diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/src')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl | 64 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl | 39 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl | 1409 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl | 183 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl | 65 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl | 45 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl | 2 |
10 files changed, 1318 insertions, 509 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl index 073cb4009b..e5760e7951 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl @@ -467,7 +467,8 @@ init(Type, Event, State) -> error(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, {Error, State}) -> - {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State}; + ssl_connection:stop_and_reply( + normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State); error({call, _} = Call, Msg, State) -> gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Call, Msg, State); error(_, _, _) -> @@ -821,7 +822,7 @@ handle_info({Protocol, _, _, _, Data}, StateName, next_event(StateName, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), - {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}} + ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, own_alert}, State0) end; handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, @@ -846,7 +847,7 @@ handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, ok end, ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}}; + ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, transport_closed}, State); true -> %% Fixes non-delivery of final DTLS record in {active, once}. %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again @@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ handle_state_timeout(flight_retransmission_timeout, StateName, handle_alerts([], Result) -> Result; -handle_alerts(_, {stop,_} = Stop) -> +handle_alerts(_, {stop, _, _} = Stop) -> Stop; handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) -> handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)); diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl index 1d6f0a42c8..5e8f5c2ca0 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); _ -> - {KeyExAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, TLSVersion) of #alert{} = Alert -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl index 96782dcfc0..8e605bec65 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl @@ -324,12 +324,13 @@ do_accept(Driver, Kernel, AcceptPid, DistCtrl, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) -> timer = Timer, this_flags = 0, allowed = Allowed}, + link(DistCtrl), dist_util:handshake_other_started(trace(HSData)); {false,IP} -> error_logger:error_msg( "** Connection attempt from " "disallowed IP ~w ** ~n", [IP]), - ?shutdown(trace(no_node)) + ?shutdown2(no_node, trace({disallowed, IP})) end end. @@ -357,7 +358,11 @@ do_setup(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> ErlEpmd = net_kernel:epmd_module(), case ErlEpmd:port_please(Name, Ip) of {port, TcpPort, Version} -> - Opts = trace(connect_options(get_ssl_options(client))), + Opts = + trace( + connect_options( + [{server_name_indication, atom_to_list(Node)} + |get_ssl_options(client)])), dist_util:reset_timer(Timer), case ssl:connect( Address, TcpPort, @@ -378,21 +383,26 @@ do_setup(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> this_flags = 0, other_version = Version, request_type = Type}, + link(DistCtrl), dist_util:handshake_we_started(trace(HSData)); Other -> %% Other Node may have closed since %% port_please ! ?shutdown2( Node, - trace({shutdown, {connect_failed, Other}})) + trace( + {ssl_connect_failed, Ip, TcpPort, Other})) end; Other -> ?shutdown2( Node, - trace({shutdown, {port_please_failed, Other}})) + trace( + {port_please_failed, ErlEpmd, Name, Ip, Other})) end; Other -> - ?shutdown2(Node, trace({shutdown, {getaddr_failed, Other}})) + ?shutdown2( + Node, + trace({getaddr_failed, Driver, Address, Other})) end. close(Socket) -> @@ -411,8 +421,9 @@ check_ip(Driver, SslSocket) -> case get_ifs(SslSocket) of {ok, IFs, IP} -> check_ip(Driver, IFs, IP); - _ -> - ?shutdown(no_node) + Other -> + ?shutdown2( + no_node, trace({check_ip_failed, SslSocket, Other})) end; _ -> true @@ -441,23 +452,22 @@ get_ifs(#sslsocket{fd = {gen_tcp, Socket, _}}) -> %% If Node is illegal terminate the connection setup!! splitnode(Driver, Node, LongOrShortNames) -> - case split_node(atom_to_list(Node), $@, []) of - [Name|Tail] when Tail =/= [] -> - Host = lists:append(Tail), + case string:split(atom_to_list(Node), "@") of + [Name, Host] when Host =/= [] -> check_node(Driver, Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames); [_] -> error_logger:error_msg( "** Nodename ~p illegal, no '@' character **~n", [Node]), - ?shutdown(Node); + ?shutdown2(Node, trace({illegal_node_n@me, Node})); _ -> error_logger:error_msg( "** Nodename ~p illegal **~n", [Node]), - ?shutdown(Node) + ?shutdown2(Node, trace({illegal_node_name, Node})) end. check_node(Driver, Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames) -> - case split_node(Host, $., []) of + case string:split(Host, ".") of [_] when LongOrShortNames == longnames -> case Driver:parse_address(Host) of {ok, _} -> @@ -468,35 +478,28 @@ check_node(Driver, Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames) -> "fully qualified hostnames **~n" "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", [Host]), - ?shutdown(Node) + ?shutdown2(Node, trace({not_longnames, Host})) end; - [_, _ | _] when LongOrShortNames == shortnames -> + [_, _] when LongOrShortNames == shortnames -> error_logger:error_msg( "** System NOT running to use " "fully qualified hostnames **~n" "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", [Host]), - ?shutdown(Node); + ?shutdown2(Node, trace({not_shortnames, Host})); _ -> [Name, Host] end. split_node(Node) when is_atom(Node) -> - case split_node(atom_to_list(Node), $@, []) of - [_, Host] -> + case string:split(atom_to_list(Node), "@") of + [Name, Host] when Name =/= [], Host =/= [] -> Host; _ -> false end; split_node(_) -> false. -%% -split_node([Chr|T], Chr, Ack) -> - [lists:reverse(Ack)|split_node(T, Chr, [])]; -split_node([H|T], Chr, Ack) -> - split_node(T, Chr, [H|Ack]); -split_node([], _, Ack) -> - [lists:reverse(Ack)]. %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -524,6 +527,17 @@ nodelay() -> get_ssl_options(Type) -> + try ets:lookup(ssl_dist_opts, Type) of + [{Type, Opts}] -> + [{erl_dist, true} | Opts]; + _ -> + get_ssl_dist_arguments(Type) + catch + error:badarg -> + get_ssl_dist_arguments(Type) + end. + +get_ssl_dist_arguments(Type) -> case init:get_argument(ssl_dist_opt) of {ok, Args} -> [{erl_dist, true} | ssl_options(Type, lists:append(Args))]; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl index 4007e44a83..656ed94ea5 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl @@ -374,13 +374,12 @@ negotiated_protocol(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) -> ssl_connection:negotiated_protocol(Pid). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec cipher_suites() -> [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] | [string()]. +-spec cipher_suites() -> [ssl_cipher:old_erl_cipher_suite()] | [string()]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher_suites() -> cipher_suites(erlang). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec cipher_suites(erlang | openssl | all) -> [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] | - [string()]. +-spec cipher_suites(erlang | openssl | all) -> [ssl_cipher:old_erl_cipher_suite() | string()]. %% Description: Returns all supported cipher suites. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher_suites(erlang) -> @@ -992,17 +991,21 @@ validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, Value) when is_list(Value) -> Value; validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, undefined) -> undefined; -validate_option(server_name_indication = Opt, Value) when is_list(Value) -> +validate_option(server_name_indication, Value) when is_list(Value) -> %% RFC 6066, Section 3: Currently, the only server names supported are %% DNS hostnames - case inet_parse:domain(Value) of - false -> - throw({error, {options, {{Opt, Value}}}}); - true -> - Value - end; -validate_option(server_name_indication, undefined = Value) -> + %% case inet_parse:domain(Value) of + %% false -> + %% throw({error, {options, {{Opt, Value}}}}); + %% true -> + %% Value + %% end; + %% + %% But the definition seems very diffuse, so let all strings through + %% and leave it up to public_key to decide... Value; +validate_option(server_name_indication, undefined) -> + undefined; validate_option(server_name_indication, disable) -> disable; @@ -1149,9 +1152,8 @@ binary_cipher_suites(Version, []) -> %% not require explicit configuration ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:suites(tls_version(Version))); binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Tuple|_] = Ciphers0) when is_tuple(Tuple) -> - Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0], + Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:suite(tuple_to_map(C)) || C <- Ciphers0], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers); - binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Cipher0 | _] = Ciphers0) when is_binary(Cipher0) -> All = ssl_cipher:all_suites(tls_version(Version)), case [Cipher || Cipher <- Ciphers0, lists:member(Cipher, All)] of @@ -1171,6 +1173,17 @@ binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers0) -> Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite(C) || C <- string:lexemes(Ciphers0, ":")], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers). +tuple_to_map({Kex, Cipher, Mac}) -> + #{key_exchange => Kex, + cipher => Cipher, + mac => Mac, + prf => default_prf}; +tuple_to_map({Kex, Cipher, Mac, Prf}) -> + #{key_exchange => Kex, + cipher => Cipher, + mac => Mac, + prf => Prf}. + handle_eccs_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) -> {_Major, Minor} = tls_version(Version), try tls_v1:ecc_curves(Minor, Value) of diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl index b6cd22dd13..b0e38fb9ad 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl @@ -44,20 +44,21 @@ is_stream_ciphersuite/1]). -export_type([cipher_suite/0, - erl_cipher_suite/0, openssl_cipher_suite/0, + erl_cipher_suite/0, old_erl_cipher_suite/0, openssl_cipher_suite/0, hash/0, key_algo/0, sign_algo/0]). --type cipher() :: null |rc4_128 | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' - | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm | chacha20_poly1305. +-type cipher() :: null |rc4_128 | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm | chacha20_poly1305. -type hash() :: null | md5 | sha | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512. -type sign_algo() :: rsa | dsa | ecdsa. --type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | - psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon. --type erl_cipher_suite() :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()} % Pre TLS 1.2 - %% TLS 1.2, internally PRE TLS 1.2 will use default_prf - | {key_algo(), cipher(), hash(), hash() | default_prf}. - - +-type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon. +-type erl_cipher_suite() :: #{key_exchange := key_algo(), + cipher := cipher(), + mac := hash(), + prf := hash() | default_prf %% Old cipher suites, version dependent + }. +-type old_erl_cipher_suite() :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()} % Pre TLS 1.2 + %% TLS 1.2, internally PRE TLS 1.2 will use default_prf + | {key_algo(), cipher(), hash(), hash() | default_prf}. -type cipher_suite() :: binary(). -type cipher_enum() :: integer(). -type openssl_cipher_suite() :: string(). @@ -83,7 +84,8 @@ security_parameters(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL = CipherSuite, SecParams) -> %% cipher values has been updated according to <CipherSuite> %%------------------------------------------------------------------- security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams) -> - { _, Cipher, Hash, PrfHashAlg} = suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{cipher := Cipher, mac := Hash, + prf := PrfHashAlg} = suite_definition(CipherSuite), SecParams#security_parameters{ cipher_suite = CipherSuite, bulk_cipher_algorithm = bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher), @@ -465,353 +467,740 @@ des_suites(_)-> %%------------------------------------------------------------------- %% TLS v1.1 suites suite_definition(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) -> - {null, null, null, null}; + #{key_exchange => null, + cipher => null, + mac => null, + prf => null}; %% RFC 5746 - Not a real cipher suite used to signal empty "renegotiation_info" extension %% to avoid handshake failure from old servers that do not ignore %% hello extension data as they should. suite_definition(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) -> - {null, null, null, null}; -%% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5) -> -%% {rsa, null, md5, default_prf}; -%% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> -%% {rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => null, + cipher => null, + mac => null, + prf => null}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> - {rsa, rc4_128, md5, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => md5, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {rsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa, des_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_dss, des_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_rsa, des_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %%% TSL V1.1 AES suites suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %% TLS v1.2 suites - %% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> %% {rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - {rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; %% not defined YET: %% TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DH_DSS AES_128_CBC SHA256 %% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_128_CBC SHA256 %% TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_DSS AES_256_CBC SHA256 %% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_256_CBC SHA256 - %%% DH-ANON deprecated by TLS spec and not available %%% by default, but good for testing purposes. suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> - {dh_anon, rc4_128, md5, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => md5, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - {dh_anon, des_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {dh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; %%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 - suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {psk, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {psk, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {psk, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 - suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {psk, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, null, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 - suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - {psk, null, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - {psk, null, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - {dhe_psk, null, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - {dhe_psk, null, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - {rsa_psk, null, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - {rsa_psk, null, sha384, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; %%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 - suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_psk, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_psk, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_psk, null, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_psk, null, sha384, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => null, mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; %%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 - suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; %% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) -> -%% {ecdhe_psk, aes_128_ccm, null, sha256}; +%% #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, +%% cipher => aes_128_ccm, +%% mac => null, +%% prf =>sha256}; %% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) -> -%% {ecdhe_psk, aes_256_ccm, null, sha256}; - +%% #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, +%% cipher => aes_256_ccm, +%% mac => null, +%% prf => sha256}; %%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 - suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_anon, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_dss, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_dss, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => srp_dss, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; %% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dh_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dh_dss, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dh_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dh_dss, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; - + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; %% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; %% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> - {dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}. + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec erl_suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> erl_cipher_suite(). +-spec erl_suite_definition(cipher_suite() | erl_cipher_suite()) -> old_erl_cipher_suite(). %% %% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. Filters last value %% for now (compatibility reasons). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -erl_suite_definition(S) -> - case suite_definition(S) of - {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, default_prf} -> +erl_suite_definition(Bin) when is_binary(Bin) -> + erl_suite_definition(suite_definition(Bin)); +erl_suite_definition(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, cipher := Cipher, + mac := Hash, prf := Prf}) -> + case Prf of + default_prf -> {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}; - Suite -> - Suite + _ -> + {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf} end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -819,327 +1208,607 @@ erl_suite_definition(S) -> %% %% Description: Return TLS cipher suite definition. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - %% TLS v1.1 suites -%%suite({rsa, null, md5}) -> -%% ?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5; -%%suite({rsa, null, sha}) -> -%% ?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({rsa, rc4_128, md5}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := md5}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; -suite({rsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({rsa, des_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher :='3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_dss, des_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher:= des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_rsa, des_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher:= des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({dh_anon, rc4_128, md5}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher:= rc4_128, + mac := md5}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; -suite({dh_anon, des_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher:= des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite({dh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; - %%% TSL V1.1 AES suites -suite({rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - %% TLS v1.2 suites - -%% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> -%% {rsa, null, sha, sha256}; -suite({rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; - %%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 - -suite({psk, rc4_128,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({psk, '3des_ede_cbc',sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, rc4_128,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, '3des_ede_cbc',sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, rc4_128,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, '3des_ede_cbc',sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - %%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 - -suite({psk, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; - %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 - -suite({psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; - -suite({psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; - -suite({psk, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite({psk, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; -suite({dhe_psk, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite({dhe_psk, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; -suite({rsa_psk, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite({rsa_psk, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; - %%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 - -suite({ecdhe_psk, rc4_128,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_psk, '3des_ede_cbc',sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher :='3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdhe_psk, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_psk, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; - %%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 - -suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -%% suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_128_ccm, null, sha256}) -> -%% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256; -%% suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_256_ccm, null, sha256}) -> -%% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256; - + %% suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + %% cipher := aes_128_ccm, + %% mac := null, + %% prf := sha256}) -> + %% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256; + %% suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + %% cipher := aes_256_ccm, + %% mac := null, + %% prf := sha256}) -> + %% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256; %%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 - -suite({srp_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - %%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -suite({ecdh_rsa, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdh_rsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdh_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -suite({ecdhe_rsa, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -suite({ecdh_anon, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdh_anon, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - %%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac:= sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; - %% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite({rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dh_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dh_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; - %% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; - - %% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites -suite({ecdhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -1516,14 +2185,13 @@ filter(DerCert, Ciphers) -> %% %% Description: Filter suites for algorithms supported by crypto. %%------------------------------------------------------------------- -filter_suites(Suites = [Value|_]) when is_tuple(Value) -> +filter_suites(Suites = [Value|_]) when is_map(Value) -> Algos = crypto:supports(), Hashs = proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos), - lists:filter(fun({KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}) -> - is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_hash(Hash, proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos)); - ({KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf}) -> + lists:filter(fun(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, + cipher := Cipher, + mac := Hash, + prf := Prf}) -> is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso is_acceptable_hash(Hash, Hashs) andalso @@ -1534,9 +2202,12 @@ filter_suites(Suites) -> Algos = crypto:supports(), Hashs = proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos), lists:filter(fun(Suite) -> - {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite), + #{key_exchange := KeyExchange, + cipher := Cipher, + mac := Hash, + prf := Prf} = suite_definition(Suite), is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso + is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso is_acceptable_hash(Hash, Hashs) andalso is_acceptable_prf(Prf, Hashs) end, Suites). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl index b1efcbb857..d046145dff 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ %% Alert and close handling -export([handle_own_alert/4, handle_alert/3, - handle_normal_shutdown/3 + handle_normal_shutdown/3, stop/2, stop_and_reply/3 ]). %% Data handling @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, catch _:_ -> ok end, - {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}}. + stop({shutdown, own_alert}, State). handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, _, #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, @@ -340,24 +340,24 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, protocol_cb = Connection, ssl_options = SslOpts, start_or_recv_from = From, host = Host, port = Port, session = Session, user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, - role = Role, socket_options = Opts, tracker = Tracker}) -> + role = Role, socket_options = Opts, tracker = Tracker} = State) -> invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session), log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection), - {stop, normal}; + stop(normal, State); handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, StateName, State) -> handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}}; + stop({shutdown, peer_close}, State); handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, #state{role = Role, ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) -> log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}}; + stop({shutdown, peer_close}, State); handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, #state{role = Role, @@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ write_application_data(Data0, {FromPid, _} = From, ok when FromPid =:= self() -> hibernate_after(connection, NewState, []); Error when FromPid =:= self() -> - {stop, {shutdown, Error}, NewState}; + stop({shutdown, Error}, NewState); ok -> hibernate_after(connection, NewState, [{reply, From, ok}]); Result -> @@ -446,8 +446,8 @@ read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, Connection:next_record_if_active(State); _ -> %% We have more data read_application_data(<<>>, State) - catch _:Reason -> - death_row(State, Reason) + catch error:_ -> + death_row(State, disconnect) end; _ -> SocketOpt = @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, Connection:next_record_if_active(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); {error,_Reason} -> %% Invalid packet in packet mode deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Buffer1, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), - stop_normal(State0) + stop(normal, State0) end. %%==================================================================== %% Help functions for tls|dtls_connection.erl @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ handle_session(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, #state{session = #session{session_id = OldId}, negotiated_version = ReqVersion, negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol} = State0) -> - {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} = + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion, KeyAlgorithm), @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ init({call, From}, {start, {Opts, EmOpts}, Timeout}, init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, State#state{ssl_options = SslOpts, socket_options = new_emulated(EmOpts, SockOpts)}, Connection) catch throw:Error -> - {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}} + stop_and_reply(normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State0) end; init({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); @@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ connection({call, {FromPid, _} = From}, {application_data, Data}, catch throw:Error -> case self() of FromPid -> - {stop, {shutdown, Error}}; + stop({shutdown, Error}, State); _ -> hibernate_after( ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, Error}]) @@ -1017,8 +1017,8 @@ connection( ProtocolSpecific#{d_handle => DHandle}}, {Record, NewerState} = Connection:next_record_if_active(NewState), Connection:next_event(connection, Record, NewerState, [{reply, From, ok}]) - catch _:Reason -> - death_row(State, Reason) + catch error:_ -> + death_row(State, disconnect) end; connection({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); @@ -1030,10 +1030,24 @@ connection( _) -> eat_msgs(Msg), try send_dist_data(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, DHandle, []) - catch _:Reason -> - death_row(State, Reason) + catch error:_ -> + death_row(State, disconnect) end; connection( + info, {send, From, Ref, Data}, + #state{ + ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, + protocol_specific = #{d_handle := _}}, + _) -> + %% This is for testing only! + %% + %% Needed by some OTP distribution + %% test suites... + From ! {Ref, ok}, + {keep_state_and_data, + [{next_event, {call, {self(), undefined}}, + {application_data, iolist_to_binary(Data)}}]}; +connection( info, tick = Msg, #state{ ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, @@ -1058,20 +1072,22 @@ connection(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> %% or the socket may die too death_row( info, {'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, Reason}, - #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid} = State}, + #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid}}, _) -> - {stop, {shutdown, Reason}, State}; + {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; death_row( - info, {'EXIT', Socket, Reason}, #state{socket = Socket} = State, _) -> - {stop, {shutdown, Reason}, State}; + info, {'EXIT', Socket, Reason}, #state{socket = Socket}, _) -> + {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; death_row(state_timeout, Reason, _State, _Connection) -> {stop, {shutdown,Reason}}; -death_row(_Type, _Msg, State, _Connection) -> - {keep_state, State, [postpone]}. +death_row(_Type, _Msg, _State, _Connection) -> + %% Waste all other events + keep_state_and_data. %% State entry function death_row(State, Reason) -> - {next_state, death_row, State, [{state_timeout, 5000, Reason}]}. + {next_state, death_row, State, + [{state_timeout, 5000, Reason}]}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec downgrade(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), @@ -1084,10 +1100,10 @@ downgrade(internal, #alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY}, tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}, {packet, 0}, {mode, binary}]), Transport:controlling_process(Socket, Pid), gen_statem:reply(From, {ok, Socket}), - stop_normal(State); + stop(normal, State); downgrade(timeout, downgrade, #state{downgrade = {_, From}} = State, _) -> gen_statem:reply(From, {error, timeout}), - stop_normal(State); + stop(normal, State); downgrade(Type, Event, State, Connection) -> handle_common_event(Type, Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). @@ -1102,7 +1118,7 @@ handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {#hello_request{} = Handshake, _}}, co handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {#hello_request{}, _}}, StateName, #state{role = client}, _) when StateName =/= connection -> {keep_state_and_data}; -handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {Handshake, Raw}}, StateName, +handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {Handshake, Raw}}, StateName, #state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0, ssl_options = #ssl_options{v2_hello_compatible = V2HComp}} = State0, Connection) -> @@ -1121,8 +1137,8 @@ handle_common_event(timeout, hibernate, _, _, _) -> {keep_state_and_data, [hibernate]}; handle_common_event(internal, {application_data, Data}, StateName, State0, Connection) -> case read_application_data(Data, State0) of - {stop, Reason, State} -> - {stop, Reason, State}; + {stop, _, _} = Stop-> + Stop; {Record, State} -> Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State) end; @@ -1151,8 +1167,9 @@ handle_call({close, _} = Close, From, StateName, State, Connection) -> %% Run terminate before returning so that the reuseaddr %% inet-option works properly Result = Connection:terminate(Close, StateName, State#state{terminated = true}), - {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, normal}, - {reply, From, Result}, State}; + stop_and_reply( + {shutdown, normal}, + {reply, From, Result}, State); handle_call({shutdown, How0}, From, _, #state{transport_cb = Transport, negotiated_version = Version, @@ -1173,7 +1190,7 @@ handle_call({shutdown, How0}, From, _, {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, ok}]}; Error -> gen_statem:reply(From, {error, Error}), - stop_normal(State) + stop(normal, State) end; handle_call({recv, _N, _Timeout}, From, _, #state{socket_options = @@ -1253,33 +1270,50 @@ handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, econnaborted}, StateName, tracker = Tracker} = State) when StateName =/= connection -> alert_user(Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role, Connection), - stop_normal(State); + stop(normal, State); handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, error_tag = ErrorTag} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Reason]), error_logger:error_report(Report), handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - stop_normal(State); + stop(normal, State); handle_info( + {'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, Reason}, _, + #state{ + user_application = {MonitorRef, _Pid}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}}) -> + {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; +handle_info( {'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, _}, _, - #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid}} = State) -> - stop_normal(State); + #state{user_application = {MonitorRef, _Pid}}) -> + {stop, normal}; +handle_info( + {'EXIT', Pid, _Reason}, StateName, + #state{user_application = {_MonitorRef, Pid}} = State) -> + %% It seems the user application has linked to us + %% - ignore that and let the monitor handle this + {next_state, StateName, State}; + %%% So that terminate will be run when supervisor issues shutdown handle_info({'EXIT', _Sup, shutdown}, _StateName, State) -> - {stop, shutdown, State}; + stop(shutdown, State); handle_info({'EXIT', Socket, normal}, _StateName, #state{socket = Socket} = State) -> %% Handle as transport close" - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State}; + stop({shutdown, transport_closed}, State); handle_info({'EXIT', Socket, Reason}, _StateName, #state{socket = Socket} = State) -> - {stop, {shutdown, Reason}, State}; + stop({shutdown, Reason}, State); + handle_info(allow_renegotiate, StateName, State) -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{allow_renegotiate = true}}; + handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, StartFrom}, StateName, #state{renegotiation = {false, first}} = State) when StateName =/= connection -> - {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, user_timeout}, - {reply, StartFrom, {error, timeout}}, State#state{timer = undefined}}; + stop_and_reply( + {shutdown, user_timeout}, + {reply, StartFrom, {error, timeout}}, + State#state{timer = undefined}); handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}, StateName, #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State) when RecvFrom =/= undefined -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, @@ -1372,9 +1406,9 @@ connection_info(#state{sni_hostname = SNIHostname, negotiated_version = {_,_} = Version, ssl_options = Opts}) -> RecordCB = record_cb(Connection), - CipherSuiteDef = ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(CipherSuite), - IsNamedCurveSuite = lists:member(element(1,CipherSuiteDef), - [ecdh_ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdh_anon]), + CipherSuiteDef = #{key_exchange := KexAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + IsNamedCurveSuite = lists:member(KexAlg, + [ecdh_ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdh_anon]), CurveInfo = case ECCCurve of {namedCurve, Curve} when IsNamedCurveSuite -> [{ecc, {named_curve, pubkey_cert_records:namedCurves(Curve)}}]; @@ -1383,7 +1417,7 @@ connection_info(#state{sni_hostname = SNIHostname, end, [{protocol, RecordCB:protocol_version(Version)}, {session_id, SessionId}, - {cipher_suite, CipherSuiteDef}, + {cipher_suite, ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(CipherSuiteDef)}, {sni_hostname, SNIHostname} | CurveInfo] ++ ssl_options_list(Opts). security_info(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) -> @@ -1451,7 +1485,7 @@ resumed_server_hello(#state{session = Session, server_hello(ServerHello, State0, Connection) -> CipherSuite = ServerHello#server_hello.cipher_suite, - {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), State = Connection:queue_handshake(ServerHello, State0), State#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm}. @@ -1465,8 +1499,8 @@ handle_peer_cert(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, State1 = State0#state{session = Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert}, public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo}, - {KeyAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), - State2 = handle_peer_cert_key(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, KeyAlg, State1), + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + State2 = handle_peer_cert_key(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, KeyAlgorithm, State1), {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State2), Connection:next_event(certify, Record, State). @@ -1548,24 +1582,24 @@ server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) -> certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS}, #state{private_key = Key, client_hello_version = {Major, Minor} = Version} = State, Connection) -> - + FakeSecret = make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa), %% Countermeasure for Bleichenbacher attack always provide some kind of premaster secret %% and fail handshake later.RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1. PremasterSecret = try ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key) of Secret when erlang:byte_size(Secret) == ?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES -> case Secret of - <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), _/binary>> -> %% Correct - Secret; + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>> -> %% Correct + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>>; <<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(_), Rest/binary>> -> %% Version mismatch <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>> end; _ -> %% erlang:byte_size(Secret) =/= ?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES - make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa) + FakeSecret catch #alert{description = ?DECRYPT_ERROR} -> - make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa) - end, + FakeSecret + end, calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); certify_client_key_exchange(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey}, #state{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, @@ -2423,8 +2457,8 @@ handle_active_option(_, connection = StateName0, To, Reply, #state{protocol_cb = hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply}]); {next_state, StateName, State, Actions} -> hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply} | Actions]); - {stop, Reason, State} -> - {stop, Reason, State} + {stop, _, _} = Stop -> + Stop end; handle_active_option(_, StateName, To, Reply, #state{user_data_buffer = <<>>} = State) -> %% Active once already set @@ -2433,8 +2467,8 @@ handle_active_option(_, StateName, To, Reply, #state{user_data_buffer = <<>>} = %% user_data_buffer =/= <<>> handle_active_option(_, StateName0, To, Reply, #state{protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> case read_application_data(<<>>, State0) of - {stop, Reason, State} -> - {stop, Reason, State}; + {stop, _, _} = Stop -> + Stop; {Record, State1} -> %% Note: Renogotiation may cause StateName0 =/= StateName case Connection:next_event(StateName0, Record, State1) of @@ -2592,7 +2626,8 @@ send_or_reply(_, Pid, _From, Data) -> send_user(Pid, Data). send_user(Pid, Msg) -> - Pid ! Msg. + Pid ! Msg, + ok. alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection); @@ -2705,14 +2740,22 @@ eat_msgs(Msg) -> after 0 -> ok end. -%% When running with erl_dist the stop reason 'normal' -%% would be too silent and prevent cleanup -stop_normal(State) -> - Reason = - case State of - #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}} -> - {shutdown, normal}; - _ -> - normal - end, - {stop, Reason, State}. +%% When acting as distribution controller map the exit reason +%% to follow the documented nodedown_reason for net_kernel +stop(Reason, State) -> + {stop, erl_dist_stop_reason(Reason, State), State}. + +stop_and_reply(Reason, Replies, State) -> + {stop_and_reply, erl_dist_stop_reason(Reason, State), Replies, State}. + +erl_dist_stop_reason( + Reason, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}}) -> + case Reason of + normal -> + %% We can not exit with normal since that will not bring + %% down the rest of the distribution processes + {shutdown, normal}; + _ -> Reason + end; +erl_dist_stop_reason(Reason, _State) -> + Reason. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl index c241a9bced..bea67935d8 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ %% Supervisor callback -export([init/1]). +%% Debug +-export([consult/1]). + %%%========================================================================= %%% API %%%========================================================================= @@ -37,7 +40,18 @@ -spec start_link() -> {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, term()}. start_link() -> - supervisor:start_link({local, ?MODULE}, ?MODULE, []). + case init:get_argument(ssl_dist_optfile) of + {ok, [File]} -> + DistOpts = consult(File), + TabOpts = [set, protected, named_table], + Tab = ets:new(ssl_dist_opts, TabOpts), + true = ets:insert(Tab, DistOpts), + supervisor:start_link({local, ?MODULE}, ?MODULE, []); + {ok, BadArg} -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, BadArg}); + error -> + supervisor:start_link({local, ?MODULE}, ?MODULE, []) + end. %%%========================================================================= %%% Supervisor callback @@ -68,3 +82,52 @@ ssl_connection_sup() -> Modules = [ssl_connection_sup], Type = supervisor, {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules}. + +consult(File) -> + case erl_prim_loader:get_file(File) of + {ok, Binary, _FullName} -> + Encoding = + case epp:read_encoding_from_binary(Binary) of + none -> latin1; + Enc -> Enc + end, + case unicode:characters_to_list(Binary, Encoding) of + {error, _String, Rest} -> + error( + {bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {encoding_error, Rest}}); + {incomplete, _String, Rest} -> + error( + {bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {encoding_incomplete, Rest}}); + String when is_list(String) -> + consult_string(String) + end; + error -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, File}) + end. + +consult_string(String) -> + case erl_scan:string(String) of + {error, Info, Location} -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {scan_error, Info, Location}}); + {ok, Tokens, _EndLocation} -> + consult_tokens(Tokens) + end. + +consult_tokens(Tokens) -> + case erl_parse:parse_exprs(Tokens) of + {error, Info} -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {parse_error, Info}}); + {ok, [Expr]} -> + consult_expr(Expr); + {ok, Other} -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {parse_error, Other}}) + end. + +consult_expr(Expr) -> + {value, Value, Bs} = erl_eval:expr(Expr, erl_eval:new_bindings()), + case erl_eval:bindings(Bs) of + [] -> + Value; + Other -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {bindings, Other}}) + end. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index 24f3a97b9b..61d61b53dd 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -1184,19 +1184,22 @@ certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 -> false -> <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>> end; -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa; - KeyExchange == dh_rsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> + +certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa; + KeyExchange == dh_rsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>; -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; - KeyExchange == dhe_dss; - KeyExchange == srp_dss -> + +certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; + KeyExchange == dhe_dss; + KeyExchange == srp_dss -> <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> + +certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>; certificate_types(_, _) -> <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>. @@ -2062,23 +2065,23 @@ handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) -> filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa; KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa; KeyExchange == srp_rsa; KeyExchange == rsa_psk -> do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_dss; KeyExchange == srp_dss -> do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; KeyExchange == dh_rsa; KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; @@ -2088,7 +2091,7 @@ filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc %% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names %% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical. filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when KeyExchange == dh_anon; KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; KeyExchange == srp_anon; @@ -2294,15 +2297,15 @@ handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) -> advertises_ec_ciphers([]) -> false; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa} | _]) -> true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa} | _]) -> true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa} | _]) -> true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa} | _]) -> true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) -> +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon} | _]) -> true; advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_psk, _,_,_} | _]) -> true; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl index f1db75d5e9..406a095d2e 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl @@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ init(Type, Event, State) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, {Error, State}) -> - {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State}; + ssl_connection:stop_and_reply( + normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State); error({call, _} = Call, Msg, State) -> gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Call, Msg, State); error(_, _, _) -> @@ -659,7 +660,7 @@ handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName, next_event(StateName, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), - {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}} + ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, own_alert}, State0) end; handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag, @@ -686,7 +687,7 @@ handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, end, ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}}; + ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, transport_closed}, State); true -> %% Fixes non-delivery of final TLS record in {active, once}. %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again @@ -698,7 +699,7 @@ handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> handle_alerts([], Result) -> Result; -handle_alerts(_, {stop,_} = Stop) -> +handle_alerts(_, {stop, _, _} = Stop) -> Stop; handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) -> handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)); diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl index a38c5704a6..d59e817ffb 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_ciphers); _ -> - {KeyExAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, Version) of #alert{} = Alert -> |