diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/src')
42 files changed, 6272 insertions, 4543 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/Makefile b/lib/ssl/src/Makefile index ebcb511653..8d1341f594 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/ssl/src/Makefile @@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ BEHAVIOUR_MODULES= \ MODULES= \ ssl \ - tls \ - dtls \ ssl_alert \ ssl_app \ ssl_sup \ @@ -64,9 +62,11 @@ MODULES= \ ssl_certificate\ ssl_pkix_db\ ssl_cipher \ + ssl_cipher_format \ ssl_srp_primes \ tls_connection \ dtls_connection \ + tls_sender\ ssl_config \ ssl_connection \ tls_handshake \ diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls.erl deleted file mode 100644 index cd705152a8..0000000000 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls.erl +++ /dev/null @@ -1,113 +0,0 @@ -%% -%% %CopyrightBegin% -%% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2016. All Rights Reserved. -%% -%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); -%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. -%% You may obtain a copy of the License at -%% -%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 -%% -%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software -%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, -%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. -%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and -%% limitations under the License. -%% -%% %CopyrightEnd% -%% - -%% - -%%% Purpose : Reflect DTLS specific API options (fairly simple wrapper at the moment) -%% First implementation will support DTLS connections only in a "TLS/TCP like way" - --module(dtls). - --include("ssl_api.hrl"). --include("ssl_internal.hrl"). - --export([connect/2, connect/3, listen/2, accept/1, accept/2, - handshake/1, handshake/2, handshake/3]). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -%% Description: Connect to a DTLS server. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - --spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()]) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | - {error, reason()}. - -connect(Socket, Options) when is_port(Socket) -> - connect(Socket, Options, infinity). - --spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()] | inet:port_number(), - timeout() | list()) -> - {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - -connect(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket) -> - DTLSOpts = [{protocol, dtls} | SslOptions], - ssl:connect(Socket, DTLSOpts, Timeout); -connect(Host, Port, Options) -> - connect(Host, Port, Options, infinity). - --spec connect(host() | port(), inet:port_number(), list(), timeout()) -> - {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - -connect(Host, Port, Options, Timeout) -> - DTLSOpts = [{protocol, dtls} | Options], - ssl:connect(Host, Port, DTLSOpts, Timeout). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec listen(inet:port_number(), [listen_option()]) ->{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - -%% -%% Description: Creates an ssl listen socket. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -listen(Port, Options) -> - DTLSOpts = [{protocol, dtls} | Options], - ssl:listen(Port, DTLSOpts). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -%% Description: Performs transport accept on an ssl listen socket -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec accept(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | - {error, reason()}. -accept(ListenSocket) -> - accept(ListenSocket, infinity). - --spec accept(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | - {error, reason()}. -accept(Socket, Timeout) -> - ssl:transport_accept(Socket, Timeout). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -%% Description: Performs accept on an ssl listen socket. e.i. performs -%% ssl handshake. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - --spec handshake(#sslsocket{}) -> ok | {error, reason()}. - -handshake(ListenSocket) -> - handshake(ListenSocket, infinity). - - --spec handshake(#sslsocket{} | port(), timeout()| [ssl_option() - | transport_option()]) -> - ok | {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - -handshake(#sslsocket{} = Socket, Timeout) -> - ssl:ssl_accept(Socket, Timeout); - -handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions) when is_port(ListenSocket) -> - handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions, infinity). - - --spec handshake(port(), [ssl_option()| transport_option()], timeout()) -> - {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - -handshake(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket) -> - ssl:ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl index 53b46542e7..721689da8b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2019. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -36,22 +36,21 @@ %% Internal application API %% Setup --export([start_fsm/8, start_link/7, init/1]). +-export([start_fsm/8, start_link/7, init/1, pids/1]). %% State transition handling --export([next_record/1, next_event/3, next_event/4, handle_common_event/4]). +-export([next_event/3, next_event/4, handle_protocol_record/3]). %% Handshake handling -export([renegotiate/2, send_handshake/2, queue_handshake/2, queue_change_cipher/2, - reinit_handshake_data/1, select_sni_extension/1, empty_connection_state/2]). + reinit/1, reinit_handshake_data/1, select_sni_extension/1, empty_connection_state/2]). %% Alert and close handling --export([encode_alert/3,send_alert/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). +-export([encode_alert/3, send_alert/2, send_alert_in_connection/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). %% Data handling --export([encode_data/3, passive_receive/2, next_record_if_active/1, - send/3, socket/5, setopts/3, getopts/3]). +-export([socket/4, setopts/3, getopts/3]). %% gen_statem state functions -export([init/3, error/3, downgrade/3, %% Initiation and take down states @@ -72,7 +71,7 @@ start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} try {ok, Pid} = dtls_connection_sup:start_child([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Opts, User, CbInfo]), - {ok, SslSocket} = ssl_connection:socket_control(?MODULE, Socket, Pid, CbModule, Tracker), + {ok, SslSocket} = ssl_connection:socket_control(?MODULE, Socket, [Pid], CbModule, Tracker), ssl_connection:handshake(SslSocket, Timeout) catch error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} -> @@ -80,7 +79,7 @@ start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> +-spec start_link(atom(), ssl:host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Creates a gen_statem process which calls Module:init/1 to @@ -91,20 +90,27 @@ start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) -> init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]) -> process_flag(trap_exit, true), - State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), + State0 = #state{protocol_specific = Map} = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), try State = ssl_connection:ssl_config(State0#state.ssl_options, Role, State0), gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], init, State) catch throw:Error -> - gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error,State0}) + EState = State0#state{protocol_specific = Map#{error => Error}}, + gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, EState) end. + +pids(_) -> + [self()]. + %%==================================================================== %% State transition handling %%==================================================================== -next_record(#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = State) when N > 0 -> - {no_record, State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}; - +next_record(#state{handshake_env = + #handshake_env{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = HsEnv} + = State) when N > 0 -> + {no_record, State#state{handshake_env = + HsEnv#handshake_env{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}}; next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch} = CT | Rest]} = Buffers, @@ -136,14 +142,14 @@ next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, connection_states = ConnectionStates}); -next_record(#state{role = server, - socket = {Listener, {Client, _}}} = State) -> +next_record(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server, + socket = {Listener, {Client, _}}}} = State) -> dtls_packet_demux:active_once(Listener, Client, self()), {no_record, State}; -next_record(#state{role = client, - socket = {_Server, Socket} = DTLSSocket, - close_tag = CloseTag, - transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> +next_record(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client, + socket = {_Server, Socket} = DTLSSocket, + close_tag = CloseTag, + transport_cb = Transport}} = State) -> case dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]) of ok -> {no_record, State}; @@ -157,9 +163,9 @@ next_record(State) -> next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). -next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, +next_event(StateName, no_record, #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> - case next_record_if_active(State0) of + case next_record(State0) of {no_record, State} -> ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); {#ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, @@ -173,21 +179,18 @@ next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, {#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, type = ?HANDSHAKE, version = _Version}, State1} = _Record when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> - {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State1, CurrentEpoch), - {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State2), - next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); + {State, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State1, CurrentEpoch), + next_event(StateName, no_record, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); %% From FLIGHT perspective CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC is treated as a handshake {#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, version = _Version}, State1} = _Record when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> - {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State1, CurrentEpoch), - {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State2), - next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); + {State, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State1, CurrentEpoch), + next_event(StateName, no_record, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); {#ssl_tls{epoch = _Epoch, - version = _Version}, State1} -> + version = _Version}, State} -> %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch - {Record, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions); + next_event(StateName, no_record, State, Actions); {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} end; @@ -205,24 +208,20 @@ next_event(connection = StateName, Record, #ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, type = ?HANDSHAKE, version = _Version} when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> - {State1, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State0, CurrentEpoch), - {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); + {State, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State0, CurrentEpoch), + next_event(StateName, no_record, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); %% From FLIGHT perspective CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC is treated as a handshake #ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, version = _Version} when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> - {State1, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State0, CurrentEpoch), - {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); + {State, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State0, CurrentEpoch), + next_event(StateName, no_record, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); _ -> next_event(StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) end; next_event(StateName, Record, #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> case Record of - no_record -> - {next_state, StateName, State0, Actions}; #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, version = Version} = Record -> State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State0), @@ -231,44 +230,49 @@ next_event(StateName, Record, #ssl_tls{epoch = _Epoch, version = _Version} = _Record -> %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch - {Record, State} = next_record(State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions); + next_event(StateName, no_record, State0, Actions); #alert{} = Alert -> {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} end. -handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State); +%%% DTLS record protocol level application data messages + +handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName0, State0) -> + case ssl_connection:read_application_data(Data, State0) of + {stop, _, _} = Stop-> + Stop; + {Record, State1} -> + {next_state, StateName, State, Actions} = next_event(StateName0, Record, State1), + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions) + end; %%% DTLS record protocol level handshake messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, +handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = Buffers0, - negotiated_version = Version} = State0) -> + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> try case dtls_handshake:get_dtls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffers0) of {[], Buffers} -> - {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers}), - next_event(StateName, Record, State); + next_event(StateName, no_record, State#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers}); {Packets, Buffers} -> - State = State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers}, + HsEnv = State#state.handshake_env, Events = dtls_handshake_events(Packets), {next_state, StateName, - State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}, Events} + State#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers, + handshake_env = + HsEnv#handshake_env{unprocessed_handshake_events + = unprocessed_events(Events)}}, Events} end catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0) + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) end; -%%% DTLS record protocol level application data messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {application_data, Data}}]}; %%% DTLS record protocol level change cipher messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> +handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = Data}}]}; %%% DTLS record protocol level Alert messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> +handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> case decode_alerts(EncAlerts) of Alerts = [_|_] -> handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, StateName, State}); @@ -276,32 +280,31 @@ handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, Sta handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) end; %% Ignore unknown TLS record level protocol messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State}. +handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, []}. %%==================================================================== %% Handshake handling %%==================================================================== -renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State, Actions) -> +renegotiate(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}} = State, Actions) -> %% Handle same way as if server requested %% the renegotiation {next_state, connection, State, [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]}; -renegotiate(#state{role = server} = State0, Actions) -> +renegotiate(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}} = State0, Actions) -> HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(), State1 = prepare_flight(State0), - {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake(HelloRequest, State1), - {Record, State} = next_record(State2), - next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions ++ MoreActions). + {State, MoreActions} = send_handshake(HelloRequest, State1), + next_event(hello, no_record, State, Actions ++ MoreActions). send_handshake(Handshake, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> #{epoch := Epoch} = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), send_handshake_flight(queue_handshake(Handshake, State), Epoch). -queue_handshake(Handshake0, #state{tls_handshake_history = Hist0, - negotiated_version = Version, +queue_handshake(Handshake0, #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist0} = HsEnv, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, flight_buffer = #{handshakes := HsBuffer0, change_cipher_spec := undefined, next_sequence := Seq} = Flight0} = State) -> @@ -309,17 +312,17 @@ queue_handshake(Handshake0, #state{tls_handshake_history = Hist0, Hist = update_handshake_history(Handshake0, Handshake, Hist0), State#state{flight_buffer = Flight0#{handshakes => [Handshake | HsBuffer0], next_sequence => Seq +1}, - tls_handshake_history = Hist}; + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist}}; -queue_handshake(Handshake0, #state{tls_handshake_history = Hist0, - negotiated_version = Version, +queue_handshake(Handshake0, #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist0} = HsEnv, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, flight_buffer = #{handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Buffer0, next_sequence := Seq} = Flight0} = State) -> Handshake = dtls_handshake:encode_handshake(Handshake0, Version, Seq), Hist = update_handshake_history(Handshake0, Handshake, Hist0), State#state{flight_buffer = Flight0#{handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec => [Handshake | Buffer0], next_sequence => Seq +1}, - tls_handshake_history = Hist}. + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist}}. queue_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, #state{flight_buffer = Flight, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> @@ -327,11 +330,18 @@ queue_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, #state{flight_buffer = Flight, dtls_record:next_epoch(ConnectionStates0, write), State#state{flight_buffer = Flight#{change_cipher_spec => ChangeCipher}, connection_states = ConnectionStates}. -reinit_handshake_data(#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers} = State) -> - State#state{premaster_secret = undefined, - public_key_info = undefined, - tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), - flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT}, + +reinit(State) -> + %% To be API compatible with TLS NOOP here + reinit_handshake_data(State). +reinit_handshake_data(#state{static_env = #static_env{data_tag = DataTag}, + protocol_buffers = Buffers, + protocol_specific = PS, + handshake_env = HsEnv} = State) -> + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), + public_key_info = undefined, + premaster_secret = undefined}, + protocol_specific = PS#{flight_state => initial_flight_state(DataTag)}, flight_buffer = new_flight(), protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{ @@ -355,15 +365,19 @@ empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) -> dtls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates). -send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, +send_alert(Alert, #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. +send_alert_in_connection(Alert, State) -> + _ = send_alert(Alert, State), + ok. + close(downgrade, _,_,_,_) -> ok; %% Other @@ -377,33 +391,13 @@ protocol_name() -> %% Data handling %%==================================================================== -encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> - dtls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0). - -passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) -> - case Buffer of - <<>> -> - {Record, State} = next_record(State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - _ -> - {Record, State} = ssl_connection:read_application_data(<<>>, State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State) - end. -next_record_if_active(State = - #state{socket_options = - #socket_options{active = false}}) -> - {no_record ,State}; - -next_record_if_active(State) -> - next_record(State). - -send(Transport, {_, {{_,_}, _} = Socket}, Data) -> - send(Transport, Socket, Data); -send(Transport, Socket, Data) -> - dtls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Data). +send(Transport, {Listener, Socket}, Data) when is_pid(Listener) -> % Server socket + dtls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Data); +send(Transport, Socket, Data) -> % Client socket + dtls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Data). -socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, _) -> - dtls_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection). +socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, _Tracker) -> + dtls_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, ?MODULE). setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) -> dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, Other). @@ -422,44 +416,39 @@ getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag) -> init(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, - #state{host = Host, port = Port, role = client, + #state{static_env = #static_env{host = Host, + port = Port, + role = client, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}}, + connection_env = CEnv, ssl_options = SslOpts, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, - session_cache = Cache, - session_cache_cb = CacheCb + connection_states = ConnectionStates0 } = State0) -> - Timer = ssl_connection:start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, From), Hello = dtls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version, HelloVersion = dtls_record:hello_version(Version, SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), - State1 = prepare_flight(State0#state{negotiated_version = Version}), - {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State1#state{negotiated_version = HelloVersion}), - State3 = State2#state{negotiated_version = Version, %% Requested version + State1 = prepare_flight(State0#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}), + {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State1#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = HelloVersion}}), + State = State2#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, %% RequestedVersion session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}, - start_or_recv_from = From, - timer = Timer, - flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT} - }, - {Record, State} = next_record(State3), - next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions); -init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{role = server, data_tag = udp} = State) -> + start_or_recv_from = From}, + + next_event(hello, no_record, State, [{{timeout, handshake}, Timeout, close} | Actions]); +init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + protocol_specific = PS} = State) -> Result = gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, - State#state{flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT}, - protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), - previous_cookie_secret => <<>>, - ignored_alerts => 0, - max_ignored_alerts => 10}}), + State#state{protocol_specific = PS#{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), + previous_cookie_secret => <<>>, + ignored_alerts => 0, + max_ignored_alerts => 10}}), erlang:send_after(dtls_v1:cookie_timeout(), self(), new_cookie_secret), Result; - -init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{role = server} = State) -> - %% I.E. DTLS over sctp - gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State#state{flight_state = reliable}); init(Type, Event, State) -> gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). @@ -470,9 +459,10 @@ init(Type, Event, State) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- error(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; -error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, {Error, State}) -> - ssl_connection:stop_and_reply( - normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State); +error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, + #state{protocol_specific = #{error := Error}} = State) -> + {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, normal}, + [{reply, From, {error, Error}}], State}; error({call, _} = Call, Msg, State) -> gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Call, Msg, State); error(_, _, _) -> @@ -484,16 +474,18 @@ error(_, _, _) -> #state{}) -> gen_statem:state_function_result(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -hello(enter, _, #state{role = server} = State) -> +hello(enter, _, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}} = State) -> {keep_state, State}; -hello(enter, _, #state{role = client} = State0) -> +hello(enter, _, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}} = State0) -> {State, Actions} = handle_flight_timer(State0), {keep_state, State, Actions}; hello(internal, #client_hello{cookie = <<>>, client_version = Version} = Hello, - #state{role = server, - transport_cb = Transport, - socket = Socket, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket}, + handshake_env = HsEnv, + connection_env = CEnv, protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret := Secret}} = State0) -> {ok, {IP, Port}} = dtls_socket:peername(Transport, Socket), Cookie = dtls_handshake:cookie(Secret, IP, Port, Hello), @@ -504,49 +496,61 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{cookie = <<>>, %% version 1.0 regardless of the version of TLS that is expected to be %% negotiated. VerifyRequest = dtls_handshake:hello_verify_request(Cookie, ?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_VERSION), - State1 = prepare_flight(State0#state{negotiated_version = Version}), - {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(VerifyRequest, State1), - {Record, State} = next_record(State2), - next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State#state{tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history()}, Actions); -hello(internal, #hello_verify_request{cookie = Cookie}, #state{role = client, - host = Host, port = Port, + State1 = prepare_flight(State0#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}), + {State, Actions} = send_handshake(VerifyRequest, State1), + next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{ + tls_handshake_history = + ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history()}}, + Actions); +hello(internal, #hello_verify_request{cookie = Cookie}, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client, + host = Host, + port = Port, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = HsEnv, + connection_env = CEnv, ssl_options = SslOpts, session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert} = Session0, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, - session_cache = Cache, - session_cache_cb = CacheCb + connection_states = ConnectionStates0 } = State0) -> Hello = dtls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, Cookie, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert), Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version, - State1 = prepare_flight(State0#state{tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history()}), + State1 = prepare_flight(State0#state{handshake_env = + HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history + = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history()}}), {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State1), - State3 = State2#state{negotiated_version = Version, %% Requested version - session = - Session0#session{session_id = - Hello#client_hello.session_id}}, - {Record, State} = next_record(State3), - next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State, Actions); -hello(internal, #client_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, - start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> + State = State2#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, %% Requested version + session = + Session0#session{session_id = + Hello#client_hello.session_id}}, + next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State, Actions); +hello(internal, #client_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, + #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, + handshake_env = HsEnv, + start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, - hello = Hello}, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{hello = Hello}}, [{reply, From, {ok, ssl_connection:map_extensions(Extensions)}}]}; -hello(internal, #server_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, - start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> +hello(internal, #server_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, + #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, + handshake_env = HsEnv, + start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, - hello = Hello}, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{hello = Hello}}, [{reply, From, {ok, ssl_connection:map_extensions(Extensions)}}]}; -hello(internal, #client_hello{cookie = Cookie} = Hello, #state{role = server, - transport_cb = Transport, - socket = Socket, + +hello(internal, #client_hello{cookie = Cookie} = Hello, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket}, protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret := Secret, - previous_cookie_secret := PSecret}} = State0) -> + previous_cookie_secret := PSecret} + } = State0) -> {ok, {IP, Port}} = dtls_socket:peername(Transport, Socket), case dtls_handshake:cookie(Secret, IP, Port, Hello) of Cookie -> @@ -561,11 +565,12 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{cookie = Cookie} = Hello, #state{role = server, end end; hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, - #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = ReqVersion, - role = client, - renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, - ssl_options = SslOptions} = State) -> + #state{ + static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = ReqVersion}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = SslOptions} = State) -> case dtls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOptions, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); @@ -581,8 +586,7 @@ hello(internal, {handshake, {#hello_verify_request{} = Handshake, _}}, State) -> {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{next_event, internal, Handshake}]}; hello(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, State0) -> {State1, Actions0} = send_handshake_flight(State0, retransmit_epoch(?FUNCTION_NAME, State0)), - {Record, State2} = next_record(State1), - {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Actions} = next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State2, Actions0), + {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Actions} = next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State1, Actions0), %% This will reset the retransmission timer by repeating the enter state event {repeat_state, State, Actions}; hello(info, Event, State) -> @@ -612,10 +616,11 @@ abbreviated(internal = Type, ConnectionStates1 = dtls_record:save_current_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), ConnectionStates = dtls_record:next_epoch(ConnectionStates1, read), gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}); -abbreviated(internal = Type, #finished{} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> +abbreviated(internal = Type, #finished{} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + protocol_specific = PS} = State) -> gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, prepare_flight(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - flight_state = connection})); + protocol_specific = PS#{flight_state => connection}})); abbreviated(state_timeout, Event, State) -> handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); abbreviated(Type, Event, State) -> @@ -633,8 +638,7 @@ certify(internal = Type, #server_hello_done{} = Event, State) -> ssl_connection:certify(Type, Event, prepare_flight(State), ?MODULE); certify(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, State0) -> {State1, Actions0} = send_handshake_flight(State0, retransmit_epoch(?FUNCTION_NAME, State0)), - {Record, State2} = next_record(State1), - {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Actions} = next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State2, Actions0), + {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Actions} = next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State1, Actions0), %% This will reset the retransmission timer by repeating the enter state event {repeat_state, State, Actions}; certify(state_timeout, Event, State) -> @@ -656,10 +660,11 @@ cipher(internal = Type, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>} = Event, ConnectionStates1 = dtls_record:save_current_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), ConnectionStates = dtls_record:next_epoch(ConnectionStates1, read), ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, ?MODULE); -cipher(internal = Type, #finished{} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> +cipher(internal = Type, #finished{} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + protocol_specific = PS} = State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, prepare_flight(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - flight_state = connection}), + protocol_specific = PS#{flight_state => connection}}), ?MODULE); cipher(state_timeout, Event, State) -> handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); @@ -675,39 +680,53 @@ connection(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; connection(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); -connection(internal, #hello_request{}, #state{host = Host, port = Port, +connection(internal, #hello_request{}, #state{static_env = #static_env{host = Host, + port = Port, + data_tag = DataTag, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb + }, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{ renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}}, + connection_env = CEnv, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, - session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb, ssl_options = SslOpts, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = State0) -> + protocol_specific = PS + } = State0) -> Hello = dtls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version, HelloVersion = dtls_record:hello_version(Version, SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), State1 = prepare_flight(State0), - {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State1#state{negotiated_version = HelloVersion}), - {Record, State} = - next_record( - State2#state{flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT}, - session = Session0#session{session_id - = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}), - next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions); -connection(internal, #client_hello{} = Hello, #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = true} = State) -> + {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State1#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = HelloVersion}}), + State = State2#state{protocol_specific = PS#{flight_state => initial_flight_state(DataTag)}, + session = Session0#session{session_id + = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}, + next_event(hello, no_record, State, Actions); +connection(internal, #client_hello{} = Hello, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{allow_renegotiate = true} = HsEnv} = State) -> %% Mitigate Computational DoS attack %% http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2011/10/ssltls_and_computational_dos.html %% http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/ Rather than disabling client %% initiated renegotiation we will disallow many client initiated %% renegotiations immediately after each other. erlang:send_after(?WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, self(), allow_renegotiate), - {next_state, hello, State#state{allow_renegotiate = false, renegotiation = {true, peer}}, + {next_state, hello, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, peer}, + allow_renegotiate = false}}, [{next_event, internal, Hello}]}; -connection(internal, #client_hello{}, #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = false} = State0) -> +connection(internal, #client_hello{}, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{allow_renegotiate = false}} = State0) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION), State1 = send_alert(Alert, State0), {Record, State} = ssl_connection:prepare_connection(State1, ?MODULE), next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State); +connection({call, From}, {application_data, Data}, State) -> + try + send_application_data(Data, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) + catch throw:Error -> + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, Error}]) + end; connection(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). @@ -752,33 +771,44 @@ initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, _}, User, end, Monitor = erlang:monitor(process, User), - - #state{socket_options = SocketOptions, + InitStatEnv = #static_env{ + role = Role, + transport_cb = CbModule, + protocol_cb = ?MODULE, + data_tag = DataTag, + close_tag = CloseTag, + error_tag = ErrorTag, + host = Host, + port = Port, + socket = Socket, + session_cache_cb = SessionCacheCb + }, + + #state{static_env = InitStatEnv, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{ + tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), + renegotiation = {false, first}, + allow_renegotiate = SSLOptions#ssl_options.client_renegotiation + }, + connection_env = #connection_env{user_application = {Monitor, User}}, + socket_options = SocketOptions, %% We do not want to save the password in the state so that %% could be written in the clear into error logs. ssl_options = SSLOptions#ssl_options{password = undefined}, session = #session{is_resumable = new}, - transport_cb = CbModule, - data_tag = DataTag, - close_tag = CloseTag, - error_tag = ErrorTag, - role = Role, - host = Host, - port = Port, - socket = Socket, connection_states = ConnectionStates, protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{}, - user_application = {Monitor, User}, - user_data_buffer = <<>>, - session_cache_cb = SessionCacheCb, - renegotiation = {false, first}, - allow_renegotiate = SSLOptions#ssl_options.client_renegotiation, + user_data_buffer = {[],0,[]}, start_or_recv_from = undefined, - protocol_cb = ?MODULE, flight_buffer = new_flight(), - flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT} + protocol_specific = #{flight_state => initial_flight_state(DataTag)} }. +initial_flight_state(udp)-> + {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT}; +initial_flight_state(_) -> + reliable. + next_dtls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{ dtls_record_buffer = Buf0, dtls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers} = State0) -> @@ -796,7 +826,7 @@ next_dtls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{ acceptable_record_versions(hello, _) -> [dtls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS]; -acceptable_record_versions(_, #state{negotiated_version = Version}) -> +acceptable_record_versions(_, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}) -> [Version]. dtls_handshake_events(Packets) -> @@ -815,19 +845,22 @@ decode_cipher_text(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts {Alert, State} end. -dtls_version(hello, Version, #state{role = server} = State) -> - State#state{negotiated_version = Version}; %%Inital version +dtls_version(hello, Version, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + connection_env = CEnv} = State) -> + State#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}; %%Inital version dtls_version(_,_, State) -> State. handle_client_hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, - renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, - session_cache = Cache, - session_cache_cb = CacheCb, - negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol, - key_algorithm = KeyExAlg, + static_env = #static_env{port = Port, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KeyExAlg, + renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, + negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol} = HsEnv, + connection_env = CEnv, + session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) -> case dtls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, @@ -842,11 +875,12 @@ handle_client_hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, end, State = prepare_flight(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - negotiated_version = Version, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, - client_hello_version = ClientVersion, - session = Session, - negotiated_protocol = Protocol}), + connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{ + hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, + client_hello_version = ClientVersion, + negotiated_protocol = Protocol}, + session = Session}), ssl_connection:hello(internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, State, ?MODULE) @@ -855,20 +889,20 @@ handle_client_hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, %% raw data from socket, unpack records handle_info({Protocol, _, _, _, Data}, StateName, - #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{data_tag = Protocol}} = State0) -> case next_dtls_record(Data, StateName, State0) of {Record, State} -> next_event(StateName, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), - ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, own_alert}, State0) + {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State0} end; handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, - #state{socket = Socket, + #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + close_tag = CloseTag}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, socket_options = #socket_options{active = Active}, - protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = CTs}, - close_tag = CloseTag, - negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = CTs}} = State) -> %% Note that as of DTLS 1.2 (TLS 1.1), %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a %% session not be resumed. This is a change from DTLS 1.0 to conform @@ -886,7 +920,7 @@ handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, ok end, ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, transport_closed}, State); + {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State}; true -> %% Fixes non-delivery of final DTLS record in {active, once}. %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again @@ -904,11 +938,11 @@ handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> ssl_connection:StateName(info, Msg, State, ?MODULE). handle_state_timeout(flight_retransmission_timeout, StateName, - #state{flight_state = {retransmit, NextTimeout}} = State0) -> - {State1, Actions0} = send_handshake_flight(State0#state{flight_state = {retransmit, NextTimeout}}, - retransmit_epoch(StateName, State0)), - {Record, State2} = next_record(State1), - {next_state, StateName, State, Actions} = next_event(StateName, Record, State2, Actions0), + #state{protocol_specific = + #{flight_state := {retransmit, _NextTimeout}}} = State0) -> + {State1, Actions0} = send_handshake_flight(State0, + retransmit_epoch(StateName, State0)), + {next_state, StateName, State, Actions} = next_event(StateName, no_record, State1, Actions0), %% This will reset the retransmission timer by repeating the enter state event {repeat_state, State, Actions}. @@ -921,8 +955,8 @@ handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) -> handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State, _Actions}) -> handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)). -handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, #state{data_tag = udp, - role = Role, +handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{data_tag = udp, + role = Role}, ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> case ignore_alert(Alert, State0) of {true, State} -> @@ -947,7 +981,7 @@ decode_alerts(Bin) -> ssl_alert:decode(Bin). gen_handshake(StateName, Type, Event, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> try ssl_connection:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of Result -> Result @@ -958,7 +992,7 @@ gen_handshake(StateName, Type, Event, Version, StateName, State) end. -gen_info(Event, connection = StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> +gen_info(Event, connection = StateName, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of Result -> Result @@ -969,7 +1003,7 @@ gen_info(Event, connection = StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = Version, StateName, State) end; -gen_info(Event, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> +gen_info(Event, StateName, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of Result -> Result @@ -1012,18 +1046,18 @@ next_flight(Flight) -> change_cipher_spec => undefined, handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec => []}. -handle_flight_timer(#state{data_tag = udp, - flight_state = {retransmit, Timeout}} = State) -> +handle_flight_timer(#state{static_env = #static_env{data_tag = udp}, + protocol_specific = #{flight_state := {retransmit, Timeout}}} = State) -> start_retransmision_timer(Timeout, State); -handle_flight_timer(#state{data_tag = udp, - flight_state = connection} = State) -> +handle_flight_timer(#state{static_env = #static_env{data_tag = udp}, + protocol_specific = #{flight_state := connection}} = State) -> {State, []}; -handle_flight_timer(State) -> +handle_flight_timer(#state{protocol_specific = #{flight_state := reliable}} = State) -> %% No retransmision needed i.e DTLS over SCTP - {State#state{flight_state = reliable}, []}. + {State, []}. -start_retransmision_timer(Timeout, State) -> - {State#state{flight_state = {retransmit, new_timeout(Timeout)}}, +start_retransmision_timer(Timeout, #state{protocol_specific = PS} = State) -> + {State#state{protocol_specific = PS#{flight_state => {retransmit, new_timeout(Timeout)}}}, [{state_timeout, Timeout, flight_retransmission_timeout}]}. new_timeout(N) when N =< 30 -> @@ -1031,11 +1065,11 @@ new_timeout(N) when N =< 30 -> new_timeout(_) -> 60. -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - flight_buffer = #{handshakes := Flight, +send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + flight_buffer = #{handshakes := Flight, change_cipher_spec := undefined}, - negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> %% TODO remove hardcoded Max size {Encoded, ConnectionStates} = @@ -1043,12 +1077,12 @@ send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, send(Transport, Socket, Encoded), {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, +send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [_|_] = Flight0, change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := []}, - negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> {HsBefore, ConnectionStates1} = encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight0), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates0), @@ -1057,12 +1091,12 @@ send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, send(Transport, Socket, [HsBefore, EncChangeCipher]), {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, +send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [_|_] = Flight0, change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Flight1}, - negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> {HsBefore, ConnectionStates1} = encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight0), Version, 1400, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates0), @@ -1073,12 +1107,12 @@ send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, send(Transport, Socket, [HsBefore, EncChangeCipher, HsAfter]), {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, +send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [], change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Flight1}, - negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates1} = encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates0), @@ -1129,3 +1163,43 @@ log_ignore_alert(true, StateName, Alert, Role) -> [Role, StateName, Txt]); log_ignore_alert(false, _, _,_) -> ok. + +send_application_data(Data, From, _StateName, + #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + handshake_env = HsEnv, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}} = State0) -> + + case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of + true -> + renegotiate(State0#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, internal}}}, + [{next_event, {call, From}, {application_data, Data}}]); + false -> + {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = + dtls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0), + State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, + case send(Transport, Socket, Msgs) of + ok -> + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(connection, State, [{reply, From, ok}]); + Result -> + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(connection, State, [{reply, From, Result}]) + end + end. + +time_to_renegotiate(_Data, + #{current_write := #{sequence_number := Num}}, + RenegotiateAt) -> + + %% We could do test: + %% is_time_to_renegotiate((erlang:byte_size(_Data) div + %% ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH) + 1, RenegotiateAt), but we chose to + %% have a some what lower renegotiateAt and a much cheaper test + is_time_to_renegotiate(Num, RenegotiateAt). + +is_time_to_renegotiate(N, M) when N < M-> + false; +is_time_to_renegotiate(_,_) -> + true. + diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl index 35c213a182..6e9bf99e52 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ %% Handshake handling %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec client_hello(host(), inet:port_number(), ssl_record:connection_states(), +-spec client_hello(ssl:host(), inet:port_number(), ssl_record:connection_states(), #ssl_options{}, integer(), atom(), boolean(), der_cert()) -> #client_hello{}. %% @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec client_hello(host(), inet:port_number(), term(), ssl_record:connection_states(), +-spec client_hello(ssl:host(), inet:port_number(), term(), ssl_record:connection_states(), #ssl_options{}, integer(), atom(), boolean(), der_cert()) -> #client_hello{}. %% @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ cookie(Key, Address, Port, #client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, Random, SessionId, CipherSuites, CompressionMethods], crypto:hmac(sha, Key, CookieData). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec hello_verify_request(binary(), dtls_record:dtls_version()) -> #hello_verify_request{}. +-spec hello_verify_request(binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> #hello_verify_request{}. %% %% Description: Creates a hello verify request message sent by server to %% verify client @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, Seq) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec get_dtls_handshake(dtls_record:dtls_version(), binary(), #protocol_buffers{}) -> +-spec get_dtls_handshake(ssl_record:ssl_version(), binary(), #protocol_buffers{}) -> {[dtls_handshake()], #protocol_buffers{}}. %% %% Description: Given buffered and new data from dtls_record, collects @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); _ -> - #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, TLSVersion) of #alert{} = Alert -> @@ -215,8 +215,6 @@ handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, HelloExt, dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt} -> {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} catch throw:Alert -> @@ -225,17 +223,16 @@ handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> - case ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions(dtls_record, Random, CipherSuite, - Compression, HelloExt, - dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), - SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; + try ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions(dtls_record, Random, CipherSuite, + Compression, HelloExt, + dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), + SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of {ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} -> {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} + catch throw:Alert -> + Alert end. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- enc_handshake(#hello_verify_request{protocol_version = {Major, Minor}, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl index 50e92027d2..41da8e5c8c 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ -define(dtls_handshake, true). -include("ssl_handshake.hrl"). %% Common TLS and DTLS records and Constantes +-include("ssl_api.hrl"). -define(HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, 3). -define(HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_VERSION, {254, 255}). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl index 1497c77cf3..092366b7c0 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl @@ -144,11 +144,11 @@ handle_info({Transport, Socket, IP, InPortNo, _} = Msg, #state{listener = Socket %% UDP socket does not have a connection and should not receive an econnreset %% This does however happens on some windows versions. Just ignoring it %% appears to make things work as expected! -handle_info({Error, Socket, econnreset = Error}, #state{listener = Socket, transport = {_,_,_, udp_error}} = State) -> +handle_info({udp_error, Socket, econnreset = Error}, #state{listener = Socket, transport = {_,_,_, udp_error}} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("Ignore SSL UDP Listener: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Error]), error_logger:info_report(Report), {noreply, State}; -handle_info({Error, Socket, Error}, #state{listener = Socket, transport = {_,_,_, Error}} = State) -> +handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Error}, #state{listener = Socket, transport = {_,_,_, ErrorTag}} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL Packet muliplxer shutdown: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Error]), error_logger:info_report(Report), {noreply, State#state{close=true}}; @@ -297,6 +297,9 @@ do_set_emulated_opts([], Opts) -> Opts; do_set_emulated_opts([{mode, Value} | Rest], Opts) -> do_set_emulated_opts(Rest, Opts#socket_options{mode = Value}); +do_set_emulated_opts([{active, N0} | Rest], Opts=#socket_options{active = Active}) when is_integer(N0) -> + N = tls_socket:update_active_n(N0, Active), + do_set_emulated_opts(Rest, Opts#socket_options{active = N}); do_set_emulated_opts([{active, Value} | Rest], Opts) -> do_set_emulated_opts(Rest, Opts#socket_options{active = Value}). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl index 9eb0d8e2d7..2fe875da31 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2019. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -49,9 +49,8 @@ is_acceptable_version/2, hello_version/2]). --export_type([dtls_version/0, dtls_atom_version/0]). +-export_type([dtls_atom_version/0]). --type dtls_version() :: ssl_record:ssl_version(). -type dtls_atom_version() :: dtlsv1 | 'dtlsv1.2'. -define(REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE, 64). @@ -135,7 +134,7 @@ set_connection_state_by_epoch(ReadState, Epoch, #{saved_read := #{epoch := Epoch States#{saved_read := ReadState}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec init_connection_state_seq(dtls_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> +-spec init_connection_state_seq(ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> ssl_record:connection_state(). %% %% Description: Copy the read sequence number to the write sequence number @@ -163,7 +162,7 @@ current_connection_state_epoch(#{current_write := #{epoch := Epoch}}, Epoch. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec get_dtls_records(binary(), [dtls_version()], binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. +-spec get_dtls_records(binary(), [ssl_record:ssl_version()], binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Given old buffer and new data from UDP/SCTP, packs up a records %% and returns it as a list of tls_compressed binaries also returns leftover @@ -188,7 +187,7 @@ get_dtls_records(Data, Versions, Buffer) -> %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec encode_handshake(iolist(), dtls_version(), integer(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> +-spec encode_handshake(iolist(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), integer(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. % %% Description: Encodes a handshake message to send on the ssl-socket. @@ -198,7 +197,7 @@ encode_handshake(Frag, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec encode_alert_record(#alert{}, dtls_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> +-spec encode_alert_record(#alert{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. %% %% Description: Encodes an alert message to send on the ssl-socket. @@ -210,7 +209,7 @@ encode_alert_record(#alert{level = Level, description = Description}, ConnectionStates). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec encode_change_cipher_spec(dtls_version(), integer(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> +-spec encode_change_cipher_spec(ssl_record:ssl_version(), integer(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. %% %% Description: Encodes a change_cipher_spec-message to send on the ssl socket. @@ -219,7 +218,7 @@ encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates) -> encode_plain_text(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, Version, Epoch, ?byte(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC_PROTO), ConnectionStates). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec encode_data(binary(), dtls_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> +-spec encode_data(binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> {iolist(),ssl_record:connection_states()}. %% %% Description: Encodes data to send on the ssl-socket. @@ -248,8 +247,8 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch} = CipherText, ConnnectionStates0) -> %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec protocol_version(dtls_atom_version() | dtls_version()) -> - dtls_version() | dtls_atom_version(). +-spec protocol_version(dtls_atom_version() | ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + ssl_record:ssl_version() | dtls_atom_version(). %% %% Description: Creates a protocol version record from a version atom %% or vice versa. @@ -263,7 +262,7 @@ protocol_version({254, 253}) -> protocol_version({254, 255}) -> dtlsv1. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec lowest_protocol_version(dtls_version(), dtls_version()) -> dtls_version(). +-spec lowest_protocol_version(ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> ssl_record:ssl_version(). %% %% Description: Lowes protocol version of two given versions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -277,7 +276,7 @@ lowest_protocol_version(_,Version) -> Version. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec lowest_protocol_version([dtls_version()]) -> dtls_version(). +-spec lowest_protocol_version([ssl_record:ssl_version()]) -> ssl_record:ssl_version(). %% %% Description: Lowest protocol version present in a list %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ lowest_protocol_version(Versions) -> lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, Vers). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec highest_protocol_version([dtls_version()]) -> dtls_version(). +-spec highest_protocol_version([ssl_record:ssl_version()]) -> ssl_record:ssl_version(). %% %% Description: Highest protocol version present in a list %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -299,7 +298,7 @@ highest_protocol_version(Versions) -> highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, Vers). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec highest_protocol_version(dtls_version(), dtls_version()) -> dtls_version(). +-spec highest_protocol_version(ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> ssl_record:ssl_version(). %% %% Description: Highest protocol version of two given versions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -315,7 +314,7 @@ highest_protocol_version(_,Version) -> Version. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec is_higher(V1 :: dtls_version(), V2::dtls_version()) -> boolean(). +-spec is_higher(V1 :: ssl_record:ssl_version(), V2::ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> boolean(). %% %% Description: Is V1 > V2 %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -327,7 +326,7 @@ is_higher(_, _) -> false. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec supported_protocol_versions() -> [dtls_version()]. +-spec supported_protocol_versions() -> [ssl_record:ssl_version()]. %% %% Description: Protocol versions supported %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -370,7 +369,7 @@ supported_protocol_versions([_|_] = Vsns) -> end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec is_acceptable_version(dtls_version(), Supported :: [dtls_version()]) -> boolean(). +-spec is_acceptable_version(ssl_record:ssl_version(), Supported :: [ssl_record:ssl_version()]) -> boolean(). %% %% Description: ssl version 2 is not acceptable security risks are too big. %% @@ -378,7 +377,7 @@ supported_protocol_versions([_|_] = Vsns) -> is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) -> lists:member(Version, Versions). --spec hello_version(dtls_version(), [dtls_version()]) -> dtls_version(). +-spec hello_version(ssl_record:ssl_version(), [ssl_record:ssl_version()]) -> ssl_record:ssl_version(). hello_version(Version, Versions) -> case dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version) of TLSVersion when TLSVersion >= {3, 3} -> @@ -499,23 +498,22 @@ encode_dtls_cipher_text(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Fragment, WriteState#{sequence_number => Seq + 1}}. encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{compression_state := CompS0, + cipher_state := CipherS0, epoch := Epoch, sequence_number := Seq, - cipher_state := CipherS0, security_parameters := #security_parameters{ cipher_type = ?AEAD, - bulk_cipher_algorithm = - BulkCipherAlgo, + bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCAlg, compression_algorithm = CompAlg} } = WriteState0) -> {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0), - AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, Epoch, Seq), + AAD = start_additional_data(Type, Version, Epoch, Seq), + CipherS = ssl_record:nonce_seed(BCAlg, <<?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(Seq)>>, CipherS0), + WriteState = WriteState0#{compression_state => CompS1, + cipher_state => CipherS}, TLSVersion = dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), - {CipherFragment, CipherS1} = - ssl_cipher:cipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, Seq, AAD, Comp, TLSVersion), - {CipherFragment, WriteState0#{compression_state => CompS1, - cipher_state => CipherS1}}; + ssl_record:cipher_aead(TLSVersion, Comp, WriteState, AAD); encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Fragment, #{compression_state := CompS0, epoch := Epoch, sequence_number := Seq, @@ -547,15 +545,16 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, BulkCipherAlgo, compression_algorithm = CompAlg}} = ReadState0, ConnnectionStates0) -> - AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, Epoch, Seq), + AAD = start_additional_data(Type, Version, Epoch, Seq), + CipherS = ssl_record:nonce_seed(BulkCipherAlgo, <<?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(Seq)>>, CipherS0), TLSVersion = dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), - case ssl_cipher:decipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, Seq, AAD, CipherFragment, TLSVersion) of - {PlainFragment, CipherState} -> - {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg, + case ssl_record:decipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS, AAD, CipherFragment, TLSVersion) of + PlainFragment when is_binary(PlainFragment) -> + {Plain, CompressionS} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg, PlainFragment, CompressionS0), - ReadState0 = ReadState0#{compression_state => CompressionS1, - cipher_state => CipherState}, - ReadState = update_replay_window(Seq, ReadState0), + ReadState1 = ReadState0#{compression_state := CompressionS, + cipher_state := CipherS}, + ReadState = update_replay_window(Seq, ReadState1), ConnnectionStates = set_connection_state_by_epoch(ReadState, Epoch, ConnnectionStates0, read), {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; #alert{} = Alert -> @@ -600,7 +599,7 @@ mac_hash({Major, Minor}, MacAlg, MacSecret, Epoch, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment Fragment], dtls_v1:hmac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, Value). -calc_aad(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Epoch, SeqNo) -> +start_additional_data(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Epoch, SeqNo) -> <<?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SeqNo), ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl index b26d3ae41a..4d07372e31 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl @@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ listen(Port, #config{transport_info = TransportInfo, case dtls_listener_sup:start_child([Port, TransportInfo, emulated_socket_options(EmOpts, #socket_options{}), Options ++ internal_inet_values(), SslOpts]) of {ok, Pid} -> - {ok, #sslsocket{pid = {dtls, Config#config{dtls_handler = {Pid, Port}}}}}; + Socket = #sslsocket{pid = {dtls, Config#config{dtls_handler = {Pid, Port}}}}, + check_active_n(EmOpts, Socket), + {ok, Socket}; Err = {error, _} -> Err end. @@ -48,7 +50,7 @@ accept(dtls, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}, dtls_handler = {Listner, _}}, _Timeout) -> case dtls_packet_demux:accept(Listner, self()) of {ok, Pid, Socket} -> - {ok, socket(Pid, Transport, {Listner, Socket}, ConnectionCb)}; + {ok, socket([Pid], Transport, {Listner, Socket}, ConnectionCb)}; {error, Reason} -> {error, Reason} end. @@ -73,16 +75,17 @@ close(gen_udp, {_Client, _Socket}) -> close(Transport, {_Client, Socket}) -> Transport:close(Socket). -socket(Pid, gen_udp = Transport, {{_, _}, Socket}, ConnectionCb) -> - #sslsocket{pid = Pid, +socket(Pids, gen_udp = Transport, {{_, _}, Socket}, ConnectionCb) -> + #sslsocket{pid = Pids, %% "The name "fd" is keept for backwards compatibility fd = {Transport, Socket, ConnectionCb}}; -socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, ConnectionCb) -> - #sslsocket{pid = Pid, +socket(Pids, Transport, Socket, ConnectionCb) -> + #sslsocket{pid = Pids, %% "The name "fd" is keept for backwards compatibility fd = {Transport, Socket, ConnectionCb}}. -setopts(_, #sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{dtls_handler = {ListenPid, _}}}}, Options) -> - SplitOpts = tls_socket:split_options(Options), +setopts(_, Socket = #sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{dtls_handler = {ListenPid, _}}}}, Options) -> + SplitOpts = {_, EmOpts} = tls_socket:split_options(Options), + check_active_n(EmOpts, Socket), dtls_packet_demux:set_sock_opts(ListenPid, SplitOpts); %%% Following clauses will not be called for emulated options, they are handled in the connection process setopts(gen_udp, Socket, Options) -> @@ -90,6 +93,32 @@ setopts(gen_udp, Socket, Options) -> setopts(Transport, Socket, Options) -> Transport:setopts(Socket, Options). +check_active_n(EmulatedOpts, Socket = #sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{dtls_handler = {ListenPid, _}}}}) -> + %% We check the resulting options to send an ssl_passive message if necessary. + case proplists:lookup(active, EmulatedOpts) of + %% The provided value is out of bound. + {_, N} when is_integer(N), N < -32768 -> + throw(einval); + {_, N} when is_integer(N), N > 32767 -> + throw(einval); + {_, N} when is_integer(N) -> + {ok, #socket_options{active = Active}, _} = dtls_packet_demux:get_all_opts(ListenPid), + case Active of + Atom when is_atom(Atom), N =< 0 -> + self() ! {ssl_passive, Socket}; + %% The result of the addition is out of bound. + %% We do not need to check < -32768 because Active can't be below 1. + A when is_integer(A), A + N > 32767 -> + throw(einval); + A when is_integer(A), A + N =< 0 -> + self() ! {ssl_passive, Socket}; + _ -> + ok + end; + _ -> + ok + end. + getopts(_, #sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{dtls_handler = {ListenPid, _}}}}, Options) -> SplitOpts = tls_socket:split_options(Options), dtls_packet_demux:get_sock_opts(ListenPid, SplitOpts); @@ -161,9 +190,18 @@ emulated_socket_options(InetValues, #socket_options{ mode = proplists:get_value(mode, InetValues, Mode), packet = proplists:get_value(packet, InetValues, Packet), packet_size = proplists:get_value(packet_size, InetValues, PacketSize), - active = proplists:get_value(active, InetValues, Active) + active = emulated_active_option(InetValues, Active) }. +emulated_active_option([], Active) -> + Active; +emulated_active_option([{active, Active} | _], _) when Active =< 0 -> + false; +emulated_active_option([{active, Active} | _], _) -> + Active; +emulated_active_option([_|Tail], Active) -> + emulated_active_option(Tail, Active). + emulated_options([{mode, Value} = Opt |Opts], Inet, Emulated) -> validate_inet_option(mode, Value), emulated_options(Opts, Inet, [Opt | proplists:delete(mode, Emulated)]); @@ -185,6 +223,9 @@ validate_inet_option(mode, Value) when Value =/= list, Value =/= binary -> throw({error, {options, {mode,Value}}}); validate_inet_option(active, Value) + when Value >= -32768, Value =< 32767 -> + ok; +validate_inet_option(active, Value) when Value =/= true, Value =/= false, Value =/= once -> throw({error, {options, {active,Value}}}); validate_inet_option(_, _) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl index df687f579b..b365961a6a 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl @@ -27,22 +27,22 @@ -define(COOKIE_BASE_TIMEOUT, 30000). --spec suites(Minor:: 253|255) -> [ssl_cipher:cipher_suite()]. +-spec suites(Minor:: 253|255) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. suites(Minor) -> lists:filter(fun(Cipher) -> - is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Cipher)) + is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Cipher)) end, tls_v1:suites(corresponding_minor_tls_version(Minor))). all_suites(Version) -> lists:filter(fun(Cipher) -> - is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Cipher)) + is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Cipher)) end, ssl_cipher:all_suites(corresponding_tls_version(Version))). anonymous_suites(Version) -> lists:filter(fun(Cipher) -> - is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Cipher)) + is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Cipher)) end, ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(corresponding_tls_version(Version))). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl index aa3d7e3f72..5cab35fd4b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl @@ -69,14 +69,14 @@ is_node_name(Node) -> %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- -hs_data_common(#sslsocket{pid = DistCtrl} = SslSocket) -> +hs_data_common(#sslsocket{pid = [_, DistCtrl|_]} = SslSocket) -> #hs_data{ f_send = - fun (Ctrl, Packet) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> + fun (_Ctrl, Packet) -> f_send(SslSocket, Packet) end, f_recv = - fun (Ctrl, Length, Timeout) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> + fun (_, Length, Timeout) -> f_recv(SslSocket, Length, Timeout) end, f_setopts_pre_nodeup = @@ -175,8 +175,7 @@ mf_getopts(SslSocket, Opts) -> ssl:getopts(SslSocket, Opts). f_handshake_complete(DistCtrl, Node, DHandle) -> - ssl_connection:handshake_complete(DistCtrl, Node, DHandle). - + tls_sender:dist_handshake_complete(DistCtrl, Node, DHandle). setopts_filter(Opts) -> [Opt || {K,_} = Opt <- Opts, @@ -244,7 +243,7 @@ accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel, Socket) -> trace([{active, false},{packet, 4}|Opts]), net_kernel:connecttime()) of - {ok, #sslsocket{pid = DistCtrl} = SslSocket} -> + {ok, #sslsocket{pid = [_, DistCtrl| _]} = SslSocket} -> trace( Kernel ! {accept, self(), DistCtrl, @@ -404,7 +403,7 @@ gen_accept_connection( do_accept( _Driver, AcceptPid, DistCtrl, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime, Kernel) -> - SslSocket = ssl_connection:get_sslsocket(DistCtrl), + {ok, SslSocket} = tls_sender:dist_tls_socket(DistCtrl), receive {AcceptPid, controller} -> Timer = dist_util:start_timer(SetupTime), @@ -481,22 +480,25 @@ allowed_nodes(PeerCert, Allowed, PeerIP, Node, Host) -> allowed_nodes(PeerCert, Allowed, PeerIP) end. - - setup(Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> gen_setup(inet_tcp, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime). gen_setup(Driver, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> Kernel = self(), monitor_pid( - spawn_opt( - fun() -> - do_setup( - Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, - MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) - end, - [link, {priority, max}])). + spawn_opt(setup_fun(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime), + [link, {priority, max}])). + +-spec setup_fun(_,_,_,_,_,_,_) -> fun(() -> no_return()). +setup_fun(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> + fun() -> + do_setup( + Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, + MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) + end. + +-spec do_setup(_,_,_,_,_,_,_) -> no_return(). do_setup(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> {Name, Address} = split_node(Driver, Node, LongOrShortNames), ErlEpmd = net_kernel:epmd_module(), @@ -521,6 +523,8 @@ do_setup(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> trace({getaddr_failed, Driver, Address, Other})) end. +-spec do_setup_connect(_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_) -> no_return(). + do_setup_connect(Driver, Kernel, Node, Address, Ip, TcpPort, Version, Type, MyNode, Timer) -> Opts = trace(connect_options(get_ssl_options(client))), dist_util:reset_timer(Timer), @@ -529,7 +533,7 @@ do_setup_connect(Driver, Kernel, Node, Address, Ip, TcpPort, Version, Type, MyNo [binary, {active, false}, {packet, 4}, Driver:family(), nodelay()] ++ Opts, net_kernel:connecttime()) of - {ok, #sslsocket{pid = DistCtrl} = SslSocket} -> + {ok, #sslsocket{pid = [_, DistCtrl| _]} = SslSocket} -> _ = monitor_pid(DistCtrl), ok = ssl:controlling_process(SslSocket, self()), HSData0 = hs_data_common(SslSocket), @@ -565,10 +569,10 @@ gen_close(Driver, Socket) -> %% Determine if EPMD module supports address resolving. Default %% is to use inet_tcp:getaddr/2. %% ------------------------------------------------------------ -get_address_resolver(EpmdModule, Driver) -> +get_address_resolver(EpmdModule, _Driver) -> case erlang:function_exported(EpmdModule, address_please, 3) of true -> {EpmdModule, address_please}; - _ -> {Driver, getaddr} + _ -> {erl_epmd, address_please} end. %% ------------------------------------------------------------ diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src index da281829cb..936df12e70 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ tls_v1, ssl_v3, tls_connection_sup, + tls_sender, %% DTLS dtls_connection, dtls_handshake, @@ -21,8 +22,6 @@ dtls_listener_sup, %% API ssl, %% Main API - tls, %% TLS specific - dtls, %% DTLS specific ssl_session_cache_api, %% Both TLS/SSL and DTLS ssl_config, @@ -30,6 +29,7 @@ ssl_handshake, ssl_record, ssl_cipher, + ssl_cipher_format, ssl_srp_primes, ssl_alert, ssl_listen_tracker_sup, %% may be used by DTLS over SCTP diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src index bfdd0c205b..ae4d60b6ed 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ %% -*- erlang -*- {"%VSN%", - [ +[ + {<<"9\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}, {<<"8\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}, {<<"7\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}, {<<"6\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}, @@ -9,6 +10,7 @@ {<<"3\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]} ], [ + {<<"9\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}, {<<"8\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}, {<<"7\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}, {<<"6\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl index 0f13b737ab..00a7f0a53a 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2019. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -61,16 +61,321 @@ -deprecated({ssl_accept, 2, eventually}). -deprecated({ssl_accept, 3, eventually}). +-export_type([socket/0, + sslsocket/0, + socket_option/0, + active_msgs/0, + host/0, + tls_option/0, + tls_client_option/0, + tls_server_option/0, + erl_cipher_suite/0, + old_cipher_suite/0, + ciphers/0, + cipher/0, + hash/0, + kex_algo/0, + prf_random/0, + cipher_filters/0, + sign_algo/0, + protocol_version/0, + protocol_extensions/0, + session_id/0, + error_alert/0, + tls_alert/0, + srp_param_type/0, + named_curve/0]). + +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +-type socket() :: gen_tcp:socket(). % exported +-type socket_option() :: gen_tcp:connect_option() | gen_tcp:listen_option() | gen_udp:option(). % exported +-type sslsocket() :: any(). % exported +-type tls_option() :: tls_client_option() | tls_server_option(). % exported +-type tls_client_option() :: client_option() | common_option() | socket_option() | transport_option(). % exported +-type tls_server_option() :: server_option() | common_option() | socket_option() | transport_option(). % exported +-type active_msgs() :: {ssl, sslsocket(), Data::binary() | list()} | {ssl_closed, sslsocket()} | + {ssl_error, sslsocket(), Reason::any()} | {ssl_passive, sslsocket()}. % exported +-type transport_option() :: {cb_info, {CallbackModule::atom(), DataTag::atom(), + ClosedTag::atom(), ErrTag::atom()}} | + {cb_info, {CallbackModule::atom(), DataTag::atom(), + ClosedTag::atom(), ErrTag::atom(), PassiveTag::atom()}}. +-type host() :: hostname() | ip_address(). % exported +-type hostname() :: string(). +-type ip_address() :: inet:ip_address(). +-type session_id() :: binary(). +-type protocol_version() :: tls_version() | dtls_version(). +-type tls_version() :: tlsv1 | 'tlsv1.1' | 'tlsv1.2' | 'tlsv1.3' | legacy_version(). +-type dtls_version() :: 'dtlsv1' | 'dtlsv1.2'. +-type legacy_version() :: sslv3. +-type verify_type() :: verify_none | verify_peer. +-type cipher() :: aes_128_cbc | + aes_256_cbc | + aes_128_gcm | + aes_256_gcm | + chacha20_poly1305 | + legacy_cipher(). % exported +-type legacy_cipher() :: rc4_128 | + des_cbc | + '3des_ede_cbc'. + +-type hash() :: sha | + sha2() | + legacy_hash(). % exported + +-type sha2() :: sha224 | + sha256 | + sha384 | + sha512. + +-type legacy_hash() :: md5. + +-type sign_algo() :: rsa | dsa | ecdsa. % exported + +-type kex_algo() :: rsa | + dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | + ecdhe_ecdsa | ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa | + srp_rsa| srp_dss | + psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | + dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon. + +-type erl_cipher_suite() :: #{key_exchange := kex_algo(), + cipher := cipher(), + mac := hash() | aead, + prf := hash() | default_prf %% Old cipher suites, version dependent + }. + +-type old_cipher_suite() :: {kex_algo(), cipher(), hash()} % Pre TLS 1.2 + %% TLS 1.2, internally PRE TLS 1.2 will use default_prf + | {kex_algo(), cipher(), hash() | aead, hash()}. + +-type named_curve() :: sect571r1 | + sect571k1 | + secp521r1 | + brainpoolP512r1 | + sect409k1 | + sect409r1 | + brainpoolP384r1 | + secp384r1 | + sect283k1 | + sect283r1 | + brainpoolP256r1 | + secp256k1 | + secp256r1 | + sect239k1 | + sect233k1 | + sect233r1 | + secp224k1 | + secp224r1 | + sect193r1 | + sect193r2 | + secp192k1 | + secp192r1 | + sect163k1 | + sect163r1 | + sect163r2 | + secp160k1 | + secp160r1 | + secp160r2. % exported + +-type srp_param_type() :: srp_1024 | + srp_1536 | + srp_2048 | + srp_3072 | + srp_4096 | + srp_6144 | + srp_8192. % exported + +-type error_alert() :: {tls_alert, {tls_alert(), Description::string()}}. % exported + +-type tls_alert() :: close_notify | + unexpected_message | + bad_record_mac | + record_overflow | + handshake_failure | + bad_certificate | + unsupported_certificate | + certificate_revoked | + certificate_expired | + certificate_unknown | + illegal_parameter | + unknown_ca | + access_denied | + decode_error | + decrypt_error | + export_restriction| + protocol_version | + insufficient_security | + internal_error | + inappropriate_fallback | + user_canceled | + no_renegotiation | + unsupported_extension | + certificate_unobtainable | + unrecognized_name | + bad_certificate_status_response | + bad_certificate_hash_value | + unknown_psk_identity | + no_application_protocol. % exported + +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +-type common_option() :: {protocol, protocol()} | + {handshake, handshake_completion()} | + {cert, cert()} | + {certfile, cert_pem()} | + {key, key()} | + {keyfile, key_pem()} | + {password, key_password()} | + {ciphers, cipher_suites()} | + {secure_renegotiate, secure_renegotiation()} | + {depth, allowed_cert_chain_length()} | + {verify_fun, custom_verify()} | + {crl_check, crl_check()} | + {crl_cache, crl_cache_opts()} | + {max_handshake_size, handshake_size()} | + {partial_chain, root_fun()} | + {versions, protocol_versions()} | + {user_lookup_fun, custom_user_lookup()} | + {log_alert, log_alert()} | + {hibernate_after, hibernate_after()} | + {padding_check, padding_check()} | + {beast_mitigation, beast_mitigation()} | + {ssl_imp, ssl_imp()}. + +-type protocol() :: tls | dtls. +-type handshake_completion() :: hello | full. +-type cert() :: public_key:der_encoded(). +-type cert_pem() :: file:filename(). +-type key() :: {'RSAPrivateKey'| 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' |'PrivateKeyInfo', + public_key:der_encoded()} | + #{algorithm := rsa | dss | ecdsa, + engine := crypto:engine_ref(), + key_id := crypto:key_id(), + password => crypto:password()}. % exported +-type key_pem() :: file:filename(). +-type key_password() :: string(). +-type cipher_suites() :: ciphers(). +-type ciphers() :: [erl_cipher_suite()] | + string(). % (according to old API) exported +-type cipher_filters() :: list({key_exchange | cipher | mac | prf, + algo_filter()}). % exported +-type algo_filter() :: fun((kex_algo()|cipher()|hash()|aead|default_prf) -> true | false). +-type secure_renegotiation() :: boolean(). +-type allowed_cert_chain_length() :: integer(). +-type custom_verify() :: {Verifyfun :: fun(), InitialUserState :: term()}. +-type crl_check() :: boolean() | peer | best_effort. +-type crl_cache_opts() :: [term()]. +-type handshake_size() :: integer(). +-type hibernate_after() :: timeout(). +-type root_fun() :: fun(). +-type protocol_versions() :: [protocol_version()]. +-type signature_algs() :: [{hash(), sign_algo()}]. +-type custom_user_lookup() :: {Lookupfun :: fun(), UserState :: term()}. +-type padding_check() :: boolean(). +-type beast_mitigation() :: one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled. +-type srp_identity() :: {Username :: string(), Password :: string()}. +-type psk_identity() :: string(). +-type log_alert() :: boolean(). + +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +-type client_option() :: {verify, client_verify_type()} | + {reuse_session, client_reuse_session()} | + {reuse_sessions, client_reuse_sessions()} | + {cacerts, client_cacerts()} | + {cacertfile, client_cafile()} | + {alpn_advertised_protocols, client_alpn()} | + {client_preferred_next_protocols, client_preferred_next_protocols()} | + {psk_identity, client_psk_identity()} | + {srp_identity, client_srp_identity()} | + {server_name_indication, sni()} | + {customize_hostname_check, customize_hostname_check()} | + {signature_algs, client_signature_algs()} | + {fallback, fallback()}. + +-type client_verify_type() :: verify_type(). +-type client_reuse_session() :: session_id(). +-type client_reuse_sessions() :: boolean() | save. +-type client_cacerts() :: [public_key:der_encoded()]. +-type client_cafile() :: file:filename(). +-type app_level_protocol() :: binary(). +-type client_alpn() :: [app_level_protocol()]. +-type client_preferred_next_protocols() :: {Precedence :: server | client, + ClientPrefs :: [app_level_protocol()]} | + {Precedence :: server | client, + ClientPrefs :: [app_level_protocol()], + Default::app_level_protocol()}. +-type client_psk_identity() :: psk_identity(). +-type client_srp_identity() :: srp_identity(). +-type customize_hostname_check() :: list(). +-type sni() :: HostName :: hostname() | disable. +-type client_signature_algs() :: signature_algs(). +-type fallback() :: boolean(). +-type ssl_imp() :: new | old. + +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +-type server_option() :: {cacerts, server_cacerts()} | + {cacertfile, server_cafile()} | + {dh, dh_der()} | + {dhfile, dh_file()} | + {verify, server_verify_type()} | + {fail_if_no_peer_cert, fail_if_no_peer_cert()} | + {reuse_sessions, server_reuse_sessions()} | + {reuse_session, server_reuse_session()} | + {alpn_preferred_protocols, server_alpn()} | + {next_protocols_advertised, server_next_protocol()} | + {psk_identity, server_psk_identity()} | + {honor_cipher_order, boolean()} | + {sni_hosts, sni_hosts()} | + {sni_fun, sni_fun()} | + {honor_cipher_order, honor_cipher_order()} | + {honor_ecc_order, honor_ecc_order()} | + {client_renegotiation, client_renegotiation()}| + {signature_algs, server_signature_algs()}. + +-type server_cacerts() :: [public_key:der_encoded()]. +-type server_cafile() :: file:filename(). +-type server_alpn() :: [app_level_protocol()]. +-type server_next_protocol() :: [app_level_protocol()]. +-type server_psk_identity() :: psk_identity(). +-type dh_der() :: binary(). +-type dh_file() :: file:filename(). +-type server_verify_type() :: verify_type(). +-type fail_if_no_peer_cert() :: boolean(). +-type server_signature_algs() :: signature_algs(). +-type server_reuse_session() :: fun(). +-type server_reuse_sessions() :: boolean(). +-type sni_hosts() :: [{hostname(), [server_option() | common_option()]}]. +-type sni_fun() :: fun(). +-type honor_cipher_order() :: boolean(). +-type honor_ecc_order() :: boolean(). +-type client_renegotiation() :: boolean(). +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +-type prf_random() :: client_random | server_random. % exported +-type protocol_extensions() :: #{renegotiation_info => binary(), + signature_algs => signature_algs(), + alpn => app_level_protocol(), + srp => binary(), + next_protocol => app_level_protocol(), + ec_point_formats => [0..2], + elliptic_curves => [public_key:oid()], + sni => hostname()}. % exported +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +%%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% API +%%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec start() -> ok | {error, reason()}. --spec start(permanent | transient | temporary) -> ok | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Utility function that starts the ssl and applications %% that it depends on. %% see application(3) %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec start() -> ok | {error, reason()}. start() -> start(temporary). +-spec start(permanent | transient | temporary) -> ok | {error, reason()}. start(Type) -> case application:ensure_all_started(ssl, Type) of {ok, _} -> @@ -87,24 +392,36 @@ stop() -> application:stop(ssl). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()]) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | - {error, reason()}. --spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()] | inet:port_number(), - timeout() | list()) -> - {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. --spec connect(host() | port(), inet:port_number(), list(), timeout()) -> - {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - %% %% Description: Connect to an ssl server. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec connect(TCPSocket, TLSOptions) -> + {ok, sslsocket()} | + {error, reason()} | + {option_not_a_key_value_tuple, any()} when + TCPSocket :: socket(), + TLSOptions :: [tls_client_option()]. + connect(Socket, SslOptions) when is_port(Socket) -> connect(Socket, SslOptions, infinity). +-spec connect(TCPSocket, TLSOptions, Timeout) -> + {ok, sslsocket()} | {error, reason()} when + TCPSocket :: socket(), + TLSOptions :: [tls_client_option()], + Timeout :: timeout(); + (Host, Port, TLSOptions) -> + {ok, sslsocket()} | + {ok, sslsocket(),Ext :: protocol_extensions()} | + {error, reason()} | + {option_not_a_key_value_tuple, any()} when + Host :: host(), + Port :: inet:port_number(), + TLSOptions :: [tls_client_option()]. connect(Socket, SslOptions0, Timeout) when is_port(Socket), - (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) -> - {Transport,_,_,_} = proplists:get_value(cb_info, SslOptions0, - {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}), + (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) -> + CbInfo = handle_option(cb_info, SslOptions0, default_cb_info(tls)), + Transport = element(1, CbInfo), EmulatedOptions = tls_socket:emulated_options(), {ok, SocketValues} = tls_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, EmulatedOptions), try handle_options(SslOptions0 ++ SocketValues, client) of @@ -117,6 +434,16 @@ connect(Socket, SslOptions0, Timeout) when is_port(Socket), connect(Host, Port, Options) -> connect(Host, Port, Options, infinity). +-spec connect(Host, Port, TLSOptions, Timeout) -> + {ok, sslsocket()} | + {ok, sslsocket(),Ext :: protocol_extensions()} | + {error, reason()} | + {option_not_a_key_value_tuple, any()} when + Host :: host(), + Port :: inet:port_number(), + TLSOptions :: [tls_client_option()], + Timeout :: timeout(). + connect(Host, Port, Options, Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) -> try {ok, Config} = handle_options(Options, client, Host), @@ -132,7 +459,10 @@ connect(Host, Port, Options, Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec listen(inet:port_number(), [listen_option()]) ->{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. +-spec listen(Port, Options) -> {ok, ListenSocket} | {error, reason()} when + Port::inet:port_number(), + Options::[tls_server_option()], + ListenSocket :: sslsocket(). %% %% Description: Creates an ssl listen socket. @@ -148,16 +478,23 @@ listen(Port, Options0) -> Error end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec transport_accept(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | - {error, reason()}. --spec transport_accept(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | - {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Performs transport accept on an ssl listen socket %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec transport_accept(ListenSocket) -> {ok, SslSocket} | + {error, reason()} when + ListenSocket :: sslsocket(), + SslSocket :: sslsocket(). + transport_accept(ListenSocket) -> transport_accept(ListenSocket, infinity). +-spec transport_accept(ListenSocket, Timeout) -> {ok, SslSocket} | + {error, reason()} when + ListenSocket :: sslsocket(), + Timeout :: timeout(), + SslSocket :: sslsocket(). + transport_accept(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{connection_cb = ConnectionCb} = Config}}, Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) -> @@ -169,25 +506,40 @@ transport_accept(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec ssl_accept(#sslsocket{}) -> ok | {error, reason()}. --spec ssl_accept(#sslsocket{} | port(), timeout()| [ssl_option() - | transport_option()]) -> - ok | {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - --spec ssl_accept(#sslsocket{} | port(), [ssl_option()] | [ssl_option()| transport_option()], timeout()) -> - ok | {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Performs accept on an ssl listen socket. e.i. performs %% ssl handshake. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec ssl_accept(SslSocket) -> + ok | + {error, Reason} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Reason :: closed | timeout | error_alert(). + ssl_accept(ListenSocket) -> ssl_accept(ListenSocket, [], infinity). + +-spec ssl_accept(Socket, TimeoutOrOptions) -> + ok | + {ok, sslsocket()} | {error, Reason} when + Socket :: sslsocket() | socket(), + TimeoutOrOptions :: timeout() | [tls_server_option()], + Reason :: timeout | closed | {options, any()} | error_alert(). + ssl_accept(Socket, Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) -> ssl_accept(Socket, [], Timeout); ssl_accept(ListenSocket, SslOptions) when is_port(ListenSocket) -> ssl_accept(ListenSocket, SslOptions, infinity); ssl_accept(Socket, Timeout) -> ssl_accept(Socket, [], Timeout). + +-spec ssl_accept(Socket, Options, Timeout) -> + ok | {ok, sslsocket()} | {error, Reason} when + Socket :: sslsocket() | socket(), + Options :: [tls_server_option()], + Timeout :: timeout(), + Reason :: timeout | closed | {options, any()} | error_alert(). + ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket) -> handshake(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout); ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> @@ -198,20 +550,35 @@ ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> Error end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec handshake(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. --spec handshake(#sslsocket{} | port(), timeout()| [ssl_option() - | transport_option()]) -> - {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - --spec handshake(#sslsocket{} | port(), [ssl_option()] | [ssl_option()| transport_option()], timeout()) -> - {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Performs accept on an ssl listen socket. e.i. performs %% ssl handshake. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +%% Performs the SSL/TLS/DTLS server-side handshake. + +-spec handshake(HsSocket) -> {ok, SslSocket} | {ok, SslSocket, Ext} | {error, Reason} when + HsSocket :: sslsocket(), + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Ext :: protocol_extensions(), + Reason :: closed | timeout | error_alert(). + handshake(ListenSocket) -> handshake(ListenSocket, infinity). +-spec handshake(HsSocket, Timeout) -> {ok, SslSocket} | {ok, SslSocket, Ext} | {error, Reason} when + HsSocket :: sslsocket(), + Timeout :: timeout(), + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Ext :: protocol_extensions(), + Reason :: closed | timeout | error_alert(); + (Socket, Options) -> {ok, SslSocket} | {ok, SslSocket, Ext} | {error, Reason} when + Socket :: socket() | sslsocket(), + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Options :: [server_option()], + Ext :: protocol_extensions(), + Reason :: closed | timeout | error_alert(). + handshake(#sslsocket{} = Socket, Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) -> ssl_connection:handshake(Socket, Timeout); @@ -219,6 +586,17 @@ handshake(#sslsocket{} = Socket, Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Tim handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions) when is_port(ListenSocket) -> handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions, infinity). +-spec handshake(Socket, Options, Timeout) -> + {ok, SslSocket} | + {ok, SslSocket, Ext} | + {error, Reason} when + Socket :: socket() | sslsocket(), + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Options :: [server_option()], + Timeout :: timeout(), + Ext :: protocol_extensions(), + Reason :: closed | timeout | {options, any()} | error_alert(). + handshake(#sslsocket{} = Socket, [], Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity)-> handshake(Socket, Timeout); @@ -231,7 +609,7 @@ handshake(#sslsocket{fd = {_, _, _, Tracker}} = Socket, SslOpts, Timeout) when catch Error = {error, _Reason} -> Error end; -handshake(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {_, _, _}} = Socket, SslOpts, Timeout) when +handshake(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_], fd = {_, _, _}} = Socket, SslOpts, Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity)-> try {ok, EmOpts, _} = dtls_packet_demux:get_all_opts(Pid), @@ -242,8 +620,8 @@ handshake(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {_, _, _}} = Socket, SslOpts, Timeout) when end; handshake(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket), (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) -> - {Transport,_,_,_} = - proplists:get_value(cb_info, SslOptions, {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}), + CbInfo = handle_option(cb_info, SslOptions, default_cb_info(tls)), + Transport = element(1, CbInfo), EmulatedOptions = tls_socket:emulated_options(), {ok, SocketValues} = tls_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, EmulatedOptions), ConnetionCb = connection_cb(SslOptions), @@ -261,8 +639,12 @@ handshake(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket), %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec handshake_continue(#sslsocket{}, [ssl_option()]) -> - {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. +-spec handshake_continue(HsSocket, Options) -> + {ok, SslSocket} | {error, Reason} when + HsSocket :: sslsocket(), + Options :: [tls_client_option() | tls_server_option()], + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Reason :: closed | timeout | error_alert(). %% %% %% Description: Continues the handshke possible with newly supplied options. @@ -270,8 +652,13 @@ handshake(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket), handshake_continue(Socket, SSLOptions) -> handshake_continue(Socket, SSLOptions, infinity). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec handshake_continue(#sslsocket{}, [ssl_option()], timeout()) -> - {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. +-spec handshake_continue(HsSocket, Options, Timeout) -> + {ok, SslSocket} | {error, Reason} when + HsSocket :: sslsocket(), + Options :: [tls_client_option() | tls_server_option()], + Timeout :: timeout(), + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Reason :: closed | timeout | error_alert(). %% %% %% Description: Continues the handshke possible with newly supplied options. @@ -279,7 +666,7 @@ handshake_continue(Socket, SSLOptions) -> handshake_continue(Socket, SSLOptions, Timeout) -> ssl_connection:handshake_continue(Socket, SSLOptions, Timeout). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec handshake_cancel(#sslsocket{}) -> term(). +-spec handshake_cancel(#sslsocket{}) -> any(). %% %% Description: Cancels the handshakes sending a close alert. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -287,77 +674,103 @@ handshake_cancel(Socket) -> ssl_connection:handshake_cancel(Socket). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec close(#sslsocket{}) -> term(). +-spec close(SslSocket) -> ok | {error, Reason} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Reason :: any(). %% %% Description: Close an ssl connection %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -close(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) -> +close(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}) when is_pid(Pid) -> ssl_connection:close(Pid, {close, ?DEFAULT_TIMEOUT}); close(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{dtls_handler = {Pid, _}}}}) -> dtls_packet_demux:close(Pid); -close(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info={Transport,_, _, _}}}}) -> +close(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info={Transport,_,_,_,_}}}}) -> Transport:close(ListenSocket). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec close(#sslsocket{}, timeout() | {pid(), integer()}) -> term(). +-spec close(SslSocket, How) -> ok | {ok, port()} | {error,Reason} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + How :: timeout() | {NewController::pid(), timeout()}, + Reason :: any(). %% %% Description: Close an ssl connection %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -close(#sslsocket{pid = TLSPid}, +close(#sslsocket{pid = [TLSPid|_]}, {Pid, Timeout} = DownGrade) when is_pid(TLSPid), is_pid(Pid), (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) -> ssl_connection:close(TLSPid, {close, DownGrade}); -close(#sslsocket{pid = TLSPid}, Timeout) when is_pid(TLSPid), +close(#sslsocket{pid = [TLSPid|_]}, Timeout) when is_pid(TLSPid), (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) -> ssl_connection:close(TLSPid, {close, Timeout}); -close(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info={Transport,_, _, _}}}}, _) -> +close(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info={Transport,_,_,_,_}}}}, _) -> Transport:close(ListenSocket). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec send(#sslsocket{}, iodata()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. +-spec send(SslSocket, Data) -> ok | {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Data :: iodata(). %% %% Description: Sends data over the ssl connection %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -send(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Data) when is_pid(Pid) -> +send(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid]}, Data) when is_pid(Pid) -> ssl_connection:send(Pid, Data); +send(#sslsocket{pid = [_, Pid]}, Data) when is_pid(Pid) -> + tls_sender:send_data(Pid, erlang:iolist_to_iovec(Data)); send(#sslsocket{pid = {_, #config{transport_info={_, udp, _, _}}}}, _) -> {error,enotconn}; %% Emulate connection behaviour send(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls,_}}, _) -> {error,enotconn}; %% Emulate connection behaviour -send(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info={Transport, _, _, _}}}}, Data) -> +send(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info = Info}}}, Data) -> + Transport = element(1, Info), Transport:send(ListenSocket, Data). %% {error,enotconn} %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec recv(#sslsocket{}, integer()) -> {ok, binary()| list()} | {error, reason()}. --spec recv(#sslsocket{}, integer(), timeout()) -> {ok, binary()| list()} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Receives data when active = false %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec recv(SslSocket, Length) -> {ok, Data} | {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Length :: integer(), + Data :: binary() | list() | HttpPacket, + HttpPacket :: any(). + recv(Socket, Length) -> recv(Socket, Length, infinity). -recv(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Length, Timeout) when is_pid(Pid), + +-spec recv(SslSocket, Length, Timeout) -> {ok, Data} | {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Length :: integer(), + Data :: binary() | list() | HttpPacket, + Timeout :: timeout(), + HttpPacket :: any(). + +recv(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}, Length, Timeout) when is_pid(Pid), (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity)-> ssl_connection:recv(Pid, Length, Timeout); recv(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls,_}}, _, _) -> {error,enotconn}; recv(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, - #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}}}}, _,_) when is_port(Listen)-> + #config{transport_info = Info}}},_,_) when is_port(Listen)-> + Transport = element(1, Info), Transport:recv(Listen, 0). %% {error,enotconn} %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec controlling_process(#sslsocket{}, pid()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. +-spec controlling_process(SslSocket, NewOwner) -> ok | {error, Reason} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + NewOwner :: pid(), + Reason :: any(). %% %% Description: Changes process that receives the messages when active = true %% or once. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -controlling_process(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, NewOwner) when is_pid(Pid), is_pid(NewOwner) -> +controlling_process(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}, NewOwner) when is_pid(Pid), is_pid(NewOwner) -> ssl_connection:new_user(Pid, NewOwner); controlling_process(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls, _}}, NewOwner) when is_pid(NewOwner) -> ok; %% Meaningless but let it be allowed to conform with TLS controlling_process(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, - #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}}}}, + #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_,_}}}}, NewOwner) when is_port(Listen), is_pid(NewOwner) -> %% Meaningless but let it be allowed to conform with normal sockets @@ -365,11 +778,15 @@ controlling_process(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec connection_information(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}. +-spec connection_information(SslSocket) -> {ok, Result} | {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Result :: [{OptionName, OptionValue}], + OptionName :: atom(), + OptionValue :: any(). %% %% Description: Return SSL information for the connection %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -connection_information(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) -> +connection_information(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}) when is_pid(Pid) -> case ssl_connection:connection_information(Pid, false) of {ok, Info} -> {ok, [Item || Item = {_Key, Value} <- Info, Value =/= undefined]}; @@ -382,11 +799,16 @@ connection_information(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls,_}}) -> {error,enotconn}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec connection_information(#sslsocket{}, [atom()]) -> {ok, list()} | {error, reason()}. +-spec connection_information(SslSocket, Items) -> {ok, Result} | {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Items :: [OptionName], + Result :: [{OptionName, OptionValue}], + OptionName :: atom(), + OptionValue :: any(). %% %% Description: Return SSL information for the connection %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -connection_information(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Items) when is_pid(Pid) -> +connection_information(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}, Items) when is_pid(Pid) -> case ssl_connection:connection_information(Pid, include_security_info(Items)) of {ok, Info} -> {ok, [Item || Item = {Key, Value} <- Info, lists:member(Key, Items), @@ -396,27 +818,33 @@ connection_information(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Items) when is_pid(Pid) -> end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec peername(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, {inet:ip_address(), inet:port_number()}} | {error, reason()}. +-spec peername(SslSocket) -> {ok, {Address, Port}} | + {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Address :: inet:ip_address(), + Port :: inet:port_number(). %% %% Description: same as inet:peername/1. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -peername(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {Transport, Socket, _}}) when is_pid(Pid)-> +peername(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_], fd = {Transport, Socket,_}}) when is_pid(Pid)-> dtls_socket:peername(Transport, Socket); -peername(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {Transport, Socket, _, _}}) when is_pid(Pid)-> +peername(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_], fd = {Transport, Socket,_,_}}) when is_pid(Pid)-> tls_socket:peername(Transport, Socket); -peername(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{dtls_handler = {_Pid, _}}}}) -> +peername(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{dtls_handler = {_Pid,_}}}}) -> dtls_socket:peername(dtls, undefined); -peername(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}}}}) -> +peername(#sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_,_}}}}) -> tls_socket:peername(Transport, ListenSocket); %% Will return {error, enotconn} peername(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls,_}}) -> {error,enotconn}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec peercert(#sslsocket{}) ->{ok, DerCert::binary()} | {error, reason()}. +-spec peercert(SslSocket) -> {ok, Cert} | {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Cert :: binary(). %% %% Description: Returns the peercert. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -peercert(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) -> +peercert(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}) when is_pid(Pid) -> case ssl_connection:peer_certificate(Pid) of {ok, undefined} -> {error, no_peercert}; @@ -429,38 +857,43 @@ peercert(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, _}}) when is_port(Listen) -> {error, enotconn}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec negotiated_protocol(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}. +-spec negotiated_protocol(SslSocket) -> {ok, Protocol} | {error, Reason} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Protocol :: binary(), + Reason :: protocol_not_negotiated. %% %% Description: Returns the protocol that has been negotiated. If no %% protocol has been negotiated will return {error, protocol_not_negotiated} %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -negotiated_protocol(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) -> +negotiated_protocol(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}) when is_pid(Pid) -> ssl_connection:negotiated_protocol(Pid). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec cipher_suites() -> [ssl_cipher:old_erl_cipher_suite()] | [string()]. +-spec cipher_suites() -> [old_cipher_suite()] | [string()]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher_suites() -> cipher_suites(erlang). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec cipher_suites(erlang | openssl | all) -> - [ssl_cipher:old_erl_cipher_suite() | string()]. +-spec cipher_suites(Type) -> [old_cipher_suite() | string()] when + Type :: erlang | openssl | all. + %% Description: Returns all supported cipher suites. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher_suites(erlang) -> - [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(default)]; + [ssl_cipher_format:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(default)]; cipher_suites(openssl) -> - [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite_name(Suite) || + [ssl_cipher_format:openssl_suite_name(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(default)]; cipher_suites(all) -> - [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(all)]. + [ssl_cipher_format:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(all)]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec cipher_suites(default | all | anonymous, tls_record:tls_version() | dtls_record:dtls_version() | - tls_record:tls_atom_version() | dtls_record:dtls_atom_version()) -> - [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()]. +-spec cipher_suites(Supported, Version) -> ciphers() when + Supported :: default | all | anonymous, + Version :: protocol_version(). + %% Description: Returns all default and all supported cipher suites for a %% TLS/DTLS version %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -473,12 +906,14 @@ cipher_suites(Base, Version) when Version == 'dtlsv1.2'; Version == 'dtlsv1'-> cipher_suites(Base, dtls_record:protocol_version(Version)); cipher_suites(Base, Version) -> - [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- supported_suites(Base, Version)]. + [ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- supported_suites(Base, Version)]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec filter_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()], - [{key_exchange | cipher | mac | prf, fun()}] | []) -> - [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()]. +-spec filter_cipher_suites(Suites, Filters) -> Ciphers when + Suites :: ciphers(), + Filters :: cipher_filters(), + Ciphers :: ciphers(). + %% Description: Removes cipher suites if any of the filter functions returns false %% for any part of the cipher suite. This function also calls default filter functions %% to make sure the cipher suite are supported by crypto. @@ -495,10 +930,10 @@ filter_cipher_suites(Suites, Filters0) -> prf_filters => add_filter(proplists:get_value(prf, Filters0), PrfF)}, ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites, Filters). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec prepend_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] | - [{key_exchange | cipher | mac | prf, fun()}], - [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()]) -> - [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()]. +-spec prepend_cipher_suites(Preferred, Suites) -> ciphers() when + Preferred :: ciphers() | cipher_filters(), + Suites :: ciphers(). + %% Description: Make <Preferred> suites become the most prefered %% suites that is put them at the head of the cipher suite list %% and remove them from <Suites> if present. <Preferred> may be a @@ -513,10 +948,10 @@ prepend_cipher_suites(Filters, Suites) -> Preferred = filter_cipher_suites(Suites, Filters), Preferred ++ (Suites -- Preferred). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec append_cipher_suites(Deferred :: [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] | - [{key_exchange | cipher | mac | prf, fun()}], - [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()]) -> - [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()]. +-spec append_cipher_suites(Deferred, Suites) -> ciphers() when + Deferred :: ciphers() | cipher_filters(), + Suites :: ciphers(). + %% Description: Make <Deferred> suites suites become the %% least prefered suites that is put them at the end of the cipher suite list %% and removed them from <Suites> if present. @@ -530,7 +965,9 @@ append_cipher_suites(Filters, Suites) -> (Suites -- Deferred) ++ Deferred. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec eccs() -> tls_v1:curves(). +-spec eccs() -> NamedCurves when + NamedCurves :: [named_curve()]. + %% Description: returns all supported curves across all versions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- eccs() -> @@ -538,27 +975,24 @@ eccs() -> eccs_filter_supported(Curves). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec eccs(tls_record:tls_version() | tls_record:tls_atom_version() | - dtls_record:dtls_version() | dtls_record:dtls_atom_version()) -> - tls_v1:curves(). +-spec eccs(Version) -> NamedCurves when + Version :: protocol_version(), + NamedCurves :: [named_curve()]. + %% Description: returns the curves supported for a given version of %% ssl/tls. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -eccs({3,0}) -> +eccs(sslv3) -> []; -eccs({3,_}) -> - Curves = tls_v1:ecc_curves(all), - eccs_filter_supported(Curves); -eccs({254,_} = Version) -> - eccs(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version)); +eccs('dtlsv1') -> + eccs('tlsv1.1'); +eccs('dtlsv1.2') -> + eccs('tlsv1.2'); eccs(Version) when Version == 'tlsv1.2'; Version == 'tlsv1.1'; - Version == tlsv1; - Version == sslv3 -> - eccs(tls_record:protocol_version(Version)); -eccs(Version) when Version == 'dtlsv1.2'; - Version == 'dtlsv1'-> - eccs(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(dtls_record:protocol_version(Version))). + Version == tlsv1 -> + Curves = tls_v1:ecc_curves(all), + eccs_filter_supported(Curves). eccs_filter_supported(Curves) -> CryptoCurves = crypto:ec_curves(), @@ -566,12 +1000,14 @@ eccs_filter_supported(Curves) -> Curves). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec getopts(#sslsocket{}, [gen_tcp:option_name()]) -> - {ok, [gen_tcp:option()]} | {error, reason()}. +-spec getopts(SslSocket, OptionNames) -> + {ok, [gen_tcp:option()]} | {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + OptionNames :: [gen_tcp:option_name()]. %% %% Description: Gets options %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -getopts(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, OptionTags) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(OptionTags) -> +getopts(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}, OptionTags) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(OptionTags) -> ssl_connection:get_opts(Pid, OptionTags); getopts(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}}}} = ListenSocket, OptionTags) when is_list(OptionTags) -> try dtls_socket:getopts(Transport, ListenSocket, OptionTags) of @@ -583,7 +1019,7 @@ getopts(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}}}} = _:Error -> {error, {options, {socket_options, OptionTags, Error}}} end; -getopts(#sslsocket{pid = {_, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}}}} = ListenSocket, +getopts(#sslsocket{pid = {_, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_,_}}}} = ListenSocket, OptionTags) when is_list(OptionTags) -> try tls_socket:getopts(Transport, ListenSocket, OptionTags) of {ok, _} = Result -> @@ -598,11 +1034,32 @@ getopts(#sslsocket{}, OptionTags) -> {error, {options, {socket_options, OptionTags}}}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec setopts(#sslsocket{}, [gen_tcp:option()]) -> ok | {error, reason()}. +-spec setopts(SslSocket, Options) -> ok | {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Options :: [gen_tcp:option()]. %% %% Description: Sets options %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -setopts(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, Options0) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(Options0) -> +setopts(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid, Sender]}, Options0) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(Options0) -> + try proplists:expand([{binary, [{mode, binary}]}, + {list, [{mode, list}]}], Options0) of + Options -> + case proplists:get_value(packet, Options, undefined) of + undefined -> + ssl_connection:set_opts(Pid, Options); + PacketOpt -> + case tls_sender:setopts(Sender, [{packet, PacketOpt}]) of + ok -> + ssl_connection:set_opts(Pid, Options); + Error -> + Error + end + end + catch + _:_ -> + {error, {options, {not_a_proplist, Options0}}} + end; +setopts(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}, Options0) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(Options0) -> try proplists:expand([{binary, [{mode, binary}]}, {list, [{mode, list}]}], Options0) of Options -> @@ -621,7 +1078,7 @@ setopts(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}}}} = _:Error -> {error, {options, {socket_options, Options, Error}}} end; -setopts(#sslsocket{pid = {_, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}}}} = ListenSocket, Options) when is_list(Options) -> +setopts(#sslsocket{pid = {_, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_,_}}}} = ListenSocket, Options) when is_list(Options) -> try tls_socket:setopts(Transport, ListenSocket, Options) of ok -> ok; @@ -635,9 +1092,9 @@ setopts(#sslsocket{}, Options) -> {error, {options,{not_a_proplist, Options}}}. %%--------------------------------------------------------------- --spec getstat(Socket) -> - {ok, OptionValues} | {error, inet:posix()} when - Socket :: #sslsocket{}, +-spec getstat(SslSocket) -> + {ok, OptionValues} | {error, inet:posix()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), OptionValues :: [{inet:stat_option(), integer()}]. %% %% Description: Get all statistic options for a socket. @@ -646,9 +1103,9 @@ getstat(Socket) -> getstat(Socket, inet:stats()). %%--------------------------------------------------------------- --spec getstat(Socket, Options) -> - {ok, OptionValues} | {error, inet:posix()} when - Socket :: #sslsocket{}, +-spec getstat(SslSocket, Options) -> + {ok, OptionValues} | {error, inet:posix()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), Options :: [inet:stat_option()], OptionValues :: [{inet:stat_option(), integer()}]. %% @@ -657,41 +1114,48 @@ getstat(Socket) -> getstat(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}}}}, Options) when is_port(Listen), is_list(Options) -> tls_socket:getstat(Transport, Listen, Options); -getstat(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {Transport, Socket, _, _}}, Options) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(Options) -> +getstat(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_], fd = {Transport, Socket, _, _}}, Options) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(Options) -> tls_socket:getstat(Transport, Socket, Options). %%--------------------------------------------------------------- --spec shutdown(#sslsocket{}, read | write | read_write) -> ok | {error, reason()}. +-spec shutdown(SslSocket, How) -> ok | {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + How :: read | write | read_write. %% %% Description: Same as gen_tcp:shutdown/2 %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -shutdown(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_, _, _}}}}, +shutdown(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, #config{transport_info = Info}}}, How) when is_port(Listen) -> + Transport = element(1, Info), Transport:shutdown(Listen, How); shutdown(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls,_}},_) -> {error, enotconn}; -shutdown(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, How) -> +shutdown(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}, How) when is_pid(Pid) -> ssl_connection:shutdown(Pid, How). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec sockname(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, {inet:ip_address(), inet:port_number()}} | {error, reason()}. +-spec sockname(SslSocket) -> + {ok, {Address, Port}} | {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Address :: inet:ip_address(), + Port :: inet:port_number(). %% %% Description: Same as inet:sockname/1 %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -sockname(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}}}}) when is_port(Listen) -> +sockname(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_,_}}}}) when is_port(Listen) -> tls_socket:sockname(Transport, Listen); sockname(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{dtls_handler = {Pid, _}}}}) -> dtls_packet_demux:sockname(Pid); -sockname(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {Transport, Socket, _}}) when is_pid(Pid) -> +sockname(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_], fd = {Transport, Socket,_}}) when is_pid(Pid) -> dtls_socket:sockname(Transport, Socket); -sockname(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {Transport, Socket, _, _}}) when is_pid(Pid) -> +sockname(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid| _], fd = {Transport, Socket,_,_}}) when is_pid(Pid) -> tls_socket:sockname(Transport, Socket). %%--------------------------------------------------------------- --spec versions() -> [{ssl_app, string()} | {supported, [tls_record:tls_atom_version()]} | - {supported_dtls, [dtls_record:dtls_atom_version()]} | - {available, [tls_record:tls_atom_version()]} | - {available_dtls, [dtls_record:dtls_atom_version()]}]. +-spec versions() -> [VersionInfo] when + VersionInfo :: {ssl_app, string()} | + {supported | available, [tls_version()]} | + {supported_dtls | available_dtls, [dtls_version()]}. %% %% Description: Returns a list of relevant versions. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -702,18 +1166,27 @@ versions() -> SupportedDTLSVsns = [dtls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- DTLSVsns], AvailableTLSVsns = ?ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS, AvailableDTLSVsns = ?ALL_AVAILABLE_DATAGRAM_VERSIONS, - [{ssl_app, ?VSN}, {supported, SupportedTLSVsns}, + [{ssl_app, "9.2"}, {supported, SupportedTLSVsns}, {supported_dtls, SupportedDTLSVsns}, {available, AvailableTLSVsns}, {available_dtls, AvailableDTLSVsns}]. %%--------------------------------------------------------------- --spec renegotiate(#sslsocket{}) -> ok | {error, reason()}. +-spec renegotiate(SslSocket) -> ok | {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(). %% %% Description: Initiates a renegotiation. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -renegotiate(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) when is_pid(Pid) -> +renegotiate(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid, Sender |_]}) when is_pid(Pid), + is_pid(Sender) -> + case tls_sender:renegotiate(Sender) of + {ok, Write} -> + tls_connection:renegotiation(Pid, Write); + Error -> + Error + end; +renegotiate(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid |_]}) when is_pid(Pid) -> ssl_connection:renegotiation(Pid); renegotiate(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls,_}}) -> {error, enotconn}; @@ -721,13 +1194,17 @@ renegotiate(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,_}}) when is_port(Listen) -> {error, enotconn}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec prf(#sslsocket{}, binary() | 'master_secret', binary(), - [binary() | prf_random()], non_neg_integer()) -> - {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}. +-spec prf(SslSocket, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> + {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()} when + SslSocket :: sslsocket(), + Secret :: binary() | 'master_secret', + Label::binary(), + Seed :: [binary() | prf_random()], + WantedLength :: non_neg_integer(). %% %% Description: use a ssl sessions TLS PRF to generate key material %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -prf(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}, +prf(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) when is_pid(Pid) -> ssl_connection:prf(Pid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength); prf(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls,_}}, _,_,_,_) -> @@ -744,7 +1221,8 @@ clear_pem_cache() -> ssl_pem_cache:clear(). %%--------------------------------------------------------------- --spec format_error({error, term()}) -> list(). +-spec format_error({error, Reason}) -> string() when + Reason :: any(). %% %% Description: Creates error string. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -754,8 +1232,8 @@ format_error(Reason) when is_list(Reason) -> Reason; format_error(closed) -> "TLS connection is closed"; -format_error({tls_alert, Description}) -> - "TLS Alert: " ++ Description; +format_error({tls_alert, {_, Description}}) -> + Description; format_error({options,{FileType, File, Reason}}) when FileType == cacertfile; FileType == certfile; FileType == keyfile; @@ -784,12 +1262,19 @@ tls_version({254, _} = Version) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec suite_to_str(ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()) -> string(). +-spec suite_to_str(CipherSuite) -> string() when + CipherSuite :: erl_cipher_suite(); + (CipherSuite) -> string() when + %% For internal use! + CipherSuite :: #{key_exchange := null, + cipher := null, + mac := null, + prf := null}. %% %% Description: Return the string representation of a cipher suite. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- suite_to_str(Cipher) -> - ssl_cipher:suite_to_str(Cipher). + ssl_cipher_format:suite_to_str(Cipher). %%%-------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -810,7 +1295,7 @@ supported_suites(all, Version) -> supported_suites(anonymous, Version) -> ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version). -do_listen(Port, #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}} = Config, tls_connection) -> +do_listen(Port, #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _,_}} = Config, tls_connection) -> tls_socket:listen(Transport, Port, Config); do_listen(Port, Config, dtls_connection) -> @@ -862,15 +1347,12 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> {list, [{mode, list}]}], Opts0), assert_proplist(Opts), RecordCb = record_cb(Opts), - - ReuseSessionFun = fun(_, _, _, _) -> true end, CaCerts = handle_option(cacerts, Opts, undefined), {Verify, FailIfNoPeerCert, CaCertDefault, VerifyFun, PartialChainHanlder, VerifyClientOnce} = handle_verify_options(Opts, CaCerts), CertFile = handle_option(certfile, Opts, <<>>), - RecordCb = record_cb(Opts), Versions = case handle_option(versions, Opts, []) of [] -> @@ -916,9 +1398,8 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> default_option_role(server, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Versions), Role)), tls_version(RecordCb:highest_protocol_version(Versions))), - %% Server side option - reuse_session = handle_option(reuse_session, Opts, ReuseSessionFun), - reuse_sessions = handle_option(reuse_sessions, Opts, true), + reuse_sessions = handle_reuse_sessions_option(reuse_sessions, Opts, Role), + reuse_session = handle_reuse_session_option(reuse_session, Opts, Role), secure_renegotiate = handle_option(secure_renegotiate, Opts, true), client_renegotiation = handle_option(client_renegotiation, Opts, default_option_role(server, true, Role), @@ -962,7 +1443,7 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> customize_hostname_check = handle_option(customize_hostname_check, Opts, []) }, - CbInfo = proplists:get_value(cb_info, Opts, default_cb_info(Protocol)), + CbInfo = handle_option(cb_info, Opts, default_cb_info(Protocol)), SslOptions = [protocol, versions, verify, verify_fun, partial_chain, fail_if_no_peer_cert, verify_client_once, depth, cert, certfile, key, keyfile, @@ -974,8 +1455,8 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> alpn_preferred_protocols, next_protocols_advertised, client_preferred_next_protocols, log_alert, server_name_indication, honor_cipher_order, padding_check, crl_check, crl_cache, - fallback, signature_algs, eccs, honor_ecc_order, beast_mitigation, - max_handshake_size, handshake, customize_hostname_check], + fallback, signature_algs, eccs, honor_ecc_order, + beast_mitigation, max_handshake_size, handshake, customize_hostname_check], SockOpts = lists:foldl(fun(Key, PropList) -> proplists:delete(Key, PropList) end, Opts, SslOptions), @@ -1004,6 +1485,10 @@ handle_option(sni_fun, Opts, Default) -> _ -> throw({error, {conflict_options, [sni_fun, sni_hosts]}}) end; +handle_option(cb_info, Opts, Default) -> + CbInfo = proplists:get_value(cb_info, Opts, Default), + true = validate_option(cb_info, CbInfo), + handle_cb_info(CbInfo, Default); handle_option(OptionName, Opts, Default) -> validate_option(OptionName, proplists:get_value(OptionName, Opts, Default)). @@ -1109,11 +1594,16 @@ validate_option(srp_identity, {Username, Password}) {unicode:characters_to_binary(Username), unicode:characters_to_binary(Password)}; +validate_option(reuse_session, undefined) -> + undefined; validate_option(reuse_session, Value) when is_function(Value) -> Value; +validate_option(reuse_session, Value) when is_binary(Value) -> + Value; validate_option(reuse_sessions, Value) when is_boolean(Value) -> Value; - +validate_option(reuse_sessions, save = Value) -> + Value; validate_option(secure_renegotiate, Value) when is_boolean(Value) -> Value; validate_option(client_renegotiation, Value) when is_boolean(Value) -> @@ -1220,9 +1710,29 @@ validate_option(handshake, full = Value) -> Value; validate_option(customize_hostname_check, Value) when is_list(Value) -> Value; +validate_option(cb_info, {V1, V2, V3, V4}) when is_atom(V1), + is_atom(V2), + is_atom(V3), + is_atom(V4) + -> + true; +validate_option(cb_info, {V1, V2, V3, V4, V5}) when is_atom(V1), + is_atom(V2), + is_atom(V3), + is_atom(V4), + is_atom(V5) + -> + true; +validate_option(cb_info, _) -> + false; validate_option(Opt, Value) -> throw({error, {options, {Opt, Value}}}). +handle_cb_info({V1, V2, V3, V4}, {_,_,_,_,_}) -> + {V1,V2,V3,V4, list_to_atom(atom_to_list(V2) ++ "passive")}; +handle_cb_info(CbInfo, _) -> + CbInfo. + handle_hashsigns_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) andalso Version >= {3, 3} -> case tls_v1:signature_algs(Version, Value) of @@ -1236,6 +1746,26 @@ handle_hashsigns_option(_, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} -> handle_hashsigns_option(_, _Version) -> undefined. +handle_reuse_sessions_option(Key, Opts, client) -> + Value = proplists:get_value(Key, Opts, true), + validate_option(Key, Value), + Value; +handle_reuse_sessions_option(Key, Opts0, server) -> + Opts = proplists:delete({Key, save}, Opts0), + Value = proplists:get_value(Key, Opts, true), + validate_option(Key, Value), + Value. + +handle_reuse_session_option(Key, Opts, client) -> + Value = proplists:get_value(Key, Opts, undefined), + validate_option(Key, Value), + Value; +handle_reuse_session_option(Key, Opts, server) -> + ReuseSessionFun = fun(_, _, _, _) -> true end, + Value = proplists:get_value(Key, Opts, ReuseSessionFun), + validate_option(Key, Value), + Value. + validate_options([]) -> []; validate_options([{Opt, Value} | Tail]) -> @@ -1323,10 +1853,10 @@ binary_cipher_suites(Version, []) -> %% not require explicit configuration default_binary_suites(Version); binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Map|_] = Ciphers0) when is_map(Map) -> - Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0], + Ciphers = [ssl_cipher_format:suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers); binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Tuple|_] = Ciphers0) when is_tuple(Tuple) -> - Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:suite(tuple_to_map(C)) || C <- Ciphers0], + Ciphers = [ssl_cipher_format:suite(tuple_to_map(C)) || C <- Ciphers0], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers); binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Cipher0 | _] = Ciphers0) when is_binary(Cipher0) -> All = ssl_cipher:all_suites(Version) ++ @@ -1341,11 +1871,11 @@ binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Cipher0 | _] = Ciphers0) when is_binary(Cipher0) end; binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Head | _] = Ciphers0) when is_list(Head) -> %% Format: ["RC4-SHA","RC4-MD5"] - Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0], + Ciphers = [ssl_cipher_format:openssl_suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers); binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers0) -> %% Format: "RC4-SHA:RC4-MD5" - Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite(C) || C <- string:lexemes(Ciphers0, ":")], + Ciphers = [ssl_cipher_format:openssl_suite(C) || C <- string:lexemes(Ciphers0, ":")], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers). default_binary_suites(Version) -> @@ -1613,7 +2143,7 @@ default_option_role(_,_,_) -> undefined. default_cb_info(tls) -> - {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}; + {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error, tcp_passive}; default_cb_info(dtls) -> {gen_udp, udp, udp_closed, udp_error}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl index 34e9797f1f..81167b5ba3 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ -include("ssl_record.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). --export([decode/1, own_alert_txt/1, alert_txt/1, reason_code/2]). +-export([decode/1, + own_alert_txt/1, + alert_txt/1, + alert_txt/4, + reason_code/4]). %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API @@ -48,18 +52,29 @@ decode(Bin) -> decode(Bin, [], 0). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server) -> - closed | {tls_alert, unicode:chardata()}. -%-spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server) -> closed | {essl, string()}. +-spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server, ProtocolName::string(), StateName::atom()) -> + {tls_alert, {atom(), unicode:chardata()}} | closed. %% %% Description: Returns the error reason that will be returned to the %% user. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -reason_code(#alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY}, _) -> +reason_code(#alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY}, _, _, _) -> closed; -reason_code(#alert{description = Description}, _) -> - {tls_alert, string:casefold(description_txt(Description))}. +reason_code(#alert{description = Description, role = Role} = Alert, Role, ProtocolName, StateName) -> + Txt = lists:flatten(alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, own_alert_txt(Alert))), + {tls_alert, {description_atom(Description), Txt}}; +reason_code(#alert{description = Description} = Alert, Role, ProtocolName, StateName) -> + Txt = lists:flatten(alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, alert_txt(Alert))), + {tls_alert, {description_atom(Description), Txt}}. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec alert_txt(string(), server | client, StateNam::atom(), string()) -> string(). +%% +%% Description: Generates alert text for log or string part of error return. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt) -> + io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt]). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec own_alert_txt(#alert{}) -> string(). @@ -181,3 +196,70 @@ description_txt(?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL) -> "No application protocol"; description_txt(Enum) -> lists:flatten(io_lib:format("unsupported/unknown alert: ~p", [Enum])). + +description_atom(?CLOSE_NOTIFY) -> + close_notify; +description_atom(?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) -> + unexpected_message; +description_atom(?BAD_RECORD_MAC) -> + bad_record_mac; +description_atom(?DECRYPTION_FAILED_RESERVED) -> + decryption_failed_reserved; +description_atom(?RECORD_OVERFLOW) -> + record_overflow; +description_atom(?DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE) -> + decompression_failure; +description_atom(?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) -> + handshake_failure; +description_atom(?NO_CERTIFICATE_RESERVED) -> + no_certificate_reserved; +description_atom(?BAD_CERTIFICATE) -> + bad_certificate; +description_atom(?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE) -> + unsupported_certificate; +description_atom(?CERTIFICATE_REVOKED) -> + certificate_revoked; +description_atom(?CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED) -> + certificate_expired; +description_atom(?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN) -> + certificate_unknown; +description_atom(?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) -> + illegal_parameter; +description_atom(?UNKNOWN_CA) -> + unknown_ca; +description_atom(?ACCESS_DENIED) -> + access_denied; +description_atom(?DECODE_ERROR) -> + decode_error; +description_atom(?DECRYPT_ERROR) -> + decrypt_error; +description_atom(?EXPORT_RESTRICTION) -> + export_restriction; +description_atom(?PROTOCOL_VERSION) -> + protocol_version; +description_atom(?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY) -> + insufficient_security; +description_atom(?INTERNAL_ERROR) -> + internal_error; +description_atom(?USER_CANCELED) -> + user_canceled; +description_atom(?NO_RENEGOTIATION) -> + no_renegotiation; +description_atom(?UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION) -> + unsupported_extension; +description_atom(?CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE) -> + certificate_unobtainable; +description_atom(?UNRECOGNISED_NAME) -> + unrecognised_name; +description_atom(?BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE) -> + bad_certificate_status_response; +description_atom(?BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE) -> + bad_certificate_hash_value; +description_atom(?UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) -> + unknown_psk_identity; +description_atom(?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK) -> + inappropriate_fallback; +description_atom(?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL) -> + no_application_protocol; +description_atom(_) -> + 'unsupported/unkonwn_alert'. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_api.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_api.hrl index 2bd51cf91e..f4594912bd 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_api.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_api.hrl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2016. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2018. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,48 +21,7 @@ -ifndef(ssl_api). -define(ssl_api, true). --include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). - -%% Visible in API --export_type([connect_option/0, listen_option/0, ssl_option/0, transport_option/0, - prf_random/0, sslsocket/0]). - - %% Looks like it does for backwards compatibility reasons -record(sslsocket, {fd = nil, pid = nil}). - --type sslsocket() :: #sslsocket{}. --type connect_option() :: socket_connect_option() | ssl_option() | transport_option(). --type socket_connect_option() :: gen_tcp:connect_option(). --type listen_option() :: socket_listen_option() | ssl_option() | transport_option(). --type socket_listen_option() :: gen_tcp:listen_option(). - --type ssl_option() :: {versions, ssl_record:ssl_atom_version()} | - {verify, verify_type()} | - {verify_fun, {fun(), InitialUserState::term()}} | - {fail_if_no_peer_cert, boolean()} | {depth, integer()} | - {cert, Der::binary()} | {certfile, path()} | {key, Der::binary()} | - {keyfile, path()} | {password, string()} | {cacerts, [Der::binary()]} | - {cacertfile, path()} | {dh, Der::binary()} | {dhfile, path()} | - {user_lookup_fun, {fun(), InitialUserState::term()}} | - {psk_identity, string()} | - {srp_identity, {string(), string()}} | - {ciphers, ciphers()} | {ssl_imp, ssl_imp()} | {reuse_sessions, boolean()} | - {reuse_session, fun()} | {hibernate_after, integer()|undefined} | - {alpn_advertised_protocols, [binary()]} | - {alpn_preferred_protocols, [binary()]} | - {next_protocols_advertised, list(binary())} | - {client_preferred_next_protocols, binary(), client | server, list(binary())}. - --type verify_type() :: verify_none | verify_peer. --type path() :: string(). --type ciphers() :: [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] | - string(). % (according to old API) --type ssl_imp() :: new | old. - --type transport_option() :: {cb_info, {CallbackModule::atom(), DataTag::atom(), - ClosedTag::atom(), ErrTag::atom()}}. --type prf_random() :: client_random | server_random. - -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_api). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl index c15e8a2138..549e557beb 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ -export([trusted_cert_and_path/4, certificate_chain/3, + certificate_chain/4, file_to_certificats/2, file_to_crls/2, validate/3, @@ -40,7 +41,8 @@ is_valid_key_usage/2, select_extension/2, extensions_list/1, - public_key_type/1 + public_key_type/1, + foldl_db/3 ]). %%==================================================================== @@ -79,7 +81,8 @@ trusted_cert_and_path(CertChain, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, PartialChainHandler) - %% Trusted must be selfsigned or it is an incomplete chain handle_path(Trusted, Path, PartialChainHandler); _ -> - %% Root CA could not be verified + %% Root CA could not be verified, but partial + %% chain handler may trusted a cert that we got handle_incomplete_chain(Path, PartialChainHandler) end end. @@ -94,10 +97,23 @@ certificate_chain(undefined, _, _) -> {error, no_cert}; certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) when is_binary(OwnCert) -> ErlCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(OwnCert, otp), - certificate_chain(ErlCert, OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, [OwnCert]); + certificate_chain(ErlCert, OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, [OwnCert], []); certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) -> DerCert = public_key:pkix_encode('OTPCertificate', OwnCert, otp), - certificate_chain(OwnCert, DerCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, [DerCert]). + certificate_chain(OwnCert, DerCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, [DerCert], []). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec certificate_chain(undefined | binary() | #'OTPCertificate'{} , db_handle(), certdb_ref(), [der_cert()]) -> + {error, no_cert} | {ok, #'OTPCertificate'{} | undefined, [der_cert()]}. +%% +%% Description: Create certificate chain with certs from +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +certificate_chain(Cert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Candidates) when is_binary(Cert) -> + ErlCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + certificate_chain(ErlCert, Cert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, [Cert], Candidates); +certificate_chain(Cert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Candidates) -> + DerCert = public_key:pkix_encode('OTPCertificate', Cert, otp), + certificate_chain(Cert, DerCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, [DerCert], Candidates). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec file_to_certificats(binary(), term()) -> [der_cert()]. %% @@ -187,9 +203,20 @@ public_key_type(?'id-ecPublicKey') -> ec. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec foldl_db(fun(), db_handle() | {extracted, list()}, list()) -> + {ok, term()} | issuer_not_found. +%% +%% Description: +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +foldl_db(IsIssuerFun, CertDbHandle, []) -> + ssl_pkix_db:foldl(IsIssuerFun, issuer_not_found, CertDbHandle); +foldl_db(IsIssuerFun, _, [_|_] = ListDb) -> + lists:foldl(IsIssuerFun, issuer_not_found, ListDb). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -certificate_chain(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain) -> +certificate_chain(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, ListDb) -> IssuerAndSelfSigned = case public_key:pkix_is_self_signed(OtpCert) of true -> @@ -200,12 +227,12 @@ certificate_chain(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain) -> case IssuerAndSelfSigned of {_, true = SelfSigned} -> - certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, ignore, ignore, SelfSigned); + do_certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, ignore, ignore, SelfSigned, ListDb); {{error, issuer_not_found}, SelfSigned} -> - case find_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) of + case find_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, ListDb) of {ok, {SerialNr, Issuer}} -> - certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, - SerialNr, Issuer, SelfSigned); + do_certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, + SerialNr, Issuer, SelfSigned, ListDb); _ -> %% Guess the the issuer must be the root %% certificate. The verification of the @@ -214,19 +241,19 @@ certificate_chain(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain) -> {ok, undefined, lists:reverse(Chain)} end; {{ok, {SerialNr, Issuer}}, SelfSigned} -> - certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, SerialNr, Issuer, SelfSigned) + do_certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, SerialNr, Issuer, SelfSigned, ListDb) end. -certificate_chain(_, _, [RootCert | _] = Chain, _, _, true) -> +do_certificate_chain(_, _, [RootCert | _] = Chain, _, _, true, _) -> {ok, RootCert, lists:reverse(Chain)}; -certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, SerialNr, Issuer, _SelfSigned) -> +do_certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, SerialNr, Issuer, _, ListDb) -> case ssl_manager:lookup_trusted_cert(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, SerialNr, Issuer) of {ok, {IssuerCert, ErlCert}} -> ErlCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(IssuerCert, otp), certificate_chain(ErlCert, IssuerCert, - CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, [IssuerCert | Chain]); + CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, [IssuerCert | Chain], ListDb); _ -> %% The trusted cert may be obmitted from the chain as the %% counter part needs to have it anyway to be able to @@ -234,7 +261,8 @@ certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, SerialNr, Issuer, _SelfSigned {ok, undefined, lists:reverse(Chain)} end. -find_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) -> + +find_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, ListDb) -> IsIssuerFun = fun({_Key, {_Der, #'OTPCertificate'{} = ErlCertCandidate}}, Acc) -> case public_key:pkix_is_issuer(OtpCert, ErlCertCandidate) of @@ -252,26 +280,29 @@ find_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) -> Acc end, - if is_reference(CertsDbRef) -> % actual DB exists - try ssl_pkix_db:foldl(IsIssuerFun, issuer_not_found, CertDbHandle) of - issuer_not_found -> - {error, issuer_not_found} - catch - {ok, _IssuerId} = Return -> - Return - end; - is_tuple(CertsDbRef), element(1,CertsDbRef) =:= extracted -> % cache bypass byproduct - {extracted, CertsData} = CertsDbRef, - DB = [Entry || {decoded, Entry} <- CertsData], - try lists:foldl(IsIssuerFun, issuer_not_found, DB) of - issuer_not_found -> - {error, issuer_not_found} - catch - {ok, _IssuerId} = Return -> - Return - end + Result = case is_reference(CertsDbRef) of + true -> + do_find_issuer(IsIssuerFun, CertDbHandle, ListDb); + false -> + {extracted, CertsData} = CertsDbRef, + DB = [Entry || {decoded, Entry} <- CertsData], + do_find_issuer(IsIssuerFun, CertDbHandle, DB) + end, + case Result of + issuer_not_found -> + {error, issuer_not_found}; + Result -> + Result end. +do_find_issuer(IssuerFun, CertDbHandle, CertDb) -> + try + foldl_db(IssuerFun, CertDbHandle, CertDb) + catch + throw:{ok, _} = Return -> + Return + end. + is_valid_extkey_usage(KeyUse, client) -> %% Client wants to verify server is_valid_key_usage(KeyUse,?'id-kp-serverAuth'); @@ -300,7 +331,7 @@ other_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> {ok, IssuerId} -> {other, IssuerId}; {error, issuer_not_found} -> - case find_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of + case find_issuer(OtpCert, BinCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, []) of {ok, IssuerId} -> {other, IssuerId}; Other -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl index 754fc46404..fce48d1678 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ % %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2019. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -33,43 +33,25 @@ -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). --export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, suite_definition/1, - erl_suite_definition/1, - cipher_init/3, decipher/6, cipher/5, decipher_aead/6, cipher_aead/6, - suite/1, suites/1, all_suites/1, crypto_support_filters/0, +-export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, + cipher_init/3, nonce_seed/2, decipher/6, cipher/5, aead_encrypt/5, aead_decrypt/6, + suites/1, all_suites/1, crypto_support_filters/0, chacha_suites/1, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, psk_suites_anon/1, srp_suites/0, srp_suites_anon/0, - rc4_suites/1, des_suites/1, rsa_suites/1, openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1, + rc4_suites/1, des_suites/1, rsa_suites/1, filter/3, filter_suites/1, filter_suites/2, hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1, is_acceptable_hash/2, is_fallback/1, - random_bytes/1, calc_mac_hash/4, - is_stream_ciphersuite/1, suite_to_str/1]). - --export_type([cipher_suite/0, - erl_cipher_suite/0, old_erl_cipher_suite/0, openssl_cipher_suite/0, - hash/0, key_algo/0, sign_algo/0]). - --type cipher() :: null |rc4_128 | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm | chacha20_poly1305. --type hash() :: null | md5 | sha | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512. --type sign_algo() :: rsa | dsa | ecdsa. --type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon. --type erl_cipher_suite() :: #{key_exchange := key_algo(), - cipher := cipher(), - mac := hash() | aead, - prf := hash() | default_prf %% Old cipher suites, version dependent - }. --type old_erl_cipher_suite() :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()} % Pre TLS 1.2 - %% TLS 1.2, internally PRE TLS 1.2 will use default_prf - | {key_algo(), cipher(), hash(), hash() | default_prf}. --type cipher_suite() :: binary(). --type cipher_enum() :: integer(). --type openssl_cipher_suite() :: string(). - + random_bytes/1, calc_mac_hash/4, calc_mac_hash/6, + is_stream_ciphersuite/1]). -compile(inline). +-type cipher_enum() :: integer(). + +-export_type([cipher_enum/0]). + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec security_parameters(cipher_suite(), #security_parameters{}) -> +-spec security_parameters(ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite(), #security_parameters{}) -> #security_parameters{}. %% Only security_parameters/2 should call security_parameters/3 with undefined as %% first argument. @@ -79,7 +61,8 @@ security_parameters(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL = CipherSuite, SecParams) -> security_parameters(undefined, CipherSuite, SecParams). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec security_parameters(ssl_record:ssl_version() | undefined, cipher_suite(), #security_parameters{}) -> +-spec security_parameters(ssl_record:ssl_version() | undefined, + ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite(), #security_parameters{}) -> #security_parameters{}. %% %% Description: Returns a security parameters record where the @@ -87,7 +70,7 @@ security_parameters(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL = CipherSuite, SecParams) -> %%------------------------------------------------------------------- security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams) -> #{cipher := Cipher, mac := Hash, - prf := PrfHashAlg} = suite_definition(CipherSuite), + prf := PrfHashAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), SecParams#security_parameters{ cipher_suite = CipherSuite, bulk_cipher_algorithm = bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher), @@ -110,9 +93,15 @@ cipher_init(?RC4, IV, Key) -> #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, state = State}; cipher_init(?AES_GCM, IV, Key) -> <<Nonce:64>> = random_bytes(8), - #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, nonce = Nonce}; + #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, nonce = Nonce, tag_len = 16}; +cipher_init(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, IV, Key) -> + #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, tag_len = 16}; cipher_init(_BCA, IV, Key) -> - #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key}. + %% Initialize random IV cache, not used for aead ciphers + #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, state = <<>>}. + +nonce_seed(Seed, CipherState) -> + CipherState#cipher_state{nonce = Seed}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec cipher(cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, binary(), iodata(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> @@ -124,12 +113,11 @@ cipher_init(_BCA, IV, Key) -> %% data is calculated and the data plus the HMAC is ecncrypted. %%------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher(?NULL, CipherState, <<>>, Fragment, _Version) -> - GenStreamCipherList = [Fragment, <<>>], - {GenStreamCipherList, CipherState}; + {iolist_to_binary(Fragment), CipherState}; cipher(?RC4, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Mac, Fragment, _Version) -> GenStreamCipherList = [Fragment, Mac], {State1, T} = crypto:stream_encrypt(State0, GenStreamCipherList), - {T, CipherState#cipher_state{state = State1}}; + {iolist_to_binary(T), CipherState#cipher_state{state = State1}}; cipher(?DES, CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version) -> block_cipher(fun(Key, IV, T) -> crypto:block_encrypt(des_cbc, Key, IV, T) @@ -145,37 +133,20 @@ cipher(?AES_CBC, CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version) -> crypto:block_encrypt(aes_cbc256, Key, IV, T) end, block_size(aes_128_cbc), CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec cipher_aead(cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, integer(), binary(), iodata(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {binary(), #cipher_state{}}. -%% -%% Description: Encrypts the data and protects associated data (AAD) using chipher -%% described by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state -%% Use for suites that use authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) -%%------------------------------------------------------------------- -cipher_aead(?AES_GCM, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) -> - aead_cipher(aes_gcm, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version); -cipher_aead(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) -> - aead_cipher(chacha20_poly1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version). - -aead_cipher(chacha20_poly1305, #cipher_state{key=Key} = CipherState, SeqNo, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) -> - CipherLen = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment), - AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>, - Nonce = ?uint64(SeqNo), - {Content, CipherTag} = crypto:block_encrypt(chacha20_poly1305, Key, Nonce, {AAD, Fragment}), - {<<Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>, CipherState}; -aead_cipher(Type, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv = IV0, nonce = Nonce} = CipherState, _SeqNo, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) -> - CipherLen = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment), - AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>, - <<Salt:4/bytes, _/binary>> = IV0, - IV = <<Salt/binary, Nonce:64/integer>>, - {Content, CipherTag} = crypto:block_encrypt(Type, Key, IV, {AAD, Fragment}), - {<<Nonce:64/integer, Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>, CipherState#cipher_state{nonce = Nonce + 1}}. +aead_encrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, Fragment, AdditionalData) -> + crypto:block_encrypt(aead_type(Type), Key, Nonce, {AdditionalData, Fragment}). + +aead_decrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, CipherText, CipherTag, AdditionalData) -> + crypto:block_decrypt(aead_type(Type), Key, Nonce, {AdditionalData, CipherText, CipherTag}). + +aead_type(?AES_GCM) -> + aes_gcm; +aead_type(?CHACHA20_POLY1305) -> + chacha20_poly1305. build_cipher_block(BlockSz, Mac, Fragment) -> TotSz = byte_size(Mac) + erlang:iolist_size(Fragment) + 1, - {PaddingLength, Padding} = get_padding(TotSz, BlockSz), - [Fragment, Mac, PaddingLength, Padding]. + [Fragment, Mac, padding_with_len(TotSz, BlockSz)]. block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CS0, Mac, Fragment, {3, N}) @@ -185,14 +156,21 @@ block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CS0, NextIV = next_iv(T, IV), {T, CS0#cipher_state{iv=NextIV}}; -block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CS0, +block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV, state = IV_Cache0} = CS0, Mac, Fragment, {3, N}) when N == 2; N == 3 -> - NextIV = random_iv(IV), + IV_Size = byte_size(IV), + <<NextIV:IV_Size/binary, IV_Cache/binary>> = + case IV_Cache0 of + <<>> -> + random_bytes(IV_Size bsl 5); % 32 IVs + _ -> + IV_Cache0 + end, L0 = build_cipher_block(BlockSz, Mac, Fragment), L = [NextIV|L0], T = Fun(Key, IV, L), - {T, CS0#cipher_state{iv=NextIV}}. + {T, CS0#cipher_state{iv=NextIV, state = IV_Cache}}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decipher(cipher_enum(), integer(), #cipher_state{}, binary(), @@ -237,19 +215,6 @@ decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) -> crypto:block_decrypt(aes_cbc256, Key, IV, T) end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decipher_aead(cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, integer(), binary(), binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {binary(), #cipher_state{}} | #alert{}. -%% -%% Description: Decrypts the data and checks the associated data (AAD) MAC using -%% cipher described by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state. -%% Use for suites that use authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) -%%------------------------------------------------------------------- -decipher_aead(?AES_GCM, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) -> - aead_decipher(aes_gcm, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version); -decipher_aead(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) -> - aead_decipher(chacha20_poly1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version). - block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) -> try @@ -280,36 +245,8 @@ block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) end. -aead_ciphertext_to_state(chacha20_poly1305, SeqNo, _IV, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) -> - CipherLen = size(Fragment) - 16, - <<CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:16/bytes>> = Fragment, - AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>, - Nonce = ?uint64(SeqNo), - {Nonce, AAD, CipherText, CipherTag}; -aead_ciphertext_to_state(_, _SeqNo, <<Salt:4/bytes, _/binary>>, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) -> - CipherLen = size(Fragment) - 24, - <<ExplicitNonce:8/bytes, CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:16/bytes>> = Fragment, - AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>, - Nonce = <<Salt/binary, ExplicitNonce/binary>>, - {Nonce, AAD, CipherText, CipherTag}. - -aead_decipher(Type, #cipher_state{key = Key, iv = IV} = CipherState, - SeqNo, AAD0, Fragment, Version) -> - try - {Nonce, AAD, CipherText, CipherTag} = aead_ciphertext_to_state(Type, SeqNo, IV, AAD0, Fragment, Version), - case crypto:block_decrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, {AAD, CipherText, CipherTag}) of - Content when is_binary(Content) -> - {Content, CipherState}; - _ -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) - end - catch - _:_ -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) - end. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec suites(ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec suites(ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of supported cipher suites. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -332,7 +269,8 @@ all_suites({3, _} = Version) -> all_suites(Version) -> dtls_v1:all_suites(Version). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec chacha_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec chacha_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> + [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns list of the chacha cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user for now due to interop problems, proably need @@ -346,7 +284,8 @@ chacha_suites(_) -> []. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec anonymous_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec anonymous_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> + [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the anonymous cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user. Intended only for testing. @@ -382,7 +321,7 @@ anonymous_suites(N) when N == 0; ]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec psk_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec psk_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the PSK cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user. @@ -404,7 +343,7 @@ psk_suites(_) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec psk_suites_anon(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec psk_suites_anon(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the anonymous PSK cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user. @@ -439,7 +378,7 @@ psk_suites_anon(_) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec srp_suites() -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec srp_suites() -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the SRP cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user. @@ -453,7 +392,7 @@ srp_suites() -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec srp_suites_anon() -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec srp_suites_anon() -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the SRP anonymous cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user. @@ -464,7 +403,8 @@ srp_suites_anon() -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec rc4_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec rc4_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> + [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the RSA|(ECDH/RSA)| (ECDH/ECDSA) %% with RC4 cipher suites, only supported if explicitly set by user. @@ -484,7 +424,7 @@ rc4_suites(N) when N =< 3 -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec des_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec des_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the cipher suites %% with DES cipher, only supported if explicitly set by user. @@ -502,7 +442,7 @@ des_suites(_)-> ]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec rsa_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec rsa_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the RSA key exchange %% cipher suites, only supported if explicitly set by user. @@ -524,1721 +464,10 @@ rsa_suites(N) when N =< 3 -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ]. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> erl_cipher_suite(). -%% -%% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. -%% Note: Currently not supported suites are commented away. -%% They should be supported or removed in the future. -%%------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% TLS v1.1 suites -suite_definition(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) -> - #{key_exchange => null, - cipher => null, - mac => null, - prf => null}; -%% RFC 5746 - Not a real cipher suite used to signal empty "renegotiation_info" extension -%% to avoid handshake failure from old servers that do not ignore -%% hello extension data as they should. -suite_definition(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) -> - #{key_exchange => null, - cipher => null, - mac => null, - prf => null}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa, - cipher => rc4_128, - mac => md5, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa, - cipher => rc4_128, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa, - cipher => des_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, - cipher => des_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, - cipher => des_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -%%% TSL V1.1 AES suites -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -%% TLS v1.2 suites -%% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> -%% {rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -%% not defined YET: -%% TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DH_DSS AES_128_CBC SHA256 -%% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_128_CBC SHA256 -%% TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_DSS AES_256_CBC SHA256 -%% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_256_CBC SHA256 -%%% DH-ANON deprecated by TLS spec and not available -%%% by default, but good for testing purposes. -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_anon, - cipher => rc4_128, - mac => md5, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_anon, - cipher => des_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_anon, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_anon, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_anon, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_anon, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_anon, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -%%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => psk, - cipher => rc4_128, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => psk, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => psk, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => psk, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, - cipher => rc4_128, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, - cipher => rc4_128, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -%%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => psk, - cipher => null, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, - cipher => null, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, - cipher => null, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -%%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => psk, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => psk, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => psk, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => psk, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => psk, - cipher => null, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => psk, - cipher => null, - mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, - cipher => null, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, - cipher => null, - mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, - cipher => null, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, - cipher => null, - mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -%%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, - cipher => rc4_128, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, - cipher => null, - mac => sha256, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, - cipher => null, mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -%%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => null, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => null, - prf => sha384}; -%% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) -> -%% #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, -%% cipher => aes_128_ccm, -%% mac => null, -%% prf =>sha256}; -%% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) -> -%% #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, -%% cipher => aes_256_ccm, -%% mac => null, -%% prf => sha256}; -%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => srp_anon, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => srp_dss, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => srp_anon, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => srp_dss, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => srp_anon, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => srp_dss, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher => null, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher => rc4_128, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher => null, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher => rc4_128, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, - cipher => null, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, - cipher => rc4_128, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, - cipher => null, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, - cipher => rc4_128, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, - cipher => null, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, - cipher => rc4_128, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, - cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha, - prf => default_prf}; -%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha384, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha384, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha384, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, - cipher => aes_128_cbc, - mac => sha256, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, - cipher => aes_256_cbc, - mac => sha384, - prf => sha384}; -%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => rsa, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_rsa, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_rsa, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_dss, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => null, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_dss, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_anon, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => dh_anon, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, - cipher => aes_128_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, - cipher => aes_256_gcm, - mac => aead, - prf => sha384}; -%% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, - cipher => chacha20_poly1305, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher => chacha20_poly1305, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> - #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, - cipher => chacha20_poly1305, - mac => aead, - prf => sha256}. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec erl_suite_definition(cipher_suite() | erl_cipher_suite()) -> old_erl_cipher_suite(). -%% -%% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. Filters last value -%% for now (compatibility reasons). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -erl_suite_definition(Bin) when is_binary(Bin) -> - erl_suite_definition(suite_definition(Bin)); -erl_suite_definition(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, cipher := Cipher, - mac := Hash, prf := Prf}) -> - case Prf of - default_prf -> - {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}; - _ -> - {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf} - end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec suite(erl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite(). -%% -%% Description: Return TLS cipher suite definition. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% TLS v1.1 suites -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, - cipher := rc4_128, - mac := md5}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, - cipher := rc4_128, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, - cipher := des_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, - cipher :='3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, - cipher:= des_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, - cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, - cipher:= des_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, - cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, - cipher:= rc4_128, - mac := md5}) -> - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, - cipher:= des_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, - cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -%%% TSL V1.1 AES suites -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -%% TLS v1.2 suites -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -%%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, - cipher := rc4_128, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, - cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, - cipher := rc4_128, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, - cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, - cipher := rc4_128, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, - cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -%%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, - cipher := null, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, - cipher := null, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, - cipher := null, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; -%%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, - cipher := null, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, - cipher := null, - mac := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, - cipher := null, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, - cipher := null, - mac := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, - cipher := null, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, - cipher := null, - mac := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; -%%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - cipher := rc4_128, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - cipher :='3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - cipher := null, - mac := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - cipher := null, - mac := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; -%%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := null, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := null, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; - %% suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - %% cipher := aes_128_ccm, - %% mac := null, - %% prf := sha256}) -> - %% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256; - %% suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - %% cipher := aes_256_ccm, - %% mac := null, - %% prf := sha256}) -> - %% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256; -%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, - cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, - cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, - cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -%%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher := null, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher := rc4_128, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher := null, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher := rc4_128, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, - cipher := null, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, - cipher := rc4_128, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, - cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, - cipher := null, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, - cipher := rc4_128, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, - cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, - cipher := null, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, - cipher := rc4_128, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, - cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -%%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac:= sha256, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha384, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha256, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha384, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha256, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha384, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, - cipher := aes_128_cbc, - mac := sha256, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, - cipher := aes_256_cbc, - mac := sha384, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, - cipher := aes_128_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, - cipher := aes_256_gcm, - mac := aead, - prf := sha384}) -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -%% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, - cipher := chacha20_poly1305, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, - cipher := chacha20_poly1305, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, - cipher := chacha20_poly1305, - mac := aead, - prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. - - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec suite_to_str(erl_cipher_suite()) -> string(). -%% -%% Description: Return the string representation of a cipher suite. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -suite_to_str(#{key_exchange := null, - cipher := null, - mac := null, - prf := null}) -> - "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV"; -suite_to_str(#{key_exchange := Kex, - cipher := Cipher, - mac := aead, - prf := PRF}) -> - "TLS_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Kex)) ++ - "_WITH_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Cipher)) ++ - "_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(PRF)); -suite_to_str(#{key_exchange := Kex, - cipher := Cipher, - mac := Mac}) -> - "TLS_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Kex)) ++ - "_WITH_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Cipher)) ++ - "_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Mac)). - - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec openssl_suite(openssl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite(). -%% -%% Description: Return TLS cipher suite definition. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% translate constants <-> openssl-strings -openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("AES256-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("RC4-SHA") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -openssl_suite("RC4-MD5") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; -openssl_suite("EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("DES-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; - -%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 - -openssl_suite("SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; - -%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; - -%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites -openssl_suite("AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; - -%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec openssl_suite_name(cipher_suite()) -> openssl_cipher_suite() | erl_cipher_suite(). -%% -%% Description: Return openssl cipher suite name if possible -%%------------------------------------------------------------------- -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "AES256-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name( ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - "RC4-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> - "RC4-MD5"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - "DES-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - "NULL-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - "AES256-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256"; - -%%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 - -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - "PSK-RC4-SHA"; - -%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 - -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA"; - -%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"; - -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"; - -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - "ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA"; - -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"; - -%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384"; - -%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; - -%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; - -%% No oppenssl name -openssl_suite_name(Cipher) -> - suite_definition(Cipher). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec filter(undefined | binary(), [cipher_suite()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec filter(undefined | binary(), [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()], + ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Select the cipher suites that can be used together with the %% supplied certificate. (Server side functionality) @@ -2258,8 +487,8 @@ filter(DerCert, Ciphers0, Version) -> filter_suites_signature(Sign, Ciphers, Version). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec filter_suites([erl_cipher_suite()] | [cipher_suite()], map()) -> - [erl_cipher_suite()] | [cipher_suite()]. +-spec filter_suites([ssl:erl_cipher_suite()] | [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()], map()) -> + [ssl:erl_cipher_suite()] | [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Filter suites using supplied filter funs %%------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -2282,11 +511,11 @@ filter_suite(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, all_filters(Hash, HashFilters) andalso all_filters(Prf, PrfFilters); filter_suite(Suite, Filters) -> - filter_suite(suite_definition(Suite), Filters). + filter_suite(ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Suite), Filters). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec filter_suites([erl_cipher_suite()] | [cipher_suite()]) -> - [erl_cipher_suite()] | [cipher_suite()]. +-spec filter_suites([ssl:erl_cipher_suite()] | [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]) -> + [ssl:erl_cipher_suite()] | [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Filter suites for algorithms supported by crypto. %%------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -2370,7 +599,7 @@ is_acceptable_cipher(rc4_128, Algos) -> is_acceptable_cipher(des_cbc, Algos) -> proplists:get_bool(des_cbc, Algos); is_acceptable_cipher('3des_ede_cbc', Algos) -> - proplists:get_bool(des3_cbc, Algos); + proplists:get_bool(des_ede3, Algos); is_acceptable_cipher(aes_128_cbc, Algos) -> proplists:get_bool(aes_cbc128, Algos); is_acceptable_cipher(aes_256_cbc, Algos) -> @@ -2410,12 +639,13 @@ random_bytes(N) -> calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, #{sequence_number := SeqNo, mac_secret := MacSecret, - security_parameters:= - SecPars}) -> + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{mac_algorithm = MacAlgorithm}}) -> + calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, MacAlgorithm, MacSecret, SeqNo). +%% +calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, MacAlgorithm, MacSecret, SeqNo) -> Length = erlang:iolist_size(PlainFragment), - mac_hash(Version, SecPars#security_parameters.mac_algorithm, - MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, - Length, PlainFragment). + mac_hash(Version, MacAlgorithm, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, PlainFragment). is_stream_ciphersuite(#{cipher := rc4_128}) -> true; @@ -2499,7 +729,6 @@ expanded_key_material(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc; Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 -> unknown. - effective_key_bits(null) -> 0; effective_key_bits(des_cbc) -> @@ -2519,18 +748,15 @@ iv_size(Cipher) when Cipher == null; Cipher == rc4_128; Cipher == chacha20_poly1305-> 0; - iv_size(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm; Cipher == aes_256_gcm -> 4; - iv_size(Cipher) -> block_size(Cipher). block_size(Cipher) when Cipher == des_cbc; Cipher == '3des_ede_cbc' -> 8; - block_size(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc; Cipher == aes_256_cbc; Cipher == aes_128_gcm; @@ -2665,21 +891,51 @@ is_correct_padding(GenBlockCipher, {3, 1}, false) -> %% Padding must be checked in TLS 1.1 and after is_correct_padding(#generic_block_cipher{padding_length = Len, padding = Padding}, _, _) -> - Len == byte_size(Padding) andalso - list_to_binary(lists:duplicate(Len, Len)) == Padding. - -get_padding(Length, BlockSize) -> - get_padding_aux(BlockSize, Length rem BlockSize). - -get_padding_aux(_, 0) -> - {0, <<>>}; -get_padding_aux(BlockSize, PadLength) -> - N = BlockSize - PadLength, - {N, list_to_binary(lists:duplicate(N, N))}. + (Len == byte_size(Padding)) andalso (padding(Len) == Padding). + +padding(PadLen) -> + case PadLen of + 0 -> <<>>; + 1 -> <<1>>; + 2 -> <<2,2>>; + 3 -> <<3,3,3>>; + 4 -> <<4,4,4,4>>; + 5 -> <<5,5,5,5,5>>; + 6 -> <<6,6,6,6,6,6>>; + 7 -> <<7,7,7,7,7,7,7>>; + 8 -> <<8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8>>; + 9 -> <<9,9,9,9,9,9,9,9,9>>; + 10 -> <<10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10>>; + 11 -> <<11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11>>; + 12 -> <<12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12>>; + 13 -> <<13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13>>; + 14 -> <<14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14>>; + 15 -> <<15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15>>; + _ -> + binary:copy(<<PadLen>>, PadLen) + end. -random_iv(IV) -> - IVSz = byte_size(IV), - random_bytes(IVSz). +padding_with_len(TextLen, BlockSize) -> + case BlockSize - (TextLen rem BlockSize) of + 0 -> <<0>>; + 1 -> <<1,1>>; + 2 -> <<2,2,2>>; + 3 -> <<3,3,3,3>>; + 4 -> <<4,4,4,4,4>>; + 5 -> <<5,5,5,5,5,5>>; + 6 -> <<6,6,6,6,6,6,6>>; + 7 -> <<7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7>>; + 8 -> <<8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8>>; + 9 -> <<9,9,9,9,9,9,9,9,9,9>>; + 10 -> <<10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10,10>>; + 11 -> <<11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11>>; + 12 -> <<12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12>>; + 13 -> <<13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13,13>>; + 14 -> <<14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14,14>>; + 15 -> <<15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15>>; + PadLen -> + binary:copy(<<PadLen>>, PadLen + 1) + end. next_iv(Bin, IV) -> BinSz = byte_size(Bin), @@ -2709,6 +965,8 @@ filter_suites_pubkey(ec, Ciphers, _, OtpCert) -> ec_ecdhe_suites(Ciphers)), filter_keyuse_suites(keyAgreement, Uses, CiphersSuites, ec_ecdh_suites(Ciphers)). +filter_suites_signature(_, Ciphers, {3, N}) when N >= 3 -> + Ciphers; filter_suites_signature(rsa, Ciphers, Version) -> (Ciphers -- ecdsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version)) -- dsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version); filter_suites_signature(dsa, Ciphers, Version) -> @@ -2775,6 +1033,8 @@ ecdsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version) -> rsa_keyed(dhe_rsa) -> true; +rsa_keyed(ecdhe_rsa) -> + true; rsa_keyed(rsa) -> true; rsa_keyed(rsa_psk) -> @@ -2838,6 +1098,8 @@ ec_keyed(ecdh_ecdsa) -> true; ec_keyed(ecdh_rsa) -> true; +ec_keyed(ecdhe_ecdsa) -> + true; ec_keyed(_) -> false. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl index ba6a98b92a..2371e8bd32 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl @@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ iv, key, state, - nonce + nonce, + tag_len }). %%% TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL is specified and is the initial state of a diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher_format.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher_format.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1d28e1e3b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher_format.erl @@ -0,0 +1,1763 @@ +% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2018-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +%% +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Purpose: Convert between diffrent cipher suite representations +%% +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +-module(ssl_cipher_format). + +-include("ssl_api.hrl"). +-include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). +-include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). + +-export_type([old_erl_cipher_suite/0, openssl_cipher_suite/0, cipher_suite/0]). + +-type internal_cipher() :: null | ssl:cipher(). +-type internal_hash() :: null | ssl:hash(). +-type internal_kex_algo() :: null | ssl:kex_algo(). +-type internal_erl_cipher_suite() :: #{key_exchange := internal_kex_algo(), + cipher := internal_cipher(), + mac := internal_hash() | aead, + prf := internal_hash() | default_prf %% Old cipher suites, version dependent + }. +-type old_erl_cipher_suite() :: {ssl:kex_algo(), internal_cipher(), internal_hash()} % Pre TLS 1.2 + %% TLS 1.2, internally PRE TLS 1.2 will use default_prf + | {ssl:kex_algo(), internal_cipher(), internal_hash(), + internal_hash() | default_prf}. +-type cipher_suite() :: binary(). +-type openssl_cipher_suite() :: string(). + + +-export([suite_to_str/1, suite_definition/1, suite/1, erl_suite_definition/1, + openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1]). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec suite_to_str(internal_erl_cipher_suite()) -> string(). +%% +%% Description: Return the string representation of a cipher suite. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +suite_to_str(#{key_exchange := null, + cipher := null, + mac := null, + prf := null}) -> + "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV"; +suite_to_str(#{key_exchange := Kex, + cipher := Cipher, + mac := aead, + prf := PRF}) -> + "TLS_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Kex)) ++ + "_WITH_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Cipher)) ++ + "_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(PRF)); +suite_to_str(#{key_exchange := Kex, + cipher := Cipher, + mac := Mac}) -> + "TLS_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Kex)) ++ + "_WITH_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Cipher)) ++ + "_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Mac)). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> internal_erl_cipher_suite(). +%% +%% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. +%% Note: Currently not supported suites are commented away. +%% They should be supported or removed in the future. +%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS v1.1 suites +suite_definition(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) -> + #{key_exchange => null, + cipher => null, + mac => null, + prf => null}; +%% RFC 5746 - Not a real cipher suite used to signal empty "renegotiation_info" extension +%% to avoid handshake failure from old servers that do not ignore +%% hello extension data as they should. +suite_definition(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) -> + #{key_exchange => null, + cipher => null, + mac => null, + prf => null}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => md5, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +%%% TSL V1.1 AES suites +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +%% TLS v1.2 suites +%% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> +%% {rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +%% not defined YET: +%% TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DH_DSS AES_128_CBC SHA256 +%% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_128_CBC SHA256 +%% TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_DSS AES_256_CBC SHA256 +%% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_256_CBC SHA256 +%%% DH-ANON deprecated by TLS spec and not available +%%% by default, but good for testing purposes. +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => md5, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +%%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 +suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +%%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 +suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +%%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 +suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; +%%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => null, mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; +%%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; +%% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) -> +%% #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, +%% cipher => aes_128_ccm, +%% mac => null, +%% prf =>sha256}; +%% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) -> +%% #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, +%% cipher => aes_256_ccm, +%% mac => null, +%% prf => sha256}; +%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 +suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => srp_anon, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => srp_dss, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => srp_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => srp_dss, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => srp_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => srp_dss, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; +%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_dss, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_dss, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +%% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec erl_suite_definition(cipher_suite() | internal_erl_cipher_suite()) -> old_erl_cipher_suite(). +%% +%% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. Filters last value +%% for now (compatibility reasons). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +erl_suite_definition(Bin) when is_binary(Bin) -> + erl_suite_definition(suite_definition(Bin)); +erl_suite_definition(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, cipher := Cipher, + mac := Hash, prf := Prf}) -> + case Prf of + default_prf -> + {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}; + _ -> + {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf} + end. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec suite(internal_erl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite(). +%% +%% Description: Return TLS cipher suite definition. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS v1.1 suites +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := md5}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher :='3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher:= des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher:= des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher:= rc4_128, + mac := md5}) -> + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher:= des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +%%% TSL V1.1 AES suites +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +%% TLS v1.2 suites +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; +%%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +%%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; +%%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; +%%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher :='3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; +%%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; + %% suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + %% cipher := aes_128_ccm, + %% mac := null, + %% prf := sha256}) -> + %% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256; + %% suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + %% cipher := aes_256_ccm, + %% mac := null, + %% prf := sha256}) -> + %% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256; +%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +%%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +%%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac:= sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +%% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec openssl_suite(openssl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite(). +%% +%% Description: Return TLS cipher suite definition. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% translate constants <-> openssl-strings +openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; +openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; +openssl_suite("AES256-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; +openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +openssl_suite("AES128-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA") -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA") -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("AES256-SHA") -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("DES-CBC3-SHA") -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA") -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA") -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("AES128-SHA") -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("RC4-SHA") -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +openssl_suite("RC4-MD5") -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; +openssl_suite("EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA") -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("DES-CBC-SHA") -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; + +%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 + +openssl_suite("SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA") -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA") -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA") -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA") -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA") -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA") -> + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; + +%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites +openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; + +openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; + +openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; + +openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; + +%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites +openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; + +%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites +openssl_suite("AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +openssl_suite("AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +openssl_suite("DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +openssl_suite("DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +openssl_suite("DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +openssl_suite("DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; + +%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites +openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec openssl_suite_name(cipher_suite()) -> openssl_cipher_suite() | internal_erl_cipher_suite(). +%% +%% Description: Return openssl cipher suite name if possible +%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + "AES256-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + "DES-CBC3-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name( ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + "AES128-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + "RC4-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> + "RC4-MD5"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> + "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> + "DES-CBC-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> + "NULL-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + "AES128-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> + "AES256-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> + "DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> + "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> + "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> + "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256"; + +%%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 + +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + "PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + "PSK-RC4-SHA"; + +%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 + +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + "SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + "SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + "SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + "SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + "SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + "SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA"; + +%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"; + +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + "ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + "ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"; + +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + "ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + "ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA"; + +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + "ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + "ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"; + +%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384"; + +%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + "AES128-GCM-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + "AES256-GCM-SHA384"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + "DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + "DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + "DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + "DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + "DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + "DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; + +%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; + +%% No oppenssl name +openssl_suite_name(Cipher) -> + suite_definition(Cipher). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_config.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_config.erl index 63c0a416ef..1e6dab9276 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_config.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_config.erl @@ -91,9 +91,9 @@ init_certificates(undefined, #{pem_cache := PemCache} = Config, CertFile, server end; init_certificates(Cert, Config, _, _) -> {ok, Config#{own_certificate => Cert}}. -init_private_key(_, #{algorithm := Alg} = Key, <<>>, _Password, _Client) when Alg == ecdsa; - Alg == rsa; - Alg == dss -> +init_private_key(_, #{algorithm := Alg} = Key, _, _Password, _Client) when Alg == ecdsa; + Alg == rsa; + Alg == dss -> case maps:is_key(engine, Key) andalso maps:is_key(key_id, Key) of true -> Key; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl index 556c204ab1..a5f29c058a 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2019. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ -export([connect/8, handshake/7, handshake/2, handshake/3, handshake_continue/3, handshake_cancel/1, - socket_control/4, socket_control/5, start_or_recv_cancel_timer/2]). + socket_control/4, socket_control/5]). %% User Events -export([send/2, recv/3, close/2, shutdown/2, @@ -51,11 +51,11 @@ %% Alert and close handling -export([handle_own_alert/4, handle_alert/3, - handle_normal_shutdown/3, stop/2, stop_and_reply/3 - ]). + handle_normal_shutdown/3, + handle_trusted_certs_db/1]). %% Data handling --export([write_application_data/3, read_application_data/2]). +-export([read_application_data/2, internal_renegotiation/2]). %% Help functions for tls|dtls_connection.erl -export([handle_session/7, ssl_config/3, @@ -64,20 +64,20 @@ %% General gen_statem state functions with extra callback argument %% to determine if it is an SSL/TLS or DTLS gen_statem machine -export([init/4, error/4, hello/4, user_hello/4, abbreviated/4, certify/4, cipher/4, - connection/4, death_row/4, downgrade/4]). + connection/4, downgrade/4]). %% gen_statem callbacks -export([terminate/3, format_status/2]). %% Erlang Distribution export --export([get_sslsocket/1, handshake_complete/3]). +-export([dist_handshake_complete/2]). %%==================================================================== %% Setup %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec connect(tls_connection | dtls_connection, - host(), inet:port_number(), + ssl:host(), inet:port_number(), port() | {tuple(), port()}, %% TLS | DTLS {#ssl_options{}, #socket_options{}, %% Tracker only needed on server side @@ -114,11 +114,11 @@ handshake(Connection, Port, Socket, Opts, User, CbInfo, Timeout) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec handshake(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | - {ok, #sslsocket{}, map()}| {error, reason()}. + {ok, #sslsocket{}, map()}| {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Starts ssl handshake. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handshake(#sslsocket{pid = Pid} = Socket, Timeout) -> +handshake(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]} = Socket, Timeout) -> case call(Pid, {start, Timeout}) of connected -> {ok, Socket}; @@ -129,12 +129,12 @@ handshake(#sslsocket{pid = Pid} = Socket, Timeout) -> end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec handshake(#sslsocket{}, {#ssl_options{},#socket_options{}}, - timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. +-spec handshake(#sslsocket{}, {#ssl_options{},#socket_options{}}, timeout()) -> + {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {ok, #sslsocket{}, map()} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Starts ssl handshake with some new options %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handshake(#sslsocket{pid = Pid} = Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> +handshake(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]} = Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> case call(Pid, {start, SslOptions, Timeout}) of connected -> {ok, Socket}; @@ -143,12 +143,12 @@ handshake(#sslsocket{pid = Pid} = Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec handshake_continue(#sslsocket{}, [ssl_option()], +-spec handshake_continue(#sslsocket{}, [ssl:tls_server_option()], timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}}| {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Continues handshake with new options %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handshake_continue(#sslsocket{pid = Pid} = Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> +handshake_continue(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]} = Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> case call(Pid, {handshake_continue, SslOptions, Timeout}) of connected -> {ok, Socket}; @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ handshake_continue(#sslsocket{pid = Pid} = Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> %% %% Description: Cancels connection %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handshake_cancel(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) -> +handshake_cancel(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}) -> case call(Pid, cancel) of closed -> ok; @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ handshake_cancel(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) -> Error end. %-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec socket_control(tls_connection | dtls_connection, port(), pid(), atom()) -> +-spec socket_control(tls_connection | dtls_connection, port(), [pid()], atom()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Set the ssl process to own the accept socket @@ -177,32 +177,28 @@ socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport) -> socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport, undefined). %-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec socket_control(tls_connection | dtls_connection, port(), pid(), atom(), pid()| undefined) -> +-spec socket_control(tls_connection | dtls_connection, port(), [pid()], atom(), pid()| atom()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport, udp_listener) -> +socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pids, Transport, udp_listener) -> %% dtls listener process must have the socket control - {ok, Connection:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, undefined)}; + {ok, Connection:socket(Pids, Transport, Socket, undefined)}; -socket_control(tls_connection = Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport, ListenTracker) -> +socket_control(tls_connection = Connection, Socket, [Pid|_] = Pids, Transport, ListenTracker) -> case Transport:controlling_process(Socket, Pid) of ok -> - {ok, Connection:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, ListenTracker)}; + {ok, Connection:socket(Pids, Transport, Socket, ListenTracker)}; {error, Reason} -> {error, Reason} end; -socket_control(dtls_connection = Connection, {_, Socket}, Pid, Transport, ListenTracker) -> +socket_control(dtls_connection = Connection, {_, Socket}, [Pid|_] = Pids, Transport, ListenTracker) -> case Transport:controlling_process(Socket, Pid) of ok -> - {ok, Connection:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, ListenTracker)}; + {ok, Connection:socket(Pids, Transport, Socket, ListenTracker)}; {error, Reason} -> {error, Reason} end. -start_or_recv_cancel_timer(infinity, _RecvFrom) -> - undefined; -start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom) -> - erlang:send_after(Timeout, self(), {cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}). %%==================================================================== %% User events @@ -215,9 +211,9 @@ start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- send(Pid, Data) -> call(Pid, {application_data, - %% iolist_to_binary should really - %% be called iodata_to_binary() - erlang:iolist_to_binary(Data)}). + %% iolist_to_iovec should really + %% be called iodata_to_iovec() + erlang:iolist_to_iovec(Data)}). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec recv(pid(), integer(), timeout()) -> @@ -306,12 +302,17 @@ peer_certificate(ConnectionPid) -> renegotiation(ConnectionPid) -> call(ConnectionPid, renegotiate). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec internal_renegotiation(pid(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> + ok. +%% +%% Description: Starts a renegotiation of the ssl session. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +internal_renegotiation(ConnectionPid, #{current_write := WriteState}) -> + gen_statem:cast(ConnectionPid, {internal_renegotiate, WriteState}). -get_sslsocket(ConnectionPid) -> - call(ConnectionPid, get_sslsocket). - -handshake_complete(ConnectionPid, Node, DHandle) -> - call(ConnectionPid, {handshake_complete, Node, DHandle}). +dist_handshake_complete(ConnectionPid, DHandle) -> + gen_statem:cast(ConnectionPid, {dist_handshake_complete, DHandle}). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec prf(pid(), binary() | 'master_secret', binary(), @@ -326,191 +327,365 @@ prf(ConnectionPid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> %%==================================================================== %% Alert and close handling %%==================================================================== -handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, - #state{role = Role, - transport_cb = Transport, - socket = Socket, - protocol_cb = Connection, - connection_states = ConnectionStates, +handle_own_alert(Alert0, _, StateName, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, + protocol_cb = Connection}, ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> try %% Try to tell the other side - {BinMsg, _} = - Connection:encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates), - Connection:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg) + send_alert(Alert0, StateName, State) catch _:_ -> %% Can crash if we are in a uninitialized state ignore end, try %% Try to tell the local user - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = Role}), + Alert = Alert0#alert{role = Role}, + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert,StateName, State) catch _:_ -> ok end, - stop({shutdown, own_alert}, State). - -handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, _, #state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - protocol_cb = Connection, - start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, - tracker = Tracker, - role = Role, renegotiation = {false, first}}) -> - alert_user(Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role, Connection); - -handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, - socket_options = Opts, - transport_cb = Transport, - protocol_cb = Connection, - user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, - tracker = Tracker, - start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, role = Role}) -> - alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role, Connection). - -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, - #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, - protocol_cb = Connection, - ssl_options = SslOpts, start_or_recv_from = From, host = Host, - port = Port, session = Session, user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, - role = Role, socket_options = Opts, tracker = Tracker} = State) -> + {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State}. + +handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + protocol_cb = Connection, + tracker = Tracker}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {false, first}}, + start_or_recv_from = StartFrom} = State) -> + Pids = Connection:pids(State), + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection); + +handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + protocol_cb = Connection, + tracker = Tracker}, + connection_env = #connection_env{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}}, + socket_options = Opts, + start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State) -> + Pids = Connection:pids(State), + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection). + +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert0, StateName, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, + socket = Socket, + host = Host, + port = Port, + tracker = Tracker, + transport_cb = Transport, + protocol_cb = Connection}, + connection_env = #connection_env{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}}, + ssl_options = SslOpts, + start_or_recv_from = From, + session = Session, + socket_options = Opts} = State) -> invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session), + Alert = Alert0#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}, log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), - StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), - alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection), - stop(normal, State); + StateName, Alert), + Pids = Connection:pids(State), + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection), + {stop, {shutdown, normal}, State}; handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, - StateName, State) -> + downgrade= StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert}]}; +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, + StateName, State) -> handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), - stop({shutdown, peer_close}, State); - -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, - #state{role = Role, ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) -> + {stop,{shutdown, peer_close}, State}; +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert0, StateName, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, + protocol_cb = Connection}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, internal}}, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> + Alert = Alert0#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}, log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), - stop({shutdown, peer_close}, State); + {stop,{shutdown, peer_close}, State}; + +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, connection = StateName, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, + protocol_cb = Connection}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, From}} = HsEnv, + ssl_options = SslOpts + } = State0) -> + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}), + State = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State0), + Connection:next_event(connection, no_record, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{renegotiation = undefined}}); handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, - #state{role = Role, - ssl_options = SslOpts, renegotiation = {true, From}, - protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, + protocol_cb = Connection}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, From}} = HsEnv, + ssl_options = SslOpts + } = State0) -> log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}), - {Record, State1} = Connection:next_record(State0), %% Go back to connection! - State = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State1#state{renegotiation = undefined}), - Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State); + State = Connection:reinit(State0#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{renegotiation = undefined}}), + Connection:next_event(connection, no_record, State); %% Gracefully log and ignore all other warning alerts handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName, - #state{ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, role = Role} = State0) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, + protocol_cb = Connection}, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0), - Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State). + Connection:next_event(StateName, no_record, State). %%==================================================================== %% Data handling %%==================================================================== -write_application_data(Data0, {FromPid, _} = From, - #state{socket = Socket, - negotiated_version = Version, - protocol_cb = Connection, - transport_cb = Transport, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - socket_options = SockOpts, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}} = State) -> - Data = encode_packet(Data0, SockOpts), - - case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of - true -> - Connection:renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, internal}}, - [{next_event, {call, From}, {application_data, Data0}}]); - false -> - {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = - Connection:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0), - NewState = State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, - case Connection:send(Transport, Socket, Msgs) of - ok when FromPid =:= self() -> - hibernate_after(connection, NewState, []); - Error when FromPid =:= self() -> - stop({shutdown, Error}, NewState); - ok -> - hibernate_after(connection, NewState, [{reply, From, ok}]); - Result -> - hibernate_after(connection, NewState, [{reply, From, Result}]) +passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = {_,BufferSize,_}}, StateName, Connection, StartTimerAction) -> + case BufferSize of + 0 -> + Connection:next_event(StateName, no_record, State0, StartTimerAction); + _ -> + case read_application_data(<<>>, State0) of + {stop, _, _} = ShutdownError -> + ShutdownError; + {Record, State} -> + case State#state.start_or_recv_from of + undefined -> + %% Cancel recv timeout as data has been delivered + Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State, + [{{timeout, recv}, infinity, timeout}]); + _ -> + Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State, StartTimerAction) + end end end. -read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, - socket = Socket, - protocol_cb = Connection, - transport_cb = Transport, - socket_options = SOpts, - bytes_to_read = BytesToRead, - start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, - timer = Timer, - user_data_buffer = Buffer0, - tracker = Tracker} = State0) -> - Buffer1 = if - Buffer0 =:= <<>> -> Data; - Data =:= <<>> -> Buffer0; - true -> <<Buffer0/binary, Data/binary>> - end, - case get_data(SOpts, BytesToRead, Buffer1) of - {ok, ClientData, Buffer} -> % Send data - case State0 of - #state{ - ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, - protocol_specific = #{d_handle := DHandle}} -> - State = - State0#state{ - user_data_buffer = Buffer, - bytes_to_read = undefined}, - try erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, ClientData) of - _ - when SOpts#socket_options.active =:= false; - Buffer =:= <<>> -> - %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv - %% Active and empty, get more data - Connection:next_record_if_active(State); - _ -> %% We have more data - read_application_data(<<>>, State) - catch error:_ -> - death_row(State, disconnect) - end; - _ -> - SocketOpt = - deliver_app_data( - Transport, Socket, SOpts, - ClientData, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), - cancel_timer(Timer), - State = - State0#state{ - user_data_buffer = Buffer, - start_or_recv_from = undefined, - timer = undefined, - bytes_to_read = undefined, - socket_options = SocketOpt - }, - if - SocketOpt#socket_options.active =:= false; - Buffer =:= <<>> -> - %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv - %% Active and empty, get more data - Connection:next_record_if_active(State); - true -> %% We have more data - read_application_data(<<>>, State) - end +read_application_data( + Data, + #state{ + user_data_buffer = {Front0,BufferSize0,Rear0}, + connection_env = #connection_env{erl_dist_handle = DHandle}} = State) -> + %% + Front = Front0, + BufferSize = BufferSize0 + byte_size(Data), + Rear = [Data|Rear0], + case DHandle of + undefined -> + read_application_data(State, Front, BufferSize, Rear); + _ -> + try read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front, BufferSize, Rear) of + Buffer -> + {no_record, State#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}} + catch error:_ -> + {stop,disconnect, + State#state{user_data_buffer = {Front,BufferSize,Rear}}} + end + end. + + +read_application_data(#state{ + socket_options = SocketOpts, + bytes_to_read = BytesToRead, + start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State, Front, BufferSize, Rear) -> + read_application_data(State, Front, BufferSize, Rear, SocketOpts, RecvFrom, BytesToRead). + +%% Pick binary from queue front, if empty wait for more data +read_application_data(State, [Bin|Front], BufferSize, Rear, SocketOpts, RecvFrom, BytesToRead) -> + read_application_data_bin(State, Front, BufferSize, Rear, SocketOpts, RecvFrom, BytesToRead, Bin); +read_application_data(State, [] = Front, BufferSize, [] = Rear, SocketOpts, RecvFrom, BytesToRead) -> + 0 = BufferSize, % Assert + {no_record, State#state{socket_options = SocketOpts, + bytes_to_read = BytesToRead, + start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, + user_data_buffer = {Front,BufferSize,Rear}}}; +read_application_data(State, [], BufferSize, Rear, SocketOpts, RecvFrom, BytesToRead) -> + [Bin|Front] = lists:reverse(Rear), + read_application_data_bin(State, Front, BufferSize, [], SocketOpts, RecvFrom, BytesToRead, Bin). + +read_application_data_bin(State, Front, BufferSize, Rear, SocketOpts, RecvFrom, BytesToRead, <<>>) -> + %% Done with this binary - get next + read_application_data(State, Front, BufferSize, Rear, SocketOpts, RecvFrom, BytesToRead); +read_application_data_bin(State, Front0, BufferSize0, Rear0, SocketOpts0, RecvFrom, BytesToRead, Bin0) -> + %% Decode one packet from a binary + case get_data(SocketOpts0, BytesToRead, Bin0) of + {ok, Data, Bin} -> % Send data + BufferSize = BufferSize0 - (byte_size(Bin0) - byte_size(Bin)), + read_application_data_deliver( + State, [Bin|Front0], BufferSize, Rear0, SocketOpts0, RecvFrom, Data); + {more, undefined} -> + %% We need more data, do not know how much + if + byte_size(Bin0) < BufferSize0 -> + %% We have more data in the buffer besides the first binary - concatenate all and retry + Bin = iolist_to_binary([Bin0,Front0|lists:reverse(Rear0)]), + read_application_data_bin( + State, [], BufferSize0, [], SocketOpts0, RecvFrom, BytesToRead, Bin); + true -> + %% All data is in the first binary, no use to retry - wait for more + {no_record, State#state{socket_options = SocketOpts0, + bytes_to_read = BytesToRead, + start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, + user_data_buffer = {[Bin0|Front0],BufferSize0,Rear0}}} end; - {more, Buffer} -> % no reply, we need more data - Connection:next_record(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); - {passive, Buffer} -> - Connection:next_record_if_active(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); - {error,_Reason} -> %% Invalid packet in packet mode - deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Buffer1, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), - stop(normal, State0) + {more, Size} when Size =< BufferSize0 -> + %% We have a packet in the buffer - collect it in a binary and decode + {Data,Front,Rear} = iovec_from_front(Size - byte_size(Bin0), Front0, Rear0, [Bin0]), + Bin = iolist_to_binary(Data), + read_application_data_bin( + State, Front, BufferSize0, Rear, SocketOpts0, RecvFrom, BytesToRead, Bin); + {more, _Size} -> + %% We do not have a packet in the buffer - wait for more + {no_record, State#state{socket_options = SocketOpts0, + bytes_to_read = BytesToRead, + start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, + user_data_buffer = {[Bin0|Front0],BufferSize0,Rear0}}}; + passive -> + {no_record, State#state{socket_options = SocketOpts0, + bytes_to_read = BytesToRead, + start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, + user_data_buffer = {[Bin0|Front0],BufferSize0,Rear0}}}; + {error,_Reason} -> + %% Invalid packet in packet mode + #state{ + static_env = + #static_env{ + socket = Socket, + protocol_cb = Connection, + transport_cb = Transport, + tracker = Tracker}, + connection_env = + #connection_env{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}}} = State, + Buffer = iolist_to_binary([Bin0,Front0|lists:reverse(Rear0)]), + deliver_packet_error( + Connection:pids(State), Transport, Socket, SocketOpts0, + Buffer, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), + {stop, {shutdown, normal}, State#state{socket_options = SocketOpts0, + bytes_to_read = BytesToRead, + start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, + user_data_buffer = {[Buffer],BufferSize0,[]}}} + end. + +read_application_data_deliver(State, Front, BufferSize, Rear, SocketOpts0, RecvFrom, Data) -> + #state{ + static_env = + #static_env{ + socket = Socket, + protocol_cb = Connection, + transport_cb = Transport, + tracker = Tracker}, + connection_env = + #connection_env{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}}} = State, + SocketOpts = + deliver_app_data( + Connection:pids(State), Transport, Socket, SocketOpts0, Data, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), + if + SocketOpts#socket_options.active =:= false -> + %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv + {no_record, + State#state{ + user_data_buffer = {Front,BufferSize,Rear}, + start_or_recv_from = undefined, + bytes_to_read = undefined, + socket_options = SocketOpts + }}; + true -> %% Try to deliver more data + read_application_data(State, Front, BufferSize, Rear, SocketOpts, undefined, undefined) + end. + + +read_application_dist_data(DHandle, [Bin|Front], BufferSize, Rear) -> + read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front, BufferSize, Rear, Bin); +read_application_dist_data(_DHandle, [] = Front, BufferSize, [] = Rear) -> + BufferSize = 0, + {Front,BufferSize,Rear}; +read_application_dist_data(DHandle, [], BufferSize, Rear) -> + [Bin|Front] = lists:reverse(Rear), + read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front, BufferSize, [], Bin). +%% +read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize, Rear0, Bin0) -> + case Bin0 of + %% + %% START Optimization + %% It is cheaper to match out several packets in one match operation than to loop for each + <<SizeA:32, DataA:SizeA/binary, + SizeB:32, DataB:SizeB/binary, + SizeC:32, DataC:SizeC/binary, + SizeD:32, DataD:SizeD/binary, Rest/binary>> -> + %% We have 4 complete packets in the first binary + erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataA), + erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataB), + erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataC), + erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataD), + read_application_dist_data( + DHandle, Front0, BufferSize - (4*4+SizeA+SizeB+SizeC+SizeD), Rear0, Rest); + <<SizeA:32, DataA:SizeA/binary, + SizeB:32, DataB:SizeB/binary, + SizeC:32, DataC:SizeC/binary, Rest/binary>> -> + %% We have 3 complete packets in the first binary + erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataA), + erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataB), + erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataC), + read_application_dist_data( + DHandle, Front0, BufferSize - (3*4+SizeA+SizeB+SizeC), Rear0, Rest); + <<SizeA:32, DataA:SizeA/binary, + SizeB:32, DataB:SizeB/binary, Rest/binary>> -> + %% We have 2 complete packets in the first binary + erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataA), + erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataB), + read_application_dist_data( + DHandle, Front0, BufferSize - (2*4+SizeA+SizeB), Rear0, Rest); + %% END Optimization + %% + %% Basic one packet code path + <<Size:32, Data:Size/binary, Rest/binary>> -> + %% We have a complete packet in the first binary + erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, Data), + read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize - (4+Size), Rear0, Rest); + <<Size:32, FirstData/binary>> when 4+Size =< BufferSize -> + %% We have a complete packet in the buffer + %% - fetch the missing content from the buffer front + {Data,Front,Rear} = iovec_from_front(Size - byte_size(FirstData), Front0, Rear0, [FirstData]), + erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, Data), + read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front, BufferSize - (4+Size), Rear); + <<Bin/binary>> -> + %% In OTP-21 the match context reuse optimization fails if we use Bin0 in recursion, so here we + %% match out the whole binary which will trick the optimization into keeping the match context + %% for the first binary contains complete packet code above + case Bin of + <<_Size:32, _InsufficientData/binary>> -> + %% We have a length field in the first binary but there is not enough data + %% in the buffer to form a complete packet - await more data + {[Bin|Front0],BufferSize,Rear0}; + <<IncompleteLengthField/binary>> when 4 < BufferSize -> + %% We do not have a length field in the first binary but the buffer + %% contains enough data to maybe form a packet + %% - fetch a tiny binary from the buffer front to complete the length field + {LengthField,Front,Rear} = + iovec_from_front(4 - byte_size(IncompleteLengthField), Front0, Rear0, [IncompleteLengthField]), + LengthBin = iolist_to_binary(LengthField), + read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front, BufferSize, Rear, LengthBin); + <<IncompleteLengthField/binary>> -> + %% We do not have enough data in the buffer to even form a length field - await more data + {[IncompleteLengthField|Front0],BufferSize,Rear0} + end end. + +iovec_from_front(Size, [], Rear, Acc) -> + iovec_from_front(Size, lists:reverse(Rear), [], Acc); +iovec_from_front(Size, [Bin|Front], Rear, Acc) -> + case Bin of + <<Last:Size/binary>> -> % Just enough + {lists:reverse(Acc, [Last]),Front,Rear}; + <<Last:Size/binary, Rest/binary>> -> % More than enough, split here + {lists:reverse(Acc, [Last]),[Rest|Front],Rear}; + <<_/binary>> -> % Not enough + BinSize = byte_size(Bin), + iovec_from_front(Size - BinSize, Front, Rear, [Bin|Acc]) + end. + + %%==================================================================== %% Help functions for tls|dtls_connection.erl %%==================================================================== @@ -523,10 +698,10 @@ handle_session(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression}, Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol0, #state{session = #session{session_id = OldId}, - negotiated_version = ReqVersion, - negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol} = State0) -> + handshake_env = #handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol} = HsEnv, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = ReqVersion} = CEnv} = State0) -> #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = - ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion, KeyAlgorithm), @@ -537,12 +712,12 @@ handle_session(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, {ProtoExt =:= npn, Protocol0} end, - State = State0#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm, - negotiated_version = Version, - connection_states = ConnectionStates, - premaster_secret = PremasterSecret, - expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = ExpectNPN, - negotiated_protocol = Protocol}, + State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm, + premaster_secret = PremasterSecret, + expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = ExpectNPN, + negotiated_protocol = Protocol}, + connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}, case ssl_session:is_new(OldId, NewId) of true -> @@ -556,10 +731,9 @@ handle_session(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec ssl_config(#ssl_options{}, client | server, #state{}) -> #state{}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -ssl_config(Opts, Role, State) -> - ssl_config(Opts, Role, State, new). - -ssl_config(Opts, Role, State0, Type) -> +ssl_config(Opts, Role, #state{static_env = InitStatEnv0, + handshake_env = HsEnv, + connection_env = CEnv} = State0) -> {ok, #{cert_db_ref := Ref, cert_db_handle := CertDbHandle, fileref_db_handle := FileRefHandle, @@ -571,24 +745,19 @@ ssl_config(Opts, Role, State0, Type) -> ssl_config:init(Opts, Role), TimeStamp = erlang:monotonic_time(), Session = State0#state.session, - State = State0#state{session = Session#session{own_certificate = OwnCert, - time_stamp = TimeStamp}, - file_ref_db = FileRefHandle, - cert_db_ref = Ref, - cert_db = CertDbHandle, - crl_db = CRLDbHandle, - session_cache = CacheHandle, - private_key = Key, - diffie_hellman_params = DHParams, - ssl_options = Opts}, - case Type of - new -> - Handshake = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), - State#state{tls_handshake_history = Handshake}; - continue -> - State - end. - + + State0#state{session = Session#session{own_certificate = OwnCert, + time_stamp = TimeStamp}, + static_env = InitStatEnv0#static_env{ + file_ref_db = FileRefHandle, + cert_db_ref = Ref, + cert_db = CertDbHandle, + crl_db = CRLDbHandle, + session_cache = CacheHandle + }, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{diffie_hellman_params = DHParams}, + connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{private_key = Key}, + ssl_options = Opts}. %%==================================================================== %% gen_statem general state functions with connection cb argument @@ -601,30 +770,25 @@ ssl_config(Opts, Role, State0, Type) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, State0, Connection) -> - Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, From), - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{start_or_recv_from = From, - timer = Timer}), - Connection:next_event(hello, Record, State); + Connection:next_event(hello, no_record, State0#state{start_or_recv_from = From}, + [{{timeout, handshake}, Timeout, close}]); init({call, From}, {start, {Opts, EmOpts}, Timeout}, - #state{role = Role, ssl_options = OrigSSLOptions, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role}, + ssl_options = OrigSSLOptions, socket_options = SockOpts} = State0, Connection) -> try SslOpts = ssl:handle_options(Opts, OrigSSLOptions), - case SslOpts of - #ssl_options{erl_dist = true} -> - process_flag(priority, max); - _ -> - ok - end, State = ssl_config(SslOpts, Role, State0), init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, State#state{ssl_options = SslOpts, socket_options = new_emulated(EmOpts, SockOpts)}, Connection) catch throw:Error -> - stop_and_reply(normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State0) + {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, normal}, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State0} end; -init({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> +init({call, From}, {new_user, _} = Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); +init({call, From}, _Msg, _State, _Connection) -> + {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, {error, notsup_on_transport_accept_socket}}]}; init(_Type, _Event, _State, _Connection) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. @@ -634,8 +798,10 @@ init(_Type, _Event, _State, _Connection) -> tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> gen_statem:state_function_result(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -error({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> - handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). +error({call, From}, {close, _}, State, _Connection) -> + {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, normal}, {reply, From, ok}, State}; +error({call, From}, _Msg, State, _Connection) -> + {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, {error, closed}}]}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec hello(gen_statem:event_type(), @@ -652,20 +818,18 @@ hello(info, Msg, State, _) -> hello(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). -user_hello({call, From}, cancel, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State, _) -> +user_hello({call, From}, cancel, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State, _) -> gen_statem:reply(From, ok), handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?USER_CANCELED, user_canceled), Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); -user_hello({call, From}, {handshake_continue, NewOptions, Timeout}, #state{hello = Hello, - role = Role, - start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, - ssl_options = Options0} = State0, _Connection) -> - Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom), +user_hello({call, From}, {handshake_continue, NewOptions, Timeout}, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{hello = Hello}, + ssl_options = Options0} = State0, _Connection) -> Options = ssl:handle_options(NewOptions, Options0#ssl_options{handshake = full}), - State = ssl_config(Options, Role, State0, continue), - {next_state, hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = From, - timer = Timer}, - [{next_event, internal, Hello}]}; + State = ssl_config(Options, Role, State0), + {next_state, hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = From}, + [{next_event, internal, Hello}, {{timeout, handshake}, Timeout, close}]}; user_hello(_, _, _, _) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. @@ -678,61 +842,63 @@ user_hello(_, _, _, _) -> abbreviated({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); abbreviated(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, - #state{role = server, - negotiated_version = Version, - expecting_finished = true, - tls_handshake_history = Handshake, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist, + expecting_finished = true} = HsEnv, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) -> case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(ssl:tls_version(Version), Finished, client, get_current_prf(ConnectionStates0, write), - MasterSecret, Handshake) of + MasterSecret, Hist) of verified -> ConnectionStates = ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0), {Record, State} = prepare_connection(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - expecting_finished = false}, Connection), - Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State); + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{expecting_finished = false}}, Connection), + Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State, [{{timeout, handshake}, infinity, close}]); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; abbreviated(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, - #state{role = client, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist0}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}, - negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) -> case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(ssl:tls_version(Version), Finished, server, get_pending_prf(ConnectionStates0, write), - MasterSecret, Handshake0) of + MasterSecret, Hist0) of verified -> ConnectionStates1 = ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_read, Data, ConnectionStates0), - {State1, Actions} = + {#state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State1, Actions} = finalize_handshake(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Connection), - {Record, State} = prepare_connection(State1#state{expecting_finished = false}, Connection), - Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State, Actions); + {Record, State} = prepare_connection(State1#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{expecting_finished = false}}, Connection), + Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State, [{{timeout, handshake}, infinity, close} | Actions]); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; %% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec %% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation abbreviated(internal, #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, - #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = State0, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = HsEnv} = State, Connection) -> - {Record, State} = - Connection:next_record(State0#state{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol}), - Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, - State#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false}); + Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol, + expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false}}); abbreviated(internal, - #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = - State0, Connection) -> + #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, + #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + handshake_env = HsEnv} = State, Connection) -> ConnectionStates1 = ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read, Connection), - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{connection_states = - ConnectionStates1}), - Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State#state{expecting_finished = true}); + Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State#state{connection_states = + ConnectionStates1, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{expecting_finished = true}}); abbreviated(info, Msg, State, _) -> handle_info(Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); abbreviated(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> @@ -750,34 +916,34 @@ certify({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> certify(info, Msg, State, _) -> handle_info(Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(internal, #certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, - #state{role = server, negotiated_version = Version, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer, fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} = State, _) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(internal, #certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, - #state{role = server, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer, fail_if_no_peer_cert = false}} = State0, Connection) -> - {Record, State} = - Connection:next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = false}), - Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State); + Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State0#state{client_certificate_requested = false}); certify(internal, #certificate{}, - #state{role = server, - negotiated_version = Version, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_none}} = State, _) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, unrequested_certificate), handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(internal, #certificate{} = Cert, - #state{negotiated_version = Version, - role = Role, - host = Host, - cert_db = CertDbHandle, - cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, - crl_db = CRLDbInfo, + #state{static_env = #static_env{ + role = Role, + host = Host, + cert_db = CertDbHandle, + cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, + crl_db = CRLDbInfo}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, ssl_options = Opts} = State, Connection) -> case ssl_handshake:certify(Cert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Opts, CRLDbInfo, Role, Host) of @@ -788,111 +954,131 @@ certify(internal, #certificate{} = Cert, handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end; certify(internal, #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, - #state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version, - key_algorithm = Alg, - public_key_info = PubKeyInfo, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg, + public_key_info = PubKeyInfo} = HsEnv, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + session = Session, connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State, Connection) - when Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dhe_rsa; - Alg == ecdhe_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa; - Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon; - Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == ecdhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk; - Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon -> - - Params = ssl_handshake:decode_server_key(Keys, Alg, ssl:tls_version(Version)), + when KexAlg == dhe_dss; + KexAlg == dhe_rsa; + KexAlg == ecdhe_rsa; + KexAlg == ecdhe_ecdsa; + KexAlg == dh_anon; + KexAlg == ecdh_anon; + KexAlg == psk; + KexAlg == dhe_psk; + KexAlg == ecdhe_psk; + KexAlg == rsa_psk; + KexAlg == srp_dss; + KexAlg == srp_rsa; + KexAlg == srp_anon -> + + Params = ssl_handshake:decode_server_key(Keys, KexAlg, ssl:tls_version(Version)), %% Use negotiated value if TLS-1.2 otherwhise return default - HashSign = negotiated_hashsign(Params#server_key_params.hashsign, Alg, PubKeyInfo, ssl:tls_version(Version)), + HashSign = negotiated_hashsign(Params#server_key_params.hashsign, KexAlg, PubKeyInfo, ssl:tls_version(Version)), - case is_anonymous(Alg) of + case is_anonymous(KexAlg) of true -> calculate_secret(Params#server_key_params.params, - State#state{hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}, Connection); + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}}, Connection); false -> case ssl_handshake:verify_server_key(Params, HashSign, ConnectionStates, ssl:tls_version(Version), PubKeyInfo) of true -> calculate_secret(Params#server_key_params.params, - State#state{hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}, - Connection); + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}, + session = session_handle_params(Params#server_key_params.params, Session)}, + Connection); false -> handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR), Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end end; certify(internal, #certificate_request{}, - #state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version, - key_algorithm = Alg} = State, _) - when Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon; - Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == ecdhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk; - Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State, _) + when KexAlg == dh_anon; + KexAlg == ecdh_anon; + KexAlg == psk; + KexAlg == dhe_psk; + KexAlg == ecdhe_psk; + KexAlg == rsa_psk; + KexAlg == srp_dss; + KexAlg == srp_rsa; + KexAlg == srp_anon -> handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(internal, #certificate_request{}, - #state{session = #session{own_certificate = undefined}, - role = client} = State0, Connection) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + session = #session{own_certificate = undefined}} = State, Connection) -> %% The client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is %% no certificate to verify. - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0), - Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State#state{client_certificate_requested = true}); + Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State#state{client_certificate_requested = true}); certify(internal, #certificate_request{} = CertRequest, - #state{session = #session{own_certificate = Cert}, - role = client, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns}, - negotiated_version = Version} = State0, Connection) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = HsEnv, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + session = #session{own_certificate = Cert}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns}} = State, Connection) -> case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(CertRequest, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, ssl:tls_version(Version)) of #alert {} = Alert -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0); - NegotiatedHashSign -> - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = true}), - Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, - State#state{cert_hashsign_algorithm = NegotiatedHashSign}) + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + NegotiatedHashSign -> + Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, + State#state{client_certificate_requested = true, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{cert_hashsign_algorithm = NegotiatedHashSign}}) end; %% PSK and RSA_PSK might bypass the Server-Key-Exchange certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, - #state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined}, - negotiated_version = Version, - psk_identity = PSKIdentity, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}, - premaster_secret = undefined, - role = client, - key_algorithm = Alg} = State0, Connection) - when Alg == psk -> - case ssl_handshake:premaster_secret({Alg, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) of + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + session = #session{master_secret = undefined}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg, + premaster_secret = undefined, + server_psk_identity = PSKIdentity} = HsEnv, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State0, Connection) + when KexAlg == psk -> + case ssl_handshake:premaster_secret({KexAlg, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) of #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0); PremasterSecret -> State = master_secret(PremasterSecret, - State0#state{premaster_secret = PremasterSecret}), - client_certify_and_key_exchange(State, Connection) + State0#state{handshake_env = + HsEnv#handshake_env{premaster_secret = PremasterSecret}}), + client_certify_and_key_exchange(State, Connection) end; certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, - #state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined}, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}, - negotiated_version = {Major, Minor} = Version, - psk_identity = PSKIdentity, - premaster_secret = undefined, - role = client, - key_algorithm = Alg} = State0, Connection) - when Alg == rsa_psk -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = {Major, Minor}} = Version, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg, + premaster_secret = undefined, + server_psk_identity = PSKIdentity} = HsEnv, + session = #session{master_secret = undefined}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State0, Connection) + when KexAlg == rsa_psk -> Rand = ssl_cipher:random_bytes(?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES-2), RSAPremasterSecret = <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rand/binary>>, - case ssl_handshake:premaster_secret({Alg, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, + case ssl_handshake:premaster_secret({KexAlg, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) of #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0); PremasterSecret -> State = master_secret(PremasterSecret, - State0#state{premaster_secret = RSAPremasterSecret}), + State0#state{handshake_env = + HsEnv#handshake_env{premaster_secret = RSAPremasterSecret}}), client_certify_and_key_exchange(State, Connection) end; %% Master secret was determined with help of server-key exchange msg certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, - #state{session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} = Session, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = Version, - premaster_secret = undefined, - role = client} = State0, Connection) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{premaster_secret = undefined}, + session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} = Session, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) -> case ssl_handshake:master_secret(ssl:tls_version(Version), Session, ConnectionStates0, client) of {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} -> @@ -903,11 +1089,11 @@ certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, end; %% Master secret is calculated from premaster_secret certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, - #state{session = Session0, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = Version, - premaster_secret = PremasterSecret, - role = client} = State0, Connection) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{premaster_secret = PremasterSecret}, + session = Session0, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) -> case ssl_handshake:master_secret(ssl:tls_version(Version), PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates0, client) of {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} -> @@ -919,14 +1105,15 @@ certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; certify(internal = Type, #client_key_exchange{} = Msg, - #state{role = server, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, client_certificate_requested = true, ssl_options = #ssl_options{fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} = State, Connection) -> %% We expect a certificate here handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); certify(internal, #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, - State = #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg, negotiated_version = Version}, Connection) -> + State = #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KeyAlg}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}, Connection) -> try certify_client_key_exchange(ssl_handshake:decode_client_key(Keys, KeyAlg, ssl:tls_version(Version)), State, Connection) @@ -949,70 +1136,70 @@ cipher(info, Msg, State, _) -> handle_info(Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); cipher(internal, #certificate_verify{signature = Signature, hashsign_algorithm = CertHashSign}, - #state{role = server, - key_algorithm = KexAlg, - public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, - negotiated_version = Version, - session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}, - tls_handshake_history = Handshake - } = State0, Connection) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist, + kex_algorithm = KexAlg, + public_key_info = PubKeyInfo} = HsEnv, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} + } = State, Connection) -> TLSVersion = ssl:tls_version(Version), %% Use negotiated value if TLS-1.2 otherwhise return default - HashSign = negotiated_hashsign(CertHashSign, KexAlg, PublicKeyInfo, TLSVersion), - case ssl_handshake:certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo, - TLSVersion, HashSign, MasterSecret, Handshake) of + HashSign = negotiated_hashsign(CertHashSign, KexAlg, PubKeyInfo, TLSVersion), + case ssl_handshake:certificate_verify(Signature, PubKeyInfo, + TLSVersion, HashSign, MasterSecret, Hist) of valid -> - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0), - Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, - State#state{cert_hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}); + Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{cert_hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}}); #alert{} = Alert -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end; %% client must send a next protocol message if we are expecting it cipher(internal, #finished{}, - #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true, - negotiated_protocol = undefined, negotiated_version = Version} = State0, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true, + negotiated_protocol = undefined}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State0, _Connection) -> handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0); cipher(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, - #state{negotiated_version = Version, - host = Host, - port = Port, - role = Role, - expecting_finished = true, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, + host = Host, + port = Port}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist, + expecting_finished = true} = HsEnv, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} = Session0, ssl_options = SslOpts, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State, Connection) -> + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State, Connection) -> case ssl_handshake:verify_connection(ssl:tls_version(Version), Finished, opposite_role(Role), get_current_prf(ConnectionStates0, read), - MasterSecret, Handshake0) of + MasterSecret, Hist) of verified -> - Session = register_session(Role, host_id(Role, Host, SslOpts), Port, Session0), + Session = handle_session(Role, SslOpts, Host, Port, Session0), cipher_role(Role, Data, Session, - State#state{expecting_finished = false}, Connection); + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{expecting_finished = false}}, Connection); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end; %% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec %% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation cipher(internal, #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, - #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true, - expecting_finished = true} = State0, Connection) -> - {Record, State} = - Connection:next_record(State0#state{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol}), - Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, - State#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false}); -cipher(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = - State0, Connection) -> - ConnectionStates1 = + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{expecting_finished = true, + expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = HsEnv} = State, Connection) -> + Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol, + expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false}}); +cipher(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, #state{handshake_env = HsEnv, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = + State, Connection) -> + ConnectionStates = ssl_record:activate_pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read, Connection), - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{connection_states = - ConnectionStates1}), - Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State#state{expecting_finished = true}); + Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{expecting_finished = true}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates}); cipher(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). @@ -1021,32 +1208,18 @@ cipher(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> gen_statem:state_function_result(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -connection({call, {FromPid, _} = From}, {application_data, Data}, - #state{protocol_cb = Connection} = State, Connection) -> - %% We should look into having a worker process to do this to - %% parallize send and receive decoding and not block the receiver - %% if sending is overloading the socket. - try - write_application_data(Data, From, State) - catch throw:Error -> - case self() of - FromPid -> - stop({shutdown, Error}, State); - _ -> - hibernate_after( - ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, Error}]) - end - end; connection({call, RecvFrom}, {recv, N, Timeout}, - #state{protocol_cb = Connection, socket_options = - #socket_options{active = false}} = State0, Connection) -> - Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom), - Connection:passive_receive(State0#state{bytes_to_read = N, - start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, - timer = Timer}, ?FUNCTION_NAME); -connection({call, From}, renegotiate, #state{protocol_cb = Connection} = State, + #state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}, + socket_options = + #socket_options{active = false}} = State0, Connection) -> + passive_receive(State0#state{bytes_to_read = N, + start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom}, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Connection, + [{{timeout, recv}, Timeout, timeout}]); + +connection({call, From}, renegotiate, #state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}, + handshake_env = HsEnv} = State, Connection) -> - Connection:renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, From}}, []); + Connection:renegotiate(State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, From}}}, []); connection({call, From}, peer_certificate, #state{session = #session{peer_certificate = Cert}} = State, _) -> hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, {ok, Cert}}]); @@ -1057,118 +1230,44 @@ connection({call, From}, {connection_information, false}, State, _) -> Info = connection_info(State), hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, {ok, Info}}]); connection({call, From}, negotiated_protocol, - #state{negotiated_protocol = undefined} = State, _) -> + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = undefined}} = State, _) -> hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, {error, protocol_not_negotiated}}]); connection({call, From}, negotiated_protocol, - #state{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol} = State, _) -> + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol}} = State, _) -> hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, {ok, SelectedProtocol}}]); -connection( - {call, From}, {handshake_complete, _Node, DHandle}, - #state{ - ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, - socket_options = SockOpts, - protocol_specific = ProtocolSpecific} = State, - Connection) -> - %% From now on we execute on normal priority - process_flag(priority, normal), - try erlang:dist_ctrl_get_data_notification(DHandle) of - _ -> - NewState = - State#state{ - socket_options = - SockOpts#socket_options{active = true}, - protocol_specific = - ProtocolSpecific#{d_handle => DHandle}}, - {Record, NewerState} = Connection:next_record_if_active(NewState), - Connection:next_event(connection, Record, NewerState, [{reply, From, ok}]) - catch error:_ -> - death_row(State, disconnect) - end; connection({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); -connection( - info, dist_data = Msg, - #state{ - ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, - protocol_specific = #{d_handle := DHandle}} = State, - _) -> - eat_msgs(Msg), - try send_dist_data(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, DHandle, []) - catch error:_ -> - death_row(State, disconnect) - end; -connection( - info, {send, From, Ref, Data}, - #state{ - ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, - protocol_specific = #{d_handle := _}}, - _) -> - %% This is for testing only! - %% - %% Needed by some OTP distribution - %% test suites... - From ! {Ref, ok}, - {keep_state_and_data, - [{next_event, {call, {self(), undefined}}, - {application_data, iolist_to_binary(Data)}}]}; -connection( - info, tick = Msg, - #state{ - ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, - protocol_specific = #{d_handle := _}}, - _) -> - eat_msgs(Msg), - {keep_state_and_data, - [{next_event, {call, {self(), undefined}}, {application_data, <<>>}}]}; +connection(cast, {internal_renegotiate, WriteState}, #state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}, + handshake_env = HsEnv, + connection_states = ConnectionStates} + = State, Connection) -> + Connection:renegotiate(State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, internal}}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates#{current_write => WriteState}}, []); +connection(cast, {dist_handshake_complete, DHandle}, + #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, + connection_env = CEnv, + socket_options = SockOpts} = State0, Connection) -> + process_flag(priority, normal), + State1 = + State0#state{ + socket_options = SockOpts#socket_options{active = true}, + connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{erl_dist_handle = DHandle}, + bytes_to_read = undefined}, + {Record, State} = read_application_data(<<>>, State1), + Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State); connection(info, Msg, State, _) -> handle_info(Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); -connection(internal, {recv, _}, State, Connection) -> - Connection:passive_receive(State, ?FUNCTION_NAME); +connection(internal, {recv, Timeout}, State, Connection) -> + passive_receive(State, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Connection, [{{timeout, recv}, Timeout, timeout}]); connection(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec death_row(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), - #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> - gen_statem:state_function_result(). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% We just wait for the owner to die which triggers the monitor, -%% or the socket may die too -death_row( - info, {'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, Reason}, - #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid}}, - _) -> - {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; -death_row( - info, {'EXIT', Socket, Reason}, #state{socket = Socket}, _) -> - {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; -death_row(state_timeout, Reason, _State, _Connection) -> - {stop, {shutdown,Reason}}; -death_row(_Type, _Msg, _State, _Connection) -> - %% Waste all other events - keep_state_and_data. - -%% State entry function -death_row(State, Reason) -> - {next_state, death_row, State, - [{state_timeout, 5000, Reason}]}. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec downgrade(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> gen_statem:state_function_result(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -downgrade(internal, #alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY}, - #state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket, - downgrade = {Pid, From}} = State, _) -> - tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}, {packet, 0}, {mode, binary}]), - Transport:controlling_process(Socket, Pid), - gen_statem:reply(From, {ok, Socket}), - stop(normal, State); -downgrade(timeout, downgrade, #state{downgrade = {_, From}} = State, _) -> - gen_statem:reply(From, {error, timeout}), - stop(normal, State); downgrade(Type, Event, State, Connection) -> handle_common_event(Type, Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). @@ -1177,40 +1276,45 @@ downgrade(Type, Event, State, Connection) -> %% common or unexpected events for the state. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {#hello_request{} = Handshake, _}}, connection = StateName, - #state{role = client} = State, _) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = HsEnv} = State, _) -> %% Should not be included in handshake history - {next_state, StateName, State#state{renegotiation = {true, peer}}, [{next_event, internal, Handshake}]}; -handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {#hello_request{}, _}}, StateName, #state{role = client}, _) + {next_state, StateName, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, peer}}}, + [{next_event, internal, Handshake}]}; +handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {#hello_request{}, _}}, StateName, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}}, _) when StateName =/= connection -> - {keep_state_and_data}; + keep_state_and_data; handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {Handshake, Raw}}, StateName, - #state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0} = State0, + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist0}} = State0, Connection) -> PossibleSNI = Connection:select_sni_extension(Handshake), %% This function handles client SNI hello extension when Handshake is %% a client_hello, which needs to be determined by the connection callback. %% In other cases this is a noop - State = handle_sni_extension(PossibleSNI, State0), - HsHist = ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hs0, iolist_to_binary(Raw)), - {next_state, StateName, State#state{tls_handshake_history = HsHist}, + State = #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = handle_sni_extension(PossibleSNI, State0), + + Hist = ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hist0, Raw), + {next_state, StateName, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist}}, [{next_event, internal, Handshake}]}; handle_common_event(internal, {protocol_record, TLSorDTLSRecord}, StateName, State, Connection) -> - Connection:handle_common_event(internal, TLSorDTLSRecord, StateName, State); + Connection:handle_protocol_record(TLSorDTLSRecord, StateName, State); handle_common_event(timeout, hibernate, _, _, _) -> {keep_state_and_data, [hibernate]}; -handle_common_event(internal, {application_data, Data}, StateName, State0, Connection) -> - case read_application_data(Data, State0) of - {stop, _, _} = Stop-> - Stop; - {Record, State} -> - Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State) - end; handle_common_event(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State, _) -> + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State, _) -> handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), Version, StateName, State); -handle_common_event(_Type, Msg, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State, +handle_common_event({timeout, handshake}, close, _StateName, #state{start_or_recv_from = StartFrom} = State, _) -> + {stop_and_reply, + {shutdown, user_timeout}, + {reply, StartFrom, {error, timeout}}, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined}}; +handle_common_event({timeout, recv}, timeout, StateName, #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State, _) -> + {next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, + bytes_to_read = undefined}, [{reply, RecvFrom, {error, timeout}}]}; +handle_common_event(_Type, Msg, StateName, #state{connection_env = + #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State, _) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, {unexpected_msg, Msg}), handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State). @@ -1218,43 +1322,41 @@ handle_common_event(_Type, Msg, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} handle_call({application_data, _Data}, _, _, _, _) -> %% In renegotiation priorities handshake, send data when handshake is finished {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}; -handle_call({close, {Pid, Timeout}}, From, StateName, State0, Connection) when is_pid(Pid) -> - %% terminate will send close alert to peer - State = State0#state{downgrade = {Pid, From}}, - Connection:terminate(downgrade, StateName, State), - %% User downgrades connection - %% When downgrading an TLS connection to a transport connection - %% we must recive the close alert from the peer before releasing the - %% transport socket. - {next_state, downgrade, State#state{terminated = true}, [{timeout, Timeout, downgrade}]}; -handle_call({close, _} = Close, From, StateName, State, Connection) -> +handle_call({close, _} = Close, From, StateName, #state{connection_env = CEnv} = State, _Connection) -> %% Run terminate before returning so that the reuseaddr %% inet-option works properly - Result = Connection:terminate(Close, StateName, State#state{terminated = true}), - stop_and_reply( - {shutdown, normal}, - {reply, From, Result}, State); -handle_call({shutdown, How0}, From, _, - #state{transport_cb = Transport, - negotiated_version = Version, - connection_states = ConnectionStates, - socket = Socket} = State, Connection) -> - case How0 of - How when How == write; How == both -> - Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), - {BinMsg, _} = - Connection:encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates), - Connection:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg); - _ -> - ok - end, - + Result = terminate(Close, StateName, State), + {stop_and_reply, + {shutdown, normal}, + {reply, From, Result}, State#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{terminated = true}}}; +handle_call({shutdown, read_write = How}, From, StateName, + #state{static_env = #static_env{transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket}, + connection_env = CEnv} = State, _) -> + try send_alert(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), + StateName, State) of + _ -> + case Transport:shutdown(Socket, How) of + ok -> + {next_state, StateName, State#state{connection_env = + CEnv#connection_env{terminated = true}}, + [{reply, From, ok}]}; + Error -> + {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, normal}, {reply, From, Error}, + State#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{terminated = true}}} + end + catch + throw:Return -> + Return + end; +handle_call({shutdown, How0}, From, StateName, + #state{static_env = #static_env{transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket}} = State, _) -> case Transport:shutdown(Socket, How0) of ok -> - {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, ok}]}; + {next_state, StateName, State, [{reply, From, ok}]}; Error -> - gen_statem:reply(From, {error, Error}), - stop(normal, State) + {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, normal}, {reply, From, Error}, State} end; handle_call({recv, _N, _Timeout}, From, _, #state{socket_options = @@ -1263,44 +1365,47 @@ handle_call({recv, _N, _Timeout}, From, _, handle_call({recv, N, Timeout}, RecvFrom, StateName, State, _) -> %% Doing renegotiate wait with handling request until renegotiate is %% finished. - Timer = start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom), - {next_state, StateName, State#state{bytes_to_read = N, start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, - timer = Timer}, - [{next_event, internal, {recv, RecvFrom}}]}; + {next_state, StateName, State#state{bytes_to_read = N, start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom}, + [{next_event, internal, {recv, RecvFrom}} , {{timeout, recv}, Timeout, timeout}]}; handle_call({new_user, User}, From, StateName, - State =#state{user_application = {OldMon, _}}, _) -> + State = #state{connection_env = #connection_env{user_application = {OldMon, _}} = CEnv}, _) -> NewMon = erlang:monitor(process, User), erlang:demonitor(OldMon, [flush]), - {next_state, StateName, State#state{user_application = {NewMon,User}}, + {next_state, StateName, State#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{user_application = {NewMon, User}}}, [{reply, From, ok}]}; handle_call({get_opts, OptTags}, From, _, - #state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, + #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}, socket_options = SockOpts}, Connection) -> OptsReply = get_socket_opts(Connection, Transport, Socket, OptTags, SockOpts, []), {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, OptsReply}]}; handle_call({set_opts, Opts0}, From, StateName, - #state{socket_options = Opts1, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport} = State0, Connection) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + tracker = Tracker}, + connection_env = + #connection_env{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}}, + socket_options = Opts1 + } = State0, Connection) -> {Reply, Opts} = set_socket_opts(Connection, Transport, Socket, Opts0, Opts1, []), + case {proplists:lookup(active, Opts0), Opts} of + {{_, N}, #socket_options{active=false}} when is_integer(N) -> + send_user( + Pid, + format_passive( + Connection:pids(State0), Transport, Socket, Tracker, Connection)); + _ -> + ok + end, State = State0#state{socket_options = Opts}, handle_active_option(Opts#socket_options.active, StateName, From, Reply, State); handle_call(renegotiate, From, StateName, _, _) when StateName =/= connection -> {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, {error, already_renegotiating}}]}; -handle_call( - get_sslsocket, From, _StateName, - #state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket, tracker = Tracker}, - Connection) -> - SslSocket = - Connection:socket(self(), Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker), - {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, SslSocket}]}; - handle_call({prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}, From, _, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - negotiated_version = Version}, _) -> + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}, _) -> #{security_parameters := SecParams} = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), #security_parameters{master_secret = MasterSecret, @@ -1327,66 +1432,51 @@ handle_call(_,_,_,_,_) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, econnaborted}, StateName, - #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, - protocol_cb = Connection, - start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, role = Role, - error_tag = ErrorTag, - tracker = Tracker} = State) when StateName =/= connection -> - alert_user(Transport, Tracker,Socket, - StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role, Connection), - stop(normal, State); - -handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, - error_tag = ErrorTag} = State) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + error_tag = ErrorTag, + tracker = Tracker, + protocol_cb = Connection}, + start_or_recv_from = StartFrom + } = State) when StateName =/= connection -> + Pids = Connection:pids(State), + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker,Socket, + StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role, StateName, Connection), + {stop, {shutdown, normal}, State}; + +handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + error_tag = ErrorTag}} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Reason]), error_logger:error_report(Report), handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - stop(normal, State); + {stop, {shutdown,normal}, State}; -handle_info( - {'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, Reason}, _, - #state{ - user_application = {MonitorRef, _Pid}, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}}) -> +handle_info({'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, Reason}, _, + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{user_application = {MonitorRef, _Pid}}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}}) -> {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; -handle_info( - {'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, _}, _, - #state{user_application = {MonitorRef, _Pid}}) -> - {stop, normal}; -handle_info( - {'EXIT', Pid, _Reason}, StateName, - #state{user_application = {_MonitorRef, Pid}} = State) -> +handle_info({'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, _}, _, + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{user_application = {MonitorRef, _Pid}}}) -> + {stop, {shutdown, normal}}; +handle_info({'EXIT', Pid, _Reason}, StateName, + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{user_application = {_MonitorRef, Pid}}} = State) -> %% It seems the user application has linked to us %% - ignore that and let the monitor handle this {next_state, StateName, State}; - %%% So that terminate will be run when supervisor issues shutdown handle_info({'EXIT', _Sup, shutdown}, _StateName, State) -> - stop(shutdown, State); -handle_info({'EXIT', Socket, normal}, _StateName, #state{socket = Socket} = State) -> + {stop, shutdown, State}; +handle_info({'EXIT', Socket, normal}, _StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket}} = State) -> %% Handle as transport close" - stop({shutdown, transport_closed}, State); -handle_info({'EXIT', Socket, Reason}, _StateName, #state{socket = Socket} = State) -> - stop({shutdown, Reason}, State); - -handle_info(allow_renegotiate, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State#state{allow_renegotiate = true}}; - -handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, StartFrom}, StateName, - #state{renegotiation = {false, first}} = State) when StateName =/= connection -> - stop_and_reply( - {shutdown, user_timeout}, - {reply, StartFrom, {error, timeout}}, - State#state{timer = undefined}); -handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}, StateName, - #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State) when RecvFrom =/= undefined -> - {next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, - bytes_to_read = undefined, - timer = undefined}, [{reply, RecvFrom, {error, timeout}}]}; -handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, _RecvFrom}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State#state{timer = undefined}}; + {stop,{shutdown, transport_closed}, State}; +handle_info({'EXIT', Socket, Reason}, _StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket}} = State) -> + {stop,{shutdown, Reason}, State}; + +handle_info(allow_renegotiate, StateName, #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{allow_renegotiate = true}}}; -handle_info(Msg, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, error_tag = Tag} = State) -> +handle_info(Msg, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, error_tag = Tag}} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Got unexpected info: ~p ~n", [{Msg, Tag, Socket}]), error_logger:info_report(Report), {next_state, StateName, State}. @@ -1394,7 +1484,7 @@ handle_info(Msg, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, error_tag = Tag} = State) -> %%==================================================================== %% general gen_statem callbacks %%==================================================================== -terminate(_, _, #state{terminated = true}) -> +terminate(_, _, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{terminated = true}}) -> %% Happens when user closes the connection using ssl:close/1 %% we want to guarantee that Transport:close has been called %% when ssl:close/1 returns unless it is a downgrade where @@ -1403,14 +1493,15 @@ terminate(_, _, #state{terminated = true}) -> %% before run by gen_statem which will end up here ok; terminate({shutdown, transport_closed} = Reason, - _StateName, #state{protocol_cb = Connection, - socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> + _StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}} = State) -> handle_trusted_certs_db(State), Connection:close(Reason, Socket, Transport, undefined, undefined); -terminate({shutdown, own_alert}, _StateName, #state{%%send_queue = SendQueue, - protocol_cb = Connection, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> +terminate({shutdown, own_alert}, _StateName, #state{ + static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}} = State) -> handle_trusted_certs_db(State), case application:get_env(ssl, alert_timeout) of {ok, Timeout} when is_integer(Timeout) -> @@ -1418,18 +1509,27 @@ terminate({shutdown, own_alert}, _StateName, #state{%%send_queue = SendQueue, _ -> Connection:close({timeout, ?DEFAULT_TIMEOUT}, Socket, Transport, undefined, undefined) end; -terminate(Reason, connection, #state{negotiated_version = Version, - protocol_cb = Connection, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}, - transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket - } = State) -> +terminate({shutdown, downgrade = Reason}, downgrade, #state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket} + } = State) -> + handle_trusted_certs_db(State), + Connection:close(Reason, Socket, Transport, undefined, undefined); +terminate(Reason, connection, #state{static_env = #static_env{ + protocol_cb = Connection, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check} + } = State) -> handle_trusted_certs_db(State), - {BinAlert, ConnectionStates} = terminate_alert(Reason, Version, ConnectionStates0, Connection), - Connection:send(Transport, Socket, BinAlert), - Connection:close(Reason, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check); -terminate(Reason, _StateName, #state{transport_cb = Transport, protocol_cb = Connection, - socket = Socket + Alert = terminate_alert(Reason), + %% Send the termination ALERT if possible + catch (ok = Connection:send_alert_in_connection(Alert, State)), + Connection:close({timeout, ?DEFAULT_TIMEOUT}, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check); +terminate(Reason, _StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{transport_cb = Transport, + protocol_cb = Connection, + socket = Socket} } = State) -> handle_trusted_certs_db(State), Connection:close(Reason, Socket, Transport, undefined, undefined). @@ -1448,14 +1548,9 @@ format_status(terminate, [_, StateName, State]) -> [{data, [{"State", {StateName, State#state{connection_states = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, protocol_buffers = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, user_data_buffer = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, - tls_handshake_history = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, + handshake_env = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, + connection_env = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, session = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, - private_key = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, - diffie_hellman_params = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, - diffie_hellman_keys = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, - srp_params = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, - srp_keys = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, - premaster_secret = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT, ssl_options = NewOptions, flight_buffer = ?SECRET_PRINTOUT} }}]}]. @@ -1463,16 +1558,21 @@ format_status(terminate, [_, StateName, State]) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -connection_info(#state{sni_hostname = SNIHostname, - session = #session{session_id = SessionId, +send_alert(Alert, connection, #state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}} = State) -> + Connection:send_alert_in_connection(Alert, State); +send_alert(Alert, _, #state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}} = State) -> + Connection:send_alert(Alert, State). + +connection_info(#state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{sni_hostname = SNIHostname}, + session = #session{session_id = SessionId, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, ecc = ECCCurve}, - protocol_cb = Connection, - negotiated_version = {_,_} = Version, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = {_,_} = Version}, ssl_options = Opts}) -> RecordCB = record_cb(Connection), - CipherSuiteDef = #{key_exchange := KexAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + CipherSuiteDef = #{key_exchange := KexAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), IsNamedCurveSuite = lists:member(KexAlg, - [ecdh_ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdh_rsa, ecdh_anon]), + [ecdh_ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdh_rsa, ecdhe_rsa, ecdh_anon]), CurveInfo = case ECCCurve of {namedCurve, Curve} when IsNamedCurveSuite -> [{ecc, {named_curve, pubkey_cert_records:namedCurves(Curve)}}]; @@ -1481,7 +1581,8 @@ connection_info(#state{sni_hostname = SNIHostname, end, [{protocol, RecordCB:protocol_version(Version)}, {session_id, SessionId}, - {cipher_suite, ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(CipherSuiteDef)}, + {cipher_suite, ssl_cipher_format:erl_suite_definition(CipherSuiteDef)}, + {selected_cipher_suite, CipherSuiteDef}, {sni_hostname, SNIHostname} | CurveInfo] ++ ssl_options_list(Opts). security_info(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) -> @@ -1494,16 +1595,17 @@ security_info(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) -> do_server_hello(Type, #hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocols} = ServerHelloExt, - #state{negotiated_version = Version, + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + handshake_env = HsEnv, session = #session{session_id = SessId}, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) when is_atom(Type) -> - + ServerHello = ssl_handshake:server_hello(SessId, ssl:tls_version(Version), ConnectionStates0, ServerHelloExt), State = server_hello(ServerHello, - State0#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = - NextProtocols =/= undefined}, Connection), + State0#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = + NextProtocols =/= undefined}}, Connection), case Type of new -> new_server_hello(ServerHello, State, Connection); @@ -1514,17 +1616,16 @@ do_server_hello(Type, #hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocol new_server_hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression, session_id = SessionId}, - #state{session = Session0, - negotiated_version = Version} = State0, Connection) -> + #state{session = Session0, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State0, Connection) -> try server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) of #state{} = State1 -> - {State2, Actions} = server_hello_done(State1, Connection), + {State, Actions} = server_hello_done(State1, Connection), Session = Session0#session{session_id = SessionId, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression}, - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State2#state{session = Session}), - Connection:next_event(certify, Record, State, Actions) + Connection:next_event(certify, no_record, State#state{session = Session}, Actions) catch #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0) @@ -1532,69 +1633,58 @@ new_server_hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, resumed_server_hello(#state{session = Session, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = Version} = State0, Connection) -> + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State0, Connection) -> case ssl_handshake:master_secret(ssl:tls_version(Version), Session, ConnectionStates0, server) of {_, ConnectionStates1} -> State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1, session = Session}, - {State2, Actions} = + {State, Actions} = finalize_handshake(State1, abbreviated, Connection), - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State2), - Connection:next_event(abbreviated, Record, State, Actions); + Connection:next_event(abbreviated, no_record, State, Actions); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0) end. server_hello(ServerHello, State0, Connection) -> CipherSuite = ServerHello#server_hello.cipher_suite, - #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), - State = Connection:queue_handshake(ServerHello, State0), - State#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm}. + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State = Connection:queue_handshake(ServerHello, State0), + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm}}. server_hello_done(State, Connection) -> HelloDone = ssl_handshake:server_hello_done(), Connection:send_handshake(HelloDone, State). handle_peer_cert(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, - #state{session = #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session} = State0, + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv, + session = #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session} = State0, Connection) -> - State1 = State0#state{session = - Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert}, - public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo}, - #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), - State2 = handle_peer_cert_key(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, KeyAlgorithm, State1), - - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State2), - Connection:next_event(certify, Record, State). + State1 = State0#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo}, + session = + Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert}}, + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + State = handle_peer_cert_key(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, KeyAlgorithm, State1), + Connection:next_event(certify, no_record, State). handle_peer_cert_key(client, _, {?'id-ecPublicKey', #'ECPoint'{point = _ECPoint} = PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}, - KeyAlg, #state{session = Session} = State) when KeyAlg == ecdh_rsa; + KeyAlg, #state{handshake_env = HsEnv, + session = Session} = State) when KeyAlg == ecdh_rsa; KeyAlg == ecdh_ecdsa -> ECDHKey = public_key:generate_key(PublicKeyParams), - {namedCurve, Oid} = PublicKeyParams, - Curve = pubkey_cert_records:namedCurves(Oid), %% Need API function PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(PublicKey, ECDHKey), - master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey, - session = Session#session{ecc = {named_curve, Curve}}}); -%% We do currently not support cipher suites that use fixed DH. -%% If we want to implement that the following clause can be used -%% to extract DH parameters form cert. -%% handle_peer_cert_key(client, _PeerCert, {?dhpublicnumber, PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}, -%% {_,SignAlg}, -%% #state{diffie_hellman_keys = {_, MyPrivatKey}} = State) when -%% SignAlg == dh_rsa; -%% SignAlg == dh_dss -> -%% dh_master_secret(PublicKeyParams, PublicKey, MyPrivatKey, State); + master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_keys = ECDHKey}, + session = Session#session{ecc = PublicKeyParams}}); handle_peer_cert_key(_, _, _, _, State) -> State. -certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client, - cert_db = CertDbHandle, - cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, +certify_client(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client, + cert_db = CertDbHandle, + cert_db_ref = CertDbRef}, + client_certificate_requested = true, session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert}} = State, Connection) -> Certificate = ssl_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client), @@ -1602,16 +1692,17 @@ certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client, certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State, _) -> State. -verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client, - negotiated_version = Version, - private_key = PrivateKey, +verify_client_cert(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist, + cert_hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version, + private_key = PrivateKey}, + client_certificate_requested = true, session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret, - own_certificate = OwnCert}, - cert_hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, - tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State, Connection) -> + own_certificate = OwnCert}} = State, Connection) -> case ssl_handshake:client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, - ssl:tls_version(Version), HashSign, PrivateKey, Handshake0) of + ssl:tls_version(Version), HashSign, PrivateKey, Hist) of #certificate_verify{} = Verified -> Connection:queue_handshake(Verified, State); ignore -> @@ -1622,16 +1713,15 @@ verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client, verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State, _) -> State. -client_certify_and_key_exchange(#state{negotiated_version = Version} = +client_certify_and_key_exchange(#state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State0, Connection) -> try do_client_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) of State1 = #state{} -> {State2, Actions} = finalize_handshake(State1, certify, Connection), - State3 = State2#state{ - %% Reinitialize - client_certificate_requested = false}, - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State3), - Connection:next_event(cipher, Record, State, Actions) + State = State2#state{ + %% Reinitialize + client_certificate_requested = false}, + Connection:next_event(cipher, no_record, State, Actions) catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) @@ -1648,7 +1738,9 @@ server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) -> request_client_cert(State2, Connection). certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS}, - #state{private_key = Key, client_hello_version = {Major, Minor} = Version} = State, Connection) -> + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{private_key = Key}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{client_hello_version = {Major, Minor} = Version}} + = State, Connection) -> FakeSecret = make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa), %% Countermeasure for Bleichenbacher attack always provide some kind of premaster secret %% and fail handshake later.RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1. @@ -1669,14 +1761,15 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS end, calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); certify_client_key_exchange(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey}, - #state{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, - diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} = State, + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, + kex_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} + } = State, Connection) -> PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientPublicDhKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, Params), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicEcDhPoint}, - #state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey} = State, Connection) -> + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_keys = ECDHKey}} = State, Connection) -> PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ClientPublicEcDhPoint}, ECDHKey), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); certify_client_key_exchange(#client_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, @@ -1686,8 +1779,8 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, PSKLookup), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher); certify_client_key_exchange(#client_dhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, - #state{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, - diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}, + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, + kex_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State0, Connection) -> @@ -1695,7 +1788,7 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_dhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, Params, PSKLookup), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher); certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, - #state{diffie_hellman_keys = ServerEcDhPrivateKey, + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_keys = ServerEcDhPrivateKey}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State, Connection) -> @@ -1703,28 +1796,29 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, ServerEcDhPrivateKey, PSKLookup), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); certify_client_key_exchange(#client_rsa_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, - #state{private_key = Key, + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{private_key = Key}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State0, Connection) -> PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, Key, PSKLookup), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher); certify_client_key_exchange(#client_srp_public{} = ClientKey, - #state{srp_params = Params, - srp_keys = Key + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{srp_params = Params, + kex_keys = Key} } = State0, Connection) -> PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, Key, Params), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher). -certify_server(#state{key_algorithm = Algo} = State, _) when Algo == dh_anon; - Algo == ecdh_anon; - Algo == psk; - Algo == dhe_psk; - Algo == ecdhe_psk; - Algo == srp_anon -> +certify_server(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg}} = + State, _) when KexAlg == dh_anon; + KexAlg == ecdh_anon; + KexAlg == psk; + KexAlg == dhe_psk; + KexAlg == ecdhe_psk; + KexAlg == srp_anon -> State; -certify_server(#state{cert_db = CertDbHandle, - cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, +certify_server(#state{static_env = #static_env{cert_db = CertDbHandle, + cert_db_ref = CertDbRef}, session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert}} = State, Connection) -> case ssl_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) of Cert = #certificate{} -> @@ -1733,18 +1827,19 @@ certify_server(#state{cert_db = CertDbHandle, throw(Alert) end. -key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa} = State,_) -> +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = rsa}} = State,_) -> State; -key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, - diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, - private_key = PrivateKey, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = Version - } = State0, Connection) - when Algo == dhe_dss; - Algo == dhe_rsa; - Algo == dh_anon -> +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg, + diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version, + private_key = PrivateKey}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) + when KexAlg == dhe_dss; + KexAlg == dhe_rsa; + KexAlg == dh_anon -> DHKeys = public_key:generate_key(Params), #{security_parameters := SecParams} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), @@ -1754,20 +1849,26 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), - State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), - State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys}; -key_exchange(#state{role = server, private_key = Key, key_algorithm = Algo} = State, _) - when Algo == ecdh_ecdsa; Algo == ecdh_rsa -> - State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Key}; -key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, - private_key = PrivateKey, + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_keys = DHKeys}}; +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg} = HsEnv, + connection_env = #connection_env{private_key = #'ECPrivateKey'{parameters = ECCurve} = Key}, + session = Session} = State, _) + when KexAlg == ecdh_ecdsa; + KexAlg == ecdh_rsa -> + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_keys = Key}, + session = Session#session{ecc = ECCurve}}; +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version, + private_key = PrivateKey}, session = #session{ecc = ECCCurve}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = Version - } = State0, Connection) - when Algo == ecdhe_ecdsa; Algo == ecdhe_rsa; - Algo == ecdh_anon -> + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) + when KexAlg == ecdhe_ecdsa; + KexAlg == ecdhe_rsa; + KexAlg == ecdh_anon -> ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(ECCCurve), #{security_parameters := SecParams} = @@ -1779,18 +1880,19 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), - State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), - State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys}; -key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk, + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_keys = ECDHKeys}}; +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = psk}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State, _) -> State; -key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk, +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint}, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, - private_key = PrivateKey, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = Version - } = State0, Connection) -> + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = psk, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version, + private_key = PrivateKey}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) -> #{security_parameters := SecParams} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, @@ -1799,15 +1901,16 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk, {psk, PskIdentityHint, HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, - PrivateKey}), + PrivateKey}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); -key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk, +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint}, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, - diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, - private_key = PrivateKey, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = Version + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = dhe_psk, + diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version, + private_key = PrivateKey}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0 } = State0, Connection) -> DHKeys = public_key:generate_key(Params), #{security_parameters := SecParams} = @@ -1820,15 +1923,16 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk, HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), - State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), - State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys}; -key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = ecdhe_psk, + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_keys = DHKeys}}; +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint}, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, - private_key = PrivateKey, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = ecdhe_psk, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version, + private_key = PrivateKey}, session = #session{ecc = ECCCurve}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = Version + connection_states = ConnectionStates0 } = State0, Connection) -> ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(ECCCurve), #{security_parameters := SecParams} = @@ -1841,17 +1945,19 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = ecdhe_psk, HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), - State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), - State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys}; -key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk, + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_keys = ECDHKeys}}; +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = rsa_psk}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State, _) -> State; -key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk, +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint}, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, - private_key = PrivateKey, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = Version + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = rsa_psk, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version, + private_key = PrivateKey}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0 } = State0, Connection) -> #{security_parameters := SecParams} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), @@ -1863,17 +1969,18 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); -key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = LookupFun}, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version, + private_key = PrivateKey}, session = #session{srp_username = Username}, - private_key = PrivateKey, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = Version + connection_states = ConnectionStates0 } = State0, Connection) - when Algo == srp_dss; - Algo == srp_rsa; - Algo == srp_anon -> + when KexAlg == srp_dss; + KexAlg == srp_rsa; + KexAlg == srp_anon -> SrpParams = handle_srp_identity(Username, LookupFun), Keys = case generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams, 0) of Alert = #alert{} -> @@ -1890,81 +1997,86 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), - State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), - State#state{srp_params = SrpParams, - srp_keys = Keys}; -key_exchange(#state{role = client, - key_algorithm = rsa, - public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, - negotiated_version = Version, - premaster_secret = PremasterSecret} = State0, Connection) -> + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{srp_params = SrpParams, + kex_keys = Keys}}; +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = rsa, + public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, + premaster_secret = PremasterSecret}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version} + } = State0, Connection) -> Msg = rsa_key_exchange(ssl:tls_version(Version), PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); -key_exchange(#state{role = client, - key_algorithm = Algorithm, - negotiated_version = Version, - diffie_hellman_keys = {DhPubKey, _} - } = State0, Connection) - when Algorithm == dhe_dss; - Algorithm == dhe_rsa; - Algorithm == dh_anon -> +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg, + kex_keys = {DhPubKey, _}}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version} + } = State0, Connection) + when KexAlg == dhe_dss; + KexAlg == dhe_rsa; + KexAlg == dh_anon -> Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version), {dh, DhPubKey}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); -key_exchange(#state{role = client, - key_algorithm = Algorithm, - negotiated_version = Version, - diffie_hellman_keys = Keys} = State0, Connection) - when Algorithm == ecdhe_ecdsa; Algorithm == ecdhe_rsa; - Algorithm == ecdh_ecdsa; Algorithm == ecdh_rsa; - Algorithm == ecdh_anon -> - Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version), {ecdh, Keys}), - Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); -key_exchange(#state{role = client, - ssl_options = SslOpts, - key_algorithm = psk, - negotiated_version = Version} = State0, Connection) -> +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg, + kex_keys = #'ECPrivateKey'{parameters = ECCurve} = Key}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + session = Session + } = State0, Connection) + when KexAlg == ecdhe_ecdsa; + KexAlg == ecdhe_rsa; + KexAlg == ecdh_ecdsa; + KexAlg == ecdh_rsa; + KexAlg == ecdh_anon -> + Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version), {ecdh, Key}), + Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0#state{session = Session#session{ecc = ECCurve}}); +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = psk}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0, Connection) -> Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version), {psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); -key_exchange(#state{role = client, - ssl_options = SslOpts, - key_algorithm = dhe_psk, - negotiated_version = Version, - diffie_hellman_keys = {DhPubKey, _}} = State0, Connection) -> +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = dhe_psk, + kex_keys = {DhPubKey, _}}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0, Connection) -> Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version), {dhe_psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, DhPubKey}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); -key_exchange(#state{role = client, - ssl_options = SslOpts, - key_algorithm = ecdhe_psk, - negotiated_version = Version, - diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys} = State0, Connection) -> +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = ecdhe_psk, + kex_keys = ECDHKeys}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0, Connection) -> Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version), {ecdhe_psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, ECDHKeys}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); -key_exchange(#state{role = client, - ssl_options = SslOpts, - key_algorithm = rsa_psk, - public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, - negotiated_version = Version, - premaster_secret = PremasterSecret} +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = rsa_psk, + public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, + premaster_secret = PremasterSecret}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0, Connection) -> Msg = rsa_psk_key_exchange(ssl:tls_version(Version), SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); -key_exchange(#state{role = client, - key_algorithm = Algorithm, - negotiated_version = Version, - srp_keys = {ClientPubKey, _}} +key_exchange(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg, + kex_keys = {ClientPubKey, _}}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State0, Connection) - when Algorithm == srp_dss; - Algorithm == srp_rsa; - Algorithm == srp_anon -> + when KexAlg == srp_dss; + KexAlg == srp_rsa; + KexAlg == srp_anon -> Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version), {srp, ClientPubKey}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0). @@ -2001,18 +2113,24 @@ rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, rsa_psk_key_exchange(_, _, _, _) -> throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, pub_key_is_not_rsa)). -request_client_cert(#state{key_algorithm = Alg} = State, _) - when Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon; - Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == ecdhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk; - Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon -> +request_client_cert(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = Alg}} = State, _) + when Alg == dh_anon; + Alg == ecdh_anon; + Alg == psk; + Alg == dhe_psk; + Alg == ecdhe_psk; + Alg == rsa_psk; + Alg == srp_dss; + Alg == srp_rsa; + Alg == srp_anon -> State; -request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer, - signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - cert_db = CertDbHandle, - cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, - negotiated_version = Version} = State0, Connection) -> +request_client_cert(#state{static_env = #static_env{cert_db = CertDbHandle, + cert_db_ref = CertDbRef}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer, + signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) -> #{security_parameters := #security_parameters{cipher_suite = CipherSuite}} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), @@ -2029,7 +2147,7 @@ request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_none}} = State. calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, - #state{negotiated_version = Version, + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, session = Session0} = State0, Connection, _Current, Next) -> @@ -2037,10 +2155,9 @@ calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates0, server) of {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} -> Session = Session0#session{master_secret = MasterSecret}, - State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, session = Session}, - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State1), - Connection:next_event(Next, Record, State); + Connection:next_event(Next, no_record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, certify, State0) end. @@ -2057,27 +2174,29 @@ finalize_handshake(State0, StateName, Connection) -> State = next_protocol(State2, Connection), finished(State, StateName, Connection). -next_protocol(#state{role = server} = State, _) -> +next_protocol(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}} = State, _) -> State; -next_protocol(#state{negotiated_protocol = undefined} = State, _) -> +next_protocol(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = undefined}} = State, _) -> State; -next_protocol(#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false} = State, _) -> +next_protocol(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false}} = State, _) -> State; -next_protocol(#state{negotiated_protocol = NextProtocol} = State0, Connection) -> +next_protocol(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = NextProtocol}} = State0, Connection) -> NextProtocolMessage = ssl_handshake:next_protocol(NextProtocol), Connection:queue_handshake(NextProtocolMessage, State0). cipher_protocol(State, Connection) -> Connection:queue_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, State). -finished(#state{role = Role, negotiated_version = Version, +finished(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, session = Session, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - tls_handshake_history = Handshake0} = State0, StateName, Connection) -> + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, + StateName, Connection) -> MasterSecret = Session#session.master_secret, Finished = ssl_handshake:finished(ssl:tls_version(Version), Role, get_current_prf(ConnectionStates0, write), - MasterSecret, Handshake0), + MasterSecret, Hist), ConnectionStates = save_verify_data(Role, Finished, ConnectionStates0, StateName), Connection:send_handshake(Finished, State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}). @@ -2093,65 +2212,71 @@ save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbrev calculate_secret(#server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base, dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey} = Params, - State, Connection) -> + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State, Connection) -> Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} = crypto:generate_key(dh, [Prime, Base]), PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ServerPublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, - State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys}, + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_keys = Keys}}, Connection, certify, certify); calculate_secret(#server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve, public = ECServerPubKey}, - State=#state{session=Session}, Connection) -> + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv, + session = Session} = State, Connection) -> ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(ECCurve), PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ECServerPubKey}, ECDHKeys), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, - State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys, + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_keys = ECDHKeys}, session = Session#session{ecc = ECCurve}}, Connection, certify, certify); calculate_secret(#server_psk_params{ hint = IdentityHint}, - State0, Connection) -> + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State, Connection) -> %% store for later use - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{psk_identity = IdentityHint}), - Connection:next_event(certify, Record, State); + Connection:next_event(certify, no_record, + State#state{handshake_env = + HsEnv#handshake_env{server_psk_identity = IdentityHint}}); calculate_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{ dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}} = ServerKey, - #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State, Connection) -> Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} = crypto:generate_key(dh, [Prime, Base]), PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ServerKey, PrivateDhKey, PSKLookup), - calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys}, + calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_keys = Keys}}, Connection, certify, certify); calculate_secret(#server_ecdhe_psk_params{ dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve}} = ServerKey, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = - State=#state{session=Session}, Connection) -> + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv, + session = Session} = State, Connection) -> ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(ECCurve), PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ServerKey, ECDHKeys, PSKLookup), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, - State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys, + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_keys = ECDHKeys}, session = Session#session{ecc = ECCurve}}, Connection, certify, certify); calculate_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator} = ServerKey, - #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{srp_identity = SRPId}} = State, + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{srp_identity = SRPId}} = State, Connection) -> Keys = generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, 0), PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ServerKey, Keys, SRPId), - calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{srp_keys = Keys}, Connection, + calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_keys = Keys}}, Connection, certify, certify). master_secret(#alert{} = Alert, _) -> Alert; -master_secret(PremasterSecret, #state{session = Session, - negotiated_version = Version, role = Role, +master_secret(PremasterSecret, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + session = Session, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> case ssl_handshake:master_secret(ssl:tls_version(Version), PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates0, Role) of @@ -2169,22 +2294,24 @@ generate_srp_server_keys(_SrpParams, 10) -> generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams = #srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime, verifier = Verifier}, N) -> - case crypto:generate_key(srp, {host, [Verifier, Generator, Prime, '6a']}) of - error -> - generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams, N+1); + try crypto:generate_key(srp, {host, [Verifier, Generator, Prime, '6a']}) of Keys -> Keys + catch + error:_ -> + generate_srp_server_keys(SrpParams, N+1) end. generate_srp_client_keys(_Generator, _Prime, 10) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, N) -> - case crypto:generate_key(srp, {user, [Generator, Prime, '6a']}) of - error -> - generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, N+1); + try crypto:generate_key(srp, {user, [Generator, Prime, '6a']}) of Keys -> Keys + catch + error:_ -> + generate_srp_client_keys(Generator, Prime, N+1) end. handle_srp_identity(Username, {Fun, UserState}) -> @@ -2209,7 +2336,7 @@ cipher_role(client, Data, Session, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} {Record, State} = prepare_connection(State0#state{session = Session, connection_states = ConnectionStates}, Connection), - Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State); + Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State, [{{timeout, handshake}, infinity, close}]); cipher_role(server, Data, Session, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Connection) -> ConnectionStates1 = ssl_record:set_client_verify_data(current_read, Data, @@ -2218,15 +2345,15 @@ cipher_role(server, Data, Session, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0 finalize_handshake(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1, session = Session}, cipher, Connection), {Record, State} = prepare_connection(State1, Connection), - Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State, Actions). - -is_anonymous(Algo) when Algo == dh_anon; - Algo == ecdh_anon; - Algo == psk; - Algo == dhe_psk; - Algo == ecdhe_psk; - Algo == rsa_psk; - Algo == srp_anon -> + Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State, [{{timeout, handshake}, infinity, close} | Actions]). + +is_anonymous(KexAlg) when KexAlg == dh_anon; + KexAlg == ecdh_anon; + KexAlg == psk; + KexAlg == dhe_psk; + KexAlg == ecdhe_psk; + KexAlg == rsa_psk; + KexAlg == srp_anon -> true; is_anonymous(_) -> false. @@ -2340,6 +2467,30 @@ set_socket_opts(ConnectionCb, Transport, Socket, [{active, Active}| Opts], SockO Active == false -> set_socket_opts(ConnectionCb, Transport, Socket, Opts, SockOpts#socket_options{active = Active}, Other); +set_socket_opts(ConnectionCb, Transport, Socket, [{active, Active1} = Opt| Opts], + SockOpts=#socket_options{active = Active0}, Other) + when Active1 >= -32768, Active1 =< 32767 -> + Active = if + is_integer(Active0), Active0 + Active1 < -32768 -> + error; + is_integer(Active0), Active0 + Active1 =< 0 -> + false; + is_integer(Active0), Active0 + Active1 > 32767 -> + error; + Active1 =< 0 -> + false; + is_integer(Active0) -> + Active0 + Active1; + true -> + Active1 + end, + case Active of + error -> + {{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}} }, SockOpts}; + _ -> + set_socket_opts(ConnectionCb, Transport, Socket, Opts, + SockOpts#socket_options{active = Active}, Other) + end; set_socket_opts(_,_, _, [{active, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) -> {{error, {options, {socket_options, Opt}} }, SockOpts}; set_socket_opts(ConnectionCb, Transport, Socket, [Opt | Opts], SockOpts, Other) -> @@ -2371,35 +2522,30 @@ map_extensions(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, elliptic_curves => ssl_handshake:extension_value(ECCCurves), sni => ssl_handshake:extension_value(SNI)}. -terminate_alert(normal, Version, ConnectionStates, Connection) -> - Connection:encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), - Version, ConnectionStates); -terminate_alert({Reason, _}, Version, ConnectionStates, Connection) when Reason == close; - Reason == shutdown -> - Connection:encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), - Version, ConnectionStates); - -terminate_alert(_, Version, ConnectionStates, Connection) -> - {BinAlert, _} = Connection:encode_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR), - Version, ConnectionStates), - BinAlert. +terminate_alert(normal) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY); +terminate_alert({Reason, _}) when Reason == close; + Reason == shutdown -> + ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY); +terminate_alert(_) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR). handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = <<>>, cacerts = []}}) -> %% No trusted certs specified ok; -handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref, - cert_db = CertDb, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = <<>>}}) when CertDb =/= undefined -> +handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{static_env = #static_env{cert_db_ref = Ref, + cert_db = CertDb}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = <<>>}}) when CertDb =/= undefined -> %% Certs provided as DER directly can not be shared %% with other connections and it is safe to delete them when the connection ends. ssl_pkix_db:remove_trusted_certs(Ref, CertDb); -handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{file_ref_db = undefined}) -> +handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{static_env = #static_env{file_ref_db = undefined}}) -> %% Something went wrong early (typically cacertfile does not %% exist) so there is nothing to handle ok; -handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref, - file_ref_db = RefDb, +handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{static_env = #static_env{cert_db_ref = Ref, + file_ref_db = RefDb}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = File}}) -> case ssl_pkix_db:ref_count(Ref, RefDb, -1) of 0 -> @@ -2408,49 +2554,64 @@ handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref, ok end. -prepare_connection(#state{renegotiation = Renegotiate, +prepare_connection(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = Renegotiate}, start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State0, Connection) when Renegotiate =/= {false, first}, RecvFrom =/= undefined -> - State1 = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State0), - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State1), - {Record, ack_connection(State)}; + State = Connection:reinit(State0), + {no_record, ack_connection(State)}; prepare_connection(State0, Connection) -> - State = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State0), + State = Connection:reinit(State0), {no_record, ack_connection(State)}. -ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {true, Initiater}} = State) - when Initiater == internal; - Initiater == peer -> - State#state{renegotiation = undefined}; -ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {true, From}} = State) -> +ack_connection(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, Initiater}} = HsEnv} = State) when Initiater == peer; + Initiater == internal -> + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{renegotiation = undefined}}; +ack_connection(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, From}} = HsEnv} = State) -> gen_statem:reply(From, ok), - State#state{renegotiation = undefined}; -ack_connection(#state{renegotiation = {false, first}, - start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, - timer = Timer} = State) when StartFrom =/= undefined -> + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{renegotiation = undefined}}; +ack_connection(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {false, first}} = HsEnv, + start_or_recv_from = StartFrom} = State) when StartFrom =/= undefined -> gen_statem:reply(StartFrom, connected), - cancel_timer(Timer), - State#state{renegotiation = undefined, - start_or_recv_from = undefined, timer = undefined}; + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{renegotiation = undefined}, + start_or_recv_from = undefined}; ack_connection(State) -> State. -cancel_timer(undefined) -> - ok; -cancel_timer(Timer) -> - erlang:cancel_timer(Timer), - ok. +session_handle_params(#server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve}, Session) -> + Session#session{ecc = ECCurve}; +session_handle_params(_, Session) -> + Session. + +handle_session(Role = server, #ssl_options{reuse_sessions = true} = SslOpts, + Host, Port, Session0) -> + register_session(Role, host_id(Role, Host, SslOpts), Port, Session0, true); +handle_session(Role = client, #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer, + reuse_sessions = Reuse} = SslOpts, + Host, Port, Session0) when Reuse =/= false -> + register_session(Role, host_id(Role, Host, SslOpts), Port, Session0, reg_type(Reuse)); +handle_session(server, _, Host, Port, Session) -> + %% Remove "session of type new" entry from session DB + ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Host, Port, Session), + Session; +handle_session(client, _,_,_, Session) -> + %% In client case there is no entry yet, so nothing to remove + Session. -register_session(client, Host, Port, #session{is_resumable = new} = Session0) -> +reg_type(save) -> + true; +reg_type(true) -> + unique. + +register_session(client, Host, Port, #session{is_resumable = new} = Session0, Save) -> Session = Session0#session{is_resumable = true}, - ssl_manager:register_session(Host, Port, Session), + ssl_manager:register_session(Host, Port, Session, Save), Session; -register_session(server, _, Port, #session{is_resumable = new} = Session0) -> +register_session(server, _, Port, #session{is_resumable = new} = Session0, _) -> Session = Session0#session{is_resumable = true}, ssl_manager:register_session(Port, Session), Session; -register_session(_, _, _, Session) -> +register_session(_, _, _, Session, _) -> Session. %% Already registered host_id(client, _Host, #ssl_options{server_name_indication = Hostname}) when is_list(Hostname) -> @@ -2459,31 +2620,30 @@ host_id(_, Host, _) -> Host. handle_new_session(NewId, CipherSuite, Compression, - #state{session = Session0, - protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}, + session = Session0 + } = State0) -> Session = Session0#session{session_id = NewId, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression}, - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{session = Session}), - Connection:next_event(certify, Record, State). - -handle_resumed_session(SessId, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = Version, - host = Host, port = Port, - protocol_cb = Connection, - session_cache = Cache, - session_cache_cb = CacheCb} = State0) -> + Connection:next_event(certify, no_record, State0#state{session = Session}). + +handle_resumed_session(SessId, #state{static_env = #static_env{host = Host, + port = Port, + protocol_cb = Connection, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> Session = CacheCb:lookup(Cache, {{Host, Port}, SessId}), case ssl_handshake:master_secret(ssl:tls_version(Version), Session, ConnectionStates0, client) of {_, ConnectionStates} -> - {Record, State} = - Connection:next_record(State0#state{ - connection_states = ConnectionStates, - session = Session}), - Connection:next_event(abbreviated, Record, State); + Connection:next_event(abbreviated, no_record, State#state{ + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + session = Session}); #alert{} = Alert -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State0) + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, hello, State) end. make_premaster_secret({MajVer, MinVer}, rsa) -> @@ -2522,7 +2682,7 @@ ssl_options_list([ciphers = Key | Keys], [Value | Values], Acc) -> ssl_options_list(Keys, Values, [{Key, lists:map( fun(Suite) -> - ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(Suite) + ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Suite) end, Value)} | Acc]); ssl_options_list([Key | Keys], [Value | Values], Acc) -> @@ -2531,12 +2691,14 @@ ssl_options_list([Key | Keys], [Value | Values], Acc) -> handle_active_option(false, connection = StateName, To, Reply, State) -> hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply}]); -handle_active_option(_, connection = StateName0, To, Reply, #state{protocol_cb = Connection, - user_data_buffer = <<>>} = State0) -> - %% Need data, set active once - {Record, State1} = Connection:next_record_if_active(State0), - %% Note: Renogotiation may cause StateName0 =/= StateName - case Connection:next_event(StateName0, Record, State1) of +handle_active_option(_, connection = StateName, To, _Reply, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{terminated = true}, + user_data_buffer = {_,0,_}} = State) -> + handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY, all_data_deliverd), StateName, + State#state{start_or_recv_from = To}), + {stop,{shutdown, peer_close}, State}; +handle_active_option(_, connection = StateName0, To, Reply, #state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}, + user_data_buffer = {_,0,_}} = State0) -> + case Connection:next_event(StateName0, no_record, State0) of {next_state, StateName, State} -> hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply}]); {next_state, StateName, State, Actions} -> @@ -2544,12 +2706,13 @@ handle_active_option(_, connection = StateName0, To, Reply, #state{protocol_cb = {stop, _, _} = Stop -> Stop end; -handle_active_option(_, StateName, To, Reply, #state{user_data_buffer = <<>>} = State) -> +handle_active_option(_, StateName, To, Reply, #state{user_data_buffer = {_,0,_}} = State) -> %% Active once already set {next_state, StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply}]}; -%% user_data_buffer =/= <<>> -handle_active_option(_, StateName0, To, Reply, #state{protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> +%% user_data_buffer nonempty +handle_active_option(_, StateName0, To, Reply, + #state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}} = State0) -> case read_application_data(<<>>, State0) of {stop, _, _} = Stop -> Stop; @@ -2565,64 +2728,27 @@ handle_active_option(_, StateName0, To, Reply, #state{protocol_cb = Connection} end end. -encode_packet(Data, #socket_options{packet=Packet}) -> - case Packet of - 1 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 8, (1 bsl 8) - 1); - 2 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 16, (1 bsl 16) - 1); - 4 -> encode_size_packet(Data, 32, (1 bsl 32) - 1); - _ -> Data - end. - -encode_size_packet(Bin, Size, Max) -> - Len = erlang:byte_size(Bin), - case Len > Max of - true -> throw({error, {badarg, {packet_to_large, Len, Max}}}); - false -> <<Len:Size, Bin/binary>> - end. - -time_to_renegotiate(_Data, - #{current_write := #{sequence_number := Num}}, - RenegotiateAt) -> - - %% We could do test: - %% is_time_to_renegotiate((erlang:byte_size(_Data) div ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH) + 1, RenegotiateAt), - %% but we chose to have a some what lower renegotiateAt and a much cheaper test - is_time_to_renegotiate(Num, RenegotiateAt). - -is_time_to_renegotiate(N, M) when N < M-> - false; -is_time_to_renegotiate(_,_) -> - true. - %% Picks ClientData -get_data(_, _, <<>>) -> - {more, <<>>}; -%% Recv timed out save buffer data until next recv -get_data(#socket_options{active=false}, undefined, Buffer) -> - {passive, Buffer}; -get_data(#socket_options{active=Active, packet=Raw}, BytesToRead, Buffer) +get_data(#socket_options{active=false}, undefined, _Bin) -> + %% Recv timed out save buffer data until next recv + passive; +get_data(#socket_options{active=Active, packet=Raw}, BytesToRead, Bin) when Raw =:= raw; Raw =:= 0 -> %% Raw Mode - if - Active =/= false orelse BytesToRead =:= 0 -> + case Bin of + <<_/binary>> when Active =/= false orelse BytesToRead =:= 0 -> %% Active true or once, or passive mode recv(0) - {ok, Buffer, <<>>}; - byte_size(Buffer) >= BytesToRead -> + {ok, Bin, <<>>}; + <<Data:BytesToRead/binary, Rest/binary>> -> %% Passive Mode, recv(Bytes) - <<Data:BytesToRead/binary, Rest/binary>> = Buffer, - {ok, Data, Rest}; - true -> + {ok, Data, Rest}; + <<_/binary>> -> %% Passive Mode not enough data - {more, Buffer} + {more, BytesToRead} end; -get_data(#socket_options{packet=Type, packet_size=Size}, _, Buffer) -> +get_data(#socket_options{packet=Type, packet_size=Size}, _, Bin) -> PacketOpts = [{packet_size, Size}], - case decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts) of - {more, _} -> - {more, Buffer}; - Decoded -> - Decoded - end. + decode_packet(Type, Bin, PacketOpts). decode_packet({http, headers}, Buffer, PacketOpts) -> decode_packet(httph, Buffer, PacketOpts); @@ -2640,42 +2766,61 @@ decode_packet(Type, Buffer, PacketOpts) -> %% Note that if the user has explicitly configured the socket to expect %% HTTP headers using the {packet, httph} option, we don't do any automatic %% switching of states. -deliver_app_data(Transport, Socket, SOpts = #socket_options{active=Active, packet=Type}, - Data, Pid, From, Tracker, Connection) -> - send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_reply(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Data, Tracker, Connection)), - SO = case Data of - {P, _, _, _} when ((P =:= http_request) or (P =:= http_response)), - ((Type =:= http) or (Type =:= http_bin)) -> - SOpts#socket_options{packet={Type, headers}}; - http_eoh when tuple_size(Type) =:= 2 -> - % End of headers - expect another Request/Response line - {Type1, headers} = Type, - SOpts#socket_options{packet=Type1}; - _ -> - SOpts - end, +deliver_app_data( + CPids, Transport, Socket, + #socket_options{active=Active, packet=Type} = SOpts, + Data, Pid, From, Tracker, Connection) -> + %% + send_or_reply( + Active, Pid, From, + format_reply( + CPids, Transport, Socket, SOpts, Data, Tracker, Connection)), + SO = + case Data of + {P, _, _, _} + when ((P =:= http_request) or (P =:= http_response)), + ((Type =:= http) or (Type =:= http_bin)) -> + SOpts#socket_options{packet={Type, headers}}; + http_eoh when tuple_size(Type) =:= 2 -> + %% End of headers - expect another Request/Response line + {Type1, headers} = Type, + SOpts#socket_options{packet=Type1}; + _ -> + SOpts + end, case Active of once -> SO#socket_options{active=false}; + 1 -> + send_user( + Pid, + format_passive( + CPids, Transport, Socket, Tracker, Connection)), + SO#socket_options{active=false}; + N when is_integer(N) -> + SO#socket_options{active=N - 1}; _ -> SO end. -format_reply(_, _,#socket_options{active = false, mode = Mode, packet = Packet, +format_reply(_, _, _,#socket_options{active = false, mode = Mode, packet = Packet, header = Header}, Data, _, _) -> {ok, do_format_reply(Mode, Packet, Header, Data)}; -format_reply(Transport, Socket, #socket_options{active = _, mode = Mode, packet = Packet, +format_reply(CPids, Transport, Socket, #socket_options{active = _, mode = Mode, packet = Packet, header = Header}, Data, Tracker, Connection) -> - {ssl, Connection:socket(self(), Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker), + {ssl, Connection:socket(CPids, Transport, Socket, Tracker), do_format_reply(Mode, Packet, Header, Data)}. -deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SO= #socket_options{active = Active}, Data, Pid, From, Tracker, Connection) -> - send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SO, Data, Tracker, Connection)). +deliver_packet_error(CPids, Transport, Socket, + SO= #socket_options{active = Active}, Data, Pid, From, Tracker, Connection) -> + send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, format_packet_error(CPids, + Transport, Socket, SO, Data, Tracker, Connection)). -format_packet_error(_, _,#socket_options{active = false, mode = Mode}, Data, _, _) -> +format_packet_error(_, _, _,#socket_options{active = false, mode = Mode}, Data, _, _) -> {error, {invalid_packet, do_format_reply(Mode, raw, 0, Data)}}; -format_packet_error(Transport, Socket, #socket_options{active = _, mode = Mode}, Data, Tracker, Connection) -> - {ssl_error, Connection:socket(self(), Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker), +format_packet_error(CPids, Transport, Socket, #socket_options{active = _, mode = Mode}, + Data, Tracker, Connection) -> + {ssl_error, Connection:socket(CPids, Transport, Socket, Tracker), {invalid_packet, do_format_reply(Mode, raw, 0, Data)}}. do_format_reply(binary, _, N, Data) when N > 0 -> % Header mode @@ -2690,6 +2835,9 @@ do_format_reply(list, Packet, _, Data) do_format_reply(list, _,_, Data) -> binary_to_list(Data). +format_passive(CPids, Transport, Socket, Tracker, Connection) -> + {ssl_passive, Connection:socket(CPids, Transport, Socket, Tracker)}. + header(0, <<>>) -> <<>>; header(_, <<>>) -> @@ -2713,38 +2861,36 @@ send_user(Pid, Msg) -> Pid ! Msg, ok. -alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> - alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection); -alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket,_, _, _, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> - alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role, Connection). +alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) -> + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection); +alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket,_, _, _, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) -> + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection). -alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> - alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, false, no_pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection). +alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) -> + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, false, no_pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection). -alert_user(_, _, _, false = Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, _) when From =/= undefined -> +alert_user(_, _, _, _, false = Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) when From =/= undefined -> %% If there is an outstanding ssl_accept | recv %% From will be defined and send_or_reply will %% send the appropriate error message. - ReasonCode = ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role), + ReasonCode = ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName), send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, {error, ReasonCode}); -alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> - case ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role) of +alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) -> + case ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName) of closed -> send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, - {ssl_closed, Connection:socket(self(), - Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker)}); + {ssl_closed, Connection:socket(Pids, Transport, Socket, Tracker)}); ReasonCode -> send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, - {ssl_error, Connection:socket(self(), - Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker), ReasonCode}) + {ssl_error, Connection:socket(Pids, Transport, Socket, Tracker), ReasonCode}) end. log_alert(true, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, #alert{role = Role} = Alert) -> Txt = ssl_alert:own_alert_txt(Alert), - error_logger:info_report(io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt])); + error_logger:info_report(ssl_alert:alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt)); log_alert(true, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, Alert) -> Txt = ssl_alert:alert_txt(Alert), - error_logger:info_report(io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt])); + error_logger:info_report(ssl_alert:alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt)); log_alert(false, _, _, _, _) -> ok. @@ -2755,7 +2901,9 @@ invalidate_session(server, _, Port, Session) -> handle_sni_extension(undefined, State) -> State; -handle_sni_extension(#sni{hostname = Hostname}, State0) -> +handle_sni_extension(#sni{hostname = Hostname}, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role} = InitStatEnv0, + handshake_env = HsEnv, + connection_env = CEnv} = State0) -> NewOptions = update_ssl_options_from_sni(State0#state.ssl_options, Hostname), case NewOptions of undefined -> @@ -2769,19 +2917,21 @@ handle_sni_extension(#sni{hostname = Hostname}, State0) -> private_key := Key, dh_params := DHParams, own_certificate := OwnCert}} = - ssl_config:init(NewOptions, State0#state.role), + ssl_config:init(NewOptions, Role), State0#state{ session = State0#state.session#session{own_certificate = OwnCert}, - file_ref_db = FileRefHandle, - cert_db_ref = Ref, - cert_db = CertDbHandle, - crl_db = CRLDbHandle, - session_cache = CacheHandle, - private_key = Key, - diffie_hellman_params = DHParams, - ssl_options = NewOptions, - sni_hostname = Hostname - } + static_env = InitStatEnv0#static_env{ + file_ref_db = FileRefHandle, + cert_db_ref = Ref, + cert_db = CertDbHandle, + crl_db = CRLDbHandle, + session_cache = CacheHandle + }, + connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{private_key = Key}, + ssl_options = NewOptions, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{sni_hostname = Hostname, + diffie_hellman_params = DHParams} + } end. update_ssl_options_from_sni(OrigSSLOptions, SNIHostname) -> @@ -2804,42 +2954,3 @@ new_emulated([], EmOpts) -> EmOpts; new_emulated(NewEmOpts, _) -> NewEmOpts. -%%---------------Erlang distribution -------------------------------------- - -send_dist_data(StateName, State, DHandle, Acc) -> - case erlang:dist_ctrl_get_data(DHandle) of - none -> - erlang:dist_ctrl_get_data_notification(DHandle), - hibernate_after(StateName, State, lists:reverse(Acc)); - Data -> - send_dist_data( - StateName, State, DHandle, - [{next_event, {call, {self(), undefined}}, {application_data, Data}} - |Acc]) - end. - -%% Overload mitigation -eat_msgs(Msg) -> - receive Msg -> eat_msgs(Msg) - after 0 -> ok - end. - -%% When acting as distribution controller map the exit reason -%% to follow the documented nodedown_reason for net_kernel -stop(Reason, State) -> - {stop, erl_dist_stop_reason(Reason, State), State}. - -stop_and_reply(Reason, Replies, State) -> - {stop_and_reply, erl_dist_stop_reason(Reason, State), Replies, State}. - -erl_dist_stop_reason( - Reason, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}}) -> - case Reason of - normal -> - %% We can not exit with normal since that will not bring - %% down the rest of the distribution processes - {shutdown, normal}; - _ -> Reason - end; -erl_dist_stop_reason(Reason, _State) -> - Reason. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl index 811aa779d5..c90fe926b7 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2019. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -33,69 +33,91 @@ -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-record(static_env, { + role :: client | server, + transport_cb :: atom(), % callback module + protocol_cb :: tls_connection | dtls_connection, + data_tag :: atom(), % ex tcp. + close_tag :: atom(), % ex tcp_closed + error_tag :: atom(), % ex tcp_error + passive_tag :: atom(), % ex tcp_passive + host :: string() | inet:ip_address(), + port :: integer(), + socket :: port() | tuple(), %% TODO: dtls socket + cert_db :: reference() | 'undefined', + session_cache :: db_handle(), + session_cache_cb :: atom(), + crl_db :: term(), + file_ref_db :: db_handle(), + cert_db_ref :: certdb_ref() | 'undefined', + tracker :: pid() | 'undefined' %% Tracker process for listen socket + }). + +-record(handshake_env, { + client_hello_version :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined', + unprocessed_handshake_events = 0 :: integer(), + tls_handshake_history :: ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake_history() | secret_printout() + | 'undefined', + expecting_finished = false ::boolean(), + renegotiation :: undefined | {boolean(), From::term() | internal | peer}, + allow_renegotiate = true ::boolean(), + %% Ext handling + hello, %%:: #client_hello{} | #server_hello{} + sni_hostname = undefined, + expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false ::boolean(), + next_protocol = undefined :: undefined | binary(), + negotiated_protocol, + hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined}, + cert_hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined}, + %% key exchange + kex_algorithm :: ssl:kex_algo(), + kex_keys :: {PublicKey :: binary(), PrivateKey :: binary()} | #'ECPrivateKey'{} | undefined | secret_printout(), + diffie_hellman_params:: #'DHParameter'{} | undefined | secret_printout(), + srp_params :: #srp_user{} | secret_printout() | 'undefined', + public_key_info :: ssl_handshake:public_key_info() | 'undefined', + premaster_secret :: binary() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', + server_psk_identity :: binary() | 'undefined' % server psk identity hint + }). + +-record(connection_env, { + user_application :: {Monitor::reference(), User::pid()}, + downgrade, + terminated = false ::boolean() | closed, + negotiated_version :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined', + erl_dist_handle = undefined :: erlang:dist_handle() | 'undefined', + private_key :: public_key:private_key() | secret_printout() | 'undefined' + }). + -record(state, { - role :: client | server, - user_application :: {Monitor::reference(), User::pid()}, - transport_cb :: atom(), % callback module - protocol_cb :: tls_connection | dtls_connection, - data_tag :: atom(), % ex tcp. - close_tag :: atom(), % ex tcp_closed - error_tag :: atom(), % ex tcp_error - host :: string() | inet:ip_address(), - port :: integer(), - socket :: port() | tuple(), %% TODO: dtls socket - ssl_options :: #ssl_options{}, - socket_options :: #socket_options{}, - connection_states :: ssl_record:connection_states() | secret_printout(), - protocol_buffers :: term() | secret_printout() , %% #protocol_buffers{} from tls_record.hrl or dtls_recor.hrl - unprocessed_handshake_events = 0 :: integer(), - tls_handshake_history :: ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake_history() | secret_printout() - | 'undefined', - cert_db :: reference() | 'undefined', - session :: #session{} | secret_printout(), - session_cache :: db_handle(), - session_cache_cb :: atom(), - crl_db :: term(), - negotiated_version :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined', - client_hello_version :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined', - client_certificate_requested = false :: boolean(), - key_algorithm :: ssl_cipher:key_algo(), - hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined}, - cert_hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined}, - public_key_info :: ssl_handshake:public_key_info() | 'undefined', - private_key :: public_key:private_key() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', - diffie_hellman_params:: #'DHParameter'{} | undefined | secret_printout(), - diffie_hellman_keys :: {PublicKey :: binary(), PrivateKey :: binary()} | #'ECPrivateKey'{} | undefined | secret_printout(), - psk_identity :: binary() | 'undefined', % server psk identity hint - srp_params :: #srp_user{} | secret_printout() | 'undefined', - srp_keys ::{PublicKey :: binary(), PrivateKey :: binary()} | secret_printout() | 'undefined', - premaster_secret :: binary() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', - file_ref_db :: db_handle(), - cert_db_ref :: certdb_ref() | 'undefined', - bytes_to_read :: undefined | integer(), %% bytes to read in passive mode - user_data_buffer :: undefined | binary() | secret_printout(), - renegotiation :: undefined | {boolean(), From::term() | internal | peer}, - start_or_recv_from :: term(), - timer :: undefined | reference(), % start_or_recive_timer - %%send_queue :: queue:queue(), - hello, %%:: #client_hello{} | #server_hello{}, - terminated = false ::boolean(), - allow_renegotiate = true ::boolean(), - expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false ::boolean(), - expecting_finished = false ::boolean(), - next_protocol = undefined :: undefined | binary(), - negotiated_protocol, - tracker :: pid() | 'undefined', %% Tracker process for listen socket - sni_hostname = undefined, - downgrade, - flight_buffer = [] :: list() | map(), %% Buffer of TLS/DTLS records, used during the TLS handshake - %% to when possible pack more than one TLS record into the - %% underlaying packet format. Introduced by DTLS - RFC 4347. - %% The mecahnism is also usefull in TLS although we do not - %% need to worry about packet loss in TLS. In DTLS we need to track DTLS handshake seqnr - flight_state = reliable, %% reliable | {retransmit, integer()}| {waiting, ref(), integer()} - last two is used in DTLS over udp. - protocol_specific = #{} :: map() - }). + static_env :: #static_env{}, + connection_env :: #connection_env{} | secret_printout(), + ssl_options :: #ssl_options{}, + socket_options :: #socket_options{}, + + %% Hanshake %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + handshake_env :: #handshake_env{} | secret_printout(), + %% Buffer of TLS/DTLS records, used during the TLS + %% handshake to when possible pack more than one TLS + %% record into the underlaying packet + %% format. Introduced by DTLS - RFC 4347. The + %% mecahnism is also usefull in TLS although we do not + %% need to worry about packet loss in TLS. In DTLS we + %% need to track DTLS handshake seqnr + flight_buffer = [] :: list() | map(), + client_certificate_requested = false :: boolean(), + protocol_specific = #{} :: map(), + session :: #session{} | secret_printout(), + %% Data shuffling %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + connection_states :: ssl_record:connection_states() | secret_printout(), + protocol_buffers :: term() | secret_printout() , %% #protocol_buffers{} from tls_record.hrl or dtls_recor.hr + user_data_buffer :: undefined | {[binary()],non_neg_integer(),[binary()]} | secret_printout(), + bytes_to_read :: undefined | integer(), %% bytes to read in passive mode + + %% recv and start handling + start_or_recv_from :: term() + }). + + -define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS, #'DHParameter'{prime = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME, base = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR}). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache.erl index 9c1af86eeb..841620ce57 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache.erl @@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ -behaviour(ssl_crl_cache_api). +-export_type([crl_src/0, uri/0]). +-type crl_src() :: {file, file:filename()} | {der, public_key:der_encoded()}. +-type uri() :: uri_string:uri_string(). + -export([lookup/3, select/2, fresh_crl/2]). -export([insert/1, insert/2, delete/1]). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache_api.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache_api.erl index d5380583e7..8a750b3929 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache_api.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache_api.erl @@ -21,12 +21,15 @@ %% -module(ssl_crl_cache_api). - -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). --type db_handle() :: term(). --type issuer_name() :: {rdnSequence, [#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}. +-export_type([dist_point/0, crl_cache_ref/0]). + +-type crl_cache_ref() :: any(). +-type issuer_name() :: {rdnSequence,[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}. +-type dist_point() :: #'DistributionPoint'{}. --callback lookup(#'DistributionPoint'{}, issuer_name(), db_handle()) -> not_available | [public_key:der_encoded()]. --callback select(issuer_name(), db_handle()) -> [public_key:der_encoded()]. --callback fresh_crl(#'DistributionPoint'{}, public_key:der_encoded()) -> public_key:der_encoded(). + +-callback lookup(dist_point(), issuer_name(), crl_cache_ref()) -> not_available | [public_key:der_encoded()]. +-callback select(issuer_name(), crl_cache_ref()) -> [public_key:der_encoded()]. +-callback fresh_crl(dist_point(), public_key:der_encoded()) -> public_key:der_encoded(). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index 3028ae9617..dea78a876f 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ hello_request() -> #hello_request{}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec server_hello(#session{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states(), - #hello_extensions{}) -> #server_hello{}. +%%-spec server_hello(binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states(), +%% Extension::map()) -> #server_hello{}. %% %% Description: Creates a server hello message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -169,14 +169,14 @@ client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version, end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec certificate_request(ssl_cipher:cipher_suite(), db_handle(), +-spec certificate_request(ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), #hash_sign_algos{}, ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> #certificate_request{}. %% %% Description: Creates a certificate_request message, called by the server. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certificate_request(CipherSuite, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, HashSigns, Version) -> - Types = certificate_types(ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), Version), + Types = certificate_types(ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), Version), Authorities = certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), #certificate_request{ certificate_types = Types, @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Opts, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) -> ServerName = server_name(Opts#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role), - [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs, + [PeerCert | ChainCerts ] = ASN1Certs, try {TrustedCert, CertPath} = ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, @@ -347,23 +347,22 @@ certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerName, Opts#ssl_options.customize_hostname_check, Opts#ssl_options.crl_check, CRLDbHandle, CertPath), - case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, - CertPath, - [{max_path_length, Opts#ssl_options.depth}, - {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of + Options = [{max_path_length, Opts#ssl_options.depth}, + {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}], + case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, CertPath, Options) of {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; {error, Reason} -> - path_validation_alert(Reason) + handle_path_validation_error(Reason, PeerCert, ChainCerts, Opts, Options, + CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) end catch - error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> + error:{badmatch,{error, {asn1, Asn1Reason}}} -> %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason}); error:OtherReason -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {unexpected_error, OtherReason}) end. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(), binary(), ssl_handshake_history()) -> valid | #alert{}. @@ -611,7 +610,7 @@ encode_hello_extensions([#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = ECPointFormats ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(ListLen), ECPointFormatList/binary, Acc/binary>>); encode_hello_extensions([#srp{username = UserName} | Rest], Acc) -> SRPLen = byte_size(UserName), - Len = SRPLen + 2, + Len = SRPLen + 1, encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), UserName/binary, Acc/binary>>); encode_hello_extensions([#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos} | Rest], Acc) -> @@ -730,7 +729,7 @@ decode_hello_extensions(Extensions) -> dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, #hello_extensions{}). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> +-spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl:kex_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> #server_key_params{}. %% %% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type @@ -739,7 +738,7 @@ decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) -> dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> +-spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl:kex_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> #encrypted_premaster_secret{} | #client_diffie_hellman_public{} | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{} @@ -777,7 +776,7 @@ available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) -> filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(Curve, Suites); available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, Curve) -> Suites = available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve), - filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, + filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, Version, []). available_signature_algs(undefined, _) -> @@ -859,22 +858,24 @@ premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g end; premaster_secret(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, ServerKey, #srp_user{prime = Prime, verifier = Verifier}) -> - case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of - error -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); + try crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of PremasterSecret -> PremasterSecret + catch + error:_ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) end; premaster_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator, srp_s = Salt, srp_b = Public}, ClientKeys, {Username, Password}) -> case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of ok -> DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]), - case crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of - error -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); + try crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of PremasterSecret -> PremasterSecret + catch + error -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) end; _ -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) @@ -924,6 +925,13 @@ premaster_secret(EncSecret, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = RSAPrivateKey) -> catch _:_ -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)) + end; +premaster_secret(EncSecret, #{algorithm := rsa} = Engine) -> + try crypto:private_decrypt(rsa, EncSecret, maps:remove(algorithm, Engine), + [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) + catch + _:_ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)) end. %%==================================================================== %% Extensions handling @@ -932,7 +940,7 @@ client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = - case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of + case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of true -> client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs); false -> @@ -964,34 +972,30 @@ handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, ClientCipherSuites, #session{cipher_suite = NegotiatedCipherSuite, compression_method = Compression} = Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> - Session = handle_srp_extension(SRP, Session0), - ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(server, RecordCB, Version, Info, - Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, + Session = handle_srp_extension(SRP, Session0), + ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(server, RecordCB, Version, Info, + Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, ClientCipherSuites, Compression, - ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation), - - ServerHelloExtensions = #hello_extensions{ - renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, - ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), - ec_point_formats = server_ecc_extension(Version, ECCFormat) - }, - + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation), + + ServerHelloExtensions = #hello_extensions{ + renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, + ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), + ec_point_formats = server_ecc_extension(Version, ECCFormat) + }, + %% If we receive an ALPN extension and have ALPN configured for this connection, %% we handle it. Otherwise we check for the NPN extension. if ALPN =/= undefined, ALPNPreferredProtocols =/= undefined -> - case handle_alpn_extension(ALPNPreferredProtocols, decode_alpn(ALPN)) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - Protocol -> - {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, - ServerHelloExtensions#hello_extensions{alpn=encode_alpn([Protocol], Renegotiation)}} - end; + Protocol = handle_alpn_extension(ALPNPreferredProtocols, decode_alpn(ALPN)), + {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, + ServerHelloExtensions#hello_extensions{alpn=encode_alpn([Protocol], Renegotiation)}}; true -> - ProtocolsToAdvertise = handle_next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, Opts), + ProtocolsToAdvertise = handle_next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, Opts), {Session, ConnectionStates, undefined, - ServerHelloExtensions#hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation= - encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(ProtocolsToAdvertise)}} + ServerHelloExtensions#hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation= + encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(ProtocolsToAdvertise)}} end. handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, @@ -1014,12 +1018,8 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, [Protocol] when not Renegotiation -> {ConnectionStates, alpn, Protocol}; undefined -> - case handle_next_protocol(NextProtocolNegotiation, NextProtoSelector, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - Protocol -> - {ConnectionStates, npn, Protocol} - end; + Protocol = handle_next_protocol(NextProtocolNegotiation, NextProtoSelector, Renegotiation), + {ConnectionStates, npn, Protocol}; {error, Reason} -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason); [] -> @@ -1055,7 +1055,10 @@ select_curve(undefined, _, _) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- select_hashsign(_, _, KeyExAlgo, _, _Version) when KeyExAlgo == dh_anon; KeyExAlgo == ecdh_anon; - KeyExAlgo == srp_anon -> + KeyExAlgo == srp_anon; + KeyExAlgo == psk; + KeyExAlgo == dhe_psk; + KeyExAlgo == ecdhe_psk -> {null, anon}; %% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have %% negotiated a lower version. @@ -1064,17 +1067,14 @@ select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, - signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign, - SubSign, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); (_) -> false end, HashSigns) of @@ -1310,6 +1310,45 @@ apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0, SslState, _CertPath) {unknown, {SslState, UserState}} end. +handle_path_validation_error({bad_cert, unknown_ca} = Reason, PeerCert, Chain, + Opts, Options, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) -> + handle_incomplete_chain(PeerCert, Chain, Opts, Options, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Reason); +handle_path_validation_error({bad_cert, invalid_issuer} = Reason, PeerCert, Chain0, + Opts, Options, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) -> + case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(PeerCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain0) of + {ok, _, [PeerCert | Chain] = OrdedChain} when Chain =/= Chain0 -> %% Chain appaears to be unorded + {Trusted, Path} = ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(OrdedChain, + CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, + Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain), + case public_key:pkix_path_validation(Trusted, Path, Options) of + {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> + {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; + {error, PathError} -> + handle_path_validation_error(PathError, PeerCert, Path, + Opts, Options, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) + end; + _ -> + path_validation_alert(Reason) + end; +handle_path_validation_error(Reason, _, _, _, _,_, _) -> + path_validation_alert(Reason). + +handle_incomplete_chain(PeerCert, Chain0, Opts, Options, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, PathError0) -> + case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(PeerCert, CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef) of + {ok, _, [PeerCert | _] = Chain} when Chain =/= Chain0 -> %% Chain candidate found + {Trusted, Path} = ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(Chain, + CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, + Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain), + case public_key:pkix_path_validation(Trusted, Path, Options) of + {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> + {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; + {error, PathError} -> + path_validation_alert(PathError) + end; + _ -> + path_validation_alert(PathError0) + end. + path_validation_alert({bad_cert, cert_expired}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, invalid_issuer}) -> @@ -1322,8 +1361,6 @@ path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_critical_extension}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, {revoked, _}}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); -%%path_validation_alert({bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined}) -> -%% ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE); path_validation_alert({bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, Details}}) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE), Alert#alert{reason = Details}; @@ -1896,7 +1933,7 @@ dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info:Len/binar RenegotiateInfo}}); dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), SRP:SRPLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) - when Len == SRPLen + 2 -> + when Len == SRPLen + 1 -> dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{srp = #srp{username = SRP}}); dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), @@ -1933,7 +1970,7 @@ dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ECPointFormats}}); dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Rest/binary>>, Acc) when Len == 0 -> - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{sni = ""}); %% Server may send an empy SNI + dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{sni = #sni{hostname = ""}}); %% Server may send an empy SNI dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> @@ -2144,30 +2181,26 @@ filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(_, Suites) -> handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, ClientCipherSuites, Compression, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) -> - case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0, - Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, - ClientCipherSuites) of - {ok, ConnectionStates} -> - hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role, - Version, - NegotiatedCipherSuite, - Random, - Compression, - ConnectionStates); - #alert{} = Alert -> - throw(Alert) - end. + {ok, ConnectionStates} = handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0, + Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, + ClientCipherSuites), + hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role, + Version, + NegotiatedCipherSuite, + Random, + Compression, + ConnectionStates). %% Receive protocols, choose one from the list, return it. handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, Reason}) -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason); + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason)); handle_alpn_extension([], _) -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL)); handle_alpn_extension([ServerProtocol|Tail], ClientProtocols) -> - case lists:member(ServerProtocol, ClientProtocols) of - true -> ServerProtocol; - false -> handle_alpn_extension(Tail, ClientProtocols) - end. + case lists:member(ServerProtocol, ClientProtocols) of + true -> ServerProtocol; + false -> handle_alpn_extension(Tail, ClientProtocols) + end. handle_next_protocol(undefined, _NextProtocolSelector, _Renegotiating) -> @@ -2180,14 +2213,14 @@ handle_next_protocol(#next_protocol_negotiation{} = NextProtocols, true -> select_next_protocol(decode_next_protocols(NextProtocols), NextProtocolSelector); false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, unexpected_next_protocol_extension) + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, unexpected_next_protocol_extension)) end. handle_next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, SslOpts)-> case handle_next_protocol_on_server(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, SslOpts) of #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; + throw(Alert); ProtocolsToAdvertise -> ProtocolsToAdvertise end. @@ -2231,37 +2264,7 @@ sign_algo(Alg) -> {_, Sign} =public_key:pkix_sign_types(Alg), Sign. -is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, _, _, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns) when - KeyExAlgo == dh_dss; - KeyExAlgo == dh_rsa; - KeyExAlgo == ecdh_rsa; - KeyExAlgo == ecdh_ecdsa - -> - %% *dh_* could be called only *dh in TLS-1.2 - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, rsa, ecdsa, ecdhe_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, _, dhe_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, rsa, ecdhe_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, rsa, rsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, _, srp_rsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, rsa} = Algos, rsa, _, rsa_psk, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, dsa} = Algos, dsa, _, dhe_dss, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, dsa} = Algos, dsa, _, srp_dss, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, ecdsa} = Algos, ecdsa, _, dhe_ecdsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, ecdsa} = Algos, ecdsa, ecdsa, ecdh_ecdsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, ecdsa} = Algos, ecdsa, ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, SupportedHashSigns) -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); -is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when +is_acceptable_hash_sign( _, KeyExAlgo, _) when KeyExAlgo == psk; KeyExAlgo == dhe_psk; KeyExAlgo == ecdhe_psk; @@ -2270,8 +2273,9 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when KeyExAlgo == ecdhe_anon -> true; -is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_,_,_,_) -> - false. +is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos,_, SupportedHashSigns) -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns). + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) -> lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns). @@ -2412,14 +2416,14 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co true -> {ok, ConnectionStates}; false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation) + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation)) end; handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv})); false -> ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), @@ -2427,7 +2431,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co true -> {ok, ConnectionStates}; false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation) + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation)) end end; @@ -2437,7 +2441,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, S handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv})); false -> handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) end. @@ -2446,9 +2450,9 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), case {SecureRenegotation, maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState)} of {_, true} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure); + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure)); {true, false} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION); + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION)); {false, false} -> {ok, ConnectionStates} end. @@ -2456,7 +2460,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> cert_curve(_, _, no_suite) -> {no_curve, no_suite}; cert_curve(Cert, ECCCurve0, CipherSuite) -> - case ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite) of + case ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite) of #{key_exchange := Kex} when Kex == ecdh_ecdsa; Kex == ecdh_rsa -> OtpCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), @@ -2464,13 +2468,7 @@ cert_curve(Cert, ECCCurve0, CipherSuite) -> #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = AlgInfo} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, {namedCurve, Oid} = AlgInfo#'PublicKeyAlgorithm'.parameters, - try pubkey_cert_records:namedCurves(Oid) of - Curve -> - {{named_curve, Curve}, CipherSuite} - catch - _:_ -> - {no_curve, no_suite} - end; + {{namedCurve, Oid}, CipherSuite}; _ -> {ECCCurve0, CipherSuite} end. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl index ae1c3ea47c..ddd7a8eb7b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl @@ -27,14 +27,12 @@ -define(SECRET_PRINTOUT, "***"). --type reason() :: term(). --type reply() :: term(). --type msg() :: term(). --type from() :: term(). --type host() :: inet:ip_address() | inet:hostname(). --type session_id() :: 0 | binary(). +-type reason() :: any(). +-type reply() :: any(). +-type msg() :: any(). +-type from() :: any(). -type certdb_ref() :: reference(). --type db_handle() :: term(). +-type db_handle() :: any(). -type der_cert() :: binary(). -type issuer() :: tuple(). -type serialnumber() :: integer(). @@ -60,6 +58,7 @@ -define(CDR_MAGIC, "GIOP"). -define(CDR_HDR_SIZE, 12). +-define(INTERNAL_ACTIVE_N, 100). -define(DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, 5000). -define(NO_DIST_POINT, "http://dummy/no_distribution_point"). @@ -83,25 +82,26 @@ -define('24H_in_sec', 86400). -record(ssl_options, { - protocol :: tls | dtls, - versions :: [ssl_record:ssl_version()], %% ssl_record:atom_version() in API - verify :: verify_none | verify_peer, + protocol :: tls | dtls | 'undefined', + versions :: [ssl_record:ssl_version()] | 'undefined', %% ssl_record:atom_version() in API + verify :: verify_none | verify_peer | 'undefined', verify_fun, %%:: fun(CertVerifyErrors::term()) -> boolean(), - partial_chain :: fun(), - fail_if_no_peer_cert :: boolean(), - verify_client_once :: boolean(), + partial_chain :: fun() | 'undefined', + fail_if_no_peer_cert :: boolean() | 'undefined', + verify_client_once :: boolean() | 'undefined', %% fun(Extensions, State, Verify, AccError) -> {Extensions, State, AccError} validate_extensions_fun, - depth :: integer(), - certfile :: binary(), + depth :: integer() | 'undefined', + certfile :: binary() | 'undefined', cert :: public_key:der_encoded() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', - keyfile :: binary(), - key :: {'RSAPrivateKey' | 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' | 'PrivateKeyInfo', - public_key:der_encoded()} | key_map() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', + keyfile :: binary() | 'undefined', + key :: {'RSAPrivateKey' | 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' | 'PrivateKeyInfo' | 'undefined', + public_key:der_encoded()} | map() %%map() -> ssl:key() how to handle dialyzer? + | secret_printout() | 'undefined', password :: string() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', cacerts :: [public_key:der_encoded()] | secret_printout() | 'undefined', - cacertfile :: binary(), - dh :: public_key:der_encoded() | secret_printout(), + cacertfile :: binary() | 'undefined', + dh :: public_key:der_encoded() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', dhfile :: binary() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', user_lookup_fun, % server option, fun to lookup the user psk_identity :: binary() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', @@ -110,26 +110,26 @@ %% Local policy for the server if it want's to reuse the session %% or not. Defaluts to allways returning true. %% fun(SessionId, PeerCert, Compression, CipherSuite) -> boolean() - reuse_session, + reuse_session :: fun() | binary() | undefined, %% Server side is a fun() %% If false sessions will never be reused, if true they %% will be reused if possible. - reuse_sessions :: boolean(), + reuse_sessions :: boolean() | save | 'undefined', %% Only client side can use value save renegotiate_at, secure_renegotiate, client_renegotiation, %% undefined if not hibernating, or number of ms of %% inactivity after which ssl_connection will go into %% hibernation - hibernate_after :: timeout(), + hibernate_after :: timeout() | 'undefined', %% This option should only be set to true by inet_tls_dist erl_dist = false :: boolean(), - alpn_advertised_protocols = undefined :: [binary()] | undefined , + alpn_advertised_protocols = undefined :: [binary()] | undefined, alpn_preferred_protocols = undefined :: [binary()] | undefined, next_protocols_advertised = undefined :: [binary()] | undefined, next_protocol_selector = undefined, %% fun([binary()]) -> binary()) log_alert :: boolean(), server_name_indication = undefined, - sni_hosts :: [{inet:hostname(), [tuple()]}], + sni_hosts :: [{inet:hostname(), [tuple()]}] | 'undefined', sni_fun :: function() | undefined, %% Should the server prefer its own cipher order over the one provided by %% the client? @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ %%mitigation entirely? beast_mitigation = one_n_minus_one :: one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled, fallback = false :: boolean(), - crl_check :: boolean() | peer | best_effort, + crl_check :: boolean() | peer | best_effort | 'undefined', crl_cache, signature_algs, eccs, @@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ max_handshake_size :: integer(), handshake, customize_hostname_check + %% , + %% save_session :: boolean() }). -record(socket_options, @@ -177,9 +179,12 @@ password => crypto:password() }. -type state_name() :: hello | abbreviated | certify | cipher | connection. --type gen_fsm_state_return() :: {next_state, state_name(), term()} | - {next_state, state_name(), term(), timeout()} | - {stop, term(), term()}. + +-type gen_fsm_state_return() :: {next_state, state_name(), any()} | + {next_state, state_name(), any(), timeout()} | + {stop, any(), any()}. +-type ssl_options() :: #ssl_options{}. + -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_internal). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl index f44fe6a2bf..c56675b691 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ connection_init/3, cache_pem_file/2, lookup_trusted_cert/4, new_session_id/1, clean_cert_db/2, - register_session/2, register_session/3, invalidate_session/2, + register_session/2, register_session/4, invalidate_session/2, insert_crls/2, insert_crls/3, delete_crls/1, delete_crls/2, invalidate_session/3, name/1]). @@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ -include("ssl_handshake.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include("ssl_api.hrl"). + -include_lib("kernel/include/file.hrl"). -record(state, { @@ -127,7 +129,13 @@ cache_pem_file(File, DbHandle) -> [Content] -> {ok, Content}; undefined -> - ssl_pem_cache:insert(File) + case ssl_pkix_db:decode_pem_file(File) of + {ok, Content} -> + ssl_pem_cache:insert(File, Content), + {ok, Content}; + Error -> + Error + end end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -142,7 +150,7 @@ lookup_trusted_cert(DbHandle, Ref, SerialNumber, Issuer) -> ssl_pkix_db:lookup_trusted_cert(DbHandle, Ref, SerialNumber, Issuer). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec new_session_id(integer()) -> session_id(). +-spec new_session_id(integer()) -> ssl:session_id(). %% %% Description: Creates a session id for the server. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -164,9 +172,11 @@ clean_cert_db(Ref, File) -> %% %% Description: Make the session available for reuse. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec register_session(host(), inet:port_number(), #session{}) -> ok. -register_session(Host, Port, Session) -> - cast({register_session, Host, Port, Session}). +-spec register_session(ssl:host(), inet:port_number(), #session{}, unique | true) -> ok. +register_session(Host, Port, Session, true) -> + call({register_session, Host, Port, Session}); +register_session(Host, Port, Session, unique = Save) -> + cast({register_session, Host, Port, Session, Save}). -spec register_session(inet:port_number(), #session{}) -> ok. register_session(Port, Session) -> @@ -177,7 +187,7 @@ register_session(Port, Session) -> %% a the session has been marked "is_resumable = false" for some while %% it will be safe to remove the data from the session database. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec invalidate_session(host(), inet:port_number(), #session{}) -> ok. +-spec invalidate_session(ssl:host(), inet:port_number(), #session{}) -> ok. invalidate_session(Host, Port, Session) -> load_mitigation(), cast({invalidate_session, Host, Port, Session}). @@ -295,7 +305,10 @@ handle_call({{new_session_id, Port}, _}, _, #state{session_cache_cb = CacheCb, session_cache_server = Cache} = State) -> Id = new_id(Port, ?GEN_UNIQUE_ID_MAX_TRIES, Cache, CacheCb), - {reply, Id, State}. + {reply, Id, State}; +handle_call({{register_session, Host, Port, Session},_}, _, State0) -> + State = client_register_session(Host, Port, Session, State0), + {reply, ok, State}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec handle_cast(msg(), #state{}) -> {noreply, #state{}}. @@ -305,8 +318,12 @@ handle_call({{new_session_id, Port}, _}, %% %% Description: Handling cast messages %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handle_cast({register_session, Host, Port, Session}, State0) -> - State = ssl_client_register_session(Host, Port, Session, State0), +handle_cast({register_session, Host, Port, Session, unique}, State0) -> + State = client_register_unique_session(Host, Port, Session, State0), + {noreply, State}; + +handle_cast({register_session, Host, Port, Session, true}, State0) -> + State = client_register_session(Host, Port, Session, State0), {noreply, State}; handle_cast({register_session, Port, Session}, State0) -> @@ -534,10 +551,10 @@ clean_cert_db(Ref, CertDb, RefDb, FileMapDb, File) -> ok end. -ssl_client_register_session(Host, Port, Session, #state{session_cache_client = Cache, - session_cache_cb = CacheCb, - session_cache_client_max = Max, - session_client_invalidator = Pid0} = State) -> +client_register_unique_session(Host, Port, Session, #state{session_cache_client = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb, + session_cache_client_max = Max, + session_client_invalidator = Pid0} = State) -> TimeStamp = erlang:monotonic_time(), NewSession = Session#session{time_stamp = TimeStamp}, @@ -551,6 +568,17 @@ ssl_client_register_session(Host, Port, Session, #state{session_cache_client = C register_unique_session(Sessions, NewSession, {Host, Port}, State) end. +client_register_session(Host, Port, Session, #state{session_cache_client = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb, + session_cache_client_max = Max, + session_client_invalidator = Pid0} = State) -> + TimeStamp = erlang:monotonic_time(), + NewSession = Session#session{time_stamp = TimeStamp}, + Pid = do_register_session({{Host, Port}, + NewSession#session.session_id}, + NewSession, Max, Pid0, Cache, CacheCb), + State#state{session_client_invalidator = Pid}. + server_register_session(Port, Session, #state{session_cache_server_max = Max, session_cache_server = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pem_cache.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pem_cache.erl index 115ab4451d..41bca2f7b5 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pem_cache.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pem_cache.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 20016-2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 20016-2018. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ -export([start_link/1, start_link_dist/1, name/1, - insert/1, + insert/2, clear/0]). % Spawn export @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ -record(state, { pem_cache, - last_pem_check :: erlang:timestamp(), + last_pem_check :: integer(), clear :: integer() }). @@ -90,19 +90,17 @@ start_link_dist(_) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec insert(binary()) -> {ok, term()} | {error, reason()}. +-spec insert(binary(), term()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Cache a pem file and return its content. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -insert(File) -> - {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file(File), - Content = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin), +insert(File, Content) -> case bypass_cache() of true -> - {ok, Content}; + ok; false -> cast({cache_pem, File, Content}), - {ok, Content} + ok end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -136,8 +134,9 @@ init([Name]) -> PemCache = ssl_pkix_db:create_pem_cache(Name), Interval = pem_check_interval(), erlang:send_after(Interval, self(), clear_pem_cache), + erlang:system_time(second), {ok, #state{pem_cache = PemCache, - last_pem_check = os:timestamp(), + last_pem_check = erlang:convert_time_unit(os:system_time(), native, second), clear = Interval }}. @@ -185,7 +184,7 @@ handle_cast({invalidate_pem, File}, #state{pem_cache = Db} = State) -> handle_info(clear_pem_cache, #state{pem_cache = PemCache, clear = Interval, last_pem_check = CheckPoint} = State) -> - NewCheckPoint = os:timestamp(), + NewCheckPoint = erlang:convert_time_unit(os:system_time(), native, second), start_pem_cache_validator(PemCache, CheckPoint), erlang:send_after(Interval, self(), clear_pem_cache), {noreply, State#state{last_pem_check = NewCheckPoint}}; @@ -231,24 +230,14 @@ init_pem_cache_validator([CacheName, PemCache, CheckPoint]) -> CheckPoint, PemCache). pem_cache_validate({File, _}, CheckPoint) -> - case file:read_file_info(File, []) of - {ok, #file_info{mtime = Time}} -> - case is_before_checkpoint(Time, CheckPoint) of - true -> - ok; - false -> - invalidate_pem(File) - end; + case file:read_file_info(File, [{time, posix}]) of + {ok, #file_info{mtime = Time}} when Time < CheckPoint -> + ok; _ -> invalidate_pem(File) end, CheckPoint. -is_before_checkpoint(Time, CheckPoint) -> - calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds( - calendar:now_to_datetime(CheckPoint)) - - calendar:datetime_to_gregorian_seconds(Time) > 0. - pem_check_interval() -> case application:get_env(ssl, ssl_pem_cache_clean) of {ok, Interval} when is_integer(Interval) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl index 8828c3a0d8..f7ddbd060e 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ extract_trusted_certs(File) -> {error, {badmatch, Error}} end. --spec decode_pem_file(binary()) -> {ok, term()}. +-spec decode_pem_file(binary()) -> {ok, term()} | {error, term()}. decode_pem_file(File) -> case file:read_file(File) of {ok, PemBin} -> @@ -316,11 +316,16 @@ decode_certs(Ref, Cert) -> end. new_trusted_cert_entry(File, [CertsDb, RefsDb, _ | _]) -> - Ref = make_ref(), - init_ref_db(Ref, File, RefsDb), - {ok, Content} = ssl_pem_cache:insert(File), - add_certs_from_pem(Content, Ref, CertsDb), - {ok, Ref}. + case decode_pem_file(File) of + {ok, Content} -> + Ref = make_ref(), + init_ref_db(Ref, File, RefsDb), + ok = ssl_pem_cache:insert(File, Content), + add_certs_from_pem(Content, Ref, CertsDb), + {ok, Ref}; + Error -> + Error + end. add_crls([_,_,_, {_, Mapping} | _], ?NO_DIST_POINT, CRLs) -> [add_crls(CRL, Mapping) || CRL <- CRLs]; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl index 659e1485ac..1a36b2dba8 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2019. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -45,14 +45,16 @@ -export([compress/3, uncompress/3, compressions/0]). %% Payload encryption/decryption --export([cipher/4, decipher/4, cipher_aead/4, is_correct_mac/2]). +-export([cipher/4, cipher/5, decipher/4, + cipher_aead/4, cipher_aead/5, decipher_aead/5, + is_correct_mac/2, nonce_seed/3]). -export_type([ssl_version/0, ssl_atom_version/0, connection_states/0, connection_state/0]). -type ssl_version() :: {integer(), integer()}. -type ssl_atom_version() :: tls_record:tls_atom_version(). --type connection_states() :: term(). %% Map --type connection_state() :: term(). %% Map +-type connection_states() :: map(). %% Map +-type connection_state() :: map(). %% Map %%==================================================================== %% Connection state handling @@ -302,29 +304,49 @@ cipher(Version, Fragment, #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = BulkCipherAlgo} } = WriteState0, MacHash) -> - + %% {CipherFragment, CipherS1} = ssl_cipher:cipher(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, MacHash, Fragment, Version), {CipherFragment, WriteState0#{cipher_state => CipherS1}}. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec cipher(ssl_version(), iodata(), #cipher_state{}, MacHash::binary(), #security_parameters{}) -> + {CipherFragment::binary(), #cipher_state{}}. +%% +%% Description: Payload encryption +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +cipher(Version, Fragment, CipherS0, MacHash, + #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = BulkCipherAlgo}) -> + %% + ssl_cipher:cipher(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, MacHash, Fragment, Version). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec cipher_aead(ssl_version(), iodata(), connection_state(), AAD::binary()) -> + {CipherFragment::binary(), connection_state()}. + +%% Description: Payload encryption %% %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -spec cipher_aead(ssl_version(), iodata(), connection_state(), MacHash::binary()) -> -%% {CipherFragment::binary(), connection_state()}. -%% %% -%% %% Description: Payload encryption -%% %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -cipher_aead(Version, Fragment, +cipher_aead(_Version, Fragment, #{cipher_state := CipherS0, - sequence_number := SeqNo, security_parameters := #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = BulkCipherAlgo} } = WriteState0, AAD) -> - {CipherFragment, CipherS1} = - ssl_cipher:cipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version), + do_cipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, Fragment, CipherS0, AAD), {CipherFragment, WriteState0#{cipher_state => CipherS1}}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec cipher_aead(ssl_version(), iodata(), #cipher_state{}, AAD::binary(), #security_parameters{}) -> + {CipherFragment::binary(), #cipher_state{}}. + +%% Description: Payload encryption +%% %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +cipher_aead(_Version, Fragment, CipherS, AAD, + #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = BulkCipherAlgo}) -> + do_cipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, Fragment, CipherS, AAD). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decipher(ssl_version(), binary(), connection_state(), boolean()) -> {binary(), binary(), connection_state()} | #alert{}. %% @@ -344,10 +366,38 @@ decipher(Version, CipherFragment, #alert{} = Alert -> Alert end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decipher_aead(ssl_cipher:cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, binary(), binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + binary() | #alert{}. +%% +%% Description: Decrypts the data and checks the associated data (AAD) MAC using +%% cipher described by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state. +%% Use for suites that use authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) +%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +decipher_aead(Type, #cipher_state{key = Key} = CipherState, AAD0, CipherFragment, _) -> + try + Nonce = decrypt_nonce(Type, CipherState, CipherFragment), + {AAD, CipherText, CipherTag} = aead_ciphertext_split(Type, CipherState, CipherFragment, AAD0), + case ssl_cipher:aead_decrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, CipherText, CipherTag, AAD) of + Content when is_binary(Content) -> + Content; + _ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) + end + catch + _:_ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) + end. + +nonce_seed(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, Seed, CipherState) -> + ssl_cipher:nonce_seed(Seed, CipherState); +nonce_seed(_,_, CipherState) -> + CipherState. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> SecParams = empty_security_params(ConnectionEnd), #{security_parameters => SecParams, @@ -372,11 +422,13 @@ random() -> Random_28_bytes = ssl_cipher:random_bytes(28), <<?UINT32(Secs_since_1970), Random_28_bytes/binary>>. +-compile({inline, [is_correct_mac/2]}). is_correct_mac(Mac, Mac) -> true; is_correct_mac(_M,_H) -> false. +-compile({inline, [record_protocol_role/1]}). record_protocol_role(client) -> ?CLIENT; record_protocol_role(server) -> @@ -400,3 +452,36 @@ initial_security_params(ConnectionEnd) -> compression_algorithm = ?NULL}, ssl_cipher:security_parameters(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, SecParams). +-define(end_additional_data(AAD, Len), << (begin(AAD)end)/binary, ?UINT16(begin(Len)end) >>). + +do_cipher_aead(?CHACHA20_POLY1305 = Type, Fragment, #cipher_state{key=Key} = CipherState, AAD0) -> + AAD = ?end_additional_data(AAD0, erlang:iolist_size(Fragment)), + Nonce = encrypt_nonce(Type, CipherState), + {Content, CipherTag} = ssl_cipher:aead_encrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, Fragment, AAD), + {<<Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>, CipherState}; +do_cipher_aead(Type, Fragment, #cipher_state{key=Key, nonce = ExplicitNonce} = CipherState, AAD0) -> + AAD = ?end_additional_data(AAD0, erlang:iolist_size(Fragment)), + Nonce = encrypt_nonce(Type, CipherState), + {Content, CipherTag} = ssl_cipher:aead_encrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, Fragment, AAD), + {<<ExplicitNonce:64/integer, Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>, CipherState#cipher_state{nonce = ExplicitNonce + 1}}. + +encrypt_nonce(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, #cipher_state{nonce = Nonce, iv = IV}) -> + crypto:exor(<<?UINT32(0), Nonce/binary>>, IV); +encrypt_nonce(?AES_GCM, #cipher_state{iv = IV, nonce = ExplicitNonce}) -> + <<Salt:4/bytes, _/binary>> = IV, + <<Salt/binary, ExplicitNonce:64/integer>>. + +decrypt_nonce(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, #cipher_state{nonce = Nonce, iv = IV}, _) -> + crypto:exor(<<Nonce:96/unsigned-big-integer>>, IV); +decrypt_nonce(?AES_GCM, #cipher_state{iv = <<Salt:4/bytes, _/binary>>}, <<ExplicitNonce:8/bytes, _/binary>>) -> + <<Salt/binary, ExplicitNonce/binary>>. + +-compile({inline, [aead_ciphertext_split/4]}). +aead_ciphertext_split(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, #cipher_state{tag_len = Len}, CipherTextFragment, AAD) -> + CipherLen = byte_size(CipherTextFragment) - Len, + <<CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:Len/bytes>> = CipherTextFragment, + {?end_additional_data(AAD, CipherLen), CipherText, CipherTag}; +aead_ciphertext_split(?AES_GCM, #cipher_state{tag_len = Len}, CipherTextFragment, AAD) -> + CipherLen = byte_size(CipherTextFragment) - (Len + 8), %% 8 is length of explicit Nonce + << _:8/bytes, CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:Len/bytes>> = CipherTextFragment, + {?end_additional_data(AAD, CipherLen), CipherText, CipherTag}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl index ed007f58d7..a927fba0de 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2019. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ -define(ALERT, 21). -define(HANDSHAKE, 22). -define(APPLICATION_DATA, 23). +-define(KNOWN_RECORD_TYPE(Type), + (is_integer(Type) andalso (20 =< (Type)) andalso ((Type) =< 23))). -define(MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, 16384). -define(MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, (?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH+1024)). -define(MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH, (?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH+2048)). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session.erl index c9607489e9..44305c65fe 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session.erl @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ -include("ssl_handshake.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include("ssl_api.hrl"). %% Internal application API -export([is_new/2, client_id/4, server_id/6, valid_session/2]). @@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ -type seconds() :: integer(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec is_new(session_id(), session_id()) -> boolean(). +-spec is_new(ssl:session_id(), ssl:session_id()) -> boolean(). %% %% Description: Checks if the session id decided by the server is a %% new or resumed sesion id. @@ -47,12 +48,19 @@ is_new(_ClientSuggestion, _ServerDecision) -> true. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec client_id({host(), inet:port_number(), #ssl_options{}}, db_handle(), atom(), +-spec client_id({ssl:host(), inet:port_number(), #ssl_options{}}, db_handle(), atom(), undefined | binary()) -> binary(). %% %% Description: Should be called by the client side to get an id %% for the client hello message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +client_id({Host, Port, #ssl_options{reuse_session = SessionId}}, Cache, CacheCb, _) when is_binary(SessionId)-> + case CacheCb:lookup(Cache, {{Host, Port}, SessionId}) of + undefined -> + <<>>; + #session{} -> + SessionId + end; client_id(ClientInfo, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert) -> case select_session(ClientInfo, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert) of no_session -> @@ -91,7 +99,8 @@ server_id(Port, SuggestedId, Options, Cert, Cache, CacheCb) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_session({_, _, #ssl_options{reuse_sessions=false}}, _Cache, _CacheCb, _OwnCert) -> +select_session({_, _, #ssl_options{reuse_sessions = Reuse}}, _Cache, _CacheCb, _OwnCert) when Reuse =/= true -> + %% If reuse_sessions == true | save a new session should be created no_session; select_session({HostIP, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert) -> Sessions = CacheCb:select_session(Cache, {HostIP, Port}), @@ -132,7 +141,7 @@ is_resumable(SuggestedSessionId, Port, #ssl_options{reuse_session = ReuseFun} = false -> {false, undefined} end; undefined -> - {false, undefined} + {false, undefined} end. resumable(new) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session_cache_api.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session_cache_api.erl index b68c75a09b..5f96f905b1 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session_cache_api.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_session_cache_api.erl @@ -23,14 +23,20 @@ -module(ssl_session_cache_api). -include("ssl_handshake.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include("ssl_api.hrl"). --type key() :: {{host(), inet:port_number()}, session_id()} | {inet:port_number(), session_id()}. +-export_type([session_cache_key/0, session/0, partial_key/0, session_cache_ref/0]). --callback init(list()) -> db_handle(). --callback terminate(db_handle()) -> any(). --callback lookup(db_handle(), key()) -> #session{} | undefined. --callback update(db_handle(), key(), #session{}) -> any(). --callback delete(db_handle(), key()) -> any(). --callback foldl(fun(), term(), db_handle()) -> term(). --callback select_session(db_handle(), {host(), inet:port_number()} | inet:port_number()) -> [#session{}]. --callback size(db_handle()) -> integer(). +-type session_cache_ref() :: any(). +-type session_cache_key() :: {partial_key(), ssl:session_id()}. +-opaque session() :: #session{}. +-opaque partial_key() :: {ssl:host(), inet:port_number()} | inet:port_number(). + +-callback init(list()) -> session_cache_ref(). +-callback terminate(session_cache_ref()) -> any(). +-callback lookup(session_cache_ref(), session_cache_key()) -> #session{} | undefined. +-callback update(session_cache_ref(), session_cache_key(), #session{}) -> any(). +-callback delete(session_cache_ref(), session_cache_key()) -> any(). +-callback foldl(fun(), term(), session_cache_ref()) -> term(). +-callback select_session(session_cache_ref(), {ssl:host(), inet:port_number()} | inet:port_number()) -> [#session{}]. +-callback size(session_cache_ref()) -> integer(). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v3.erl index 82d165f995..4eab60b440 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v3.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_v3.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ setup_keys(MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HS, KML, _EKML, IVS) -> {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}. --spec suites() -> [ssl_cipher:cipher_suite()]. +-spec suites() -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. suites() -> [ diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls.erl deleted file mode 100644 index aa41cd1ba6..0000000000 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls.erl +++ /dev/null @@ -1,112 +0,0 @@ -%% -%% %CopyrightBegin% -%% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2016. All Rights Reserved. -%% -%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); -%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. -%% You may obtain a copy of the License at -%% -%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 -%% -%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software -%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, -%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. -%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and -%% limitations under the License. -%% -%% %CopyrightEnd% -%% - -%% - -%%% Purpose : Reflect TLS specific API options (fairly simple wrapper at the moment) - --module(tls). - --include("ssl_api.hrl"). --include("ssl_internal.hrl"). - --export([connect/2, connect/3, listen/2, accept/1, accept/2, - handshake/1, handshake/2, handshake/3]). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -%% Description: Connect to an TLS server. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - --spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()]) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | - {error, reason()}. - -connect(Socket, Options) when is_port(Socket) -> - connect(Socket, Options, infinity). - --spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()] | inet:port_number(), - timeout() | list()) -> - {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - -connect(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket) -> - TLSOpts = [{protocol, tls} | SslOptions], - ssl:connect(Socket, TLSOpts, Timeout); -connect(Host, Port, Options) -> - connect(Host, Port, Options, infinity). - --spec connect(host() | port(), inet:port_number(), list(), timeout()) -> - {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - -connect(Host, Port, Options, Timeout) -> - TLSOpts = [{protocol, tls} | Options], - ssl:connect(Host, Port, TLSOpts, Timeout). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec listen(inet:port_number(), [listen_option()]) ->{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - -%% -%% Description: Creates an ssl listen socket. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -listen(Port, Options) -> - TLSOpts = [{protocol, tls} | Options], - ssl:listen(Port, TLSOpts). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -%% Description: Performs transport accept on an ssl listen socket -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec accept(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | - {error, reason()}. -accept(ListenSocket) -> - accept(ListenSocket, infinity). - --spec accept(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | - {error, reason()}. -accept(Socket, Timeout) -> - ssl:transport_accept(Socket, Timeout). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -%% Description: Performs accept on an ssl listen socket. e.i. performs -%% ssl handshake. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - --spec handshake(#sslsocket{}) -> ok | {error, reason()}. - -handshake(ListenSocket) -> - handshake(ListenSocket, infinity). - - --spec handshake(#sslsocket{} | port(), timeout()| [ssl_option() - | transport_option()]) -> - ok | {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - -handshake(#sslsocket{} = Socket, Timeout) -> - ssl:ssl_accept(Socket, Timeout); - -handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions) when is_port(ListenSocket) -> - handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions, infinity). - - --spec handshake(port(), [ssl_option()| transport_option()], timeout()) -> - {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. - -handshake(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) when is_port(Socket) -> - ssl:ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl index a3002830d1..55ab9ff54a 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2019. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ %% %% %CopyrightEnd% %% - %% %%---------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Purpose: Handles an ssl connection, e.i. both the setup @@ -43,30 +42,36 @@ %% Internal application API %% Setup --export([start_fsm/8, start_link/7, init/1]). +-export([start_fsm/8, start_link/8, init/1, pids/1]). %% State transition handling --export([next_record/1, next_event/3, next_event/4, handle_common_event/4]). +-export([next_event/3, next_event/4, + handle_protocol_record/3]). %% Handshake handling --export([renegotiate/2, send_handshake/2, +-export([renegotiation/2, renegotiate/2, send_handshake/2, queue_handshake/2, queue_change_cipher/2, - reinit_handshake_data/1, select_sni_extension/1, empty_connection_state/2]). + reinit/1, reinit_handshake_data/1, select_sni_extension/1, + empty_connection_state/2]). %% Alert and close handling --export([encode_alert/3, send_alert/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). +-export([send_alert/2, send_alert_in_connection/2, + send_sync_alert/2, + close/5, protocol_name/0]). %% Data handling --export([encode_data/3, passive_receive/2, next_record_if_active/1, send/3, - socket/5, setopts/3, getopts/3]). +-export([socket/4, setopts/3, getopts/3]). %% gen_statem state functions -export([init/3, error/3, downgrade/3, %% Initiation and take down states hello/3, user_hello/3, certify/3, cipher/3, abbreviated/3, %% Handshake states - connection/3, death_row/3]). + connection/3]). %% gen_statem callbacks -export([callback_mode/0, terminate/3, code_change/4, format_status/2]). + +-define(DIST_CNTRL_SPAWN_OPTS, [{priority, max}]). + %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API %%==================================================================== @@ -74,12 +79,13 @@ %% Setup %%==================================================================== start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} = Opts, - User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, + User, {CbModule, _,_, _, _} = CbInfo, Timeout) -> try - {ok, Pid} = tls_connection_sup:start_child([Role, Host, Port, Socket, + {ok, Sender} = tls_sender:start(), + {ok, Pid} = tls_connection_sup:start_child([Role, Sender, Host, Port, Socket, Opts, User, CbInfo]), - {ok, SslSocket} = ssl_connection:socket_control(?MODULE, Socket, Pid, CbModule, Tracker), + {ok, SslSocket} = ssl_connection:socket_control(?MODULE, Socket, [Pid, Sender], CbModule, Tracker), ssl_connection:handshake(SslSocket, Timeout) catch error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} -> @@ -87,12 +93,13 @@ start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} end; start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = true},_, Tracker} = Opts, - User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, + User, {CbModule, _,_, _, _} = CbInfo, Timeout) -> try - {ok, Pid} = tls_connection_sup:start_child_dist([Role, Host, Port, Socket, + {ok, Sender} = tls_sender:start([{spawn_opt, ?DIST_CNTRL_SPAWN_OPTS}]), + {ok, Pid} = tls_connection_sup:start_child_dist([Role, Sender, Host, Port, Socket, Opts, User, CbInfo]), - {ok, SslSocket} = ssl_connection:socket_control(?MODULE, Socket, Pid, CbModule, Tracker), + {ok, SslSocket} = ssl_connection:socket_control(?MODULE, Socket, [Pid, Sender], CbModule, Tracker), ssl_connection:handshake(SslSocket, Timeout) catch error:{badmatch, {error, _} = Error} -> @@ -100,120 +107,203 @@ start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = true},_, Tracker} = end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> +-spec start_link(atom(), pid(), ssl:host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, reason()}. %% %% Description: Creates a gen_statem process which calls Module:init/1 to %% initialize. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) -> - {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}. +start_link(Role, Sender, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) -> + {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Sender, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}. -init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]) -> +init([Role, Sender, Host, Port, Socket, {SslOpts, _, _} = Options, User, CbInfo]) -> process_flag(trap_exit, true), - State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), + link(Sender), + case SslOpts#ssl_options.erl_dist of + true -> + process_flag(priority, max); + _ -> + ok + end, + State0 = #state{protocol_specific = Map} = initial_state(Role, Sender, + Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), try State = ssl_connection:ssl_config(State0#state.ssl_options, Role, State0), - gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], init, State) + initialize_tls_sender(State), + gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], init, State) catch throw:Error -> - gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error, State0}) + EState = State0#state{protocol_specific = Map#{error => Error}}, + gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, EState) end. + +pids(#state{protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}}) -> + [self(), Sender]. + %%==================================================================== %% State transition handling %%==================================================================== -next_record(#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = State) when N > 0 -> - {no_record, State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}; - -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest]} - = Buffers, - connection_states = ConnStates0, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) -> - case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0, Check) of - {Plain, ConnStates} -> - {Plain, State#state{protocol_buffers = - Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = Rest}, - connection_states = ConnStates}}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - {Alert, State} - end; -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = []}, - socket = Socket, - close_tag = CloseTag, - transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> - case tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]) of - ok -> - {no_record, State}; - _ -> +next_record(_, #state{handshake_env = + #handshake_env{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = HsEnv} + = State) when N > 0 -> + {no_record, State#state{handshake_env = + HsEnv#handshake_env{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}}; +next_record(_, #state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = [_|_] = CipherTexts}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) -> + next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Check); +next_record(connection, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = []}, + protocol_specific = #{active_n_toggle := true} + } = State) -> + %% If ssl application user is not reading data wait to activate socket + flow_ctrl(State); + +next_record(_, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = []}, + protocol_specific = #{active_n_toggle := true} + } = State) -> + activate_socket(State); +next_record(_, State) -> + {no_record, State}. + + +flow_ctrl(#state{user_data_buffer = {_,Size,_}, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}, + bytes_to_read = undefined} = State) when Size =/= 0 -> + {no_record, State}; +flow_ctrl(#state{user_data_buffer = {_,Size,_}, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}, + bytes_to_read = 0} = State) when Size =/= 0 -> + {no_record, State}; +flow_ctrl(#state{user_data_buffer = {_,Size,_}, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}, + bytes_to_read = BytesToRead} = State) when (Size >= BytesToRead) andalso + (BytesToRead > 0) -> + {no_record, State}; +flow_ctrl(State) -> + activate_socket(State). + + +activate_socket(#state{protocol_specific = #{active_n_toggle := true, active_n := N} = ProtocolSpec, + static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + close_tag = CloseTag, + transport_cb = Transport} + } = State) -> + case tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, N}]) of + ok -> + {no_record, State#state{protocol_specific = ProtocolSpec#{active_n_toggle => false}}}; + _ -> self() ! {CloseTag, Socket}, - {no_record, State} + {no_record, State} + end. + +%% Decipher next record and concatenate consecutive ?APPLICATION_DATA records into one +%% +next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Check) -> + next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Check, []). +%% +next_record(State, [#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA} = CT|CipherTexts], ConnectionStates0, Check, Acc) -> + case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnectionStates0, Check) of + {#ssl_tls{fragment = Fragment}, ConnectionStates} -> + next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Check, [Fragment|Acc]); + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert end; -next_record(State) -> - {no_record, State}. +next_record(State, [CT|CipherTexts], ConnectionStates0, Check, []) -> + case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnectionStates0, Check) of + {Record, ConnectionStates} -> + next_record_done(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Record); + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert + end; +next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, _Check, Acc) -> + %% Not ?APPLICATION_DATA but we have a nonempty Acc + %% -> build an ?APPLICATION_DATA record with the accumulated fragments + next_record_done(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, + #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = iolist_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc))}). + +next_record_done(#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers} = State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Record) -> + {Record, + State#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = CipherTexts}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates}}. next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). - -next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) -> - case next_record_if_active(State0) of - {no_record, State} -> +%% +next_event(StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) -> + case next_record(StateName, State0) of + {no_record, State} -> ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); - {#ssl_tls{} = Record, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} + {Record, State} -> + next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions) end; -next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions) -> - case Record of - no_record -> - {next_state, StateName, State, Actions}; - #ssl_tls{} = Record -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} - end. +next_event(StateName, #ssl_tls{} = Record, State, Actions) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; +next_event(StateName, #alert{} = Alert, State, Actions) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]}. + -handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State); +%%% TLS record protocol level application data messages +handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, + #state{start_or_recv_from = From, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}} = State0) when From =/= undefined -> + case ssl_connection:read_application_data(Data, State0) of + {stop, _, _} = Stop-> + Stop; + {Record, #state{start_or_recv_from = Caller} = State1} -> + TimerAction = case Caller of + undefined -> %% Passive recv complete cancel timer + [{{timeout, recv}, infinity, timeout}]; + _ -> + [] + end, + {next_state, StateName, State, Actions} = next_event(StateName, Record, State1, TimerAction), + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions) + end; +handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State0) -> + case ssl_connection:read_application_data(Data, State0) of + {stop, _, _} = Stop-> + Stop; + {Record, State1} -> + {next_state, StateName, State, Actions} = next_event(StateName, Record, State1), + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions) + end; %%% TLS record protocol level handshake messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, +handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf0} = Buffers, - negotiated_version = Version, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> try {Packets, Buf} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version,Data,Buf0, Options), - State1 = + State = State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf}}, case Packets of [] -> assert_buffer_sanity(Buf, Options), - {Record, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, Record, State); + next_event(StateName, no_record, State); _ -> Events = tls_handshake_events(Packets), case StateName of connection -> - ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State1, Events); + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Events); _ -> + HsEnv = State#state.handshake_env, {next_state, StateName, - State1#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}, Events} + State#state{handshake_env = + HsEnv#handshake_env{unprocessed_handshake_events + = unprocessed_events(Events)}}, Events} end end catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0) end; -%%% TLS record protocol level application data messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {application_data, Data}}]}; %%% TLS record protocol level change cipher messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> +handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = Data}}]}; %%% TLS record protocol level Alert messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> +handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> try decode_alerts(EncAlerts) of Alerts = [_|_] -> handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, StateName, State}); @@ -229,70 +319,79 @@ handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, Sta end; %% Ignore unknown TLS record level protocol messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State}. +handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, []}. %%==================================================================== %% Handshake handling %%==================================================================== -renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State, Actions) -> +renegotiation(Pid, WriteState) -> + gen_statem:call(Pid, {user_renegotiate, WriteState}). + +renegotiate(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = HsEnv} = State, Actions) -> %% Handle same way as if server requested %% the renegotiation Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), - {next_state, connection, State#state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0}, + {next_state, connection, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hs0}}, [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]}; - -renegotiate(#state{role = server, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - negotiated_version = Version, +renegotiate(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}, + handshake_env = HsEnv, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Actions) -> HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(), Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version), Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0), - send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), - State1 = State0#state{connection_states = + tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - tls_handshake_history = Hs0}, - {Record, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions). + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hs0}}, + next_event(hello, no_record, State, Actions). send_handshake(Handshake, State) -> send_handshake_flight(queue_handshake(Handshake, State)). -queue_handshake(Handshake, #state{negotiated_version = Version, - tls_handshake_history = Hist0, - flight_buffer = Flight0, +queue_handshake(Handshake, #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist0} = HsEnv, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + flight_buffer = Flight0, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> {BinHandshake, ConnectionStates, Hist} = encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hist0), State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - tls_handshake_history = Hist, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist}, flight_buffer = Flight0 ++ [BinHandshake]}. -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, +send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}, flight_buffer = Flight} = State0) -> - send(Transport, Socket, Flight), + tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Flight), {State0#state{flight_buffer = []}, []}. -queue_change_cipher(Msg, #state{negotiated_version = Version, - flight_buffer = Flight0, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> +queue_change_cipher(Msg, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + flight_buffer = Flight0, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> {BinChangeCipher, ConnectionStates} = encode_change_cipher(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0), State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, flight_buffer = Flight0 ++ [BinChangeCipher]}. -reinit_handshake_data(State) -> +reinit(#state{protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + connection_states = #{current_write := Write}} = State) -> + tls_sender:update_connection_state(Sender, Write, Version), + reinit_handshake_data(State). + +reinit_handshake_data(#state{handshake_env = HsEnv} =State) -> %% premaster_secret, public_key_info and tls_handshake_info %% are only needed during the handshake phase. %% To reduce memory foot print of a connection reinitialize them. State#state{ - premaster_secret = undefined, - public_key_info = undefined, - tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history() + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), + public_key_info = undefined, + premaster_secret = undefined} }. select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = HelloExtensions}) -> @@ -306,15 +405,6 @@ empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> %%==================================================================== %% Alert and close handling %%==================================================================== -send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> - {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = - encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), - send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), - State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec encode_alert(#alert{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. @@ -323,6 +413,36 @@ send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) -> tls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates). + +send_alert(Alert, #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = StateData0) -> + {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = + encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), + tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + StateData0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. + +%% If an ALERT sent in the connection state, should cause the TLS +%% connection to end, we need to synchronize with the tls_sender +%% process so that the ALERT if possible (that is the tls_sender process is +%% not blocked) is sent before the connection process terminates and +%% thereby closes the transport socket. +send_alert_in_connection(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, State) -> + send_sync_alert(Alert, State); +send_alert_in_connection(#alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, State) -> + send_sync_alert(Alert, State); +send_alert_in_connection(Alert, + #state{protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}}) -> + tls_sender:send_alert(Sender, Alert). +send_sync_alert( + Alert, #state{protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}} = State) -> + try tls_sender:send_and_ack_alert(Sender, Alert) + catch + _:_ -> + throw({stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State}) + end. + %% User closes or recursive call! close({close, Timeout}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, _,_) -> tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]), @@ -354,31 +474,9 @@ protocol_name() -> %%==================================================================== %% Data handling %%==================================================================== -encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> - tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0). - -passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) -> - case Buffer of - <<>> -> - {Record, State} = next_record(State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - _ -> - {Record, State} = ssl_connection:read_application_data(<<>>, State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State) - end. -next_record_if_active(State = - #state{socket_options = - #socket_options{active = false}}) -> - {no_record ,State}; -next_record_if_active(State) -> - next_record(State). - -send(Transport, Socket, Data) -> - tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Data). - -socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker) -> - tls_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker). +socket(Pids, Transport, Socket, Tracker) -> + tls_socket:socket(Pids, Transport, Socket, ?MODULE, Tracker). setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) -> tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, Other). @@ -396,16 +494,19 @@ getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, - #state{host = Host, port = Port, role = client, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client, + host = Host, + port = Port, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = HsEnv, + connection_env = CEnv, ssl_options = SslOpts, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, - transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, - session_cache = Cache, - session_cache_cb = CacheCb + connection_states = ConnectionStates0 } = State0) -> - Timer = ssl_connection:start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, From), Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), @@ -414,16 +515,14 @@ init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, Handshake0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Hello, HelloVersion, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), - send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), - State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - negotiated_version = Version, %% Requested version - session = - Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}, - tls_handshake_history = Handshake, - start_or_recv_from = From, - timer = Timer}, - {Record, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(hello, Record, State); + tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, %% Requested version + session = + Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Handshake}, + start_or_recv_from = From}, + next_event(hello, no_record, State, [{{timeout, handshake}, Timeout, close}]); init(Type, Event, State) -> gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). @@ -432,17 +531,13 @@ init(Type, Event, State) -> {start, timeout()} | term(), #state{}) -> gen_statem:state_function_result(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - -error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, {Error, State}) -> - ssl_connection:stop_and_reply( - normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State); error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, #state{protocol_specific = #{error := Error}} = State) -> - ssl_connection:stop_and_reply( - normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State); -error({call, _} = Call, Msg, {Error, #state{protocol_specific = Map} = State}) -> - gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Call, Msg, - State#state{protocol_specific = Map#{error => Error}}); + {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, normal}, + [{reply, From, {error, Error}}], State}; + +error({call, _} = Call, Msg, State) -> + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Call, Msg, State); error(_, _, _) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. @@ -452,29 +547,38 @@ error(_, _, _) -> #state{}) -> gen_statem:state_function_result(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -hello(internal, #client_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, - start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> - {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, - hello = Hello}, +hello(internal, #client_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, + #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, + handshake_env = HsEnv, + start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> + {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{hello = Hello}}, [{reply, From, {ok, ssl_connection:map_extensions(Extensions)}}]}; -hello(internal, #server_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, - start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> +hello(internal, #server_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, + #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, + handshake_env = HsEnv, + start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, - hello = Hello}, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{hello = Hello}}, [{reply, From, {ok, ssl_connection:map_extensions(Extensions)}}]}; hello(internal, #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, - renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, - session_cache = Cache, - session_cache_cb = CacheCb, - negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol, - key_algorithm = KeyExAlg, + static_env = #static_env{ + port = Port, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KeyExAlg, + renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, + negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol} = HsEnv, + connection_env = CEnv, + session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert, KeyExAlg}, Renegotiation) of #alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State); + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, + State#state{connection_env = + CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = ClientVersion}}); {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, Protocol0, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} -> Protocol = case Protocol0 of @@ -483,21 +587,24 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, end, gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - negotiated_version = Version, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, - client_hello_version = ClientVersion, - session = Session, - negotiated_protocol = Protocol}) + connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{ + hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, + client_hello_version = ClientVersion, + negotiated_protocol = Protocol}, + session = Session + }) end; hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - negotiated_version = ReqVersion, - role = client, - renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = ReqVersion} = CEnv, + static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}}, ssl_options = SslOptions} = State) -> case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOptions, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, hello, State); + #alert{} = Alert -> %%TODO + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, hello, + State#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = ReqVersion}}); {Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} -> ssl_connection:handle_session(Hello, Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol, State) @@ -544,63 +651,143 @@ cipher(Type, Event, State) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- connection(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +connection({call, From}, {user_renegotiate, WriteState}, + #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> + {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates#{current_write => WriteState}}, + [{next_event,{call, From}, renegotiate}]}; +connection({call, From}, + {close, {Pid, _Timeout}}, + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{terminated = closed} =CEnv} = State) -> + {next_state, downgrade, State#state{connection_env = + CEnv#connection_env{terminated = true, + downgrade = {Pid, From}}}, + [{next_event, internal, ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY)}]}; +connection({call, From}, + {close,{Pid, Timeout}}, + #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}, + connection_env = CEnv + } = State0) -> + case tls_sender:downgrade(Sender, Timeout) of + {ok, Write} -> + %% User downgrades connection + %% When downgrading an TLS connection to a transport connection + %% we must recive the close alert from the peer before releasing the + %% transport socket. + State = send_alert(?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), + State0#state{connection_states = + ConnectionStates#{current_write => Write}}), + {next_state, downgrade, State#state{connection_env = + CEnv#connection_env{downgrade = {Pid, From}, + terminated = true}}, + [{timeout, Timeout, downgrade}]}; + {error, timeout} -> + {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, downgrade_fail}, [{reply, From, {error, timeout}}]} + end; connection(internal, #hello_request{}, - #state{role = client, host = Host, port = Port, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client, + host = Host, + port = Port, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {Renegotiation, peer}}, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, - session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb, - ssl_options = SslOpts, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}} = State0) -> - Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, - Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), - {State1, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State0), - {Record, State} = - next_record( - State1#state{session = Session0#session{session_id - = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}), - next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions); + ssl_options = SslOpts, + protocol_specific = #{sender := Pid}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State0) -> + try tls_sender:peer_renegotiate(Pid) of + {ok, Write} -> + Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, SslOpts, + Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), + {State, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates#{current_write => Write}}), + next_event(hello, no_record, State#state{session = Session0#session{session_id + = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}, Actions) + catch + _:_ -> + {stop, {shutdown, sender_blocked}, State0} + end; +connection(internal, #hello_request{}, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client, + host = Host, + port = Port, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}}, + session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, + ssl_options = SslOpts, + connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State0) -> + Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, SslOpts, + Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), + {State, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State0), + next_event(hello, no_record, State#state{session = Session0#session{session_id + = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}, Actions); connection(internal, #client_hello{} = Hello, - #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = true} = State0) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{allow_renegotiate = true}= HsEnv, + connection_states = CS, + protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender} + } = State) -> %% Mitigate Computational DoS attack %% http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2011/10/ssltls_and_computational_dos.html %% http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/ Rather than disabling client %% initiated renegotiation we will disallow many client initiated %% renegotiations immediately after each other. erlang:send_after(?WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, self(), allow_renegotiate), - {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{allow_renegotiate = false, - renegotiation = {true, peer}}), - next_event(hello, Record, State, [{next_event, internal, Hello}]); + {ok, Write} = tls_sender:renegotiate(Sender), + next_event(hello, no_record, State#state{connection_states = CS#{current_write => Write}, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, peer}, + allow_renegotiate = false} + }, + [{next_event, internal, Hello}]); connection(internal, #client_hello{}, - #state{role = server, allow_renegotiate = false} = State0) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{allow_renegotiate = false}} = State0) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION), - State1 = send_alert(Alert, State0), - {Record, State} = ssl_connection:prepare_connection(State1, ?MODULE), - next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State); + send_alert_in_connection(Alert, State0), + State = reinit_handshake_data(State0), + next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); + connection(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec death_row(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> - gen_statem:state_function_result(). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -death_row(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:death_row(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec downgrade(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> gen_statem:state_function_result(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +downgrade(internal, #alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY}, + #state{static_env = #static_env{transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket}, + connection_env = #connection_env{downgrade = {Pid, From}}} = State) -> + tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}, {packet, 0}, {mode, binary}]), + Transport:controlling_process(Socket, Pid), + {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, downgrade},[{reply, From, {ok, Socket}}], State}; +downgrade(timeout, downgrade, #state{ connection_env = #connection_env{downgrade = {_, From}}} = State) -> + {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, normal},[{reply, From, {error, timeout}}], State}; +downgrade(info, {CloseTag, Socket}, + #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + close_tag = CloseTag}, + connection_env = #connection_env{downgrade = {_, From}}} = + State) -> + {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, normal},[{reply, From, {error, CloseTag}}], State}; +downgrade(info, Info, State) -> + handle_info(Info, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); downgrade(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). - + ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). %-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% gen_statem callbacks %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- callback_mode() -> state_functions. +terminate({shutdown, {sender_died, Reason}}, _StateName, + #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}} + = State) -> + ssl_connection:handle_trusted_certs_db(State), + close(Reason, Socket, Transport, undefined, undefined); terminate(Reason, StateName, State) -> - catch ssl_connection:terminate(Reason, StateName, State). + catch ssl_connection:terminate(Reason, StateName, State), + ensure_sender_terminate(Reason, State). format_status(Type, Data) -> ssl_connection:format_status(Type, Data). @@ -611,9 +798,10 @@ code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, Tracker}, User, - {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) -> - #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation} = SSLOptions, +initial_state(Role, Sender, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, Tracker}, User, + {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag, PassiveTag}) -> + #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation, + erl_dist = IsErlDist} = SSLOptions, ConnectionStates = tls_record:init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation), SessionCacheCb = case application:get_env(ssl, session_cb) of @@ -622,43 +810,85 @@ initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, Tracker}, Us _ -> ssl_session_cache end, - - Monitor = erlang:monitor(process, User), - - #state{socket_options = SocketOptions, - ssl_options = SSLOptions, - session = #session{is_resumable = new}, - transport_cb = CbModule, - data_tag = DataTag, - close_tag = CloseTag, - error_tag = ErrorTag, - role = Role, - host = Host, - port = Port, - socket = Socket, - connection_states = ConnectionStates, - protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{}, - user_application = {Monitor, User}, - user_data_buffer = <<>>, - session_cache_cb = SessionCacheCb, - renegotiation = {false, first}, - allow_renegotiate = SSLOptions#ssl_options.client_renegotiation, - start_or_recv_from = undefined, - protocol_cb = ?MODULE, - tracker = Tracker, - flight_buffer = [] - }. - -next_tls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{tls_record_buffer = Buf0, - tls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers} - = State0) -> - case tls_record:get_tls_records(Data, - acceptable_record_versions(StateName, State0), - Buf0) of + InternalActiveN = case application:get_env(ssl, internal_active_n) of + {ok, N} when is_integer(N) andalso (not IsErlDist) -> + N; + _ -> + ?INTERNAL_ACTIVE_N + end, + UserMonitor = erlang:monitor(process, User), + InitStatEnv = #static_env{ + role = Role, + transport_cb = CbModule, + protocol_cb = ?MODULE, + data_tag = DataTag, + close_tag = CloseTag, + error_tag = ErrorTag, + passive_tag = PassiveTag, + host = Host, + port = Port, + socket = Socket, + session_cache_cb = SessionCacheCb, + tracker = Tracker + }, + #state{ + static_env = InitStatEnv, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{ + tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), + renegotiation = {false, first}, + allow_renegotiate = SSLOptions#ssl_options.client_renegotiation + }, + connection_env = #connection_env{user_application = {UserMonitor, User}}, + socket_options = SocketOptions, + ssl_options = SSLOptions, + session = #session{is_resumable = new}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{}, + user_data_buffer = {[],0,[]}, + start_or_recv_from = undefined, + flight_buffer = [], + protocol_specific = #{sender => Sender, + active_n => InternalActiveN, + active_n_toggle => true + } + }. + +initialize_tls_sender(#state{static_env = #static_env{ + role = Role, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket, + tracker = Tracker + }, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + socket_options = SockOpts, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}, + connection_states = #{current_write := ConnectionWriteState}, + protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}}) -> + Init = #{current_write => ConnectionWriteState, + role => Role, + socket => Socket, + socket_options => SockOpts, + tracker => Tracker, + transport_cb => Transport, + negotiated_version => Version, + renegotiate_at => RenegotiateAt}, + tls_sender:initialize(Sender, Init). + +next_tls_record(Data, StateName, + #state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{tls_record_buffer = Buf0, + tls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers} = State0) -> + Versions = + case StateName of + hello -> + [tls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS]; + _ -> + State0#state.connection_env#connection_env.negotiated_version + end, + case tls_record:get_tls_records(Data, Versions, Buf0) of {Records, Buf1} -> CT1 = CT0 ++ Records, - next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers = + next_record(StateName, State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_record_buffer = Buf1, tls_cipher_texts = CT1}}); #alert{} = Alert -> @@ -666,10 +896,6 @@ next_tls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = end. -acceptable_record_versions(hello, _) -> - [tls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS]; -acceptable_record_versions(_, #state{negotiated_version = Version}) -> - [Version]. handle_record_alert(Alert, _) -> Alert. @@ -680,26 +906,35 @@ tls_handshake_events(Packets) -> %% raw data from socket, upack records handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName, - #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{data_tag = Protocol}} = State0) -> case next_tls_record(Data, StateName, State0) of {Record, State} -> next_event(StateName, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), - ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, own_alert}, State0) + {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State0} end; +handle_info({PassiveTag, Socket}, StateName, + #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + passive_tag = PassiveTag}, + protocol_specific = PS + } = State) -> + next_event(StateName, no_record, + State#state{protocol_specific = PS#{active_n_toggle => true}}); handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, - #state{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag, + #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, socket_options = #socket_options{active = Active}, protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = CTs}, - negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + user_data_buffer = {_,BufferSize,_}, + protocol_specific = PS} = State) -> %% Note that as of TLS 1.1, %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a %% session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform %% with widespread implementation practice. - case (Active == false) andalso (CTs =/= []) of + case (Active == false) andalso ((CTs =/= []) or (BufferSize =/= 0)) of false -> case Version of {1, N} when N >= 1 -> @@ -713,13 +948,17 @@ handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, end, ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, transport_closed}, State); + {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State}; true -> %% Fixes non-delivery of final TLS record in {active, once}. %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again - %% and then receive the final message. - next_event(StateName, no_record, State) + %% and then receive the final message. Set internal active_n to zero + %% to ensure socket close message is sent if there is not enough data to deliver. + next_event(StateName, no_record, State#state{protocol_specific = PS#{active_n_toggle => true}}) end; +handle_info({'EXIT', Sender, Reason}, _, + #state{protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}} = State) -> + {stop, {shutdown, {sender_died, Reason}}, State}; handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> ssl_connection:StateName(info, Msg, State, ?MODULE). @@ -727,6 +966,14 @@ handle_alerts([], Result) -> Result; handle_alerts(_, {stop, _, _} = Stop) -> Stop; +handle_alerts([#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} | _Alerts], + {next_state, connection = StateName, #state{connection_env = CEnv, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}, + user_data_buffer = {_,BufferSize,_}, + protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = CTs}} = + State}) when (BufferSize =/= 0) orelse + (CTs =/= []) -> + {next_state, StateName, State#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{terminated = true}}}; handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) -> handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)); handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State, _Actions}) -> @@ -746,7 +993,7 @@ decode_alerts(Bin) -> ssl_alert:decode(Bin). gen_handshake(StateName, Type, Event, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> try ssl_connection:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of Result -> Result @@ -757,7 +1004,7 @@ gen_handshake(StateName, Type, Event, Version, StateName, State) end. -gen_info(Event, connection = StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> +gen_info(Event, connection = StateName, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of Result -> Result @@ -768,7 +1015,7 @@ gen_info(Event, connection = StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = Version, StateName, State) end; -gen_info(Event, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> +gen_info(Event, StateName, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of Result -> Result @@ -788,7 +1035,8 @@ unprocessed_events(Events) -> erlang:length(Events)-1. -assert_buffer_sanity(<<?BYTE(_Type), ?UINT24(Length), Rest/binary>>, #ssl_options{max_handshake_size = Max}) when +assert_buffer_sanity(<<?BYTE(_Type), ?UINT24(Length), Rest/binary>>, + #ssl_options{max_handshake_size = Max}) when Length =< Max -> case size(Rest) of N when N < Length -> @@ -808,3 +1056,16 @@ assert_buffer_sanity(Bin, _) -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, malformed_handshake_data)) end. + +ensure_sender_terminate(downgrade, _) -> + ok; %% Do not terminate sender during downgrade phase +ensure_sender_terminate(_, #state{protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}}) -> + %% Make sure TLS sender dies when connection process is terminated normally + %% This is needed if the tls_sender is blocked in prim_inet:send + Kill = fun() -> + receive + after 5000 -> + catch (exit(Sender, kill)) + end + end, + spawn(Kill). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.hrl index 0af2258932..9063b1b736 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.hrl @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ -include("tls_record.hrl"). -record(protocol_buffers, { - tls_packets = [], %% :: [#ssl_tls{}], % Not yet handled decode SSL/TLS packets. tls_record_buffer = <<>>, %% :: binary(), % Buffer of incomplete records tls_handshake_buffer = <<>>, %% :: binary(), % Buffer of incomplete handshakes tls_cipher_texts = [] %%:: [binary()] diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl index f1eecb2875..c2b0d8e039 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). +-include("ssl_api.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). %% Handshake handling @@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ %% Handshake handling %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec client_hello(host(), inet:port_number(), ssl_record:connection_states(), +-spec client_hello(ssl:host(), inet:port_number(), ssl_record:connection_states(), #ssl_options{}, integer(), atom(), boolean(), der_cert()) -> #client_hello{}. %% @@ -81,13 +82,13 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, -spec hello(#server_hello{} | #client_hello{}, #ssl_options{}, ssl_record:connection_states() | {inet:port_number(), #session{}, db_handle(), atom(), ssl_record:connection_states(), - binary() | undefined, ssl_cipher:key_algo()}, + binary() | undefined, ssl:kex_algo()}, boolean()) -> - {tls_record:tls_version(), session_id(), + {tls_record:tls_version(), ssl:session_id(), ssl_record:connection_states(), alpn | npn, binary() | undefined}| {tls_record:tls_version(), {resumed | new, #session{}}, ssl_record:connection_states(), binary() | undefined, - #hello_extensions{}, {ssl_cipher:hash(), ssl_cipher:sign_algo()} | + #hello_extensions{}, {ssl:hash(), ssl:sign_algo()} | undefined} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Handles a received hello message @@ -126,6 +127,9 @@ hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion, handle_client_hello(Version, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) end catch + error:{case_clause,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> + %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {failed_to_decode_own_certificate, Asn1Reason}); _:_ -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, malformed_handshake_data) end. @@ -153,7 +157,7 @@ encode_handshake(Package, Version) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec get_tls_handshake(tls_record:tls_version(), binary(), binary() | iolist(), #ssl_options{}) -> - {[tls_handshake()], binary()}. + {[{tls_handshake(), binary()}], binary()}. %% %% Description: Given buffered and new data from ssl_record, collects %% and returns it as a list of handshake messages, also returns leftover @@ -196,7 +200,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_ciphers); _ -> - #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, Version) of #alert{} = Alert -> @@ -220,8 +224,6 @@ handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, HelloExt, Version, SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt} -> {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} @@ -232,14 +234,14 @@ handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> - case ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuite, + try ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, HelloExt, Version, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, - Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; + Renegotiation) of {ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} -> {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} + catch throw:Alert -> + Alert end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, _Version) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl index f1aca8c801..38022030ee 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2019. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -75,25 +75,22 @@ init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation) -> pending_write => Pending}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec get_tls_records(binary(), [tls_version()], binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. +-spec get_tls_records( + binary(), [tls_version()] | tls_version(), + Buffer0 :: binary() | {'undefined' | #ssl_tls{}, {[binary()],non_neg_integer(),[binary()]}}) -> + {Records :: [#ssl_tls{}], + Buffer :: {'undefined' | #ssl_tls{}, {[binary()],non_neg_integer(),[binary()]}}} | + #alert{}. %% %% and returns it as a list of tls_compressed binaries also returns leftover %% Description: Given old buffer and new data from TCP, packs up a records %% data %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -get_tls_records(Data, Versions, Buffer) -> - BinData = list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), - case erlang:byte_size(BinData) of - N when N >= 3 -> - case assert_version(BinData, Versions) of - true -> - get_tls_records_aux(BinData, []); - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) - end; - _ -> - get_tls_records_aux(BinData, []) - end. + +get_tls_records(Data, Versions, Buffer) when is_binary(Buffer) -> + parse_tls_records(Versions, {[Data],byte_size(Data),[]}, undefined); +get_tls_records(Data, Versions, {Hdr, {Front,Size,Rear}}) -> + parse_tls_records(Versions, {Front,Size + byte_size(Data),[Data|Rear]}, Hdr). %%==================================================================== %% Encoding @@ -113,8 +110,8 @@ encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates) -> case iolist_size(Frag) of N when N > ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH -> - Data = split_bin(iolist_to_binary(Frag), ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA, BeastMitigation), - encode_iolist(?HANDSHAKE, Data, Version, ConnectionStates); + Data = split_iovec(erlang:iolist_to_iovec(Frag), Version, BCA, BeastMitigation), + encode_fragments(?HANDSHAKE, Version, Data, ConnectionStates); _ -> encode_plain_text(?HANDSHAKE, Version, Frag, ConnectionStates) end. @@ -140,18 +137,18 @@ encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates) -> encode_plain_text(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, Version, ?byte(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC_PROTO), ConnectionStates). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec encode_data(binary(), tls_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> - {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. +-spec encode_data([binary()], tls_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> + {[[binary()]], ssl_record:connection_states()}. %% %% Description: Encodes data to send on the ssl-socket. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -encode_data(Frag, Version, +encode_data(Data, Version, #{current_write := #{beast_mitigation := BeastMitigation, security_parameters := #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCA}}} = ConnectionStates) -> - Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA, BeastMitigation), - encode_iolist(?APPLICATION_DATA, Data, Version, ConnectionStates). + Fragments = split_iovec(Data, Version, BCA, BeastMitigation), + encode_fragments(?APPLICATION_DATA, Version, Fragments, ConnectionStates). %%==================================================================== %% Decoding @@ -163,56 +160,59 @@ encode_data(Frag, Version, %% %% Description: Decode cipher text %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, - fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, +decode_cipher_text(CipherText, #{current_read := - #{compression_state := CompressionS0, - sequence_number := Seq, - cipher_state := CipherS0, + #{sequence_number := Seq, security_parameters := - #security_parameters{ - cipher_type = ?AEAD, - bulk_cipher_algorithm = - BulkCipherAlgo, - compression_algorithm = CompAlg} - } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, _) -> - AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, ReadState0), - case ssl_cipher:decipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, Seq, AAD, CipherFragment, Version) of - {PlainFragment, CipherS1} -> - {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg, - PlainFragment, CompressionS0), - ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#{ + #security_parameters{cipher_type = ?AEAD, + bulk_cipher_algorithm = BulkCipherAlgo}, + cipher_state := CipherS0 + } + } = ConnectionStates0, _) -> + SeqBin = <<?UINT64(Seq)>>, + #ssl_tls{type = Type, version = {MajVer,MinVer} = Version, fragment = Fragment} = CipherText, + StartAdditionalData = <<SeqBin/binary, ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>, + CipherS = ssl_record:nonce_seed(BulkCipherAlgo, SeqBin, CipherS0), + case ssl_record:decipher_aead( + BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS, StartAdditionalData, Fragment, Version) + of + PlainFragment when is_binary(PlainFragment) -> + #{current_read := + #{security_parameters := SecParams, + compression_state := CompressionS0} = ReadState0} = ConnectionStates0, + {Plain, CompressionS} = ssl_record:uncompress(SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm, + PlainFragment, CompressionS0), + ConnectionStates = ConnectionStates0#{ current_read => ReadState0#{ - cipher_state => CipherS1, + cipher_state => CipherS, sequence_number => Seq + 1, - compression_state => CompressionS1}}, - {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; + compression_state => CompressionS}}, + {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnectionStates}; #alert{} = Alert -> Alert end; -decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{version = Version, fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, - #{current_read := - #{compression_state := CompressionS0, - sequence_number := Seq, - security_parameters := - #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg} - } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, PaddingCheck) -> + #{current_read := ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, PaddingCheck) -> case ssl_record:decipher(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0, PaddingCheck) of {PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} -> - MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState1), + MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(CipherText#ssl_tls.type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState1), case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of true -> + #{sequence_number := Seq, + compression_state := CompressionS0, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg}} = ReadState0, {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg, PlainFragment, CompressionS0), - ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#{ - current_read => ReadState1#{ - sequence_number => Seq + 1, - compression_state => CompressionS1}}, + ConnnectionStates = + ConnnectionStates0#{current_read => + ReadState1#{sequence_number => Seq + 1, + compression_state => CompressionS1}}, {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) end; #alert{} = Alert -> Alert @@ -394,113 +394,224 @@ initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> server_verify_data => undefined }. -assert_version(<<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), _/binary>>, Versions) -> - is_acceptable_version({MajVer, MinVer}, Versions). - -get_tls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?APPLICATION_DATA),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, - Acc) -> - get_tls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_tls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?HANDSHAKE),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Length), - Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> - get_tls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_tls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?ALERT),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, - Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> - get_tls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_tls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, - Acc) -> - get_tls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_tls_records_aux(<<0:1, _CT:7, ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer), - ?UINT16(Length), _/binary>>, - _Acc) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); -get_tls_records_aux(Data, Acc) -> - case size(Data) =< ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH + ?INITIAL_BYTES of - true -> - {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}; - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) - end. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{current_write := Write0} = ConnectionStates) -> - {CipherFragment, Write1} = do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, Write0), - {CipherText, Write} = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, CipherFragment, Write1), - {CipherText, ConnectionStates#{current_write => Write}}. - -encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Fragment, #{sequence_number := Seq} = Write) -> - Length = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment), - {[<<?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Fragment], - Write#{sequence_number => Seq +1}}. - -encode_iolist(Type, Data, Version, ConnectionStates0) -> - {ConnectionStates, EncodedMsg} = - lists:foldl(fun(Text, {CS0, Encoded}) -> - {Enc, CS1} = - encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Text, CS0), - {CS1, [Enc | Encoded]} - end, {ConnectionStates0, []}, Data), - {lists:reverse(EncodedMsg), ConnectionStates}. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{compression_state := CompS0, - security_parameters := - #security_parameters{ - cipher_type = ?AEAD, - compression_algorithm = CompAlg} - } = WriteState0) -> - {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0), - WriteState1 = WriteState0#{compression_state => CompS1}, - AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, WriteState1), - ssl_record:cipher_aead(Version, Comp, WriteState1, AAD); -do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{compression_state := CompS0, - security_parameters := - #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg} - }= WriteState0) -> - {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0), - WriteState1 = WriteState0#{compression_state => CompS1}, - MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, Comp, WriteState1), - ssl_record:cipher(Version, Comp, WriteState1, MacHash); -do_encode_plain_text(_,_,_,CS) -> + +parse_tls_records(Versions, Q, undefined) -> + decode_tls_records(Versions, Q, [], undefined, undefined, undefined); +parse_tls_records(Versions, Q, #ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, fragment = Length}) -> + decode_tls_records(Versions, Q, [], Type, Version, Length). + +%% Generic code path +decode_tls_records(Versions, {_,Size,_} = Q0, Acc, undefined, _Version, _Length) -> + if + 5 =< Size -> + {<<?BYTE(Type),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Q} = binary_from_front(5, Q0), + validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, {MajVer,MinVer}, Length); + 3 =< Size -> + {<<?BYTE(Type),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer)>>, Q} = binary_from_front(3, Q0), + validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, {MajVer,MinVer}, undefined); + 1 =< Size -> + {<<?BYTE(Type)>>, Q} = binary_from_front(1, Q0), + validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, undefined, undefined); + true -> + validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q0, Acc, undefined, undefined, undefined) + end; +decode_tls_records(Versions, {_,Size,_} = Q0, Acc, Type, undefined, _Length) -> + if + 4 =< Size -> + {<<?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Q} = binary_from_front(4, Q0), + validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, {MajVer,MinVer}, Length); + 2 =< Size -> + {<<?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer)>>, Q} = binary_from_front(2, Q0), + validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, {MajVer,MinVer}, undefined); + true -> + validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q0, Acc, Type, undefined, undefined) + end; +decode_tls_records(Versions, {_,Size,_} = Q0, Acc, Type, Version, undefined) -> + if + 2 =< Size -> + {<<?UINT16(Length)>>, Q} = binary_from_front(2, Q0), + validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length); + true -> + validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q0, Acc, Type, Version, undefined) + end; +decode_tls_records(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length) -> + validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length). + +validate_tls_records_type(_Versions, Q, Acc, undefined, _Version, _Length) -> + {lists:reverse(Acc), + {undefined, Q}}; +validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length) -> + if + ?KNOWN_RECORD_TYPE(Type) -> + validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length); + true -> + %% Not ?KNOWN_RECORD_TYPE(Type) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) + end. + +validate_tls_record_version(_Versions, Q, Acc, Type, undefined, _Length) -> + {lists:reverse(Acc), + {#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = undefined, fragment = undefined}, Q}}; +validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length) -> + if + is_list(Versions) -> + case is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of + true -> + validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length); + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + end; + Version =:= Versions -> + %% Exact version match + validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length); + true -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + end. + +validate_tls_record_length(_Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, undefined) -> + {lists:reverse(Acc), + {#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, fragment = undefined}, Q}}; +validate_tls_record_length(Versions, {_,Size0,_} = Q0, Acc, Type, Version, Length) -> + if + Length =< ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> + if + Length =< Size0 -> + %% Complete record + {Fragment, Q} = binary_from_front(Length, Q0), + Record = #ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, fragment = Fragment}, + decode_tls_records(Versions, Q, [Record|Acc], undefined, undefined, undefined); + true -> + {lists:reverse(Acc), + {#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, fragment = Length}, Q0}} + end; + true -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW) + end. + + +binary_from_front(SplitSize, {Front,Size,Rear}) -> + binary_from_front(SplitSize, Front, Size, Rear, []). +%% +binary_from_front(SplitSize, [], Size, [_] = Rear, Acc) -> + %% Optimize a simple case + binary_from_front(SplitSize, Rear, Size, [], Acc); +binary_from_front(SplitSize, [], Size, Rear, Acc) -> + binary_from_front(SplitSize, lists:reverse(Rear), Size, [], Acc); +binary_from_front(SplitSize, [Bin|Front], Size, Rear, []) -> + %% Optimize a frequent case + BinSize = byte_size(Bin), + if + SplitSize < BinSize -> + {RetBin, Rest} = erlang:split_binary(Bin, SplitSize), + {RetBin, {[Rest|Front],Size - SplitSize,Rear}}; + BinSize < SplitSize -> + binary_from_front(SplitSize - BinSize, Front, Size, Rear, [Bin]); + true -> % Perfect fit + {Bin, {Front,Size - SplitSize,Rear}} + end; +binary_from_front(SplitSize, [Bin|Front], Size, Rear, Acc) -> + BinSize = byte_size(Bin), + if + SplitSize < BinSize -> + {Last, Rest} = erlang:split_binary(Bin, SplitSize), + RetBin = iolist_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc, [Last])), + {RetBin, {[Rest|Front],Size - byte_size(RetBin),Rear}}; + BinSize < SplitSize -> + binary_from_front(SplitSize - BinSize, Front, Size, Rear, [Bin|Acc]); + true -> % Perfect fit + RetBin = iolist_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc, [Bin])), + {RetBin, {Front,Size - byte_size(RetBin),Rear}} + end. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates0) -> + {[CipherText],ConnectionStates} = encode_fragments(Type, Version, [Data], ConnectionStates0), + {CipherText,ConnectionStates}. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_fragments(Type, Version, Data, + #{current_write := #{compression_state := CompS, + cipher_state := CipherS, + sequence_number := Seq}} = ConnectionStates) -> + encode_fragments(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates, CompS, CipherS, Seq, []). +%% +encode_fragments(_Type, _Version, [], #{current_write := WriteS} = CS, + CompS, CipherS, Seq, CipherFragments) -> + {lists:reverse(CipherFragments), + CS#{current_write := WriteS#{compression_state := CompS, + cipher_state := CipherS, + sequence_number := Seq}}}; +encode_fragments(Type, Version, [Text|Data], + #{current_write := #{security_parameters := + #security_parameters{cipher_type = ?AEAD, + bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCAlg, + compression_algorithm = CompAlg} = SecPars}} = CS, + CompS0, CipherS0, Seq, CipherFragments) -> + {CompText, CompS} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Text, CompS0), + SeqBin = <<?UINT64(Seq)>>, + CipherS1 = ssl_record:nonce_seed(BCAlg, SeqBin, CipherS0), + {MajVer, MinVer} = Version, + VersionBin = <<?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>, + StartAdditionalData = <<SeqBin/binary, ?BYTE(Type), VersionBin/binary>>, + {CipherFragment,CipherS} = ssl_record:cipher_aead(Version, CompText, CipherS1, StartAdditionalData, SecPars), + Length = byte_size(CipherFragment), + CipherHeader = <<?BYTE(Type), VersionBin/binary, ?UINT16(Length)>>, + encode_fragments(Type, Version, Data, CS, CompS, CipherS, Seq + 1, + [[CipherHeader, CipherFragment] | CipherFragments]); +encode_fragments(Type, Version, [Text|Data], + #{current_write := #{security_parameters := + #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg, + mac_algorithm = MacAlgorithm} = SecPars, + mac_secret := MacSecret}} = CS, + CompS0, CipherS0, Seq, CipherFragments) -> + {CompText, CompS} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Text, CompS0), + MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, CompText, MacAlgorithm, MacSecret, Seq), + {CipherFragment,CipherS} = ssl_record:cipher(Version, CompText, CipherS0, MacHash, SecPars), + Length = byte_size(CipherFragment), + {MajVer, MinVer} = Version, + CipherHeader = <<?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, + encode_fragments(Type, Version, Data, CS, CompS, CipherS, Seq + 1, + [[CipherHeader, CipherFragment] | CipherFragments]); +encode_fragments(_Type, _Version, _Data, CS, _CompS, _CipherS, _Seq, _CipherFragments) -> exit({cs, CS}). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -calc_aad(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, - #{sequence_number := SeqNo}) -> - <<?UINT64(SeqNo), ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>. %% 1/n-1 splitting countermeasure Rizzo/Duong-Beast, RC4 chiphers are %% not vulnerable to this attack. -split_bin(<<FirstByte:8, Rest/binary>>, ChunkSize, Version, BCA, one_n_minus_one) when - BCA =/= ?RC4 andalso ({3, 1} == Version orelse - {3, 0} == Version) -> - do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [[FirstByte]]); +split_iovec(Data, Version, BCA, one_n_minus_one) + when (BCA =/= ?RC4) andalso ({3, 1} == Version orelse + {3, 0} == Version) -> + {Part, RestData} = split_iovec(Data, 1, []), + [Part|split_iovec(RestData)]; %% 0/n splitting countermeasure for clients that are incompatible with 1/n-1 %% splitting. -split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Version, BCA, zero_n) when - BCA =/= ?RC4 andalso ({3, 1} == Version orelse - {3, 0} == Version) -> - do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, [[<<>>]]); -split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, _, _, _) -> - do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, []). - -do_split_bin(<<>>, _, Acc) -> - lists:reverse(Acc); -do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Acc) -> - case Bin of - <<Chunk:ChunkSize/binary, Rest/binary>> -> - do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [Chunk | Acc]); - _ -> - lists:reverse(Acc, [Bin]) - end. +split_iovec(Data, Version, BCA, zero_n) + when (BCA =/= ?RC4) andalso ({3, 1} == Version orelse + {3, 0} == Version) -> + {Part, RestData} = split_iovec(Data, 0, []), + [Part|split_iovec(RestData)]; +split_iovec(Data, _Version, _BCA, _BeatMitigation) -> + split_iovec(Data). + +split_iovec([]) -> + []; +split_iovec(Data) -> + {Part,Rest} = split_iovec(Data, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, []), + [Part|split_iovec(Rest)]. +%% +split_iovec([Bin|Data] = Bin_Data, SplitSize, Acc) -> + BinSize = byte_size(Bin), + if + BinSize =< SplitSize -> + split_iovec(Data, SplitSize - BinSize, [Bin|Acc]); + SplitSize == 0 -> + {lists:reverse(Acc), Bin_Data}; + SplitSize < BinSize -> + {Last, Rest} = erlang:split_binary(Bin, SplitSize), + {lists:reverse(Acc, [Last]), [Rest|Data]} + end; +split_iovec([], _SplitSize, Acc) -> + {lists:reverse(Acc),[]}. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> Ver; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_sender.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_sender.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c07b7f49cd --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_sender.erl @@ -0,0 +1,516 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2018-2019. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +-module(tls_sender). + +-behaviour(gen_statem). + +-include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include("ssl_alert.hrl"). +-include("ssl_handshake.hrl"). +-include("ssl_api.hrl"). + +%% API +-export([start/0, start/1, initialize/2, send_data/2, send_alert/2, + send_and_ack_alert/2, setopts/2, renegotiate/1, peer_renegotiate/1, downgrade/2, + update_connection_state/3, dist_tls_socket/1, dist_handshake_complete/3]). + +%% gen_statem callbacks +-export([callback_mode/0, init/1, terminate/3, code_change/4]). +-export([init/3, connection/3, handshake/3, death_row/3]). + +-define(SERVER, ?MODULE). + +-record(static, + {connection_pid, + role, + socket, + socket_options, + tracker, + transport_cb, + negotiated_version, + renegotiate_at, + connection_monitor, + dist_handle + }). + +-record(data, + {static = #static{}, + connection_states = #{} + }). + +%%%=================================================================== +%%% API +%%%=================================================================== +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec start() -> {ok, Pid :: pid()} | + ignore | + {error, Error :: term()}. +-spec start(list()) -> {ok, Pid :: pid()} | + ignore | + {error, Error :: term()}. + +%% Description: Start sender process to avoid dead lock that +%% may happen when a socket is busy (busy port) and the +%% same process is sending and receiving +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +start() -> + gen_statem:start(?MODULE, [], []). +start(SpawnOpts) -> + gen_statem:start(?MODULE, [], SpawnOpts). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec initialize(pid(), map()) -> ok. +%% Description: So TLS connection process can initialize it sender +%% process. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +initialize(Pid, InitMsg) -> + gen_statem:call(Pid, {self(), InitMsg}). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec send_data(pid(), iodata()) -> ok | {error, term()}. +%% Description: Send application data +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +send_data(Pid, AppData) -> + %% Needs error handling for external API + call(Pid, {application_data, AppData}). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec send_alert(pid(), #alert{}) -> _. +%% Description: TLS connection process wants to send an Alert +%% in the connection state. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +send_alert(Pid, Alert) -> + gen_statem:cast(Pid, Alert). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec send_and_ack_alert(pid(), #alert{}) -> _. +%% Description: TLS connection process wants to send an Alert +%% in the connection state and recive an ack. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +send_and_ack_alert(Pid, Alert) -> + gen_statem:call(Pid, {ack_alert, Alert}, ?DEFAULT_TIMEOUT). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec setopts(pid(), [{packet, integer() | atom()}]) -> ok | {error, term()}. +%% Description: Send application data +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +setopts(Pid, Opts) -> + call(Pid, {set_opts, Opts}). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec renegotiate(pid()) -> {ok, WriteState::map()} | {error, closed}. +%% Description: So TLS connection process can synchronize the +%% encryption state to be used when handshaking. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +renegotiate(Pid) -> + %% Needs error handling for external API + call(Pid, renegotiate). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec peer_renegotiate(pid()) -> {ok, WriteState::map()} | {error, term()}. +%% Description: So TLS connection process can synchronize the +%% encryption state to be used when handshaking. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +peer_renegotiate(Pid) -> + gen_statem:call(Pid, renegotiate, ?DEFAULT_TIMEOUT). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec update_connection_state(pid(), WriteState::map(), tls_record:tls_version()) -> ok. +%% Description: So TLS connection process can synchronize the +%% encryption state to be used when sending application data. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +update_connection_state(Pid, NewState, Version) -> + gen_statem:cast(Pid, {new_write, NewState, Version}). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec downgrade(pid(), integer()) -> {ok, ssl_record:connection_state()} + | {error, timeout}. +%% Description: So TLS connection process can synchronize the +%% encryption state to be used when sending application data. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +downgrade(Pid, Timeout) -> + try gen_statem:call(Pid, downgrade, Timeout) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + {error, timeout} + end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec dist_handshake_complete(pid(), node(), term()) -> ok. +%% Description: Erlang distribution callback +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +dist_handshake_complete(ConnectionPid, Node, DHandle) -> + gen_statem:call(ConnectionPid, {dist_handshake_complete, Node, DHandle}). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec dist_tls_socket(pid()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}}. +%% Description: To enable distribution startup to get a proper "#sslsocket{}" +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +dist_tls_socket(Pid) -> + gen_statem:call(Pid, dist_get_tls_socket). + +%%%=================================================================== +%%% gen_statem callbacks +%%%=================================================================== +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec callback_mode() -> gen_statem:callback_mode_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +callback_mode() -> + state_functions. + + +-define(HANDLE_COMMON, + ?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Msg, StateData) -> + handle_common(Type, Msg, StateData)). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec init(Args :: term()) -> + gen_statem:init_result(atom()). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +init(_) -> + %% Note: Should not trap exits so that this process + %% will be terminated if tls_connection process is + %% killed brutally + {ok, init, #data{}}. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec init(gen_statem:event_type(), + Msg :: term(), + StateData :: term()) -> + gen_statem:event_handler_result(atom()). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +init({call, From}, {Pid, #{current_write := WriteState, + role := Role, + socket := Socket, + socket_options := SockOpts, + tracker := Tracker, + transport_cb := Transport, + negotiated_version := Version, + renegotiate_at := RenegotiateAt}}, + #data{connection_states = ConnectionStates, static = Static0} = StateData0) -> + Monitor = erlang:monitor(process, Pid), + StateData = + StateData0#data{connection_states = ConnectionStates#{current_write => WriteState}, + static = Static0#static{connection_pid = Pid, + connection_monitor = Monitor, + role = Role, + socket = Socket, + socket_options = SockOpts, + tracker = Tracker, + transport_cb = Transport, + negotiated_version = Version, + renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}}, + {next_state, handshake, StateData, [{reply, From, ok}]}; +init(_, _, _) -> + %% Just in case anything else sneeks through + {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec connection(gen_statem:event_type(), + Msg :: term(), + StateData :: term()) -> + gen_statem:event_handler_result(atom()). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +connection({call, From}, {application_data, AppData}, + #data{static = #static{socket_options = #socket_options{packet = Packet}}} = + StateData) -> + case encode_packet(Packet, AppData) of + {error, _} = Error -> + {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, StateData, [{reply, From, Error}]}; + Data -> + send_application_data(Data, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, StateData) + end; +connection({call, From}, {ack_alert, #alert{} = Alert}, StateData0) -> + StateData = send_tls_alert(Alert, StateData0), + {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, StateData, + [{reply,From,ok}]}; +connection({call, From}, renegotiate, + #data{connection_states = #{current_write := Write}} = StateData) -> + {next_state, handshake, StateData, [{reply, From, {ok, Write}}]}; +connection({call, From}, downgrade, #data{connection_states = + #{current_write := Write}} = StateData) -> + {next_state, death_row, StateData, [{reply,From, {ok, Write}}]}; +connection({call, From}, {set_opts, Opts}, StateData) -> + handle_set_opts(From, Opts, StateData); +connection({call, From}, dist_get_tls_socket, + #data{static = #static{transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket, + connection_pid = Pid, + tracker = Tracker}} = StateData) -> + TLSSocket = tls_connection:socket([Pid, self()], Transport, Socket, Tracker), + {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, StateData, [{reply, From, {ok, TLSSocket}}]}; +connection({call, From}, {dist_handshake_complete, _Node, DHandle}, + #data{static = #static{connection_pid = Pid} = Static} = StateData) -> + ok = erlang:dist_ctrl_input_handler(DHandle, Pid), + ok = ssl_connection:dist_handshake_complete(Pid, DHandle), + %% From now on we execute on normal priority + process_flag(priority, normal), + {keep_state, StateData#data{static = Static#static{dist_handle = DHandle}}, + [{reply,From,ok}| + case dist_data(DHandle) of + [] -> + []; + Data -> + [{next_event, internal, + {application_packets,{self(),undefined},erlang:iolist_to_iovec(Data)}}] + end]}; +connection(internal, {application_packets, From, Data}, StateData) -> + send_application_data(Data, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, StateData); +%% +connection(cast, #alert{} = Alert, StateData0) -> + StateData = send_tls_alert(Alert, StateData0), + {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, StateData}; +connection(cast, {new_write, WritesState, Version}, + #data{connection_states = ConnectionStates, static = Static} = StateData) -> + {next_state, connection, + StateData#data{connection_states = + ConnectionStates#{current_write => WritesState}, + static = Static#static{negotiated_version = Version}}}; +%% +connection(info, dist_data, #data{static = #static{dist_handle = DHandle}}) -> + {keep_state_and_data, + case dist_data(DHandle) of + [] -> + []; + Data -> + [{next_event, internal, + {application_packets,{self(),undefined},erlang:iolist_to_iovec(Data)}}] + end}; +connection(info, tick, StateData) -> + consume_ticks(), + Data = [<<0:32>>], % encode_packet(4, <<>>) + From = {self(), undefined}, + send_application_data(Data, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, StateData); +connection(info, {send, From, Ref, Data}, _StateData) -> + %% This is for testing only! + %% + %% Needed by some OTP distribution + %% test suites... + From ! {Ref, ok}, + {keep_state_and_data, + [{next_event, {call, {self(), undefined}}, + {application_data, erlang:iolist_to_iovec(Data)}}]}; +?HANDLE_COMMON. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec handshake(gen_statem:event_type(), + Msg :: term(), + StateData :: term()) -> + gen_statem:event_handler_result(atom()). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +handshake({call, From}, {set_opts, Opts}, StateData) -> + handle_set_opts(From, Opts, StateData); +handshake({call, _}, _, _) -> + %% Postpone all calls to the connection state + {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}; +handshake(internal, {application_packets,_,_}, _) -> + {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}; +handshake(cast, {new_write, WritesState, Version}, + #data{connection_states = ConnectionStates, static = Static} = StateData) -> + {next_state, connection, + StateData#data{connection_states = ConnectionStates#{current_write => WritesState}, + static = Static#static{negotiated_version = Version}}}; +handshake(info, dist_data, _) -> + {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}; +handshake(info, tick, _) -> + %% Ignore - data is sent anyway during handshake + consume_ticks(), + keep_state_and_data; +handshake(info, {send, _, _, _}, _) -> + %% Testing only, OTP distribution test suites... + {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}; +?HANDLE_COMMON. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec death_row(gen_statem:event_type(), + Msg :: term(), + StateData :: term()) -> + gen_statem:event_handler_result(atom()). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +death_row(state_timeout, Reason, _State) -> + {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; +death_row(_Type, _Msg, _State) -> + %% Waste all other events + keep_state_and_data. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec terminate(Reason :: term(), State :: term(), Data :: term()) -> + any(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +terminate(_Reason, _State, _Data) -> + void. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec code_change( + OldVsn :: term() | {down,term()}, + State :: term(), Data :: term(), Extra :: term()) -> + {ok, NewState :: term(), NewData :: term()} | + (Reason :: term()). +%% Convert process state when code is changed +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +code_change(_OldVsn, State, Data, _Extra) -> + {ok, State, Data}. + +%%%=================================================================== +%%% Internal functions +%%%=================================================================== + +handle_set_opts( + From, Opts, #data{static = #static{socket_options = SockOpts} = Static} = StateData) -> + {keep_state, StateData#data{static = Static#static{socket_options = set_opts(SockOpts, Opts)}}, + [{reply, From, ok}]}. + +handle_common( + {call, From}, {set_opts, Opts}, + #data{static = #static{socket_options = SockOpts} = Static} = StateData) -> + {keep_state, StateData#data{static = Static#static{socket_options = set_opts(SockOpts, Opts)}}, + [{reply, From, ok}]}; +handle_common( + info, {'DOWN', Monitor, _, _, Reason}, + #data{static = #static{connection_monitor = Monitor, + dist_handle = Handle}} = StateData) when Handle =/= undefined -> + {next_state, death_row, StateData, + [{state_timeout, 5000, Reason}]}; +handle_common( + info, {'DOWN', Monitor, _, _, _}, + #data{static = #static{connection_monitor = Monitor}} = StateData) -> + {stop, normal, StateData}; +handle_common(info, Msg, _) -> + Report = + io_lib:format("TLS sender: Got unexpected info: ~p ~n", [Msg]), + error_logger:info_report(Report), + keep_state_and_data; +handle_common(Type, Msg, _) -> + Report = + io_lib:format( + "TLS sender: Got unexpected event: ~p ~n", [{Type,Msg}]), + error_logger:error_report(Report), + keep_state_and_data. + +send_tls_alert(#alert{} = Alert, + #data{static = #static{negotiated_version = Version, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = StateData0) -> + {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = + tls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), + tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + StateData0#data{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. + +send_application_data(Data, From, StateName, + #data{static = #static{connection_pid = Pid, + socket = Socket, + dist_handle = DistHandle, + negotiated_version = Version, + transport_cb = Transport, + renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = StateData0) -> + case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of + true -> + ssl_connection:internal_renegotiation(Pid, ConnectionStates0), + {next_state, handshake, StateData0, + [{next_event, internal, {application_packets, From, Data}}]}; + false -> + {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0), + StateData = StateData0#data{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, + case tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Msgs) of + ok when DistHandle =/= undefined -> + {next_state, StateName, StateData, []}; + Reason when DistHandle =/= undefined -> + {next_state, death_row, StateData, [{state_timeout, 5000, Reason}]}; + ok -> + {next_state, StateName, StateData, [{reply, From, ok}]}; + Result -> + {next_state, StateName, StateData, [{reply, From, Result}]} + end + end. + +-compile({inline, encode_packet/2}). +encode_packet(Packet, Data) -> + Len = iolist_size(Data), + case Packet of + 1 when Len < (1 bsl 8) -> [<<Len:8>>|Data]; + 2 when Len < (1 bsl 16) -> [<<Len:16>>|Data]; + 4 when Len < (1 bsl 32) -> [<<Len:32>>|Data]; + N when N =:= 1; N =:= 2; N =:= 4 -> + {error, + {badarg, {packet_to_large, Len, (1 bsl (Packet bsl 3)) - 1}}}; + _ -> + Data + end. + +set_opts(SocketOptions, [{packet, N}]) -> + SocketOptions#socket_options{packet = N}. + +time_to_renegotiate(_Data, + #{current_write := #{sequence_number := Num}}, + RenegotiateAt) -> + + %% We could do test: + %% is_time_to_renegotiate((erlang:byte_size(_Data) div + %% ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH) + 1, RenegotiateAt), but we chose to + %% have a some what lower renegotiateAt and a much cheaper test + is_time_to_renegotiate(Num, RenegotiateAt). + +is_time_to_renegotiate(N, M) when N < M-> + false; +is_time_to_renegotiate(_,_) -> + true. + +call(FsmPid, Event) -> + try gen_statem:call(FsmPid, Event) + catch + exit:{noproc, _} -> + {error, closed}; + exit:{normal, _} -> + {error, closed}; + exit:{{shutdown, _},_} -> + {error, closed} + end. + +%%-------------- Erlang distribution helpers ------------------------------ + +dist_data(DHandle) -> + case erlang:dist_ctrl_get_data(DHandle) of + none -> + erlang:dist_ctrl_get_data_notification(DHandle), + []; + %% This is encode_packet(4, Data) without Len check + %% since the emulator will always deliver a Data + %% smaller than 4 GB, and the distribution will + %% therefore always have to use {packet,4} + Data when is_binary(Data) -> + Len = byte_size(Data), + [[<<Len:32>>,Data]|dist_data(DHandle)]; + [BA,BB] = Data -> + Len = byte_size(BA) + byte_size(BB), + [[<<Len:32>>|Data]|dist_data(DHandle)]; + Data when is_list(Data) -> + Len = iolist_size(Data), + [[<<Len:32>>|Data]|dist_data(DHandle)] + end. + + +%% Empty the inbox from distribution ticks - do not let them accumulate +consume_ticks() -> + receive tick -> + consume_ticks() + after 0 -> + ok + end. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_socket.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_socket.erl index 154281f1c2..6c32e6fa04 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_socket.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_socket.erl @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ emulated_socket_options/2, get_emulated_opts/1, set_emulated_opts/2, get_all_opts/1, handle_call/3, handle_cast/2, handle_info/2, code_change/3]). +-export([update_active_n/2]). -record(state, { emulated_opts, @@ -45,18 +46,20 @@ send(Transport, Socket, Data) -> Transport:send(Socket, Data). -listen(Transport, Port, #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}, +listen(Transport, Port, #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _, _}, inet_user = Options, ssl = SslOpts, emulated = EmOpts} = Config) -> case Transport:listen(Port, Options ++ internal_inet_values()) of {ok, ListenSocket} -> {ok, Tracker} = inherit_tracker(ListenSocket, EmOpts, SslOpts), - {ok, #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, Config#config{emulated = Tracker}}}}; + Socket = #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, Config#config{emulated = Tracker}}}, + check_active_n(EmOpts, Socket), + {ok, Socket}; Err = {error, _} -> Err end. -accept(ListenSocket, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_} = CbInfo, +accept(ListenSocket, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_,_} = CbInfo, connection_cb = ConnectionCb, ssl = SslOpts, emulated = Tracker}, Timeout) -> @@ -64,11 +67,12 @@ accept(ListenSocket, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_} = CbInfo, {ok, Socket} -> {ok, EmOpts} = get_emulated_opts(Tracker), {ok, Port} = tls_socket:port(Transport, Socket), - ConnArgs = [server, "localhost", Port, Socket, + {ok, Sender} = tls_sender:start(), + ConnArgs = [server, Sender, "localhost", Port, Socket, {SslOpts, emulated_socket_options(EmOpts, #socket_options{}), Tracker}, self(), CbInfo], case tls_connection_sup:start_child(ConnArgs) of {ok, Pid} -> - ssl_connection:socket_control(ConnectionCb, Socket, Pid, Transport, Tracker); + ssl_connection:socket_control(ConnectionCb, Socket, [Pid, Sender], Transport, Tracker); {error, Reason} -> {error, Reason} end; @@ -76,7 +80,7 @@ accept(ListenSocket, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_} = CbInfo, {error, Reason} end. -upgrade(Socket, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}= CbInfo, +upgrade(Socket, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_,_}= CbInfo, ssl = SslOptions, emulated = EmOpts, connection_cb = ConnectionCb}, Timeout) -> ok = setopts(Transport, Socket, tls_socket:internal_inet_values()), @@ -94,7 +98,7 @@ connect(Address, Port, #config{transport_info = CbInfo, inet_user = UserOpts, ssl = SslOpts, emulated = EmOpts, inet_ssl = SocketOpts, connection_cb = ConnetionCb}, Timeout) -> - {Transport, _, _, _} = CbInfo, + {Transport, _, _, _, _} = CbInfo, try Transport:connect(Address, Port, SocketOpts, Timeout) of {ok, Socket} -> ssl_connection:connect(ConnetionCb, Address, Port, Socket, @@ -112,18 +116,20 @@ connect(Address, Port, {error, {options, {socket_options, UserOpts}}} end. -socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, ConnectionCb, Tracker) -> - #sslsocket{pid = Pid, +socket(Pids, Transport, Socket, ConnectionCb, Tracker) -> + #sslsocket{pid = Pids, %% "The name "fd" is keept for backwards compatibility fd = {Transport, Socket, ConnectionCb, Tracker}}. -setopts(gen_tcp, #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{emulated = Tracker}}}, Options) -> +setopts(gen_tcp, Socket = #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{emulated = Tracker}}}, Options) -> {SockOpts, EmulatedOpts} = split_options(Options), ok = set_emulated_opts(Tracker, EmulatedOpts), + check_active_n(EmulatedOpts, Socket), inet:setopts(ListenSocket, SockOpts); -setopts(_, #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}, +setopts(_, Socket = #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_,_}, emulated = Tracker}}}, Options) -> {SockOpts, EmulatedOpts} = split_options(Options), ok = set_emulated_opts(Tracker, EmulatedOpts), + check_active_n(EmulatedOpts, Socket), Transport:setopts(ListenSocket, SockOpts); %%% Following clauses will not be called for emulated options, they are handled in the connection process setopts(gen_tcp, Socket, Options) -> @@ -131,6 +137,31 @@ setopts(gen_tcp, Socket, Options) -> setopts(Transport, Socket, Options) -> Transport:setopts(Socket, Options). +check_active_n(EmulatedOpts, Socket = #sslsocket{pid = {_, #config{emulated = Tracker}}}) -> + %% We check the resulting options to send an ssl_passive message if necessary. + case proplists:lookup(active, EmulatedOpts) of + %% The provided value is out of bound. + {_, N} when is_integer(N), N < -32768 -> + throw(einval); + {_, N} when is_integer(N), N > 32767 -> + throw(einval); + {_, N} when is_integer(N) -> + case get_emulated_opts(Tracker, [active]) of + [{_, false}] -> + self() ! {ssl_passive, Socket}, + ok; + %% The result of the addition is out of bound. + [{_, A}] when is_integer(A), A < -32768 -> + throw(einval); + [{_, A}] when is_integer(A), A > 32767 -> + throw(einval); + _ -> + ok + end; + _ -> + ok + end. + getopts(gen_tcp, #sslsocket{pid = {ListenSocket, #config{emulated = Tracker}}}, Options) -> {SockOptNames, EmulatedOptNames} = split_options(Options), EmulatedOpts = get_emulated_opts(Tracker, EmulatedOptNames), @@ -208,7 +239,7 @@ start_link(Port, SockOpts, SslOpts) -> init([Port, Opts, SslOpts]) -> process_flag(trap_exit, true), true = link(Port), - {ok, #state{emulated_opts = Opts, port = Port, ssl_opts = SslOpts}}. + {ok, #state{emulated_opts = do_set_emulated_opts(Opts, []), port = Port, ssl_opts = SslOpts}}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec handle_call(msg(), from(), #state{}) -> {reply, reply(), #state{}}. @@ -303,9 +334,24 @@ split_options([Name | Opts], Emu, SocketOptNames, EmuOptNames) -> do_set_emulated_opts([], Opts) -> Opts; +do_set_emulated_opts([{active, N0} | Rest], Opts) when is_integer(N0) -> + N = update_active_n(N0, proplists:get_value(active, Opts, false)), + do_set_emulated_opts(Rest, [{active, N} | proplists:delete(active, Opts)]); do_set_emulated_opts([{Name,_} = Opt | Rest], Opts) -> do_set_emulated_opts(Rest, [Opt | proplists:delete(Name, Opts)]). +update_active_n(New, Current) -> + if + is_integer(Current), New + Current =< 0 -> + false; + is_integer(Current) -> + New + Current; + New =< 0 -> + false; + true -> + New + end. + get_socket_opts(_, [], _) -> []; get_socket_opts(ListenSocket, SockOptNames, Cb) -> @@ -365,6 +411,9 @@ validate_inet_option(header, Value) when not is_integer(Value) -> throw({error, {options, {header,Value}}}); validate_inet_option(active, Value) + when Value >= -32768, Value =< 32767 -> + ok; +validate_inet_option(active, Value) when Value =/= true, Value =/= false, Value =/= once -> throw({error, {options, {active,Value}}}); validate_inet_option(_, _) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl index d6b500748e..1bfd9a8b6d 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, {Major, Minor}, Fragment]), Mac. --spec suites(1|2|3) -> [ssl_cipher:cipher_suite()]. +-spec suites(1|2|3) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2 -> [ |