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-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl370
1 files changed, 262 insertions, 108 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index 9c3fe9d73b..e84473f215 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2017. All Rights Reserved.
%%
%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@
%% Handle handshake messages
-export([certify/10, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5,
- master_secret/5, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6,
- init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/2, verify_server_key/5
+ master_secret/4, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6,
+ init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/3, verify_server_key/5
]).
%% Encode/Decode
@@ -70,11 +70,11 @@
%% Extensions handling
-export([client_hello_extensions/6,
handle_client_hello_extensions/9, %% Returns server hello extensions
- handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2
+ handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3
]).
%% MISC
--export([select_version/3, prf/6, select_hashsign/5,
+-export([select_version/3, prf/6, select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5,
select_hashsign_algs/3,
premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]).
@@ -94,15 +94,14 @@ hello_request() ->
#hello_request{}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec server_hello(#session{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), #connection_states{},
+-spec server_hello(#session{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states(),
#hello_extensions{}) -> #server_hello{}.
%%
%% Description: Creates a server hello message.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Extensions) ->
- Pending = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
-
+ #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
+ ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
#server_hello{server_version = Version,
cipher_suite = SecParams#security_parameters.cipher_suite,
compression_method =
@@ -121,11 +120,13 @@ server_hello_done() ->
#server_hello_done{}.
client_hello_extensions(Host, Version, CipherSuites,
- #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, versions = AllVersions} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) ->
+ #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns,
+ eccs = SupportedECCs,
+ versions = AllVersions} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) ->
{EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} =
case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of
true ->
- client_ecc_extensions(tls_v1, Version);
+ client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs);
false ->
{undefined, undefined}
end,
@@ -335,9 +336,8 @@ verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams,
signature = Signature},
HashSign = {HashAlgo, _},
ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) ->
- ConnectionState =
+ #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
#security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo,
@@ -397,14 +397,13 @@ verify_signature(_, Hash, {HashAlgo, _SignAlg}, Signature,
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
MaxPathLen, _Verify, ValidationFunAndState0, PartialChain, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, Role) ->
- [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs,
-
- ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(ValidationFunAndState0, Role,
- CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle),
-
+ [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs,
try
{TrustedCert, CertPath} =
ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, PartialChain),
+ ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(ValidationFunAndState0, Role,
+ CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
+ CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, CertPath),
case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert,
CertPath,
[{max_path_length, MaxPathLen},
@@ -447,7 +446,7 @@ init_handshake_history() ->
{[], []}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec update_handshake_history(ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake_history(), Data ::term()) ->
+-spec update_handshake_history(ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake_history(), Data ::term(), boolean()) ->
ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake_history().
%%
%% Description: Update the handshake history buffer with Data.
@@ -457,14 +456,14 @@ update_handshake_history(Handshake, % special-case SSL2 client hello
?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
?UINT16(CDLength),
CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
- ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>) ->
+ ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>, true) ->
update_handshake_history(Handshake,
<<?CLIENT_HELLO, ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
?UINT16(CDLength),
CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
- ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>);
-update_handshake_history({Handshake0, _Prev}, Data) ->
+ ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>, true);
+update_handshake_history({Handshake0, _Prev}, Data, _) ->
{[Data|Handshake0], Handshake0}.
%% %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -581,7 +580,7 @@ prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) ->
{atom(), atom()} | undefined | #alert{}.
%%
-%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms extension
+%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms hello extension (server)
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
select_hashsign(_, undefined, _, _, _Version) ->
{null, anon};
@@ -593,14 +592,17 @@ select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo,
select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns,
{Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 ->
#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
- #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
- Sign = cert_sign(Algo),
- case lists:filter(fun({sha, dsa = S}) when S == Sign ->
- true;
- ({_, dsa}) ->
- false;
- ({_, _} = Algos) ->
- is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
+ #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert,
+ signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+ #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} =
+ TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+
+ Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
+ SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
+
+ case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign,
+ SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns);
(_) ->
false
end, HashSigns) of
@@ -613,6 +615,49 @@ select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) ->
#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, binary(),
+ [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+ {atom(), atom()} | #alert{}.
+
+%%
+%% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client)
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, undefined, _, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+ %% There client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail
+ %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is
+ %% no certificate to verify.
+ {undefined, undefined};
+
+select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns},
+ certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns,
+ {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3->
+ #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+ #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert,
+ signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
+ #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} =
+ TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+
+ Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo),
+ SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo),
+
+ case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of
+ true ->
+ case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+ (_) ->
+ false
+ end, HashSigns) of
+ [] ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
+ [HashSign | _] ->
+ HashSign
+ end;
+ false ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm)
+ end;
+select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) ->
+ select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
@@ -648,34 +693,34 @@ select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) ->
select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) ->
{sha, dsa}.
+
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec master_secret(atom(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), #connection_states{},
- client | server) -> {binary(), #connection_states{}} | #alert{}.
+-spec master_secret(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(),
+ client | server) -> {binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()} | #alert{}.
%%
%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys,
%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update
%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails.
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-master_secret(RecordCB, Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret},
+master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret},
ConnectionStates, Role) ->
- ConnectionState =
+ #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
- try master_secret(RecordCB, Version, Mastersecret, SecParams,
+ try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams,
ConnectionStates, Role)
catch
exit:_ ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure)
end;
-master_secret(RecordCB, Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
- ConnectionState =
+master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
+ #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+
#security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo,
client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
- try master_secret(RecordCB, Version,
+ try master_secret(Version,
calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret,
ClientRandom, ServerRandom),
SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role)
@@ -1125,8 +1170,9 @@ select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port,
{resumed, Resumed}
end.
-supported_ecc({Major, Minor} = Version) when ((Major == 3) and (Minor >= 1)) orelse (Major > 3) ->
- Curves = tls_v1:ecc_curves(Version),
+%% Deprecated?
+supported_ecc({Major, Minor}) when ((Major == 3) and (Minor >= 1)) orelse (Major > 3) ->
+ Curves = tls_v1:ecc_curves(Minor),
#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = Curves};
supported_ecc(_) ->
#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = []}.
@@ -1143,11 +1189,13 @@ certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 ->
end;
certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa;
+ KeyExchange == dh_rsa;
KeyExchange == dhe_rsa;
KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa ->
<<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>;
-certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
+certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss;
+ KeyExchange == dhe_dss;
KeyExchange == srp_dss ->
<<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>;
@@ -1170,13 +1218,18 @@ certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
end,
list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]).
-certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
+certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) when is_reference(CertDbRef) ->
ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref == CertDbRef ->
[Cert | Acc];
(_, Acc) ->
Acc
end,
- ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle).
+ ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle);
+certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) ->
+ %% Cache disabled, Ref contains data
+ lists:foldl(fun({decoded, {_Key,Cert}}, Acc) -> [Cert | Acc] end,
+ [], CertDbData).
+
%%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
@@ -1256,35 +1309,67 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression,
end.
select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) ->
- ServerVersion = RecordCB:highest_protocol_version(Versions),
- RecordCB:lowest_protocol_version(ClientVersion, ServerVersion).
+ do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions).
+
+do_select_version(_, ClientVersion, []) ->
+ ClientVersion;
+do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions]) ->
+ case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of
+ true ->
+ %% Version too high for client - keep looking
+ do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions);
+ false ->
+ %% Version ok for client - look for a higher
+ do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, Version)
+ end.
+%%
+do_select_version(_, _, [], GoodVersion) ->
+ GoodVersion;
+do_select_version(
+ RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions], GoodVersion) ->
+ BetterVersion =
+ case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of
+ true ->
+ %% Version too high for client
+ GoodVersion;
+ false ->
+ %% Version ok for client
+ case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, GoodVersion) of
+ true ->
+ %% Use higher version
+ Version;
+ false ->
+ GoodVersion
+ end
+ end,
+ do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, BetterVersion).
renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) ->
#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined};
renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) ->
- CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
+ ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
true ->
#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)};
false ->
#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
end;
renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) ->
- CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
+ ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
true ->
- Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
+ Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data};
false ->
#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
end;
renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) ->
- CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- case CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation of
+ ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of
true ->
- CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
- SData =CS#connection_state.server_verify_data,
+ CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+ SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState),
#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>};
false ->
#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}
@@ -1307,9 +1392,9 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _
handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify},
ConnectionStates, true, _, _) ->
- CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- CData = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
- SData = CS#connection_state.server_verify_data,
+ ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
+ SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState),
case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of
true ->
{ok, ConnectionStates};
@@ -1323,8 +1408,8 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co
true ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
false ->
- CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
+ ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState),
case Data == ClientVerify of
true ->
{ok, ConnectionStates};
@@ -1345,8 +1430,8 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, S
end.
handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
- CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
- case {SecureRenegotation, CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation} of
+ ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
+ case {SecureRenegotation, maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState)} of
{_, true} ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure);
{true, false} ->
@@ -1371,12 +1456,12 @@ srp_user(#ssl_options{srp_identity = {UserName, _}}) ->
srp_user(_) ->
undefined.
-client_ecc_extensions(Module, Version) ->
+client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) ->
CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()),
case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of
true ->
EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]},
- EllipticCurves = #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = Module:ecc_curves(Version)},
+ EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs,
{EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves};
_ ->
{undefined, undefined}
@@ -1410,22 +1495,34 @@ advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) ->
true;
advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) ->
advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest).
-select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves},
- #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves}) ->
- select_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves);
-select_curve(undefined, _) ->
+
+select_curve(Client, Server) ->
+ select_curve(Client, Server, false).
+
+select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves},
+ #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves},
+ ServerOrder) ->
+ case ServerOrder of
+ false ->
+ select_shared_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves);
+ true ->
+ select_shared_curve(ServerCurves, ClientCurves)
+ end;
+select_curve(undefined, _, _) ->
%% Client did not send ECC extension use default curve if
%% ECC cipher is negotiated
- {namedCurve, ?secp256r1};
-select_curve(_, []) ->
+ {namedCurve, ?secp256r1}.
+
+select_shared_curve([], _) ->
no_curve;
-select_curve(Curves, [Curve| Rest]) ->
+select_shared_curve([Curve | Rest], Curves) ->
case lists:member(Curve, Curves) of
true ->
{namedCurve, Curve};
false ->
- select_curve(Curves, Rest)
+ select_shared_curve(Rest, Curves)
end.
+
%% RFC 6066, Section 3: Currently, the only server names supported are
%% DNS hostnames
sni(_, disable) ->
@@ -1443,7 +1540,8 @@ sni1(Hostname) ->
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-validation_fun_and_state({Fun, UserState0}, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle) ->
+validation_fun_and_state({Fun, UserState0}, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
+ CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, CertPath) ->
{fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) ->
case ssl_certificate:validate(OtpCert,
Extension,
@@ -1452,22 +1550,25 @@ validation_fun_and_state({Fun, UserState0}, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLC
{valid, {NewSslState, UserState}};
{fail, Reason} ->
apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Reason, UserState,
- SslState);
+ SslState, CertPath);
{unknown, _} ->
apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert,
- Extension, UserState, SslState)
+ Extension, UserState, SslState, CertPath)
end;
(OtpCert, VerifyResult, {SslState, UserState}) ->
apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState,
- SslState)
+ SslState, CertPath)
end, {{Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle}, UserState0}};
-validation_fun_and_state(undefined, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle) ->
+validation_fun_and_state(undefined, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
+ CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, CertPath) ->
{fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, SslState) ->
ssl_certificate:validate(OtpCert,
Extension,
SslState);
- (OtpCert, VerifyResult, SslState) when (VerifyResult == valid) or (VerifyResult == valid_peer) ->
- case crl_check(OtpCert, CRLCheck, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLDbHandle, VerifyResult) of
+ (OtpCert, VerifyResult, SslState) when (VerifyResult == valid) or
+ (VerifyResult == valid_peer) ->
+ case crl_check(OtpCert, CRLCheck, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
+ CRLDbHandle, VerifyResult, CertPath) of
valid ->
{VerifyResult, SslState};
Reason ->
@@ -1480,20 +1581,21 @@ validation_fun_and_state(undefined, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRL
end, {Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle}}.
apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState0,
- {_, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle} = SslState) when
+ {_, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle} = SslState, CertPath) when
(VerifyResult == valid) or (VerifyResult == valid_peer) ->
case Fun(OtpCert, VerifyResult, UserState0) of
{Valid, UserState} when (Valid == valid) or (Valid == valid_peer) ->
- case crl_check(OtpCert, CRLCheck, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CRLDbHandle, VerifyResult) of
+ case crl_check(OtpCert, CRLCheck, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
+ CRLDbHandle, VerifyResult, CertPath) of
valid ->
{Valid, {SslState, UserState}};
Result ->
- apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Result, UserState, SslState)
+ apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, Result, UserState, SslState, CertPath)
end;
{fail, _} = Fail ->
Fail
end;
-apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0, SslState) ->
+apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0, SslState, _CertPath) ->
case Fun(OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0) of
{Valid, UserState} when (Valid == valid) or (Valid == valid_peer)->
{Valid, {SslState, UserState}};
@@ -1564,7 +1666,7 @@ calc_finished({3, 0}, Role, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
calc_finished({3, N}, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
tls_v1:finished(Role, N, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)).
-master_secret(_RecordCB, Version, MasterSecret,
+master_secret(Version, MasterSecret,
#security_parameters{
bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCA,
client_random = ClientRandom,
@@ -1647,18 +1749,16 @@ hello_pending_connection_states(_RecordCB, Role, Version, CipherSuite, Random, C
NewWriteSecParams,
ConnectionStates).
-hello_security_parameters(client, Version, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random,
+hello_security_parameters(client, Version, #{security_parameters := SecParams}, CipherSuite, Random,
Compression) ->
- SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams),
NewSecParams#security_parameters{
server_random = Random,
compression_algorithm = Compression
};
-hello_security_parameters(server, Version, ConnectionState, CipherSuite, Random,
+hello_security_parameters(server, Version, #{security_parameters := SecParams}, CipherSuite, Random,
Compression) ->
- SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
NewSecParams = ssl_cipher:security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams),
NewSecParams#security_parameters{
client_random = Random,
@@ -2091,13 +2191,14 @@ handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun)
handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) ->
Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState).
-crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _) ->
+crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _, _) ->
valid;
-crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option.
+crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid, _) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option.
valid;
-crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _) ->
+crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, CertPath) ->
Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) ->
- ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, DBInfo)
+ ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, {CertPath,
+ DBInfo})
end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}},
{update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end}
],
@@ -2133,7 +2234,8 @@ dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) ->
no_dps;
DistPoints ->
Issuer = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer,
- distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle)
+ CRLs = distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle),
+ dps_and_crls(DistPoints, CRLs, [])
end;
dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) ->
@@ -2146,7 +2248,13 @@ dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) ->
end, GenNames),
[{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs].
-distpoints_lookup([], _, _, _) ->
+dps_and_crls([], _, Acc) ->
+ Acc;
+dps_and_crls([DP | Rest], CRLs, Acc) ->
+ DpCRL = [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs],
+ dps_and_crls(Rest, CRLs, DpCRL ++ Acc).
+
+distpoints_lookup([],_, _, _) ->
[];
distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) ->
Result =
@@ -2161,30 +2269,76 @@ distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) ->
not_available ->
distpoints_lookup(Rest, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle);
CRLs ->
- [{DistPoint, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs]
+ CRLs
end.
-cert_sign(?rsaEncryption) ->
+sign_algo(?rsaEncryption) ->
rsa;
-cert_sign(?'id-ecPublicKey') ->
+sign_algo(?'id-ecPublicKey') ->
ecdsa;
-cert_sign(?'id-dsa') ->
+sign_algo(?'id-dsa') ->
dsa;
-cert_sign(Alg) ->
+sign_algo(Alg) ->
{_, Sign} =public_key:pkix_sign_types(Alg),
Sign.
-is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, Sign} = Algos, Sign, _, SupportedHashSigns) ->
- is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
-is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos,_, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns) when KeyExAlgo == dh_ecdsa;
- KeyExAlgo == ecdh_rsa;
- KeyExAlgo == ecdh_ecdsa ->
+is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, _, _, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns) when
+ KeyExAlgo == dh_dss;
+ KeyExAlgo == dh_rsa;
+ KeyExAlgo == dh_ecdsa ->
+ %% dh_* could be called only dh in TLS-1.2
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, rsa, ecdsa, ecdh_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, _, dhe_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
-is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_,_,_) ->
- false.
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, rsa, ecdhe_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, rsa, rsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, _, srp_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, _, rsa_psk, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, dsa} = Algos, dsa, _, dhe_dss, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, dsa} = Algos, dsa, _, srp_dss, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, ecdsa} = Algos, ecdsa, _, dhe_ecdsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, ecdsa} = Algos, ecdsa, ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, SupportedHashSigns) ->
+ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns);
+is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when
+ KeyExAlgo == psk;
+ KeyExAlgo == dhe_psk;
+ KeyExAlgo == srp_anon;
+ KeyExAlgo == dh_anon;
+ KeyExAlgo == ecdhe_anon
+ ->
+ true;
+is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_, _,_,_) ->
+ false.
+
is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) ->
lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns).
+is_acceptable_cert_type(Sign, _HashSigns, Types) ->
+ lists:member(sign_type(Sign), binary_to_list(Types)).
+
+is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) ->
+ [] =/= lists:dropwhile(fun({_, S}) when S =/= Sign ->
+ true;
+ (_)->
+ false
+ end, HashSigns).
+sign_type(rsa) ->
+ ?RSA_SIGN;
+sign_type(dsa) ->
+ ?DSS_SIGN;
+sign_type(ecdsa) ->
+ ?ECDSA_SIGN.
+
+
bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
unacceptable_dsa_key;
bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-05-29 00:50:36 +0000