diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl | 1965 |
1 files changed, 954 insertions, 1011 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index 8681765284..e74361993d 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -44,46 +44,44 @@ #client_key_exchange{} | #finished{} | #certificate_verify{} | #hello_request{} | #next_protocol{}. -%% Handshake messages +%% Create handshake messages -export([hello_request/0, server_hello/4, server_hello_done/0, - certificate/4, certificate_request/5, key_exchange/3, + certificate/4, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_request/5, key_exchange/3, finished/5, next_protocol/1]). %% Handle handshake messages --export([certify/7, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5, +-export([certify/7, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5, master_secret/4, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6, - init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/3, verify_server_key/5 + init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/3, verify_server_key/5, + select_version/3 ]). -%% Encode/Decode +%% Encode -export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/1, - encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1, - decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1, + encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1]). +%% Decode +-export([decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1, decode_server_key/3, decode_client_key/3, decode_suites/2 ]). %% Cipher suites handling --export([available_suites/2, available_signature_algs/2, cipher_suites/2, - select_session/11, supported_ecc/1, available_signature_algs/4]). +-export([available_suites/2, available_signature_algs/2, available_signature_algs/4, + cipher_suites/2, prf/6, select_session/11, supported_ecc/1, + premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]). %% Extensions handling -export([client_hello_extensions/5, handle_client_hello_extensions/9, %% Returns server hello extensions - handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3 + handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3, + select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5, + select_hashsign_algs/3 ]). -%% MISC --export([select_version/3, prf/6, select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5, - select_hashsign_algs/3, - premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]). - %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Create handshake messages %%==================================================================== -%% ---------- Create handshake messages ---------- - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec hello_request() -> #hello_request{}. %% @@ -119,31 +117,6 @@ server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Extensions) -> server_hello_done() -> #server_hello_done{}. -client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, - #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, - eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> - {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = - case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of - true -> - client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs); - false -> - {undefined, undefined} - end, - SRP = srp_user(SslOpts), - - #hello_extensions{ - renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client, - ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), - srp = SRP, - signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version), - ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, - elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, - alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation), - next_protocol_negotiation = - encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, - Renegotiation), - sni = sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certificate(der_cert(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), client | server) -> #certificate{} | #alert{}. %% @@ -171,14 +144,6 @@ certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) -> end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}. -%% -%% Description: Creates a next protocol message -%%------------------------------------------------------------------- -next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) -> - #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec client_certificate_verify(undefined | der_cert(), binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(), public_key:private_key(), ssl_handshake_history()) -> @@ -346,22 +311,51 @@ key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, {PublicKey, _}, finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {Handshake, _}) -> % use the current handshake #finished{verify_data = calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake)}. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}. +%% +%% Description: Creates a next protocol message +%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) -> + #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}. -%% ---------- Handle handshake messages ---------- +%%==================================================================== +%% Handle handshake messages +%%==================================================================== +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), #ssl_options{}, term(), + client | server, inet:hostname() | inet:ip_address()) -> {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}. +%% +%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, + Opts, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) -> -verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams, - signature = Signature}, - HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, - ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) -> - #{security_parameters := SecParams} = - ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, - server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, - Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, - <<ClientRandom/binary, - ServerRandom/binary, - EncParams/binary>>), - verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo). + ServerName = server_name(Opts#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role), + [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs, + try + {TrustedCert, CertPath} = + ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, + Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain), + ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role, + CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerName, + Opts#ssl_options.crl_check, CRLDbHandle, CertPath), + case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, + CertPath, + [{max_path_length, Opts#ssl_options.depth}, + {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of + {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> + {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; + {error, Reason} -> + path_validation_alert(Reason) + end + catch + error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> + %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason}); + error:OtherReason -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {unexpected_error, OtherReason}) + end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(), @@ -404,43 +398,55 @@ verify_signature(_, Hash, {HashAlgo, _SignAlg}, Signature, {?'id-ecPublicKey', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) -> public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}). - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), #ssl_options{}, term(), - client | server, inet:hostname() | inet:ip_address()) -> {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}. +-spec master_secret(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(), + client | server) -> {binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()} | #alert{}. %% -%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, - Opts, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) -> +%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys, +%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update +%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails. +%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret}, + ConnectionStates, Role) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParams} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams, + ConnectionStates, Role) + catch + exit:_ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure) + end; - ServerName = server_name(Opts#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role), - [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs, - try - {TrustedCert, CertPath} = - ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, - Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain), - ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role, - CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerName, - Opts#ssl_options.crl_check, CRLDbHandle, CertPath), - case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, - CertPath, - [{max_path_length, Opts#ssl_options.depth}, - {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of - {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> - {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; - {error, Reason} -> - path_validation_alert(Reason) - end +master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParams} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + + #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo, + client_random = ClientRandom, + server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, + try master_secret(Version, + calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret, + ClientRandom, ServerRandom), + SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role) catch - error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> - %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason}); - error:OtherReason -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {unexpected_error, OtherReason}) + exit:_ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary(). +%% +%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) -> + MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value), + SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value), + <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>; + +server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) -> + crypto:hash(Hash, Value). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec verify_connection(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #finished{}, client | server, integer(), binary(), ssl_handshake_history()) -> verified | #alert{}. %% @@ -487,292 +493,31 @@ update_handshake_history(Handshake, % special-case SSL2 client hello update_handshake_history({Handshake0, _Prev}, Data, _) -> {[Data|Handshake0], Handshake0}. -%% %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -spec decrypt_premaster_secret(binary(), #'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> binary(). - -%% %% -%% %% Description: Public key decryption using the private key. -%% %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) -> -%% try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey, -%% [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) -%% catch -%% _:_ -> -%% throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)) -%% end. - -premaster_secret(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params) -> - try - public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params) - catch - error:computation_failed -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end; -premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}) -> - try - crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base]) - catch - error:computation_failed -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end; -premaster_secret(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, ServerKey, #srp_user{prime = Prime, - verifier = Verifier}) -> - case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of - error -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); - PremasterSecret -> - PremasterSecret - end; -premaster_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator, srp_s = Salt, srp_b = Public}, - ClientKeys, {Username, Password}) -> - case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of - ok -> - DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]), - case crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of - error -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); - PremasterSecret -> - PremasterSecret - end; - _ -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end; -premaster_secret(#client_rsa_psk_identity{ - identity = PSKIdentity, - exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = EncPMS} - }, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key, PSKLookup) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key), - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret); -premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{ - hint = IdentityHint, - dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_y = PublicDhKey} = Params}, - PrivateDhKey, - LookupFun) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params), - psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret); - -premaster_secret(#server_ecdhe_psk_params{ - hint = IdentityHint, - dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{ - public = ECServerPubKey}}, - PrivateEcDhKey, - LookupFun) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ECServerPubKey}, PrivateEcDhKey), - psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret); - -premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) -> - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret); - -premaster_secret(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{ - identity = PSKIdentity, - dh_public = PublicEcDhPoint}, PrivateEcDhKey, PSKLookup) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = PublicEcDhPoint}, PrivateEcDhKey), - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret). - -premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{ - identity = PSKIdentity, - dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateKey, Params), - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret). - -premaster_secret(#client_psk_identity{identity = PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) -> - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup); -premaster_secret({psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) -> - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup); -premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{} = ECPoint, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ECDHKeys) -> - public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys); -premaster_secret(EncSecret, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = RSAPrivateKey) -> - try public_key:decrypt_private(EncSecret, RSAPrivateKey, - [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) - catch - _:_ -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)) - end. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary(). -%% -%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) -> - MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value), - SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value), - <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>; - -server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) -> - crypto:hash(Hash, Value). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), non_neg_integer(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) -> - {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}. -%% -%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) -> - {error, undefined}; -prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> - {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}. - - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{} | undefined, undefined | binary(), - atom(), [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {atom(), atom()} | undefined | #alert{}. - -%% -%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms hello extension (server) -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_hashsign(_, undefined, _, _, _Version) -> - {null, anon}; -%% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have -%% negotiated a lower version. -select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, - undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); -select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, - {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, - signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = - TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - - Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), - SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), - - case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign, - SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); - (_) -> - false - end, HashSigns) of - [] -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); - [HashSign | _] -> - HashSign - end; -select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) -> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, binary(), - [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {atom(), atom()} | #alert{}. - -%% -%% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client) -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, undefined, _, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - %% There client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail - %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is - %% no certificate to verify. - {undefined, undefined}; - -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, - certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, - {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, - signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = - TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - - Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), - SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), - - case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of - true -> - case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); - (_) -> - false - end, HashSigns) of - [] -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); - [HashSign | _] -> - HashSign - end; - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm) - end; -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) -> - select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {atom(), atom()}. - -%% Description: For TLS 1.2 hash function and signature algorithm pairs can be -%% negotiated with the signature_algorithms extension, -%% for previous versions always use appropriate defaults. -%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1. Signature Algorithms -%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the -%% server MUST do the following: (e.i defaults for TLS 1.2) -%% -%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA, -%% DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had -%% sent the value {sha1,rsa}. -%% -%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS, -%% DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}. -%% -%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA, -%% ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_hashsign_algs(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso - Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - HashSign; -select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - {sha, rsa}; -select_hashsign_algs(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) -> - {sha, ecdsa}; -select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) -> - {md5sha, rsa}; -select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) -> - {sha, dsa}. - - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec master_secret(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(), - client | server) -> {binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()} | #alert{}. -%% -%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys, -%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update -%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails. -%%------------------------------------------------------------------- -master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret}, - ConnectionStates, Role) -> - #{security_parameters := SecParams} = - ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams, - ConnectionStates, Role) - catch - exit:_ -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure) - end; - -master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) -> +verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams, + signature = Signature}, + HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, + ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) -> #{security_parameters := SecParams} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - - #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo, - client_random = ClientRandom, + #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, - try master_secret(Version, - calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret, - ClientRandom, ServerRandom), - SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role) - catch - exit:_ -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure) - end. + Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, + <<ClientRandom/binary, + ServerRandom/binary, + EncParams/binary>>), + verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo). + +select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) -> + do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Encode handshake +%%==================================================================== -%%-------------Encode/Decode -------------------------------- encode_handshake(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, _Version) -> PaddingLength = 32 - ((byte_size(SelectedProtocol) + 2) rem 32), {?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE((byte_size(SelectedProtocol))), SelectedProtocol/binary, ?BYTE(PaddingLength), 0:(PaddingLength * 8)>>}; - encode_handshake(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, @@ -894,71 +639,6 @@ encode_hello_extensions([#sni{hostname = Hostname} | Rest], Acc) -> ?UINT16(HostLen), HostnameBin/binary, Acc/binary>>). -enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, - ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) -> - EncParams = encode_server_key(Params), - case HashAlgo of - null -> - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = EncParams, - hashsign = {null, anon}, - signature = <<>>}; - _ -> - Hash = - server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary, - ServerRandom/binary, - EncParams/binary>>), - Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = EncParams, - hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, - signature = Signature} - end. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - #encrypted_premaster_secret{} - | #client_diffie_hellman_public{} - | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{} - | #client_psk_identity{} - | #client_dhe_psk_identity{} - | #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{} - | #client_rsa_psk_identity{} - | #client_srp_public{}. -%% -%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) -> - dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - #server_key_params{}. -%% -%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) -> - dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). - -%% -%% Description: Encode and decode functions for ALPN extension data. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - -%% While the RFC opens the door to allow ALPN during renegotiation, in practice -%% this does not work and it is recommended to ignore any ALPN extension during -%% renegotiation, as done here. -encode_alpn(_, true) -> - undefined; -encode_alpn(undefined, _) -> - undefined; -encode_alpn(Protocols, _) -> - #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}. - -decode_alpn(undefined) -> - undefined; -decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) -> - decode_protocols(Data, []). - encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) -> undefined; encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, false) -> @@ -972,6 +652,10 @@ encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(undefined) -> encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(Protocols) -> #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}. +%%==================================================================== +%% Decode handshake +%%==================================================================== + decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) -> #hello_request{}; decode_handshake(_, ?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE(SelectedProtocolLength), @@ -1004,7 +688,6 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:3 cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, compression_method = Comp_method, extensions = HelloExtensions}; - decode_handshake(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>) -> #certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)}; decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys) -> @@ -1051,83 +734,30 @@ decode_hello_extensions({client, <<?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>}) decode_hello_extensions(Extensions) -> dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, #hello_extensions{}). -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, - ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> - Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -%% ECParameters with named_curve -%% TODO: explicit curve -dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID), - ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary, - _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> - Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)}, - public = ECPoint}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - KeyExchange, Version) - when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK -> - Params = #server_psk_params{ - hint = PskIdentityHint}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + #server_key_params{}. +%% +%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) -> + dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary, - ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, - ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) -> - DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, - Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{ - hint = IdentityHint, - dh_params = DHParams}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary, - ?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID), - ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary, - _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PSK, Version) -> - DHParams = #server_ecdh_params{ - curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)}, - public = ECPoint}, - Params = #server_ecdhe_psk_params{ - hint = IdentityHint, - dh_params = DHParams}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2 + PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, - ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary, - ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) -> - Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + #encrypted_premaster_secret{} + | #client_diffie_hellman_public{} + | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{} + | #client_psk_identity{} + | #client_dhe_psk_identity{} + | #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{} + | #client_rsa_psk_identity{} + | #client_srp_public{}. +%% +%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) -> + dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decode_suites('2_bytes'|'3_bytes', binary()) -> list(). @@ -1139,7 +769,9 @@ decode_suites('2_bytes', Dec) -> decode_suites('3_bytes', Dec) -> from_3bytes(Dec). -%%-------------Cipeher suite handling -------------------------------- +%%==================================================================== +%% Cipher suite handling +%%==================================================================== available_suites(UserSuites, Version) -> lists:filtermap(fun(Suite) -> @@ -1152,61 +784,37 @@ available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) -> available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, Curve) -> Suites = available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve), filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, []). -filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) -> - lists:reverse(Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, - Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> - do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, - Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == srp_rsa; - KeyExchange == rsa_psk -> - do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when - KeyExchange == dhe_dss; - KeyExchange == srp_dss -> - do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when - KeyExchange == dh_dss; - KeyExchange == dh_rsa; - KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa -> - %% Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature - %% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names - %% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical. - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when - KeyExchange == dh_anon; - KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; - KeyExchange == srp_anon; - KeyExchange == psk; - KeyExchange == dhe_psk; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_psk -> - %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]). - -do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) -> - case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of - true -> - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); - false -> - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) - end. - -unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) -> - ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites(); -unavailable_ecc_suites(_) -> - []. +available_signature_algs(undefined, _) -> + undefined; +available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} -> + #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = SupportedHashSigns}; +available_signature_algs(_, _) -> + undefined. +available_signature_algs(undefined, SupportedHashSigns, _, Version) when + Version >= {3,3} -> + SupportedHashSigns; +available_signature_algs(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, SupportedHashSigns, + _, Version) when Version >= {3,3} -> + sets:to_list(sets:intersection(sets:from_list(ClientHashSigns), + sets:from_list(SupportedHashSigns))); +available_signature_algs(_, _, _, _) -> + undefined. cipher_suites(Suites, false) -> [?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV | Suites]; cipher_suites(Suites, true) -> Suites. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), non_neg_integer(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) -> + {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}. +%% +%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) -> + {error, undefined}; +prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> + {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}. select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve} = Session, Version, @@ -1227,68 +835,109 @@ select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, {resumed, Resumed} end. -%% Deprecated? supported_ecc({Major, Minor}) when ((Major == 3) and (Minor >= 1)) orelse (Major > 3) -> Curves = tls_v1:ecc_curves(Minor), #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = Curves}; supported_ecc(_) -> #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = []}. -%%-------------certificate handling -------------------------------- - -certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 -> - case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa, - proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of - true -> - <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; - false -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>> +premaster_secret(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params) -> + try + public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params) + catch + error:computation_failed -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) + end; +premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}) -> + try + crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base]) + catch + error:computation_failed -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) end; +premaster_secret(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, ServerKey, #srp_user{prime = Prime, + verifier = Verifier}) -> + case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of + error -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); + PremasterSecret -> + PremasterSecret + end; +premaster_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator, srp_s = Salt, srp_b = Public}, + ClientKeys, {Username, Password}) -> + case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of + ok -> + DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]), + case crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of + error -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); + PremasterSecret -> + PremasterSecret + end; + _ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) + end; +premaster_secret(#client_rsa_psk_identity{ + identity = PSKIdentity, + exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = EncPMS} + }, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key, PSKLookup) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key), + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret); +premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{ + hint = IdentityHint, + dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_y = PublicDhKey} = Params}, + PrivateDhKey, + LookupFun) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params), + psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret); +premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) -> + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret). -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa; - KeyExchange == dh_rsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; - KeyExchange == dhe_dss; - KeyExchange == srp_dss -> - <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> - <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types(_, _) -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>. - -certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> - Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), - Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) -> - OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject, - DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp), - DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin), - <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>> - end, - list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]). - -certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) when is_reference(CertDbRef) -> - ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref == CertDbRef -> - [Cert | Acc]; - (_, Acc) -> - Acc - end, - ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle); -certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) -> - %% Cache disabled, Ref contains data - lists:foldl(fun({decoded, {_Key,Cert}}, Acc) -> [Cert | Acc] end, - [], CertDbData). - +premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{ + identity = PSKIdentity, + dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateKey, Params), + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret). +premaster_secret(#client_psk_identity{identity = PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) -> + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup); +premaster_secret({psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) -> + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup); +premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{} = ECPoint, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ECDHKeys) -> + public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys); +premaster_secret(EncSecret, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = RSAPrivateKey) -> + try public_key:decrypt_private(EncSecret, RSAPrivateKey, + [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) + catch + _:_ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)) + end. +%%==================================================================== +%% Extensions handling +%%==================================================================== +client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, + #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, + eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> + {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = + case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of + true -> + client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs); + false -> + {undefined, undefined} + end, + SRP = srp_user(SslOpts), -%%-------------Extension handling -------------------------------- + #hello_extensions{ + renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client, + ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), + srp = SRP, + signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version), + ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, + elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, + alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation), + next_protocol_negotiation = + encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, + Renegotiation), + sni = sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}. handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, ClientCipherSuites, #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info, @@ -1365,233 +1014,205 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, too_many_protocols_in_server_hello) end. -select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) -> - do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions). - -do_select_version(_, ClientVersion, []) -> - ClientVersion; -do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions]) -> - case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of - true -> - %% Version too high for client - keep looking - do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions); - false -> - %% Version ok for client - look for a higher - do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, Version) - end. -%% -do_select_version(_, _, [], GoodVersion) -> - GoodVersion; -do_select_version( - RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions], GoodVersion) -> - BetterVersion = - case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of - true -> - %% Version too high for client - GoodVersion; - false -> - %% Version ok for client - case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, GoodVersion) of - true -> - %% Use higher version - Version; - false -> - GoodVersion - end - end, - do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, BetterVersion). +select_curve(Client, Server) -> + select_curve(Client, Server, false). -renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}; -renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of - true -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}; - false -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} - end; -renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of - true -> - Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data}; - false -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} +select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves}, + #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves}, + ServerOrder) -> + case ServerOrder of + false -> + select_shared_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves); + true -> + select_shared_curve(ServerCurves, ClientCurves) end; +select_curve(undefined, _, _) -> + %% Client did not send ECC extension use default curve if + %% ECC cipher is negotiated + {namedCurve, ?secp256r1}. -renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of - true -> - CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), - SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState), - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>}; - false -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} - end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{} | undefined, undefined | binary(), + atom(), [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + {atom(), atom()} | undefined | #alert{}. -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, - ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> - {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; +%% +%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms hello extension (server) +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +select_hashsign(_, undefined, _, _, _Version) -> + {null, anon}; +%% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have +%% negotiated a lower version. +select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, + undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> + select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); +select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, + {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, + signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = + TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> - case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of - true -> - {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; - false -> - {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)} + Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), + SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), + + case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign, + SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); + (_) -> + false + end, HashSigns) of + [] -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); + [HashSign | _] -> + HashSign end; +select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) -> + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, + select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, binary(), + [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + {atom(), atom()} | #alert{}. -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> - {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}; +%% +%% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client) +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, undefined, _, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> + %% There client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail + %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is + %% no certificate to verify. + {undefined, undefined}; + +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, + certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, + {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, + signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = + TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, - ConnectionStates, true, _, _) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), - SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState), - case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of + Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), + SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), + + case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of true -> - {ok, ConnectionStates}; + case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); + (_) -> + false + end, HashSigns) of + [] -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); + [HashSign | _] -> + HashSign + end; false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm) end; -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, - ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) -> - - case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of - true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); - false -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), - case Data == ClientVerify of - true -> - {ok, ConnectionStates}; - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation) - end - end; - -handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) -> - handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation); +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) -> + select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version). -handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> - case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of - true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); - false -> - handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) - end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + {atom(), atom()}. -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - case {SecureRenegotation, maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState)} of - {_, true} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure); - {true, false} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION); - {false, false} -> - {ok, ConnectionStates} - end. +%% Description: For TLS 1.2 hash function and signature algorithm pairs can be +%% negotiated with the signature_algorithms extension, +%% for previous versions always use appropriate defaults. +%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1. Signature Algorithms +%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the +%% server MUST do the following: (e.i defaults for TLS 1.2) +%% +%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA, +%% DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had +%% sent the value {sha1,rsa}. +%% +%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS, +%% DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}. +%% +%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA, +%% ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}. -hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, - srp = SRP, - signature_algs = HashSigns, - ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, - elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, - alpn = ALPN, - next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation, - sni = Sni}) -> - [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns, - EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined]. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +select_hashsign_algs(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso + Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> + HashSign; +select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> + {sha, rsa}; +select_hashsign_algs(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) -> + {sha, ecdsa}; +select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) -> + {md5sha, rsa}; +select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) -> + {sha, dsa}. srp_user(#ssl_options{srp_identity = {UserName, _}}) -> #srp{username = UserName}; srp_user(_) -> undefined. -client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) -> - CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), - case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of - true -> - EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}, - EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs, - {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves}; - _ -> - {undefined, undefined} - end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Internal functions +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%------------- Create handshake messages ---------------------------- -server_ecc_extension(_Version, EcPointFormats) -> - CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), - case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of +int_to_bin(I) -> + L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2, + <<I:(L*8)>>. + +certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 -> + case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa, + proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of true -> - handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats); + <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; false -> - undefined - end. - -handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) -> - undefined; -handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) -> - #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}. - -advertises_ec_ciphers([]) -> - false; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_psk, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) -> - advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest). - -select_curve(Client, Server) -> - select_curve(Client, Server, false). - -select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves}, - #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves}, - ServerOrder) -> - case ServerOrder of - false -> - select_shared_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves); - true -> - select_shared_curve(ServerCurves, ClientCurves) + <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>> end; -select_curve(undefined, _, _) -> - %% Client did not send ECC extension use default curve if - %% ECC cipher is negotiated - {namedCurve, ?secp256r1}. +certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa; + KeyExchange == dh_rsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> + <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>; +certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; + KeyExchange == dhe_dss; + KeyExchange == srp_dss -> + <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; +certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> + <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>; +certificate_types(_, _) -> + <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>. -select_shared_curve([], _) -> - no_curve; -select_shared_curve([Curve | Rest], Curves) -> - case lists:member(Curve, Curves) of - true -> - {namedCurve, Curve}; - false -> - select_shared_curve(Rest, Curves) - end. +certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> + Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), + Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) -> + OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject, + DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp), + DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin), + <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>> + end, + list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]). -sni(undefined) -> - undefined; -sni(disable) -> - undefined; -sni(Hostname) -> - #sni{hostname = Hostname}. +certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) when is_reference(CertDbRef) -> + ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref == CertDbRef -> + [Cert | Acc]; + (_, Acc) -> + Acc + end, + ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle); +certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) -> + %% Cache disabled, Ref contains data + lists:foldl(fun({decoded, {_Key,Cert}}, Acc) -> [Cert | Acc] end, + [], CertDbData). + +%%-------------Handle handshake messages -------------------------------- -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%%% Internal functions -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- validation_fun_and_state({Fun, UserState0}, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerNameIndication, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, CertPath) -> {fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) -> @@ -1683,17 +1304,6 @@ path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) -> path_validation_alert(Reason) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason). -encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) -> - try - PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey, - [{rsa_pad, - rsa_pkcs1_padding}]), - #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret} - catch - _:_-> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed)) - end. - digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) -> try do_digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of Signature -> @@ -1719,6 +1329,106 @@ do_digitally_signed({3, _}, Hash, HashAlgo, #{algorithm := Alg} = Engine) -> do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) -> public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key). +bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) -> + unacceptable_dsa_key; +bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> + unacceptable_rsa_key; +bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) -> + unacceptable_ecdsa_key. + +crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _, _) -> + valid; +crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid, _) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option. + valid; +crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, CertPath) -> + Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) -> + ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, {CertPath, + DBInfo}) + end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}}, + {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end}, + {undetermined_details, true} + ], + case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of + no_dps -> + crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, + dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), + Options); + DpsAndCRLs -> %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed + %% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} + case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of + {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} -> + crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, + CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options); + Other -> + Other + end + end. + +crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) -> + case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of + {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} -> + valid; + Other -> + Other + end; +crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, _, Dps, Options) -> + public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options). + +dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) -> + case public_key:pkix_dist_points(OtpCert) of + [] -> + no_dps; + DistPoints -> + Issuer = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer, + CRLs = distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle), + dps_and_crls(DistPoints, CRLs, []) + end; + +dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) -> + DP = #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, GenNames}} = + public_key:pkix_dist_point(OtpCert), + CRLs = lists:flatmap(fun({directoryName, Issuer}) -> + Callback:select(Issuer, CRLDbHandle); + (_) -> + [] + end, GenNames), + [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs]. + +dps_and_crls([], _, Acc) -> + Acc; +dps_and_crls([DP | Rest], CRLs, Acc) -> + DpCRL = [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs], + dps_and_crls(Rest, CRLs, DpCRL ++ Acc). + +distpoints_lookup([],_, _, _) -> + []; +distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) -> + Result = + try Callback:lookup(DistPoint, Issuer, CRLDbHandle) + catch + error:undef -> + %% The callback module still uses the 2-argument + %% version of the lookup function. + Callback:lookup(DistPoint, CRLDbHandle) + end, + case Result of + not_available -> + distpoints_lookup(Rest, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle); + CRLs -> + CRLs + end. + +encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) -> + try + PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey, + [{rsa_pad, + rsa_pkcs1_padding}]), + #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret} + catch + _:_-> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed)) + end. + calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) -> ssl_v3:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)); calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, HashAlgo, _MasterSecret, Handshake) -> @@ -1771,24 +1481,7 @@ calc_master_secret({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) calc_master_secret({3,_}, PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) -> tls_v1:master_secret(PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom). - -handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, - ClientCipherSuites, Compression, - ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) -> - case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0, - Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, - ClientCipherSuites) of - {ok, ConnectionStates} -> - hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role, - Version, - NegotiatedCipherSuite, - Random, - Compression, - ConnectionStates); - #alert{} = Alert -> - throw(Alert) - end. - + %% Update pending connection states with parameters exchanged via %% hello messages %% NOTE : Role is the role of the receiver of the hello message @@ -1828,7 +1521,43 @@ hello_security_parameters(server, Version, #{security_parameters := SecParams}, compression_algorithm = Compression }. -%%-------------Encode/Decode -------------------------------- +select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) -> + ?NULL. + +do_select_version(_, ClientVersion, []) -> + ClientVersion; +do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions]) -> + case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of + true -> + %% Version too high for client - keep looking + do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions); + false -> + %% Version ok for client - look for a higher + do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, Version) + end. +%% +do_select_version(_, _, [], GoodVersion) -> + GoodVersion; +do_select_version( + RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions], GoodVersion) -> + BetterVersion = + case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of + true -> + %% Version too high for client + GoodVersion; + false -> + %% Version ok for client + case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, GoodVersion) of + true -> + %% Use higher version + Version; + false -> + GoodVersion + end + end, + do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, BetterVersion). + +%%-------------Encode handshakes -------------------------------- encode_server_key(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}) -> PLen = byte_size(P), @@ -1934,6 +1663,110 @@ encode_protocol(Protocol, Acc) -> Len = byte_size(Protocol), <<Acc/binary, ?BYTE(Len), Protocol/binary>>. +enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, + ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) -> + EncParams = encode_server_key(Params), + case HashAlgo of + null -> + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = EncParams, + hashsign = {null, anon}, + signature = <<>>}; + _ -> + Hash = + server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary, + ServerRandom/binary, + EncParams/binary>>), + Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = EncParams, + hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, + signature = Signature} + end. + +%% While the RFC opens the door to allow ALPN during renegotiation, in practice +%% this does not work and it is recommended to ignore any ALPN extension during +%% renegotiation, as done here. +encode_alpn(_, true) -> + undefined; +encode_alpn(undefined, _) -> + undefined; +encode_alpn(Protocols, _) -> + #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}. + +hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, + srp = SRP, + signature_algs = HashSigns, + ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, + elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, + alpn = ALPN, + next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation, + sni = Sni}) -> + [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns, + EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined]. + +%%-------------Decode handshakes--------------------------------- +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, + ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, + ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> + Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +%% ECParameters with named_curve +%% TODO: explicit curve +dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID), + ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary, + _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> + Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)}, + public = ECPoint}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + KeyExchange, Version) + when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK -> + Params = #server_psk_params{ + hint = PskIdentityHint}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary, + ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, + ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, + ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) -> + DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, + Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{ + hint = IdentityHint, + dh_params = DHParams}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary, + ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, + ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary, + ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) -> + Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})). + dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) -> #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}; dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) -> @@ -2079,6 +1912,11 @@ dec_sni(<<?BYTE(?SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME), ?UINT16(Len), dec_sni(<<?BYTE(_), ?UINT16(Len), _:Len, Rest/binary>>) -> dec_sni(Rest); dec_sni(_) -> undefined. +decode_alpn(undefined) -> + undefined; +decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) -> + decode_protocols(Data, []). + decode_next_protocols({next_protocol_negotiation, Protocols}) -> decode_protocols(Protocols, []). @@ -2123,6 +1961,7 @@ from_2bytes(<<>>, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc); from_2bytes(<<?UINT16(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> from_2bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]). + key_exchange_alg(rsa) -> ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA; key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss; @@ -2146,8 +1985,122 @@ key_exchange_alg(Alg) key_exchange_alg(_) -> ?NULL. +%%-------------Cipher suite handling ----------------------------- +select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, false) -> + select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites); +select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, true) -> + select_cipher_suite(Suites, CipherSuites). + +select_cipher_suite([], _) -> + no_suite; +select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) -> + case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of + true -> + Suite; + false -> + select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites) + end. + +is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) -> + lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites). + +psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) -> + case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of + {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> + Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK), + <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>; + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + _ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) + end. + +psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret) -> + case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of + {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> + Len = erlang:byte_size(PremasterSecret), + PSKLen = erlang:byte_size(PSK), + <<?UINT16(Len), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(PSKLen), PSK/binary>>; + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + _ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) + end. + +handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun) + when LookupFun == undefined -> + error; +handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) -> + Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState). + +filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, + Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> + do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); + +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, + Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == srp_rsa; + KeyExchange == rsa_psk -> + do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + KeyExchange == dhe_dss; + KeyExchange == srp_dss -> + do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + KeyExchange == dh_dss; + KeyExchange == dh_rsa; + KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa -> + %% Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature + %% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names + %% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical. + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + KeyExchange == dh_anon; + KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; + KeyExchange == srp_anon; + KeyExchange == psk; + KeyExchange == dhe_psk -> + %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]). + +do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) -> + case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of + true -> + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); + false -> + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) + end. + +unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) -> + ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites(); +unavailable_ecc_suites(_) -> + []. %%-------------Extension handling -------------------------------- +handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, + ClientCipherSuites, Compression, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) -> + case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0, + Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, + ClientCipherSuites) of + {ok, ConnectionStates} -> + hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role, + Version, + NegotiatedCipherSuite, + Random, + Compression, + ConnectionStates); + #alert{} = Alert -> + throw(Alert) + end. + %% Receive protocols, choose one from the list, return it. handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, Reason}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason); @@ -2210,150 +2163,6 @@ handle_srp_extension(undefined, Session) -> handle_srp_extension(#srp{username = Username}, Session) -> Session#session{srp_username = Username}. -%%-------------Misc -------------------------------- - -select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, false) -> - select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites); -select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, true) -> - select_cipher_suite(Suites, CipherSuites). - -select_cipher_suite([], _) -> - no_suite; -select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) -> - case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of - true -> - Suite; - false -> - select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites) - end. - -int_to_bin(I) -> - L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2, - <<I:(L*8)>>. - -is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) -> - lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites). - -select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) -> - ?NULL. - -available_signature_algs(undefined, _) -> - undefined; -available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} -> - #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = SupportedHashSigns}; -available_signature_algs(_, _) -> - undefined. - -psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) -> - case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of - {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> - Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK), - <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>; - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - _ -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end. - -psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret) -> - case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of - {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> - Len = erlang:byte_size(PremasterSecret), - PSKLen = erlang:byte_size(PSK), - <<?UINT16(Len), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(PSKLen), PSK/binary>>; - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - _ -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end. - -handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun) - when LookupFun == undefined -> - error; -handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) -> - Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState). - -crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _, _) -> - valid; -crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid, _) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option. - valid; -crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, CertPath) -> - Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) -> - ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, {CertPath, - DBInfo}) - end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}}, - {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end}, - {undetermined_details, true} - ], - case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of - no_dps -> - crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, - dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), - Options); - DpsAndCRLs -> %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed - %% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} - case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of - {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} -> - crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, - CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options); - Other -> - Other - end - end. - -crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) -> - case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of - {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} -> - valid; - Other -> - Other - end; -crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, _, Dps, Options) -> - public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options). - -dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) -> - case public_key:pkix_dist_points(OtpCert) of - [] -> - no_dps; - DistPoints -> - Issuer = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer, - CRLs = distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle), - dps_and_crls(DistPoints, CRLs, []) - end; - -dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) -> - DP = #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, GenNames}} = - public_key:pkix_dist_point(OtpCert), - CRLs = lists:flatmap(fun({directoryName, Issuer}) -> - Callback:select(Issuer, CRLDbHandle); - (_) -> - [] - end, GenNames), - [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs]. - -dps_and_crls([], _, Acc) -> - Acc; -dps_and_crls([DP | Rest], CRLs, Acc) -> - DpCRL = [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs], - dps_and_crls(Rest, CRLs, DpCRL ++ Acc). - -distpoints_lookup([],_, _, _) -> - []; -distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) -> - Result = - try Callback:lookup(DistPoint, Issuer, CRLDbHandle) - catch - error:undef -> - %% The callback module still uses the 2-argument - %% version of the lookup function. - Callback:lookup(DistPoint, CRLDbHandle) - end, - case Result of - not_available -> - distpoints_lookup(Rest, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle); - CRLs -> - CRLs - end. sign_algo(?rsaEncryption) -> rsa; @@ -2404,7 +2213,6 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when true; is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_, _,_,_) -> false. - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) -> lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns). @@ -2424,27 +2232,162 @@ sign_type(dsa) -> sign_type(ecdsa) -> ?ECDSA_SIGN. - -bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) -> - unacceptable_dsa_key; -bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> - unacceptable_rsa_key; -bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) -> - unacceptable_ecdsa_key. - -available_signature_algs(undefined, SupportedHashSigns, _, Version) when - Version >= {3,3} -> - SupportedHashSigns; -available_signature_algs(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, SupportedHashSigns, - _, Version) when Version >= {3,3} -> - sets:to_list(sets:intersection(sets:from_list(ClientHashSigns), - sets:from_list(SupportedHashSigns))); -available_signature_algs(_, _, _, _) -> - undefined. - server_name(_, _, server) -> undefined; %% Not interesting to check your own name. server_name(undefined, Host, client) -> {fallback, Host}; %% Fallback to Host argument to connect server_name(SNI, _, client) -> SNI. %% If Server Name Indication is available + +client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) -> + CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), + case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of + true -> + EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}, + EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs, + {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves}; + _ -> + {undefined, undefined} + end. + +server_ecc_extension(_Version, EcPointFormats) -> + CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), + case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of + true -> + handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats); + false -> + undefined + end. + +handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) -> + undefined; +handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) -> + #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}. + +advertises_ec_ciphers([]) -> + false; +advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) -> + advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest). + +select_shared_curve([], _) -> + no_curve; +select_shared_curve([Curve | Rest], Curves) -> + case lists:member(Curve, Curves) of + true -> + {namedCurve, Curve}; + false -> + select_shared_curve(Rest, Curves) + end. + +sni(undefined) -> + undefined; +sni(disable) -> + undefined; +sni(Hostname) -> + #sni{hostname = Hostname}. + +renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}; +renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of + true -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}; + false -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} + end; +renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of + true -> + Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data}; + false -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} + end; + +renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of + true -> + CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), + SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState), + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>}; + false -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} + end. + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, + ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> + case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of + true -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; + false -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)} + end; + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}; + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, + ConnectionStates, true, _, _) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), + SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState), + case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of + true -> + {ok, ConnectionStates}; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation) + end; +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, + ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) -> + + case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of + true -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); + false -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), + case Data == ClientVerify of + true -> + {ok, ConnectionStates}; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation) + end + end; + +handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) -> + handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation); + +handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> + case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of + true -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); + false -> + handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) + end. + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + case {SecureRenegotation, maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState)} of + {_, true} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure); + {true, false} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION); + {false, false} -> + {ok, ConnectionStates} + end. |