:default_algorithms()}
| Opts]);
init_per_testcase(_TestCase, Config) ->
check_std_daemon_works(Config, ?LINE).
end_per_testcase(no_common_alg_server_disconnects, Config) ->
stop_std_daemon(Config);
-end_per_testcase(TC, Config) when TC == gex_client_init_default_noexact ;
- TC == gex_client_init_default_exact ;
- TC == gex_client_init_option_groups ;
- TC == gex_client_init_option_groups_file ->
+end_per_testcase(TC, Config) when TC == gex_client_init_option_groups ;
+ TC == gex_client_init_option_groups_moduli_file ;
+ TC == gex_client_init_option_groups_file ;
+ TC == gex_server_gex_limit ->
stop_std_daemon(Config);
end_per_testcase(_TestCase, Config) ->
check_std_daemon_works(Config, ?LINE).
@@ -114,25 +139,10 @@ end_per_testcase(_TestCase, Config) ->
%%% Connect to an erlang server and check that the testlib acts as a client.
lib_works_as_client(Config) ->
%% Connect and negotiate keys
- {ok,InitialState} =
- ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec(
- [{set_options, [print_ops, print_seqnums, print_messages]},
- {connect,
- server_host(Config),server_port(Config),
- [{preferred_algorithms,[{kex,['diffie-hellman-group1-sha1']}]},
- {silently_accept_hosts, true},
- {user_dir, user_dir(Config)},
- {user_interaction, false}]},
- receive_hello,
- {send, hello},
- {send, ssh_msg_kexinit},
- {match, #ssh_msg_kexinit{_='_'}, receive_msg},
- {send, ssh_msg_kexdh_init},
- {match,# ssh_msg_kexdh_reply{_='_'}, receive_msg},
- {send, #ssh_msg_newkeys{}},
- {match, #ssh_msg_newkeys{_='_'}, receive_msg}
- ]
- ),
+ {ok,InitialState} = ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec(
+ [{set_options, [print_ops, print_seqnums, print_messages]}]
+ ),
+ {ok,AfterKexState} = connect_and_kex(Config, InitialState),
%% Do the authentcation
{User,Pwd} = server_user_password(Config),
@@ -147,7 +157,7 @@ lib_works_as_client(Config) ->
?STRING(unicode:characters_to_binary(Pwd))>>
}},
{match, #ssh_msg_userauth_success{_='_'}, receive_msg}
- ], InitialState),
+ ], AfterKexState),
%% Disconnect
{ok,_} =
@@ -327,31 +337,29 @@ no_common_alg_client_disconnects(Config) ->
X ->
ct:log("¤¤¤¤¤"),
ct:fail(X)
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
%%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-gex_client_init_default_noexact(Config) ->
- do_gex_client_init(Config, {2000, 3000, 4000},
- %% Warning, app knowledege:
- ?dh_group15).
-
-
-gex_client_init_default_exact(Config) ->
- do_gex_client_init(Config, {2000, 2048, 4000},
- %% Warning, app knowledege:
- ?dh_group14).
-
-
gex_client_init_option_groups(Config) ->
do_gex_client_init(Config, {2000, 2048, 4000},
- {'n/a',{3,41}}).
-
+ {3,41}).
gex_client_init_option_groups_file(Config) ->
do_gex_client_init(Config, {2000, 2048, 4000},
- {'n/a',{5,61}}).
+ {5,61}).
+
+gex_client_init_option_groups_moduli_file(Config) ->
+ do_gex_client_init(Config, {2000, 2048, 4000},
+ {5,16#B7}).
-do_gex_client_init(Config, {Min,N,Max}, {_,{G,P}}) ->
+gex_server_gex_limit(Config) ->
+ do_gex_client_init(Config, {1000, 3000, 4000},
+ {7,91}).
+
+
+do_gex_client_init(Config, {Min,N,Max}, {G,P}) ->
{ok,_} =
ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec(
[{set_options, [print_ops, print_seqnums, print_messages]},
@@ -373,6 +381,106 @@ do_gex_client_init(Config, {Min,N,Max}, {_,{G,P}}) ->
]
).
+
+%%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+bad_service_name(Config) ->
+ bad_service_name(Config, "kfglkjf").
+
+bad_long_service_name(Config) ->
+ bad_service_name(Config,
+ lists:duplicate(?SSH_MAX_PACKET_SIZE div 2, $a)).
+
+bad_very_long_service_name(Config) ->
+ bad_service_name(Config,
+ lists:duplicate(4*?SSH_MAX_PACKET_SIZE, $a)).
+
+empty_service_name(Config) ->
+ bad_service_name(Config, "").
+
+bad_service_name_then_correct(Config) ->
+ {ok,InitialState} = connect_and_kex(Config),
+ {ok,_} =
+ ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec(
+ [{set_options, [print_ops, print_seqnums, print_messages]},
+ {send, #ssh_msg_service_request{name = "kdjglkfdjgkldfjglkdfjglkfdjglkj"}},
+ {send, #ssh_msg_service_request{name = "ssh-connection"}},
+ {match, {'or',[#ssh_msg_disconnect{_='_'},
+ tcp_closed
+ ]},
+ receive_msg}
+ ], InitialState).
+
+
+bad_service_name(Config, Name) ->
+ {ok,InitialState} = connect_and_kex(Config),
+ {ok,_} =
+ ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec(
+ [{set_options, [print_ops, print_seqnums, print_messages]},
+ {send, #ssh_msg_service_request{name = Name}},
+ {match, {'or',[#ssh_msg_disconnect{_='_'},
+ tcp_closed
+ ]},
+ receive_msg}
+ ], InitialState).
+
+%%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+packet_length_too_large(Config) -> bad_packet_length(Config, +4).
+
+packet_length_too_short(Config) -> bad_packet_length(Config, -4).
+
+bad_packet_length(Config, LengthExcess) ->
+ PacketFun =
+ fun(Msg, Ssh) ->
+ BinMsg = ssh_message:encode(Msg),
+ ssh_transport:pack(BinMsg, Ssh, LengthExcess)
+ end,
+ {ok,InitialState} = connect_and_kex(Config),
+ {ok,_} =
+ ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec(
+ [{set_options, [print_ops, print_seqnums, print_messages]},
+ {send, {special,
+ #ssh_msg_service_request{name="ssh-userauth"},
+ PacketFun}},
+ %% Prohibit remote decoder starvation:
+ {send, #ssh_msg_service_request{name="ssh-userauth"}},
+ {match, {'or',[#ssh_msg_disconnect{_='_'},
+ tcp_closed
+ ]},
+ receive_msg}
+ ], InitialState).
+
+%%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+service_name_length_too_large(Config) -> bad_service_name_length(Config, +4).
+
+service_name_length_too_short(Config) -> bad_service_name_length(Config, -4).
+
+
+bad_service_name_length(Config, LengthExcess) ->
+ PacketFun =
+ fun(#ssh_msg_service_request{name=Service}, Ssh) ->
+ BinName = list_to_binary(Service),
+ BinMsg =
+ <<?BYTE(?SSH_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST),
+ %% A bad string encoding of Service:
+ ?UINT32(size(BinName)+LengthExcess), BinName/binary
+ >>,
+ ssh_transport:pack(BinMsg, Ssh)
+ end,
+ {ok,InitialState} = connect_and_kex(Config),
+ {ok,_} =
+ ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec(
+ [{set_options, [print_ops, print_seqnums, print_messages]},
+ {send, {special,
+ #ssh_msg_service_request{name="ssh-userauth"},
+ PacketFun} },
+ %% Prohibit remote decoder starvation:
+ {send, #ssh_msg_service_request{name="ssh-userauth"}},
+ {match, {'or',[#ssh_msg_disconnect{_='_'},
+ tcp_closed
+ ]},
+ receive_msg}
+ ], InitialState).
+
%%%================================================================
%%%==== Internal functions ========================================
%%%================================================================
@@ -480,3 +588,24 @@ std_connect(Host, Port, Config, Opts) ->
30000).
%%%----------------------------------------------------------------
+connect_and_kex(Config) ->
+ connect_and_kex(Config, ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec([]) ).
+
+connect_and_kex(Config, InitialState) ->
+ ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec(
+ [{connect,
+ server_host(Config),server_port(Config),
+ [{preferred_algorithms,[{kex,['diffie-hellman-group1-sha1']}]},
+ {silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user_dir, user_dir(Config)},
+ {user_interaction, false}]},
+ receive_hello,
+ {send, hello},
+ {send, ssh_msg_kexinit},
+ {match, #ssh_msg_kexinit{_='_'}, receive_msg},
+ {send, ssh_msg_kexdh_init},
+ {match,# ssh_msg_kexdh_reply{_='_'}, receive_msg},
+ {send, #ssh_msg_newkeys{}},
+ {match, #ssh_msg_newkeys{_='_'}, receive_msg}
+ ],
+ InitialState).
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_protocol_SUITE_data/dh_group_test.moduli b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_protocol_SUITE_data/dh_group_test.moduli
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f6995ba4c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_protocol_SUITE_data/dh_group_test.moduli
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+20151021104105 2 6 100 2222 5 B7
+20151021104106 2 6 100 1111 5 4F
+
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_renegotiate_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_renegotiate_SUITE.erl
index 9daa6efc02..227dfcddcd 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_renegotiate_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_renegotiate_SUITE.erl
@@ -32,9 +32,15 @@
suite() -> [{ct_hooks,[ts_install_cth]}].
-all() -> [rekey, rekey_limit, renegotiate1, renegotiate2].
+all() -> [{group,default_algs},
+ {group,aes_gcm}
+ ].
-groups() -> [].
+groups() -> [{default_algs, [], tests()},
+ {aes_gcm, [], tests()}
+ ].
+
+tests() -> [rekey, rekey_limit, renegotiate1, renegotiate2].
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
init_per_suite(Config) ->
@@ -50,6 +56,18 @@ end_per_suite(_Config) ->
crypto:stop().
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+init_per_group(aes_gcm, Config) ->
+ [{preferred_algorithms, [{cipher,[{client2server,['[email protected]']},
+ {server2client,['[email protected]']}]}]}
+ | Config];
+init_per_group(_, Config) ->
+ [{preferred_algorithms, ssh:default_algorithms()} | Config].
+
+
+end_per_group(_, Config) ->
+ Config.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
init_per_testcase(_TestCase, Config) ->
ssh:start(),
Config.
@@ -89,9 +107,10 @@ rekey_limit(Config) ->
UserDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
DataFile = filename:join(UserDir, "rekey.data"),
- {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:std_daemon(Config,[]),
+ {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:std_daemon(Config,[{max_random_length_padding,0}]),
- ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:std_connect(Config, Host, Port, [{rekey_limit, 4500}]),
+ ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:std_connect(Config, Host, Port, [{rekey_limit, 6000},
+ {max_random_length_padding,0}]),
{ok, SftpPid} = ssh_sftp:start_channel(ConnectionRef),
Kex1 = get_kex_init(ConnectionRef),
@@ -132,13 +151,13 @@ renegotiate1(Config) ->
UserDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
DataFile = filename:join(UserDir, "renegotiate1.data"),
- {Pid, Host, DPort} = ssh_test_lib:std_daemon(Config,[]),
+ {Pid, Host, DPort} = ssh_test_lib:std_daemon(Config,[{max_random_length_padding,0}]),
RPort = ssh_test_lib:inet_port(),
{ok,RelayPid} = ssh_relay:start_link({0,0,0,0}, RPort, Host, DPort),
- ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:std_connect(Config, Host, RPort, []),
+ ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:std_connect(Config, Host, RPort, [{max_random_length_padding,0}]),
{ok, SftpPid} = ssh_sftp:start_channel(ConnectionRef),
Kex1 = get_kex_init(ConnectionRef),
@@ -170,12 +189,12 @@ renegotiate2(Config) ->
UserDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
DataFile = filename:join(UserDir, "renegotiate2.data"),
- {Pid, Host, DPort} = ssh_test_lib:std_daemon(Config,[]),
+ {Pid, Host, DPort} = ssh_test_lib:std_daemon(Config,[{max_random_length_padding,0}]),
RPort = ssh_test_lib:inet_port(),
{ok,RelayPid} = ssh_relay:start_link({0,0,0,0}, RPort, Host, DPort),
- ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:std_connect(Config, Host, RPort, []),
+ ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:std_connect(Config, Host, RPort, [{max_random_length_padding,0}]),
{ok, SftpPid} = ssh_sftp:start_channel(ConnectionRef),
Kex1 = get_kex_init(ConnectionRef),
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_sftp_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_sftp_SUITE.erl
index 32fdec9842..698af259c8 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_sftp_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_sftp_SUITE.erl
@@ -526,6 +526,8 @@ async_read(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
ok;
Msg ->
ct:fail(Msg)
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
async_write() ->
@@ -593,6 +595,8 @@ pos_read(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
ok;
Msg ->
ct:fail(Msg)
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
NewData1 = "hopp",
@@ -618,6 +622,8 @@ pos_write(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
ok;
Msg ->
ct:fail(Msg)
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end,
ok = ssh_sftp:pwrite(Sftp, Handle, eof, list_to_binary("!")),
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_sftpd_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_sftpd_SUITE.erl
index 94a54ec9db..6b03a2b763 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_sftpd_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_sftpd_SUITE.erl
@@ -683,6 +683,8 @@ reply(Cm, Channel, RBuf) ->
closed;
{ssh_cm, Cm, Msg} ->
ct:fail(Msg)
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_test_lib.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_test_lib.erl
index 6d568125bb..424afc76fe 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_test_lib.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_test_lib.erl
@@ -93,9 +93,12 @@ std_connect(Config, Host, Port, ExtraOpts) ->
| ExtraOpts]).
std_simple_sftp(Host, Port, Config) ->
+ std_simple_sftp(Host, Port, Config, []).
+
+std_simple_sftp(Host, Port, Config, Opts) ->
UserDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
DataFile = filename:join(UserDir, "test.data"),
- ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:std_connect(Config, Host, Port, []),
+ ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:std_connect(Config, Host, Port, Opts),
{ok, ChannelRef} = ssh_sftp:start_channel(ConnectionRef),
Data = crypto:rand_bytes(proplists:get_value(std_simple_sftp_size,Config,10)),
ok = ssh_sftp:write_file(ChannelRef, DataFile, Data),
@@ -104,7 +107,10 @@ std_simple_sftp(Host, Port, Config) ->
Data == ReadData.
std_simple_exec(Host, Port, Config) ->
- ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:std_connect(Config, Host, Port, []),
+ std_simple_exec(Host, Port, Config, []).
+
+std_simple_exec(Host, Port, Config, Opts) ->
+ ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:std_connect(Config, Host, Port, Opts),
{ok, ChannelId} = ssh_connection:session_channel(ConnectionRef, infinity),
success = ssh_connection:exec(ConnectionRef, ChannelId, "23+21-2.", infinity),
Data = {ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {data, ChannelId, 0, <<"42\n">>}},
@@ -157,7 +163,9 @@ loop_io_server(TestCase, Buff0) ->
{'EXIT',_, _} ->
erlang:display('ssh_test_lib:loop_io_server/2 EXIT'),
ok
- end.
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
+ end.
io_request({put_chars, Chars}, TestCase, _, _, Buff) ->
reply(TestCase, Chars),
@@ -206,6 +214,8 @@ receive_exec_result(Msg) ->
Other ->
ct:log("Other ~p", [Other]),
{unexpected_msg, Other}
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
@@ -286,6 +296,7 @@ setup_dsa(DataDir, UserDir) ->
file:make_dir(System),
file:copy(filename:join(DataDir, "ssh_host_dsa_key"), filename:join(System, "ssh_host_dsa_key")),
file:copy(filename:join(DataDir, "ssh_host_dsa_key.pub"), filename:join(System, "ssh_host_dsa_key.pub")),
+ct:log("DataDir ~p:~n ~p~n~nSystDir ~p:~n ~p~n~nUserDir ~p:~n ~p",[DataDir, file:list_dir(DataDir), System, file:list_dir(System), UserDir, file:list_dir(UserDir)]),
setup_dsa_known_host(DataDir, UserDir),
setup_dsa_auth_keys(DataDir, UserDir).
@@ -294,10 +305,21 @@ setup_rsa(DataDir, UserDir) ->
System = filename:join(UserDir, "system"),
file:make_dir(System),
file:copy(filename:join(DataDir, "ssh_host_rsa_key"), filename:join(System, "ssh_host_rsa_key")),
- file:copy(filename:join(DataDir, "ssh_host_rsa_key"), filename:join(System, "ssh_host_rsa_key.pub")),
+ file:copy(filename:join(DataDir, "ssh_host_rsa_key.pub"), filename:join(System, "ssh_host_rsa_key.pub")),
+ct:log("DataDir ~p:~n ~p~n~nSystDir ~p:~n ~p~n~nUserDir ~p:~n ~p",[DataDir, file:list_dir(DataDir), System, file:list_dir(System), UserDir, file:list_dir(UserDir)]),
setup_rsa_known_host(DataDir, UserDir),
setup_rsa_auth_keys(DataDir, UserDir).
+setup_ecdsa(Size, DataDir, UserDir) ->
+ file:copy(filename:join(DataDir, "id_ecdsa"++Size), filename:join(UserDir, "id_ecdsa")),
+ System = filename:join(UserDir, "system"),
+ file:make_dir(System),
+ file:copy(filename:join(DataDir, "ssh_host_ecdsa_key"++Size), filename:join(System, "ssh_host_ecdsa_key")),
+ file:copy(filename:join(DataDir, "ssh_host_ecdsa_key"++Size++".pub"), filename:join(System, "ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub")),
+ct:log("DataDir ~p:~n ~p~n~nSystDir ~p:~n ~p~n~nUserDir ~p:~n ~p",[DataDir, file:list_dir(DataDir), System, file:list_dir(System), UserDir, file:list_dir(UserDir)]),
+ setup_ecdsa_known_host(Size, System, UserDir),
+ setup_ecdsa_auth_keys(Size, UserDir, UserDir).
+
clean_dsa(UserDir) ->
del_dirs(filename:join(UserDir, "system")),
file:delete(filename:join(UserDir,"id_dsa")),
@@ -349,6 +371,11 @@ setup_rsa_known_host(SystemDir, UserDir) ->
[{Key, _}] = public_key:ssh_decode(SshBin, public_key),
setup_known_hosts(Key, UserDir).
+setup_ecdsa_known_host(_Size, SystemDir, UserDir) ->
+ {ok, SshBin} = file:read_file(filename:join(SystemDir, "ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub")),
+ [{Key, _}] = public_key:ssh_decode(SshBin, public_key),
+ setup_known_hosts(Key, UserDir).
+
setup_known_hosts(Key, UserDir) ->
{ok, Hostname} = inet:gethostname(),
{ok, {A, B, C, D}} = inet:getaddr(Hostname, inet),
@@ -376,6 +403,14 @@ setup_rsa_auth_keys(Dir, UserDir) ->
PKey = #'RSAPublicKey'{publicExponent = E, modulus = N},
setup_auth_keys([{ PKey, [{comment, "Test"}]}], UserDir).
+setup_ecdsa_auth_keys(_Size, Dir, UserDir) ->
+ {ok, Pem} = file:read_file(filename:join(Dir, "id_ecdsa")),
+ ECDSA = public_key:pem_entry_decode(hd(public_key:pem_decode(Pem))),
+ #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = Q,
+ parameters = Param = {namedCurve,_Id0}} = ECDSA,
+ PKey = #'ECPoint'{point = Q},
+ setup_auth_keys([{ {PKey,Param}, [{comment, "Test"}]}], UserDir).
+
setup_auth_keys(Keys, Dir) ->
AuthKeys = public_key:ssh_encode(Keys, auth_keys),
AuthKeysFile = filename:join(Dir, "authorized_keys"),
@@ -424,6 +459,14 @@ openssh_sanity_check(Config) ->
{skip, Str}
end.
+openssh_supports(ClientOrServer, Tag, Alg) when ClientOrServer == sshc ;
+ ClientOrServer == sshd ->
+ SSH_algos = ssh_test_lib:default_algorithms(ClientOrServer),
+ L = proplists:get_value(Tag, SSH_algos, []),
+ lists:member(Alg, L) orelse
+ lists:member(Alg, proplists:get_value(client2server, L, [])) orelse
+ lists:member(Alg, proplists:get_value(server2client, L, [])).
+
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Check if we have a "newer" ssh client that supports these test cases
@@ -443,7 +486,63 @@ check_ssh_client_support2(P) ->
-1
end.
-default_algorithms(Host, Port) ->
+%%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Probe a server or a client about algorithm support
+
+default_algorithms(sshd) ->
+ default_algorithms(sshd, "localhost", 22);
+
+default_algorithms(sshc) ->
+ default_algorithms(sshc, []).
+
+default_algorithms(sshd, Host, Port) ->
+ try run_fake_ssh(
+ ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec(
+ [{connect,Host,Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user_interaction, false}]}]))
+ catch
+ _C:_E ->
+ ct:log("***~p:~p: ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE,_C,_E]),
+ []
+ end.
+
+default_algorithms(sshc, DaemonOptions) ->
+ Parent = self(),
+ %% Start a process handling one connection on the server side:
+ Srvr =
+ spawn_link(
+ fun() ->
+ Parent !
+ {result, self(),
+ try
+ {ok,InitialState} = ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec(listen),
+ Parent ! {hostport,self(),ssh_trpt_test_lib:server_host_port(InitialState)},
+ run_fake_ssh(
+ ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec([{accept, DaemonOptions}],
+ InitialState))
+ catch
+ _C:_E ->
+ ct:log("***~p:~p: ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE,_C,_E]),
+ []
+ end}
+ end),
+
+ receive
+ {hostport,Srvr,{_Host,Port}} ->
+ spawn(fun()-> os:cmd(lists:concat(["ssh -o \"StrictHostKeyChecking no\" -p ",Port," localhost"])) end)
+ after ?TIMEOUT ->
+ ct:fail("No server respons 1")
+ end,
+
+ receive
+ {result,Srvr,L} ->
+ L
+ after ?TIMEOUT ->
+ ct:fail("No server respons 2")
+ end.
+
+
+run_fake_ssh({ok,InitialState}) ->
KexInitPattern =
#ssh_msg_kexinit{
kex_algorithms = '$kex_algorithms',
@@ -456,61 +555,35 @@ default_algorithms(Host, Port) ->
compression_algorithms_server_to_client = '$compression_algorithms_server_to_client',
_ = '_'
},
+ {ok,E} = ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec([{set_options,[silent]},
+ {send, hello},
+ receive_hello,
+ {send, ssh_msg_kexinit},
+ {match, KexInitPattern, receive_msg},
+ close_socket
+ ],
+ InitialState),
+ [Kex, PubKey, EncC2S, EncS2C, MacC2S, MacS2C, CompC2S, CompS2C] =
+ ssh_trpt_test_lib:instantiate(['$kex_algorithms',
+ '$server_host_key_algorithms',
+ '$encryption_algorithms_client_to_server',
+ '$encryption_algorithms_server_to_client',
+ '$mac_algorithms_client_to_server',
+ '$mac_algorithms_server_to_client',
+ '$compression_algorithms_client_to_server',
+ '$compression_algorithms_server_to_client'
+ ], E),
+ [{kex, to_atoms(Kex)},
+ {public_key, to_atoms(PubKey)},
+ {cipher, [{client2server, to_atoms(EncC2S)},
+ {server2client, to_atoms(EncS2C)}]},
+ {mac, [{client2server, to_atoms(MacC2S)},
+ {server2client, to_atoms(MacS2C)}]},
+ {compression, [{client2server, to_atoms(CompC2S)},
+ {server2client, to_atoms(CompS2C)}]}].
+
- try ssh_trpt_test_lib:exec(
- [{connect,Host,Port, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
- {user_interaction, false}]},
- {send,hello},
- receive_hello,
- {send, ssh_msg_kexinit},
- {match, KexInitPattern, receive_msg},
- close_socket])
- of
- {ok,E} ->
- [Kex, PubKey, EncC2S, EncS2C, MacC2S, MacS2C, CompC2S, CompS2C] =
- ssh_trpt_test_lib:instantiate(['$kex_algorithms',
- '$server_host_key_algorithms',
- '$encryption_algorithms_client_to_server',
- '$encryption_algorithms_server_to_client',
- '$mac_algorithms_client_to_server',
- '$mac_algorithms_server_to_client',
- '$compression_algorithms_client_to_server',
- '$compression_algorithms_server_to_client'
- ], E),
- [{kex, to_atoms(Kex)},
- {public_key, to_atoms(PubKey)},
- {cipher, [{client2server, to_atoms(EncC2S)},
- {server2client, to_atoms(EncS2C)}]},
- {mac, [{client2server, to_atoms(MacC2S)},
- {server2client, to_atoms(MacS2C)}]},
- {compression, [{client2server, to_atoms(CompC2S)},
- {server2client, to_atoms(CompS2C)}]}];
- _ ->
- []
- catch
- _:_ ->
- []
- end.
-
-
-default_algorithms(sshd) ->
- default_algorithms("localhost", 22);
-default_algorithms(sshc) ->
- case os:find_executable("ssh") of
- false ->
- [];
- _ ->
- Cipher = sshc(cipher),
- Mac = sshc(mac),
- [{kex, sshc(kex)},
- {public_key, sshc(key)},
- {cipher, [{client2server, Cipher},
- {server2client, Cipher}]},
- {mac, [{client2server, Mac},
- {server2client, Mac}]}
- ]
- end.
-
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
sshc(Tag) ->
to_atoms(
string:tokens(os:cmd(lists:concat(["ssh -Q ",Tag])), "\n")
@@ -552,4 +625,24 @@ algo_intersection(_, _) ->
to_atoms(L) -> lists:map(fun erlang:list_to_atom/1, L).
-
+%%%----------------------------------------------------------------
+ssh_supports(Alg, SshDefaultAlg_tag) ->
+ SupAlgs =
+ case proplists:get_value(SshDefaultAlg_tag,
+ ssh:default_algorithms()) of
+ [{_K1,L1}, {_K2,L2}] ->
+ lists:usort(L1++L2);
+ L ->
+ L
+ end,
+ if
+ is_atom(Alg) ->
+ lists:member(Alg, SupAlgs);
+ is_list(Alg) ->
+ case Alg--SupAlgs of
+ [] ->
+ true;
+ UnSup ->
+ {false,UnSup}
+ end
+ end.
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_to_openssh_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_to_openssh_SUITE.erl
index 104c1f9107..d1dfa2efdf 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_to_openssh_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_to_openssh_SUITE.erl
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ all() ->
groups() ->
[{erlang_client, [], [erlang_shell_client_openssh_server,
- erlang_client_openssh_server_exec,
erlang_client_openssh_server_exec_compressed,
erlang_client_openssh_server_setenv,
erlang_client_openssh_server_publickey_rsa,
@@ -54,12 +53,7 @@ groups() ->
erlang_client_openssh_server_kexs,
erlang_client_openssh_server_nonexistent_subsystem
]},
- {erlang_server, [], [erlang_server_openssh_client_exec,
- erlang_server_openssh_client_exec_compressed,
- erlang_server_openssh_client_pulic_key_dsa,
- erlang_server_openssh_client_cipher_suites,
- erlang_server_openssh_client_macs,
- erlang_server_openssh_client_kexs]}
+ {erlang_server, [], [erlang_server_openssh_client_public_key_dsa]}
].
init_per_suite(Config) ->
@@ -88,7 +82,7 @@ init_per_group(erlang_server, Config) ->
init_per_group(erlang_client, Config) ->
CommonAlgs = ssh_test_lib:algo_intersection(
ssh:default_algorithms(),
- ssh_test_lib:default_algorithms("localhost", 22)),
+ ssh_test_lib:default_algorithms(sshd)),
[{common_algs,CommonAlgs} | Config];
init_per_group(_, Config) ->
Config.
@@ -100,18 +94,21 @@ end_per_group(erlang_server, Config) ->
end_per_group(_, Config) ->
Config.
-init_per_testcase(erlang_server_openssh_client_cipher_suites, Config) ->
- check_ssh_client_support(Config);
-
-init_per_testcase(erlang_server_openssh_client_macs, Config) ->
- check_ssh_client_support(Config);
-
-init_per_testcase(erlang_server_openssh_client_kexs, Config) ->
- check_ssh_client_support(Config);
-
-init_per_testcase(erlang_client_openssh_server_kexs, Config) ->
- check_ssh_client_support(Config);
+init_per_testcase(erlang_server_openssh_client_public_key_dsa, Config) ->
+ case ssh_test_lib:openssh_supports(sshc, public_key, 'ssh-dss') of
+ true ->
+ init_per_testcase('__default__',Config);
+ false ->
+ {skip,"openssh client does not support DSA"}
+ end;
+init_per_testcase(erlang_client_openssh_server_publickey_dsa, Config) ->
+ case ssh_test_lib:openssh_supports(sshd, public_key, 'ssh-dss') of
+ true ->
+ init_per_testcase('__default__',Config);
+ false ->
+ {skip,"openssh client does not support DSA"}
+ end;
init_per_testcase(_TestCase, Config) ->
ssh:start(),
Config.
@@ -182,23 +179,29 @@ erlang_client_openssh_server_exec_compressed() ->
erlang_client_openssh_server_exec_compressed(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
CompressAlgs = [zlib, '[email protected]',none],
- ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:connect(?SSH_DEFAULT_PORT, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
- {user_interaction, false},
- {preferred_algorithms,
- [{compression,CompressAlgs}]}]),
- {ok, ChannelId} = ssh_connection:session_channel(ConnectionRef, infinity),
- success = ssh_connection:exec(ConnectionRef, ChannelId,
- "echo testing", infinity),
- Data = {ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {data, ChannelId, 0, <<"testing\n">>}},
- case ssh_test_lib:receive_exec_result(Data) of
- expected ->
- ssh_test_lib:receive_exec_end(ConnectionRef, ChannelId);
- {unexpected_msg,{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef,
- {exit_status, ChannelId, 0}} = ExitStatus} ->
- ct:log("0: Collected data ~p", [ExitStatus]),
- ssh_test_lib:receive_exec_result(Data, ConnectionRef, ChannelId);
- Other ->
- ct:fail(Other)
+ case ssh_test_lib:ssh_supports(CompressAlgs, compression) of
+ {false,L} ->
+ {skip, io_lib:format("~p compression is not supported",[L])};
+
+ true ->
+ ConnectionRef = ssh_test_lib:connect(?SSH_DEFAULT_PORT, [{silently_accept_hosts, true},
+ {user_interaction, false},
+ {preferred_algorithms,
+ [{compression,CompressAlgs}]}]),
+ {ok, ChannelId} = ssh_connection:session_channel(ConnectionRef, infinity),
+ success = ssh_connection:exec(ConnectionRef, ChannelId,
+ "echo testing", infinity),
+ Data = {ssh_cm, ConnectionRef, {data, ChannelId, 0, <<"testing\n">>}},
+ case ssh_test_lib:receive_exec_result(Data) of
+ expected ->
+ ssh_test_lib:receive_exec_end(ConnectionRef, ChannelId);
+ {unexpected_msg,{ssh_cm, ConnectionRef,
+ {exit_status, ChannelId, 0}} = ExitStatus} ->
+ ct:log("0: Collected data ~p", [ExitStatus]),
+ ssh_test_lib:receive_exec_result(Data, ConnectionRef, ChannelId);
+ Other ->
+ ct:fail(Other)
+ end
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -252,202 +255,6 @@ erlang_client_openssh_server_kexs(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-erlang_server_openssh_client_exec() ->
- [{doc, "Test that exec command works."}].
-
-erlang_server_openssh_client_exec(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
- SystemDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
- PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
- KnownHosts = filename:join(PrivDir, "known_hosts"),
-
- {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SystemDir},
- {failfun, fun ssh_test_lib:failfun/2}]),
-
-
- ct:sleep(500),
-
- Cmd = "ssh -p " ++ integer_to_list(Port) ++
- " -o UserKnownHostsFile=" ++ KnownHosts ++ " " ++ Host ++ " 1+1.",
-
- ct:log("Cmd: ~p~n", [Cmd]),
-
- SshPort = open_port({spawn, Cmd}, [binary]),
-
- receive
- {SshPort,{data, <<"2\n">>}} ->
- ok
- after ?TIMEOUT ->
- ct:fail("Did not receive answer")
-
- end,
- ssh:stop_daemon(Pid).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-erlang_server_openssh_client_cipher_suites() ->
- [{doc, "Test that we can connect with different cipher suites."}].
-
-erlang_server_openssh_client_cipher_suites(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
- SystemDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
- PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
- KnownHosts = filename:join(PrivDir, "known_hosts"),
-
- {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SystemDir},
- {failfun, fun ssh_test_lib:failfun/2}]),
-
- ct:sleep(500),
-
- OpenSshCiphers =
- ssh_test_lib:to_atoms(
- string:tokens(os:cmd("ssh -Q cipher"), "\n")),
- ErlCiphers =
- proplists:get_value(client2server,
- proplists:get_value(cipher, ssh:default_algorithms())),
- CommonCiphers =
- ssh_test_lib:algo_intersection(ErlCiphers, OpenSshCiphers),
-
- comment(CommonCiphers),
-
- lists:foreach(
- fun(Cipher) ->
- Cmd = lists:concat(["ssh -p ",Port,
- " -o UserKnownHostsFile=",KnownHosts," ",Host," ",
- " -c ",Cipher," 1+1."]),
- ct:log("Cmd: ~p~n", [Cmd]),
-
- SshPort = open_port({spawn, Cmd}, [binary, stderr_to_stdout]),
-
- receive
- {SshPort,{data, <<"2\n">>}} ->
- ok
- after ?TIMEOUT ->
- ct:fail("~p Did not receive answer",[Cipher])
- end
- end, CommonCiphers),
-
- ssh:stop_daemon(Pid).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-erlang_server_openssh_client_macs() ->
- [{doc, "Test that we can connect with different MACs."}].
-
-erlang_server_openssh_client_macs(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
- SystemDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
- PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
- KnownHosts = filename:join(PrivDir, "known_hosts"),
-
- {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SystemDir},
- {failfun, fun ssh_test_lib:failfun/2}]),
-
-
- ct:sleep(500),
-
- OpenSshMacs =
- ssh_test_lib:to_atoms(
- string:tokens(os:cmd("ssh -Q mac"), "\n")),
- ErlMacs =
- proplists:get_value(client2server,
- proplists:get_value(mac, ssh:default_algorithms())),
- CommonMacs =
- ssh_test_lib:algo_intersection(ErlMacs, OpenSshMacs),
-
- comment(CommonMacs),
-
- lists:foreach(
- fun(MAC) ->
- Cmd = lists:concat(["ssh -p ",Port,
- " -o UserKnownHostsFile=",KnownHosts," ",Host," ",
- " -o MACs=",MAC," 1+1."]),
- ct:log("Cmd: ~p~n", [Cmd]),
-
- SshPort = open_port({spawn, Cmd}, [binary, stderr_to_stdout]),
-
- receive
- {SshPort,{data, <<"2\n">>}} ->
- ok
- after ?TIMEOUT ->
- ct:fail("~p Did not receive answer",[MAC])
- end
- end, CommonMacs),
-
- ssh:stop_daemon(Pid).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-erlang_server_openssh_client_kexs() ->
- [{doc, "Test that we can connect with different KEXs."}].
-
-erlang_server_openssh_client_kexs(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
- SystemDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
- PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
- KnownHosts = filename:join(PrivDir, "known_hosts"),
-
- {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SystemDir},
- {failfun, fun ssh_test_lib:failfun/2},
- {preferred_algorithms,
- [{kex,ssh_transport:supported_algorithms(kex)}]}
- ]),
- ct:sleep(500),
-
- OpenSshKexs =
- ssh_test_lib:to_atoms(
- string:tokens(os:cmd("ssh -Q kex"), "\n")),
- ErlKexs =
- proplists:get_value(kex, ssh:default_algorithms()),
- CommonKexs =
- ssh_test_lib:algo_intersection(ErlKexs, OpenSshKexs),
-
- comment(CommonKexs),
-
- lists:foreach(
- fun(Kex) ->
- Cmd = lists:concat(["ssh -p ",Port,
- " -o UserKnownHostsFile=",KnownHosts," ",Host," ",
- " -o KexAlgorithms=",Kex," 1+1."]),
- ct:log("Cmd: ~p~n", [Cmd]),
-
- SshPort = open_port({spawn, Cmd}, [binary, stderr_to_stdout]),
-
- receive
- {SshPort,{data, <<"2\n">>}} ->
- ok
- after ?TIMEOUT ->
- ct:log("~p Did not receive answer",[Kex])
- end
- end, CommonKexs),
-
- ssh:stop_daemon(Pid).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-erlang_server_openssh_client_exec_compressed() ->
- [{doc, "Test that exec command works."}].
-
-erlang_server_openssh_client_exec_compressed(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
- SystemDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
- PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
- KnownHosts = filename:join(PrivDir, "known_hosts"),
-
-%% CompressAlgs = [zlib, '[email protected]'], % Does not work
- CompressAlgs = [zlib],
- {Pid, Host, Port} = ssh_test_lib:daemon([{system_dir, SystemDir},
- {preferred_algorithms,
- [{compression, CompressAlgs}]},
- {failfun, fun ssh_test_lib:failfun/2}]),
-
- ct:sleep(500),
-
- Cmd = "ssh -p " ++ integer_to_list(Port) ++
- " -o UserKnownHostsFile=" ++ KnownHosts ++ " -C "++ Host ++ " 1+1.",
- SshPort = open_port({spawn, Cmd}, [binary]),
-
- receive
- {SshPort,{data, <<"2\n">>}} ->
- ok
- after ?TIMEOUT ->
- ct:fail("Did not receive answer")
-
- end,
- ssh:stop_daemon(Pid).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
erlang_client_openssh_server_setenv() ->
[{doc, "Test api function ssh_connection:setenv"}].
@@ -543,9 +350,9 @@ erlang_client_openssh_server_publickey_dsa(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
{skip, "no ~/.ssh/id_dsa"}
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-erlang_server_openssh_client_pulic_key_dsa() ->
+erlang_server_openssh_client_public_key_dsa() ->
[{doc, "Validate using dsa publickey."}].
-erlang_server_openssh_client_pulic_key_dsa(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
+erlang_server_openssh_client_public_key_dsa(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
SystemDir = ?config(data_dir, Config),
PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
KnownHosts = filename:join(PrivDir, "known_hosts"),
@@ -642,6 +449,8 @@ receive_hej() ->
ct:log("Extra info: ~p~n", [Info]),
receive_hej()
end
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
receive_logout() ->
@@ -651,11 +460,15 @@ receive_logout() ->
receive
<<"Connection closed">> ->
ok
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end;
Info ->
ct:log("Extra info when logging out: ~p~n", [Info]),
receive_logout()
- end.
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
+ end.
receive_normal_exit(Shell) ->
receive
@@ -665,6 +478,8 @@ receive_normal_exit(Shell) ->
receive_normal_exit(Shell);
Other ->
ct:fail({unexpected_msg, Other})
+ after
+ 30000 -> ct:fail("timeout ~p:~p",[?MODULE,?LINE])
end.
extra_logout() ->
diff --git a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_trpt_test_lib.erl b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_trpt_test_lib.erl
index caf9bac3b6..4269529ae8 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/test/ssh_trpt_test_lib.erl
+++ b/lib/ssh/test/ssh_trpt_test_lib.erl
@@ -73,7 +73,10 @@ exec(Op, S0=#s{}) ->
op(Op, S1))
of
S = #s{} ->
- print_traces(S),
+ case proplists:get_value(silent,S#s.opts) of
+ true -> ok;
+ _ -> print_traces(S)
+ end,
{ok,S}
catch
{fail,Reason,Se} ->
@@ -383,7 +386,14 @@ send(S0, Line) when is_binary(Line) ->
fun(X) when X==true;X==detail -> {"Send line~n~p~n",[Line]} end),
send_bytes(Line, S#s{return_value = Line});
-%%% Msg = #ssh_msg_*{}
+send(S0, {special,Msg,PacketFun}) when is_tuple(Msg),
+ is_function(PacketFun,2) ->
+ S = opt(print_messages, S0,
+ fun(X) when X==true;X==detail -> {"Send~n~s~n",[format_msg(Msg)]} end),
+ {Packet, C} = PacketFun(Msg, S#s.ssh),
+ send_bytes(Packet, S#s{ssh = C, %%inc_send_seq_num(C),
+ return_value = Msg});
+
send(S0, Msg) when is_tuple(Msg) ->
S = opt(print_messages, S0,
fun(X) when X==true;X==detail -> {"Send~n~s~n",[format_msg(Msg)]} end),
@@ -743,7 +753,7 @@ print_traces(S) ->
[case Len-length(Acc)-1 of
0 ->
io_lib:format(Fmt,Args);
- N ->
+ _N ->
io_lib:format(lists:concat(['~p --------~n',Fmt]),
[Len-length(Acc)-1|Args])
end | Acc]
diff --git a/lib/ssh/vsn.mk b/lib/ssh/vsn.mk
index b305eedcdc..d828bccd29 100644
--- a/lib/ssh/vsn.mk
+++ b/lib/ssh/vsn.mk
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
#-*-makefile-*- ; force emacs to enter makefile-mode
-SSH_VSN = 4.1
+SSH_VSN = 4.2
APP_VSN = "ssh-$(SSH_VSN)"