diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml | 640 |
1 files changed, 636 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml index 0ba0bb9634..df6de08b9b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>1999</year><year>2013</year> + <year>1999</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -27,11 +27,235 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the SSL application.</p> -<section><title>SSL 7.3.3.2</title> +<section><title>SSL 8.2.2</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + TLS sessions must be registered with SNI if provided, so + that sessions where client hostname verification would + fail can not connect reusing a session created when the + server name verification succeeded.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14632</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + If no SNI is available and the hostname is an IP-address + also check for IP-address match. This check is not as + good as a DNS hostname check and certificates using + IP-address are not recommended.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14655</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>SSL 8.2.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> <list> <item> + <p> + Max session table works correctly again</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14556</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Customize alert handling for DTLS over UDP to mitigate + DoS attacks</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14078</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Improved error propagation and reports</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14236</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>SSL 8.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + ECDH-ECDSA key exchange supported, was accidently + dismissed in earlier versions.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14421</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Correct close semantics for active once connections. This + was a timing dependent bug the resulted in the close + message not always reaching the ssl user process.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14443</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + TLS-1.2 clients will now always send hello messages on + its own format, as opposed to earlier versions that will + send the hello on the lowest supported version, this is a + change supported by the latest RFC.</p> + <p> + This will make interoperability with some newer servers + smoother. Potentially, but unlikely, this could cause a + problem with older servers if they do not adhere to the + RFC and ignore unknown extensions.</p> + <p> + *** POTENTIAL INCOMPATIBILITY ***</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13820</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Allow Erlang/OTP to use OpenSSL in FIPS-140 mode, in + order to satisfy specific security requirements (mostly + by different parts of the US federal government). </p> + <p> + See the new crypto users guide "FIPS mode" chapter about + building and using the FIPS support which is disabled by + default.</p> + <p> + (Thanks to dszoboszlay and legoscia)</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13921 Aux Id: PR-1180 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Implemented DTLS cookie generation, required by spec, + instead of using a hardcoded value.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14076</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Implement sliding window replay protection of DTLS + records.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14077</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + TLS client processes will by default call + public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/2 to verify the hostname + of the connection with the server certificates specified + hostname during certificate path validation. The user may + explicitly disables it. Also if the hostname can not be + derived from the first argument to connect or is not + supplied by the server name indication option, the check + will not be performed.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14197</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Extend connection_information/[1,2] . The values + session_id, master_secret, client_random and + server_random can no be accessed by + connection_information/2. Note only session_id will be + added to connection_information/1. The rational is that + values concerning the connection security should have to + be explicitly requested.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14291</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Chacha cipher suites are currently not tested enough to + be most preferred ones</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14382</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Basic support for DTLS that been tested together with + OpenSSL.</p> + <p> + Test by providing the option {protocol, dtls} to the ssl + API functions connect and listen.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14388</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> +</section> + +<section><title>SSL 8.1.3.1</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) @@ -79,9 +303,211 @@ </list> </section> +<section><title>SSL 8.1.3</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Remove debug printout</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14396</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>SSL 8.1.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Correct active once emulation, for TLS. Now all data + received by the connection process will be delivered + through active once, even when the active once arrives + after that the gen_tcp socket is closed by the peer.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14300</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>SSL 8.1.1</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Corrected termination behavior, that caused a PEM cache + bug and sometimes resulted in connection failures.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14100</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Fix bug that could hang ssl connection processes when + failing to require more data for very large handshake + packages. Add option max_handshake_size to mitigate DoS + attacks.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14138</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Improved support for CRL handling that could fail to work + as intended when an id-ce-extKeyUsage was present in the + certificate. Also improvements where needed to + distributionpoint handling so that all revocations + actually are found and not deemed to be not determinable.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14141</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + A TLS handshake might accidentally match old sslv2 format + and ssl application would incorrectly aborted TLS + handshake with ssl_v2_client_hello_no_supported. Parsing + was altered to avoid this problem.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14222</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Correct default cipher list to prefer AES 128 before 3DES</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14235</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Move PEM cache to a dedicated process, to avoid making + the SSL manager process a bottleneck. This improves + scalability of TLS connections.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13874</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + </section> -<section><title>SSL 7.3.3.1</title> +<section><title>SSL 8.1</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + List of possible anonymous suites, never supported by + default, where incorrect for some TLS versions.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13926</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Experimental version of DTLS. It is runnable but not + complete and cannot be considered reliable for production + usage.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-12982</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Add API options to handle ECC curve selection.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13959</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>SSL 8.0.3</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + A timing related bug in event handling could cause + interoperability problems between an erlang TLS server + and some TLS clients, especially noticed with Firefox as + TLS client.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13917</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Correct ECC curve selection, the error could cause the + default to always be selected.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13918</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>SSL 8.0.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Correctly formed handshake messages received out of order + will now correctly fail the connection with unexpected + message.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13853</p> + </item> + + <item> + <p>Correct handling of signature algorithm selection</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13711</p> + </item> + + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + ssl application now behaves gracefully also on partially + incorrect input from peer.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13834</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Add application environment configuration + bypass_pem_cache. This can be used as a workaround for + the current implementation of the PEM-cache that has + proven to be a bottleneck.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13883</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>SSL 8.0.1</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> <list> @@ -101,7 +527,161 @@ </section> - <section><title>SSL 7.3.3.0.1</title> +<section><title>SSL 8.0</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Server now rejects, a not requested client cert, as an + incorrect handshake message and ends the connection.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13651</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Remove default support for DES cipher suites</p> + <p> + *** POTENTIAL INCOMPATIBILITY ***</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13195</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Deprecate the function <c>crypto:rand_bytes</c> and make + sure that <c>crypto:strong_rand_bytes</c> is used in all + places that are cryptographically significant.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13214</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Better error handling of user error during TLS upgrade. + ERL-69 is solved by gen_statem rewrite of ssl + application.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13255</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Provide user friendly error message when crypto rejects a + key</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13256</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Add ssl:getstat/1 and ssl:getstat/2</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13415</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + TLS distribution connections now allow specifying the + options <c>verify_fun</c>, <c>crl_check</c> and + <c>crl_cache</c>. See the documentation. GitHub pull req + #956 contributed by Magnus Henoch.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13429 Aux Id: Pull#956 </p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Remove confusing error message when closing a distributed + erlang node running over TLS</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13431</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Remove default support for use of md5 in TLS 1.2 + signature algorithms</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13463</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + ssl now uses gen_statem instead of gen_fsm to implement + the ssl connection process, this solves some timing + issues in addition to making the code more intuitive as + the behaviour can be used cleanly instead of having a lot + of workaround for shortcomings of the behaviour.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13464</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Phase out interoperability with clients that offer SSLv2. + By default they are no longer supported, but an option to + provide interoperability is offered.</p> + <p> + *** POTENTIAL INCOMPATIBILITY ***</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13465</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + OpenSSL has functions to generate short (eight hex + digits) hashes of issuers of certificates and CRLs. These + hashes are used by the "c_rehash" script to populate + directories of CA certificates and CRLs, e.g. in the + Apache web server. Add functionality to let an Erlang + program find the right CRL for a given certificate in + such a directory.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13530</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Some legacy TLS 1.0 software does not tolerate the 1/n-1 + content split BEAST mitigation technique. Add a + beast_mitigation SSL option (defaulting to + one_n_minus_one) to select or disable the BEAST + mitigation technique.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13629</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Enhance error log messages to facilitate for users to + understand the error</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13632</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Increased default DH params to 2048-bit</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13636</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Propagate CRL unknown CA error so that public_key + validation process continues correctly and determines + what should happen.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13656</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Introduce a flight concept for handshake packages. This + is a preparation for enabling DTLS, however it can also + have a positive effects for TLS on slow and unreliable + networks.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-13678</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + + <section><title>SSL 7.3.3.2</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> <list> @@ -184,7 +764,59 @@ </list> </section> + <section><title>SSL 7.3.3.0.1</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + </section> <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> <list> <item> |