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-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src6
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl76
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl53
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl853
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl193
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl13
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl14
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl64
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl17
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl18
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl20
11 files changed, 883 insertions, 444 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src
index fdda65021d..e8ae6846aa 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
{"3.10.5", [{restart_application, ssl}]},
{"3.10.6", [{restart_application, ssl}]},
{"3.10.7", [{restart_application, ssl}]},
- {"3.10.8", [{restart_application, ssl}]}
+ {"3.10.8", [{restart_application, ssl}]},
+ {"3.10.9", [{restart_application, ssl}]}
],
[
{"3.10", [{restart_application, ssl}]},
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@
{"3.10.4", [{restart_application, ssl}]},
{"3.10.5", [{restart_application, ssl}]},
{"3.10.6", [{restart_application, ssl}]},
- {"3.10.8", [{restart_application, ssl}]}
+ {"3.10.8", [{restart_application, ssl}]},
+ {"3.10.9", [{restart_application, ssl}]}
]}.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
index de74c91505..3cd4c7fdbd 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
@@ -29,13 +29,15 @@
connect/3, connect/2, connect/4, connection_info/1,
controlling_process/2, listen/2, pid/1, peername/1, recv/2, recv/3,
send/2, getopts/2, setopts/2, seed/1, sockname/1, peercert/1,
- peercert/2, version/0, versions/0, session_info/1, format_error/1]).
+ peercert/2, version/0, versions/0, session_info/1, format_error/1,
+ renegotiate/1]).
%% Should be deprecated as soon as old ssl is removed
%%-deprecated({pid, 1, next_major_release}).
-include("ssl_int.hrl").
-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
+-include("ssl_record.hrl").
-record(config, {ssl, %% SSL parameters
inet_user, %% User set inet options
@@ -151,18 +153,23 @@ transport_accept(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{cb=CbInfo, ssl=SslOpts}
%% and options should be inherited.
EmOptions = emulated_options(),
{ok, InetValues} = inet:getopts(ListenSocket, EmOptions),
- {CbModule,_,_} = CbInfo,
- {ok, Socket} = CbModule:accept(ListenSocket, Timeout),
- inet:setopts(Socket, internal_inet_values()),
- {ok, Port} = inet:port(Socket),
- case ssl_connection_sup:start_child([server, "localhost", Port, Socket,
- {SslOpts, socket_options(InetValues)}, self(),
- CbInfo]) of
- {ok, Pid} ->
- CbModule:controlling_process(Socket, Pid),
- {ok, SslSocket#sslsocket{pid = Pid}};
- {error, Reason} ->
- {error, Reason}
+ ok = inet:setopts(ListenSocket, internal_inet_values()),
+ {CbModule,_,_} = CbInfo,
+ case CbModule:accept(ListenSocket, Timeout) of
+ {ok, Socket} ->
+ ok = inet:setopts(ListenSocket, InetValues),
+ {ok, Port} = inet:port(Socket),
+ ConnArgs = [server, "localhost", Port, Socket,
+ {SslOpts, socket_options(InetValues)}, self(), CbInfo],
+ case ssl_connection_sup:start_child(ConnArgs) of
+ {ok, Pid} ->
+ CbModule:controlling_process(Socket, Pid),
+ {ok, SslSocket#sslsocket{pid = Pid}};
+ {error, Reason} ->
+ {error, Reason}
+ end;
+ {error, Reason} ->
+ {error, Reason}
end;
transport_accept(#sslsocket{} = ListenSocket, Timeout) ->
@@ -436,6 +443,10 @@ versions() ->
AvailableVsns = ?DEFAULT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
[{ssl_app, ?VSN}, {supported, SupportedVsns}, {available, AvailableVsns}].
+
+renegotiate(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = new_ssl}) ->
+ ssl_connection:renegotiation(Pid).
+
%%%--------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -509,6 +520,9 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role) ->
end
end,
+ UserFailIfNoPeerCert = validate_option(fail_if_no_peer_cert,
+ proplists:get_value(fail_if_no_peer_cert, Opts, false)),
+
{Verify, FailIfNoPeerCert, CaCertDefault} =
%% Handle 0, 1, 2 for backwards compatibility
case proplists:get_value(verify, Opts, verify_none) of
@@ -521,9 +535,7 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role) ->
verify_none ->
{verify_none, false, ca_cert_default(verify_none, Role)};
verify_peer ->
- {verify_peer, proplists:get_value(fail_if_no_peer_cert,
- Opts, false),
- ca_cert_default(verify_peer, Role)};
+ {verify_peer, UserFailIfNoPeerCert, ca_cert_default(verify_peer, Role)};
Value ->
throw({error, {eoptions, {verify, Value}}})
end,
@@ -534,28 +546,31 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role) ->
versions = handle_option(versions, Opts, []),
verify = validate_option(verify, Verify),
verify_fun = handle_option(verify_fun, Opts, VerifyFun),
- fail_if_no_peer_cert = validate_option(fail_if_no_peer_cert,
- FailIfNoPeerCert),
+ fail_if_no_peer_cert = FailIfNoPeerCert,
verify_client_once = handle_option(verify_client_once, Opts, false),
+ validate_extensions_fun = handle_option(validate_extensions_fun, Opts, undefined),
depth = handle_option(depth, Opts, 1),
certfile = CertFile,
keyfile = handle_option(keyfile, Opts, CertFile),
key = handle_option(key, Opts, undefined),
password = handle_option(password, Opts, ""),
cacertfile = handle_option(cacertfile, Opts, CaCertDefault),
+ dhfile = handle_option(dhfile, Opts, undefined),
ciphers = handle_option(ciphers, Opts, []),
%% Server side option
reuse_session = handle_option(reuse_session, Opts, ReuseSessionFun),
reuse_sessions = handle_option(reuse_sessions, Opts, true),
+ renegotiate_at = handle_option(renegotiate_at, Opts, ?DEFAULT_RENEGOTIATE_AT),
debug = handle_option(debug, Opts, [])
},
CbInfo = proplists:get_value(cb_info, Opts, {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed}),
- SslOptions = [versions, verify, verify_fun,
+ SslOptions = [versions, verify, verify_fun, validate_extensions_fun,
+ fail_if_no_peer_cert, verify_client_once,
depth, certfile, keyfile,
- key, password, cacertfile, ciphers,
+ key, password, cacertfile, dhfile, ciphers,
debug, reuse_session, reuse_sessions, ssl_imp,
- cd_info],
+ cb_info, renegotiate_at],
SockOpts = lists:foldl(fun(Key, PropList) ->
proplists:delete(Key, PropList)
@@ -585,6 +600,9 @@ validate_option(fail_if_no_peer_cert, Value)
validate_option(verify_client_once, Value)
when Value == true; Value == false ->
Value;
+
+validate_option(validate_extensions_fun, Value) when Value == undefined; is_function(Value) ->
+ Value;
validate_option(depth, Value) when is_integer(Value),
Value >= 0, Value =< 255->
Value;
@@ -605,11 +623,17 @@ validate_option(cacertfile, undefined) ->
"";
validate_option(cacertfile, Value) when is_list(Value), Value =/= "" ->
Value;
+validate_option(dhfile, undefined = Value) ->
+ Value;
+validate_option(dhfile, Value) when is_list(Value), Value =/= "" ->
+ Value;
validate_option(ciphers, Value) when is_list(Value) ->
Version = ssl_record:highest_protocol_version([]),
try cipher_suites(Version, Value)
catch
exit:_ ->
+ throw({error, {eoptions, {ciphers, Value}}});
+ error:_->
throw({error, {eoptions, {ciphers, Value}}})
end;
validate_option(reuse_session, Value) when is_function(Value) ->
@@ -617,6 +641,9 @@ validate_option(reuse_session, Value) when is_function(Value) ->
validate_option(reuse_sessions, Value) when Value == true;
Value == false ->
Value;
+validate_option(renegotiate_at, Value) when is_integer(Value) ->
+ min(Value, ?DEFAULT_RENEGOTIATE_AT);
+
validate_option(debug, Value) when is_list(Value); Value == true ->
Value;
validate_option(Opt, Value) ->
@@ -628,7 +655,7 @@ validate_versions([Version | Rest], Versions) when Version == 'tlsv1.1';
Version == tlsv1;
Version == sslv3 ->
validate_versions(Rest, Versions);
-validate_versions(Ver, Versions) ->
+validate_versions([Ver| _], Versions) ->
throw({error, {eoptions, {Ver, {versions, Versions}}}}).
validate_inet_option(mode, Value)
@@ -832,6 +859,11 @@ version() ->
Vsns
end,
{ok, {SSLVsn, CompVsn, LibVsn}}.
+
+min(N,M) when N < M ->
+ N;
+min(_, M) ->
+ M.
%% Only used to remove exit messages from old ssl
%% First is a nonsense clause to provide some
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
index d97b61a5ce..686e90a70c 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
-%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2009. All Rights Reserved.
-%%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2010. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%%
+%%
%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
%% under the License.
-%%
+%%
%% %CopyrightEnd%
%%
@@ -29,10 +29,12 @@
-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
-include("ssl_debug.hrl").
+-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
-export([trusted_cert_and_path/3,
certificate_chain/2,
- file_to_certificats/1]).
+ file_to_certificats/1,
+ validate_extensions/6]).
%%====================================================================
%% Internal application API
@@ -87,6 +89,30 @@ file_to_certificats(File) ->
{ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(File),
[Bin || {cert, Bin, not_encrypted} <- List].
+
+%% Validates ssl/tls specific extensions
+validate_extensions([], ValidationState, UnknownExtensions, _, AccErr, _) ->
+ {UnknownExtensions, ValidationState, AccErr};
+
+validate_extensions([#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-extKeyUsage',
+ extnValue = KeyUse,
+ critical = true} | Rest],
+ ValidationState, UnknownExtensions, Verify, AccErr0, Role) ->
+ case is_valid_extkey_usage(KeyUse, Role) of
+ true ->
+ validate_extensions(Rest, ValidationState, UnknownExtensions,
+ Verify, AccErr0, Role);
+ false ->
+ AccErr =
+ not_valid_extension({bad_cert, invalid_ext_key_usage}, Verify, AccErr0),
+ validate_extensions(Rest, ValidationState, UnknownExtensions, Verify, AccErr, Role)
+ end;
+
+validate_extensions([Extension | Rest], ValidationState, UnknownExtensions,
+ Verify, AccErr, Role) ->
+ validate_extensions(Rest, ValidationState, [Extension | UnknownExtensions],
+ Verify, AccErr, Role).
+
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -154,3 +180,18 @@ not_valid(Alert, true, _) ->
throw(Alert);
not_valid(_, false, {ErlCert, Path}) ->
{ErlCert, Path, [{bad_cert, unknown_ca}]}.
+
+is_valid_extkey_usage(KeyUse, client) ->
+ %% Client wants to verify server
+ is_valid_key_usage(KeyUse,?'id-kp-serverAuth');
+is_valid_extkey_usage(KeyUse, server) ->
+ %% Server wants to verify client
+ is_valid_key_usage(KeyUse, ?'id-kp-clientAuth').
+
+is_valid_key_usage(KeyUse, Use) ->
+ lists:member(Use, KeyUse).
+
+not_valid_extension(Error, true, _) ->
+ throw(Error);
+not_valid_extension(Error, false, AccErrors) ->
+ [Error | AccErrors].
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
index 4847fd278d..8ff001b172 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
@@ -41,15 +41,14 @@
%% Internal application API
-export([send/2, send/3, recv/3, connect/7, accept/6, close/1, shutdown/2,
new_user/2, get_opts/2, set_opts/2, info/1, session_info/1,
- peer_certificate/1,
- sockname/1, peername/1]).
+ peer_certificate/1, sockname/1, peername/1, renegotiation/1]).
%% Called by ssl_connection_sup
-export([start_link/7]).
%% gen_fsm callbacks
--export([init/1, hello/2, certify/2, cipher/2, connection/2, connection/3, abbreviated/2,
- handle_event/3,
+-export([init/1, hello/2, certify/2, cipher/2, connection/2,
+ abbreviated/2, handle_event/3,
handle_sync_event/4, handle_info/3, terminate/3, code_change/4]).
-record(state, {
@@ -78,17 +77,25 @@
client_certificate_requested = false,
key_algorithm, % atom as defined by cipher_suite
public_key_info, % PKIX: {Algorithm, PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}
- private_key, % PKIX: 'RSAPrivateKey'
- diffie_hellman_params, %
+ private_key, % PKIX: #'RSAPrivateKey'{}
+ diffie_hellman_params, % PKIX: #'DHParameter'{} relevant for server side
+ diffie_hellman_keys, % {PublicKey, PrivateKey}
premaster_secret, %
cert_db_ref, % ets_table()
from, % term(), where to reply
bytes_to_read, % integer(), # bytes to read in passive mode
user_data_buffer, % binary()
%% tls_buffer, % Keeps a lookahead one packet if available
- log_alert % boolan()
+ log_alert, % boolean()
+ renegotiation, % {boolean(), From | internal | peer}
+ recv_during_renegotiation, %boolean()
+ send_queue % queue()
}).
+-define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS,
+ #'DHParameter'{prime = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME,
+ base = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR}).
+
%%====================================================================
%% Internal application API
%%====================================================================
@@ -99,15 +106,15 @@
%% Description:
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
send(Pid, Data) ->
- sync_send_event(Pid, {application_data, erlang:iolist_to_binary(Data)}, infinity).
+ sync_send_all_state_event(Pid, {application_data, erlang:iolist_to_binary(Data)}, infinity).
send(Pid, Data, Timeout) ->
- sync_send_event(Pid, {application_data, erlang:iolist_to_binary(Data)}, Timeout).
+ sync_send_all_state_event(Pid, {application_data, erlang:iolist_to_binary(Data)}, Timeout).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Function:
%%
%% Description:
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-recv(Pid, Length, Timeout) -> % TODO: Prio with renegotiate?
+recv(Pid, Length, Timeout) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(Pid, {recv, Length}, Timeout).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Function:
@@ -209,6 +216,14 @@ session_info(ConnectionPid) ->
peer_certificate(ConnectionPid) ->
sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, peer_certificate).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Function:
+%%
+%% Description:
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+renegotiation(ConnectionPid) ->
+ sync_send_all_state_event(ConnectionPid, renegotiate).
+
%%====================================================================
%% ssl_connection_sup API
%%====================================================================
@@ -224,7 +239,6 @@ start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) ->
gen_fsm:start_link(?MODULE, [Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options,
User, CbInfo], []).
-
%%====================================================================
%% gen_fsm callbacks
%%====================================================================
@@ -243,12 +257,13 @@ init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOpts, _} = Options,
Hashes0 = ssl_handshake:init_hashes(),
try ssl_init(SSLOpts, Role) of
- {ok, Ref, CacheRef, OwnCert, Key} ->
+ {ok, Ref, CacheRef, OwnCert, Key, DHParams} ->
State = State0#state{tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes0,
own_cert = OwnCert,
cert_db_ref = Ref,
session_cache = CacheRef,
- private_key = Key},
+ private_key = Key,
+ diffie_hellman_params = DHParams},
{ok, hello, State}
catch
throw:Error ->
@@ -261,18 +276,20 @@ init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOpts, _} = Options,
%% {next_state, NextStateName,
%% NextState, Timeout} |
%% {stop, Reason, NewState}
-%% Description:There should be one instance of this function for each possible
-%% state name. Whenever a gen_fsm receives an event sent using
-%% gen_fsm:send_event/2, the instance of this function with the same name as
-%% the current state name StateName is called to handle the event. It is also
-%% called if a timeout occurs.
+%%
+%% Description:There should be one instance of this function for each
+%% possible state name. Whenever a gen_fsm receives an event sent
+%% using gen_fsm:send_event/2, the instance of this function with the
+%% same name as the current state name StateName is called to handle
+%% the event. It is also called if a timeout occurs.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
hello(socket_control, #state{host = Host, port = Port, role = client,
ssl_options = SslOpts,
transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket,
connection_states = ConnectionStates}
= State0) ->
- Hello = ssl_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, SslOpts),
+ Hello = ssl_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port,
+ ConnectionStates, SslOpts),
Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version,
Hashes0 = ssl_handshake:init_hashes(),
{BinMsg, CS2, Hashes1} =
@@ -289,7 +306,7 @@ hello(socket_control, #state{host = Host, port = Port, role = client,
hello(socket_control, #state{role = server} = State) ->
{next_state, hello, next_record(State)};
-hello(hello, #state{role = client} = State) ->
+hello(#hello_request{}, #state{role = client} = State) ->
{next_state, hello, State};
hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
@@ -301,13 +318,14 @@ hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
host = Host, port = Port,
session_cache = Cache,
session_cache_cb = CacheCb} = State0) ->
+
{Version, NewId, ConnectionStates1} =
ssl_handshake:hello(Hello, ConnectionStates0),
{KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} =
ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
- PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion),
+ PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion, KeyAlgorithm),
State = State0#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm,
negotiated_version = Version,
@@ -358,47 +376,45 @@ hello(Hello = #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion},
abbreviated(socket_control, #state{role = server} = State) ->
{next_state, abbreviated, State};
-abbreviated(hello, State) ->
+abbreviated(#hello_request{}, State) ->
{next_state, certify, State};
abbreviated(Finished = #finished{},
#state{role = server,
negotiated_version = Version,
tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes,
- session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
- from = From} = State) ->
+ session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}} =
+ State0) ->
case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, client,
MasterSecret, Hashes) of
verified ->
- gen_fsm:reply(From, connected),
- {next_state, connection, next_record_if_active(State)};
- #alert{} = Alert ->
- handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, abbreviated, State),
- {stop, normal, State}
+ State = ack_connection(State0),
+ next_state_connection(State);
+ #alert{} = Alert ->
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, abbreviated, State0),
+ {stop, normal, State0}
end;
abbreviated(Finished = #finished{},
#state{role = client, tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes0,
session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
- from = From,
- negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
+ negotiated_version = Version} = State0) ->
case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished, server,
MasterSecret, Hashes0) of
verified ->
- {ConnectionStates, Hashes} = finalize_client_handshake(State),
- gen_fsm:reply(From, connected),
- {next_state, connection,
- next_record_if_active(State#state{tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes,
- connection_states =
- ConnectionStates})};
+ {ConnectionStates, Hashes} = finalize_client_handshake(State0),
+ State = ack_connection(State0),
+ next_state_connection(State#state{tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes,
+ connection_states =
+ ConnectionStates});
#alert{} = Alert ->
- handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, abbreviated, State),
- {stop, normal, State}
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, abbreviated, State0),
+ {stop, normal, State0}
end.
certify(socket_control, #state{role = server} = State) ->
{next_state, certify, State};
-certify(hello, State) ->
+certify(#hello_request{}, State) ->
{next_state, certify, State};
certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = []},
@@ -415,52 +431,71 @@ certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = []},
ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer,
fail_if_no_peer_cert = false}} =
State) ->
- {next_state, certify, next_record(State#state{client_certificate_requested = false})};
+ {next_state, certify,
+ next_record(State#state{client_certificate_requested = false})};
certify(#certificate{} = Cert,
- #state{session = Session,
- negotiated_version = Version,
+ #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+ role = Role,
cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
- ssl_options = Opts} = State0) ->
+ ssl_options = Opts} = State) ->
case ssl_handshake:certify(Cert, CertDbRef, Opts#ssl_options.depth,
Opts#ssl_options.verify,
- Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun) of
+ Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun,
+ Opts#ssl_options.validate_extensions_fun, Role) of
{PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo} ->
- State = State0#state{session =
- Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert},
- public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo,
- client_certificate_requested = false
- },
- {next_state, certify, next_record(State)};
+ handle_peer_cert(PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo,
+ State#state{client_certificate_requested = false});
#alert{} = Alert ->
- handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify_certificate, State0),
- {stop, normal, State0}
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify_certificate, State),
+ {stop, normal, State}
end;
certify(#server_key_exchange{} = KeyExchangeMsg,
- #state{role = client,
- key_algorithm = Alg} = State)
- when Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dh_anon; Alg == krb5 ->
- NewState = handle_server_key(KeyExchangeMsg, State),
- {next_state, certify, NewState};
+ #state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version,
+ key_algorithm = Alg} = State0)
+ when Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dhe_rsa ->%%Not imp:Alg == dh_anon;Alg == krb5 ->
+ case handle_server_key(KeyExchangeMsg, State0) of
+ #state{} = State ->
+ {next_state, certify, next_record(State)};
+ #alert{} = Alert ->
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify_server_keyexchange,
+ State0),
+ {stop, normal, State0}
+ end;
certify(#server_key_exchange{},
State = #state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version,
key_algorithm = Alg})
- when Alg == rsa; Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa ->
+ when Alg == rsa; Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa ->
Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE),
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify_server_key_exchange, State),
{stop, normal, State};
-certify(KeyExchangeMsg = #server_key_exchange{}, State =
- #state{role = server}) ->
- NewState = handle_clinet_key(KeyExchangeMsg, State),
- {next_state, cipher, NewState};
-
certify(#certificate_request{}, State) ->
NewState = State#state{client_certificate_requested = true},
{next_state, certify, next_record(NewState)};
+
+%% Master secret was determined with help of server-key exchange msg
+certify(#server_hello_done{},
+ #state{session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} = Session,
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+ negotiated_version = Version,
+ premaster_secret = undefined,
+ role = client} = State0) ->
+ case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, Session,
+ ConnectionStates0, client) of
+ {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates1} ->
+ State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1},
+ client_certify_and_key_exchange(State);
+ #alert{} = Alert ->
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version,
+ certify_server_hello_done, State0),
+ {stop, normal, State0}
+ end;
+
+%% Master secret is calculated from premaster_secret
certify(#server_hello_done{},
#state{session = Session0,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
@@ -487,7 +522,8 @@ certify(#client_key_exchange{},
negotiated_version = Version}) ->
%% We expect a certificate here
Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE),
- handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify_server_waiting_certificate, State),
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version,
+ certify_server_waiting_certificate, State),
{stop, normal, State};
@@ -517,11 +553,41 @@ certify(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify_client_key_exchange,
State0),
{stop, normal, State0}
+ end;
+
+certify(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = #client_diffie_hellman_public{
+ dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey}},
+ #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+ diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{prime = P,
+ base = G},
+ diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey},
+ role = Role,
+ session = Session,
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
+
+ PMpint = crypto:mpint(P),
+ GMpint = crypto:mpint(G),
+ PremasterSecret = crypto:dh_compute_key(mpint_binary(ClientPublicDhKey),
+ ServerDhPrivateKey,
+ [PMpint, GMpint]),
+
+ case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret,
+ ConnectionStates0, Role) of
+ {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
+ State = State0#state{session =
+ Session#session{master_secret
+ = MasterSecret},
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates},
+ {next_state, cipher, next_record(State)};
+ #alert{} = Alert ->
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version,
+ certify_client_key_exchange, State0),
+ {stop, normal, State0}
end.
cipher(socket_control, #state{role = server} = State) ->
{next_state, cipher, State};
-cipher(hello, State) ->
+cipher(#hello_request{}, State) ->
{next_state, cipher, State};
cipher(#certificate_verify{signature = Signature},
@@ -543,43 +609,41 @@ cipher(#certificate_verify{signature = Signature},
end;
cipher(#finished{} = Finished,
- State = #state{from = From,
- negotiated_version = Version,
- host = Host,
- port = Port,
- role = Role,
- session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}
- = Session0,
- tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes}) ->
-
+ #state{negotiated_version = Version,
+ host = Host,
+ port = Port,
+ role = Role,
+ session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}
+ = Session0,
+ tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes} = State0) ->
+
case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(Version, Finished,
opposite_role(Role),
MasterSecret, Hashes) of
verified ->
- gen_fsm:reply(From, connected),
+ State = ack_connection(State0),
Session = register_session(Role, Host, Port, Session0),
case Role of
client ->
- {next_state, connection,
- next_record_if_active(State#state{session = Session})};
+ next_state_connection(State#state{session = Session});
server ->
{NewConnectionStates, NewHashes} =
finalize_server_handshake(State#state{
session = Session}),
- NewState =
- State#state{connection_states = NewConnectionStates,
- session = Session,
- tls_handshake_hashes = NewHashes},
- {next_state, connection, next_record_if_active(NewState)}
+ next_state_connection(State#state{connection_states =
+ NewConnectionStates,
+ session = Session,
+ tls_handshake_hashes =
+ NewHashes})
end;
#alert{} = Alert ->
- handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, cipher, State),
- {stop, normal, State}
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, cipher, State0),
+ {stop, normal, State0}
end.
connection(socket_control, #state{role = server} = State) ->
{next_state, connection, State};
-connection(hello, State = #state{host = Host, port = Port,
+connection(#hello_request{}, State = #state{host = Host, port = Port,
socket = Socket,
ssl_options = SslOpts,
negotiated_version = Version,
@@ -592,42 +656,11 @@ connection(hello, State = #state{host = Host, port = Port,
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates1, Hashes1} =
encode_handshake(Hello, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hashes0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
- {next_state, hello, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
- tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes1}}.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Function:
-%% state_name(Event, From, State) -> {next_state, NextStateName, NextState} |
-%% {next_state, NextStateName,
-%% NextState, Timeout} |
-%% {reply, Reply, NextStateName, NextState}|
-%% {reply, Reply, NextStateName,
-%% NextState, Timeout} |
-%% {stop, Reason, NewState}|
-%% {stop, Reason, Reply, NewState}
-%% Description: There should be one instance of this function for each
-%% possible state name. Whenever a gen_fsm receives an event sent using
-%% gen_fsm:sync_send_event/2,3, the instance of this function with the same
-%% name as the current state name StateName is called to handle the event.
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-connection({application_data, Data0}, _From,
- State = #state{socket = Socket,
- negotiated_version = Version,
- transport_cb = Transport,
- connection_states = ConnectionStates0}) ->
- %% We should look into having a worker process to do this to
- %% parallize send and receive decoding and not block the receiver
- %% if sending is overloading the socket.
- try
- Data = encode_packet(Data0, State#state.socket_options),
- {Msgs, ConnectionStates1} = encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0),
- Result = Transport:send(Socket, Msgs),
- {reply, Result,
- connection, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}}
-
- catch throw:Error ->
- {reply, Error, connection, State}
- end.
+ {next_state, hello, next_record(State#state{connection_states =
+ ConnectionStates1,
+ tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes1})};
+connection(#client_hello{} = Hello, #state{role = server} = State) ->
+ hello(Hello, State).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Function:
@@ -642,22 +675,37 @@ connection({application_data, Data0}, _From,
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
handle_event(#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data},
StateName,
- State = #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg,
- tls_handshake_buffer = Buf0,
- negotiated_version = Version}) ->
+ State0 = #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg,
+ tls_handshake_buffer = Buf0,
+ negotiated_version = Version}) ->
Handle =
- fun({Packet, Raw}, {next_state, SName, AS=#state{tls_handshake_hashes=Hs0}}) ->
+ fun({#hello_request{} = Packet, _}, {next_state, connection = SName, State}) ->
+ %% This message should not be included in handshake
+ %% message hashes. Starts new handshake (renegotiation)
+ Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_hashes(),
+ ?MODULE:SName(Packet, State#state{tls_handshake_hashes=Hs0,
+ renegotiation = {true, peer}});
+ ({#hello_request{} = Packet, _}, {next_state, SName, State}) ->
+ %% This message should not be included in handshake
+ %% message hashes. Already in negotiation so it will be ignored!
+ ?MODULE:SName(Packet, State);
+ ({#client_hello{} = Packet, Raw}, {next_state, connection = SName, State}) ->
+ Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_hashes(),
+ Hs1 = ssl_handshake:update_hashes(Hs0, Raw),
+ ?MODULE:SName(Packet, State#state{tls_handshake_hashes=Hs1,
+ renegotiation = {true, peer}});
+ ({Packet, Raw}, {next_state, SName, State = #state{tls_handshake_hashes=Hs0}}) ->
Hs1 = ssl_handshake:update_hashes(Hs0, Raw),
- ?MODULE:SName(Packet, AS#state{tls_handshake_hashes=Hs1});
+ ?MODULE:SName(Packet, State#state{tls_handshake_hashes=Hs1});
(_, StopState) -> StopState
end,
try
{Packets, Buf} = ssl_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Data,Buf0, KeyAlg,Version),
- Start = {next_state, StateName, State#state{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf}},
+ Start = {next_state, StateName, State0#state{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf}},
lists:foldl(Handle, Start, Packets)
catch throw:#alert{} = Alert ->
- handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State),
- {stop, normal, State}
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0),
+ {stop, normal, State0}
end;
handle_event(#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data},
@@ -686,7 +734,8 @@ handle_event(#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) ->
{next_state, StateName, State};
handle_event(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, connection,
- #state{from = From, user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, log_alert = Log,
+ #state{from = From, user_application = {_Mon, Pid},
+ log_alert = Log,
host = Host, port = Port, session = Session,
role = Role, socket_options = Opts} = State) ->
invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session),
@@ -712,11 +761,21 @@ handle_event(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert,
_, #state{from = From, role = Role} = State) ->
alert_user(From, Alert, Role),
{stop, normal, State};
-handle_event(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName,
+
+handle_event(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName,
+ #state{log_alert = Log, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) ->
+ log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
+ {stop, normal, State};
+
+handle_event(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName,
+ #state{log_alert = Log, renegotiation = {true, From}} = State) ->
+ log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
+ gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}),
+ {next_state, connection, next_record(State)};
+
+handle_event(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?USER_CANCELED} = Alert, StateName,
#state{log_alert = Log} = State) ->
log_alert(Log, StateName, Alert),
-%%TODO: Could be user_canceled or no_negotiation should the latter be
- %% treated as fatal?!
{next_state, StateName, next_record(State)}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -734,6 +793,43 @@ handle_event(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName,
%% gen_fsm:sync_send_all_state_event/2,3, this function is called to handle
%% the event.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+handle_sync_event({application_data, Data0}, From, connection,
+ #state{socket = Socket,
+ negotiated_version = Version,
+ transport_cb = Transport,
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+ send_queue = SendQueue,
+ socket_options = SockOpts,
+ ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}}
+ = State) ->
+ %% We should look into having a worker process to do this to
+ %% parallize send and receive decoding and not block the receiver
+ %% if sending is overloading the socket.
+ try
+ Data = encode_packet(Data0, SockOpts),
+ case encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of
+ {Msgs, [], ConnectionStates} ->
+ Result = Transport:send(Socket, Msgs),
+ {reply, Result,
+ connection, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}};
+ {Msgs, RestData, ConnectionStates} ->
+ if
+ Msgs =/= [] ->
+ Transport:send(Socket, Msgs);
+ true ->
+ ok
+ end,
+ renegotiate(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+ send_queue = queue:in_r({From, RestData}, SendQueue),
+ renegotiation = {true, internal}})
+ end
+ catch throw:Error ->
+ {reply, Error, connection, State}
+ end;
+handle_sync_event({application_data, Data}, From, StateName,
+ #state{send_queue = Queue} = State) ->
+ %% In renegotiation priorities handshake, send data when handshake is finished
+ {next_state, StateName, State#state{send_queue = queue:in({From, Data}, Queue)}};
handle_sync_event(started, From, StateName, State) ->
{next_state, StateName, State#state{from = From}};
@@ -750,23 +846,14 @@ handle_sync_event({shutdown, How}, From, StateName,
{stop, normal, Error, State#state{from = From}}
end;
-%% TODO: men vad g�r next_record om det �r t.ex. renegotiate? kanske
-%% inte bra... t�l att t�nkas p�!
-handle_sync_event({recv, N}, From, StateName,
- State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}) ->
- State1 = State0#state{bytes_to_read = N, from = From},
- case Buffer of
- <<>> ->
- State = next_record(State1),
- {next_state, StateName, State};
- _ ->
- case application_data(<<>>, State1) of
- Stop = {stop, _, _} ->
- Stop;
- State ->
- {next_state, StateName, State}
- end
- end;
+handle_sync_event({recv, N}, From, connection = StateName, State0) ->
+ passive_receive(State0#state{bytes_to_read = N, from = From}, StateName);
+
+%% Doing renegotiate wait with handling request until renegotiate is
+%% finished. Will be handled by next_state_connection/1.
+handle_sync_event({recv, N}, From, StateName, State) ->
+ {next_state, StateName, State#state{bytes_to_read = N, from = From,
+ recv_during_renegotiation = true}};
handle_sync_event({new_user, User}, _From, StateName,
State =#state{user_application = {OldMon, _}}) ->
@@ -814,6 +901,12 @@ handle_sync_event({set_opts, Opts0}, _From, StateName,
end
end;
+handle_sync_event(renegotiate, From, connection, State) ->
+ renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, From}});
+
+handle_sync_event(renegotiate, _, StateName, State) ->
+ {reply, {error, already_renegotiating}, StateName, State};
+
handle_sync_event(info, _, StateName,
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
session = #session{cipher_suite = Suite}} = State) ->
@@ -834,7 +927,6 @@ handle_sync_event(peer_certificate, _, StateName,
= State) ->
{reply, {ok, Cert}, StateName, State}.
-
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Function:
%% handle_info(Info,StateName,State)-> {next_state, NextStateName, NextState}|
@@ -863,34 +955,6 @@ handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName, State =
{stop, normal, State}
end;
-%% %% This is the code for {packet,ssl} removed because it was slower
-%% %% than handling it in erlang.
-%% handle_info(Data = #ssl_tls{}, StateName,
-%% State = #state{tls_buffer = Buffer,
-%% socket = Socket,
-%% connection_states = ConnectionStates0}) ->
-%% case Buffer of
-%% buffer ->
-%% {next_state, StateName, State#state{tls_buffer = [Data]}};
-%% continue ->
-%% inet:setopts(Socket, [{active,once}]),
-%% {Plain, ConnectionStates} =
-%% ssl_record:decode_cipher_text(Data, ConnectionStates0),
-%% gen_fsm:send_all_state_event(self(), Plain),
-%% {next_state, StateName,
-%% State#state{tls_buffer = buffer,
-%% connection_states = ConnectionStates}};
-%% List when is_list(List) ->
-%% {next_state, StateName,
-%% State#state{tls_buffer = Buffer ++ [Data]}}
-%% end;
-
-%% handle_info(CloseMsg = {_, Socket}, StateName0,
-%% #state{socket = Socket,tls_buffer = [Msg]} = State0) ->
-%% %% Hmm we have a ssl_tls msg buffered, handle that first
-%% %% and it proberbly is a close alert
-%% {next_state, StateName0, State0#state{tls_buffer=[Msg,{ssl_close,CloseMsg}]}};
-
handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, _StateName,
#state{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag,
negotiated_version = Version, host = Host,
@@ -924,17 +988,23 @@ handle_info(A, StateName, State) ->
%% necessary cleaning up. When it returns, the gen_fsm terminates with
%% Reason. The return value is ignored.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-terminate(_Reason, connection, _S=#state{negotiated_version = Version,
+terminate(_Reason, connection, #state{negotiated_version = Version,
connection_states = ConnectionStates,
transport_cb = Transport,
- socket = Socket}) ->
+ socket = Socket, send_queue = SendQueue,
+ renegotiation = Renegotiate}) ->
+ notify_senders(SendQueue),
+ notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate),
{BinAlert, _} = encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING,?CLOSE_NOTIFY),
Version, ConnectionStates),
Transport:send(Socket, BinAlert),
Transport:close(Socket);
-terminate(_Reason, _StateName, _S=#state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket}) ->
- Transport:close(Socket),
- ok.
+terminate(_Reason, _StateName, #state{transport_cb = Transport,
+ socket = Socket, send_queue = SendQueue,
+ renegotiation = Renegotiate}) ->
+ notify_senders(SendQueue),
+ notify_renegotiater(Renegotiate),
+ Transport:close(Socket).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Function:
@@ -969,8 +1039,8 @@ ssl_init(SslOpts, Role) ->
PrivateKey =
init_private_key(SslOpts#ssl_options.key, SslOpts#ssl_options.keyfile,
SslOpts#ssl_options.password, Role),
- ?DBG_TERM(PrivateKey),
- {ok, CertDbRef, CacheRef, OwnCert, PrivateKey}.
+ DHParams = init_diffie_hellman(SslOpts#ssl_options.dhfile, Role),
+ {ok, CertDbRef, CacheRef, OwnCert, PrivateKey, DHParams}.
init_certificates(#ssl_options{cacertfile = CACertFile,
certfile = CertFile}, Role) ->
@@ -1005,12 +1075,14 @@ init_certificates(CertDbRef, CacheRef, CertFile, server) ->
catch
_E:{badmatch, _R={error,_}} ->
Report = io_lib:format("SSL: ~p: ~p:~p ~s~n ~p~n",
- [?LINE, _E,_R, CertFile, erlang:get_stacktrace()]),
+ [?LINE, _E,_R, CertFile,
+ erlang:get_stacktrace()]),
error_logger:error_report(Report),
throw(ecertfile);
_E:_R ->
Report = io_lib:format("SSL: ~p: ~p:~p ~s~n ~p~n",
- [?LINE, _E,_R, CertFile, erlang:get_stacktrace()]),
+ [?LINE, _E,_R, CertFile,
+ erlang:get_stacktrace()]),
error_logger:error_report(Report),
throw(ecertfile)
end.
@@ -1021,40 +1093,43 @@ init_private_key(undefined, KeyFile, Password, _) ->
try
{ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(KeyFile),
[Der] = [Der || Der = {PKey, _ , _} <- List,
- PKey =:= rsa_private_key orelse PKey =:= dsa_private_key],
+ PKey =:= rsa_private_key orelse
+ PKey =:= dsa_private_key],
{ok, Decoded} = public_key:decode_private_key(Der,Password),
Decoded
catch
_E:{badmatch, _R={error,_}} ->
Report = io_lib:format("SSL: ~p: ~p:~p ~s~n ~p~n",
- [?LINE, _E,_R, KeyFile, erlang:get_stacktrace()]),
+ [?LINE, _E,_R, KeyFile,
+ erlang:get_stacktrace()]),
error_logger:error_report(Report),
throw(ekeyfile);
_E:_R ->
Report = io_lib:format("SSL: ~p: ~p:~p ~s~n ~p~n",
- [?LINE, _E,_R, KeyFile, erlang:get_stacktrace()]),
+ [?LINE, _E,_R, KeyFile,
+ erlang:get_stacktrace()]),
error_logger:error_report(Report),
throw(ekeyfile)
end;
init_private_key(PrivateKey, _, _,_) ->
PrivateKey.
-send_event(FsmPid, Event) ->
- gen_fsm:send_event(FsmPid, Event).
-
-sync_send_event(FsmPid, Event, Timeout) ->
- try gen_fsm:sync_send_event(FsmPid, Event, Timeout) of
- Reply ->
- Reply
- catch
- exit:{noproc, _} ->
- {error, closed};
- exit:{timeout, _} ->
- {error, timeout};
- exit:{normal, _} ->
- {error, closed}
+init_diffie_hellman(_, client) ->
+ undefined;
+init_diffie_hellman(undefined, _) ->
+ ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS;
+init_diffie_hellman(DHParamFile, server) ->
+ {ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(DHParamFile),
+ case [Der || Der = {dh_params, _ , _} <- List] of
+ [Der] ->
+ {ok, Decoded} = public_key:decode_dhparams(Der),
+ Decoded;
+ [] ->
+ ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS
end.
+send_event(FsmPid, Event) ->
+ gen_fsm:send_event(FsmPid, Event).
send_all_state_event(FsmPid, Event) ->
@@ -1078,6 +1153,16 @@ sync_send_all_state_event(FsmPid, Event, Timeout) ->
alert_event(Alert) ->
send_all_state_event(self(), Alert).
+%% We do currently not support cipher suites that use fixed DH.
+%% If we want to implement that we should add a code
+%% here to extract DH parameters form cert.
+handle_peer_cert(PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo,
+ #state{session = Session} = State0) ->
+ State = State0#state{session =
+ Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert},
+ public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo},
+ {next_state, certify, next_record(State)}.
+
certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
transport_cb = Transport,
@@ -1111,9 +1196,8 @@ verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client,
ignore -> %% No key or cert or fixed_diffie_hellman
State;
Verified ->
- SigAlg = ssl_handshake:sig_alg(KeyAlg),
{BinVerified, ConnectionStates1, Hashes1} =
- encode_handshake(Verified, SigAlg, Version,
+ encode_handshake(Verified, KeyAlg, Version,
ConnectionStates0, Hashes0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinVerified),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
@@ -1140,8 +1224,10 @@ do_server_hello(Type, #state{negotiated_version = Version,
{_, ConnectionStates1} ->
State1 = State#state{connection_states=ConnectionStates1,
session = Session},
- {ConnectionStates, Hashes} = finalize_server_handshake(State1),
- Resumed = State1#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+ {ConnectionStates, Hashes} =
+ finalize_server_handshake(State1),
+ Resumed = State1#state{connection_states =
+ ConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes},
{next_state, abbreviated, next_record(Resumed)};
#alert{} = Alert ->
@@ -1252,14 +1338,15 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo} = State)
Algo == dh_rsa ->
State;
-key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_export} = State) ->
+%key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_export} = State) ->
%% TODO when the public key in the server certificate is
%% less than or equal to 512 bits in length dont send key_exchange
%% but do it otherwise
- State;
+% State;
key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
diffie_hellman_params = Params,
+ private_key = PrivateKey,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
negotiated_version = Version,
tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes0,
@@ -1270,26 +1357,28 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
Algo == dhe_dss_export;
Algo == dhe_rsa;
Algo == dhe_rsa_export ->
- Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, Params),
- {BinMsg, ConnectionStates1, Hashes1} =
- encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hashes0),
- Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
- State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
- tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes1};
-key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dh_anon,
- connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
- negotiated_version = Version,
- tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes0,
- socket = Socket,
- transport_cb = Transport
- } = State) ->
- Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, anonymous),
- {BinMsg, ConnectionStates1, Hashes1} =
+ Keys = public_key:gen_key(Params),
+ ConnectionState =
+ ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+ SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+ #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
+ server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+ Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, {dh, Keys, Params,
+ Algo, ClientRandom,
+ ServerRandom,
+ PrivateKey}),
+ {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Hashes1} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hashes0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
- State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
+ State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+ diffie_hellman_keys = Keys,
tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes1};
+
+
+%% key_algorithm = dh_anon is not supported. Should be by default disabled
+%% if support is implemented and then we need a key_exchange clause for it
+%% here.
key_exchange(#state{role = client,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
@@ -1309,17 +1398,33 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client,
key_exchange(#state{role = client,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
key_algorithm = Algorithm,
- public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo,
negotiated_version = Version,
- diffie_hellman_params = Params,
- own_cert = Cert,
+ diffie_hellman_keys = {DhPubKey, _},
socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes0} = State)
when Algorithm == dhe_dss;
Algorithm == dhe_dss_export;
Algorithm == dhe_rsa;
Algorithm == dhe_rsa_export ->
- Msg = dh_key_exchange(Cert, Params, PublicKeyInfo),
+ Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, {dh, DhPubKey}),
+ {BinMsg, ConnectionStates1, Hashes1} =
+ encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hashes0),
+ Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
+ State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
+ tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes1};
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = client,
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+ key_algorithm = Algorithm,
+ negotiated_version = Version,
+ client_certificate_requested = ClientCertReq,
+ own_cert = OwnCert,
+ diffie_hellman_keys = DhKeys,
+ socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
+ tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes0} = State)
+ when Algorithm == dh_dss;
+ Algorithm == dh_rsa ->
+ Msg = dh_key_exchange(OwnCert, DhKeys, ClientCertReq),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates1, Hashes1} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hashes0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
@@ -1334,17 +1439,19 @@ rsa_key_exchange(PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _})
ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client,
{premaster_secret, PremasterSecret,
PublicKeyInfo});
-
rsa_key_exchange(_, _) ->
throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
-dh_key_exchange(OwnCert, Params, PublicKeyInfo) ->
+dh_key_exchange(OwnCert, DhKeys, true) ->
case public_key:pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(OwnCert) of
true ->
ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, fixed_diffie_hellman);
false ->
- ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, {dh, Params, PublicKeyInfo})
- end.
+ {DhPubKey, _} = DhKeys,
+ ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, {dh, DhPubKey})
+ end;
+dh_key_exchange(_, {DhPubKey, _}, false) ->
+ ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, {dh, DhPubKey}).
request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer},
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
@@ -1378,7 +1485,8 @@ finalize_client_handshake(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0}
finalize_server_handshake(State) ->
ConnectionStates0 = cipher_protocol(State),
ConnectionStates =
- ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, write),
+ ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0,
+ write),
finished(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}).
cipher_protocol(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
@@ -1386,7 +1494,8 @@ cipher_protocol(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
negotiated_version = Version,
transport_cb = Transport}) ->
{BinChangeCipher, NewConnectionStates} =
- encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates),
+ encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{},
+ Version, ConnectionStates),
Transport:send(Socket, BinChangeCipher),
NewConnectionStates.
@@ -1402,10 +1511,66 @@ finished(#state{role = Role, socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version,
Transport:send(Socket, BinFinished),
{NewConnectionStates, NewHashes}.
-handle_server_key(_KeyExchangeMsg, State) ->
- State.
-handle_clinet_key(_KeyExchangeMsg, State) ->
- State.
+handle_server_key(
+ #server_key_exchange{params =
+ #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,
+ dh_g = G,
+ dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey},
+ signed_params = Signed},
+ #state{session = Session, negotiated_version = Version, role = Role,
+ public_key_info = PubKeyInfo,
+ key_algorithm = KeyAlgo,
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
+
+ PLen = size(P),
+ GLen = size(G),
+ YLen = size(ServerPublicDhKey),
+
+ ConnectionState =
+ ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+ SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
+ #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
+ server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+ Hash = ssl_handshake:server_key_exchange_hash(KeyAlgo,
+ <<ClientRandom/binary,
+ ServerRandom/binary,
+ ?UINT16(PLen), P/binary,
+ ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary,
+ ?UINT16(YLen),
+ ServerPublicDhKey/binary>>),
+
+ case verify_dh_params(Signed, Hash, PubKeyInfo) of
+ true ->
+ PMpint = mpint_binary(P),
+ GMpint = mpint_binary(G),
+ Keys = {_, ClientDhPrivateKey} =
+ crypto:dh_generate_key([PMpint,GMpint]),
+ PremasterSecret =
+ crypto:dh_compute_key(mpint_binary(ServerPublicDhKey),
+ ClientDhPrivateKey, [PMpint, GMpint]),
+ case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret,
+ ConnectionStates0, Role) of
+ {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
+ State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys,
+ session =
+ Session#session{master_secret
+ = MasterSecret},
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates};
+ #alert{} = Alert ->
+ Alert
+ end;
+ false ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+ end.
+
+verify_dh_params(Signed, Hash, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyparams}) ->
+ case public_key:decrypt_public(Signed, PubKey,
+ [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) of
+ Hash ->
+ true;
+ _ ->
+ false
+ end.
encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
?DBG_TERM(Alert),
@@ -1442,8 +1607,8 @@ encode_size_packet(Bin, Size, Max) ->
false -> <<Len:Size, Bin/binary>>
end.
-encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
- ssl_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates).
+encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt) ->
+ ssl_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt).
decode_alerts(Bin) ->
decode_alerts(Bin, []).
@@ -1454,6 +1619,20 @@ decode_alerts(<<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description), Rest/binary>>, Acc) ->
decode_alerts(<<>>, Acc) ->
lists:reverse(Acc, []).
+passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) ->
+ case Buffer of
+ <<>> ->
+ State = next_record(State0),
+ {next_state, StateName, State};
+ _ ->
+ case application_data(<<>>, State0) of
+ Stop = {stop, _, _} ->
+ Stop;
+ State ->
+ {next_state, StateName, State}
+ end
+ end.
+
application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid},
socket_options = SOpts,
bytes_to_read = BytesToRead,
@@ -1504,19 +1683,49 @@ get_data(#socket_options{active=Active, packet=Raw}, BytesToRead, Buffer)
end;
get_data(#socket_options{packet=Type, packet_size=Size}, _, Buffer) ->
PacketOpts = [{packet_size, Size}],
- case erlang:decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts) of
+ case decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts) of
{more, _} ->
{ok, <<>>, Buffer};
Decoded ->
Decoded
end.
-deliver_app_data(SO = #socket_options{active=once}, Data, Pid, From) ->
- send_or_reply(once, Pid, From, format_reply(SO, Data)),
- SO#socket_options{active=false};
-deliver_app_data(SO= #socket_options{active=Active}, Data, Pid, From) ->
- send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_reply(SO, Data)),
- SO.
+decode_packet({http, headers}, Buffer, PacketOpts) ->
+ decode_packet(httph, Buffer, PacketOpts);
+decode_packet({http_bin, headers}, Buffer, PacketOpts) ->
+ decode_packet(httph_bin, Buffer, PacketOpts);
+decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts) ->
+ erlang:decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts).
+
+%% Just like with gen_tcp sockets, an ssl socket that has been configured with
+%% {packet, http} (or {packet, http_bin}) will automatically switch to expect
+%% HTTP headers after it sees a HTTP Request or HTTP Response line. We
+%% represent the current state as follows:
+%% #socket_options.packet =:= http: Expect a HTTP Request/Response line
+%% #socket_options.packet =:= {http, headers}: Expect HTTP Headers
+%% Note that if the user has explicitly configured the socket to expect
+%% HTTP headers using the {packet, httph} option, we don't do any automatic
+%% switching of states.
+deliver_app_data(SOpts = #socket_options{active=Active, packet=Type},
+ Data, Pid, From) ->
+ send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_reply(SOpts, Data)),
+ SO = case Data of
+ {P, _, _, _} when ((P =:= http_request) or (P =:= http_response)),
+ ((Type =:= http) or (Type =:= http_bin)) ->
+ SOpts#socket_options{packet={Type, headers}};
+ http_eoh when tuple_size(Type) =:= 2 ->
+ % End of headers - expect another Request/Response line
+ {Type1, headers} = Type,
+ SOpts#socket_options{packet=Type1};
+ _ ->
+ SOpts
+ end,
+ case Active of
+ once ->
+ SO#socket_options{active=false};
+ _ ->
+ SO
+ end.
format_reply(#socket_options{active=false, mode=Mode, header=Header}, Data) ->
{ok, format_reply(Mode, Header, Data)};
@@ -1557,34 +1766,6 @@ opposite_role(server) ->
send_user(Pid, Msg) ->
Pid ! Msg.
-%% %% This is the code for {packet,ssl} removed because it was slower
-%% %% than handling it in erlang.
-%% next_record(#state{socket = Socket,
-%% tls_buffer = [Msg|Rest],
-%% connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
-%% Buffer =
-%% case Rest of
-%% [] ->
-%% inet:setopts(Socket, [{active,once}]),
-%% buffer;
-%% _ -> Rest
-%% end,
-%% case Msg of
-%% #ssl_tls{} ->
-%% {Plain, ConnectionStates} =
-%% ssl_record:decode_cipher_text(Msg, ConnectionStates0),
-%% gen_fsm:send_all_state_event(self(), Plain),
-%% State#state{tls_buffer=Buffer, connection_states = ConnectionStates};
-%% {ssl_close, Msg} ->
-%% self() ! Msg,
-%% State#state{tls_buffer=Buffer}
-%% end;
-%% next_record(#state{socket = Socket, tls_buffer = undefined} = State) ->
-%% inet:setopts(Socket, [{active,once}]),
-%% State#state{tls_buffer=continue};
-%% next_record(State) ->
-%% State#state{tls_buffer=continue}.
-
next_record(#state{tls_cipher_texts = [], socket = Socket} = State) ->
inet:setopts(Socket, [{active,once}]),
State;
@@ -1594,13 +1775,57 @@ next_record(#state{tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest],
gen_fsm:send_all_state_event(self(), Plain),
State#state{tls_cipher_texts = Rest, connection_states = ConnStates}.
+
next_record_if_active(State =
#state{socket_options =
#socket_options{active = false}}) ->
State;
+
next_record_if_active(State) ->
next_record(State).
+next_state_connection(#state{send_queue = Queue0,
+ negotiated_version = Version,
+ socket = Socket,
+ transport_cb = Transport,
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+ ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}
+ } = State) ->
+ %% Send queued up data
+ case queue:out(Queue0) of
+ {{value, {From, Data}}, Queue} ->
+ case encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of
+ {Msgs, [], ConnectionStates} ->
+ Result = Transport:send(Socket, Msgs),
+ gen_fsm:reply(From, Result),
+ next_state_connection(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+ send_queue = Queue});
+ %% This is unlikely to happen. User configuration of the
+ %% undocumented test option renegotiation_at can make it more likely.
+ {Msgs, RestData, ConnectionStates} ->
+ if
+ Msgs =/= [] ->
+ Transport:send(Socket, Msgs);
+ true ->
+ ok
+ end,
+ renegotiate(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+ send_queue = queue:in_r({From, RestData}, Queue),
+ renegotiation = {true, internal}})
+ end;
+ {empty, Queue0} ->
+ next_state_is_connection(State)
+ end.
+
+next_state_is_connection(State =
+ #state{recv_during_renegotiation = true, socket_options =
+ #socket_options{active = false}}) ->
+ passive_receive(State#state{recv_during_renegotiation = false}, connection);
+
+next_state_is_connection(State) ->
+ {next_state, connection, next_record_if_active(State)}.
+
+
register_session(_, _, _, #session{is_resumable = true} = Session) ->
Session; %% Already registered
register_session(client, Host, Port, Session0) ->
@@ -1650,7 +1875,10 @@ initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions}, User,
bytes_to_read = 0,
user_data_buffer = <<>>,
log_alert = true,
- session_cache_cb = SessionCacheCb
+ session_cache_cb = SessionCacheCb,
+ renegotiation = {false, first},
+ recv_during_renegotiation = false,
+ send_queue = queue:new()
}.
sslsocket(Pid) ->
@@ -1665,8 +1893,12 @@ get_socket_opts(Socket, [mode | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
get_socket_opts(Socket, Tags, SockOpts,
[{mode, SockOpts#socket_options.mode} | Acc]);
get_socket_opts(Socket, [packet | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
- get_socket_opts(Socket, Tags, SockOpts,
- [{packet, SockOpts#socket_options.packet} | Acc]);
+ case SockOpts#socket_options.packet of
+ {Type, headers} ->
+ get_socket_opts(Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{packet, Type} | Acc]);
+ Type ->
+ get_socket_opts(Socket, Tags, SockOpts, [{packet, Type} | Acc])
+ end;
get_socket_opts(Socket, [header | Tags], SockOpts, Acc) ->
get_socket_opts(Socket, Tags, SockOpts,
[{header, SockOpts#socket_options.header} | Acc]);
@@ -1688,7 +1920,8 @@ set_socket_opts(Socket, [], SockOpts, Other) ->
inet:setopts(Socket, Other),
SockOpts;
set_socket_opts(Socket, [{mode, Mode}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) ->
- set_socket_opts(Socket, Opts, SockOpts#socket_options{mode = Mode}, Other);
+ set_socket_opts(Socket, Opts,
+ SockOpts#socket_options{mode = Mode}, Other);
set_socket_opts(Socket, [{packet, Packet}| Opts], SockOpts, Other) ->
set_socket_opts(Socket, Opts,
SockOpts#socket_options{packet = Packet}, Other);
@@ -1743,7 +1976,55 @@ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName,
catch _:_ ->
ok
end.
-
-make_premaster_secret({MajVer, MinVer}) ->
+make_premaster_secret({MajVer, MinVer}, Alg) when Alg == rsa;
+ Alg == dh_dss;
+ Alg == dh_rsa ->
Rand = crypto:rand_bytes(?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES-2),
- <<?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), Rand/binary>>.
+ <<?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), Rand/binary>>;
+make_premaster_secret(_, _) ->
+ undefined.
+
+mpint_binary(Binary) ->
+ Size = byte_size(Binary),
+ <<?UINT32(Size), Binary/binary>>.
+
+
+ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {true, Initiater}} = State)
+ when Initiater == internal;
+ Initiater == peer ->
+ State#state{renegotiation = undefined};
+ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {true, From}} = State) ->
+ gen_fsm:reply(From, ok),
+ State#state{renegotiation = undefined};
+ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {false, first}, from = From} = State) ->
+ gen_fsm:reply(From, connected),
+ State#state{renegotiation = undefined}.
+
+renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State) ->
+ %% Handle same way as if server requested
+ %% the renegotiation
+ Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_hashes(),
+ connection(#hello_request{}, State#state{tls_handshake_hashes = Hs0});
+renegotiate(#state{role = server,
+ socket = Socket,
+ transport_cb = Transport,
+ negotiated_version = Version,
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
+ HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(),
+ Frag = ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version, undefined),
+ Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_hashes(),
+ {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} =
+ ssl_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
+ Transport:send(Socket, BinMsg),
+ {next_state, hello, next_record(State#state{connection_states =
+ ConnectionStates,
+ tls_handshake_hashes = Hs0})}.
+notify_senders(SendQueue) ->
+ lists:foreach(fun({From, _}) ->
+ gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, closed})
+ end, queue:to_list(SendQueue)).
+
+notify_renegotiater({true, From}) when not is_atom(From) ->
+ gen_fsm:reply(From, {error, closed});
+notify_renegotiater(_) ->
+ ok.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index 8c598135ca..9f5ac7106a 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -31,11 +31,11 @@
-include("ssl_debug.hrl").
-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
--export([master_secret/4, client_hello/4, server_hello/3, hello/2,
- certify/5, certificate/3,
+-export([master_secret/4, client_hello/4, server_hello/3, hello/2,
+ hello_request/0, certify/7, certificate/3,
client_certificate_verify/6,
certificate_verify/6, certificate_request/2,
- key_exchange/2, finished/4,
+ key_exchange/2, server_key_exchange_hash/2, finished/4,
verify_connection/5,
get_tls_handshake/4,
server_hello_done/0, sig_alg/1,
@@ -97,6 +97,15 @@ server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% Function: hello_request() -> #hello_request{}
+%%
+%% Description: Creates a hello request message sent by server to
+%% trigger renegotiation.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+hello_request() ->
+ #hello_request{}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Function: hello(Hello, Info) ->
%% {Version, Id, NewConnectionStates} |
%% #alert{}
@@ -152,10 +161,25 @@ hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion, random = Random} = Hello,
%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbRef,
- MaxPathLen, Verify, VerifyFun) ->
+ MaxPathLen, Verify, VerifyFun, ValidateFun, Role) ->
[PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs,
VerifyBool = verify_bool(Verify),
-
+
+ ValidateExtensionFun =
+ case ValidateFun of
+ undefined ->
+ fun(Extensions, ValidationState, Verify0, AccError) ->
+ ssl_certificate:validate_extensions(Extensions, ValidationState,
+ [], Verify0, AccError, Role)
+ end;
+ Fun ->
+ fun(Extensions, ValidationState, Verify0, AccError) ->
+ {NewExtensions, NewValidationState, NewAccError}
+ = ssl_certificate:validate_extensions(Extensions, ValidationState,
+ [], Verify0, AccError, Role),
+ Fun(NewExtensions, NewValidationState, Verify0, NewAccError)
+ end
+ end,
try
%% Allow missing root_cert and check that with VerifyFun
ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbRef, false) of
@@ -165,6 +189,8 @@ certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbRef,
[{max_path_length,
MaxPathLen},
{verify, VerifyBool},
+ {validate_extensions_fun,
+ ValidateExtensionFun},
{acc_errors,
VerifyErrors}]),
case Result of
@@ -248,8 +274,10 @@ client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version, Algorithm,
%% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
certificate_verify(Signature, {_, PublicKey, _}, Version,
- MasterSecret, Algorithm, {_, Hashes0})
- when Algorithm =:= rsa; Algorithm =:= dh_rsa; Algorithm =:= dhe_rsa ->
+ MasterSecret, Algorithm, {_, Hashes0})
+ when Algorithm == rsa;
+ Algorithm == dh_rsa;
+ Algorithm == dhe_rsa ->
Hashes = calc_certificate_verify(Version, MasterSecret,
Algorithm, Hashes0),
case public_key:decrypt_public(Signature, PublicKey,
@@ -296,30 +324,32 @@ key_exchange(client, fixed_diffie_hellman) ->
#client_diffie_hellman_public{
dh_public = <<>>
}};
-key_exchange(client, {dh, PublicKey}) ->
- Len = byte_size(PublicKey),
+key_exchange(client, {dh, <<?UINT32(Len), PublicKey:Len/binary>>}) ->
#client_key_exchange{
- exchange_keys = #client_diffie_hellman_public{
- dh_public = <<?UINT16(Len), PublicKey/binary>>}
+ exchange_keys = #client_diffie_hellman_public{
+ dh_public = PublicKey}
};
-%% key_exchange(server, {{?'dhpublicnumber', _PublicKey,
-%% #'DomainParameters'{p = P, g = G, y = Y},
-%% SignAlgorithm, ClientRandom, ServerRandom}}) ->
-%% ServerDHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
-%% PLen = byte_size(P),
-%% GLen = byte_size(G),
-%% YLen = byte_size(Y),
-%% Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(SignAlgorithm, <<ClientRandom/binary,
-%% ServerRandom/binary,
-%% ?UINT16(PLen), P/binary,
-%% ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary,
-%% ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary>>),
-%% Signed = digitally_signed(Hash, PrivateKey),
-%% #server_key_exchange{
-%% params = ServerDHParams,
-%% signed_params = Signed
-%% };
+key_exchange(server, {dh, {<<?UINT32(_), PublicKey/binary>>, _},
+ #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G},
+ KeyAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
+ <<?UINT32(_), PBin/binary>> = crypto:mpint(P),
+ <<?UINT32(_), GBin/binary>> = crypto:mpint(G),
+ PLen = byte_size(PBin),
+ GLen = byte_size(GBin),
+ YLen = byte_size(PublicKey),
+ ServerDHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = PBin,
+ dh_g = GBin, dh_y = PublicKey},
+
+ Hash =
+ server_key_exchange_hash(KeyAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary,
+ ServerRandom/binary,
+ ?UINT16(PLen), PBin/binary,
+ ?UINT16(GLen), GBin/binary,
+ ?UINT16(YLen), PublicKey/binary>>),
+ Signed = digitally_signed(Hash, PrivateKey),
+ #server_key_exchange{params = ServerDHParams,
+ signed_params = Signed};
key_exchange(_, _) ->
%%TODO : Real imp
#server_key_exchange{}.
@@ -417,7 +447,8 @@ server_hello_done() ->
%%
%% encode a handshake packet to binary
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-encode_handshake(Package, Version, SigAlg) ->
+encode_handshake(Package, Version, KeyAlg) ->
+ SigAlg = sig_alg(KeyAlg),
{MsgType, Bin} = enc_hs(Package, Version, SigAlg),
Len = byte_size(Bin),
[MsgType, ?uint24(Len), Bin].
@@ -437,32 +468,16 @@ get_tls_handshake(Data, Buffer, KeyAlg, Version) ->
get_tls_handshake_aux(list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]),
KeyAlg, Version, []).
-get_tls_handshake_aux(<<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), Body:Length/binary,Rest/binary>>,
- KeyAlg, Version, Acc) ->
+get_tls_handshake_aux(<<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length),
+ Body:Length/binary,Rest/binary>>, KeyAlg,
+ Version, Acc) ->
Raw = <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), Body/binary>>,
- H = dec_hs(Type, Body, KeyAlg, Version),
+ H = dec_hs(Type, Body, key_exchange_alg(KeyAlg), Version),
get_tls_handshake_aux(Rest, KeyAlg, Version, [{H,Raw} | Acc]);
get_tls_handshake_aux(Data, _KeyAlg, _Version, Acc) ->
{lists:reverse(Acc), Data}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% Function: sig_alg(atom()) -> integer()
-%%
-%% Description: Convert from key exchange as atom to signature
-%% algorithm as a ?SIGNATURE_... constant
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-sig_alg(dh_anon) ->
- ?SIGNATURE_ANONYMOUS;
-sig_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == rsa; Alg == dh_rsa ->
- ?SIGNATURE_RSA;
-sig_alg(Alg) when Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dhe_dss ->
- ?SIGNATURE_DSA;
-sig_alg(_) ->
- ?NULL.
-
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
verify_bool(verify_peer) ->
@@ -649,8 +664,8 @@ dec_hs(?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
dec_hs(?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>, _, _) ->
#certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)};
dec_hs(?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(ModLen), Mod:ModLen/binary,
- ?UINT16(ExpLen), Exp:ExpLen/binary,
- Sig/binary>>,
+ ?UINT16(ExpLen), Exp:ExpLen/binary,
+ ?UINT16(_), Sig/binary>>,
?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) ->
#server_key_exchange{params = #server_rsa_params{rsa_modulus = Mod,
rsa_exponent = Exp},
@@ -658,9 +673,10 @@ dec_hs(?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(ModLen), Mod:ModLen/binary,
dec_hs(?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary,
- Sig/binary>>,
+ ?UINT16(_), Sig/binary>>,
?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
- #server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
+ #server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,dh_g = G,
+ dh_y = Y},
signed_params = Sig};
dec_hs(?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
<<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes:CertTypesLen/binary,
@@ -672,18 +688,20 @@ dec_hs(?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>, _, _) ->
#server_hello_done{};
dec_hs(?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,<<?UINT16(_), Signature/binary>>, _, _)->
#certificate_verify{signature = Signature};
-dec_hs(?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, PKEPMS, rsa, {3, 0}) ->
+dec_hs(?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) ->
PreSecret = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS},
#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = PreSecret};
-dec_hs(?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, rsa, _) ->
+dec_hs(?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>,
+ ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) ->
PreSecret = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS},
#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = PreSecret};
dec_hs(?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
%% TODO: Should check whether the cert already contains a suitable DH-key (7.4.7.2)
throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, implicit_public_value_encoding));
-dec_hs(?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(DH_YCLen), DH_YC:DH_YCLen/binary>>,
+dec_hs(?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
- #client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_YC};
+ #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys =
+ #client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y}};
dec_hs(?FINISHED, VerifyData, _, _) ->
#finished{verify_data = VerifyData};
dec_hs(_, _, _, _) ->
@@ -756,12 +774,13 @@ enc_hs(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1CertList}, _Version, _) ->
{?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>};
enc_hs(#server_key_exchange{params = #server_rsa_params{rsa_modulus = Mod,
rsa_exponent = Exp},
- signed_params = SignedParams}, _Version, _) ->
+ signed_params = SignedParams}, _Version, _) ->
ModLen = byte_size(Mod),
ExpLen = byte_size(Exp),
- {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(ModLen), Mod/binary,
+ SignedLen = byte_size(SignedParams),
+ {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(ModLen),Mod/binary,
?UINT16(ExpLen), Exp/binary,
- SignedParams/binary>>
+ ?UINT16(SignedLen), SignedParams/binary>>
};
enc_hs(#server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{
dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
@@ -769,10 +788,11 @@ enc_hs(#server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{
PLen = byte_size(P),
GLen = byte_size(G),
YLen = byte_size(Y),
- {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
- ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
- ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary,
- SignedParams/binary>>
+ SignedLen = byte_size(SignedParams),
+ {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(PLen), P/binary,
+ ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary,
+ ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary,
+ ?UINT16(SignedLen), SignedParams/binary>>
};
enc_hs(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
certificate_authorities = CertAuths},
@@ -927,13 +947,40 @@ calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, _, Algorithm, Hashes)
when N == 1; N == 2 ->
ssl_tls1:certificate_verify(Algorithm, Hashes).
-%% server_key_exchange_hash(Algorithm, Value) when Algorithm == rsa;
-%% Algorithm == dh_rsa;
-%% Algorithm == dhe_rsa ->
-%% MD5 = crypto:md5_final(Value),
-%% SHA = crypto:sha_final(Value),
-%% <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
+server_key_exchange_hash(Algorithm, Value) when Algorithm == rsa;
+ Algorithm == dh_rsa;
+ Algorithm == dhe_rsa ->
+ MD5Context = crypto:md5_init(),
+ NewMD5Context = crypto:md5_update(MD5Context, Value),
+ MD5 = crypto:md5_final(NewMD5Context),
+
+ SHAContext = crypto:sha_init(),
+ NewSHAContext = crypto:sha_update(SHAContext, Value),
+ SHA = crypto:sha_final(NewSHAContext),
+
+ <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
+
+server_key_exchange_hash(Algorithm, Value) when Algorithm == dh_dss;
+ Algorithm == dhe_dss ->
+
+ SHAContext = crypto:sha_init(),
+ NewSHAContext = crypto:sha_update(SHAContext, Value),
+ crypto:sha_final(NewSHAContext).
-%% server_key_exchange_hash(Algorithm, Value) when Algorithm == dh_dss;
-%% Algorithm == dhe_dss ->
-%% crypto:sha_final(Value).
+
+sig_alg(dh_anon) ->
+ ?SIGNATURE_ANONYMOUS;
+sig_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == rsa; Alg == dh_rsa ->
+ ?SIGNATURE_RSA;
+sig_alg(Alg) when Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dhe_dss ->
+ ?SIGNATURE_DSA;
+sig_alg(_) ->
+ ?NULL.
+
+key_exchange_alg(rsa) ->
+ ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA;
+key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss;
+ Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa; Alg == dh_anon ->
+ ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN;
+key_exchange_alg(_) ->
+ ?NULL.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl
index b2bdfa0934..889d39f2af 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl
@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
-%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2009. All Rights Reserved.
-%%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2010. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%%
+%%
%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
%% under the License.
-%%
+%%
%% %CopyrightEnd%
%%
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@
-define(NUM_OF_SESSION_ID_BYTES, 32). % TSL 1.1 & SSL 3
-define(NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES, 48).
-
+-define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR, 2).
+-define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME, 16#FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Handsake protocol - RFC 4346 section 7.4
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
index 23a5c93452..8d19abfe1e 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
-%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2009. All Rights Reserved.
-%%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2010. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%%
+%%
%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
%% under the License.
-%%
+%%
%% %CopyrightEnd%
%%
@@ -57,12 +57,15 @@
verify_fun, % fun(CertVerifyErrors) -> boolean()
fail_if_no_peer_cert, % boolean()
verify_client_once, % boolean()
+ %% fun(Extensions, State, Verify, AccError) -> {Extensions, State, AccError}
+ validate_extensions_fun,
depth, % integer()
certfile, % file()
keyfile, % file()
key, %
password, %
cacertfile, % file()
+ dhfile, % file()
ciphers, %
%% Local policy for the server if it want's to reuse the session
%% or not. Defaluts to allways returning true.
@@ -71,6 +74,7 @@
%% If false sessions will never be reused, if true they
%% will be reused if possible.
reuse_sessions, % boolean()
+ renegotiate_at,
debug %
}).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
index 37a3d1b639..da48f049f6 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
-%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2009. All Rights Reserved.
-%%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2010. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%%
+%%
%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
%% under the License.
-%%
+%%
%% %CopyrightEnd%
%%
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
%% Encoding records
-export([encode_handshake/3, encode_alert_record/3,
- encode_change_cipher_spec/2, encode_data/3]).
+ encode_change_cipher_spec/2, encode_data/4]).
%% Decoding
-export([decode_cipher_text/2]).
@@ -474,19 +474,31 @@ split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Acc) ->
lists:reverse(Acc, [Bin])
end.
-encode_data(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates)
+encode_data(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt)
when byte_size(Frag) < (?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH - 2048) ->
- encode_plain_text(?APPLICATION_DATA,Version,Frag,ConnectionStates);
-encode_data(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+ case encode_plain_text(?APPLICATION_DATA,Version,Frag,ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt) of
+ {renegotiate, Data} ->
+ {[], Data, ConnectionStates};
+ {Msg, CS} ->
+ {Msg, [], CS}
+ end;
+
+encode_data(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt) when is_binary(Frag) ->
Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH - 2048),
- {CS1, Acc} =
- lists:foldl(fun(B, {CS0, Acc}) ->
- {ET, CS1} =
- encode_plain_text(?APPLICATION_DATA,
- Version, B, CS0),
- {CS1, [ET | Acc]}
- end, {ConnectionStates, []}, Data),
- {lists:reverse(Acc), CS1}.
+ encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt);
+
+encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) when is_list(Data) ->
+ {ConnectionStates, EncodedMsg, NotEncdedData} =
+ lists:foldl(fun(B, {CS0, Encoded, Rest}) ->
+ case encode_plain_text(?APPLICATION_DATA,
+ Version, B, CS0, RenegotiateAt) of
+ {renegotiate, NotEnc} ->
+ {CS0, Encoded, [NotEnc | Rest]};
+ {Enc, CS1} ->
+ {CS1, [Enc | Encoded], Rest}
+ end
+ end, {ConnectionStates0, [], []}, Data),
+ {lists:reverse(EncodedMsg), lists:reverse(NotEncdedData), ConnectionStates}.
encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
encode_plain_text(?HANDSHAKE, Version, Frag, ConnectionStates).
@@ -499,6 +511,16 @@ encode_alert_record(#alert{level = Level, description = Description},
encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates) ->
encode_plain_text(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, Version, <<1:8>>, ConnectionStates).
+encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt) ->
+ #connection_states{current_write =
+ #connection_state{sequence_number = Num}} = ConnectionStates,
+ case renegotiate(Num, RenegotiateAt) of
+ false ->
+ encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates);
+ true ->
+ {renegotiate, Data}
+ end.
+
encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates) ->
#connection_states{current_write=#connection_state{
compression_state=CompS0,
@@ -511,6 +533,11 @@ encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates) ->
CTBin = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, CipherText),
{CTBin, ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_write = CS2}}.
+renegotiate(N, M) when N < M->
+ false;
+renegotiate(_,_) ->
+ true.
+
encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Fragment) ->
Length = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
[<<?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Fragment].
@@ -529,9 +556,6 @@ cipher(Type, Version, Fragment, CS0) ->
CS2 = CS1#connection_state{cipher_state=CipherS1},
{Ciphered, CS2}.
-decipher(TLS=#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC}, CS) ->
- %% These are never encrypted
- {TLS, CS};
decipher(TLS=#ssl_tls{type=Type, version=Version, fragment=Fragment}, CS0) ->
SP = CS0#connection_state.security_parameters,
BCA = SP#security_parameters.bulk_cipher_algorithm, % eller Cipher?
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
index 7370e0f0b3..362b7039d4 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
-%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2009. All Rights Reserved.
-%%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2010. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%%
+%%
%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
%% under the License.
-%%
+%%
%% %CopyrightEnd%
%%
@@ -63,6 +63,13 @@
sequence_number
}).
+-define(MAX_SEQENCE_NUMBER, 18446744073709552000). %% math:pow(2, 64) - 1 = 1.8446744073709552e19
+%% Sequence numbers can not wrap so when max is about to be reached we should renegotiate.
+%% We will renegotiate a little before so that there will be sequence numbers left
+%% for the rehandshake and a little data.
+-define(MARGIN, 100).
+-define(DEFAULT_RENEGOTIATE_AT, ?MAX_SEQENCE_NUMBER - ?MARGIN).
+
%% ConnectionEnd
-define(SERVER, 0).
-define(CLIENT, 1).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl
index ab29ac64df..df809ce275 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl
@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
-%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2009. All Rights Reserved.
-%%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2010. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%%
+%%
%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
%% under the License.
-%%
+%%
%% %CopyrightEnd%
%%
@@ -182,13 +182,13 @@ setup_keys(export, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom,
suites() ->
[
%% TODO: uncomment when supported
- %% ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
%% ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- %% TODO: Funkar inte, borde: ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- %% ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
%% ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- %% ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
%% ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
%%?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TODO: Support this?
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl
index e0013c48ac..ce9a135168 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl
@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
-%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2009. All Rights Reserved.
-%%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2010. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.
-%%
+%%
%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
%% under the License.
-%%
+%%
%% %CopyrightEnd%
%%
@@ -136,13 +136,13 @@ mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, {Major, Minor},
suites() ->
[
%% TODO: uncomment when supported
- %% ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- %% ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- %% TODO: Funkar inte, borde: ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
- %% ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ %%?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
%% ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
- %% ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
%% ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
%%?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TODO: Support this?
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-25 12:22:54 +0000