diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl | 528 |
1 files changed, 371 insertions, 157 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index 29b64f7a81..235d6efbb6 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -3,16 +3,17 @@ %% %% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2015. All Rights Reserved. %% -%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, -%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in -%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the -%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be -%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/. +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at %% -%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" -%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See -%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations -%% under the License. +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. %% %% %CopyrightEnd% @@ -45,11 +46,11 @@ %% Handshake messages -export([hello_request/0, server_hello/4, server_hello_done/0, - certificate/4, certificate_request/4, key_exchange/3, + certificate/4, certificate_request/5, key_exchange/3, finished/5, next_protocol/1]). %% Handle handshake messages --export([certify/8, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5, +-export([certify/10, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5, master_secret/5, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6, init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/2, verify_server_key/5 ]). @@ -63,8 +64,8 @@ ]). %% Cipher suites handling --export([available_suites/2, cipher_suites/2, - select_session/10, supported_ecc/1]). +-export([available_suites/2, available_signature_algs/3, cipher_suites/2, + select_session/11, supported_ecc/1]). %% Extensions handling -export([client_hello_extensions/6, @@ -73,8 +74,8 @@ ]). %% MISC --export([select_version/3, prf/5, select_hashsign/3, - select_hashsign_algs/2, select_hashsign_algs/3, +-export([select_version/3, prf/6, select_hashsign/5, + select_hashsign_algs/3, premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]). %%==================================================================== @@ -119,7 +120,8 @@ server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Extensions) -> server_hello_done() -> #server_hello_done{}. -client_hello_extensions(Host, Version, CipherSuites, SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> +client_hello_extensions(Host, Version, CipherSuites, + #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, versions = AllVersions} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of true -> @@ -133,9 +135,10 @@ client_hello_extensions(Host, Version, CipherSuites, SslOpts, ConnectionStates, renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), srp = SRP, - hash_signs = advertised_hash_signs(Version), + signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version, AllVersions), ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, + alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation), next_protocol_negotiation = encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, Renegotiation), @@ -149,7 +152,7 @@ client_hello_extensions(Host, Version, CipherSuites, SslOpts, ConnectionStates, certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client) -> Chain = case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of - {ok, CertChain} -> + {ok, _, CertChain} -> CertChain; {error, _} -> %% If no suitable certificate is available, the client @@ -161,7 +164,7 @@ certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client) -> certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) -> case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of - {ok, Chain} -> + {ok, _, Chain} -> #certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain}; {error, _} -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR) @@ -201,14 +204,14 @@ client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version, end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec certificate_request(ssl_cipher:cipher_suite(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - #certificate_request{}. +-spec certificate_request(ssl_cipher:cipher_suite(), db_handle(), + certdb_ref(), #hash_sign_algos{}, ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + #certificate_request{}. %% %% Description: Creates a certificate_request message, called by the server. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -certificate_request(CipherSuite, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Version) -> +certificate_request(CipherSuite, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, HashSigns, Version) -> Types = certificate_types(ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), Version), - HashSigns = advertised_hash_signs(Version), Authorities = certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), #certificate_request{ certificate_types = Types, @@ -242,7 +245,7 @@ key_exchange(client, _Version, {dh, PublicKey}) -> dh_public = PublicKey} }; -key_exchange(client, _Version, {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = {0, ECPublicKey}}}) -> +key_exchange(client, _Version, {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = ECPublicKey}}) -> #client_key_exchange{ exchange_keys = #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{ dh_public = ECPublicKey} @@ -283,7 +286,7 @@ key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, {PublicKey, _}, enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerDHParams, HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey); -key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = {0, ECPublicKey}, +key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = ECPublicKey, parameters = ECCurve}, HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) -> ServerECParams = #server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve, public = ECPublicKey}, @@ -349,6 +352,9 @@ verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams, %% %% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +certificate_verify(_, _, _, undefined, _, _) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo, Version, HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) -> Hash = calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake), @@ -377,55 +383,31 @@ verify_signature(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, end; verify_signature(_Version, Hash, {HashAlgo, dsa}, Signature, {?'id-dsa', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) -> public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}); -verify_signature(_Version, Hash, {HashAlgo, ecdsa}, Signature, +verify_signature(_, Hash, {HashAlgo, _SignAlg}, Signature, {?'id-ecPublicKey', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) -> public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}). + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), integer() | nolimit, - verify_peer | verify_none, {fun(), term}, fun(), + verify_peer | verify_none, {fun(), term}, fun(), term(), term(), client | server) -> {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, - MaxPathLen, _Verify, VerifyFunAndState, PartialChain, Role) -> + MaxPathLen, _Verify, ValidationFunAndState0, PartialChain, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, Role) -> [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs, - - ValidationFunAndState = - case VerifyFunAndState of - undefined -> - {fun(OtpCert, ExtensionOrVerifyResult, SslState) -> - ssl_certificate:validate_extension(OtpCert, - ExtensionOrVerifyResult, SslState) - end, Role}; - {Fun, UserState0} -> - {fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) -> - case ssl_certificate:validate_extension(OtpCert, - Extension, - SslState) of - {valid, NewSslState} -> - {valid, {NewSslState, UserState}}; - {fail, Reason} -> - apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Reason, UserState, - SslState); - {unknown, _} -> - apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, - Extension, UserState, SslState) - end; - (OtpCert, VerifyResult, {SslState, UserState}) -> - apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState, - SslState) - end, {Role, UserState0}} - end, + + ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(ValidationFunAndState0, Role, + CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle), try - {TrustedErlCert, CertPath} = + {TrustedCert, CertPath} = ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, PartialChain), - case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedErlCert, - CertPath, - [{max_path_length, - MaxPathLen}, + case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, + CertPath, + [{max_path_length, MaxPathLen}, {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; @@ -582,54 +564,58 @@ server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) -> server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) -> crypto:hash(Hash, Value). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) -> +-spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), non_neg_integer(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}. %% %% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _) -> +prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) -> {error, undefined}; -prf({3,1}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> - {ok, tls_v1:prf(?MD5SHA, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}; -prf({3,_N}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> - {ok, tls_v1:prf(?SHA256, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}. +prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> + {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{}| undefined, undefined | binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {atom(), atom()} | undefined. +-spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{} | undefined, undefined | binary(), + atom(), [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + {atom(), atom()} | undefined | #alert{}. %% -%% Description: +%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms extension %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_hashsign(_, undefined, _Version) -> +select_hashsign(_, undefined, _, _, _Version) -> {null, anon}; -select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, Version) -> +%% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have +%% negotiated a lower version. +select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, + undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> + select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); +select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, + {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version); -select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, Version) -> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} =public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - DefaultHashSign = {_, Sign} = select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version), - case lists:filter(fun({sha, dsa}) -> + Sign = cert_sign(Algo), + case lists:filter(fun({sha, dsa = S}) when S == Sign -> true; ({_, dsa}) -> false; - ({Hash, S}) when S == Sign -> - ssl_cipher:is_acceptable_hash(Hash, - proplists:get_value(hashs, crypto:supports())); + ({_, _} = Algos) -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); (_) -> false end, HashSigns) of [] -> - DefaultHashSign; - [HashSign| _] -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); + [HashSign | _] -> HashSign - end. + end; +select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) -> + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, + select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec select_hashsign_algs(#hash_sign_algos{}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> +-spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> {atom(), atom()}. %% Description: For TLS 1.2 hash function and signature algorithm pairs can be @@ -662,24 +648,6 @@ select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) -> select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) -> {sha, dsa}. --spec select_hashsign_algs(atom(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> {atom(), atom()}. -%% Wrap function to keep the knowledge of the default values in -%% one place only -select_hashsign_algs(Alg, Version) when (Alg == rsa orelse - Alg == dhe_rsa orelse - Alg == dh_rsa orelse - Alg == ecdhe_rsa orelse - Alg == ecdh_rsa orelse - Alg == srp_rsa) -> - select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, Version); -select_hashsign_algs(Alg, Version) when (Alg == dhe_dss orelse - Alg == dh_dss orelse - Alg == srp_dss) -> - select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', Version); -select_hashsign_algs(Alg, Version) when (Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa orelse - Alg == ecdh_ecdsa) -> - select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-ecPublicKey', Version). - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec master_secret(atom(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), #connection_states{}, client | server) -> {binary(), #connection_states{}} | #alert{}. @@ -791,6 +759,11 @@ encode_hello_extensions([], Acc) -> Size = byte_size(Acc), <<?UINT16(Size), Acc/binary>>; +encode_hello_extensions([#alpn{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) -> + Len = byte_size(ExtensionData), + ExtLen = Len + 2, + encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ALPN_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtensionData/binary, Acc/binary>>); encode_hello_extensions([#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) -> Len = byte_size(ExtensionData), encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), @@ -889,6 +862,25 @@ decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) -> decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) -> dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). +%% +%% Description: Encode and decode functions for ALPN extension data. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +%% While the RFC opens the door to allow ALPN during renegotiation, in practice +%% this does not work and it is recommended to ignore any ALPN extension during +%% renegotiation, as done here. +encode_alpn(_, true) -> + undefined; +encode_alpn(undefined, _) -> + undefined; +encode_alpn(Protocols, _) -> + #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}. + +decode_alpn(undefined) -> + undefined; +decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) -> + decode_protocols(Data, []). + encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) -> undefined; encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, false) -> @@ -1059,9 +1051,56 @@ available_suites(UserSuites, Version) -> lists:member(Suite, ssl_cipher:all_suites(Version)) end, UserSuites). -available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, Curve) -> +available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) -> ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version)) - -- unavailable_ecc_suites(Curve). + -- unavailable_ecc_suites(Curve); +available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, Curve) -> + Suites = available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve), + filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, []). +filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, + Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> + do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); + +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, + Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == srp_rsa; + KeyExchange == rsa_psk -> + do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + KeyExchange == dhe_dss; + KeyExchange == srp_dss -> + do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + KeyExchange == dh_dss; + KeyExchange == dh_rsa; + KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa -> + %% Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature + %% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names + %% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical. + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + KeyExchange == dh_anon; + KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; + KeyExchange == srp_anon; + KeyExchange == psk; + KeyExchange == dhe_psk -> + %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]). + +do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) -> + case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of + true -> + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); + false -> + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) + end. unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) -> ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites(); @@ -1073,17 +1112,17 @@ cipher_suites(Suites, false) -> cipher_suites(Suites, true) -> Suites. -select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve} = +select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve} = Session, Version, - #ssl_options{ciphers = UserSuites, honor_cipher_order = HCO} = SslOpts, + #ssl_options{ciphers = UserSuites, honor_cipher_order = HonorCipherOrder} = SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert) -> {SessionId, Resumed} = ssl_session:server_id(Port, SuggestedSessionId, SslOpts, Cert, Cache, CacheCb), case Resumed of undefined -> - Suites = available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version, ECCCurve), - CipherSuite = select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, HCO), + Suites = available_suites(Cert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, ECCCurve), + CipherSuite = select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, HonorCipherOrder), Compression = select_compression(Compressions), {new, Session#session{session_id = SessionId, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, @@ -1151,8 +1190,10 @@ handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, ClientCipherSuites, #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info, srp = SRP, ec_point_formats = ECCFormat, + alpn = ALPN, next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, Version, - #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation} = Opts, + #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation, + alpn_preferred_protocols = ALPNPreferredProtocols} = Opts, #session{cipher_suite = NegotiatedCipherSuite, compression_method = Compression} = Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> @@ -1161,19 +1202,34 @@ handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, ClientCipherSuites, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, ClientCipherSuites, Compression, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation), - ProtocolsToAdvertise = handle_next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, Opts), - + ServerHelloExtensions = #hello_extensions{ renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), - ec_point_formats = server_ecc_extension(Version, ECCFormat), - next_protocol_negotiation = - encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(ProtocolsToAdvertise) + ec_point_formats = server_ecc_extension(Version, ECCFormat) }, - {Session, ConnectionStates, ServerHelloExtensions}. + + %% If we receive an ALPN extension and have ALPN configured for this connection, + %% we handle it. Otherwise we check for the NPN extension. + if + ALPN =/= undefined, ALPNPreferredProtocols =/= undefined -> + case handle_alpn_extension(ALPNPreferredProtocols, decode_alpn(ALPN)) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + Protocol -> + {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, + ServerHelloExtensions#hello_extensions{alpn=encode_alpn([Protocol], Renegotiation)}} + end; + true -> + ProtocolsToAdvertise = handle_next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, Opts), + {Session, ConnectionStates, undefined, + ServerHelloExtensions#hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation= + encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(ProtocolsToAdvertise)}} + end. handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info, + alpn = ALPN, next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, Version, #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation, next_protocol_selector = NextProtoSelector}, @@ -1182,11 +1238,23 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, CipherSuite, undefined, Compression, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation), - case handle_next_protocol(NextProtocolNegotiation, NextProtoSelector, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - Protocol -> - {ConnectionStates, Protocol} + + %% If we receive an ALPN extension then this is the protocol selected, + %% otherwise handle the NPN extension. + case decode_alpn(ALPN) of + %% ServerHello contains exactly one protocol: the one selected. + %% We also ignore the ALPN extension during renegotiation (see encode_alpn/2). + [Protocol] when not Renegotiation -> + {ConnectionStates, alpn, Protocol}; + undefined -> + case handle_next_protocol(NextProtocolNegotiation, NextProtoSelector, Renegotiation) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + Protocol -> + {ConnectionStates, npn, Protocol} + end; + _ -> %% {error, _Reason} or a list of 0/2+ protocols. + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) end. select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) -> @@ -1291,13 +1359,14 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, srp = SRP, - hash_signs = HashSigns, + signature_algs = HashSigns, ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, + alpn = ALPN, next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation, sni = Sni}) -> [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns, - EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined]. + EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined]. srp_user(#ssl_options{srp_identity = {UserName, _}}) -> #srp{username = UserName}; @@ -1376,15 +1445,66 @@ sni1(Hostname) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +validation_fun_and_state({Fun, UserState0}, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle) -> + {fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) -> + case ssl_certificate:validate(OtpCert, + Extension, + SslState) of + {valid, NewSslState} -> + {valid, {NewSslState, UserState}}; + {fail, Reason} -> + apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Reason, UserState, + SslState); + {unknown, _} -> + apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, + Extension, UserState, SslState) + end; + (OtpCert, VerifyResult, {SslState, UserState}) -> + apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState, + SslState) + end, {{Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle}, UserState0}}; +validation_fun_and_state(undefined, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle) -> + {fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, SslState) -> + ssl_certificate:validate(OtpCert, + Extension, + SslState); + (OtpCert, VerifyResult, SslState) when (VerifyResult == valid) or (VerifyResult == valid_peer) -> + case crl_check(OtpCert, CRLCheck, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLDbHandle, VerifyResult) of + valid -> + {VerifyResult, SslState}; + Reason -> + {fail, Reason} + end; + (OtpCert, VerifyResult, SslState) -> + ssl_certificate:validate(OtpCert, + VerifyResult, + SslState) + end, {Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle}}. + +apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState0, + {_, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle} = SslState) when + (VerifyResult == valid) or (VerifyResult == valid_peer) -> + case Fun(OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState0) of + {Valid, UserState} when (Valid == valid) or (Valid == valid_peer) -> + case crl_check(OtpCert, CRLCheck, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLDbHandle, VerifyResult) of + valid -> + {Valid, {SslState, UserState}}; + Result -> + apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Result, UserState, SslState) + end; + {fail, _} = Fail -> + Fail + end; apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0, SslState) -> case Fun(OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0) of - {valid, UserState} -> - {valid, {SslState, UserState}}; + {Valid, UserState} when (Valid == valid) or (Valid == valid_peer)-> + {Valid, {SslState, UserState}}; {fail, _} = Fail -> Fail; {unknown, UserState} -> {unknown, {SslState, UserState}} end. + path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_expired}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_issuer}) -> @@ -1395,8 +1515,10 @@ path_validation_alert({bad_cert, name_not_permitted}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_critical_extension}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); -path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_revoked}) -> +path_validation_alert({bad_cert, {revoked, _}}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); +path_validation_alert({bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined}) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, selfsigned_peer}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) -> @@ -1437,6 +1559,7 @@ calc_finished({3, N}, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) -> master_secret(_RecordCB, Version, MasterSecret, #security_parameters{ + bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCA, client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom, hash_size = HashSize, @@ -1455,8 +1578,8 @@ master_secret(_RecordCB, Version, MasterSecret, ssl_record:set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, Role, ConnStates1), - ClientCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ClientIV, key = ClientWriteKey}, - ServerCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ServerIV, key = ServerWriteKey}, + ClientCipherState = ssl_cipher:cipher_init(BCA, ClientIV, ClientWriteKey), + ServerCipherState = ssl_cipher:cipher_init(BCA, ServerIV, ServerWriteKey), {MasterSecret, ssl_record:set_pending_cipher_state(ConnStates2, ClientCipherState, ServerCipherState, Role)}. @@ -1681,6 +1804,10 @@ dec_server_key_signature(_, _, _) -> dec_hello_extensions(<<>>, Acc) -> Acc; +dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ALPN_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) + when Len + 2 =:= ExtLen -> + ALPN = #alpn{extension_data = ExtensionData}, + dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{alpn = ALPN}); dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> NextP = #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData}, dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextP}); @@ -1707,7 +1834,7 @@ dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), <<?UINT16(SignAlgoListLen), SignAlgoList/binary>> = ExtData, HashSignAlgos = [{ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)} || <<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>> <= SignAlgoList], - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{hash_signs = + dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{signature_algs = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos}}); dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), @@ -1761,18 +1888,19 @@ dec_sni(<<?BYTE(_), ?UINT16(Len), _:Len, Rest/binary>>) -> dec_sni(Rest); dec_sni(_) -> undefined. decode_next_protocols({next_protocol_negotiation, Protocols}) -> - decode_next_protocols(Protocols, []). -decode_next_protocols(<<>>, Acc) -> + decode_protocols(Protocols, []). + +decode_protocols(<<>>, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc); -decode_next_protocols(<<?BYTE(Len), Protocol:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> +decode_protocols(<<?BYTE(Len), Protocol:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> case Len of 0 -> - {error, invalid_next_protocols}; + {error, invalid_protocols}; _ -> - decode_next_protocols(Rest, [Protocol|Acc]) + decode_protocols(Rest, [Protocol|Acc]) end; -decode_next_protocols(_Bytes, _Acc) -> - {error, invalid_next_protocols}. +decode_protocols(_Bytes, _Acc) -> + {error, invalid_protocols}. %% encode/decode stream of certificate data to/from list of certificate data certs_to_list(ASN1Certs) -> @@ -1806,7 +1934,7 @@ from_2bytes(<<?UINT16(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> key_exchange_alg(rsa) -> ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA; key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss; - Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa; Alg == dh_anon -> + Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa; Alg == dh_anon -> ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN; key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == ecdhe_rsa; Alg == ecdh_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa; Alg == ecdh_ecdsa; @@ -1826,6 +1954,17 @@ key_exchange_alg(_) -> %%-------------Extension handling -------------------------------- +%% Receive protocols, choose one from the list, return it. +handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, _Reason}) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); +handle_alpn_extension([], _) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); +handle_alpn_extension([ServerProtocol|Tail], ClientProtocols) -> + case lists:member(ServerProtocol, ClientProtocols) of + true -> ServerProtocol; + false -> handle_alpn_extension(Tail, ClientProtocols) + end. + handle_next_protocol(undefined, _NextProtocolSelector, _Renegotiating) -> undefined; @@ -1904,27 +2043,16 @@ is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) -> select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) -> ?NULL. --define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(MD), {MD, rsa}). --define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_DSA(MD), {MD, dsa}). --define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_ECDSA(MD), {MD, ecdsa}). - --define(TLSEXT_SIGALG(MD), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_ECDSA(MD), ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(MD)). - -advertised_hash_signs({Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - HashSigns = [?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha512), - ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha384), - ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha256), - ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha224), - ?TLSEXT_SIGALG(sha), - ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_DSA(sha), - ?TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(md5)], - CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(), - HasECC = proplists:get_bool(ecdsa, proplists:get_value(public_keys, CryptoSupport)), - Hashs = proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport), - #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = - lists:filter(fun({Hash, ecdsa}) -> HasECC andalso proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashs); - ({Hash, _}) -> proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashs) end, HashSigns)}; -advertised_hash_signs(_) -> +available_signature_algs(undefined, _, _) -> + undefined; +available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, {Major, Minor}, AllVersions) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> + case tls_record:lowest_protocol_version(AllVersions) of + {3, 3} -> + #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = SupportedHashSigns}; + _ -> + undefined + end; +available_signature_algs(_, _, _) -> undefined. psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) -> @@ -1955,3 +2083,89 @@ handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun) error; handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) -> Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState). + +crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _) -> + valid; +crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option. + valid; +crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _) -> + Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) -> + ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) + end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}}, + {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end} + ], + case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of + no_dps -> + crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, + dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), + Options); + DpsAndCRLs -> %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed + %% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} + case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of + {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} -> + crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, + CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options); + Other -> + Other + end + end. + +crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) -> + case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of + {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} -> + valid; + Other -> + Other + end; +crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, _, Dps, Options) -> + public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options). + +dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) -> + case public_key:pkix_dist_points(OtpCert) of + [] -> + no_dps; + DistPoints -> + distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Callback, CRLDbHandle) + end; + +dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) -> + DP = #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, GenNames}} = + public_key:pkix_dist_point(OtpCert), + CRLs = lists:flatmap(fun({directoryName, Issuer}) -> + Callback:select(Issuer, CRLDbHandle); + (_) -> + [] + end, GenNames), + [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs]. + +distpoints_lookup([], _, _) -> + []; +distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Callback, CRLDbHandle) -> + case Callback:lookup(DistPoint, CRLDbHandle) of + not_available -> + distpoints_lookup(Rest, Callback, CRLDbHandle); + CRLs -> + [{DistPoint, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs] + end. + +cert_sign(?rsaEncryption) -> + rsa; +cert_sign(?'id-ecPublicKey') -> + ecdsa; +cert_sign(?'id-dsa') -> + dsa; +cert_sign(Alg) -> + {_, Sign} =public_key:pkix_sign_types(Alg), + Sign. + +is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, Sign} = Algos, Sign, _, SupportedHashSigns) -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); +is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos,_, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns) when KeyExAlgo == dh_ecdsa; + KeyExAlgo == ecdh_rsa; + KeyExAlgo == ecdh_ecdsa -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); +is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_,_,_) -> + false. +is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) -> + lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns). + |