diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl | 136 |
1 files changed, 69 insertions, 67 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index dd194275ac..cd601c04c0 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -759,11 +759,12 @@ available_suites(UserSuites, Version) -> lists:filtermap(fun(Suite) -> lists:member(Suite, VersionSuites) end, UserSuites). available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) -> - ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version)) - -- unavailable_ecc_suites(Curve); + Suites = ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version), Version), + filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(Curve, Suites); available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, Curve) -> Suites = available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve), - filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, []). + filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, + Version, []). available_signature_algs(undefined, _) -> undefined; @@ -801,7 +802,7 @@ prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) -> prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}. -select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve} = +select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve0} = Session, Version, #ssl_options{ciphers = UserSuites, honor_cipher_order = HonorCipherOrder} = SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert) -> @@ -810,10 +811,12 @@ select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, Cache, CacheCb), case Resumed of undefined -> - Suites = available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, ECCCurve), - CipherSuite = select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, HonorCipherOrder), + Suites = available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, ECCCurve0), + CipherSuite0 = select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, HonorCipherOrder), + {ECCCurve, CipherSuite} = cert_curve(Cert, ECCCurve0, CipherSuite0), Compression = select_compression(Compressions), {new, Session#session{session_id = SessionId, + ecc = ECCCurve, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression}}; _ -> @@ -1026,7 +1029,8 @@ select_curve(undefined, _, _) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- select_hashsign(_, _, KeyExAlgo, _, _Version) when KeyExAlgo == dh_anon; KeyExAlgo == ecdh_anon; - KeyExAlgo == srp_anon -> + KeyExAlgo == srp_anon; + KeyExAlgo == psk -> {null, anon}; %% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have %% negotiated a lower version. @@ -1035,17 +1039,14 @@ select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, - signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), - SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), - - case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign, - SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); + SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), + + case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); (_) -> false end, HashSigns) of @@ -1993,25 +1994,26 @@ handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun) handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) -> Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState). -filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) -> - lists:reverse(Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, - Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> - do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, +filter_hashsigns([], [], _, _, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Version, + Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> + do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Version, Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa; KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa; KeyExchange == srp_rsa; KeyExchange == rsa_psk -> - do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Version, Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_dss; KeyExchange == srp_dss -> - do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Verion, + Acc) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; KeyExchange == dh_rsa; KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; @@ -2020,28 +2022,37 @@ filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], Has %% Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature %% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names %% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical. - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Verion, [Suite| Acc]); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Version, + Acc) when KeyExchange == dh_anon; KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; KeyExchange == srp_anon; KeyExchange == psk; KeyExchange == dhe_psk -> %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]). + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, [Suite| Acc]). -do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) -> +do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc) -> case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of true -> - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, [Suite| Acc]); false -> - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Version, Acc) end. -unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) -> - ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites(); -unavailable_ecc_suites(_) -> - []. +filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve, Suites) -> + ECCSuites = ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(ecdh_ecdsa) -> true; + (ecdhe_ecdsa) -> true; + (ecdh_rsa) -> true; + (_) -> false + end], + cipher_filters => [], + mac_filters => [], + prf_filters => []}), + Suites -- ECCSuites; +filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(_, Suites) -> + Suites. %%-------------Extension handling -------------------------------- handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, @@ -2134,35 +2145,7 @@ sign_algo(Alg) -> {_, Sign} =public_key:pkix_sign_types(Alg), Sign. -is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, _, _, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns) when - KeyExAlgo == dh_dss; - KeyExAlgo == dh_rsa; - KeyExAlgo == dh_ecdsa -> - %% dh_* could be called only dh in TLS-1.2 - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, rsa, ecdsa, ecdh_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, _, dhe_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, rsa, ecdhe_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, rsa, rsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, _, srp_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, _, rsa_psk, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, dsa} = Algos, dsa, _, dhe_dss, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, dsa} = Algos, dsa, _, srp_dss, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, ecdsa} = Algos, ecdsa, _, dhe_ecdsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, ecdsa} = Algos, ecdsa, ecdsa, ecdh_ecdsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, ecdsa} = Algos, ecdsa, ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when +is_acceptable_hash_sign( _, KeyExAlgo, _) when KeyExAlgo == psk; KeyExAlgo == dhe_psk; KeyExAlgo == srp_anon; @@ -2170,8 +2153,9 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when KeyExAlgo == ecdhe_anon -> true; -is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_, _,_,_) -> - false. +is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos,_, SupportedHashSigns) -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns). + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) -> lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns). @@ -2350,3 +2334,21 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> {false, false} -> {ok, ConnectionStates} end. + +cert_curve(_, _, no_suite) -> + {no_curve, no_suite}; +cert_curve(Cert, ECCCurve0, CipherSuite) -> + case ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite) of + #{key_exchange := Kex} when Kex == ecdh_ecdsa; + Kex == ecdh_rsa -> + OtpCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + TBSCert = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate, + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = AlgInfo} + = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, + {namedCurve, Oid} = AlgInfo#'PublicKeyAlgorithm'.parameters, + {{namedCurve, Oid}, CipherSuite}; + _ -> + {ECCCurve0, CipherSuite} + end. + + |