diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/src')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl | 17 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl | 87 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl | 22 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl | 31 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl | 58 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl | 144 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl | 189 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_logger.erl | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl | 135 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_1_3.erl | 96 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl | 43 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl | 857 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.hrl | 47 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl | 23 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.erl | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl | 22 |
19 files changed, 1373 insertions, 424 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl index e070006900..b220691e79 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ -export([encode_alert/3, send_alert/2, send_alert_in_connection/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). %% Data handling --export([next_record/1, socket/4, setopts/3, getopts/3]). +-export([socket/4, setopts/3, getopts/3]). %% gen_statem state functions -export([init/3, error/3, downgrade/3, %% Initiation and take down states @@ -451,11 +451,11 @@ init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, HelloVersion = dtls_record:hello_version(Version, SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), State1 = prepare_flight(State0#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}), {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State1#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = HelloVersion}}), - State3 = State2#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, %% RequestedVersion + State = State2#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, %% RequestedVersion session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}, start_or_recv_from = From}, - next_event(hello, no_record, State3, [{{timeout, handshake}, Timeout, close} | Actions]); + next_event(hello, no_record, State, [{{timeout, handshake}, Timeout, close} | Actions]); init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, protocol_specific = PS} = State) -> Result = gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, @@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{cookie = <<>>, VerifyRequest = dtls_handshake:hello_verify_request(Cookie, ?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_VERSION), State1 = prepare_flight(State0#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}), {State, Actions} = send_handshake(VerifyRequest, State1), - next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, + next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{ tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history()}}, @@ -836,9 +836,12 @@ initial_flight_state(_) -> next_dtls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{ dtls_record_buffer = Buf0, dtls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + static_env = #static_env{data_tag = DataTag}, ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) -> case dtls_record:get_dtls_records(Data, - acceptable_record_versions(StateName, State0), + {DataTag, StateName, Version, + [dtls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_AVAILABLE_DATAGRAM_VERSIONS]}, Buf0, SslOpts) of {Records, Buf1} -> CT1 = CT0 ++ Records, @@ -849,10 +852,6 @@ next_dtls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{ Alert end. -acceptable_record_versions(hello, _) -> - [dtls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_AVAILABLE_DATAGRAM_VERSIONS]; -acceptable_record_versions(_, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}) -> - [Version]. dtls_handshake_events(Packets) -> lists:map(fun(Packet) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl index d8c0e30973..4a381745d4 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl @@ -255,7 +255,8 @@ enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods), BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites), CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites), - ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions), + ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions, + dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version({Major, Minor})), {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl index c6431b55a9..94b350eaa5 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl @@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ handle_info({Transport, Socket, IP, InPortNo, _} = Msg, #state{listener = Socket handle_info({PassiveTag, Socket}, #state{active_n = N, listener = Socket, - transport = {_,_,_, udp_error, PassiveTag}}) -> - next_datagram(Socket, N); - + transport = {_, _, _, _, PassiveTag}} = State) -> + next_datagram(Socket, N), + {noreply, State}; %% UDP socket does not have a connection and should not receive an econnreset %% This does however happens on some windows versions. Just ignoring it %% appears to make things work as expected! diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl index a4846f42c5..8b8db7b2de 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl @@ -162,26 +162,16 @@ current_connection_state_epoch(#{current_write := #{epoch := Epoch}}, Epoch. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec get_dtls_records(binary(), [ssl_record:ssl_version()], binary(), +-spec get_dtls_records(binary(), {atom(), atom(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), [ssl_record:ssl_version()]}, binary(), #ssl_options{}) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Given old buffer and new data from UDP/SCTP, packs up a records %% and returns it as a list of tls_compressed binaries also returns leftover %% data %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -get_dtls_records(Data, Versions, Buffer, SslOpts) -> +get_dtls_records(Data, Vinfo, Buffer, SslOpts) -> BinData = list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), - case erlang:byte_size(BinData) of - N when N >= 3 -> - case assert_version(BinData, Versions) of - true -> - get_dtls_records_aux(BinData, [], SslOpts); - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) - end; - _ -> - get_dtls_records_aux(BinData, [], SslOpts) - end. + get_dtls_records_aux(Vinfo, BinData, [], SslOpts). %%==================================================================== %% Encoding DTLS records @@ -405,52 +395,49 @@ initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> client_verify_data => undefined, server_verify_data => undefined }. -assert_version(<<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), _/binary>>, Versions) -> - is_acceptable_version({MajVer, MinVer}, Versions). -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?APPLICATION_DATA),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>> = RawDTLSRecord, - Acc, SslOpts) -> - ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, inbound, 'record', [RawDTLSRecord]), - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc], SslOpts); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?HANDSHAKE),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), - Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>> = RawDTLSRecord, - Acc, SslOpts) when MajVer >= 128 -> - ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, inbound, 'record', [RawDTLSRecord]), - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc], SslOpts); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?ALERT),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, - Rest/binary>> = RawDTLSRecord, Acc, SslOpts) -> +get_dtls_records_aux({DataTag, StateName, _, Versions} = Vinfo, <<?BYTE(Type),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>> = RawDTLSRecord, + Acc, SslOpts) when ((StateName == hello) orelse + ((StateName == certify) andalso (DataTag == udp)) orelse + ((StateName == abbreviated) andalso(DataTag == udp))) + andalso + ((Type == ?HANDSHAKE) orelse + (Type == ?ALERT)) -> ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, inbound, 'record', [RawDTLSRecord]), - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc], SslOpts); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + case is_acceptable_version({MajVer, MinVer}, Versions) of + true -> + get_dtls_records_aux(Vinfo, Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = Type, + version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, + fragment = Data} | Acc], SslOpts); + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + end; +get_dtls_records_aux({_, _, Version, _} = Vinfo, <<?BYTE(Type),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>> = RawDTLSRecord, - Acc, SslOpts) -> + Acc, SslOpts) when (Type == ?APPLICATION_DATA) orelse + (Type == ?HANDSHAKE) orelse + (Type == ?ALERT) orelse + (Type == ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) -> ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, inbound, 'record', [RawDTLSRecord]), - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc], SslOpts); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer), + case {MajVer, MinVer} of + Version -> + get_dtls_records_aux(Vinfo, Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = Type, + version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, + fragment = Data} | Acc], SslOpts); + _ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + end; +get_dtls_records_aux(_, <<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer), ?UINT16(Length), _/binary>>, _Acc, _) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); -get_dtls_records_aux(Data, Acc, _) -> +get_dtls_records_aux(_, Data, Acc, _) -> case size(Data) =< ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH + ?INITIAL_BYTES of true -> {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl index 6af65e09f2..7ff9aed8ea 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl @@ -125,7 +125,11 @@ protocol_extensions/0, session_id/0, error_alert/0, - srp_param_type/0]). + tls_alert/0, + srp_param_type/0, + named_curve/0, + sign_scheme/0, + group/0]). %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -191,7 +195,8 @@ | rsa_pss_pss_sha384 | rsa_pss_pss_sha512 | rsa_pkcs1_sha1 - | ecdsa_sha1. + | ecdsa_sha1. % exported + -type kex_algo() :: rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa | ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa | @@ -236,10 +241,10 @@ sect163r2 | secp160k1 | secp160r1 | - secp160r2. + secp160r2. % exported -type group() :: secp256r1 | secp384r1 | secp521r1 | ffdhe2048 | - ffdhe3072 | ffdhe4096 | ffdhe6144 | ffdhe8192. + ffdhe3072 | ffdhe4096 | ffdhe6144 | ffdhe8192. % exported -type srp_param_type() :: srp_1024 | srp_1536 | @@ -279,7 +284,7 @@ bad_certificate_status_response | bad_certificate_hash_value | unknown_psk_identity | - no_application_protocol. + no_application_protocol. % exported %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -type common_option() :: {protocol, protocol()} | @@ -292,6 +297,7 @@ {ciphers, cipher_suites()} | {eccs, [named_curve()]} | {signature_algs_cert, signature_schemes()} | + {supported_groups, supported_groups()} | {secure_renegotiate, secure_renegotiation()} | {depth, allowed_cert_chain_length()} | {verify_fun, custom_verify()} | @@ -338,6 +344,7 @@ -type protocol_versions() :: [protocol_version()]. -type signature_algs() :: [{hash(), sign_algo()}]. -type signature_schemes() :: [sign_scheme()]. +-type supported_groups() :: [group()]. -type custom_user_lookup() :: {Lookupfun :: fun(), UserState :: any()}. -type padding_check() :: boolean(). -type beast_mitigation() :: one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled. @@ -975,7 +982,8 @@ cipher_suites(all) -> %% Description: Returns all default and all supported cipher suites for a %% TLS/DTLS version %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -cipher_suites(Base, Version) when Version == 'tlsv1.2'; +cipher_suites(Base, Version) when Version == 'tlsv1.3'; + Version == 'tlsv1.2'; Version == 'tlsv1.1'; Version == tlsv1; Version == sslv3 -> @@ -1909,7 +1917,7 @@ validate_option(Opt, Value) -> throw({error, {options, {Opt, Value}}}). handle_cb_info({V1, V2, V3, V4}, {_,_,_,_,_}) -> - {V1,V2,V3,V4, list_to_atom(atom_to_list(V2) ++ "passive")}; + {V1,V2,V3,V4, list_to_atom(atom_to_list(V2) ++ "_passive")}; handle_cb_info(CbInfo, _) -> CbInfo. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl index 06b1b005a5..2d57b72f7b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ -include("ssl_record.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). --export([decode/1, own_alert_txt/1, alert_txt/1, reason_code/2]). +-export([decode/1, + own_alert_txt/1, + alert_txt/1, + alert_txt/4, + reason_code/4]). %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API @@ -48,20 +52,29 @@ decode(Bin) -> decode(Bin, [], 0). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server) -> -%% {tls_alert, unicode:chardata()} | closed. -%-spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server) -> closed | {essl, string()}. +-spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server, ProtocolName::string(), StateName::atom()) -> + {tls_alert, {atom(), unicode:chardata()}} | closed. %% %% Description: Returns the error reason that will be returned to the %% user. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -reason_code(#alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY}, _) -> +reason_code(#alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY}, _, _, _) -> closed; -reason_code(#alert{description = Description, role = Role} = Alert, Role) -> - {tls_alert, {description_atom(Description), own_alert_txt(Alert)}}; -reason_code(#alert{description = Description} = Alert, Role) -> - {tls_alert, {description_atom(Description), alert_txt(Alert#alert{role = Role})}}. +reason_code(#alert{description = Description, role = Role} = Alert, Role, ProtocolName, StateName) -> + Txt = lists:flatten(alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, own_alert_txt(Alert))), + {tls_alert, {description_atom(Description), Txt}}; +reason_code(#alert{description = Description} = Alert, Role, ProtocolName, StateName) -> + Txt = lists:flatten(alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, alert_txt(Alert))), + {tls_alert, {description_atom(Description), Txt}}. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec alert_txt(string(), server | client, StateNam::atom(), string()) -> string(). +%% +%% Description: Generates alert text for log or string part of error return. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt) -> + io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt]). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec own_alert_txt(#alert{}) -> string(). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl index 21db887bb5..c16e2331ff 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ cipher_init/3, nonce_seed/2, decipher/6, cipher/5, aead_encrypt/6, aead_decrypt/6, suites/1, all_suites/1, crypto_support_filters/0, chacha_suites/1, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, psk_suites_anon/1, - srp_suites/0, srp_suites_anon/0, + srp_suites/1, srp_suites_anon/1, rc4_suites/1, des_suites/1, rsa_suites/1, filter/3, filter_suites/1, filter_suites/2, hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1, is_acceptable_hash/2, is_fallback/1, @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ all_suites({3, _} = Version) -> suites(Version) ++ chacha_suites(Version) ++ psk_suites(Version) - ++ srp_suites() + ++ srp_suites(Version) ++ rc4_suites(Version) ++ des_suites(Version) ++ rsa_suites(Version); @@ -313,8 +313,8 @@ chacha_suites(_) -> %% Description: Returns a list of the anonymous cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user. Intended only for testing. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -anonymous_suites({3, N}) -> - srp_suites_anon() ++ anonymous_suites(N); +anonymous_suites({3, N} = Version) -> + srp_suites_anon(Version) ++ anonymous_suites(N); anonymous_suites({254, _} = Version) -> dtls_v1:anonymous_suites(Version); anonymous_suites(4) -> @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ psk_suites(_) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- psk_suites_anon({3, N}) -> psk_suites_anon(N); -psk_suites_anon(3) -> +psk_suites_anon(3 = N) -> [ ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, @@ -401,8 +401,8 @@ psk_suites_anon(3) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - ] ++ psk_suites_anon(0); -psk_suites_anon(_) -> + ] ++ psk_suites_anon(N-1); +psk_suites_anon(N) when N > 0 -> [?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, @@ -413,14 +413,18 @@ psk_suites_anon(_) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]. + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]; +psk_suites_anon(0) -> + []. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec srp_suites() -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. +-spec srp_suites(tls_record:tls_version()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the SRP cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -srp_suites() -> +srp_suites({3,0}) -> + []; +srp_suites(_) -> [?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, @@ -429,12 +433,14 @@ srp_suites() -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec srp_suites_anon() -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. +-spec srp_suites_anon(tls_record:tls_version()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the SRP anonymous cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -srp_suites_anon() -> +srp_suites_anon({3,0}) -> + []; +srp_suites_anon(_) -> [?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA]. @@ -923,6 +929,12 @@ signature_scheme(rsa_pss_pss_sha384) -> ?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384; signature_scheme(rsa_pss_pss_sha512) -> ?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512; signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha1) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA1; signature_scheme(ecdsa_sha1) -> ?ECDSA_SHA1; +%% Handling legacy signature algorithms +signature_scheme({Hash0, Sign0}) -> + Hash = hash_algorithm(Hash0), + Sign = sign_algorithm(Sign0), + <<?UINT16(SigAlg)>> = <<?BYTE(Hash),?BYTE(Sign)>>, + SigAlg; signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA256) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha256; signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA384) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha384; signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA512) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha512; @@ -962,18 +974,30 @@ scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_pss_sha256) -> {sha256, rsa_pss_pss, undefined}; scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_pss_sha384) -> {sha384, rsa_pss_pss, undefined}; scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_pss_sha512) -> {sha512, rsa_pss_pss, undefined}; scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha1) -> {sha1, rsa_pkcs1, undefined}; -scheme_to_components(ecdsa_sha1) -> {sha1, ecdsa, undefined}. +scheme_to_components(ecdsa_sha1) -> {sha1, ecdsa, undefined}; +%% Handling legacy signature algorithms +scheme_to_components({Hash,Sign}) -> {Hash, Sign, undefined}. -%% TODO: Add support for EC and RSA-SSA signatures -signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?sha1WithRSAEncryption}) -> - rsa_pkcs1_sha1; +%% TODO: Add support for ed25519, ed448, rsa_pss* signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?sha256WithRSAEncryption}) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha256; signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?sha384WithRSAEncryption}) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha384; signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?sha512WithRSAEncryption}) -> - rsa_pkcs1_sha512. + rsa_pkcs1_sha512; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'ecdsa-with-SHA256'}) -> + ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'ecdsa-with-SHA384'}) -> + ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'ecdsa-with-SHA512'}) -> + ecdsa_secp512r1_sha512; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'sha-1WithRSAEncryption'}) -> + rsa_pkcs1_sha1; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?sha1WithRSAEncryption}) -> + rsa_pkcs1_sha1; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'ecdsa-with-SHA1'}) -> + ecdsa_sha1. %% RFC 5246: 6.2.3.2. CBC Block Cipher diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl index a5f754d2e3..2483509228 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ handshake(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]} = Socket, Timeout) -> connected -> {ok, Socket}; {ok, Ext} -> - {ok, Socket, Ext}; + {ok, Socket, no_records(Ext)}; Error -> Error end. @@ -328,34 +328,33 @@ prf(ConnectionPid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> %%==================================================================== %% Alert and close handling %%==================================================================== -handle_own_alert(Alert, _, StateName, +handle_own_alert(Alert0, _, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, protocol_cb = Connection}, ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> try %% Try to tell the other side - send_alert(Alert, StateName, State) + send_alert(Alert0, StateName, State) catch _:_ -> %% Can crash if we are in a uninitialized state ignore end, try %% Try to tell the local user - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, - Alert#alert{role = Role}), + Alert = Alert0#alert{role = Role}, + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert,StateName, State) catch _:_ -> ok end, {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State}. -handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, _, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - protocol_cb = Connection, - tracker = Tracker}, - handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {false, first}}, - start_or_recv_from = StartFrom} = State) -> +handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + protocol_cb = Connection, + tracker = Tracker}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {false, first}}, + start_or_recv_from = StartFrom} = State) -> Pids = Connection:pids(State), - alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role, Connection); + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection); handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, socket = Socket, @@ -366,9 +365,9 @@ handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = socket_options = Opts, start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State) -> Pids = Connection:pids(State), - alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role, Connection). + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection). -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert0, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, socket = Socket, host = Host, @@ -382,11 +381,11 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, session = Session, socket_options = Opts} = State) -> invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session), + Alert = Alert0#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}, log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), - StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + StateName, Alert), Pids = Connection:pids(State), - alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, - opposite_role(Role), Connection), + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection), {stop, {shutdown, normal}, State}; handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, @@ -396,13 +395,14 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, StateName, State) -> handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), {stop,{shutdown, peer_close}, State}; -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert0, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, protocol_cb = Connection}, handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, internal}}, ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> + Alert = Alert0#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}, log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), {stop,{shutdown, peer_close}, State}; @@ -614,7 +614,8 @@ read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize, Rear0, Bin0) -> <<SizeA:32, DataA:SizeA/binary, SizeB:32, DataB:SizeB/binary, SizeC:32, DataC:SizeC/binary, - SizeD:32, DataD:SizeD/binary, Rest/binary>> -> + SizeD:32, DataD:SizeD/binary, Rest/binary>> + when 0 < SizeA, 0 < SizeB, 0 < SizeC, 0 < SizeD -> %% We have 4 complete packets in the first binary erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataA), erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataB), @@ -624,7 +625,8 @@ read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize, Rear0, Bin0) -> DHandle, Front0, BufferSize - (4*4+SizeA+SizeB+SizeC+SizeD), Rear0, Rest); <<SizeA:32, DataA:SizeA/binary, SizeB:32, DataB:SizeB/binary, - SizeC:32, DataC:SizeC/binary, Rest/binary>> -> + SizeC:32, DataC:SizeC/binary, Rest/binary>> + when 0 < SizeA, 0 < SizeB, 0 < SizeC -> %% We have 3 complete packets in the first binary erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataA), erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataB), @@ -632,7 +634,8 @@ read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize, Rear0, Bin0) -> read_application_dist_data( DHandle, Front0, BufferSize - (3*4+SizeA+SizeB+SizeC), Rear0, Rest); <<SizeA:32, DataA:SizeA/binary, - SizeB:32, DataB:SizeB/binary, Rest/binary>> -> + SizeB:32, DataB:SizeB/binary, Rest/binary>> + when 0 < SizeA, 0 < SizeB -> %% We have 2 complete packets in the first binary erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataA), erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataB), @@ -643,13 +646,13 @@ read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize, Rear0, Bin0) -> %% Basic one packet code path <<Size:32, Data:Size/binary, Rest/binary>> -> %% We have a complete packet in the first binary - erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, Data), + 0 < Size andalso erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, Data), read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize - (4+Size), Rear0, Rest); <<Size:32, FirstData/binary>> when 4+Size =< BufferSize -> %% We have a complete packet in the buffer %% - fetch the missing content from the buffer front {Data,Front,Rear} = iovec_from_front(Size - byte_size(FirstData), Front0, Rear0, [FirstData]), - erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, Data), + 0 < Size andalso erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, Data), read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front, BufferSize - (4+Size), Rear); <<Bin/binary>> -> %% In OTP-21 the match context reuse optimization fails if we use Bin0 in recursion, so here we @@ -665,23 +668,61 @@ read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize, Rear0, Bin0) -> %% contains enough data to maybe form a packet %% - fetch a tiny binary from the buffer front to complete the length field {LengthField,Front,Rear} = - iovec_from_front(4 - byte_size(IncompleteLengthField), Front0, Rear0, [IncompleteLengthField]), + case IncompleteLengthField of + <<>> -> + iovec_from_front(4, Front0, Rear0, []); + _ -> + iovec_from_front( + 4 - byte_size(IncompleteLengthField), Front0, Rear0, [IncompleteLengthField]) + end, LengthBin = iolist_to_binary(LengthField), read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front, BufferSize, Rear, LengthBin); <<IncompleteLengthField/binary>> -> %% We do not have enough data in the buffer to even form a length field - await more data - {[IncompleteLengthField|Front0],BufferSize,Rear0} + case IncompleteLengthField of + <<>> -> + {Front0,BufferSize,Rear0}; + _ -> + {[IncompleteLengthField|Front0],BufferSize,Rear0} + end end end. +iovec_from_front(0, Front, Rear, Acc) -> + {lists:reverse(Acc),Front,Rear}; iovec_from_front(Size, [], Rear, Acc) -> - iovec_from_front(Size, lists:reverse(Rear), [], Acc); + case Rear of + %% Avoid lists:reverse/1 for simple cases. + %% Case clause for [] to avoid infinite loop. + [_] -> + iovec_from_front(Size, Rear, [], Acc); + [Bin2,Bin1] -> + iovec_from_front(Size, [Bin1,Bin2], [], Acc); + [Bin3,Bin2,Bin1] -> + iovec_from_front(Size, [Bin1,Bin2,Bin3], [], Acc); + [_,_,_|_] = Rear -> + iovec_from_front(Size, lists:reverse(Rear), [], Acc) + end; +iovec_from_front(Size, [Bin|Front], Rear, []) -> + case Bin of + <<Last:Size/binary>> -> % Just enough + {[Last],Front,Rear}; + <<Last:Size/binary, Rest/binary>> -> % More than enough, split here + {[Last],[Rest|Front],Rear}; + <<>> -> % Not enough, skip empty binaries + iovec_from_front(Size, Front, Rear, []); + <<_/binary>> -> % Not enough + BinSize = byte_size(Bin), + iovec_from_front(Size - BinSize, Front, Rear, [Bin]) + end; iovec_from_front(Size, [Bin|Front], Rear, Acc) -> case Bin of <<Last:Size/binary>> -> % Just enough {lists:reverse(Acc, [Last]),Front,Rear}; <<Last:Size/binary, Rest/binary>> -> % More than enough, split here {lists:reverse(Acc, [Last]),[Rest|Front],Rear}; + <<>> -> % Not enough, skip empty binaries + iovec_from_front(Size, Front, Rear, Acc); <<_/binary>> -> % Not enough BinSize = byte_size(Bin), iovec_from_front(Size - BinSize, Front, Rear, [Bin|Acc]) @@ -709,6 +750,7 @@ handle_session(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, {ExpectNPN, Protocol} = case Protocol0 of undefined -> + {false, CurrentProtocol}; _ -> {ProtoExt =:= npn, Protocol0} @@ -1194,7 +1236,7 @@ cipher(internal, #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, handshake_env = #handshake_env{expecting_finished = true, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = HsEnv} = State, Connection) -> - Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, + Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false}}); cipher(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, #state{handshake_env = HsEnv, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = @@ -1233,10 +1275,17 @@ connection({call, From}, {connection_information, false}, State, _) -> Info = connection_info(State), hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, {ok, Info}}]); connection({call, From}, negotiated_protocol, - #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = undefined}} = State, _) -> + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{alpn = undefined, + negotiated_protocol = undefined}} = State, _) -> hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, {error, protocol_not_negotiated}}]); connection({call, From}, negotiated_protocol, - #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol}} = State, _) -> + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{alpn = undefined, + negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol}} = State, _) -> + hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, + [{reply, From, {ok, SelectedProtocol}}]); +connection({call, From}, negotiated_protocol, + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{alpn = SelectedProtocol, + negotiated_protocol = undefined}} = State, _) -> hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, {ok, SelectedProtocol}}]); connection({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> @@ -1445,7 +1494,7 @@ handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, econnaborted}, StateName, } = State) when StateName =/= connection -> Pids = Connection:pids(State), alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker,Socket, - StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role, Connection), + StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role, StateName, Connection), {stop, {shutdown, normal}, State}; handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, @@ -2907,22 +2956,22 @@ send_user(Pid, Msg) -> Pid ! Msg, ok. -alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> - alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection); -alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket,_, _, _, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> - alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role, Connection). +alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) -> + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection); +alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket,_, _, _, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) -> + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection). -alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> - alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, false, no_pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection). +alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) -> + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, false, no_pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection). -alert_user(_, _, _, _, false = Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, _) when From =/= undefined -> +alert_user(_, _, _, _, false = Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) when From =/= undefined -> %% If there is an outstanding ssl_accept | recv %% From will be defined and send_or_reply will %% send the appropriate error message. - ReasonCode = ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role), + ReasonCode = ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName), send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, {error, ReasonCode}); -alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> - case ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role) of +alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) -> + case ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName) of closed -> send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, {ssl_closed, Connection:socket(Pids, Transport, Socket, Tracker)}); @@ -2933,11 +2982,11 @@ alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Con log_alert(Level, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, #alert{role = Role} = Alert) -> Txt = ssl_alert:own_alert_txt(Alert), - Report = io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt]), + Report = ssl_alert:alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt), ssl_logger:notice(Level, Report); log_alert(Level, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, Alert) -> Txt = ssl_alert:alert_txt(Alert), - Report = io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt]), + Report = ssl_alert:alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt), ssl_logger:notice(Level, Report). invalidate_session(client, Host, Port, Session) -> @@ -3000,3 +3049,8 @@ new_emulated([], EmOpts) -> EmOpts; new_emulated(NewEmOpts, _) -> NewEmOpts. + +no_records(Extensions) -> + maps:map(fun(_, Value) -> + ssl_handshake:extension_value(Value) + end, Extensions). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl index ff7207a8ce..844368c761 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ sni_hostname = undefined, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false ::boolean(), next_protocol = undefined :: undefined | binary(), + alpn = undefined, %% Used in TLS 1.3 negotiated_protocol, hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined}, cert_hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined}, @@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ srp_params :: #srp_user{} | secret_printout() | 'undefined', public_key_info :: ssl_handshake:public_key_info() | 'undefined', premaster_secret :: binary() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', - server_psk_identity :: binary() | 'undefined' % server psk identity hint + server_psk_identity :: binary() | 'undefined' % server psk identity hint }). -record(connection_env, { diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index 7b34991f4f..bd2efa9fbb 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ ]). %% Encode --export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/1, encode_extensions/1, encode_extensions/2, +-export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/2, encode_extensions/1, encode_extensions/2, encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1]). %% Decode -export([decode_handshake/3, decode_vector/1, decode_hello_extensions/4, decode_extensions/3, @@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ handle_client_hello_extensions/9, %% Returns server hello extensions handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3, select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5, - select_hashsign_algs/3, empty_extensions/2, add_server_share/3 + select_hashsign_algs/3, empty_extensions/2, add_server_share/3, + add_alpn/2, add_selected_version/1, decode_alpn/1 ]). -export([get_cert_params/1, @@ -98,8 +99,8 @@ hello_request() -> #hello_request{}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec server_hello(binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states(), - Extension::map()) -> #server_hello{}. +%%-spec server_hello(binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states(), +%% Extension::map()) -> #server_hello{}. %% %% Description: Creates a server hello message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -363,7 +364,7 @@ certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) end catch - error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> + error:{badmatch,{error, {asn1, Asn1Reason}}} -> %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason}); error:OtherReason -> @@ -533,14 +534,14 @@ encode_handshake(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, _Version) PaddingLength = 32 - ((byte_size(SelectedProtocol) + 2) rem 32), {?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE((byte_size(SelectedProtocol))), SelectedProtocol/binary, ?BYTE(PaddingLength), 0:(PaddingLength * 8)>>}; -encode_handshake(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, +encode_handshake(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor} = Version, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Comp_method, extensions = Extensions}, _Version) -> SID_length = byte_size(Session_ID), - ExtensionsBin = encode_hello_extensions(Extensions), + ExtensionsBin = encode_hello_extensions(Extensions, Version), {?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID/binary, CipherSuite/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method), ExtensionsBin/binary>>}; @@ -588,7 +589,9 @@ encode_handshake(#certificate_verify{signature = BinSig, hashsign_algorithm = Ha encode_handshake(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, _Version) -> {?FINISHED, VerifyData}. -encode_hello_extensions(Extensions) -> +encode_hello_extensions(_, {3, 0}) -> + <<>>; +encode_hello_extensions(Extensions, _) -> encode_extensions(hello_extensions_list(Extensions), <<>>). encode_extensions(Exts) -> @@ -706,7 +709,25 @@ encode_extensions([#key_share_server_hello{server_share = ServerShare0} | Rest], encode_extensions([#key_share_hello_retry_request{selected_group = Group0} | Rest], Acc) -> Group = tls_v1:group_to_enum(Group0), encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), - ?UINT16(2), ?UINT16(Group), Acc/binary>>). + ?UINT16(2), ?UINT16(Group), Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#psk_key_exchange_modes{ke_modes = KEModes0} | Rest], Acc) -> + KEModes = encode_psk_key_exchange_modes(KEModes0), + KEModesLen = byte_size(KEModes), + ExtLen = KEModesLen + 1, + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES_EXT), + ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?BYTE(KEModesLen), KEModes/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#pre_shared_key_client_hello{ + offered_psks = #offered_psks{ + identities = Identities0, + binders = Binders0} = PSKs} | Rest], Acc) -> + Identities = encode_psk_identities(Identities0), + Binders = encode_psk_binders(Binders0), + Len = byte_size(Identities) + byte_size(Binders), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?PRE_SHARED_KEY_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), Identities/binary, Binders/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#pre_shared_key_server_hello{selected_identity = Identity} | Rest], Acc) -> + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?PRE_SHARED_KEY_EXT), + ?UINT16(2), ?UINT16(Identity), Acc/binary>>). encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) -> @@ -1165,6 +1186,13 @@ add_server_share(hello_retry_request, Extensions, Extensions#{key_share => #key_share_hello_retry_request{ selected_group = Group}}. +add_alpn(Extensions, ALPN0) -> + ALPN = encode_alpn([ALPN0], false), + Extensions#{alpn => ALPN}. + +add_selected_version(Extensions) -> + SupportedVersions = #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = {3,4}}, + Extensions#{server_hello_selected_version => SupportedVersions}. kse_remove_private_key(#key_share_entry{ group = Group, @@ -1186,10 +1214,7 @@ signature_algs_ext(undefined) -> signature_algs_ext(SignatureSchemes0) -> %% The SSL option signature_algs contains both hash-sign algorithms (tuples) and %% signature schemes (atoms) if TLS 1.3 is configured. - %% Filter out all hash-sign tuples when creating the signature_algs extension. - %% (TLS 1.3 specific record type) - SignatureSchemes = lists:filter(fun is_atom/1, SignatureSchemes0), - #signature_algorithms{signature_scheme_list = SignatureSchemes}. + #signature_algorithms{signature_scheme_list = SignatureSchemes0}. signature_algs_cert(undefined) -> undefined; @@ -1251,6 +1276,8 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, %% We also ignore the ALPN extension during renegotiation (see encode_alpn/2). [Protocol] when not Renegotiation -> {ConnectionStates, alpn, Protocol}; + [_] when Renegotiation -> + {ConnectionStates, alpn, undefined}; undefined -> NextProtocolNegotiation = maps:get(next_protocol_negotiation, Exts, undefined), Protocol = handle_next_protocol(NextProtocolNegotiation, NextProtoSelector, Renegotiation), @@ -1474,7 +1501,20 @@ extension_value(#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = Data}) -> extension_value(#srp{username = Name}) -> Name; extension_value(#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data}) -> - Data. + Data; +extension_value(#signature_algorithms{signature_scheme_list = Schemes}) -> + Schemes; +extension_value(#signature_algorithms_cert{signature_scheme_list = Schemes}) -> + Schemes; +extension_value(#key_share_client_hello{client_shares = ClientShares}) -> + ClientShares; +extension_value(#key_share_server_hello{server_share = ServerShare}) -> + ServerShare; +extension_value(#client_hello_versions{versions = Versions}) -> + Versions; +extension_value(#server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = SelectedVersion}) -> + SelectedVersion. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions @@ -2075,6 +2115,41 @@ encode_key_share_entry(#key_share_entry{ Len = byte_size(KeyExchange), <<?UINT16((tls_v1:group_to_enum(Group))),?UINT16(Len),KeyExchange/binary>>. +encode_psk_key_exchange_modes(KEModes) -> + encode_psk_key_exchange_modes(lists:reverse(KEModes), <<>>). +%% +encode_psk_key_exchange_modes([], Acc) -> + Acc; +encode_psk_key_exchange_modes([psk_ke|T], Acc) -> + encode_psk_key_exchange_modes(T, <<?BYTE(?PSK_KE),Acc/binary>>); +encode_psk_key_exchange_modes([psk_dhe_ke|T], Acc) -> + encode_psk_key_exchange_modes(T, <<?BYTE(?PSK_DHE_KE),Acc/binary>>). + + +encode_psk_identities(Identities) -> + encode_psk_identities(Identities, <<>>). +%% +encode_psk_identities([], Acc) -> + Len = byte_size(Acc), + <<?UINT16(Len), Acc/binary>>; +encode_psk_identities([#psk_identity{ + identity = Identity, + obfuscated_ticket_age = Age}|T], Acc) -> + IdLen = byte_size(Identity), + encode_psk_identities(T, <<Acc/binary,?UINT16(IdLen),Identity/binary,Age/binary>>). + + +encode_psk_binders(Binders) -> + encode_psk_binders(Binders, <<>>). +%% +encode_psk_binders([], Acc) -> + Len = byte_size(Acc), + <<?UINT16(Len), Acc/binary>>; +encode_psk_binders([Binder|T], Acc) -> + Len = byte_size(Binder), + encode_psk_binders(T, <<Acc/binary,?BYTE(Len),Binder/binary>>). + + hello_extensions_list(HelloExtensions) -> [Ext || {_, Ext} <- maps:to_list(HelloExtensions), Ext =/= undefined]. @@ -2427,6 +2502,33 @@ decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), #key_share_hello_retry_request{ selected_group = tls_v1:enum_to_group(Group)}}); +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> + <<?BYTE(PLen),KEModes:PLen/binary>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{psk_key_exchange_modes => + #psk_key_exchange_modes{ + ke_modes = decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(KEModes)}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?PRE_SHARED_KEY_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Version, MessageType = client_hello, Acc) -> + <<?UINT16(IdLen),Identities:IdLen/binary,?UINT16(BLen),Binders:BLen/binary>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{pre_shared_key => + #pre_shared_key_client_hello{ + offered_psks = #offered_psks{ + identities = decode_psk_identities(Identities), + binders = decode_psk_binders(Binders)}}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?PRE_SHARED_KEY_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Version, MessageType = server_hello, Acc) -> + <<?UINT16(Identity)>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{pre_shared_key => + #pre_shared_key_server_hello{ + selected_identity = Identity}}); %% Ignore data following the ClientHello (i.e., %% extensions) if not understood. @@ -2486,6 +2588,38 @@ decode_protocols(<<?BYTE(Len), Protocol:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> decode_protocols(_Bytes, _Acc) -> {error, invalid_protocols}. + +decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(KEModes) -> + decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(KEModes, []). +%% +decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(<<>>, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(<<?BYTE(?PSK_KE), Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(Rest, [psk_ke|Acc]); +decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(<<?BYTE(?PSK_DHE_KE), Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(Rest, [psk_dhe_ke|Acc]). + + +decode_psk_identities(Identities) -> + decode_psk_identities(Identities, []). +%% +decode_psk_identities(<<>>, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +decode_psk_identities(<<?UINT16(Len), Identity:Len/binary, Age:4/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_psk_identities(Rest, [#psk_identity{ + identity = Identity, + obfuscated_ticket_age = Age}|Acc]). + + +decode_psk_binders(Binders) -> + decode_psk_binders(Binders, []). +%% +decode_psk_binders(<<>>, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +decode_psk_binders(<<?BYTE(Len), Binder:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_psk_binders(Rest, [Binder|Acc]). + + %% encode/decode stream of certificate data to/from list of certificate data certs_to_list(ASN1Certs) -> certs_to_list(ASN1Certs, []). @@ -2652,7 +2786,7 @@ filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(_, Suites) -> handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, ClientCipherSuites, Compression, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) -> - {ok, ConnectionStates} = handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0, + {ok, ConnectionStates} = handle_renegotiation_info(Version, RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, ClientCipherSuites), hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role, @@ -2922,11 +3056,11 @@ renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) -> #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} end. -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, +handle_renegotiation_info(_, _RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> +handle_renegotiation_info(_, _RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; @@ -2934,10 +3068,10 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)} end; -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> +handle_renegotiation_info(_, _RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}; -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, +handle_renegotiation_info(_, _RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, ConnectionStates, true, _, _) -> ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), @@ -2948,7 +3082,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co false -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation)) end; -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, +handle_renegotiation_info(_, _RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of @@ -2964,11 +3098,13 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation)) end end; +handle_renegotiation_info({3,0}, _RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, _SecureRenegotation, _) -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; -handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) -> +handle_renegotiation_info(_, RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) -> handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation); -handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> +handle_renegotiation_info(_, RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv})); @@ -3022,7 +3158,7 @@ empty_extensions({3,4}, client_hello) -> %% padding => undefined, key_share => undefined, pre_shared_key => undefined, - %% psk_key_exhange_modes => undefined, + psk_key_exchange_modes => undefined, %% early_data => undefined, %% cookie => undefined, client_hello_versions => undefined, @@ -3046,6 +3182,13 @@ empty_extensions({3,4}, server_hello) -> key_share => undefined, pre_shared_key => undefined }; +empty_extensions({3,4}, hello_retry_request) -> + #{server_hello_selected_version => undefined, + key_share => undefined, + pre_shared_key => undefined + }; +empty_extensions({3,0}, _) -> + empty_extensions(); empty_extensions(_, server_hello) -> #{renegotiation_info => undefined, alpn => undefined, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_logger.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_logger.erl index 987693b96b..514a4464bc 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_logger.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_logger.erl @@ -200,6 +200,11 @@ parse_handshake(Direction, #encrypted_extensions{} = EncryptedExtensions) -> Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, EncryptedExtensions", [header_prefix(Direction)]), Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(encrypted_extensions, EncryptedExtensions)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #new_session_ticket{} = NewSessionTicket) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Post-Handshake, NewSessionTicket", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(new_session_ticket, NewSessionTicket)]), {Header, Message}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl index a05858221a..3998f03519 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ -include("tls_connection.hrl"). -include("tls_handshake.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("tls_record.hrl"). -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). @@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ close/5, protocol_name/0]). %% Data handling --export([next_record/1, socket/4, setopts/3, getopts/3]). +-export([socket/4, setopts/3, getopts/3]). %% gen_statem state functions -export([init/3, error/3, downgrade/3, %% Initiation and take down states @@ -161,32 +162,60 @@ pids(#state{protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}}) -> %%==================================================================== %% State transition handling %%==================================================================== -next_record(#state{handshake_env = +next_record(_, #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = HsEnv} = State) when N > 0 -> {no_record, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}}; -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = [_|_] = CipherTexts}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) -> +next_record(_, #state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = [_|_] = CipherTexts}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) -> next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Check); -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = []}, - protocol_specific = #{active_n_toggle := true, active_n := N} = ProtocolSpec, - static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, - close_tag = CloseTag, - transport_cb = Transport} - } = State) -> - case tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, N}]) of - ok -> - {no_record, State#state{protocol_specific = ProtocolSpec#{active_n_toggle => false}}}; - _ -> - self() ! {CloseTag, Socket}, - {no_record, State} - end; -next_record(State) -> +next_record(connection, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = []}, + protocol_specific = #{active_n_toggle := true} + } = State) -> + %% If ssl application user is not reading data wait to activate socket + flow_ctrl(State); + +next_record(_, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = []}, + protocol_specific = #{active_n_toggle := true} + } = State) -> + activate_socket(State); +next_record(_, State) -> {no_record, State}. + +flow_ctrl(#state{user_data_buffer = {_,Size,_}, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}, + bytes_to_read = undefined} = State) when Size =/= 0 -> + {no_record, State}; +flow_ctrl(#state{user_data_buffer = {_,Size,_}, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}, + bytes_to_read = 0} = State) when Size =/= 0 -> + {no_record, State}; +flow_ctrl(#state{user_data_buffer = {_,Size,_}, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}, + bytes_to_read = BytesToRead} = State) when (Size >= BytesToRead) andalso + (BytesToRead > 0) -> + {no_record, State}; +flow_ctrl(State) -> + activate_socket(State). + + +activate_socket(#state{protocol_specific = #{active_n_toggle := true, active_n := N} = ProtocolSpec, + static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + close_tag = CloseTag, + transport_cb = Transport} + } = State) -> + case tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, N}]) of + ok -> + {no_record, State#state{protocol_specific = ProtocolSpec#{active_n_toggle => false}}}; + _ -> + self() ! {CloseTag, Socket}, + {no_record, State} + end. + %% Decipher next record and concatenate consecutive ?APPLICATION_DATA records into one %% next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Check) -> @@ -224,31 +253,20 @@ next_record_done(#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers} = State, CipherTexts, Connec State#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = CipherTexts}, connection_states = ConnectionStates}}. - next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). %% next_event(StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) -> - case next_record(State0) of + case next_record(StateName, State0) of {no_record, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, Actions}; - {#ssl_tls{} = Record, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - Version = State0#state.connection_env#connection_env.negotiated_version, - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0) + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); + {Record, State} -> + next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions) end; -next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions) -> - case Record of - no_record -> - {next_state, StateName, State, Actions}; - #ssl_tls{} = Record -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - Version = State#state.connection_env#connection_env.negotiated_version, - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) - end. - +next_event(StateName, #ssl_tls{} = Record, State, Actions) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; +next_event(StateName, #alert{} = Alert, State, Actions) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]}. %%% TLS record protocol level application data messages handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, @@ -272,12 +290,8 @@ handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, Stat {stop, _, _} = Stop-> Stop; {Record, State1} -> - case next_event(StateName, Record, State1) of - {next_state, StateName, State, Actions} -> - ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); - {stop, _, _} = Stop -> - Stop - end + {next_state, StateName, State, Actions} = next_event(StateName, Record, State1), + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions) end; %%% TLS record protocol level handshake messages handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, @@ -303,8 +317,7 @@ handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, _ -> HsEnv = State#state.handshake_env, {next_state, StateName, - State#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers, - handshake_env = + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}}, Events} end @@ -323,7 +336,9 @@ handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, StateName, State}); [] -> ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, empty_alert), - Version, StateName, State) + Version, StateName, State); + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) catch _:_ -> ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, alert_decode_error), @@ -381,6 +396,7 @@ queue_handshake(Handshake, #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_h handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist}, flight_buffer = Flight0 ++ [BinHandshake]}. + send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport}, flight_buffer = Flight} = State0) -> @@ -646,10 +662,16 @@ hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOptions, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of #alert{} = Alert -> %%TODO ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, hello, - State#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = ReqVersion}}); + State#state{connection_env = + CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = ReqVersion}}); + %% Legacy TLS 1.2 and older {Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} -> ssl_connection:handle_session(Hello, - Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol, State) + Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol, State); + %% TLS 1.3 + {next_state, wait_sh} -> + %% Continue in TLS 1.3 'wait_sh' state + {next_state, wait_sh, State, [{next_event, internal, Hello}]} end; hello(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); @@ -790,6 +812,11 @@ connection(internal, #client_hello{}, State = reinit_handshake_data(State0), next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +connection(internal, #new_session_ticket{}, State) -> + %% TLS 1.3 + %% Drop NewSessionTicket (currently not supported) + next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); + connection(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). @@ -1049,7 +1076,7 @@ next_tls_record(Data, StateName, case tls_record:get_tls_records(Data, Versions, Buf0, SslOpts) of {Records, Buf1} -> CT1 = CT0 ++ Records, - next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers = + next_record(StateName, State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_record_buffer = Buf1, tls_cipher_texts = CT1}}); #alert{} = Alert -> @@ -1150,7 +1177,6 @@ encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hist0) -> encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) -> tls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates). --spec decode_alerts(binary()) -> list(). decode_alerts(Bin) -> ssl_alert:decode(Bin). @@ -1273,9 +1299,10 @@ maybe_generate_client_shares(#ssl_options{ versions = [Version|_], supported_groups = #supported_groups{ - supported_groups = Groups}}) + supported_groups = [Group|_]}}) when Version =:= {3,4} -> - ssl_cipher:generate_client_shares(Groups); + %% Generate only key_share entry for the most preferred group + ssl_cipher:generate_client_shares([Group]); maybe_generate_client_shares(_) -> undefined. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_1_3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_1_3.erl index 701a5860c2..117e4f059d 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_1_3.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_1_3.erl @@ -112,13 +112,15 @@ negotiated/4, wait_cert/4, wait_cv/4, - wait_finished/4 + wait_finished/4, + wait_sh/4, + wait_ee/4, + wait_cert_cr/4 ]). -start(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State0, _Module) -> - {Record, State} = tls_connection:next_record(State0), - tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State); +start(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); start(internal, #client_hello{} = Hello, State0, _Module) -> case tls_handshake_1_3:do_start(Hello, State0) of #alert{} = Alert -> @@ -128,13 +130,19 @@ start(internal, #client_hello{} = Hello, State0, _Module) -> {State, negotiated} -> {next_state, negotiated, State, [{next_event, internal, start_handshake}]} end; +start(internal, #server_hello{} = ServerHello, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_start(ServerHello, State0) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, start, State0); + {State, NextState} -> + {next_state, NextState, State, []} + end; start(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). -negotiated(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State0, _Module) -> - {Record, State} = tls_connection:next_record(State0), - tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State); +negotiated(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); negotiated(internal, Message, State0, _Module) -> case tls_handshake_1_3:do_negotiated(Message, State0) of #alert{} = Alert -> @@ -144,41 +152,36 @@ negotiated(internal, Message, State0, _Module) -> end. -wait_cert(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State0, _Module) -> - {Record, State} = tls_connection:next_record(State0), - tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State); +wait_cert(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); wait_cert(internal, #certificate_1_3{} = Certificate, State0, _Module) -> case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_cert(Certificate, State0) of {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, wait_cert, State); - {State1, NextState} -> - {Record, State} = tls_connection:next_record(State1), - tls_connection:next_event(NextState, Record, State) + {State, NextState} -> + tls_connection:next_event(NextState, no_record, State) end; wait_cert(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). -wait_cv(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State0, _Module) -> - {Record, State} = tls_connection:next_record(State0), - tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State); +wait_cv(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); wait_cv(internal, #certificate_verify_1_3{} = CertificateVerify, State0, _Module) -> case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_cv(CertificateVerify, State0) of {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, wait_cv, State); - {State1, NextState} -> - {Record, State} = tls_connection:next_record(State1), - tls_connection:next_event(NextState, Record, State) + {State, NextState} -> + tls_connection:next_event(NextState, no_record, State) end; wait_cv(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). -wait_finished(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State0, _Module) -> - {Record, State} = tls_connection:next_record(State0), - tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State); +wait_finished(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); wait_finished(internal, #finished{} = Finished, State0, Module) -> case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_finished(Finished, State0) of @@ -190,3 +193,52 @@ wait_finished(internal, end; wait_finished(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). + + +wait_sh(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +wait_sh(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_sh(Hello, State0) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, wait_sh, State0); + {State1, start, ServerHello} -> + %% hello_retry_request: go to start + {next_state, start, State1, [{next_event, internal, ServerHello}]}; + {State1, wait_ee} -> + tls_connection:next_event(wait_ee, no_record, State1) + end; +wait_sh(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> + ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). + + +wait_ee(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +wait_ee(internal, #encrypted_extensions{} = EE, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_ee(EE, State0) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, wait_ee, State0); + {State1, NextState} -> + tls_connection:next_event(NextState, no_record, State1) + end; +wait_ee(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> + ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). + + +wait_cert_cr(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +wait_cert_cr(internal, #certificate_1_3{} = Certificate, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_cert_cr(Certificate, State0) of + {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, wait_cert_cr, State); + {State1, NextState} -> + tls_connection:next_event(NextState, no_record, State1) + end; +wait_cert_cr(internal, #certificate_request_1_3{} = CertificateRequest, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_cert_cr(CertificateRequest, State0) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, wait_cert_cr, State0); + {State1, NextState} -> + tls_connection:next_event(NextState, no_record, State1) + end; +wait_cert_cr(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> + ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl index 2480e05097..37265e0759 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, {tls_record:tls_version(), {resumed | new, #session{}}, ssl_record:connection_states(), binary() | undefined, HelloExt::map(), {ssl:hash(), ssl:sign_algo()} | - undefined} | #alert{}. + undefined} | {atom(), atom()} |#alert{}. %% %% Description: Handles a received hello message %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -148,29 +148,48 @@ hello(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, %% %% - If "supported_version" is present (ServerHello): %% - Abort handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert -hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, +hello(#server_hello{server_version = LegacyVersion, + random = Random, + cipher_suite = CipherSuite, + compression_method = Compression, + session_id = SessionId, extensions = #{server_hello_selected_version := - #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = Version}} + #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = Version} = HelloExt} }, - #ssl_options{versions = SupportedVersions}, - _ConnectionStates0, _Renegotiation) -> - case tls_record:is_higher({3,4}, Version) of + #ssl_options{versions = SupportedVersions} = SslOpt, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> + %% In TLS 1.3, the TLS server indicates its version using the "supported_versions" extension + %% (Section 4.2.1), and the legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the version + %% number for TLS 1.2. + %% The "supported_versions" extension is supported from TLS 1.2. + case LegacyVersion > {3,3} orelse + LegacyVersion =:= {3,3} andalso Version < {3,3} of true -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); false -> case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, SupportedVersions) of true -> - %% Implement TLS 1.3 statem ??? - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION); + case Version of + {3,3} -> + %% TLS 1.2 ServerHello with "supported_versions" (special case) + handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, + Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation); + {3,4} -> + %% TLS 1.3 + {next_state, wait_sh} + end; false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) end end; -hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, random = Random, +hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, + random = Random, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression, - session_id = SessionId, extensions = HelloExt}, + session_id = SessionId, + extensions = HelloExt}, #ssl_options{versions = SupportedVersions} = SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, SupportedVersions) of @@ -360,7 +379,7 @@ do_hello(Version, Versions, CipherSuites, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, {3, N}) when N < 4 -> {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>}; -enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, +enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor} = Version, random = Random, session_id = SessionID, cipher_suites = CipherSuites, @@ -371,7 +390,7 @@ enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods), BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites), CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites), - ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions), + ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions, Version), {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl index 8a4ad922e1..c29366e717 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl @@ -39,14 +39,23 @@ %% Create handshake messages -export([certificate/5, certificate_verify/4, - encrypted_extensions/0, - server_hello/4]). + encrypted_extensions/1]). -export([do_start/2, do_negotiated/2, do_wait_cert/2, do_wait_cv/2, - do_wait_finished/2]). + do_wait_finished/2, + do_wait_sh/2, + do_wait_ee/2, + do_wait_cert_cr/2]). + + +%% crypto:hash(sha256, "HelloRetryRequest"). +-define(HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_RANDOM, <<207,33,173,116,229,154,97,17, + 190,29,140,2,30,101,184,145, + 194,162,17,22,122,187,140,94, + 7,158,9,226,200,168,51,156>>). %%==================================================================== %% Create handshake messages @@ -64,11 +73,24 @@ server_hello(MsgType, SessionId, KeyShare, ConnectionStates) -> extensions = Extensions }. + +%% The server's extensions MUST contain "supported_versions". +%% Additionally, it SHOULD contain the minimal set of extensions +%% necessary for the client to generate a correct ClientHello pair. As +%% with the ServerHello, a HelloRetryRequest MUST NOT contain any +%% extensions that were not first offered by the client in its +%% ClientHello, with the exception of optionally the "cookie" (see +%% Section 4.2.2) extension. +server_hello_extensions(hello_retry_request = MsgType, KeyShare) -> + SupportedVersions = #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = {3,4}}, + Extensions = #{server_hello_selected_version => SupportedVersions}, + ssl_handshake:add_server_share(MsgType, Extensions, KeyShare); server_hello_extensions(MsgType, KeyShare) -> SupportedVersions = #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = {3,4}}, Extensions = #{server_hello_selected_version => SupportedVersions}, ssl_handshake:add_server_share(MsgType, Extensions, KeyShare). + server_hello_random(server_hello, #security_parameters{server_random = Random}) -> Random; %% For reasons of backward compatibility with middleboxes (see @@ -79,13 +101,17 @@ server_hello_random(server_hello, #security_parameters{server_random = Random}) %% CF 21 AD 74 E5 9A 61 11 BE 1D 8C 02 1E 65 B8 91 %% C2 A2 11 16 7A BB 8C 5E 07 9E 09 E2 C8 A8 33 9C server_hello_random(hello_retry_request, _) -> - crypto:hash(sha256, "HelloRetryRequest"). + ?HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_RANDOM. -%% TODO: implement support for encrypted_extensions -encrypted_extensions() -> +encrypted_extensions(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{alpn = undefined}}) -> #encrypted_extensions{ extensions = #{} + }; +encrypted_extensions(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{alpn = ALPNProtocol}}) -> + Extensions = ssl_handshake:add_alpn(#{}, ALPNProtocol), + #encrypted_extensions{ + extensions = Extensions }. @@ -111,7 +137,7 @@ add_signature_algorithms_cert(Extensions, undefined) -> Extensions; add_signature_algorithms_cert(Extensions, SignAlgsCert) -> Extensions#{signature_algorithms_cert => - #signature_algorithms{signature_scheme_list = SignAlgsCert}}. + #signature_algorithms_cert{signature_scheme_list = SignAlgsCert}}. filter_tls13_algs(undefined) -> undefined; @@ -119,7 +145,6 @@ filter_tls13_algs(Algo) -> lists:filter(fun is_atom/1, Algo). -%% TODO: use maybe monad for error handling! %% enum { %% X509(0), %% RawPublicKey(2), @@ -142,18 +167,28 @@ filter_tls13_algs(Algo) -> %% opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; %% CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; %% } Certificate; -certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, _CRContext, server) -> +certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, _CRContext, Role) -> case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of {ok, _, Chain} -> CertList = chain_to_cert_list(Chain), %% If this message is in response to a CertificateRequest, the value of %% certificate_request_context in that message. Otherwise (in the case %%of server authentication), this field SHALL be zero length. - #certificate_1_3{ - certificate_request_context = <<>>, - certificate_list = CertList}; - {error, Error} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {server_has_no_suitable_certificates, Error}) + {ok, #certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + certificate_list = CertList}}; + {error, Error} when Role =:= server -> + {error, {no_suitable_certificates, Error}}; + {error, _Error} when Role =:= client -> + %% The client MUST send a Certificate message if and only if the server + %% has requested client authentication via a CertificateRequest message + %% (Section 4.3.2). If the server requests client authentication but no + %% suitable certificate is available, the client MUST send a Certificate + %% message containing no certificates (i.e., with the "certificate_list" + %% field having length 0). + {ok, #certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + certificate_list = []}} end. @@ -161,7 +196,7 @@ certificate_verify(PrivateKey, SignatureScheme, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, handshake_env = #handshake_env{ - tls_handshake_history = {Messages, _}}}, server) -> + tls_handshake_history = {Messages, _}}}, Role) -> #{security_parameters := SecParamsR} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = HKDFAlgo} = SecParamsR, @@ -173,11 +208,11 @@ certificate_verify(PrivateKey, SignatureScheme, %% Transcript-Hash uses the HKDF hash function defined by the cipher suite. THash = tls_v1:transcript_hash(Context, HKDFAlgo), + ContextString = context_string(Role), %% Digital signatures use the hash function defined by the selected signature %% scheme. - case sign(THash, <<"TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify">>, - HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of + case sign(THash, ContextString, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of {ok, Signature} -> {ok, #certificate_verify_1_3{ algorithm = SignatureScheme, @@ -252,6 +287,21 @@ encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg) -> %% Decode handshake %%==================================================================== + +decode_handshake(?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, + ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, + Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method), + ?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>) + when Random =:= ?HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_RANDOM -> + HelloExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(Extensions, {3,4}, {Major, Minor}, + hello_retry_request), + #server_hello{ + server_version = {Major,Minor}, + random = Random, + session_id = Session_ID, + cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, + compression_method = Comp_method, + extensions = HelloExtensions}; decode_handshake(?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <<?BYTE(0), ?UINT16(Size), EncExts:Size/binary>>) -> Exts = decode_extensions(EncExts, certificate_request), #certificate_request_1_3{ @@ -384,6 +434,15 @@ certificate_entry(DER) -> %% 79 %% 00 %% 0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 +sign(THash, Context, HashAlgo, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = PrivateKey) -> + Content = build_content(Context, THash), + try public_key:sign(Content, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of + Signature -> + {ok, Signature} + catch + error:badarg -> + {error, badarg} + end; sign(THash, Context, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) -> Content = build_content(Context, THash), @@ -401,7 +460,16 @@ sign(THash, Context, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) -> end. -verify(THash, Context, HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKey) -> +verify(THash, Context, HashAlgo, Signature, {?'id-ecPublicKey', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) -> + Content = build_content(Context, THash), + try public_key:verify(Content, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) of + Result -> + {ok, Result} + catch + error:badarg -> + {error, badarg} + end; +verify(THash, Context, HashAlgo, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PublicKey, _PubKeyParams}) -> Content = build_content(Context, THash), %% The length of the Salt MUST be equal to the length of the output @@ -428,15 +496,17 @@ build_content(Context, THash) -> %%==================================================================== +%% TLS Server do_start(#client_hello{cipher_suites = ClientCiphers, session_id = SessionId, extensions = Extensions} = _Hello, #state{connection_states = _ConnectionStates0, ssl_options = #ssl_options{ciphers = ServerCiphers, signature_algs = ServerSignAlgs, - supported_groups = ServerGroups0}, + supported_groups = ServerGroups0, + alpn_preferred_protocols = ALPNPreferredProtocols, + honor_cipher_order = HonorCipherOrder}, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert}} = State0) -> - ClientGroups0 = maps:get(elliptic_curves, Extensions, undefined), ClientGroups = get_supported_groups(ClientGroups0), ServerGroups = get_supported_groups(ServerGroups0), @@ -444,23 +514,27 @@ do_start(#client_hello{cipher_suites = ClientCiphers, ClientShares0 = maps:get(key_share, Extensions, undefined), ClientShares = get_key_shares(ClientShares0), + ClientALPN0 = maps:get(alpn, Extensions, undefined), + ClientALPN = ssl_handshake:decode_alpn(ClientALPN0), + ClientSignAlgs = get_signature_scheme_list( maps:get(signature_algs, Extensions, undefined)), ClientSignAlgsCert = get_signature_scheme_list( maps:get(signature_algs_cert, Extensions, undefined)), - %% TODO: use library function if it exists - %% Init the maybe "monad" {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), try + %% Handle ALPN extension if ALPN is configured + ALPNProtocol = Maybe(handle_alpn(ALPNPreferredProtocols, ClientALPN)), + %% If the server does not select a PSK, then the server independently selects a %% cipher suite, an (EC)DHE group and key share for key establishment, %% and a signature algorithm/certificate pair to authenticate itself to %% the client. - Cipher = Maybe(select_cipher_suite(ClientCiphers, ServerCiphers)), + Cipher = Maybe(select_cipher_suite(HonorCipherOrder, ClientCiphers, ServerCiphers)), Groups = Maybe(select_common_groups(ServerGroups, ClientGroups)), - Maybe(validate_key_share(ClientGroups, ClientShares)), + Maybe(validate_client_key_share(ClientGroups, ClientShares)), {PublicKeyAlgo, SignAlgo, SignHash} = get_certificate_params(Cert), @@ -479,8 +553,14 @@ do_start(#client_hello{cipher_suites = ClientCiphers, %% Generate server_share KeyShare = ssl_cipher:generate_server_share(Group), - State1 = update_start_state(State0, Cipher, KeyShare, SessionId, - Group, SelectedSignAlg, ClientPubKey), + State1 = update_start_state(State0, + #{cipher => Cipher, + key_share => KeyShare, + session_id => SessionId, + group => Group, + sign_alg => SelectedSignAlg, + peer_public_key => ClientPubKey, + alpn => ALPNProtocol}), %% 4.1.4. Hello Retry Request %% @@ -490,10 +570,7 @@ do_start(#client_hello{cipher_suites = ClientCiphers, %% the handshake. Maybe(send_hello_retry_request(State1, ClientPubKey, KeyShare, SessionId)) - %% TODO: - %% - session handling - %% - handle extensions: ALPN - %% (do not handle: NPN, srp, renegotiation_info, ec_point_formats) + %% TODO: session handling catch {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_groups}} -> @@ -505,7 +582,87 @@ do_start(#client_hello{cipher_suites = ClientCiphers, {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_signature_algorithm}} -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, "No suitable signature algorithm"); {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_public_key}} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_public_key) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_public_key); + {Ref, no_application_protocol} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL) + end; +%% TLS Client +do_start(#server_hello{cipher_suite = SelectedCipherSuite, + session_id = SessionId, + extensions = Extensions} = _ServerHello, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client, + host = Host, + port = Port, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, + tls_handshake_history = _HHistory} = HsEnv, + connection_env = CEnv, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{ciphers = ClientCiphers, + supported_groups = ClientGroups0} = SslOpts, + session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0 + } = State0) -> + ClientGroups = get_supported_groups(ClientGroups0), + + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + ServerKeyShare = maps:get(key_share, Extensions, undefined), + SelectedGroup = get_selected_group(ServerKeyShare), + + %% Upon receipt of this extension in a HelloRetryRequest, the client + %% MUST verify that (1) the selected_group field corresponds to a group + %% which was provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the + %% original ClientHello and (2) the selected_group field does not + %% correspond to a group which was provided in the "key_share" extension + %% in the original ClientHello. If either of these checks fails, then + %% the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" + %% alert. + Maybe(validate_selected_group(SelectedGroup, ClientGroups)), + + Maybe(validate_cipher_suite(SelectedCipherSuite, ClientCiphers)), + + %% Otherwise, when sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST + %% replace the original "key_share" extension with one containing only a + %% new KeyShareEntry for the group indicated in the selected_group field + %% of the triggering HelloRetryRequest. + ClientKeyShare = ssl_cipher:generate_client_shares([SelectedGroup]), + Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, + Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert, ClientKeyShare), + + HelloVersion = tls_record:hello_version(SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), + + %% Update state + State1 = update_start_state(State0, + #{cipher => SelectedCipherSuite, + key_share => ClientKeyShare, + session_id => SessionId, + group => SelectedGroup}), + + %% Replace ClientHello1 with a special synthetic handshake message + State2 = replace_ch1_with_message_hash(State1), + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = HHistory}} = State2, + + {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = + tls_connection:encode_handshake(Hello, HelloVersion, ConnectionStates0, HHistory), + tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'handshake', Hello), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'record', BinMsg), + + State = State2#state{ + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = HelloVersion}, %% Requested version + session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Handshake}, + key_share = ClientKeyShare}, + + {State, wait_sh} + + catch + {Ref, {illegal_parameter, Reason}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, Reason) end. @@ -515,7 +672,7 @@ do_negotiated(start_handshake, own_certificate = OwnCert, ecc = SelectedGroup, sign_alg = SignatureScheme, - dh_public_value = ClientKey}, + dh_public_value = ClientPublicKey}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{} = SslOpts, key_share = KeyShare, handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = _HHistory0}, @@ -526,6 +683,8 @@ do_negotiated(start_handshake, socket = _Socket, transport_cb = _Transport} } = State0) -> + ServerPrivateKey = get_server_private_key(KeyShare), + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), try @@ -536,12 +695,12 @@ do_negotiated(start_handshake, {State1, _} = tls_connection:send_handshake(ServerHello, State0), State2 = - calculate_handshake_secrets(ClientKey, SelectedGroup, KeyShare, State1), + calculate_handshake_secrets(ClientPublicKey, ServerPrivateKey, SelectedGroup, State1), State3 = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State2), %% Create EncryptedExtensions - EncryptedExtensions = encrypted_extensions(), + EncryptedExtensions = encrypted_extensions(State2), %% Encode EncryptedExtensions State4 = tls_connection:queue_handshake(EncryptedExtensions, State3), @@ -550,7 +709,7 @@ do_negotiated(start_handshake, {State5, NextState} = maybe_send_certificate_request(State4, SslOpts), %% Create Certificate - Certificate = certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, <<>>, server), + Certificate = Maybe(certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, <<>>, server)), %% Encode Certificate State6 = tls_connection:queue_handshake(Certificate, State5), @@ -574,14 +733,16 @@ do_negotiated(start_handshake, catch {Ref, badarg} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {digitally_sign, badarg}) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {digitally_sign, badarg}); + {Ref, {no_suitable_certificates, Reason}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {no_suitable_certificates, Reason}) end. do_wait_cert(#certificate_1_3{} = Certificate, State0) -> {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), try - Maybe(process_client_certificate(Certificate, State0)) + Maybe(process_certificate(Certificate, State0)) catch {Ref, {certificate_required, State}} -> {?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, certificate_required), State}; @@ -591,6 +752,8 @@ do_wait_cert(#certificate_1_3{} = Certificate, State0) -> {?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, Reason), State}; {Ref, {{handshake_failure, Reason}, State}} -> {?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason), State}; + {Ref, {#alert{} = Alert, State}} -> + {Alert, State}; {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> {Alert, State} end. @@ -599,8 +762,8 @@ do_wait_cert(#certificate_1_3{} = Certificate, State0) -> do_wait_cv(#certificate_verify_1_3{} = CertificateVerify, State0) -> {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), try - Maybe(verify_signature_algorithm(State0, CertificateVerify)), - Maybe(verify_certificate_verify(State0, CertificateVerify)) + State1 = Maybe(verify_signature_algorithm(State0, CertificateVerify)), + Maybe(verify_certificate_verify(State1, CertificateVerify)) catch {Ref, {{bad_certificate, Reason}, State}} -> {?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE, {bad_certificate, Reason}), State}; @@ -610,20 +773,9 @@ do_wait_cv(#certificate_verify_1_3{} = CertificateVerify, State0) -> {?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {handshake_failure, Reason}), State} end. - +%% TLS Server do_wait_finished(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, - #state{connection_states = _ConnectionStates0, - session = #session{session_id = _SessionId, - own_certificate = _OwnCert}, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{} = _SslOpts, - key_share = _KeyShare, - handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = _HHistory0}, - static_env = #static_env{ - cert_db = _CertDbHandle, - cert_db_ref = _CertDbRef, - socket = _Socket, - transport_cb = _Transport} - } = State0) -> + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}} = State0) -> {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), @@ -639,19 +791,237 @@ do_wait_finished(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, catch {Ref, decrypt_error} -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR, decrypt_error) + end; +%% TLS Client +do_wait_finished(#finished{verify_data = _VerifyData}, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}} = State0) -> + + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + + try + %% Maybe(validate_client_finished(State0, VerifyData)), + + %% Maybe send Certificate + CertificateVerify + State1 = Maybe(maybe_queue_cert_cert_cv(State0)), + + Finished = finished(State1), + + %% Encode Finished + State2 = tls_connection:queue_handshake(Finished, State1), + + %% Send first flight + {State3, _} = tls_connection:send_handshake_flight(State2), + + State4 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State3), + + %% Configure traffic keys + ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State4) + + catch + {Ref, decrypt_error} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR, decrypt_error); + {Ref, badarg} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {digitally_sign, badarg}); + {Ref, {no_suitable_certificates, Reason}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {no_suitable_certificates, Reason}) + end. + + +do_wait_sh(#server_hello{cipher_suite = SelectedCipherSuite, + session_id = SessionId, + extensions = Extensions} = ServerHello, + #state{key_share = ClientKeyShare0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{ciphers = ClientCiphers, + supported_groups = ClientGroups0}} = State0) -> + ClientGroups = get_supported_groups(ClientGroups0), + ServerKeyShare0 = maps:get(key_share, Extensions, undefined), + ClientKeyShare = get_key_shares(ClientKeyShare0), + + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + %% Go to state 'start' if server replies with 'HelloRetryRequest'. + Maybe(maybe_hello_retry_request(ServerHello, State0)), + + ServerKeyShare = get_key_shares(ServerKeyShare0), + + Maybe(validate_cipher_suite(SelectedCipherSuite, ClientCiphers)), + Maybe(validate_server_key_share(ClientGroups, ServerKeyShare)), + + %% Get server public key + {SelectedGroup, ServerPublicKey} = get_server_public_key(ServerKeyShare), + + {_, ClientPrivateKey} = get_client_private_key([SelectedGroup], ClientKeyShare), + + %% Update state + State1 = update_start_state(State0, + #{cipher => SelectedCipherSuite, + key_share => ClientKeyShare0, + session_id => SessionId, + group => SelectedGroup, + peer_public_key => ServerPublicKey}), + + State2 = calculate_handshake_secrets(ServerPublicKey, ClientPrivateKey, SelectedGroup, State1), + + State3 = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State2), + + {State3, wait_ee} + + catch + {Ref, {State, StateName, ServerHello}} -> + {State, StateName, ServerHello}; + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_groups}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_groups); + {Ref, illegal_parameter} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + {Ref, no_suitable_cipher} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_cipher); + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_signature_algorithm}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, "No suitable signature algorithm"); + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_public_key}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_public_key) + end. + + +do_wait_ee(#encrypted_extensions{extensions = Extensions}, State0) -> + + ALPNProtocol0 = maps:get(alpn, Extensions, undefined), + ALPNProtocol = get_alpn(ALPNProtocol0), + + {Ref,_Maybe} = maybe(), + + try + %% Update state + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State0, + State1 = State0#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{alpn = ALPNProtocol}}, + + {State1, wait_cert_cr} + catch + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_groups}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_groups); + {Ref, illegal_parameter} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + {Ref, no_suitable_cipher} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_cipher); + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_signature_algorithm}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, "No suitable signature algorithm"); + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_public_key}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_public_key) end. +do_wait_cert_cr(#certificate_1_3{} = Certificate, State0) -> + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + Maybe(process_certificate(Certificate, State0)) + catch + {Ref, {certificate_required, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, certificate_required); + {Ref, {{certificate_unknown, Reason}, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, Reason); + {Ref, {{internal_error, Reason}, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, Reason); + {Ref, {{handshake_failure, Reason}, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason); + {Ref, {#alert{} = Alert, State}} -> + {Alert, State} + end; +do_wait_cert_cr(#certificate_request_1_3{} = CertificateRequest, State0) -> + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + Maybe(process_certificate_request(CertificateRequest, State0)) + catch + {Ref, {certificate_required, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, certificate_required); + {Ref, {{certificate_unknown, Reason}, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, Reason); + {Ref, {illegal_parameter, Reason}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, Reason); + {Ref, {{internal_error, Reason}, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, Reason); + {Ref, {{handshake_failure, Reason}, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason) + end. + + + %% TODO: Remove this function! %% not_implemented(State, Reason) -> %% {error, {not_implemented, State, Reason}}. -%% + %% not_implemented(update_secrets, State0, Reason) -> %% State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), %% State = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1), %% {error, {not_implemented, State, Reason}}. +%% For reasons of backward compatibility with middleboxes (see +%% Appendix D.4), the HelloRetryRequest message uses the same structure +%% as the ServerHello, but with Random set to the special value of the +%% SHA-256 of "HelloRetryRequest": +%% +%% CF 21 AD 74 E5 9A 61 11 BE 1D 8C 02 1E 65 B8 91 +%% C2 A2 11 16 7A BB 8C 5E 07 9E 09 E2 C8 A8 33 9C +%% +%% Upon receiving a message with type server_hello, implementations MUST +%% first examine the Random value and, if it matches this value, process +%% it as described in Section 4.1.4). +maybe_hello_retry_request(#server_hello{random = ?HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_RANDOM} = ServerHello, State0) -> + {error, {State0, start, ServerHello}}; +maybe_hello_retry_request(_, _) -> + ok. + + +maybe_queue_cert_cert_cv(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State) -> + {ok, State}; +maybe_queue_cert_cert_cv(#state{connection_states = _ConnectionStates0, + session = #session{session_id = _SessionId, + own_certificate = OwnCert}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{} = _SslOpts, + key_share = _KeyShare, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = _HHistory0}, + static_env = #static_env{ + role = client, + cert_db = CertDbHandle, + cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, + socket = _Socket, + transport_cb = _Transport} + } = State0) -> + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + %% Create Certificate + Certificate = Maybe(certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, <<>>, client)), + + %% Encode Certificate + State1 = tls_connection:queue_handshake(Certificate, State0), + + %% Maybe create and queue CertificateVerify + State = Maybe(maybe_queue_cert_verify(Certificate, State1)), + {ok, State} + catch + {Ref, badarg} -> + {error, badarg} + end. + + +%% Clients MUST send this message whenever authenticating via a certificate +%% (i.e., when the Certificate message is non-empty). +maybe_queue_cert_verify(#certificate_1_3{certificate_list = []}, State) -> + {ok, State}; +maybe_queue_cert_verify(_Certificate, + #state{connection_states = _ConnectionStates0, + session = #session{sign_alg = SignatureScheme}, + connection_env = #connection_env{private_key = CertPrivateKey}, + static_env = #static_env{role = client} + } = State) -> + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + CertificateVerify = Maybe(certificate_verify(CertPrivateKey, SignatureScheme, State, client)), + {ok, tls_connection:queue_handshake(CertificateVerify, State)} + catch + {Ref, badarg} -> + {error, badarg} + end. + %% Recipients of Finished messages MUST verify that the contents are %% correct and if incorrect MUST terminate the connection with a @@ -684,7 +1054,7 @@ send_hello_retry_request(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, ServerHello = server_hello(hello_retry_request, SessionId, KeyShare, ConnectionStates0), {State1, _} = tls_connection:send_handshake(ServerHello, State0), - %% TODO: Fix handshake history! + %% Update handshake history State2 = replace_ch1_with_message_hash(State1), {ok, {State2, start}}; @@ -703,19 +1073,44 @@ maybe_send_certificate_request(State, #ssl_options{ {tls_connection:queue_handshake(CertificateRequest, State), wait_cert}. -process_client_certificate(#certificate_1_3{ - certificate_request_context = <<>>, - certificate_list = []}, - #state{ssl_options = - #ssl_options{ - fail_if_no_peer_cert = false}} = State) -> +process_certificate_request(#certificate_request_1_3{}, + #state{session = #session{own_certificate = undefined}} = State) -> + {ok, {State#state{client_certificate_requested = true}, wait_cert}}; + +process_certificate_request(#certificate_request_1_3{ + extensions = Extensions}, + #state{session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session} = State) -> + ServerSignAlgs = get_signature_scheme_list( + maps:get(signature_algs, Extensions, undefined)), + ServerSignAlgsCert = get_signature_scheme_list( + maps:get(signature_algs_cert, Extensions, undefined)), + + {_PublicKeyAlgo, SignAlgo, SignHash} = get_certificate_params(Cert), + + %% Check if server supports signature algorithm of client certificate + case check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, SignHash, ServerSignAlgs, ServerSignAlgsCert) of + ok -> + {ok, {State#state{client_certificate_requested = true}, wait_cert}}; + {error, _} -> + %% Certificate not supported: send empty certificate in state 'wait_finished' + {ok, {State#state{client_certificate_requested = true, + session = Session#session{own_certificate = undefined}}, wait_cert}} + end. + + +process_certificate(#certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + certificate_list = []}, + #state{ssl_options = + #ssl_options{ + fail_if_no_peer_cert = false}} = State) -> {ok, {State, wait_finished}}; -process_client_certificate(#certificate_1_3{ - certificate_request_context = <<>>, - certificate_list = []}, - #state{ssl_options = - #ssl_options{ - fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} = State0) -> +process_certificate(#certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + certificate_list = []}, + #state{ssl_options = + #ssl_options{ + fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} = State0) -> %% At this point the client believes that the connection is up and starts using %% its traffic secrets. In order to be able send an proper Alert to the client @@ -724,19 +1119,18 @@ process_client_certificate(#certificate_1_3{ State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), State = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1), {error, {certificate_required, State}}; -process_client_certificate(#certificate_1_3{certificate_list = Certs0}, - #state{ssl_options = - #ssl_options{signature_algs = SignAlgs, - signature_algs_cert = SignAlgsCert} = SslOptions, - static_env = - #static_env{ - role = Role, - host = Host, - cert_db = CertDbHandle, - cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, - crl_db = CRLDbHandle}} = State0) -> +process_certificate(#certificate_1_3{certificate_list = Certs0}, + #state{ssl_options = + #ssl_options{signature_algs = SignAlgs, + signature_algs_cert = SignAlgsCert} = SslOptions, + static_env = + #static_env{ + role = Role, + host = Host, + cert_db = CertDbHandle, + cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, + crl_db = CRLDbHandle}} = State0) -> %% TODO: handle extensions! - %% Remove extensions from list of certificates! Certs = convert_certificate_chain(Certs0), case is_supported_signature_algorithm(Certs, SignAlgs, SignAlgsCert) of @@ -747,13 +1141,11 @@ process_client_certificate(#certificate_1_3{certificate_list = Certs0}, State = store_peer_cert(State0, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo), {ok, {State, wait_cv}}; {error, Reason} -> - State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), - State = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1), + State = update_encryption_state(Role, State0), {error, {Reason, State}}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), - State = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1), - {Alert, State} + {ok, #alert{} = Alert} -> + State = update_encryption_state(Role, State0), + {error, {Alert, State}} end; false -> State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), @@ -777,6 +1169,17 @@ is_supported_signature_algorithm([BinCert|_], SignAlgs0) -> lists:member(Scheme, SignAlgs). +%% Sets correct encryption state when sending Alerts in shared states that use different secrets. +%% - If client: use handshake secrets. +%% - If server: use traffic secrets as by this time the client's state machine +%% already stepped into the 'connection' state. +update_encryption_state(server, State0) -> + State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), + ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1); +update_encryption_state(client, State) -> + State. + + validate_certificate_chain(Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, SslOptions, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) -> ServerName = ssl_handshake:server_name(SslOptions#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role), [PeerCert | ChainCerts ] = Certs, @@ -797,12 +1200,12 @@ validate_certificate_chain(Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, SslOptions, CRLDbHand {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> {ok, {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}}; {error, Reason} -> - ssl_handshake:handle_path_validation_error(Reason, PeerCert, ChainCerts, - SslOptions, Options, - CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) + {ok, ssl_handshake:handle_path_validation_error(Reason, PeerCert, ChainCerts, + SslOptions, Options, + CertDbHandle, CertDbRef)} end catch - error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> + error:{badmatch,{error, {asn1, Asn1Reason}}} -> %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed {error, {certificate_unknown, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason}}}; error:OtherReason -> @@ -861,7 +1264,7 @@ message_hash(ClientHello1, HKDFAlgo) -> crypto:hash(HKDFAlgo, ClientHello1)]. -calculate_handshake_secrets(ClientKey, SelectedGroup, KeyShare, +calculate_handshake_secrets(PublicKey, PrivateKey, SelectedGroup, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, handshake_env = #handshake_env{ @@ -874,13 +1277,13 @@ calculate_handshake_secrets(ClientKey, SelectedGroup, KeyShare, %% Calculate handshake_secret PSK = binary:copy(<<0>>, ssl_cipher:hash_size(HKDFAlgo)), EarlySecret = tls_v1:key_schedule(early_secret, HKDFAlgo , {psk, PSK}), - PrivateKey = get_server_private_key(KeyShare), %% #'ECPrivateKey'{} - IKM = calculate_shared_secret(ClientKey, PrivateKey, SelectedGroup), + IKM = calculate_shared_secret(PublicKey, PrivateKey, SelectedGroup), HandshakeSecret = tls_v1:key_schedule(handshake_secret, HKDFAlgo, IKM, EarlySecret), %% Calculate [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret {Messages, _} = HHistory, + ClientHSTrafficSecret = tls_v1:client_handshake_traffic_secret(HKDFAlgo, HandshakeSecret, lists:reverse(Messages)), ServerHSTrafficSecret = @@ -899,10 +1302,13 @@ calculate_handshake_secrets(ClientKey, SelectedGroup, KeyShare, ReadKey, ReadIV, ReadFinishedKey, WriteKey, WriteIV, WriteFinishedKey). -calculate_traffic_secrets(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - handshake_env = - #handshake_env{ - tls_handshake_history = HHistory}} = State0) -> + +calculate_traffic_secrets(#state{ + static_env = #static_env{role = Role}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + handshake_env = + #handshake_env{ + tls_handshake_history = HHistory}} = State0) -> #{security_parameters := SecParamsR} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = HKDFAlgo, @@ -913,7 +1319,7 @@ calculate_traffic_secrets(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_v1:key_schedule(master_secret, HKDFAlgo, HandshakeSecret), %% Get the correct list messages for the handshake context. - Messages = get_handshake_context(HHistory), + Messages = get_handshake_context(Role, HHistory), %% Calculate [sender]_application_traffic_secret_0 ClientAppTrafficSecret0 = @@ -942,11 +1348,6 @@ get_private_key(#key_share_entry{ {_, PrivateKey}}) -> PrivateKey. -%% TODO: implement EC keys -get_public_key({?'rsaEncryption', PublicKey, _}) -> - PublicKey. - - %% X25519, X448 calculate_shared_secret(OthersKey, MyKey, Group) when is_binary(OthersKey) andalso is_binary(MyKey) andalso @@ -966,9 +1367,11 @@ calculate_shared_secret(OthersKey, MyKey = #'ECPrivateKey'{}, _Group) public_key:compute_key(Point, MyKey). -update_pending_connection_states(#state{connection_states = - CS = #{pending_read := PendingRead0, - pending_write := PendingWrite0}} = State, +update_pending_connection_states(#state{ + static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + connection_states = + CS = #{pending_read := PendingRead0, + pending_write := PendingWrite0}} = State, HandshakeSecret, ReadKey, ReadIV, ReadFinishedKey, WriteKey, WriteIV, WriteFinishedKey) -> @@ -977,8 +1380,23 @@ update_pending_connection_states(#state{connection_states = PendingWrite = update_connection_state(PendingWrite0, HandshakeSecret, WriteKey, WriteIV, WriteFinishedKey), State#state{connection_states = CS#{pending_read => PendingRead, + pending_write => PendingWrite}}; +update_pending_connection_states(#state{ + static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + connection_states = + CS = #{pending_read := PendingRead0, + pending_write := PendingWrite0}} = State, + HandshakeSecret, + ReadKey, ReadIV, ReadFinishedKey, + WriteKey, WriteIV, WriteFinishedKey) -> + PendingRead = update_connection_state(PendingRead0, HandshakeSecret, + WriteKey, WriteIV, WriteFinishedKey), + PendingWrite = update_connection_state(PendingWrite0, HandshakeSecret, + ReadKey, ReadIV, ReadFinishedKey), + State#state{connection_states = CS#{pending_read => PendingRead, pending_write => PendingWrite}}. + update_connection_state(ConnectionState = #{security_parameters := SecurityParameters0}, HandshakeSecret, Key, IV, FinishedKey) -> %% Store secret @@ -988,11 +1406,24 @@ update_connection_state(ConnectionState = #{security_parameters := SecurityParam cipher_state => cipher_init(Key, IV, FinishedKey)}. +update_start_state(State, Map) -> + Cipher = maps:get(cipher, Map, undefined), + KeyShare = maps:get(key_share, Map, undefined), + SessionId = maps:get(session_id, Map, undefined), + Group = maps:get(group, Map, undefined), + SelectedSignAlg = maps:get(sign_alg, Map, undefined), + PeerPublicKey = maps:get(peer_public_key, Map, undefined), + ALPNProtocol = maps:get(alpn, Map, undefined), + update_start_state(State, Cipher, KeyShare, SessionId, + Group, SelectedSignAlg, PeerPublicKey, + ALPNProtocol). +%% update_start_state(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{} = HsEnv, connection_env = CEnv, session = Session} = State, Cipher, KeyShare, SessionId, - Group, SelectedSignAlg, ClientPubKey) -> + Group, SelectedSignAlg, PeerPublicKey, ALPNProtocol) -> #{security_parameters := SecParamsR0} = PendingRead = maps:get(pending_read, ConnectionStates0), #{security_parameters := SecParamsW0} = PendingWrite = @@ -1003,11 +1434,12 @@ update_start_state(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, ConnectionStates0#{pending_read => PendingRead#{security_parameters => SecParamsR}, pending_write => PendingWrite#{security_parameters => SecParamsW}}, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{alpn = ALPNProtocol}, key_share = KeyShare, session = Session#session{session_id = SessionId, ecc = Group, sign_alg = SelectedSignAlg, - dh_public_value = ClientPubKey, + dh_public_value = PeerPublicKey, cipher_suite = Cipher}, connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = {3,4}}}. @@ -1071,25 +1503,41 @@ get_handshake_context_cv({[<<15,_/binary>>|Messages], _}) -> %% %% Drop all client messages from the front of the iolist using the property that %% incoming messages are binaries. -get_handshake_context({Messages, _}) -> - get_handshake_context(Messages); -get_handshake_context([H|T]) when is_binary(H) -> - get_handshake_context(T); -get_handshake_context(L) -> +get_handshake_context(server, {Messages, _}) -> + get_handshake_context_server(Messages); +get_handshake_context(client, {Messages, _}) -> + get_handshake_context_client(Messages). + +get_handshake_context_server([H|T]) when is_binary(H) -> + get_handshake_context_server(T); +get_handshake_context_server(L) -> + L. + + +get_handshake_context_client([H|T]) when is_list(H) -> + get_handshake_context_client(T); +get_handshake_context_client(L) -> L. +%% If the CertificateVerify message is sent by a server, the signature +%% algorithm MUST be one offered in the client's "signature_algorithms" +%% extension unless no valid certificate chain can be produced without +%% unsupported algorithms +%% %% If sent by a client, the signature algorithm used in the signature %% MUST be one of those present in the supported_signature_algorithms %% field of the "signature_algorithms" extension in the %% CertificateRequest message. -verify_signature_algorithm(#state{ssl_options = - #ssl_options{ - signature_algs = ServerSignAlgs}} = State0, - #certificate_verify_1_3{algorithm = ClientSignAlg}) -> - case lists:member(ClientSignAlg, ServerSignAlgs) of +verify_signature_algorithm(#state{ + static_env = #static_env{role = Role}, + ssl_options = + #ssl_options{ + signature_algs = LocalSignAlgs}} = State0, + #certificate_verify_1_3{algorithm = PeerSignAlg}) -> + case lists:member(PeerSignAlg, LocalSignAlgs) of true -> - ok; + {ok, maybe_update_selected_sign_alg(State0, PeerSignAlg, Role)}; false -> State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), State = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1), @@ -1098,11 +1546,19 @@ verify_signature_algorithm(#state{ssl_options = end. -verify_certificate_verify(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - handshake_env = - #handshake_env{ - public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, - tls_handshake_history = HHistory}} = State0, +maybe_update_selected_sign_alg(#state{session = Session} = State, SignAlg, client) -> + State#state{session = Session#session{sign_alg = SignAlg}}; +maybe_update_selected_sign_alg(State, _, _) -> + State. + + +verify_certificate_verify(#state{ + static_env = #static_env{role = Role}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + handshake_env = + #handshake_env{ + public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, + tls_handshake_history = HHistory}} = State0, #certificate_verify_1_3{ algorithm = SignatureScheme, signature = Signature}) -> @@ -1120,12 +1576,11 @@ verify_certificate_verify(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, %% Transcript-Hash uses the HKDF hash function defined by the cipher suite. THash = tls_v1:transcript_hash(Context, HKDFAlgo), - PublicKey = get_public_key(PublicKeyInfo), + ContextString = peer_context_string(Role), %% Digital signatures use the hash function defined by the selected signature %% scheme. - case verify(THash, <<"TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify">>, - HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKey) of + case verify(THash, ContextString, HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKeyInfo) of {ok, true} -> {ok, {State0, wait_finished}}; {ok, false} -> @@ -1139,6 +1594,19 @@ verify_certificate_verify(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, end. +context_string(server) -> + <<"TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify">>; +context_string(client) -> + <<"TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify">>. + + +%% Return context string for verifing peer signature +peer_context_string(server) -> + <<"TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify">>; +peer_context_string(client) -> + <<"TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify">>. + + %% If there is no overlap between the received %% "supported_groups" and the groups supported by the server, then the %% server MUST abort the handshake with a "handshake_failure" or an @@ -1172,14 +1640,36 @@ select_common_groups(ServerGroups, ClientGroups) -> %% for groups not listed in the client's "supported_groups" extension. %% Servers MAY check for violations of these rules and abort the %% handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert if one is violated. -validate_key_share(_ ,[]) -> +validate_client_key_share(_ ,[]) -> ok; -validate_key_share([], _) -> +validate_client_key_share([], _) -> {error, illegal_parameter}; -validate_key_share([G|ClientGroups], [{_, G, _}|ClientShares]) -> - validate_key_share(ClientGroups, ClientShares); -validate_key_share([_|ClientGroups], [_|_] = ClientShares) -> - validate_key_share(ClientGroups, ClientShares). +validate_client_key_share([G|ClientGroups], [{_, G, _}|ClientShares]) -> + validate_client_key_share(ClientGroups, ClientShares); +validate_client_key_share([_|ClientGroups], [_|_] = ClientShares) -> + validate_client_key_share(ClientGroups, ClientShares). + + +%% Verify that selected group is offered by the client. +validate_server_key_share([G|_ClientGroups], {_, G, _}) -> + ok; +validate_server_key_share([_|ClientGroups], {_, _, _} = ServerKeyShare) -> + validate_server_key_share(ClientGroups, ServerKeyShare). + + +validate_selected_group(SelectedGroup, [SelectedGroup|_]) -> + {error, {illegal_parameter, + "Selected group sent by the server shall not correspond to a group" + " which was provided in the key_share extension"}}; +validate_selected_group(SelectedGroup, ClientGroups) -> + case lists:member(SelectedGroup, ClientGroups) of + true -> + ok; + false -> + {error, {illegal_parameter, + "Selected group sent by the server shall correspond to a group" + " which was provided in the supported_groups extension"}} + end. get_client_public_key([Group|_] = Groups, ClientShares) -> @@ -1197,32 +1687,79 @@ get_client_public_key([Group|Groups], ClientShares, PreferredGroup) -> get_client_public_key(Groups, ClientShares, PreferredGroup) end. +get_client_private_key([Group|_] = Groups, ClientShares) -> + get_client_private_key(Groups, ClientShares, Group). +%% +get_client_private_key(_, [], PreferredGroup) -> + {PreferredGroup, no_suitable_key}; +get_client_private_key([], _, PreferredGroup) -> + {PreferredGroup, no_suitable_key}; +get_client_private_key([Group|Groups], ClientShares, PreferredGroup) -> + case lists:keysearch(Group, 2, ClientShares) of + {value, {_, _, {_, ClientPrivateKey}}} -> + {Group, ClientPrivateKey}; + {value, {_, _, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ClientPrivateKey}} -> + {Group, ClientPrivateKey}; + false -> + get_client_private_key(Groups, ClientShares, PreferredGroup) + end. + -%% get_client_public_key(Group, ClientShares) -> -%% case lists:keysearch(Group, 2, ClientShares) of -%% {value, {_, _, ClientPublicKey}} -> -%% ClientPublicKey; -%% false -> -%% %% 4.1.4. Hello Retry Request -%% %% -%% %% The server will send this message in response to a ClientHello -%% %% message if it is able to find an acceptable set of parameters but the -%% %% ClientHello does not contain sufficient information to proceed with -%% %% the handshake. -%% no_suitable_key -%% end. - -select_cipher_suite([], _) -> +get_server_public_key({key_share_entry, Group, PublicKey}) -> + {Group, PublicKey}. + + +%% RFC 7301 - Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension +%% It is expected that a server will have a list of protocols that it +%% supports, in preference order, and will only select a protocol if the +%% client supports it. In that case, the server SHOULD select the most +%% highly preferred protocol that it supports and that is also +%% advertised by the client. In the event that the server supports no +%% protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL respond +%% with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert. +handle_alpn(undefined, _) -> + {ok, undefined}; +handle_alpn([], _) -> + {error, no_application_protocol}; +handle_alpn([_|_], undefined) -> + {ok, undefined}; +handle_alpn([ServerProtocol|T], ClientProtocols) -> + case lists:member(ServerProtocol, ClientProtocols) of + true -> + {ok, ServerProtocol}; + false -> + handle_alpn(T, ClientProtocols) + end. + + +select_cipher_suite(_, [], _) -> {error, no_suitable_cipher}; -select_cipher_suite([Cipher|ClientCiphers], ServerCiphers) -> +%% If honor_cipher_order is set to true, use the server's preference for +%% cipher suite selection. +select_cipher_suite(true, ClientCiphers, ServerCiphers) -> + select_cipher_suite(false, ServerCiphers, ClientCiphers); +select_cipher_suite(false, [Cipher|ClientCiphers], ServerCiphers) -> case lists:member(Cipher, tls_v1:suites('TLS_v1.3')) andalso lists:member(Cipher, ServerCiphers) of true -> {ok, Cipher}; false -> - select_cipher_suite(ClientCiphers, ServerCiphers) + select_cipher_suite(false, ClientCiphers, ServerCiphers) end. + +%% RFC 8446 4.1.3 ServerHello +%% A client which receives a cipher suite that was not offered MUST abort the +%% handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. +validate_cipher_suite(Cipher, ClientCiphers) -> + case lists:member(Cipher, ClientCiphers) of + true -> + ok; + false -> + {error, illegal_parameter} + end. + + %% RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) %% TLS 1.3 provides two extensions for indicating which signature %% algorithms may be used in digital signatures. The @@ -1246,15 +1783,20 @@ check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, SignHash, _, ClientSignAlgsCert) -> %% DSA keys are not supported by TLS 1.3 select_sign_algo(dsa, _ClientSignAlgs, _ServerSignAlgs) -> {error, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_public_key}}; -%% TODO: Implement support for ECDSA keys! select_sign_algo(_, [], _) -> {error, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_signature_algorithm}}; select_sign_algo(PublicKeyAlgo, [C|ClientSignAlgs], ServerSignAlgs) -> {_, S, _} = ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(C), %% RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and Legacy algorithms are not defined for use in signed %% TLS handshake messages: filter sha-1 and rsa_pkcs1. + %% + %% RSASSA-PSS RSAE algorithms: If the public key is carried in an X.509 + %% certificate, it MUST use the rsaEncryption OID. + %% RSASSA-PSS PSS algorithms: If the public key is carried in an X.509 certificate, + %% it MUST use the RSASSA-PSS OID. case ((PublicKeyAlgo =:= rsa andalso S =:= rsa_pss_rsae) - orelse (PublicKeyAlgo =:= rsa_pss andalso S =:= rsa_pss_rsae)) + orelse (PublicKeyAlgo =:= rsa_pss andalso S =:= rsa_pss_pss) + orelse (PublicKeyAlgo =:= ecdsa andalso S =:= ecdsa)) andalso lists:member(C, ServerSignAlgs) of true -> @@ -1331,7 +1873,20 @@ get_supported_groups(#supported_groups{supported_groups = Groups}) -> Groups. get_key_shares(#key_share_client_hello{client_shares = ClientShares}) -> - ClientShares. + ClientShares; +get_key_shares(#key_share_server_hello{server_share = ServerShare}) -> + ServerShare. + +get_selected_group(#key_share_hello_retry_request{selected_group = SelectedGroup}) -> + SelectedGroup. + +get_alpn(ALPNProtocol0) -> + case ssl_handshake:decode_alpn(ALPNProtocol0) of + undefined -> + undefined; + [ALPNProtocol] -> + ALPNProtocol + end. maybe() -> Ref = erlang:make_ref(), diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.hrl index 7ae1b93e1c..eb85f216c8 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.hrl @@ -74,29 +74,52 @@ y % opaque Y[coordinate_length]; }). +%% RFC 8446 4.2.9. Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes + +%% enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode; -define(PSK_KE, 0). -define(PSK_DHE_KE, 1). --record(psk_keyexchange_modes, { +-record(psk_key_exchange_modes, { ke_modes % ke_modes<1..255> }). + +%% RFC 8446 4.2.10. Early Data Indication -record(empty, { }). -record(early_data_indication, { indication % uint32 max_early_data_size (new_session_ticket) | %% #empty{} (client_hello, encrypted_extensions) }). --record(psk_identity, { - identity, % opaque identity<1..2^16-1> - obfuscated_ticket_age % uint32 - }). --record(offered_psks, { - psk_identity, %identities<7..2^16-1>; - psk_binder_entry %binders<33..2^16-1>, opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255> - }). --record(pre_shared_keyextension,{ - extension %OfferedPsks (client_hello) | uint16 selected_identity (server_hello) - }). + +%% RFC 8446 4.2.11. Pre-Shared Key Extension +-record(psk_identity, + { + identity, % opaque identity<1..2^16-1> + obfuscated_ticket_age % uint32 + }). + +-record(offered_psks, + { + identities, % PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>; + binders % PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>; opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255> + }). + +%% struct { +%% select (Handshake.msg_type) { +%% case client_hello: OfferedPsks; +%% case server_hello: uint16 selected_identity; +%% }; +%% } PreSharedKeyExtension; +-record(pre_shared_key_client_hello, + { + offered_psks + }). + +-record(pre_shared_key_server_hello, + { + selected_identity + }). %% RFC 8446 B.3.1.2. -record(cookie, { diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl index a5c550a429..2aeab98929 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl @@ -514,16 +514,27 @@ validate_tls_record_length(Versions, {_,Size0,_} = Q0, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Versi end. -binary_from_front(SplitSize, {Front,Size,Rear}) -> +binary_from_front(0, Q) -> + {<<>>, Q}; +binary_from_front(SplitSize, {Front,Size,Rear}) when SplitSize =< Size -> binary_from_front(SplitSize, Front, Size, Rear, []). %% -binary_from_front(SplitSize, [], Size, [_] = Rear, Acc) -> - %% Optimize a simple case - binary_from_front(SplitSize, Rear, Size, [], Acc); +%% SplitSize > 0 and there is at least SplitSize bytes buffered in Front and Rear binary_from_front(SplitSize, [], Size, Rear, Acc) -> - binary_from_front(SplitSize, lists:reverse(Rear), Size, [], Acc); + case Rear of + %% Avoid lists:reverse/1 for simple cases. + %% Case clause for [] to avoid infinite loop. + [_] -> + binary_from_front(SplitSize, Rear, Size, [], Acc); + [Bin2,Bin1] -> + binary_from_front(SplitSize, [Bin1,Bin2], Size, [], Acc); + [Bin3,Bin2,Bin1] -> + binary_from_front(SplitSize, [Bin1,Bin2,Bin3], Size, [], Acc); + [_,_,_|_] -> + binary_from_front(SplitSize, lists:reverse(Rear), Size, [], Acc) + end; binary_from_front(SplitSize, [Bin|Front], Size, Rear, []) -> - %% Optimize a frequent case + %% Optimize the frequent case when the accumulator is empty BinSize = byte_size(Bin), if SplitSize < BinSize -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.erl index 74321a1ae2..d713062284 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.erl @@ -138,6 +138,15 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, {#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, version = {3,4}, %% Internally use real version fragment = <<2,47>>}, ConnectionStates0}; +%% TLS 1.3 server can receive a User Cancelled Alert when handshake is +%% paused and then cancelled on the client side. +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, + version = ?LEGACY_VERSION, + fragment = <<2,90>>}, + ConnectionStates0) -> + {#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, + version = {3,4}, %% Internally use real version + fragment = <<2,90>>}, ConnectionStates0}; %% RFC8446 - TLS 1.3 %% D.4. Middlebox Compatibility Mode %% - If not offering early data, the client sends a dummy diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl index 27cd5765e5..f7c8c770ae 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl @@ -606,8 +606,26 @@ signature_schemes(Version, SignatureSchemes) when is_tuple(Version) Acc end; %% Special clause for filtering out the legacy hash-sign tuples. - (_ , Acc) -> - Acc + ({Hash, dsa = Sign} = Alg, Acc) -> + case proplists:get_bool(dss, PubKeys) + andalso proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashes) + andalso is_pair(Hash, Sign, Hashes) + of + true -> + [Alg | Acc]; + false -> + Acc + end; + ({Hash, Sign} = Alg, Acc) -> + case proplists:get_bool(Sign, PubKeys) + andalso proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashes) + andalso is_pair(Hash, Sign, Hashes) + of + true -> + [Alg | Acc]; + false -> + Acc + end end, Supported = lists:foldl(Fun, [], SignatureSchemes), lists:reverse(Supported); |