aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/lib/ssl/src
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/src')
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl3
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl3
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl7
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl14
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl4
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl8
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl4
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl101
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl3
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl43
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl4
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls_dist_proxy.erl3
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl5
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl2
14 files changed, 125 insertions, 79 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
index 82d6faee42..60a61bc901 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
@@ -416,7 +416,8 @@ encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions}, User,
{CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) ->
- ConnectionStates = ssl_record:init_connection_states(Role),
+ #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation} = SSLOptions,
+ ConnectionStates = ssl_record:init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation),
SessionCacheCb = case application:get_env(ssl, session_cb) of
{ok, Cb} when is_atom(Cb) ->
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl
index 3481e89af0..0da4b3587f 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl
@@ -87,7 +87,8 @@ do_setup(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) ->
case inet:getaddr(Address, Driver:family()) of
{ok, Ip} ->
Timer = dist_util:start_timer(SetupTime),
- case erl_epmd:port_please(Name, Ip) of
+ ErlEpmd = net_kernel:epmd_module(),
+ case ErlEpmd:port_please(Name, Ip) of
{port, TcpPort, Version} ->
?trace("port_please(~p) -> version ~p~n",
[Node,Version]),
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
index 51732b4a59..5dc2e583a5 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
@@ -725,6 +725,7 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role) ->
server, Role),
protocol = proplists:get_value(protocol, Opts, tls),
padding_check = proplists:get_value(padding_check, Opts, true),
+ beast_mitigation = handle_option(beast_mitigation, Opts, one_n_minus_one),
fallback = handle_option(fallback, Opts,
proplists:get_value(fallback, Opts,
default_option_role(client,
@@ -746,7 +747,7 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role) ->
alpn_preferred_protocols, next_protocols_advertised,
client_preferred_next_protocols, log_alert,
server_name_indication, honor_cipher_order, padding_check, crl_check, crl_cache,
- fallback, signature_algs],
+ fallback, signature_algs, beast_mitigation],
SockOpts = lists:foldl(fun(Key, PropList) ->
proplists:delete(Key, PropList)
@@ -986,6 +987,10 @@ validate_option(crl_check, Value) when (Value == best_effort) or (Value == peer)
Value;
validate_option(crl_cache, {Cb, {_Handle, Options}} = Value) when is_atom(Cb) and is_list(Options) ->
Value;
+validate_option(beast_mitigation, Value) when Value == one_n_minus_one orelse
+ Value == zero_n orelse
+ Value == disabled ->
+ Value;
validate_option(Opt, Value) ->
throw({error, {options, {Opt, Value}}}).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl
index 3e35e24527..db71b16d80 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl
@@ -73,10 +73,14 @@ reason_code(#alert{description = Description}, _) ->
%%
%% Description: Returns the error string for given alert.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-alert_txt(#alert{level = Level, description = Description, where = {Mod,Line}}) ->
+alert_txt(#alert{level = Level, description = Description, where = {Mod,Line}, reason = undefined}) ->
Mod ++ ":" ++ integer_to_list(Line) ++ ":" ++
- level_txt(Level) ++" "++ description_txt(Description).
+ level_txt(Level) ++" "++ description_txt(Description);
+alert_txt(#alert{reason = Reason} = Alert) ->
+ BaseTxt = alert_txt(Alert#alert{reason = undefined}),
+ FormatDepth = 9, % Some limit on printed representation of an error
+ ReasonTxt = lists:flatten(io_lib:format("~P", [Reason, FormatDepth])),
+ BaseTxt ++ " - " ++ ReasonTxt.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
@@ -85,7 +89,7 @@ alert_txt(#alert{level = Level, description = Description, where = {Mod,Line}})
%% It is very unlikely that an correct implementation will send more than one alert at the time
%% So it there is more than 10 warning alerts we consider it an error
decode(<<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(_), _/binary>>, _, N) when Level == ?WARNING, N > ?MAX_ALERTS ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECODE_ERROR);
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECODE_ERROR, too_many_remote_alerts);
decode(<<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description), Rest/binary>>, Acc, N) when Level == ?WARNING ->
Alert = ?ALERT_REC(Level, Description),
decode(Rest, [Alert | Acc], N + 1);
@@ -93,7 +97,7 @@ decode(<<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description), _Rest/binary>>, Acc, _) when Level ==
Alert = ?ALERT_REC(Level, Description),
lists:reverse([Alert | Acc]); %% No need to decode rest fatal alert will end the connection
decode(<<?BYTE(_Level), _/binary>>, _, _) ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, failed_to_decode_remote_alert);
decode(<<>>, Acc, _) ->
lists:reverse(Acc, []).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl
index 8c4bd08d31..38facb964f 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@
-define(NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, 120).
-define(ALERT_REC(Level,Desc), #alert{level=Level,description=Desc,where={?FILE, ?LINE}}).
+-define(ALERT_REC(Level,Desc,Reason), #alert{level=Level,description=Desc,where={?FILE, ?LINE},reason=Reason}).
-define(MAX_ALERTS, 10).
@@ -116,6 +117,7 @@
-record(alert, {
level,
description,
- where = {?FILE, ?LINE}
+ where = {?FILE, ?LINE},
+ reason
}).
-endif. % -ifdef(ssl_alert).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
index dc0a0c2cc4..e935c033c7 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Fragment, _,
%% alerts may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in
%% TLS [CBCATT]. It is preferable to uniformly use the
%% bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of the error."
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
end;
decipher(?DES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0,
%% alerts may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in
%% TLS [CBCATT]. It is preferable to uniformly use the
%% bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of the error."
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
end.
aead_ciphertext_to_state(chacha20_poly1305, SeqNo, _IV, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) ->
@@ -296,11 +296,11 @@ aead_decipher(Type, #cipher_state{key = Key, iv = IV} = CipherState,
Content when is_binary(Content) ->
{Content, CipherState};
_ ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
end
catch
_:_ ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
index 089b3615c6..22d107ff9c 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
@@ -1488,7 +1488,7 @@ rsa_key_exchange(Version, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _})
{premaster_secret, PremasterSecret,
PublicKeyInfo});
rsa_key_exchange(_, _, _) ->
- throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+ throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, pub_key_is_not_rsa)).
rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret,
PublicKeyInfo = {Algorithm, _, _})
@@ -1505,7 +1505,7 @@ rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret,
{psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret,
PublicKeyInfo});
rsa_psk_key_exchange(_, _, _, _) ->
- throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+ throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, pub_key_is_not_rsa)).
request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer,
signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns},
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index 598d4e4112..0787e151c0 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) ->
{ok, _, Chain} ->
#certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain};
{error, _} ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR)
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, server_has_no_suitable_certificates)
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version,
PrivateKey, {Handshake, _}) ->
case public_key:pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(OwnCert) of
true ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, fixed_diffie_hellman_prohibited);
false ->
Hashes =
calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake),
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams,
%% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
certificate_verify(_, _, _, undefined, _, _) ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, invalid_certificate_verify_message);
certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo, Version,
HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) ->
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
catch
error:_ ->
%% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN)
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, failed_to_decode_certificate)
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo,
false
end, HashSigns) of
[] ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm);
[HashSign | _] ->
HashSign
end;
@@ -664,11 +664,8 @@ master_secret(RecordCB, Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret},
try master_secret(RecordCB, Version, Mastersecret, SecParams,
ConnectionStates, Role)
catch
- exit:Reason ->
- Report = io_lib:format("Key calculation failed due to ~p",
- [Reason]),
- error_logger:error_report(Report),
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+ exit:_ ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure)
end;
master_secret(RecordCB, Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
@@ -683,11 +680,8 @@ master_secret(RecordCB, Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) ->
ClientRandom, ServerRandom),
SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role)
catch
- exit:Reason ->
- Report = io_lib:format("Master secret calculation failed"
- " due to ~p", [Reason]),
- error_logger:error_report(Report),
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+ exit:_ ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure)
end.
%%-------------Encode/Decode --------------------------------
@@ -958,8 +952,8 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, PKEPMS) ->
#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = PKEPMS};
decode_handshake(_Version, ?FINISHED, VerifyData) ->
#finished{verify_data = VerifyData};
-decode_handshake(_, _, _) ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+decode_handshake(_, Message, _) ->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_handshake, Message})).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec decode_hello_extensions({client, binary()} | binary()) -> #hello_extensions{}.
@@ -1031,8 +1025,8 @@ dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary,
params_bin = BinMsg,
hashsign = HashSign,
signature = Signature};
-dec_server_key(_, _, _) ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) ->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec decode_suites('2_bytes'|'3_bytes', binary()) -> list().
@@ -1253,8 +1247,12 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression,
Protocol ->
{ConnectionStates, npn, Protocol}
end;
- _ -> %% {error, _Reason} or a list of 0/2+ protocols.
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+ {error, Reason} ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason);
+ [] ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, no_protocols_in_server_hello);
+ [_|_] ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, too_many_protocols_in_server_hello)
end.
select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) ->
@@ -1316,14 +1314,14 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co
true ->
{ok, ConnectionStates};
false ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation)
end;
handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify},
ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) ->
case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
true ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
false ->
CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
Data = CS#connection_state.client_verify_data,
@@ -1331,7 +1329,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co
true ->
{ok, ConnectionStates};
false ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation)
end
end;
@@ -1341,7 +1339,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, S
handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) ->
case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of
true ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv});
false ->
handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation)
end.
@@ -1350,7 +1348,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) ->
CS = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
case {SecureRenegotation, CS#connection_state.secure_renegotiation} of
{_, true} ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure);
{true, false} ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION);
{false, false} ->
@@ -1523,8 +1521,8 @@ path_validation_alert({bad_cert, selfsigned_peer}) ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNKNOWN_CA);
-path_validation_alert(_) ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE).
+path_validation_alert(Reason) ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason).
encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) ->
try
@@ -1533,18 +1531,27 @@ encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) ->
rsa_pkcs1_padding}]),
#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret}
catch
- _:_->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE))
+ _:_->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed))
end.
-digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) when Minor >= 3 ->
+digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) ->
+ try do_digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of
+ Signature ->
+ Signature
+ catch
+ error:badkey->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, bad_key(PrivateKey)))
+ end.
+
+do_digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) when Minor >= 3 ->
public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key);
-digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
+do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key);
-digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
+do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) ->
public_key:encrypt_private(Hash, Key,
[{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]);
-digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) ->
+do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) ->
public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key).
calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
@@ -1751,12 +1758,12 @@ dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) ->
dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) ->
#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS};
dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE));
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, empty_dh_public));
dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y};
dec_client_key(<<>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE));
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE, empty_dh_public));
dec_client_key(<<?BYTE(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) ->
#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y};
@@ -1800,7 +1807,7 @@ dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(0)>>, _) ->
dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, _) ->
{Params, undefined, Signature};
dec_server_key_signature(_, _, _) ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)).
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, failed_to_decrypt_server_key_sign)).
dec_hello_extensions(<<>>, Acc) ->
Acc;
@@ -1955,8 +1962,8 @@ key_exchange_alg(_) ->
%%-------------Extension handling --------------------------------
%% Receive protocols, choose one from the list, return it.
-handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, _Reason}) ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, Reason}) ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason);
handle_alpn_extension([], _) ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
handle_alpn_extension([ServerProtocol|Tail], ClientProtocols) ->
@@ -1976,7 +1983,7 @@ handle_next_protocol(#next_protocol_negotiation{} = NextProtocols,
true ->
select_next_protocol(decode_next_protocols(NextProtocols), NextProtocolSelector);
false ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) % unexpected next protocol extension
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, unexpected_next_protocol_extension)
end.
@@ -1996,17 +2003,17 @@ handle_next_protocol_on_server(#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<>>}
Protocols;
handle_next_protocol_on_server(_Hello, _Renegotiation, _SSLOpts) ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE). % unexpected next protocol extension
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, unexpected_next_protocol_extension).
next_protocol_extension_allowed(NextProtocolSelector, Renegotiating) ->
NextProtocolSelector =/= undefined andalso not Renegotiating.
-select_next_protocol({error, _Reason}, _NextProtocolSelector) ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+select_next_protocol({error, Reason}, _NextProtocolSelector) ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason);
select_next_protocol(Protocols, NextProtocolSelector) ->
case NextProtocolSelector(Protocols) of
?NO_PROTOCOL ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, no_next_protocol);
Protocol when is_binary(Protocol) ->
Protocol
end.
@@ -2169,3 +2176,9 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_,_,_) ->
is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) ->
lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns).
+bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
+ unacceptable_dsa_key;
+bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
+ unacceptable_rsa_key;
+bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) ->
+ unacceptable_ecdsa_key.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
index 076e663cd4..dddcbdeeda 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@
%% the client?
honor_cipher_order = false :: boolean(),
padding_check = true :: boolean(),
+ %%Should we use 1/n-1 or 0/n splitting to mitigate BEAST, or disable
+ %%mitigation entirely?
+ beast_mitigation = one_n_minus_one :: one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled,
fallback = false :: boolean(),
crl_check :: boolean() | peer | best_effort,
crl_cache,
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
index 866bfcef7e..0a086f5eeb 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
%% Connection state handling
--export([init_connection_states/1,
+-export([init_connection_states/2,
current_connection_state/2, pending_connection_state/2,
activate_pending_connection_state/2,
set_security_params/3,
@@ -62,15 +62,16 @@
%%====================================================================
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec init_connection_states(client | server) -> #connection_states{}.
+-spec init_connection_states(client | server, one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled ) ->
+ #connection_states{}.
%%
%% Description: Creates a connection_states record with appropriate
%% values for the initial SSL connection setup.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-init_connection_states(Role) ->
+init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation) ->
ConnectionEnd = record_protocol_role(Role),
- Current = initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
- Pending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
+ Current = initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation),
+ Pending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation),
#connection_states{current_read = Current,
pending_read = Pending,
current_write = Current,
@@ -119,9 +120,10 @@ activate_pending_connection_state(States =
read) ->
NewCurrent = Pending#connection_state{epoch = dtls_next_epoch(Current),
sequence_number = 0},
+ BeastMitigation = Pending#connection_state.beast_mitigation,
SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
ConnectionEnd = SecParams#security_parameters.connection_end,
- EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
+ EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation),
SecureRenegotation = NewCurrent#connection_state.secure_renegotiation,
NewPending = EmptyPending#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = SecureRenegotation},
States#connection_states{current_read = NewCurrent,
@@ -134,9 +136,10 @@ activate_pending_connection_state(States =
write) ->
NewCurrent = Pending#connection_state{epoch = dtls_next_epoch(Current),
sequence_number = 0},
+ BeastMitigation = Pending#connection_state.beast_mitigation,
SecParams = Pending#connection_state.security_parameters,
ConnectionEnd = SecParams#security_parameters.connection_end,
- EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd),
+ EmptyPending = empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation),
SecureRenegotation = NewCurrent#connection_state.secure_renegotiation,
NewPending = EmptyPending#connection_state{secure_renegotiation = SecureRenegotation},
States#connection_states{current_write = NewCurrent,
@@ -314,12 +317,13 @@ set_pending_cipher_state(#connection_states{pending_read = Read,
encode_handshake(Frag, Version,
#connection_states{current_write =
#connection_state{
+ beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation,
security_parameters =
#security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCA}}} =
ConnectionStates) ->
case iolist_size(Frag) of
N when N > ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH ->
- Data = split_bin(iolist_to_binary(Frag), ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA),
+ Data = split_bin(iolist_to_binary(Frag), ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA, BeastMitigation),
encode_iolist(?HANDSHAKE, Data, Version, ConnectionStates);
_ ->
encode_plain_text(?HANDSHAKE, Version, Frag, ConnectionStates)
@@ -352,10 +356,11 @@ encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates) ->
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
encode_data(Frag, Version,
#connection_states{current_write = #connection_state{
+ beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation,
security_parameters =
#security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCA}}} =
ConnectionStates) ->
- Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA),
+ Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA, BeastMitigation),
encode_iolist(?APPLICATION_DATA, Data, Version, ConnectionStates).
uncompress(?NULL, Data, CS) ->
@@ -447,9 +452,10 @@ decipher_aead(Version, CipherFragment,
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd) ->
+empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) ->
SecParams = empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd),
- #connection_state{security_parameters = SecParams}.
+ #connection_state{security_parameters = SecParams,
+ beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation}.
empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd = ?CLIENT) ->
#security_parameters{connection_end = ConnectionEnd,
@@ -478,10 +484,11 @@ record_protocol_role(client) ->
record_protocol_role(server) ->
?SERVER.
-initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd) ->
+initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) ->
#connection_state{security_parameters =
initial_security_params(ConnectionEnd),
- sequence_number = 0
+ sequence_number = 0,
+ beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation
}.
initial_security_params(ConnectionEnd) ->
@@ -506,11 +513,17 @@ encode_iolist(Type, Data, Version, ConnectionStates0) ->
%% 1/n-1 splitting countermeasure Rizzo/Duong-Beast, RC4 chiphers are
%% not vulnerable to this attack.
-split_bin(<<FirstByte:8, Rest/binary>>, ChunkSize, Version, BCA) when
+split_bin(<<FirstByte:8, Rest/binary>>, ChunkSize, Version, BCA, one_n_minus_one) when
BCA =/= ?RC4 andalso ({3, 1} == Version orelse
{3, 0} == Version) ->
do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [[FirstByte]]);
-split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, _, _) ->
+%% 0/n splitting countermeasure for clients that are incompatible with 1/n-1
+%% splitting.
+split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Version, BCA, zero_n) when
+ BCA =/= ?RC4 andalso ({3, 1} == Version orelse
+ {3, 0} == Version) ->
+ do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, [[<<>>]]);
+split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, _, _, _) ->
do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, []).
do_split_bin(<<>>, _, Acc) ->
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
index d34d144343..87fde35258 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
@@ -40,7 +40,9 @@
%% RFC 5746
secure_renegotiation,
client_verify_data,
- server_verify_data
+ server_verify_data,
+ %% How to do BEAST mitigation?
+ beast_mitigation
}).
-record(connection_states, {
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls_dist_proxy.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls_dist_proxy.erl
index 4651687fe6..2e308a15b7 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls_dist_proxy.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls_dist_proxy.erl
@@ -116,7 +116,8 @@ handle_call({listen, Driver, Name}, _From, State) ->
{ok, TcpAddress} = get_tcp_address(Socket),
{ok, WorldTcpAddress} = get_tcp_address(World),
{_,Port} = WorldTcpAddress#net_address.address,
- case erl_epmd:register_node(Name, Port) of
+ ErlEpmd = net_kernel:epmd_module(),
+ case ErlEpmd:register_node(Name, Port) of
{ok, Creation} ->
{reply, {ok, {Socket, TcpAddress, Creation}},
State#state{listen={Socket, World}}};
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
index 208edc644a..91903b4a1f 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
@@ -496,7 +496,8 @@ decode_alerts(Bin) ->
initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, Tracker}, User,
{CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) ->
- ConnectionStates = ssl_record:init_connection_states(Role),
+ #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation} = SSLOptions,
+ ConnectionStates = ssl_record:init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation),
SessionCacheCb = case application:get_env(ssl, session_cb) of
{ok, Cb} when is_atom(Cb) ->
@@ -922,7 +923,7 @@ alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket,_, _, _, From, Alert, Role) ->
alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role) ->
alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, false, no_pid, From, Alert, Role).
-alert_user(_, _, _, false = Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role) ->
+alert_user(_, _, _, false = Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role) when From =/= undefined ->
%% If there is an outstanding ssl_accept | recv
%% From will be defined and send_or_reply will
%% send the appropriate error message.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
index f34eebb0e4..871eb970eb 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId,
SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert),
case CipherSuite of
no_suite ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_ciphers);
_ ->
{KeyExAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, Version) of
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-12-23 07:39:11 +0000