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-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl186
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl7
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate_db.erl1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl54
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl152
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl217
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl2
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl2
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl97
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl7
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl7
11 files changed, 405 insertions, 327 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
index b4437628c3..7e5929d708 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
@@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ transport_accept(#sslsocket{} = ListenSocket, Timeout) ->
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec ssl_accept(#sslsocket{}) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
--spec ssl_accept(#sslsocket{}, timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+-spec ssl_accept(#sslsocket{}, list() | timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
+-spec ssl_accept(port(), list(), timeout()) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: Performs accept on a ssl listen socket. e.i. performs
%% ssl handshake.
@@ -463,11 +464,102 @@ versions() ->
%%---------------------------------------------------------------
-spec renegotiate(#sslsocket{}) -> ok | {error, reason()}.
%%
-%% Description:
+%% Description: Initiates a renegotiation.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
renegotiate(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = new_ssl}) ->
ssl_connection:renegotiation(Pid).
+%%---------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec format_error({error, term()}) -> list().
+%%
+%% Description: Creates error string.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+format_error({error, Reason}) ->
+ format_error(Reason);
+format_error(Reason) when is_list(Reason) ->
+ Reason;
+format_error(closed) ->
+ "The connection is closed";
+format_error(ecacertfile) ->
+ "Own CA certificate file is invalid.";
+format_error(ecertfile) ->
+ "Own certificate file is invalid.";
+format_error(ekeyfile) ->
+ "Own private key file is invalid.";
+format_error(esslaccept) ->
+ "Server SSL handshake procedure between client and server failed.";
+format_error(esslconnect) ->
+ "Client SSL handshake procedure between client and server failed.";
+format_error({eoptions, Options}) ->
+ lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Error in options list: ~p~n", [Options]));
+
+%%%%%%%%%%%% START OLD SSL format_error %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+format_error(ebadsocket) ->
+ "Connection not found (internal error).";
+format_error(ebadstate) ->
+ "Connection not in connect state (internal error).";
+format_error(ebrokertype) ->
+ "Wrong broker type (internal error).";
+format_error(echaintoolong) ->
+ "The chain of certificates provided by peer is too long.";
+format_error(ecipher) ->
+ "Own list of specified ciphers is invalid.";
+format_error(ekeymismatch) ->
+ "Own private key does not match own certificate.";
+format_error(enoissuercert) ->
+ "Cannot find certificate of issuer of certificate provided by peer.";
+format_error(enoservercert) ->
+ "Attempt to do accept without having set own certificate.";
+format_error(enotlistener) ->
+ "Attempt to accept on a non-listening socket.";
+format_error(enoproxysocket) ->
+ "No proxy socket found (internal error or max number of file "
+ "descriptors exceeded).";
+format_error(enooptions) ->
+ "List of options is empty.";
+format_error(enotstarted) ->
+ "The SSL application has not been started.";
+format_error(eoptions) ->
+ "Invalid list of options.";
+format_error(epeercert) ->
+ "Certificate provided by peer is in error.";
+format_error(epeercertexpired) ->
+ "Certificate provided by peer has expired.";
+format_error(epeercertinvalid) ->
+ "Certificate provided by peer is invalid.";
+format_error(eselfsignedcert) ->
+ "Certificate provided by peer is self signed.";
+format_error(esslerrssl) ->
+ "SSL protocol failure. Typically because of a fatal alert from peer.";
+format_error(ewantconnect) ->
+ "Protocol wants to connect, which is not supported in this "
+ "version of the SSL application.";
+format_error(ex509lookup) ->
+ "Protocol wants X.509 lookup, which is not supported in this "
+ "version of the SSL application.";
+format_error({badcall, _Call}) ->
+ "Call not recognized for current mode (active or passive) and state "
+ "of socket.";
+format_error({badcast, _Cast}) ->
+ "Call not recognized for current mode (active or passive) and state "
+ "of socket.";
+
+format_error({badinfo, _Info}) ->
+ "Call not recognized for current mode (active or passive) and state "
+ "of socket.";
+
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% END OLD SSL format_error %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+
+format_error(Error) ->
+ case (catch inet:format_error(Error)) of
+ "unkknown POSIX" ++ _ ->
+ no_format(Error);
+ {'EXIT', _} ->
+ no_format(Error);
+ Other ->
+ Other
+ end.
+
%%%--------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -655,7 +747,7 @@ validate_option(depth, Value) when is_integer(Value),
validate_option(cert, Value) when Value == undefined;
is_binary(Value) ->
Value;
-validate_option(certfile, Value) when is_list(Value) ->
+validate_option(certfile, Value) when Value == undefined; is_list(Value) ->
Value;
validate_option(key, undefined) ->
@@ -798,7 +890,7 @@ cipher_suites(Version, [{_,_,_}| _] = Ciphers0) ->
Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0],
cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers);
cipher_suites(Version, [Cipher0 | _] = Ciphers0) when is_binary(Cipher0) ->
- Supported = ssl_cipher:suites(Version),
+ Supported = ssl_cipher:suites(Version) ++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(),
case [Cipher || Cipher <- Ciphers0, lists:member(Cipher, Supported)] of
[] ->
Supported;
@@ -814,92 +906,6 @@ cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers0) ->
Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite(C) || C <- string:tokens(Ciphers0, ":")],
cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers).
-format_error({error, Reason}) ->
- format_error(Reason);
-format_error(Reason) when is_list(Reason) ->
- Reason;
-format_error(closed) ->
- "The connection is closed";
-format_error(ecacertfile) ->
- "Own CA certificate file is invalid.";
-format_error(ecertfile) ->
- "Own certificate file is invalid.";
-format_error(ekeyfile) ->
- "Own private key file is invalid.";
-format_error(esslaccept) ->
- "Server SSL handshake procedure between client and server failed.";
-format_error(esslconnect) ->
- "Client SSL handshake procedure between client and server failed.";
-format_error({eoptions, Options}) ->
- lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Error in options list: ~p~n", [Options]));
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%% START OLD SSL format_error %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-format_error(ebadsocket) ->
- "Connection not found (internal error).";
-format_error(ebadstate) ->
- "Connection not in connect state (internal error).";
-format_error(ebrokertype) ->
- "Wrong broker type (internal error).";
-format_error(echaintoolong) ->
- "The chain of certificates provided by peer is too long.";
-format_error(ecipher) ->
- "Own list of specified ciphers is invalid.";
-format_error(ekeymismatch) ->
- "Own private key does not match own certificate.";
-format_error(enoissuercert) ->
- "Cannot find certificate of issuer of certificate provided by peer.";
-format_error(enoservercert) ->
- "Attempt to do accept without having set own certificate.";
-format_error(enotlistener) ->
- "Attempt to accept on a non-listening socket.";
-format_error(enoproxysocket) ->
- "No proxy socket found (internal error or max number of file "
- "descriptors exceeded).";
-format_error(enooptions) ->
- "List of options is empty.";
-format_error(enotstarted) ->
- "The SSL application has not been started.";
-format_error(eoptions) ->
- "Invalid list of options.";
-format_error(epeercert) ->
- "Certificate provided by peer is in error.";
-format_error(epeercertexpired) ->
- "Certificate provided by peer has expired.";
-format_error(epeercertinvalid) ->
- "Certificate provided by peer is invalid.";
-format_error(eselfsignedcert) ->
- "Certificate provided by peer is self signed.";
-format_error(esslerrssl) ->
- "SSL protocol failure. Typically because of a fatal alert from peer.";
-format_error(ewantconnect) ->
- "Protocol wants to connect, which is not supported in this "
- "version of the SSL application.";
-format_error(ex509lookup) ->
- "Protocol wants X.509 lookup, which is not supported in this "
- "version of the SSL application.";
-format_error({badcall, _Call}) ->
- "Call not recognized for current mode (active or passive) and state "
- "of socket.";
-format_error({badcast, _Cast}) ->
- "Call not recognized for current mode (active or passive) and state "
- "of socket.";
-
-format_error({badinfo, _Info}) ->
- "Call not recognized for current mode (active or passive) and state "
- "of socket.";
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% END OLD SSL format_error %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-format_error(Error) ->
- case (catch inet:format_error(Error)) of
- "unkknown POSIX" ++ _ ->
- no_format(Error);
- {'EXIT', _} ->
- no_format(Error);
- Other ->
- Other
- end.
-
no_format(Error) ->
lists:flatten(io_lib:format("No format string for error: \"~p\" available.", [Error])).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
index a4c54afb27..5571fb01f6 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
@@ -112,9 +112,10 @@ file_to_certificats(File) ->
{ok, List} = ssl_manager:cache_pem_file(File),
[Bin || {'Certificate', Bin, not_encrypted} <- List].
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec validate_extension(term(), #'Extension'{}, term()) -> {valid, term()} |
- {fail, tuple()} |
- {unknown, term()}.
+-spec validate_extension(term(), #'Extension'{} | {bad_cert, atom()} | valid,
+ term()) -> {valid, term()} |
+ {fail, tuple()} |
+ {unknown, term()}.
%%
%% Description: Validates ssl/tls specific extensions
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate_db.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate_db.erl
index 7d50c30d47..2a5a7f3394 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate_db.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate_db.erl
@@ -228,4 +228,3 @@ add_certs(Cert, Ref, CertsDb) ->
"it could not be correctly decoded.~n", []),
error_logger:info_report(Report)
end.
-
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
index 8230149304..9824e17fcd 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
-export([security_parameters/2, suite_definition/1,
decipher/5, cipher/4,
- suite/1, suites/1,
+ suite/1, suites/1, anonymous_suites/0,
openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1, filter/2]).
-compile(inline).
@@ -191,6 +191,19 @@ suites({3, N}) when N == 1; N == 2 ->
ssl_tls1:suites().
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec anonymous_suites() -> [cipher_suite()].
+%%
+%% Description: Returns a list of the anonymous cipher suites, only supported
+%% if explicitly set by user. Intended only for testing.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+anonymous_suites() ->
+ [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
+ ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA].
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> erl_cipher_suite().
%%
%% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition.
@@ -235,7 +248,20 @@ suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) ->
suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) ->
{dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha};
suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) ->
- {dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}.
+ {dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha};
+
+%%% DH-ANON deprecated by TLS spec and not available
+%%% by default, but good for testing purposes.
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) ->
+ {dh_anon, rc4_128, md5};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) ->
+ {dh_anon, des_cbc, sha};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) ->
+ {dh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) ->
+ {dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) ->
+ {dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec suite(erl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite().
@@ -266,12 +292,12 @@ suite({dhe_rsa, des_cbc, sha}) ->
?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA;
suite({dhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) ->
?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA;
-%% suite({dh_anon, rc4_128, md5}) ->
-%% ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5;
-%% suite({dh_anon, des40_cbc, sha}) ->
-%% ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA;
-%% suite({dh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) ->
-%% ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA;
+suite({dh_anon, rc4_128, md5}) ->
+ ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5;
+suite({dh_anon, des_cbc, sha}) ->
+ ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA;
+suite({dh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) ->
+ ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA;
%%% TSL V1.1 AES suites
suite({rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) ->
@@ -280,16 +306,16 @@ suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha}) ->
?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA;
suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) ->
?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA;
-%% suite({dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}) ->
-%% ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA;
+suite({dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}) ->
+ ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA;
suite({rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) ->
?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA;
suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha}) ->
?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA;
suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) ->
- ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.
-%% suite({dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) ->
-%% ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA;
+suite({dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) ->
+ ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec openssl_suite(openssl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite().
@@ -580,5 +606,3 @@ filter_rsa_suites(Use, KeyUse, CipherSuits, RsaSuites) ->
false ->
CipherSuits -- RsaSuites
end.
-
-
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
index c94199c336..3a9cada81e 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
session, % #session{} from ssl_handshake.hrl
session_cache, %
session_cache_cb, %
- negotiated_version, % #protocol_version{}
+ negotiated_version, % tls_version()
supported_protocol_versions, % [atom()]
client_certificate_requested = false,
key_algorithm, % atom as defined by cipher_suite
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
case ssl_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOptions, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
{Version, NewId, ConnectionStates} ->
- {KeyAlgorithm, _, _} =
+ {KeyAlgorithm, _, _} =
ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion, KeyAlgorithm),
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ certify(#certificate{} = Cert,
certify(#server_key_exchange{} = KeyExchangeMsg,
#state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version,
key_algorithm = Alg} = State0)
- when Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dhe_rsa ->
+ when Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dh_anon ->
case handle_server_key(KeyExchangeMsg, State0) of
#state{} = State1 ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State1),
@@ -613,25 +613,10 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPubl
#state{negotiated_version = Version,
diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{prime = P,
base = G},
- diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey},
- role = Role,
- session = Session,
- connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
-
- PMpint = crypto:mpint(P),
- GMpint = crypto:mpint(G),
- PremasterSecret = crypto:dh_compute_key(mpint_binary(ClientPublicDhKey),
- ServerDhPrivateKey,
- [PMpint, GMpint]),
-
- case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret,
- ConnectionStates0, Role) of
- {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
- State1 = State0#state{session =
- Session#session{master_secret
- = MasterSecret},
- connection_states = ConnectionStates},
+ diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} = State0) ->
+ case dh_master_secret(crypto:mpint(P), crypto:mpint(G), ClientPublicDhKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, State0) of
+ #state{} = State1 ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State1),
next_state(cipher, Record, State);
#alert{} = Alert ->
@@ -653,12 +638,10 @@ cipher(#certificate_verify{signature = Signature},
public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo,
negotiated_version = Version,
session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
- key_algorithm = Algorithm,
tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes
} = State0) ->
case ssl_handshake:certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo,
- Version, MasterSecret,
- Algorithm, Hashes) of
+ Version, MasterSecret, Hashes) of
valid ->
{Record, State} = next_record(State0),
next_state(cipher, Record, State);
@@ -1058,6 +1041,8 @@ init_certificates(#ssl_options{cacerts = CaCerts,
end,
init_certificates(Cert, CertDbRef, CacheRef, CertFile, Role).
+init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CacheRef, "", _) ->
+ {ok, CertDbRef, CacheRef, undefined};
init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CacheRef, CertFile, client) ->
try
@@ -1068,18 +1053,18 @@ init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CacheRef, CertFile, client) ->
end;
init_certificates(undefined, CertDbRef, CacheRef, CertFile, server) ->
- try
+ try
[OwnCert] = ssl_certificate:file_to_certificats(CertFile),
{ok, CertDbRef, CacheRef, OwnCert}
- catch
- Error:Reason ->
- handle_file_error(?LINE, Error, Reason, CertFile, ecertfile,
- erlang:get_stacktrace())
- end;
+ catch
+ Error:Reason ->
+ handle_file_error(?LINE, Error, Reason, CertFile, ecertfile,
+ erlang:get_stacktrace())
+ end;
init_certificates(Cert, CertDbRef, CacheRef, _, _) ->
{ok, CertDbRef, CacheRef, Cert}.
-init_private_key(undefined, "", _Password, client) ->
+init_private_key(undefined, "", _Password, _Client) ->
undefined;
init_private_key(undefined, KeyFile, Password, _) ->
try
@@ -1182,16 +1167,15 @@ verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client,
negotiated_version = Version,
own_cert = OwnCert,
socket = Socket,
- key_algorithm = KeyAlg,
private_key = PrivateKey,
session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes0} = State) ->
+
case ssl_handshake:client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret,
- Version, KeyAlg,
- PrivateKey, Hashes0) of
+ Version, PrivateKey, Hashes0) of
#certificate_verify{} = Verified ->
{BinVerified, ConnectionStates1, Hashes1} =
- encode_handshake(Verified, KeyAlg, Version,
+ encode_handshake(Verified, Version,
ConnectionStates0, Hashes0),
Transport:send(Socket, BinVerified),
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1,
@@ -1340,15 +1324,17 @@ server_hello_done(#state{transport_cb = Transport,
Transport:send(Socket, BinHelloDone),
State#state{connection_states = NewConnectionStates,
tls_handshake_hashes = NewHashes}.
-
-certify_server(#state{transport_cb = Transport,
- socket = Socket,
- negotiated_version = Version,
- connection_states = ConnectionStates,
- tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes,
- cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
- own_cert = OwnCert} = State) ->
+certify_server(#state{key_algorithm = dh_anon} = State) ->
+ State;
+
+certify_server(#state{transport_cb = Transport,
+ socket = Socket,
+ negotiated_version = Version,
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+ tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes,
+ cert_db_ref = CertDbRef,
+ own_cert = OwnCert} = State) ->
case ssl_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbRef, server) of
CertMsg = #certificate{} ->
{BinCertMsg, NewConnectionStates, NewHashes} =
@@ -1373,7 +1359,8 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
transport_cb = Transport
} = State)
when Algo == dhe_dss;
- Algo == dhe_rsa ->
+ Algo == dhe_rsa;
+ Algo == dh_anon ->
Keys = crypto:dh_generate_key([crypto:mpint(P), crypto:mpint(G)]),
ConnectionState =
@@ -1392,11 +1379,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo,
diffie_hellman_keys = Keys,
tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes1};
-
-%% key_algorithm = dh_anon is not supported. Should be by default disabled
-%% if support is implemented and then we need a key_exchange clause for it
-%% here.
-
key_exchange(#state{role = client,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
key_algorithm = rsa,
@@ -1419,7 +1401,8 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client,
socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport,
tls_handshake_hashes = Hashes0} = State)
when Algorithm == dhe_dss;
- Algorithm == dhe_rsa ->
+ Algorithm == dhe_rsa;
+ Algorithm == dh_anon ->
Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, {dh, DhPubKey}),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates1, Hashes1} =
encode_handshake(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hashes0),
@@ -1497,23 +1480,30 @@ save_verify_data(client, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbrev
save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbreviated) ->
ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates).
+handle_server_key(#server_key_exchange{params =
+ #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,
+ dh_g = G,
+ dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey},
+ signed_params = <<>>},
+ #state{key_algorithm = dh_anon} = State) ->
+ dh_master_secret(P, G, ServerPublicDhKey, undefined, State);
+
handle_server_key(
#server_key_exchange{params =
#server_dh_params{dh_p = P,
dh_g = G,
dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey},
signed_params = Signed},
- #state{session = Session, negotiated_version = Version, role = Role,
- public_key_info = PubKeyInfo,
+ #state{public_key_info = PubKeyInfo,
key_algorithm = KeyAlgo,
- connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) ->
PLen = size(P),
GLen = size(G),
YLen = size(ServerPublicDhKey),
ConnectionState =
- ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+ ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read),
SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters,
#security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
@@ -1527,29 +1517,11 @@ handle_server_key(
case verify_dh_params(Signed, Hash, PubKeyInfo) of
true ->
- PMpint = mpint_binary(P),
- GMpint = mpint_binary(G),
- Keys = {_, ClientDhPrivateKey} =
- crypto:dh_generate_key([PMpint,GMpint]),
- PremasterSecret =
- crypto:dh_compute_key(mpint_binary(ServerPublicDhKey),
- ClientDhPrivateKey, [PMpint, GMpint]),
- case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret,
- ConnectionStates0, Role) of
- {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
- State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys,
- session =
- Session#session{master_secret
- = MasterSecret},
- connection_states = ConnectionStates};
- #alert{} = Alert ->
- Alert
- end;
+ dh_master_secret(P, G, ServerPublicDhKey, undefined, State);
false ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)
end.
-
verify_dh_params(Signed, Hashes, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams}) ->
case public_key:decrypt_public(Signed, PubKey,
[{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) of
@@ -1561,6 +1533,30 @@ verify_dh_params(Signed, Hashes, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams}) ->
verify_dh_params(Signed, Hash, {?'id-dsa', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) ->
public_key:verify(Hash, none, Signed, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}).
+dh_master_secret(Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, undefined, State) ->
+ PMpint = mpint_binary(Prime),
+ GMpint = mpint_binary(Base),
+ Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} =
+ crypto:dh_generate_key([PMpint,GMpint]),
+ dh_master_secret(PMpint, GMpint, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys});
+
+dh_master_secret(PMpint, GMpint, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey,
+ #state{session = Session,
+ negotiated_version = Version, role = Role,
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
+ PremasterSecret =
+ crypto:dh_compute_key(mpint_binary(PublicDhKey), PrivateDhKey,
+ [PMpint, GMpint]),
+ case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret,
+ ConnectionStates0, Role) of
+ {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} ->
+ State#state{
+ session =
+ Session#session{master_secret = MasterSecret},
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates};
+ #alert{} = Alert ->
+ Alert
+ end.
cipher_role(client, Data, Session, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) ->
ConnectionStates = ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0),
@@ -1585,13 +1581,9 @@ encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
?DBG_TERM(#change_cipher_spec{}),
ssl_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates).
-encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version, ConnectionStates, Hashes) ->
- encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, null, Version,
- ConnectionStates, Hashes).
-
-encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, SigAlg, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hashes0) ->
+encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hashes0) ->
?DBG_TERM(HandshakeRec),
- Frag = ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version, SigAlg),
+ Frag = ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeRec, Version),
Hashes1 = ssl_handshake:update_hashes(Hashes0, Frag),
{E, ConnectionStates1} =
ssl_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
@@ -2179,7 +2171,7 @@ renegotiate(#state{role = server,
negotiated_version = Version,
connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) ->
HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(),
- Frag = ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version, null),
+ Frag = ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version),
Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_hashes(),
{BinMsg, ConnectionStates} =
ssl_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0),
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index b9b1ccb134..f8e5d585e7 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@
-export([master_secret/4, client_hello/5, server_hello/4, hello/4,
hello_request/0, certify/6, certificate/3,
- client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6,
+ client_certificate_verify/5, certificate_verify/5,
certificate_request/2, key_exchange/2, server_key_exchange_hash/2,
finished/4, verify_connection/5, get_tls_handshake/2,
- decode_client_key/3, server_hello_done/0, sig_alg/1,
- encode_handshake/3, init_hashes/0, update_hashes/2,
+ decode_client_key/3, server_hello_done/0,
+ encode_handshake/2, init_hashes/0, update_hashes/2,
decrypt_premaster_secret/2]).
-type tls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | #server_hello{} |
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ certificate(OwnCert, CertDbRef, client) ->
{error, _} ->
%% If no suitable certificate is available, the client
%% SHOULD send a certificate message containing no
- %% certificates. (chapter 7.4.6. rfc 4346)
+ %% certificates. (chapter 7.4.6. RFC 4346)
[]
end,
#certificate{asn1_certificates = Chain};
@@ -252,17 +252,17 @@ certificate(OwnCert, CertDbRef, server) ->
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec client_certificate_verify(undefined | der_cert(), binary(),
- tls_version(), key_algo(), private_key(),
+ tls_version(), private_key(),
{{binary(), binary()},{binary(), binary()}}) ->
#certificate_verify{} | ignore | #alert{}.
%%
%% Description: Creates a certificate_verify message, called by the client.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-client_certificate_verify(undefined, _, _, _, _, _) ->
+client_certificate_verify(undefined, _, _, _, _) ->
ignore;
-client_certificate_verify(_, _, _, _, undefined, _) ->
+client_certificate_verify(_, _, _, undefined, _) ->
ignore;
-client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version, Algorithm,
+client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version,
PrivateKey, {Hashes0, _}) ->
case public_key:pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(OwnCert) of
true ->
@@ -270,33 +270,30 @@ client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version, Algorithm,
false ->
Hashes =
calc_certificate_verify(Version, MasterSecret,
- Algorithm, Hashes0),
+ alg_oid(PrivateKey), Hashes0),
Signed = digitally_signed(Hashes, PrivateKey),
#certificate_verify{signature = Signed}
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-%% -spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), tls_version(),
-%% binary(), key_algo(),
-%% {_, {binary(), binary()}}) -> valid | #alert{}.
+-spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), tls_version(),
+ binary(), {_, {binary(), binary()}}) -> valid | #alert{}.
%%
%% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-certificate_verify(Signature, {_, PublicKey, _}, Version,
- MasterSecret, Algorithm, {_, Hashes0})
- when Algorithm == rsa;
- Algorithm == dhe_rsa ->
+certificate_verify(Signature, {?'rsaEncryption'= Algorithm, PublicKey, _}, Version,
+ MasterSecret, {_, Hashes0}) ->
Hashes = calc_certificate_verify(Version, MasterSecret,
Algorithm, Hashes0),
- case public_key:decrypt_public(Signature, PublicKey,
+ case public_key:decrypt_public(Signature, PublicKey,
[{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) of
Hashes ->
valid;
_ ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE)
end;
-certificate_verify(Signature, {_, PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}, Version,
- MasterSecret, dhe_dss = Algorithm, {_, Hashes0}) ->
+certificate_verify(Signature, {?'id-dsa' = Algorithm, PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}, Version,
+ MasterSecret, {_, Hashes0}) ->
Hashes = calc_certificate_verify(Version, MasterSecret,
Algorithm, Hashes0),
case public_key:verify(Hashes, none, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) of
@@ -355,15 +352,22 @@ key_exchange(server, {dh, {<<?UINT32(Len), PublicKey:Len/binary>>, _},
YLen = byte_size(PublicKey),
ServerDHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = PBin,
dh_g = GBin, dh_y = PublicKey},
- Hash =
- server_key_exchange_hash(KeyAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary,
- ServerRandom/binary,
- ?UINT16(PLen), PBin/binary,
- ?UINT16(GLen), GBin/binary,
- ?UINT16(YLen), PublicKey/binary>>),
- Signed = digitally_signed(Hash, PrivateKey),
- #server_key_exchange{params = ServerDHParams,
- signed_params = Signed}.
+
+ case KeyAlgo of
+ dh_anon ->
+ #server_key_exchange{params = ServerDHParams,
+ signed_params = <<>>};
+ _ ->
+ Hash =
+ server_key_exchange_hash(KeyAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary,
+ ServerRandom/binary,
+ ?UINT16(PLen), PBin/binary,
+ ?UINT16(GLen), GBin/binary,
+ ?UINT16(YLen), PublicKey/binary>>),
+ Signed = digitally_signed(Hash, PrivateKey),
+ #server_key_exchange{params = ServerDHParams,
+ signed_params = Signed}
+ end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec master_secret(tls_version(), #session{} | binary(), #connection_states{},
@@ -441,13 +445,12 @@ server_hello_done() ->
#server_hello_done{}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec encode_handshake(tls_handshake(), tls_version(), key_algo()) -> iolist().
+-spec encode_handshake(tls_handshake(), tls_version()) -> iolist().
%%
%% Description: Encode a handshake packet to binary
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-encode_handshake(Package, Version, KeyAlg) ->
- SigAlg = sig_alg(KeyAlg),
- {MsgType, Bin} = enc_hs(Package, Version, SigAlg),
+encode_handshake(Package, Version) ->
+ {MsgType, Bin} = enc_hs(Package, Version),
Len = byte_size(Bin),
[MsgType, ?uint24(Len), Bin].
@@ -474,6 +477,73 @@ decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) ->
dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec init_hashes() ->{{binary(), binary()}, {binary(), binary()}}.
+
+%%
+%% Description: Calls crypto hash (md5 and sha) init functions to
+%% initalize the hash context.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+init_hashes() ->
+ T = {crypto:md5_init(), crypto:sha_init()},
+ {T, T}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec update_hashes({{binary(), binary()}, {binary(), binary()}}, Data ::term()) ->
+ {{binary(), binary()}, {binary(), binary()}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Calls crypto hash (md5 and sha) update functions to
+%% update the hash context with Data.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+update_hashes(Hashes, % special-case SSL2 client hello
+ <<?CLIENT_HELLO, ?UINT24(_), ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
+ ?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
+ ?UINT16(CDLength),
+ CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
+ ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>) ->
+ update_hashes(Hashes,
+ <<?CLIENT_HELLO, ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
+ ?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
+ ?UINT16(CDLength),
+ CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
+ ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>);
+update_hashes({{MD50, SHA0}, _Prev}, Data) ->
+ ?DBG_HEX(Data),
+ {MD51, SHA1} = {crypto:md5_update(MD50, Data),
+ crypto:sha_update(SHA0, Data)},
+ ?DBG_HEX(crypto:md5_final(MD51)),
+ ?DBG_HEX(crypto:sha_final(SHA1)),
+ {{MD51, SHA1}, {MD50, SHA0}}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decrypt_premaster_secret(binary(), #'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> binary().
+
+%%
+%% Description: Public key decryption using the private key.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) ->
+ try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey,
+ [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
+ catch
+ _:_ ->
+ throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPTION_FAILED))
+ end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec server_key_exchange_hash(rsa | dhe_rsa| dhe_dss | dh_anon, binary()) -> binary().
+
+%%
+%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+server_key_exchange_hash(Algorithm, Value) when Algorithm == rsa;
+ Algorithm == dhe_rsa ->
+ MD5 = crypto:md5(Value),
+ SHA = crypto:sha(Value),
+ <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
+
+server_key_exchange_hash(dhe_dss, Value) ->
+ crypto:sha(Value).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
get_tls_handshake_aux(<<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length),
@@ -794,6 +864,13 @@ dec_hs(?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>) ->
dec_hs(?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary,
+ ?UINT16(0)>>) -> %% May happen if key_algorithm is dh_anon
+ #server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,dh_g = G,
+ dh_y = Y},
+ signed_params = <<>>};
+dec_hs(?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
+ ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
+ ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary,
?UINT16(Len), Sig:Len/binary>>) ->
#server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,dh_g = G,
dh_y = Y},
@@ -861,14 +938,6 @@ encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) ->
throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE))
end.
-decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) ->
- try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey,
- [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}])
- catch
- _:_ ->
- throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPTION_FAILED))
- end.
-
%% encode/decode stream of certificate data to/from list of certificate data
certs_to_list(ASN1Certs) ->
certs_to_list(ASN1Certs, []).
@@ -884,14 +953,14 @@ certs_from_list(ACList) ->
<<?UINT24(CertLen), Cert/binary>>
end || Cert <- ACList]).
-enc_hs(#hello_request{}, _Version, _) ->
+enc_hs(#hello_request{}, _Version) ->
{?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>};
enc_hs(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor},
random = Random,
session_id = SessionID,
cipher_suites = CipherSuites,
compression_methods = CompMethods,
- renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo}, _Version, _) ->
+ renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo}, _Version) ->
SIDLength = byte_size(SessionID),
BinCompMethods = list_to_binary(CompMethods),
CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods),
@@ -909,20 +978,20 @@ enc_hs(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor},
session_id = Session_ID,
cipher_suite = Cipher_suite,
compression_method = Comp_method,
- renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo}, _Version, _) ->
+ renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo}, _Version) ->
SID_length = byte_size(Session_ID),
Extensions = hello_extensions(RenegotiationInfo),
ExtensionsBin = enc_hello_extensions(Extensions),
{?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary,
?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID/binary,
Cipher_suite/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method), ExtensionsBin/binary>>};
-enc_hs(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1CertList}, _Version, _) ->
+enc_hs(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1CertList}, _Version) ->
ASN1Certs = certs_from_list(ASN1CertList),
ACLen = erlang:iolist_size(ASN1Certs),
{?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>};
enc_hs(#server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{
dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y},
- signed_params = SignedParams}, _Version, _) ->
+ signed_params = SignedParams}, _Version) ->
PLen = byte_size(P),
GLen = byte_size(G),
YLen = byte_size(Y),
@@ -934,21 +1003,21 @@ enc_hs(#server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{
};
enc_hs(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes,
certificate_authorities = CertAuths},
- _Version, _) ->
+ _Version) ->
CertTypesLen = byte_size(CertTypes),
CertAuthsLen = byte_size(CertAuths),
{?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
<<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes/binary,
?UINT16(CertAuthsLen), CertAuths/binary>>
};
-enc_hs(#server_hello_done{}, _Version, _) ->
+enc_hs(#server_hello_done{}, _Version) ->
{?SERVER_HELLO_DONE, <<>>};
-enc_hs(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version, _) ->
+enc_hs(#client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version) ->
{?CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, enc_cke(ExchangeKeys, Version)};
-enc_hs(#certificate_verify{signature = BinSig}, _, _) ->
+enc_hs(#certificate_verify{signature = BinSig}, _) ->
EncSig = enc_bin_sig(BinSig),
{?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, EncSig};
-enc_hs(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, _Version, _) ->
+enc_hs(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, _Version) ->
{?FINISHED, VerifyData}.
enc_cke(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS},{3, 0}) ->
@@ -987,29 +1056,6 @@ enc_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Info} | Rest
Len = InfoLen +1,
enc_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(InfoLen), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>).
-init_hashes() ->
- T = {crypto:md5_init(), crypto:sha_init()},
- {T, T}.
-
-update_hashes(Hashes, % special-case SSL2 client hello
- <<?CLIENT_HELLO, ?UINT24(_), ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
- ?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
- ?UINT16(CDLength),
- CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
- ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>) ->
- update_hashes(Hashes,
- <<?CLIENT_HELLO, ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor),
- ?UINT16(CSLength), ?UINT16(0),
- ?UINT16(CDLength),
- CipherSuites:CSLength/binary,
- ChallengeData:CDLength/binary>>);
-update_hashes({{MD50, SHA0}, _Prev}, Data) ->
- ?DBG_HEX(Data),
- {MD51, SHA1} = {crypto:md5_update(MD50, Data),
- crypto:sha_update(SHA0, Data)},
- ?DBG_HEX(crypto:md5_final(MD51)),
- ?DBG_HEX(crypto:sha_final(SHA1)),
- {{MD51, SHA1}, {MD50, SHA0}}.
from_3bytes(Bin3) ->
from_3bytes(Bin3, []).
@@ -1098,28 +1144,10 @@ calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, _, Algorithm, Hashes)
when N == 1; N == 2 ->
ssl_tls1:certificate_verify(Algorithm, Hashes).
-server_key_exchange_hash(Algorithm, Value) when Algorithm == rsa;
- Algorithm == dhe_rsa ->
- MD5 = crypto:md5(Value),
- SHA = crypto:sha(Value),
- <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
-
-server_key_exchange_hash(dhe_dss, Value) ->
- crypto:sha(Value).
-
-sig_alg(dh_anon) ->
- ?SIGNATURE_ANONYMOUS;
-sig_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == rsa ->
- ?SIGNATURE_RSA;
-sig_alg(dhe_dss) ->
- ?SIGNATURE_DSA;
-sig_alg(_) ->
- ?NULL.
-
key_exchange_alg(rsa) ->
?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA;
key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss;
- Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa ->
+ Alg == dh_dss; Alg == dh_rsa; Alg == dh_anon ->
?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN;
key_exchange_alg(_) ->
?NULL.
@@ -1133,3 +1161,8 @@ apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0, SslState) ->
{unknown, UserState} ->
{unknown, {SslState, UserState}}
end.
+
+alg_oid(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
+ ?'rsaEncryption';
+alg_oid(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) ->
+ ?'id-dsa'.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
index ddb05e70f6..d2dee4d861 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
-type tls_atom_version() :: sslv3 | tlsv1.
-type cache_ref() :: term().
-type certdb_ref() :: term().
--type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss.
+-type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | dh_anon.
-type enum_algo() :: integer().
-type public_key() :: #'RSAPublicKey'{} | integer().
-type public_key_params() :: #'Dss-Parms'{} | term().
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
index 0116466677..3b02d96562 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ server_session_id(Port, SuggestedSessionId, SslOpts) ->
call({server_session_id, Port, SuggestedSessionId, SslOpts}).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec register_session(port_num(), #session{}) -> ok.
-spec register_session(host(), port_num(), #session{}) -> ok.
%%
%% Description: Make the session available for reuse.
@@ -132,6 +133,7 @@ register_session(Host, Port, Session) ->
register_session(Port, Session) ->
cast({register_session, Port, Session}).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec invalidate_session(port_num(), #session{}) -> ok.
-spec invalidate_session(host(), port_num(), #session{}) -> ok.
%%
%% Description: Make the session unavilable for reuse.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
index acd0d49c19..803baeb09c 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
@@ -497,6 +497,66 @@ decode_cipher_text(CipherText, ConnnectionStates0) ->
#alert{} = Alert ->
Alert
end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_data(iolist(), tls_version(), #connection_states{}, integer()) ->
+ {iolist(), iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes data to send on the ssl-socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_data(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt)
+ when byte_size(Frag) < (?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH - 2048) ->
+ case encode_plain_text(?APPLICATION_DATA,Version,Frag,ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt) of
+ {renegotiate, Data} ->
+ {[], Data, ConnectionStates};
+ {Msg, CS} ->
+ {Msg, [], CS}
+ end;
+
+encode_data(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt) when is_binary(Frag) ->
+ Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH - 2048),
+ encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt);
+
+encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) when is_list(Data) ->
+ {ConnectionStates, EncodedMsg, NotEncdedData} =
+ lists:foldl(fun(B, {CS0, Encoded, Rest}) ->
+ case encode_plain_text(?APPLICATION_DATA,
+ Version, B, CS0, RenegotiateAt) of
+ {renegotiate, NotEnc} ->
+ {CS0, Encoded, [NotEnc | Rest]};
+ {Enc, CS1} ->
+ {CS1, [Enc | Encoded], Rest}
+ end
+ end, {ConnectionStates0, [], []}, Data),
+ {lists:reverse(EncodedMsg), lists:reverse(NotEncdedData), ConnectionStates}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_handshake(iolist(), tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+ {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes a handshake message to send on the ssl-socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+ encode_plain_text(?HANDSHAKE, Version, Frag, ConnectionStates).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_alert_record(#alert{}, tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+ {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes an alert message to send on the ssl-socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_alert_record(#alert{level = Level, description = Description},
+ Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+ encode_plain_text(?ALERT, Version, <<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description)>>,
+ ConnectionStates).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec encode_change_cipher_spec(tls_version(), #connection_states{}) ->
+ {iolist(), #connection_states{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encodes a change_cipher_spec-message to send on the ssl socket.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates) ->
+ encode_plain_text(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, Version, <<1:8>>, ConnectionStates).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
@@ -550,43 +610,6 @@ split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Acc) ->
lists:reverse(Acc, [Bin])
end.
-encode_data(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt)
- when byte_size(Frag) < (?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH - 2048) ->
- case encode_plain_text(?APPLICATION_DATA,Version,Frag,ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt) of
- {renegotiate, Data} ->
- {[], Data, ConnectionStates};
- {Msg, CS} ->
- {Msg, [], CS}
- end;
-
-encode_data(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt) when is_binary(Frag) ->
- Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH - 2048),
- encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt);
-
-encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) when is_list(Data) ->
- {ConnectionStates, EncodedMsg, NotEncdedData} =
- lists:foldl(fun(B, {CS0, Encoded, Rest}) ->
- case encode_plain_text(?APPLICATION_DATA,
- Version, B, CS0, RenegotiateAt) of
- {renegotiate, NotEnc} ->
- {CS0, Encoded, [NotEnc | Rest]};
- {Enc, CS1} ->
- {CS1, [Enc | Encoded], Rest}
- end
- end, {ConnectionStates0, [], []}, Data),
- {lists:reverse(EncodedMsg), lists:reverse(NotEncdedData), ConnectionStates}.
-
-encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
- encode_plain_text(?HANDSHAKE, Version, Frag, ConnectionStates).
-
-encode_alert_record(#alert{level = Level, description = Description},
- Version, ConnectionStates) ->
- encode_plain_text(?ALERT, Version, <<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description)>>,
- ConnectionStates).
-
-encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates) ->
- encode_plain_text(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, Version, <<1:8>>, ConnectionStates).
-
encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, ConnectionStates, RenegotiateAt) ->
#connection_states{current_write =
#connection_state{sequence_number = Num}} = ConnectionStates,
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl
index 1add203fb0..f3cb6ad66e 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_ssl3.erl
@@ -79,10 +79,9 @@ finished(Role, MasterSecret, {MD5Hash, SHAHash}) ->
SHA = handshake_hash(?SHA, MasterSecret, Sender, SHAHash),
<<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>.
--spec certificate_verify(key_algo(), binary(), {binary(), binary()}) -> binary().
+-spec certificate_verify(OID::tuple(), binary(), {binary(), binary()}) -> binary().
-certificate_verify(Algorithm, MasterSecret, {MD5Hash, SHAHash})
- when Algorithm == rsa; Algorithm == dhe_rsa ->
+certificate_verify(?'rsaEncryption', MasterSecret, {MD5Hash, SHAHash}) ->
%% md5_hash
%% MD5(master_secret + pad_2 +
%% MD5(handshake_messages + master_secret + pad_1));
@@ -94,7 +93,7 @@ certificate_verify(Algorithm, MasterSecret, {MD5Hash, SHAHash})
SHA = handshake_hash(?SHA, MasterSecret, undefined, SHAHash),
<<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
-certificate_verify(dhe_dss, MasterSecret, {_, SHAHash}) ->
+certificate_verify(?'id-dsa', MasterSecret, {_, SHAHash}) ->
%% sha_hash
%% SHA(master_secret + pad_2 +
%% SHA(handshake_messages + master_secret + pad_1));
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl
index d1bc0730ba..dd66418dd8 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls1.erl
@@ -60,15 +60,14 @@ finished(Role, MasterSecret, {MD5Hash, SHAHash}) ->
SHA = hash_final(?SHA, SHAHash),
prf(MasterSecret, finished_label(Role), [MD5, SHA], 12).
--spec certificate_verify(key_algo(), {binary(), binary()}) -> binary().
+-spec certificate_verify(OID::tuple(), {binary(), binary()}) -> binary().
-certificate_verify(Algorithm, {MD5Hash, SHAHash}) when Algorithm == rsa;
- Algorithm == dhe_rsa ->
+certificate_verify(?'rsaEncryption', {MD5Hash, SHAHash}) ->
MD5 = hash_final(?MD5, MD5Hash),
SHA = hash_final(?SHA, SHAHash),
<<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>;
-certificate_verify(dhe_dss, {_, SHAHash}) ->
+certificate_verify(?'id-dsa', {_, SHAHash}) ->
hash_final(?SHA, SHAHash).
-spec setup_keys(binary(), binary(), binary(), integer(),