diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl | 303 |
1 files changed, 207 insertions, 96 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl index 8c2a16ba96..50c5f0d755 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -%% +% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2017. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -34,22 +34,30 @@ -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). -export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, suite_definition/1, + erl_suite_definition/1, cipher_init/3, decipher/6, cipher/5, decipher_aead/6, cipher_aead/6, suite/1, suites/1, all_suites/1, ec_keyed_suites/0, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, srp_suites/0, - rc4_suites/1, openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1, filter/2, filter_suites/1, - hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1, is_acceptable_hash/2, is_fallback/1]). + rc4_suites/1, des_suites/1, openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1, filter/2, filter_suites/1, + hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1, is_acceptable_hash/2, is_fallback/1, + random_bytes/1, calc_mac_hash/4, + is_stream_ciphersuite/1]). -export_type([cipher_suite/0, erl_cipher_suite/0, openssl_cipher_suite/0, - key_algo/0]). + hash/0, key_algo/0, sign_algo/0]). --type cipher() :: null |rc4_128 | idea_cbc | des40_cbc | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' +-type cipher() :: null |rc4_128 | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm | chacha20_poly1305. --type hash() :: null | sha | md5 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512. --type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon. --type erl_cipher_suite() :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()}. --type int_cipher_suite() :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash(), hash() | default_prf}. +-type hash() :: null | md5 | sha | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512. +-type sign_algo() :: rsa | dsa | ecdsa. +-type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | + psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon. +-type erl_cipher_suite() :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()} % Pre TLS 1.2 + %% TLS 1.2, internally PRE TLS 1.2 will use default_prf + | {key_algo(), cipher(), hash(), hash() | default_prf}. + + -type cipher_suite() :: binary(). -type cipher_enum() :: integer(). -type openssl_cipher_suite() :: string(). @@ -97,7 +105,7 @@ cipher_init(?RC4, IV, Key) -> State = crypto:stream_init(rc4, Key), #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, state = State}; cipher_init(?AES_GCM, IV, Key) -> - <<Nonce:64>> = ssl:random_bytes(8), + <<Nonce:64>> = random_bytes(8), #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, nonce = Nonce}; cipher_init(_BCA, IV, Key) -> #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key}. @@ -149,7 +157,7 @@ cipher_aead(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) -> aead_cipher(chacha20_poly1305, #cipher_state{key=Key} = CipherState, SeqNo, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) -> CipherLen = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment), AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>, - Nonce = <<SeqNo:64/integer>>, + Nonce = ?uint64(SeqNo), {Content, CipherTag} = crypto:block_encrypt(chacha20_poly1305, Key, Nonce, {AAD, Fragment}), {<<Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>, CipherState}; aead_cipher(Type, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv = IV0, nonce = Nonce} = CipherState, _SeqNo, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) -> @@ -207,7 +215,7 @@ decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Fragment, _, %% alerts may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in %% TLS [CBCATT]. It is preferable to uniformly use the %% bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of the error." - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) end; decipher(?DES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) -> @@ -265,14 +273,14 @@ block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0, %% alerts may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in %% TLS [CBCATT]. It is preferable to uniformly use the %% bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of the error." - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) end. aead_ciphertext_to_state(chacha20_poly1305, SeqNo, _IV, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) -> CipherLen = size(Fragment) - 16, <<CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:16/bytes>> = Fragment, AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>, - Nonce = <<SeqNo:64/integer>>, + Nonce = ?uint64(SeqNo), {Nonce, AAD, CipherText, CipherTag}; aead_ciphertext_to_state(_, _SeqNo, <<Salt:4/bytes, _/binary>>, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) -> CipherLen = size(Fragment) - 24, @@ -289,11 +297,11 @@ aead_decipher(Type, #cipher_state{key = Key, iv = IV} = CipherState, Content when is_binary(Content) -> {Content, CipherState}; _ -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) end catch _:_ -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -303,15 +311,21 @@ aead_decipher(Type, #cipher_state{key = Key, iv = IV} = CipherState, %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- suites({3, 0}) -> ssl_v3:suites(); -suites({3, N}) -> - tls_v1:suites(N). +suites({3, Minor}) -> + tls_v1:suites(Minor); +suites({_, Minor}) -> + dtls_v1:suites(Minor). -all_suites(Version) -> +all_suites({3, _} = Version) -> suites(Version) ++ anonymous_suites(Version) ++ psk_suites(Version) ++ srp_suites() - ++ rc4_suites(Version). + ++ rc4_suites(Version) + ++ des_suites(Version); +all_suites(Version) -> + dtls_v1:all_suites(Version). + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec anonymous_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. %% @@ -321,25 +335,33 @@ all_suites(Version) -> anonymous_suites({3, N}) -> anonymous_suites(N); - +anonymous_suites({254, _} = Version) -> + anonymous_suites(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version)) + -- [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5]; anonymous_suites(N) when N >= 3 -> [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - ] ++ anonymous_suites(0); - -anonymous_suites(_) -> - [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, - ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA]. + ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5]; + +anonymous_suites(2) -> + [?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5]; + +anonymous_suites(N) when N == 0; + N == 1 -> + [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + ]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec psk_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. @@ -415,9 +437,19 @@ rc4_suites({3, N}) when N =< 3 -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec des_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +%% +%% Description: Returns a list of the cipher suites +%% with DES cipher, only supported if explicitly set by user. +%% Are not considered secure any more. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +des_suites(_)-> + [?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> int_cipher_suite(). +-spec suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> erl_cipher_suite(). %% %% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. %% Note: Currently not supported suites are commented away. @@ -722,6 +754,20 @@ suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> {dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec erl_suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> erl_cipher_suite(). +%% +%% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. Filters last value +%% for now (compatibility reasons). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +erl_suite_definition(S) -> + case suite_definition(S) of + {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, default_prf} -> + {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}; + Suite -> + Suite + end. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec suite(erl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite(). %% %% Description: Return TLS cipher suite definition. @@ -823,17 +869,17 @@ suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) -> %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 -suite({psk, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({psk, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; suite({psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> @@ -940,74 +986,74 @@ suite({ecdh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; %%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; %% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite({rsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({rsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({dh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({dh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dh_dss, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({dh_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dh_dss, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({dh_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; %% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) -> +suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) -> +suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; %% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites -suite({ecdhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null}) -> +suite({ecdhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, chacha20_poly1305, null}) -> +suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null}) -> +suite({dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -1384,18 +1430,14 @@ filter(DerCert, Ciphers) -> %% %% Description: Filter suites for algorithms supported by crypto. %%------------------------------------------------------------------- -filter_suites(Suites = [{_,_,_}|_]) -> +filter_suites(Suites = [Value|_]) when is_tuple(Value) -> Algos = crypto:supports(), + Hashs = proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos), lists:filter(fun({KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}) -> is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_hash(Hash, proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos)) - end, Suites); - -filter_suites(Suites = [{_,_,_,_}|_]) -> - Algos = crypto:supports(), - Hashs = proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos), - lists:filter(fun({KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf}) -> + is_acceptable_hash(Hash, proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos)); + ({KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf}) -> is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso is_acceptable_hash(Hash, Hashs) andalso @@ -1413,25 +1455,60 @@ filter_suites(Suites) -> is_acceptable_prf(Prf, Hashs) end, Suites). -is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) - when KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_anon -> +is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, _Algos) when KeyExchange == psk; + KeyExchange == null -> + true; +is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == dh_anon; + KeyExchange == dhe_psk -> + proplists:get_bool(dh, Algos); +is_acceptable_keyexchange(dhe_dss, Algos) -> + proplists:get_bool(dh, Algos) andalso + proplists:get_bool(dss, Algos); +is_acceptable_keyexchange(dhe_rsa, Algos) -> + proplists:get_bool(dh, Algos) andalso + proplists:get_bool(rsa, Algos); +is_acceptable_keyexchange(ecdh_anon, Algos) -> proplists:get_bool(ecdh, Algos); -is_acceptable_keyexchange(_, _) -> - true. - +is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> + proplists:get_bool(ecdh, Algos) andalso + proplists:get_bool(ecdsa, Algos); +is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> + proplists:get_bool(ecdh, Algos) andalso + proplists:get_bool(rsa, Algos); +is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == rsa; + KeyExchange == rsa_psk -> + proplists:get_bool(rsa, Algos); +is_acceptable_keyexchange(srp_anon, Algos) -> + proplists:get_bool(srp, Algos); +is_acceptable_keyexchange(srp_dss, Algos) -> + proplists:get_bool(srp, Algos) andalso + proplists:get_bool(dss, Algos); +is_acceptable_keyexchange(srp_rsa, Algos) -> + proplists:get_bool(srp, Algos) andalso + proplists:get_bool(rsa, Algos); +is_acceptable_keyexchange(_KeyExchange, _Algos) -> + false. + +is_acceptable_cipher(null, _Algos) -> + true; +is_acceptable_cipher(rc4_128, Algos) -> + proplists:get_bool(rc4, Algos); +is_acceptable_cipher(des_cbc, Algos) -> + proplists:get_bool(des_cbc, Algos); +is_acceptable_cipher('3des_ede_cbc', Algos) -> + proplists:get_bool(des3_cbc, Algos); +is_acceptable_cipher(aes_128_cbc, Algos) -> + proplists:get_bool(aes_cbc128, Algos); +is_acceptable_cipher(aes_256_cbc, Algos) -> + proplists:get_bool(aes_cbc256, Algos); is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, Algos) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm; Cipher == aes_256_gcm -> proplists:get_bool(aes_gcm, Algos); -is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, Algos) - when Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 -> - proplists:get_bool(Cipher, Algos); -is_acceptable_cipher(_, _) -> - true. +is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, Algos) -> + proplists:get_bool(Cipher, Algos). is_acceptable_hash(null, _Algos) -> true; @@ -1446,9 +1523,42 @@ is_acceptable_prf(Prf, Algos) -> is_fallback(CipherSuites)-> lists:member(?TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV, CipherSuites). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec random_bytes(integer()) -> binary(). + +%% +%% Description: Generates cryptographically secure random sequence +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +random_bytes(N) -> + crypto:strong_rand_bytes(N). + +calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, + PlainFragment, #{sequence_number := SeqNo, + mac_secret := MacSecret, + security_parameters:= + SecPars}) -> + Length = erlang:iolist_size(PlainFragment), + mac_hash(Version, SecPars#security_parameters.mac_algorithm, + MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, + Length, PlainFragment). + +is_stream_ciphersuite({_, rc4_128, _, _}) -> + true; +is_stream_ciphersuite(_) -> + false. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +mac_hash({_,_}, ?NULL, _MacSecret, _SeqNo, _Type, + _Length, _Fragment) -> + <<>>; +mac_hash({3, 0}, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) -> + ssl_v3:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment); +mac_hash({3, N} = Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) + when N =:= 1; N =:= 2; N =:= 3 -> + tls_v1:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Version, + Length, Fragment). bulk_cipher_algorithm(null) -> ?NULL; @@ -1686,7 +1796,7 @@ get_padding_aux(BlockSize, PadLength) -> random_iv(IV) -> IVSz = byte_size(IV), - ssl:random_bytes(IVSz). + random_bytes(IVSz). next_iv(Bin, IV) -> BinSz = byte_size(Bin), @@ -1714,7 +1824,8 @@ dhe_rsa_suites() -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256]. + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 + ]. psk_rsa_suites() -> [?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, |