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Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml | 78 |
1 files changed, 78 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml index 4c6a204e63..a8450c2630 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -28,6 +28,84 @@ <p>This document describes the changes made to the SSL application.</p> +<section><title>SSL 8.2.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + TLS sessions must be registered with SNI if provided, so + that sessions where client hostname verification would + fail can not connect reusing a session created when the + server name verification succeeded.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14632</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + If no SNI is available and the hostname is an IP-address + also check for IP-address match. This check is not as + good as a DNS hostname check and certificates using + IP-address are not recommended.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14655</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + <section><title>SSL 8.2.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> |