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-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl1965
1 files changed, 954 insertions, 1011 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index 8681765284..e74361993d 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -44,46 +44,44 @@
#client_key_exchange{} | #finished{} | #certificate_verify{} |
#hello_request{} | #next_protocol{}.
-%% Handshake messages
+%% Create handshake messages
-export([hello_request/0, server_hello/4, server_hello_done/0,
- certificate/4, certificate_request/5, key_exchange/3,
+ certificate/4, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_request/5, key_exchange/3,
finished/5, next_protocol/1]).
%% Handle handshake messages
--export([certify/7, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5,
+-export([certify/7, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5,
master_secret/4, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6,
- init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/3, verify_server_key/5
+ init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/3, verify_server_key/5,
+ select_version/3
]).
-%% Encode/Decode
+%% Encode
-export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/1,
- encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1,
- decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1,
+ encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1]).
+%% Decode
+-export([decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1,
decode_server_key/3, decode_client_key/3,
decode_suites/2
]).
%% Cipher suites handling
--export([available_suites/2, available_signature_algs/2, cipher_suites/2,
- select_session/11, supported_ecc/1, available_signature_algs/4]).
+-export([available_suites/2, available_signature_algs/2, available_signature_algs/4,
+ cipher_suites/2, prf/6, select_session/11, supported_ecc/1,
+ premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]).
%% Extensions handling
-export([client_hello_extensions/5,
handle_client_hello_extensions/9, %% Returns server hello extensions
- handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3
+ handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3,
+ select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5,
+ select_hashsign_algs/3
]).
-%% MISC
--export([select_version/3, prf/6, select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5,
- select_hashsign_algs/3,
- premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]).
-
%%====================================================================
-%% Internal application API
+%% Create handshake messages
%%====================================================================
-%% ---------- Create handshake messages ----------
-
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec hello_request() -> #hello_request{}.
%%
@@ -119,31 +117,6 @@ server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Extensions) ->
server_hello_done() ->
#server_hello_done{}.
-client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites,
- #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns,
- eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) ->
- {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} =
- case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of
- true ->
- client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs);
- false ->
- {undefined, undefined}
- end,
- SRP = srp_user(SslOpts),
-
- #hello_extensions{
- renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client,
- ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
- srp = SRP,
- signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version),
- ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
- elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
- alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation),
- next_protocol_negotiation =
- encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector,
- Renegotiation),
- sni = sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}.
-
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec certificate(der_cert(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), client | server) -> #certificate{} | #alert{}.
%%
@@ -171,14 +144,6 @@ certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) ->
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Creates a next protocol message
-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) ->
- #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec client_certificate_verify(undefined | der_cert(), binary(),
ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(), public_key:private_key(),
ssl_handshake_history()) ->
@@ -346,22 +311,51 @@ key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, {PublicKey, _},
finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {Handshake, _}) -> % use the current handshake
#finished{verify_data =
calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake)}.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a next protocol message
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) ->
+ #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}.
-%% ---------- Handle handshake messages ----------
+%%====================================================================
+%% Handle handshake messages
+%%====================================================================
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), #ssl_options{}, term(),
+ client | server, inet:hostname() | inet:ip_address()) -> {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
+ Opts, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) ->
-verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams,
- signature = Signature},
- HashSign = {HashAlgo, _},
- ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) ->
- #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
- ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
- server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
- Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo,
- <<ClientRandom/binary,
- ServerRandom/binary,
- EncParams/binary>>),
- verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo).
+ ServerName = server_name(Opts#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role),
+ [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs,
+ try
+ {TrustedCert, CertPath} =
+ ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
+ Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain),
+ ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role,
+ CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerName,
+ Opts#ssl_options.crl_check, CRLDbHandle, CertPath),
+ case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert,
+ CertPath,
+ [{max_path_length, Opts#ssl_options.depth},
+ {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of
+ {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} ->
+ {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo};
+ {error, Reason} ->
+ path_validation_alert(Reason)
+ end
+ catch
+ error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} ->
+ %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason});
+ error:OtherReason ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {unexpected_error, OtherReason})
+ end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(),
@@ -404,43 +398,55 @@ verify_signature(_, Hash, {HashAlgo, _SignAlg}, Signature,
{?'id-ecPublicKey', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) ->
public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}).
-
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), #ssl_options{}, term(),
- client | server, inet:hostname() | inet:ip_address()) -> {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}.
+-spec master_secret(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(),
+ client | server) -> {binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()} | #alert{}.
%%
-%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
- Opts, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) ->
+%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys,
+%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update
+%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails.
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret},
+ ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+ #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
+ ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams,
+ ConnectionStates, Role)
+ catch
+ exit:_ ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure)
+ end;
- ServerName = server_name(Opts#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role),
- [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs,
- try
- {TrustedCert, CertPath} =
- ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
- Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain),
- ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role,
- CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerName,
- Opts#ssl_options.crl_check, CRLDbHandle, CertPath),
- case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert,
- CertPath,
- [{max_path_length, Opts#ssl_options.depth},
- {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of
- {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} ->
- {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo};
- {error, Reason} ->
- path_validation_alert(Reason)
- end
+master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+ #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
+ ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+
+ #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
+ client_random = ClientRandom,
+ server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+ try master_secret(Version,
+ calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret,
+ ClientRandom, ServerRandom),
+ SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role)
catch
- error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} ->
- %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason});
- error:OtherReason ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {unexpected_error, OtherReason})
+ exit:_ ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure)
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary().
+%%
+%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) ->
+ MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value),
+ SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value),
+ <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
+
+server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) ->
+ crypto:hash(Hash, Value).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec verify_connection(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #finished{}, client | server, integer(), binary(),
ssl_handshake_history()) -> verified | #alert{}.
%%
@@ -487,292 +493,31 @@ update_handshake_history(Handshake, % special-case SSL2 client hello
update_handshake_history({Handshake0, _Prev}, Data, _) ->
{[Data|Handshake0], Handshake0}.
-%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% -spec decrypt_premaster_secret(binary(), #'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> binary().
-
-%% %%
-%% %% Description: Public key decryption using the private key.
-%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) ->
-%% try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey,
-%% [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
-%% catch
-%% _:_ ->
-%% throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR))
-%% end.
-
-premaster_secret(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params) ->
- try
- public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params)
- catch
- error:computation_failed ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
- end;
-premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}) ->
- try
- crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base])
- catch
- error:computation_failed ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
- end;
-premaster_secret(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, ServerKey, #srp_user{prime = Prime,
- verifier = Verifier}) ->
- case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of
- error ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER));
- PremasterSecret ->
- PremasterSecret
- end;
-premaster_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator, srp_s = Salt, srp_b = Public},
- ClientKeys, {Username, Password}) ->
- case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of
- ok ->
- DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]),
- case crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of
- error ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER));
- PremasterSecret ->
- PremasterSecret
- end;
- _ ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
- end;
-premaster_secret(#client_rsa_psk_identity{
- identity = PSKIdentity,
- exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = EncPMS}
- }, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key, PSKLookup) ->
- PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
- psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret);
-premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{
- hint = IdentityHint,
- dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_y = PublicDhKey} = Params},
- PrivateDhKey,
- LookupFun) ->
- PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params),
- psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret);
-
-premaster_secret(#server_ecdhe_psk_params{
- hint = IdentityHint,
- dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{
- public = ECServerPubKey}},
- PrivateEcDhKey,
- LookupFun) ->
- PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ECServerPubKey}, PrivateEcDhKey),
- psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret);
-
-premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) ->
- psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret);
-
-premaster_secret(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{
- identity = PSKIdentity,
- dh_public = PublicEcDhPoint}, PrivateEcDhKey, PSKLookup) ->
- PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = PublicEcDhPoint}, PrivateEcDhKey),
- psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret).
-
-premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{
- identity = PSKIdentity,
- dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) ->
- PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateKey, Params),
- psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret).
-
-premaster_secret(#client_psk_identity{identity = PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) ->
- psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup);
-premaster_secret({psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) ->
- psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup);
-premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{} = ECPoint, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ECDHKeys) ->
- public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys);
-premaster_secret(EncSecret, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = RSAPrivateKey) ->
- try public_key:decrypt_private(EncSecret, RSAPrivateKey,
- [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
- catch
- _:_ ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR))
- end.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary().
-%%
-%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) ->
- MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value),
- SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value),
- <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
-
-server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) ->
- crypto:hash(Hash, Value).
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), non_neg_integer(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) ->
- {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}.
-%%
-%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) ->
- {error, undefined};
-prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
- {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}.
-
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{} | undefined, undefined | binary(),
- atom(), [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
- {atom(), atom()} | undefined | #alert{}.
-
-%%
-%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms hello extension (server)
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-select_hashsign(_, undefined, _, _, _Version) ->
- {null, anon};
-%% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have
-%% negotiated a lower version.
-select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo,
- undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
- select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version);
-select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns,
- {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
- #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
- #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert,
- signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
- #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} =
- TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
-
- Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
- SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
-
- case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign ->
- is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign,
- SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
- (_) ->
- false
- end, HashSigns) of
- [] ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
- [HashSign | _] ->
- HashSign
- end;
-select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) ->
- #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
- #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
- select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version).
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, binary(),
- [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
- {atom(), atom()} | #alert{}.
-
-%%
-%% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client)
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, undefined, _, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
- %% There client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail
- %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is
- %% no certificate to verify.
- {undefined, undefined};
-
-select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns},
- certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns,
- {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
- #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
- #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert,
- signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
- #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} =
- TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
-
- Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
- SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
-
- case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of
- true ->
- case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign ->
- is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
- (_) ->
- false
- end, HashSigns) of
- [] ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
- [HashSign | _] ->
- HashSign
- end;
- false ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm)
- end;
-select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) ->
- select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
- {atom(), atom()}.
-
-%% Description: For TLS 1.2 hash function and signature algorithm pairs can be
-%% negotiated with the signature_algorithms extension,
-%% for previous versions always use appropriate defaults.
-%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1. Signature Algorithms
-%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
-%% server MUST do the following: (e.i defaults for TLS 1.2)
-%%
-%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA,
-%% DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had
-%% sent the value {sha1,rsa}.
-%%
-%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS,
-%% DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}.
-%%
-%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
-%% ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-select_hashsign_algs(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso
- Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
- HashSign;
-select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
- {sha, rsa};
-select_hashsign_algs(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) ->
- {sha, ecdsa};
-select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) ->
- {md5sha, rsa};
-select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) ->
- {sha, dsa}.
-
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec master_secret(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(),
- client | server) -> {binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()} | #alert{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys,
-%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update
-%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails.
-%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret},
- ConnectionStates, Role) ->
- #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
- ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams,
- ConnectionStates, Role)
- catch
- exit:_ ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure)
- end;
-
-master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams,
+ signature = Signature},
+ HashSign = {HashAlgo, _},
+ ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) ->
#{security_parameters := SecParams} =
ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
-
- #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
- client_random = ClientRandom,
+ #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
- try master_secret(Version,
- calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret,
- ClientRandom, ServerRandom),
- SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role)
- catch
- exit:_ ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure)
- end.
+ Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo,
+ <<ClientRandom/binary,
+ ServerRandom/binary,
+ EncParams/binary>>),
+ verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo).
+
+select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) ->
+ do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions).
+
+%%====================================================================
+%% Encode handshake
+%%====================================================================
-%%-------------Encode/Decode --------------------------------
encode_handshake(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, _Version) ->
PaddingLength = 32 - ((byte_size(SelectedProtocol) + 2) rem 32),
{?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE((byte_size(SelectedProtocol))), SelectedProtocol/binary,
?BYTE(PaddingLength), 0:(PaddingLength * 8)>>};
-
encode_handshake(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor},
random = Random,
session_id = Session_ID,
@@ -894,71 +639,6 @@ encode_hello_extensions([#sni{hostname = Hostname} | Rest], Acc) ->
?UINT16(HostLen), HostnameBin/binary,
Acc/binary>>).
-enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
- ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) ->
- EncParams = encode_server_key(Params),
- case HashAlgo of
- null ->
- #server_key_params{params = Params,
- params_bin = EncParams,
- hashsign = {null, anon},
- signature = <<>>};
- _ ->
- Hash =
- server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary,
- ServerRandom/binary,
- EncParams/binary>>),
- Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey),
- #server_key_params{params = Params,
- params_bin = EncParams,
- hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
- signature = Signature}
- end.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
- #encrypted_premaster_secret{}
- | #client_diffie_hellman_public{}
- | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{}
- | #client_psk_identity{}
- | #client_dhe_psk_identity{}
- | #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{}
- | #client_rsa_psk_identity{}
- | #client_srp_public{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) ->
- dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
- #server_key_params{}.
-%%
-%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) ->
- dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
-
-%%
-%% Description: Encode and decode functions for ALPN extension data.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-%% While the RFC opens the door to allow ALPN during renegotiation, in practice
-%% this does not work and it is recommended to ignore any ALPN extension during
-%% renegotiation, as done here.
-encode_alpn(_, true) ->
- undefined;
-encode_alpn(undefined, _) ->
- undefined;
-encode_alpn(Protocols, _) ->
- #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}.
-
-decode_alpn(undefined) ->
- undefined;
-decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) ->
- decode_protocols(Data, []).
-
encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) ->
undefined;
encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, false) ->
@@ -972,6 +652,10 @@ encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(undefined) ->
encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(Protocols) ->
#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}.
+%%====================================================================
+%% Decode handshake
+%%====================================================================
+
decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) ->
#hello_request{};
decode_handshake(_, ?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE(SelectedProtocolLength),
@@ -1004,7 +688,6 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:3
cipher_suite = Cipher_suite,
compression_method = Comp_method,
extensions = HelloExtensions};
-
decode_handshake(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>) ->
#certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)};
decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys) ->
@@ -1051,83 +734,30 @@ decode_hello_extensions({client, <<?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>})
decode_hello_extensions(Extensions) ->
dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, #hello_extensions{}).
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
- ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
- ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
- ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
- Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
- {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version),
- #server_key_params{params = Params,
- params_bin = BinMsg,
- hashsign = HashSign,
- signature = Signature};
-%% ECParameters with named_curve
-%% TODO: explicit curve
-dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID),
- ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary,
- _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
- ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
- Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)},
- public = ECPoint},
- {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version),
- #server_key_params{params = Params,
- params_bin = BinMsg,
- hashsign = HashSign,
- signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
- KeyExchange, Version)
- when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ->
- Params = #server_psk_params{
- hint = PskIdentityHint},
- {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version),
- #server_key_params{params = Params,
- params_bin = BinMsg,
- hashsign = HashSign,
- signature = Signature};
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+ #server_key_params{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) ->
+ dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary,
- ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
- ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
- ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
- ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) ->
- DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
- Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{
- hint = IdentityHint,
- dh_params = DHParams},
- {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version),
- #server_key_params{params = Params,
- params_bin = BinMsg,
- hashsign = HashSign,
- signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary,
- ?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID),
- ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary,
- _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
- ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PSK, Version) ->
- DHParams = #server_ecdh_params{
- curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)},
- public = ECPoint},
- Params = #server_ecdhe_psk_params{
- hint = IdentityHint,
- dh_params = DHParams},
- {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2 + PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version),
- #server_key_params{params = Params,
- params_bin = BinMsg,
- hashsign = HashSign,
- signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary,
- ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
- ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary,
- ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
- ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) ->
- Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B},
- {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version),
- #server_key_params{params = Params,
- params_bin = BinMsg,
- hashsign = HashSign,
- signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+ #encrypted_premaster_secret{}
+ | #client_diffie_hellman_public{}
+ | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{}
+ | #client_psk_identity{}
+ | #client_dhe_psk_identity{}
+ | #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{}
+ | #client_rsa_psk_identity{}
+ | #client_srp_public{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) ->
+ dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec decode_suites('2_bytes'|'3_bytes', binary()) -> list().
@@ -1139,7 +769,9 @@ decode_suites('2_bytes', Dec) ->
decode_suites('3_bytes', Dec) ->
from_3bytes(Dec).
-%%-------------Cipeher suite handling --------------------------------
+%%====================================================================
+%% Cipher suite handling
+%%====================================================================
available_suites(UserSuites, Version) ->
lists:filtermap(fun(Suite) ->
@@ -1152,61 +784,37 @@ available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) ->
available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, Curve) ->
Suites = available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve),
filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, []).
-filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) ->
- lists:reverse(Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns,
- Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
- KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
- do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns,
- Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa;
- KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
- KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa;
- KeyExchange == srp_rsa;
- KeyExchange == rsa_psk ->
- do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when
- KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
- KeyExchange == srp_dss ->
- do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when
- KeyExchange == dh_dss;
- KeyExchange == dh_rsa;
- KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
- KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa;
- KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa ->
- %% Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature
- %% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names
- %% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical.
- filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
-filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when
- KeyExchange == dh_anon;
- KeyExchange == ecdh_anon;
- KeyExchange == srp_anon;
- KeyExchange == psk;
- KeyExchange == dhe_psk;
- KeyExchange == ecdhe_psk ->
- %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous
- filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]).
-
-do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) ->
- case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of
- true ->
- filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
- false ->
- filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc)
- end.
-
-unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) ->
- ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites();
-unavailable_ecc_suites(_) ->
- [].
+available_signature_algs(undefined, _) ->
+ undefined;
+available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} ->
+ #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = SupportedHashSigns};
+available_signature_algs(_, _) ->
+ undefined.
+available_signature_algs(undefined, SupportedHashSigns, _, Version) when
+ Version >= {3,3} ->
+ SupportedHashSigns;
+available_signature_algs(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, SupportedHashSigns,
+ _, Version) when Version >= {3,3} ->
+ sets:to_list(sets:intersection(sets:from_list(ClientHashSigns),
+ sets:from_list(SupportedHashSigns)));
+available_signature_algs(_, _, _, _) ->
+ undefined.
cipher_suites(Suites, false) ->
[?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV | Suites];
cipher_suites(Suites, true) ->
Suites.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), non_neg_integer(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) ->
+ {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}.
+%%
+%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) ->
+ {error, undefined};
+prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
+ {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}.
select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve} =
Session, Version,
@@ -1227,68 +835,109 @@ select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port,
{resumed, Resumed}
end.
-%% Deprecated?
supported_ecc({Major, Minor}) when ((Major == 3) and (Minor >= 1)) orelse (Major > 3) ->
Curves = tls_v1:ecc_curves(Minor),
#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = Curves};
supported_ecc(_) ->
#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = []}.
-%%-------------certificate handling --------------------------------
-
-certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 ->
- case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa,
- proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of
- true ->
- <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
- false ->
- <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>
+premaster_secret(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params) ->
+ try
+ public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params)
+ catch
+ error:computation_failed ->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+ end;
+premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}) ->
+ try
+ crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base])
+ catch
+ error:computation_failed ->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
end;
+premaster_secret(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, ServerKey, #srp_user{prime = Prime,
+ verifier = Verifier}) ->
+ case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of
+ error ->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER));
+ PremasterSecret ->
+ PremasterSecret
+ end;
+premaster_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator, srp_s = Salt, srp_b = Public},
+ ClientKeys, {Username, Password}) ->
+ case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of
+ ok ->
+ DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]),
+ case crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of
+ error ->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER));
+ PremasterSecret ->
+ PremasterSecret
+ end;
+ _ ->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+ end;
+premaster_secret(#client_rsa_psk_identity{
+ identity = PSKIdentity,
+ exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = EncPMS}
+ }, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key, PSKLookup) ->
+ PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
+ psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret);
+premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{
+ hint = IdentityHint,
+ dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_y = PublicDhKey} = Params},
+ PrivateDhKey,
+ LookupFun) ->
+ PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params),
+ psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret);
+premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) ->
+ psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret).
-certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa;
- KeyExchange == dh_rsa;
- KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
- KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa ->
- <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>;
-
-certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss;
- KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
- KeyExchange == srp_dss ->
- <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
-
-certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
- KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
- KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa;
- KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
- <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>;
-
-certificate_types(_, _) ->
- <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>.
-
-certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
- Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
- Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) ->
- OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject,
- DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp),
- DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin),
- <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>>
- end,
- list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]).
-
-certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) when is_reference(CertDbRef) ->
- ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref == CertDbRef ->
- [Cert | Acc];
- (_, Acc) ->
- Acc
- end,
- ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle);
-certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) ->
- %% Cache disabled, Ref contains data
- lists:foldl(fun({decoded, {_Key,Cert}}, Acc) -> [Cert | Acc] end,
- [], CertDbData).
-
+premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{
+ identity = PSKIdentity,
+ dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) ->
+ PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateKey, Params),
+ psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret).
+premaster_secret(#client_psk_identity{identity = PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) ->
+ psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup);
+premaster_secret({psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) ->
+ psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup);
+premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{} = ECPoint, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ECDHKeys) ->
+ public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys);
+premaster_secret(EncSecret, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = RSAPrivateKey) ->
+ try public_key:decrypt_private(EncSecret, RSAPrivateKey,
+ [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
+ catch
+ _:_ ->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR))
+ end.
+%%====================================================================
+%% Extensions handling
+%%====================================================================
+client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites,
+ #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns,
+ eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) ->
+ {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} =
+ case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of
+ true ->
+ client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs);
+ false ->
+ {undefined, undefined}
+ end,
+ SRP = srp_user(SslOpts),
-%%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
+ #hello_extensions{
+ renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client,
+ ConnectionStates, Renegotiation),
+ srp = SRP,
+ signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version),
+ ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
+ elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
+ alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation),
+ next_protocol_negotiation =
+ encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector,
+ Renegotiation),
+ sni = sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}.
handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, ClientCipherSuites,
#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info,
@@ -1365,233 +1014,205 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression,
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, too_many_protocols_in_server_hello)
end.
-select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) ->
- do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions).
-
-do_select_version(_, ClientVersion, []) ->
- ClientVersion;
-do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions]) ->
- case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of
- true ->
- %% Version too high for client - keep looking
- do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions);
- false ->
- %% Version ok for client - look for a higher
- do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, Version)
- end.
-%%
-do_select_version(_, _, [], GoodVersion) ->
- GoodVersion;
-do_select_version(
- RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions], GoodVersion) ->
- BetterVersion =
- case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of
- true ->
- %% Version too high for client
- GoodVersion;
- false ->
- %% Version ok for client
- case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, GoodVersion) of
- true ->
- %% Use higher version
- Version;
- false ->
- GoodVersion
- end
- end,
- do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, BetterVersion).
+select_curve(Client, Server) ->
+ select_curve(Client, Server, false).
-renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) ->
- #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined};
-renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) ->
- ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
- true ->
- #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)};
- false ->
- #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
- end;
-renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) ->
- ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
- true ->
- Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
- #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data};
- false ->
- #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves},
+ #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves},
+ ServerOrder) ->
+ case ServerOrder of
+ false ->
+ select_shared_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves);
+ true ->
+ select_shared_curve(ServerCurves, ClientCurves)
end;
+select_curve(undefined, _, _) ->
+ %% Client did not send ECC extension use default curve if
+ %% ECC cipher is negotiated
+ {namedCurve, ?secp256r1}.
-renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) ->
- ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
- true ->
- CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
- SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState),
- #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>};
- false ->
- #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
- end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{} | undefined, undefined | binary(),
+ atom(), [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+ {atom(), atom()} | undefined | #alert{}.
-handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)},
- ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
- {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
+%%
+%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms hello extension (server)
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+select_hashsign(_, undefined, _, _, _Version) ->
+ {null, anon};
+%% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have
+%% negotiated a lower version.
+select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo,
+ undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+ select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version);
+select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns,
+ {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
+ #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+ #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert,
+ signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+ #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} =
+ TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
-handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) ->
- case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
- true ->
- {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
- false ->
- {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}
+ Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
+ SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
+
+ case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign,
+ SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
+ (_) ->
+ false
+ end, HashSigns) of
+ [] ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
+ [HashSign | _] ->
+ HashSign
end;
+select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) ->
+ #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+ #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+ select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, binary(),
+ [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+ {atom(), atom()} | #alert{}.
-handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
- {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)};
+%%
+%% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client)
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, undefined, _, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+ %% There client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail
+ %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is
+ %% no certificate to verify.
+ {undefined, undefined};
+
+select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns},
+ certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns,
+ {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+ #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+ #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert,
+ signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+ #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} =
+ TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
-handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify},
- ConnectionStates, true, _, _) ->
- ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
- SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState),
- case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of
+ Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
+ SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
+
+ case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of
true ->
- {ok, ConnectionStates};
+ case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+ (_) ->
+ false
+ end, HashSigns) of
+ [] ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
+ [HashSign | _] ->
+ HashSign
+ end;
false ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation)
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm)
end;
-handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify},
- ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) ->
-
- case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
- true ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
- false ->
- ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
- case Data == ClientVerify of
- true ->
- {ok, ConnectionStates};
- false ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation)
- end
- end;
-
-handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) ->
- handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation);
+select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) ->
+ select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version).
-handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) ->
- case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
- true ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
- false ->
- handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation)
- end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+ {atom(), atom()}.
-handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
- ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- case {SecureRenegotation, maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState)} of
- {_, true} ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure);
- {true, false} ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- {false, false} ->
- {ok, ConnectionStates}
- end.
+%% Description: For TLS 1.2 hash function and signature algorithm pairs can be
+%% negotiated with the signature_algorithms extension,
+%% for previous versions always use appropriate defaults.
+%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1. Signature Algorithms
+%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
+%% server MUST do the following: (e.i defaults for TLS 1.2)
+%%
+%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA,
+%% DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had
+%% sent the value {sha1,rsa}.
+%%
+%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS,
+%% DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}.
+%%
+%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
+%% ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}.
-hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
- srp = SRP,
- signature_algs = HashSigns,
- ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
- elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
- alpn = ALPN,
- next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation,
- sni = Sni}) ->
- [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns,
- EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined].
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+select_hashsign_algs(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso
+ Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
+ HashSign;
+select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
+ {sha, rsa};
+select_hashsign_algs(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) ->
+ {sha, ecdsa};
+select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) ->
+ {md5sha, rsa};
+select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) ->
+ {sha, dsa}.
srp_user(#ssl_options{srp_identity = {UserName, _}}) ->
#srp{username = UserName};
srp_user(_) ->
undefined.
-client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) ->
- CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
- case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
- true ->
- EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]},
- EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs,
- {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves};
- _ ->
- {undefined, undefined}
- end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%% Internal functions
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%%------------- Create handshake messages ----------------------------
-server_ecc_extension(_Version, EcPointFormats) ->
- CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
- case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
+int_to_bin(I) ->
+ L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2,
+ <<I:(L*8)>>.
+
+certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 ->
+ case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa,
+ proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of
true ->
- handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats);
+ <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
false ->
- undefined
- end.
-
-handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) ->
- undefined;
-handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) ->
- #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}.
-
-advertises_ec_ciphers([]) ->
- false;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
- true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
- true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
- true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
- true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) ->
- true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_psk, _,_,_} | _]) ->
- true;
-advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) ->
- advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest).
-
-select_curve(Client, Server) ->
- select_curve(Client, Server, false).
-
-select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves},
- #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves},
- ServerOrder) ->
- case ServerOrder of
- false ->
- select_shared_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves);
- true ->
- select_shared_curve(ServerCurves, ClientCurves)
+ <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>
end;
-select_curve(undefined, _, _) ->
- %% Client did not send ECC extension use default curve if
- %% ECC cipher is negotiated
- {namedCurve, ?secp256r1}.
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa;
+ KeyExchange == dh_rsa;
+ KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
+ KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa ->
+ <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>;
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss;
+ KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
+ KeyExchange == srp_dss ->
+ <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
+ KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
+ KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa;
+ KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
+ <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>;
+certificate_types(_, _) ->
+ <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>.
-select_shared_curve([], _) ->
- no_curve;
-select_shared_curve([Curve | Rest], Curves) ->
- case lists:member(Curve, Curves) of
- true ->
- {namedCurve, Curve};
- false ->
- select_shared_curve(Rest, Curves)
- end.
+certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
+ Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
+ Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) ->
+ OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject,
+ DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp),
+ DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin),
+ <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>>
+ end,
+ list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]).
-sni(undefined) ->
- undefined;
-sni(disable) ->
- undefined;
-sni(Hostname) ->
- #sni{hostname = Hostname}.
+certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) when is_reference(CertDbRef) ->
+ ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref == CertDbRef ->
+ [Cert | Acc];
+ (_, Acc) ->
+ Acc
+ end,
+ ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle);
+certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) ->
+ %% Cache disabled, Ref contains data
+ lists:foldl(fun({decoded, {_Key,Cert}}, Acc) -> [Cert | Acc] end,
+ [], CertDbData).
+
+%%-------------Handle handshake messages --------------------------------
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%%% Internal functions
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
validation_fun_and_state({Fun, UserState0}, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
ServerNameIndication, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, CertPath) ->
{fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) ->
@@ -1683,17 +1304,6 @@ path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) ->
path_validation_alert(Reason) ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason).
-encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) ->
- try
- PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey,
- [{rsa_pad,
- rsa_pkcs1_padding}]),
- #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret}
- catch
- _:_->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed))
- end.
-
digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) ->
try do_digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of
Signature ->
@@ -1719,6 +1329,106 @@ do_digitally_signed({3, _}, Hash, HashAlgo, #{algorithm := Alg} = Engine) ->
do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) ->
public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key).
+bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
+ unacceptable_dsa_key;
+bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
+ unacceptable_rsa_key;
+bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) ->
+ unacceptable_ecdsa_key.
+
+crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _, _) ->
+ valid;
+crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid, _) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option.
+ valid;
+crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, CertPath) ->
+ Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) ->
+ ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, {CertPath,
+ DBInfo})
+ end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}},
+ {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end},
+ {undetermined_details, true}
+ ],
+ case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of
+ no_dps ->
+ crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check,
+ dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer),
+ Options);
+ DpsAndCRLs -> %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed
+ %% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined}
+ case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of
+ {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} ->
+ crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback,
+ CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options);
+ Other ->
+ Other
+ end
+ end.
+
+crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) ->
+ case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of
+ {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} ->
+ valid;
+ Other ->
+ Other
+ end;
+crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, _, Dps, Options) ->
+ public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options).
+
+dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) ->
+ case public_key:pkix_dist_points(OtpCert) of
+ [] ->
+ no_dps;
+ DistPoints ->
+ Issuer = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer,
+ CRLs = distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle),
+ dps_and_crls(DistPoints, CRLs, [])
+ end;
+
+dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) ->
+ DP = #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, GenNames}} =
+ public_key:pkix_dist_point(OtpCert),
+ CRLs = lists:flatmap(fun({directoryName, Issuer}) ->
+ Callback:select(Issuer, CRLDbHandle);
+ (_) ->
+ []
+ end, GenNames),
+ [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs].
+
+dps_and_crls([], _, Acc) ->
+ Acc;
+dps_and_crls([DP | Rest], CRLs, Acc) ->
+ DpCRL = [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs],
+ dps_and_crls(Rest, CRLs, DpCRL ++ Acc).
+
+distpoints_lookup([],_, _, _) ->
+ [];
+distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) ->
+ Result =
+ try Callback:lookup(DistPoint, Issuer, CRLDbHandle)
+ catch
+ error:undef ->
+ %% The callback module still uses the 2-argument
+ %% version of the lookup function.
+ Callback:lookup(DistPoint, CRLDbHandle)
+ end,
+ case Result of
+ not_available ->
+ distpoints_lookup(Rest, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle);
+ CRLs ->
+ CRLs
+ end.
+
+encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) ->
+ try
+ PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey,
+ [{rsa_pad,
+ rsa_pkcs1_padding}]),
+ #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret}
+ catch
+ _:_->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed))
+ end.
+
calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
ssl_v3:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake));
calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, HashAlgo, _MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
@@ -1771,24 +1481,7 @@ calc_master_secret({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom)
calc_master_secret({3,_}, PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) ->
tls_v1:master_secret(PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom).
-
-handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite,
- ClientCipherSuites, Compression,
- ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) ->
- case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0,
- Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation,
- ClientCipherSuites) of
- {ok, ConnectionStates} ->
- hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role,
- Version,
- NegotiatedCipherSuite,
- Random,
- Compression,
- ConnectionStates);
- #alert{} = Alert ->
- throw(Alert)
- end.
-
+
%% Update pending connection states with parameters exchanged via
%% hello messages
%% NOTE : Role is the role of the receiver of the hello message
@@ -1828,7 +1521,43 @@ hello_security_parameters(server, Version, #{security_parameters := SecParams},
compression_algorithm = Compression
}.
-%%-------------Encode/Decode --------------------------------
+select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) ->
+ ?NULL.
+
+do_select_version(_, ClientVersion, []) ->
+ ClientVersion;
+do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions]) ->
+ case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of
+ true ->
+ %% Version too high for client - keep looking
+ do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions);
+ false ->
+ %% Version ok for client - look for a higher
+ do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, Version)
+ end.
+%%
+do_select_version(_, _, [], GoodVersion) ->
+ GoodVersion;
+do_select_version(
+ RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions], GoodVersion) ->
+ BetterVersion =
+ case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of
+ true ->
+ %% Version too high for client
+ GoodVersion;
+ false ->
+ %% Version ok for client
+ case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, GoodVersion) of
+ true ->
+ %% Use higher version
+ Version;
+ false ->
+ GoodVersion
+ end
+ end,
+ do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, BetterVersion).
+
+%%-------------Encode handshakes --------------------------------
encode_server_key(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}) ->
PLen = byte_size(P),
@@ -1934,6 +1663,110 @@ encode_protocol(Protocol, Acc) ->
Len = byte_size(Protocol),
<<Acc/binary, ?BYTE(Len), Protocol/binary>>.
+enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
+ ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) ->
+ EncParams = encode_server_key(Params),
+ case HashAlgo of
+ null ->
+ #server_key_params{params = Params,
+ params_bin = EncParams,
+ hashsign = {null, anon},
+ signature = <<>>};
+ _ ->
+ Hash =
+ server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary,
+ ServerRandom/binary,
+ EncParams/binary>>),
+ Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey),
+ #server_key_params{params = Params,
+ params_bin = EncParams,
+ hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
+ signature = Signature}
+ end.
+
+%% While the RFC opens the door to allow ALPN during renegotiation, in practice
+%% this does not work and it is recommended to ignore any ALPN extension during
+%% renegotiation, as done here.
+encode_alpn(_, true) ->
+ undefined;
+encode_alpn(undefined, _) ->
+ undefined;
+encode_alpn(Protocols, _) ->
+ #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}.
+
+hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo,
+ srp = SRP,
+ signature_algs = HashSigns,
+ ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats,
+ elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves,
+ alpn = ALPN,
+ next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation,
+ sni = Sni}) ->
+ [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns,
+ EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined].
+
+%%-------------Decode handshakes---------------------------------
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
+ ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+ ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+ ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
+ Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
+ {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version),
+ #server_key_params{params = Params,
+ params_bin = BinMsg,
+ hashsign = HashSign,
+ signature = Signature};
+%% ECParameters with named_curve
+%% TODO: explicit curve
+dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID),
+ ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary,
+ _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+ ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) ->
+ Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)},
+ public = ECPoint},
+ {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version),
+ #server_key_params{params = Params,
+ params_bin = BinMsg,
+ hashsign = HashSign,
+ signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+ KeyExchange, Version)
+ when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ->
+ Params = #server_psk_params{
+ hint = PskIdentityHint},
+ {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version),
+ #server_key_params{params = Params,
+ params_bin = BinMsg,
+ hashsign = HashSign,
+ signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary,
+ ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
+ ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+ ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+ ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) ->
+ DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
+ Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{
+ hint = IdentityHint,
+ dh_params = DHParams},
+ {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version),
+ #server_key_params{params = Params,
+ params_bin = BinMsg,
+ hashsign = HashSign,
+ signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary,
+ ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+ ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary,
+ ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+ ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) ->
+ Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B},
+ {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version),
+ #server_key_params{params = Params,
+ params_bin = BinMsg,
+ hashsign = HashSign,
+ signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) ->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})).
+
dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) ->
#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS};
dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) ->
@@ -2079,6 +1912,11 @@ dec_sni(<<?BYTE(?SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME), ?UINT16(Len),
dec_sni(<<?BYTE(_), ?UINT16(Len), _:Len, Rest/binary>>) -> dec_sni(Rest);
dec_sni(_) -> undefined.
+decode_alpn(undefined) ->
+ undefined;
+decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) ->
+ decode_protocols(Data, []).
+
decode_next_protocols({next_protocol_negotiation, Protocols}) ->
decode_protocols(Protocols, []).
@@ -2123,6 +1961,7 @@ from_2bytes(<<>>, Acc) ->
lists:reverse(Acc);
from_2bytes(<<?UINT16(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
from_2bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]).
+
key_exchange_alg(rsa) ->
?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA;
key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss;
@@ -2146,8 +1985,122 @@ key_exchange_alg(Alg)
key_exchange_alg(_) ->
?NULL.
+%%-------------Cipher suite handling -----------------------------
+select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, false) ->
+ select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites);
+select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, true) ->
+ select_cipher_suite(Suites, CipherSuites).
+
+select_cipher_suite([], _) ->
+ no_suite;
+select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) ->
+ case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of
+ true ->
+ Suite;
+ false ->
+ select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites)
+ end.
+
+is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) ->
+ lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites).
+
+psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) ->
+ case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of
+ {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
+ Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK),
+ <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>;
+ #alert{} = Alert ->
+ Alert;
+ _ ->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+ end.
+
+psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret) ->
+ case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of
+ {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
+ Len = erlang:byte_size(PremasterSecret),
+ PSKLen = erlang:byte_size(PSK),
+ <<?UINT16(Len), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(PSKLen), PSK/binary>>;
+ #alert{} = Alert ->
+ Alert;
+ _ ->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
+ end.
+
+handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun)
+ when LookupFun == undefined ->
+ error;
+handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) ->
+ Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState).
+
+filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) ->
+ lists:reverse(Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns,
+ Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa;
+ KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
+ do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
+
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns,
+ Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa;
+ KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
+ KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa;
+ KeyExchange == srp_rsa;
+ KeyExchange == rsa_psk ->
+ do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when
+ KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
+ KeyExchange == srp_dss ->
+ do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when
+ KeyExchange == dh_dss;
+ KeyExchange == dh_rsa;
+ KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa;
+ KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa;
+ KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa ->
+ %% Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature
+ %% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names
+ %% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical.
+ filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
+filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when
+ KeyExchange == dh_anon;
+ KeyExchange == ecdh_anon;
+ KeyExchange == srp_anon;
+ KeyExchange == psk;
+ KeyExchange == dhe_psk ->
+ %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous
+ filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]).
+
+do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) ->
+ case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of
+ true ->
+ filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]);
+ false ->
+ filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc)
+ end.
+
+unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) ->
+ ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites();
+unavailable_ecc_suites(_) ->
+ [].
%%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
+handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite,
+ ClientCipherSuites, Compression,
+ ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) ->
+ case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0,
+ Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation,
+ ClientCipherSuites) of
+ {ok, ConnectionStates} ->
+ hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role,
+ Version,
+ NegotiatedCipherSuite,
+ Random,
+ Compression,
+ ConnectionStates);
+ #alert{} = Alert ->
+ throw(Alert)
+ end.
+
%% Receive protocols, choose one from the list, return it.
handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, Reason}) ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason);
@@ -2210,150 +2163,6 @@ handle_srp_extension(undefined, Session) ->
handle_srp_extension(#srp{username = Username}, Session) ->
Session#session{srp_username = Username}.
-%%-------------Misc --------------------------------
-
-select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, false) ->
- select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites);
-select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, true) ->
- select_cipher_suite(Suites, CipherSuites).
-
-select_cipher_suite([], _) ->
- no_suite;
-select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) ->
- case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of
- true ->
- Suite;
- false ->
- select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites)
- end.
-
-int_to_bin(I) ->
- L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2,
- <<I:(L*8)>>.
-
-is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) ->
- lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites).
-
-select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) ->
- ?NULL.
-
-available_signature_algs(undefined, _) ->
- undefined;
-available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} ->
- #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = SupportedHashSigns};
-available_signature_algs(_, _) ->
- undefined.
-
-psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) ->
- case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of
- {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
- Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK),
- <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>;
- #alert{} = Alert ->
- Alert;
- _ ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
- end.
-
-psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret) ->
- case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of
- {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) ->
- Len = erlang:byte_size(PremasterSecret),
- PSKLen = erlang:byte_size(PSK),
- <<?UINT16(Len), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(PSKLen), PSK/binary>>;
- #alert{} = Alert ->
- Alert;
- _ ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER))
- end.
-
-handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun)
- when LookupFun == undefined ->
- error;
-handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) ->
- Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState).
-
-crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _, _) ->
- valid;
-crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid, _) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option.
- valid;
-crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, CertPath) ->
- Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) ->
- ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, {CertPath,
- DBInfo})
- end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}},
- {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end},
- {undetermined_details, true}
- ],
- case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of
- no_dps ->
- crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check,
- dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer),
- Options);
- DpsAndCRLs -> %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed
- %% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined}
- case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of
- {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} ->
- crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback,
- CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options);
- Other ->
- Other
- end
- end.
-
-crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) ->
- case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of
- {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} ->
- valid;
- Other ->
- Other
- end;
-crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, _, Dps, Options) ->
- public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options).
-
-dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) ->
- case public_key:pkix_dist_points(OtpCert) of
- [] ->
- no_dps;
- DistPoints ->
- Issuer = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer,
- CRLs = distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle),
- dps_and_crls(DistPoints, CRLs, [])
- end;
-
-dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) ->
- DP = #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, GenNames}} =
- public_key:pkix_dist_point(OtpCert),
- CRLs = lists:flatmap(fun({directoryName, Issuer}) ->
- Callback:select(Issuer, CRLDbHandle);
- (_) ->
- []
- end, GenNames),
- [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs].
-
-dps_and_crls([], _, Acc) ->
- Acc;
-dps_and_crls([DP | Rest], CRLs, Acc) ->
- DpCRL = [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs],
- dps_and_crls(Rest, CRLs, DpCRL ++ Acc).
-
-distpoints_lookup([],_, _, _) ->
- [];
-distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) ->
- Result =
- try Callback:lookup(DistPoint, Issuer, CRLDbHandle)
- catch
- error:undef ->
- %% The callback module still uses the 2-argument
- %% version of the lookup function.
- Callback:lookup(DistPoint, CRLDbHandle)
- end,
- case Result of
- not_available ->
- distpoints_lookup(Rest, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle);
- CRLs ->
- CRLs
- end.
sign_algo(?rsaEncryption) ->
rsa;
@@ -2404,7 +2213,6 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when
true;
is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_, _,_,_) ->
false.
-
is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) ->
lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns).
@@ -2424,27 +2232,162 @@ sign_type(dsa) ->
sign_type(ecdsa) ->
?ECDSA_SIGN.
-
-bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
- unacceptable_dsa_key;
-bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
- unacceptable_rsa_key;
-bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) ->
- unacceptable_ecdsa_key.
-
-available_signature_algs(undefined, SupportedHashSigns, _, Version) when
- Version >= {3,3} ->
- SupportedHashSigns;
-available_signature_algs(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, SupportedHashSigns,
- _, Version) when Version >= {3,3} ->
- sets:to_list(sets:intersection(sets:from_list(ClientHashSigns),
- sets:from_list(SupportedHashSigns)));
-available_signature_algs(_, _, _, _) ->
- undefined.
-
server_name(_, _, server) ->
undefined; %% Not interesting to check your own name.
server_name(undefined, Host, client) ->
{fallback, Host}; %% Fallback to Host argument to connect
server_name(SNI, _, client) ->
SNI. %% If Server Name Indication is available
+
+client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) ->
+ CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
+ case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
+ true ->
+ EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]},
+ EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs,
+ {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves};
+ _ ->
+ {undefined, undefined}
+ end.
+
+server_ecc_extension(_Version, EcPointFormats) ->
+ CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
+ case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
+ true ->
+ handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats);
+ false ->
+ undefined
+ end.
+
+handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) ->
+ undefined;
+handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) ->
+ #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}.
+
+advertises_ec_ciphers([]) ->
+ false;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+ true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+ true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+ true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+ true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+ true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) ->
+ advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest).
+
+select_shared_curve([], _) ->
+ no_curve;
+select_shared_curve([Curve | Rest], Curves) ->
+ case lists:member(Curve, Curves) of
+ true ->
+ {namedCurve, Curve};
+ false ->
+ select_shared_curve(Rest, Curves)
+ end.
+
+sni(undefined) ->
+ undefined;
+sni(disable) ->
+ undefined;
+sni(Hostname) ->
+ #sni{hostname = Hostname}.
+
+renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) ->
+ #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined};
+renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) ->
+ ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
+ true ->
+ #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)};
+ false ->
+ #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+ end;
+renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) ->
+ ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
+ true ->
+ Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+ #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data};
+ false ->
+ #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+ end;
+
+renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) ->
+ ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
+ true ->
+ CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+ SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+ #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>};
+ false ->
+ #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
+ end.
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)},
+ ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
+ {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) ->
+ case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
+ true ->
+ {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)};
+ false ->
+ {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}
+ end;
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) ->
+ {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)};
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify},
+ ConnectionStates, true, _, _) ->
+ ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+ SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+ case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of
+ true ->
+ {ok, ConnectionStates};
+ false ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation)
+ end;
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify},
+ ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) ->
+
+ case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
+ true ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
+ false ->
+ ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+ case Data == ClientVerify of
+ true ->
+ {ok, ConnectionStates};
+ false ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation)
+ end
+ end;
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) ->
+ handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation);
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) ->
+ case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
+ true ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
+ false ->
+ handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation)
+ end.
+
+handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
+ ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ case {SecureRenegotation, maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState)} of
+ {_, true} ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure);
+ {true, false} ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ {false, false} ->
+ {ok, ConnectionStates}
+ end.