diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl/src')
41 files changed, 8176 insertions, 1686 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/Makefile b/lib/ssl/src/Makefile index 8d1341f594..8dc76f2638 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/ssl/src/Makefile @@ -39,60 +39,80 @@ RELSYSDIR = $(RELEASE_PATH)/lib/ssl-$(VSN) # ---------------------------------------------------- BEHAVIOUR_MODULES= \ - ssl_session_cache_api \ - ssl_crl_cache_api + ssl_crl_cache_api \ + ssl_session_cache_api + MODULES= \ - ssl \ - ssl_alert \ - ssl_app \ - ssl_sup \ - ssl_admin_sup\ - tls_connection_sup \ - ssl_connection_sup \ - ssl_listen_tracker_sup\ + dtls_connection \ dtls_connection_sup \ - dtls_packet_demux \ + dtls_handshake \ dtls_listener_sup \ - ssl_dist_sup\ - ssl_dist_admin_sup\ - ssl_dist_connection_sup\ + dtls_packet_demux \ + dtls_record \ + dtls_socket \ + dtls_v1 \ inet_tls_dist \ inet6_tls_dist \ - ssl_certificate\ - ssl_pkix_db\ + ssl \ + ssl_admin_sup \ + ssl_alert \ + ssl_app \ + ssl_certificate \ ssl_cipher \ ssl_cipher_format \ - ssl_srp_primes \ - tls_connection \ - dtls_connection \ - tls_sender\ ssl_config \ ssl_connection \ - tls_handshake \ - dtls_handshake\ - ssl_handshake\ - ssl_manager \ - ssl_session \ - ssl_session_cache \ - ssl_pem_cache \ - ssl_crl\ + ssl_connection_sup \ + ssl_crl \ ssl_crl_cache \ ssl_crl_hash_dir \ - tls_socket \ - dtls_socket \ - tls_record \ - dtls_record \ + ssl_dh_groups \ + ssl_dist_admin_sup \ + ssl_dist_connection_sup \ + ssl_dist_sup \ + ssl_handshake \ + ssl_listen_tracker_sup \ + ssl_logger \ + ssl_manager \ + ssl_pem_cache \ + ssl_pkix_db \ ssl_record \ + ssl_session \ + ssl_session_cache \ + ssl_srp_primes \ + ssl_sup \ ssl_v3 \ - tls_v1 \ - dtls_v1 + tls_connection \ + tls_connection_sup \ + tls_connection_1_3 \ + tls_handshake \ + tls_handshake_1_3 \ + tls_record \ + tls_record_1_3 \ + tls_sender \ + tls_socket \ + tls_v1 + INTERNAL_HRL_FILES = \ - ssl_alert.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl \ - tls_connection.hrl dtls_connection.hrl ssl_connection.hrl \ - ssl_handshake.hrl tls_handshake.hrl dtls_handshake.hrl ssl_api.hrl ssl_internal.hrl \ - ssl_record.hrl tls_record.hrl dtls_record.hrl ssl_srp.hrl + dtls_connection.hrl \ + dtls_handshake.hrl \ + dtls_record.hrl \ + ssl_alert.hrl \ + ssl_api.hrl \ + ssl_cipher.hrl \ + ssl_connection.hrl \ + ssl_handshake.hrl \ + ssl_internal.hrl \ + ssl_record.hrl \ + ssl_srp.hrl \ + tls_connection.hrl \ + tls_handshake.hrl \ + tls_handshake_1_3.hrl \ + tls_record.hrl \ + tls_record_1_3.hrl + ERL_FILES= \ $(MODULES:%=%.erl) \ @@ -111,6 +131,10 @@ APP_TARGET= $(EBIN)/$(APP_FILE) APPUP_SRC= $(APPUP_FILE).src APPUP_TARGET= $(EBIN)/$(APPUP_FILE) +DEPDIR=$(ERL_TOP)/lib/ssl/src/deps +DEP_FILE=$(DEPDIR)/ssl.d +$(shell mkdir -p $(dir $(DEP_FILE)) >/dev/null) + # ---------------------------------------------------- # FLAGS # ---------------------------------------------------- @@ -118,7 +142,7 @@ EXTRA_ERLC_FLAGS = +warn_unused_vars ERL_COMPILE_FLAGS += -I$(ERL_TOP)/lib/kernel/src \ -pz $(EBIN) \ -pz $(ERL_TOP)/lib/public_key/ebin \ - $(EXTRA_ERLC_FLAGS) -DVSN=\"$(VSN)\" + $(EXTRA_ERLC_FLAGS) # ---------------------------------------------------- @@ -127,11 +151,22 @@ ERL_COMPILE_FLAGS += -I$(ERL_TOP)/lib/kernel/src \ $(TARGET_FILES): $(BEHAVIOUR_TARGET_FILES) -debug opt: $(TARGET_FILES) $(APP_TARGET) $(APPUP_TARGET) +$(DEP_FILE): $(ERL_FILES) + $(gen_verbose)erlc -M $(ERL_FILES) \ + | sed "s@$(ERL_TOP)@../../..@g" \ + | sed "s/\.$(EMULATOR)/\.$$\(EMULATOR\)/" \ + | sed 's@^dtls_@$$(EBIN)/dtls_@' \ + | sed 's@^inet_@$$(EBIN)/inet_@' \ + | sed 's@^ssl_@$$(EBIN)/ssl_@' \ + | sed 's@^tls_@$$(EBIN)/tls_@' \ + > $(DEP_FILE) + +debug opt: $(TARGET_FILES) $(APP_TARGET) $(APPUP_TARGET) $(DEP_FILE) clean: rm -f $(TARGET_FILES) $(APP_TARGET) $(APPUP_TARGET) $(BEHAVIOUR_TARGET_FILES) rm -f errs core *~ + rm -rf $(DEPDIR) $(APP_TARGET): $(APP_SRC) ../vsn.mk $(vsn_verbose)sed -e 's;%VSN%;$(VSN);' $< > $@ @@ -141,7 +176,6 @@ $(APPUP_TARGET): $(APPUP_SRC) ../vsn.mk docs: - # ---------------------------------------------------- # Release Target # ---------------------------------------------------- @@ -159,22 +193,4 @@ release_docs_spec: # ---------------------------------------------------- # Dependencies # ---------------------------------------------------- -$(EBIN)/inet_tls_dist.$(EMULATOR): ../../kernel/include/net_address.hrl ../../kernel/include/dist.hrl ../../kernel/include/dist_util.hrl -$(EBIN)/tls.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_alert.$(EMULATOR): ssl_alert.hrl ssl_record.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_certificate.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_certificate_db.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl ../../kernel/include/file.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_cipher.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/tls_connection.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl tls_connection.hrl tls_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl tls_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/dtls_connection.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl dtls_connection.hrl dtls_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl dtls_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/tls_handshake.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl tls_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl tls_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/tls_handshake.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_connection.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_manager.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ../../kernel/include/file.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_record.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_session.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_session_cache.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_session_cache_api.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_ssl3.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_tls1.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_cache.$(EMULATOR): ssl_cache.erl ssl_internal.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl - +-include $(DEP_FILE) diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl index 2c6b71c97a..b220691e79 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_srp.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% Internal application API @@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ -export([encode_alert/3, send_alert/2, send_alert_in_connection/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). %% Data handling --export([next_record/1, socket/4, setopts/3, getopts/3]). +-export([socket/4, setopts/3, getopts/3]). %% gen_statem state functions -export([init/3, error/3, downgrade/3, %% Initiation and take down states @@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ %% Setup %%==================================================================== start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} = Opts, - User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, + User, {CbModule, _, _, _, _} = CbInfo, Timeout) -> try {ok, Pid} = dtls_connection_sup:start_child([Role, Host, Port, Socket, @@ -146,13 +147,16 @@ next_record(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server, socket = {Listener, {Client, _}}}} = State) -> dtls_packet_demux:active_once(Listener, Client, self()), {no_record, State}; -next_record(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client, +next_record(#state{protocol_specific = #{active_n_toggle := true, + active_n := N} = ProtocolSpec, + static_env = #static_env{role = client, socket = {_Server, Socket} = DTLSSocket, close_tag = CloseTag, transport_cb = Transport}} = State) -> - case dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]) of + case dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,N}]) of ok -> - {no_record, State}; + {no_record, State#state{protocol_specific = + ProtocolSpec#{active_n_toggle => false}}}; _ -> self() ! {CloseTag, DTLSSocket}, {no_record, State} @@ -192,7 +196,8 @@ next_event(StateName, no_record, %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch next_event(StateName, no_record, State, Actions); {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} + Version = State#state.connection_env#connection_env.negotiated_version, + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) end; next_event(connection = StateName, Record, #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> @@ -232,7 +237,8 @@ next_event(StateName, Record, %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch next_event(StateName, no_record, State0, Actions); #alert{} = Alert -> - {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} + Version = State0#state.connection_env#connection_env.negotiated_version, + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0) end. %%% DTLS record protocol level application data messages @@ -249,10 +255,11 @@ handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, Stat handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, StateName, - #state{protocol_buffers = Buffers0, - connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> + #state{protocol_buffers = Buffers0, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + ssl_options = Options} = State) -> try - case dtls_handshake:get_dtls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffers0) of + case dtls_handshake:get_dtls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffers0, Options) of {[], Buffers} -> next_event(StateName, no_record, State#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers}); {Packets, Buffers} -> @@ -287,9 +294,10 @@ handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> %% Handshake handling %%==================================================================== -renegotiate(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}} = State, Actions) -> +renegotiate(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}} = State0, Actions) -> %% Handle same way as if server requested %% the renegotiation + State = reinit_handshake_data(State0), {next_state, connection, State, [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]}; @@ -307,9 +315,12 @@ queue_handshake(Handshake0, #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_ connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, flight_buffer = #{handshakes := HsBuffer0, change_cipher_spec := undefined, - next_sequence := Seq} = Flight0} = State) -> + next_sequence := Seq} = Flight0, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> Handshake = dtls_handshake:encode_handshake(Handshake0, Version, Seq), Hist = update_handshake_history(Handshake0, Handshake, Hist0), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'handshake', Handshake0), + State#state{flight_buffer = Flight0#{handshakes => [Handshake | HsBuffer0], next_sequence => Seq +1}, handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist}}; @@ -317,9 +328,12 @@ queue_handshake(Handshake0, #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_ queue_handshake(Handshake0, #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist0} = HsEnv, connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, flight_buffer = #{handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Buffer0, - next_sequence := Seq} = Flight0} = State) -> + next_sequence := Seq} = Flight0, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> Handshake = dtls_handshake:encode_handshake(Handshake0, Version, Seq), Hist = update_handshake_history(Handshake0, Handshake, Hist0), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'handshake', Handshake0), + State#state{flight_buffer = Flight0#{handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec => [Handshake | Buffer0], next_sequence => Seq +1}, handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist}}. @@ -327,7 +341,7 @@ queue_handshake(Handshake0, #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_ queue_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, #state{flight_buffer = Flight, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> ConnectionStates = - dtls_record:next_epoch(ConnectionStates0, write), + dtls_record:next_epoch(ConnectionStates0, write), State#state{flight_buffer = Flight#{change_cipher_spec => ChangeCipher}, connection_states = ConnectionStates}. @@ -350,8 +364,8 @@ reinit_handshake_data(#state{static_env = #static_env{data_tag = DataTag}, dtls_handshake_later_fragments = [] }}. -select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = HelloExtensions}) -> - HelloExtensions#hello_extensions.sni; +select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = #{sni := SNI}}) -> + SNI; select_sni_extension(_) -> undefined. @@ -367,11 +381,14 @@ encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) -> send_alert(Alert, #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) -> {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'record', BinMsg), State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. send_alert_in_connection(Alert, State) -> @@ -434,12 +451,11 @@ init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, HelloVersion = dtls_record:hello_version(Version, SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), State1 = prepare_flight(State0#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}), {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State1#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = HelloVersion}}), - State3 = State2#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, %% RequestedVersion + State = State2#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, %% RequestedVersion session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}, start_or_recv_from = From}, - {Record, State} = next_record(State3), - next_event(hello, Record, State, [{{timeout, handshake}, Timeout, close} | Actions]); + next_event(hello, no_record, State, [{{timeout, handshake}, Timeout, close} | Actions]); init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, protocol_specific = PS} = State) -> Result = gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, @@ -497,9 +513,8 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{cookie = <<>>, %% negotiated. VerifyRequest = dtls_handshake:hello_verify_request(Cookie, ?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_VERSION), State1 = prepare_flight(State0#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}), - {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(VerifyRequest, State1), - {Record, State} = next_record(State2), - next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, + {State, Actions} = send_handshake(VerifyRequest, State1), + next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{ tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history()}}, @@ -537,14 +552,14 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{hello = Hello}}, - [{reply, From, {ok, ssl_connection:map_extensions(Extensions)}}]}; + [{reply, From, {ok, Extensions}}]}; hello(internal, #server_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, handshake_env = HsEnv, start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{hello = Hello}}, - [{reply, From, {ok, ssl_connection:map_extensions(Extensions)}}]}; + [{reply, From, {ok, Extensions}}]}; hello(internal, #client_hello{cookie = Cookie} = Hello, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server, transport_cb = Transport, @@ -701,12 +716,10 @@ connection(internal, #hello_request{}, #state{static_env = #static_env{host = Ho HelloVersion = dtls_record:hello_version(Version, SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), State1 = prepare_flight(State0), {State2, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State1#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = HelloVersion}}), - {Record, State} = - next_record( - State2#state{protocol_specific = PS#{flight_state => initial_flight_state(DataTag)}, - session = Session0#session{session_id - = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}), - next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions); + State = State2#state{protocol_specific = PS#{flight_state => initial_flight_state(DataTag)}, + session = Session0#session{session_id + = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}, + next_event(hello, no_record, State, Actions); connection(internal, #client_hello{} = Hello, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, handshake_env = #handshake_env{allow_renegotiate = true} = HsEnv} = State) -> %% Mitigate Computational DoS attack @@ -762,7 +775,7 @@ format_status(Type, Data) -> %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, _}, User, - {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) -> + {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag, PassiveTag}) -> #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation} = SSLOptions, ConnectionStates = dtls_record:init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation), @@ -772,7 +785,12 @@ initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, _}, User, _ -> ssl_session_cache end, - + InternalActiveN = case application:get_env(ssl, internal_active_n) of + {ok, N} when is_integer(N) -> + N; + _ -> + ?INTERNAL_ACTIVE_N + end, Monitor = erlang:monitor(process, User), InitStatEnv = #static_env{ role = Role, @@ -781,6 +799,7 @@ initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, _}, User, data_tag = DataTag, close_tag = CloseTag, error_tag = ErrorTag, + passive_tag = PassiveTag, host = Host, port = Port, socket = Socket, @@ -804,7 +823,9 @@ initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, _}, User, user_data_buffer = {[],0,[]}, start_or_recv_from = undefined, flight_buffer = new_flight(), - protocol_specific = #{flight_state => initial_flight_state(DataTag)} + protocol_specific = #{active_n => InternalActiveN, + active_n_toggle => true, + flight_state => initial_flight_state(DataTag)} }. initial_flight_state(udp)-> @@ -814,10 +835,14 @@ initial_flight_state(_) -> next_dtls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{ dtls_record_buffer = Buf0, - dtls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers} = State0) -> + dtls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + static_env = #static_env{data_tag = DataTag}, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) -> case dtls_record:get_dtls_records(Data, - acceptable_record_versions(StateName, State0), - Buf0) of + {DataTag, StateName, Version, + [dtls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_AVAILABLE_DATAGRAM_VERSIONS]}, + Buf0, SslOpts) of {Records, Buf1} -> CT1 = CT0 ++ Records, next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers = @@ -827,10 +852,6 @@ next_dtls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{ Alert end. -acceptable_record_versions(hello, _) -> - [dtls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS]; -acceptable_record_versions(_, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}}) -> - [Version]. dtls_handshake_events(Packets) -> lists:map(fun(Packet) -> @@ -900,12 +921,21 @@ handle_info({Protocol, _, _, _, Data}, StateName, ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State0} end; + +handle_info({PassiveTag, Socket}, StateName, + #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = {_, Socket}, + passive_tag = PassiveTag}, + protocol_specific = PS} = State) -> + next_event(StateName, no_record, + State#state{protocol_specific = PS#{active_n_toggle => true}}); + handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag}, connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, socket_options = #socket_options{active = Active}, - protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = CTs}} = State) -> + protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = CTs}, + protocol_specific = PS} = State) -> %% Note that as of DTLS 1.2 (TLS 1.1), %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a %% session not be resumed. This is a change from DTLS 1.0 to conform @@ -928,7 +958,8 @@ handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, %% Fixes non-delivery of final DTLS record in {active, once}. %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again %% and then receive the final message. - next_event(StateName, no_record, State) + next_event(StateName, no_record, State#state{ + protocol_specific = PS#{active_n_toggle => true}}) end; handle_info(new_cookie_secret, StateName, @@ -963,7 +994,7 @@ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{data ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> case ignore_alert(Alert, State0) of {true, State} -> - log_ignore_alert(Options#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert, Role), + log_ignore_alert(Options#ssl_options.log_level, StateName, Alert, Role), {next_state, StateName, State}; {false, State} -> ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) @@ -1063,21 +1094,24 @@ start_retransmision_timer(Timeout, #state{protocol_specific = PS} = State) -> {State#state{protocol_specific = PS#{flight_state => {retransmit, new_timeout(Timeout)}}}, [{state_timeout, Timeout, flight_retransmission_timeout}]}. -new_timeout(N) when N =< 30 -> +new_timeout(N) when N =< 30000 -> N * 2; new_timeout(_) -> - 60. + 60000. send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport}, connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, flight_buffer = #{handshakes := Flight, change_cipher_spec := undefined}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{log_level = LogLevel}} = State0, + Epoch) -> %% TODO remove hardcoded Max size {Encoded, ConnectionStates} = encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates0), - send(Transport, Socket, Encoded), + send(Transport, Socket, Encoded), + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, outbound, 'record', Encoded), {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, @@ -1086,12 +1120,16 @@ send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [_|_] = Flight0, change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := []}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{log_level = LogLevel}} = State0, + Epoch) -> {HsBefore, ConnectionStates1} = encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight0), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates0), {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates} = encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates1), send(Transport, Socket, [HsBefore, EncChangeCipher]), + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, outbound, 'record', [HsBefore]), + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, outbound, 'record', [EncChangeCipher]), {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, @@ -1100,7 +1138,9 @@ send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [_|_] = Flight0, change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Flight1}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{log_level = LogLevel}} = State0, + Epoch) -> {HsBefore, ConnectionStates1} = encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight0), Version, 1400, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates0), {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates2} = @@ -1108,6 +1148,9 @@ send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, {HsAfter, ConnectionStates} = encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight1), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates2), send(Transport, Socket, [HsBefore, EncChangeCipher, HsAfter]), + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, outbound, 'record', [HsBefore]), + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, outbound, 'record', [EncChangeCipher]), + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, outbound, 'record', [HsAfter]), {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, @@ -1116,12 +1159,16 @@ send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [], change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Flight1}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{log_level = LogLevel}} = State0, + Epoch) -> {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates1} = encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates0), {HsAfter, ConnectionStates} = encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight1), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates1), send(Transport, Socket, [EncChangeCipher, HsAfter]), + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, outbound, 'record', [EncChangeCipher]), + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, outbound, 'record', [HsAfter]), {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}. retransmit_epoch(_StateName, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) -> @@ -1160,11 +1207,11 @@ is_ignore_alert(#alert{description = ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER}) -> is_ignore_alert(_) -> false. -log_ignore_alert(true, StateName, Alert, Role) -> +log_ignore_alert(debug, StateName, Alert, Role) -> Txt = ssl_alert:alert_txt(Alert), - error_logger:format("DTLS over UDP ~p: In state ~p ignored to send ALERT ~s as DoS-attack mitigation \n", - [Role, StateName, Txt]); -log_ignore_alert(false, _, _,_) -> + ?LOG_ERROR("DTLS over UDP ~p: In state ~p ignored to send ALERT ~s as DoS-attack mitigation \n", + [Role, StateName, Txt]); +log_ignore_alert(_, _, _, _) -> ok. send_application_data(Data, From, _StateName, @@ -1173,7 +1220,8 @@ send_application_data(Data, From, _StateName, connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, handshake_env = HsEnv, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}} = State0) -> + ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt, + log_level = LogLevel}} = State0) -> case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of true -> @@ -1185,6 +1233,7 @@ send_application_data(Data, From, _StateName, State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, case send(Transport, Socket, Msgs) of ok -> + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, outbound, 'record', Msgs), ssl_connection:hibernate_after(connection, State, [{reply, From, ok}]); Result -> ssl_connection:hibernate_after(connection, State, [{reply, From, Result}]) diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl index 6e9bf99e52..4a381745d4 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ -export([fragment_handshake/2, encode_handshake/3]). %% Handshake decodeing --export([get_dtls_handshake/3]). +-export([get_dtls_handshake/4]). -type dtls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | #hello_verify_request{} | ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake(). @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, Cookie, ConnectionStates, Extensions = ssl_handshake:client_hello_extensions(TLSVersion, CipherSuites, SslOpts, ConnectionStates, - Renegotiation), + Renegotiation, undefined), Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert), #client_hello{session_id = Id, @@ -151,15 +151,15 @@ encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, Seq) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec get_dtls_handshake(ssl_record:ssl_version(), binary(), #protocol_buffers{}) -> +-spec get_dtls_handshake(ssl_record:ssl_version(), binary(), #protocol_buffers{}, #ssl_options{}) -> {[dtls_handshake()], #protocol_buffers{}}. %% %% Description: Given buffered and new data from dtls_record, collects %% and returns it as a list of handshake messages, also returns %% possible leftover data in the new "protocol_buffers". %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -get_dtls_handshake(Version, Fragment, ProtocolBuffers) -> - handle_fragments(Version, Fragment, ProtocolBuffers, []). +get_dtls_handshake(Version, Fragment, ProtocolBuffers, Options) -> + handle_fragments(Version, Fragment, ProtocolBuffers, Options, []). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions @@ -169,10 +169,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, cipher_suites = CipherSuites, compression_methods = Compressions, random = Random, - extensions = - #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves, - signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} - = HelloExt}, + extensions = HelloExt}, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, eccs = SupportedECCs, @@ -181,6 +178,8 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, Renegotiation) -> case dtls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of true -> + Curves = maps:get(elliptic_curves, HelloExt, undefined), + ClientHashSigns = maps:get(signature_algs, HelloExt, undefined), TLSVersion = dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), AvailableHashSigns = ssl_handshake:available_signature_algs( ClientHashSigns, SupportedHashSigns, Cert,TLSVersion), @@ -194,8 +193,8 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); _ -> - #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), - case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, + #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(CipherSuite), + case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign({ClientHashSigns, undefined}, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, TLSVersion) of #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; @@ -256,7 +255,8 @@ enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods), BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites), CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites), - ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions), + ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions, + dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version({Major, Minor})), {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary, @@ -311,20 +311,21 @@ address_to_bin({A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H}, Port) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handle_fragments(Version, FragmentData, Buffers0, Acc) -> +handle_fragments(Version, FragmentData, Buffers0, Options, Acc) -> Fragments = decode_handshake_fragments(FragmentData), - do_handle_fragments(Version, Fragments, Buffers0, Acc). + do_handle_fragments(Version, Fragments, Buffers0, Options, Acc). -do_handle_fragments(_, [], Buffers, Acc) -> +do_handle_fragments(_, [], Buffers, _Options, Acc) -> {lists:reverse(Acc), Buffers}; -do_handle_fragments(Version, [Fragment | Fragments], Buffers0, Acc) -> +do_handle_fragments(Version, [Fragment | Fragments], Buffers0, Options, Acc) -> case reassemble(Version, Fragment, Buffers0) of {more_data, Buffers} when Fragments == [] -> {lists:reverse(Acc), Buffers}; {more_data, Buffers} -> - do_handle_fragments(Version, Fragments, Buffers, Acc); - {HsPacket, Buffers} -> - do_handle_fragments(Version, Fragments, Buffers, [HsPacket | Acc]) + do_handle_fragments(Version, Fragments, Buffers, Options, Acc); + {{Handshake, _} = HsPacket, Buffers} -> + ssl_logger:debug(Options#ssl_options.log_level, inbound, 'handshake', Handshake), + do_handle_fragments(Version, Fragments, Buffers, Options, [HsPacket | Acc]) end. decode_handshake(Version, <<?BYTE(Type), Bin/binary>>) -> @@ -332,7 +333,7 @@ decode_handshake(Version, <<?BYTE(Type), Bin/binary>>) -> decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) -> #hello_request{}; -decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), +decode_handshake(Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), ?UINT24(_), ?UINT24(_), ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, @@ -340,8 +341,10 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary, ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary, Extensions/binary>>) -> - - DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions({client, Extensions}), + TLSVersion = dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), + LegacyVersion = dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version({Major, Minor}), + Exts = ssl_handshake:decode_vector(Extensions), + DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(Exts, TLSVersion, LegacyVersion, client), #client_hello{ client_version = {Major,Minor}, @@ -362,9 +365,9 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), decode_handshake(Version, Tag, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), ?UINT24(_), ?UINT24(_), Msg/binary>>) -> %% DTLS specifics stripped - decode_tls_thandshake(Version, Tag, Msg). + decode_tls_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg). -decode_tls_thandshake(Version, Tag, Msg) -> +decode_tls_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg) -> TLSVersion = dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), ssl_handshake:decode_handshake(TLSVersion, Tag, Msg). @@ -425,74 +428,135 @@ merge_fragment(Frag0, [Frag1 | Rest]) -> Frag -> merge_fragment(Frag, Rest) end. -%% Duplicate + + +%% Duplicate (fully contained fragment) +%% 2,5 _ _ P P P P P +%% 2,5 _ _ C C C C C merge_fragments(#handshake_fragment{ - fragment_offset = PreviousOffSet, + fragment_offset = PreviousOffSet, fragment_length = PreviousLen, fragment = PreviousData - } = Previous, + } = Previous, #handshake_fragment{ fragment_offset = PreviousOffSet, fragment_length = PreviousLen, fragment = PreviousData}) -> Previous; -%% Lager fragment save new data +%% Duplicate (fully contained fragment) +%% 2,5 _ _ P P P P P +%% 2,2 _ _ C C +%% 0,3 X X X +%% 5,3 _ _ _ _ _ X X X merge_fragments(#handshake_fragment{ - fragment_offset = PreviousOffSet, - fragment_length = PreviousLen, + fragment_offset = PreviousOffset, + fragment_length = PreviousLen + } = Previous, + #handshake_fragment{ + fragment_offset = CurrentOffset, + fragment_length = CurrentLen}) + when PreviousOffset =< CurrentOffset andalso + CurrentOffset =< PreviousOffset + PreviousLen andalso + CurrentOffset + CurrentLen =< PreviousOffset + PreviousLen -> + Previous; + +%% Fully overlapping fragments +%% 2,5 _ _ P P P P P +%% 0,8 C C C C C C C C +merge_fragments(#handshake_fragment{ + fragment_offset = PreviousOffset, + fragment_length = PreviousLen + }, + #handshake_fragment{ + fragment_offset = CurrentOffset, + fragment_length = CurrentLen} = Current) + when CurrentOffset =< PreviousOffset andalso + CurrentOffset + CurrentLen >= PreviousOffset + PreviousLen -> + Current; + +%% Overlapping fragments +%% 2,5 _ _ P P P P P +%% 0,3 C C C +merge_fragments(#handshake_fragment{ + fragment_offset = PreviousOffset, + fragment_length = PreviousLen, fragment = PreviousData - } = Previous, - #handshake_fragment{ - fragment_offset = PreviousOffSet, - fragment_length = CurrentLen, - fragment = CurrentData}) when CurrentLen > PreviousLen -> - NewLength = CurrentLen - PreviousLen, - <<_:PreviousLen/binary, NewData/binary>> = CurrentData, + } = Previous, + #handshake_fragment{ + fragment_offset = CurrentOffset, + fragment_length = CurrentLen, + fragment = CurrentData}) + when CurrentOffset < PreviousOffset andalso + CurrentOffset + CurrentLen < PreviousOffset + PreviousLen -> + NewDataLen = PreviousOffset - CurrentOffset, + <<NewData:NewDataLen/binary, _/binary>> = CurrentData, Previous#handshake_fragment{ - fragment_length = PreviousLen + NewLength, - fragment = <<PreviousData/binary, NewData/binary>> + fragment_length = PreviousLen + NewDataLen, + fragment = <<NewData/binary, PreviousData/binary>> }; -%% Smaller fragment +%% Overlapping fragments +%% 2,5 _ _ P P P P P +%% 5,3 _ _ _ _ _ C C C merge_fragments(#handshake_fragment{ - fragment_offset = PreviousOffSet, - fragment_length = PreviousLen - } = Previous, - #handshake_fragment{ - fragment_offset = PreviousOffSet, - fragment_length = CurrentLen}) when CurrentLen < PreviousLen -> - Previous; -%% Next fragment, might be overlapping + fragment_offset = PreviousOffset, + fragment_length = PreviousLen, + fragment = PreviousData + } = Previous, + #handshake_fragment{ + fragment_offset = CurrentOffset, + fragment_length = CurrentLen, + fragment = CurrentData}) + when CurrentOffset > PreviousOffset andalso + CurrentOffset < PreviousOffset + PreviousLen -> + NewDataLen = CurrentOffset + CurrentLen - (PreviousOffset + PreviousLen), + DropLen = CurrentLen - NewDataLen, + <<_:DropLen/binary, NewData/binary>> = CurrentData, + Previous#handshake_fragment{ + fragment_length = PreviousLen + NewDataLen, + fragment = <<PreviousData/binary, NewData/binary>> + }; + +%% Adjacent fragments +%% 2,5 _ _ P P P P P +%% 7,3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C C C merge_fragments(#handshake_fragment{ - fragment_offset = PreviousOffSet, - fragment_length = PreviousLen, + fragment_offset = PreviousOffset, + fragment_length = PreviousLen, fragment = PreviousData - } = Previous, - #handshake_fragment{ - fragment_offset = CurrentOffSet, - fragment_length = CurrentLen, - fragment = CurrentData}) - when PreviousOffSet + PreviousLen >= CurrentOffSet andalso - PreviousOffSet + PreviousLen < CurrentOffSet + CurrentLen -> - CurrentStart = PreviousOffSet + PreviousLen - CurrentOffSet, - <<_:CurrentStart/bytes, Data/binary>> = CurrentData, + } = Previous, + #handshake_fragment{ + fragment_offset = CurrentOffset, + fragment_length = CurrentLen, + fragment = CurrentData}) + when CurrentOffset =:= PreviousOffset + PreviousLen -> Previous#handshake_fragment{ - fragment_length = PreviousLen + CurrentLen - CurrentStart, - fragment = <<PreviousData/binary, Data/binary>>}; -%% already fully contained fragment + fragment_length = PreviousLen + CurrentLen, + fragment = <<PreviousData/binary, CurrentData/binary>> + }; + +%% Adjacent fragments +%% 2,5 _ _ P P P P P +%% 0,2 C C merge_fragments(#handshake_fragment{ - fragment_offset = PreviousOffSet, - fragment_length = PreviousLen - } = Previous, + fragment_offset = PreviousOffset, + fragment_length = PreviousLen, + fragment = PreviousData + } = Previous, #handshake_fragment{ - fragment_offset = CurrentOffSet, - fragment_length = CurrentLen}) - when PreviousOffSet + PreviousLen >= CurrentOffSet andalso - PreviousOffSet + PreviousLen >= CurrentOffSet + CurrentLen -> - Previous; + fragment_offset = CurrentOffset, + fragment_length = CurrentLen, + fragment = CurrentData}) + when PreviousOffset =:= CurrentOffset + CurrentLen -> + Previous#handshake_fragment{ + fragment_length = PreviousLen + CurrentLen, + fragment = <<CurrentData/binary, PreviousData/binary>> + }; %% No merge there is a gap +%% 3,5 _ _ _ P P P P +%% 0,2 C C merge_fragments(Previous, Current) -> [Previous, Current]. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl index 41da8e5c8c..de2be1daeb 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl @@ -26,23 +26,13 @@ -ifndef(dtls_handshake). -define(dtls_handshake, true). +-include("tls_handshake.hrl"). %% Common TLS and DTLS records and Constantes -include("ssl_handshake.hrl"). %% Common TLS and DTLS records and Constantes -include("ssl_api.hrl"). -define(HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, 3). -define(HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_VERSION, {254, 255}). --record(client_hello, { - client_version, - random, - session_id, % opaque SessionID<0..32> - cookie, % opaque<2..2^16-1> - cipher_suites, % cipher_suites<2..2^16-1> - compression_methods, % compression_methods<1..2^8-1>, - %% Extensions - extensions - }). - -record(hello_verify_request, { protocol_version, cookie @@ -57,4 +47,11 @@ fragment }). +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% RFC 7764 Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys +%% for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Not supported +-define(USE_SRTP, 14). + -endif. % -ifdef(dtls_handshake). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl index 092366b7c0..94b350eaa5 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ -behaviour(gen_server). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% API -export([start_link/5, active_once/3, accept/2, sockname/1, close/1, @@ -34,7 +35,8 @@ terminate/2, code_change/3]). -record(state, - {port, + {active_n, + port, listener, transport, dtls_options, @@ -75,10 +77,18 @@ set_sock_opts(PacketSocket, Opts) -> %%% gen_server callbacks %%%=================================================================== -init([Port, {TransportModule, _,_,_} = TransportInfo, EmOpts, InetOptions, DTLSOptions]) -> +init([Port, {TransportModule, _,_,_,_} = TransportInfo, EmOpts, InetOptions, DTLSOptions]) -> try {ok, Socket} = TransportModule:open(Port, InetOptions), - {ok, #state{port = Port, + InternalActiveN = case application:get_env(ssl, internal_active_n) of + {ok, N} when is_integer(N) -> + N; + _ -> + ?INTERNAL_ACTIVE_N + end, + + {ok, #state{active_n = InternalActiveN, + port = Port, first = true, transport = TransportInfo, dtls_options = DTLSOptions, @@ -91,10 +101,11 @@ init([Port, {TransportModule, _,_,_} = TransportInfo, EmOpts, InetOptions, DTLSO handle_call({accept, _}, _, #state{close = true} = State) -> {reply, {error, closed}, State}; -handle_call({accept, Accepter}, From, #state{first = true, +handle_call({accept, Accepter}, From, #state{active_n = N, + first = true, accepters = Accepters, listener = Socket} = State0) -> - next_datagram(Socket), + next_datagram(Socket, N), State = State0#state{first = false, accepters = queue:in({Accepter, From}, Accepters)}, {noreply, State}; @@ -136,21 +147,26 @@ handle_cast({active_once, Client, Pid}, State0) -> State = handle_active_once(Client, Pid, State0), {noreply, State}. -handle_info({Transport, Socket, IP, InPortNo, _} = Msg, #state{listener = Socket, transport = {_,Transport,_,_}} = State0) -> +handle_info({Transport, Socket, IP, InPortNo, _} = Msg, #state{listener = Socket, transport = {_,Transport,_,_,_}} = State0) -> State = handle_datagram({IP, InPortNo}, Msg, State0), - next_datagram(Socket), {noreply, State}; +handle_info({PassiveTag, Socket}, + #state{active_n = N, + listener = Socket, + transport = {_, _, _, _, PassiveTag}} = State) -> + next_datagram(Socket, N), + {noreply, State}; %% UDP socket does not have a connection and should not receive an econnreset %% This does however happens on some windows versions. Just ignoring it %% appears to make things work as expected! -handle_info({udp_error, Socket, econnreset = Error}, #state{listener = Socket, transport = {_,_,_, udp_error}} = State) -> +handle_info({udp_error, Socket, econnreset = Error}, #state{listener = Socket, transport = {_,_,_, udp_error,_}} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("Ignore SSL UDP Listener: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Error]), - error_logger:info_report(Report), + ?LOG_NOTICE(Report), {noreply, State}; -handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Error}, #state{listener = Socket, transport = {_,_,_, ErrorTag}} = State) -> +handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Error}, #state{listener = Socket, transport = {_,_,_, ErrorTag,_}} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL Packet muliplxer shutdown: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Error]), - error_logger:info_report(Report), + ?LOG_NOTICE(Report), {noreply, State#state{close=true}}; handle_info({'DOWN', _, process, Pid, _}, #state{clients = Clients, @@ -202,16 +218,16 @@ dispatch(Client, Msg, #state{dtls_msq_queues = MsgQueues} = State) -> Pid ! Msg, State#state{dtls_msq_queues = kv_update(Client, Queue, MsgQueues)}; - {{value, _}, Queue} -> + {{value, _UDP}, _Queue} -> State#state{dtls_msq_queues = - kv_update(Client, queue:in(Msg, Queue), MsgQueues)}; + kv_update(Client, queue:in(Msg, Queue0), MsgQueues)}; {empty, Queue} -> State#state{dtls_msq_queues = kv_update(Client, queue:in(Msg, Queue), MsgQueues)} end end. -next_datagram(Socket) -> - inet:setopts(Socket, [{active, once}]). +next_datagram(Socket, N) -> + inet:setopts(Socket, [{active, N}]). handle_active_once(Client, Pid, #state{dtls_msq_queues = MsgQueues} = State0) -> Queue0 = kv_get(Client, MsgQueues), diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl index 2fe875da31..8b8db7b2de 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). %% Handling of incoming data --export([get_dtls_records/3, init_connection_states/2, empty_connection_state/1]). +-export([get_dtls_records/4, init_connection_states/2, empty_connection_state/1]). -export([save_current_connection_state/2, next_epoch/2, get_connection_state_by_epoch/3, replay_detect/2, init_connection_state_seq/2, current_connection_state_epoch/2]). @@ -162,25 +162,16 @@ current_connection_state_epoch(#{current_write := #{epoch := Epoch}}, Epoch. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec get_dtls_records(binary(), [ssl_record:ssl_version()], binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. +-spec get_dtls_records(binary(), {atom(), atom(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), [ssl_record:ssl_version()]}, binary(), + #ssl_options{}) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Given old buffer and new data from UDP/SCTP, packs up a records %% and returns it as a list of tls_compressed binaries also returns leftover %% data %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -get_dtls_records(Data, Versions, Buffer) -> +get_dtls_records(Data, Vinfo, Buffer, SslOpts) -> BinData = list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), - case erlang:byte_size(BinData) of - N when N >= 3 -> - case assert_version(BinData, Versions) of - true -> - get_dtls_records_aux(BinData, []); - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) - end; - _ -> - get_dtls_records_aux(BinData, []) - end. + get_dtls_records_aux(Vinfo, BinData, [], SslOpts). %%==================================================================== %% Encoding DTLS records @@ -404,47 +395,49 @@ initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> client_verify_data => undefined, server_verify_data => undefined }. -assert_version(<<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), _/binary>>, Versions) -> - is_acceptable_version({MajVer, MinVer}, Versions). -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?APPLICATION_DATA),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, - Acc) -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?HANDSHAKE),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), - Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) when MajVer >= 128 -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?ALERT),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), +get_dtls_records_aux({DataTag, StateName, _, Versions} = Vinfo, <<?BYTE(Type),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>> = RawDTLSRecord, + Acc, SslOpts) when ((StateName == hello) orelse + ((StateName == certify) andalso (DataTag == udp)) orelse + ((StateName == abbreviated) andalso(DataTag == udp))) + andalso + ((Type == ?HANDSHAKE) orelse + (Type == ?ALERT)) -> + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, inbound, 'record', [RawDTLSRecord]), + case is_acceptable_version({MajVer, MinVer}, Versions) of + true -> + get_dtls_records_aux(Vinfo, Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = Type, + version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, + fragment = Data} | Acc], SslOpts); + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + end; +get_dtls_records_aux({_, _, Version, _} = Vinfo, <<?BYTE(Type),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, - Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, - Acc) -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>> = RawDTLSRecord, + Acc, SslOpts) when (Type == ?APPLICATION_DATA) orelse + (Type == ?HANDSHAKE) orelse + (Type == ?ALERT) orelse + (Type == ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) -> + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, inbound, 'record', [RawDTLSRecord]), + case {MajVer, MinVer} of + Version -> + get_dtls_records_aux(Vinfo, Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = Type, + version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, + fragment = Data} | Acc], SslOpts); + _ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + end; +get_dtls_records_aux(_, <<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer), ?UINT16(Length), _/binary>>, - _Acc) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> + _Acc, _) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); -get_dtls_records_aux(Data, Acc) -> +get_dtls_records_aux(_, Data, Acc, _) -> case size(Data) =< ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH + ?INITIAL_BYTES of true -> {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl index 4d07372e31..b305d08f70 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ listen(Port, #config{transport_info = TransportInfo, Err end. -accept(dtls, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}, +accept(dtls, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_,_}, connection_cb = ConnectionCb, dtls_handler = {Listner, _}}, _Timeout) -> case dtls_packet_demux:accept(Listner, self()) of @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ accept(dtls, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}, {error, Reason} end. -connect(Address, Port, #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _} = CbInfo, +connect(Address, Port, #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _, _} = CbInfo, connection_cb = ConnectionCb, ssl = SslOpts, emulated = EmOpts, @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ default_inet_values() -> [{active, true}, {mode, list}, {packet, 0}, {packet_size, 0}]. default_cb_info() -> - {gen_udp, udp, udp_closed, udp_error}. + {gen_udp, udp, udp_closed, udp_error, udp_passive}. get_emulated_opts(EmOpts, EmOptNames) -> lists:map(fun(Name) -> {value, Value} = lists:keysearch(Name, 1, EmOpts), diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl index b365961a6a..fc9dce02ce 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl @@ -31,18 +31,18 @@ suites(Minor) -> lists:filter(fun(Cipher) -> - is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Cipher)) + is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(Cipher)) end, tls_v1:suites(corresponding_minor_tls_version(Minor))). all_suites(Version) -> lists:filter(fun(Cipher) -> - is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Cipher)) + is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(Cipher)) end, ssl_cipher:all_suites(corresponding_tls_version(Version))). anonymous_suites(Version) -> lists:filter(fun(Cipher) -> - is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Cipher)) + is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(Cipher)) end, ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(corresponding_tls_version(Version))). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl index 5cab35fd4b..8d9b92361b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2019. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). -include("ssl_api.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -131,8 +132,8 @@ f_recv(SslSocket, Length, Timeout) -> f_setopts_pre_nodeup(_SslSocket) -> ok. -f_setopts_post_nodeup(_SslSocket) -> - ok. +f_setopts_post_nodeup(SslSocket) -> + ssl:setopts(SslSocket, [nodelay()]). f_getll(DistCtrl) -> {ok, DistCtrl}. @@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ listen(Name) -> gen_listen(Driver, Name) -> case inet_tcp_dist:gen_listen(Driver, Name) of {ok, {Socket, Address, Creation}} -> - inet:setopts(Socket, [{packet, 4}]), + inet:setopts(Socket, [{packet, 4}, {nodelay, true}]), {ok, {Socket, Address#net_address{protocol=tls}, Creation}}; Other -> Other @@ -225,7 +226,7 @@ accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel) -> true -> accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel, Socket); {false,IP} -> - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "** Connection attempt from " "disallowed IP ~w ** ~n", [IP]), ?shutdown2(no_node, trace({disallowed, IP})) @@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel, Socket) -> {error, {options, _}} = Error -> %% Bad options: that's probably our fault. %% Let's log that. - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "Cannot accept TLS distribution connection: ~s~n", [ssl:format_error(Error)]), gen_tcp:close(Socket), @@ -436,7 +437,7 @@ allowed_nodes(SslSocket, Allowed) -> PeerCert, allowed_hosts(Allowed), PeerIP) of [] -> - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "** Connection attempt from " "disallowed node(s) ~p ** ~n", [PeerIP]), ?shutdown2( @@ -531,7 +532,7 @@ do_setup_connect(Driver, Kernel, Node, Address, Ip, TcpPort, Version, Type, MyNo case ssl:connect( Address, TcpPort, [binary, {active, false}, {packet, 4}, - Driver:family(), nodelay()] ++ Opts, + Driver:family(), {nodelay, true}] ++ Opts, net_kernel:connecttime()) of {ok, #sslsocket{pid = [_, DistCtrl| _]} = SslSocket} -> _ = monitor_pid(DistCtrl), @@ -695,12 +696,12 @@ split_node(Driver, Node, LongOrShortNames) -> {node, Name, Host} -> check_node(Driver, Node, Name, Host, LongOrShortNames); {host, _} -> - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "** Nodename ~p illegal, no '@' character **~n", [Node]), ?shutdown2(Node, trace({illegal_node_n@me, Node})); _ -> - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "** Nodename ~p illegal **~n", [Node]), ?shutdown2(Node, trace({illegal_node_name, Node})) end. @@ -712,7 +713,7 @@ check_node(Driver, Node, Name, Host, LongOrShortNames) -> {ok, _} -> {Name, Host}; _ -> - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "** System running to use " "fully qualified hostnames **~n" "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", @@ -720,7 +721,7 @@ check_node(Driver, Node, Name, Host, LongOrShortNames) -> ?shutdown2(Node, trace({not_longnames, Host})) end; [_,_|_] when LongOrShortNames =:= shortnames -> - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "** System NOT running to use " "fully qualified hostnames **~n" "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", @@ -850,13 +851,13 @@ monitor_pid(Pid) -> %% MRef = erlang:monitor(process, Pid), %% receive %% {'DOWN', MRef, _, _, normal} -> - %% error_logger:error_report( - %% [dist_proc_died, + %% ?LOG_ERROR( + %% [{slogan, dist_proc_died}, %% {reason, normal}, %% {pid, Pid}]); %% {'DOWN', MRef, _, _, Reason} -> - %% error_logger:info_report( - %% [dist_proc_died, + %% ?LOG_NOTICE( + %% [{slogan, dist_proc_died}, %% {reason, Reason}, %% {pid, Pid}]) %% end diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src index 936df12e70..e7a4d73ec4 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src @@ -4,13 +4,17 @@ {modules, [ %% TLS/SSL tls_connection, + tls_connection_1_3, tls_handshake, + tls_handshake_1_3, tls_record, + tls_record_1_3, tls_socket, tls_v1, ssl_v3, tls_connection_sup, tls_sender, + ssl_dh_groups, %% DTLS dtls_connection, dtls_handshake, @@ -51,6 +55,8 @@ ssl_crl_cache, ssl_crl_cache_api, ssl_crl_hash_dir, + %% Logging + ssl_logger, %% App structure ssl_app, ssl_sup, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl index 7c1d0a3829..7ff9aed8ea 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl @@ -35,27 +35,69 @@ -include("ssl_srp.hrl"). %% Application handling --export([start/0, start/1, stop/0, clear_pem_cache/0]). +-export([start/0, + start/1, + stop/0, + clear_pem_cache/0]). %% Socket handling --export([connect/3, connect/2, connect/4, - listen/2, transport_accept/1, transport_accept/2, - handshake/1, handshake/2, handshake/3, handshake_continue/2, - handshake_continue/3, handshake_cancel/1, - ssl_accept/1, ssl_accept/2, ssl_accept/3, - controlling_process/2, peername/1, peercert/1, sockname/1, - close/1, close/2, shutdown/2, recv/2, recv/3, send/2, - getopts/2, setopts/2, getstat/1, getstat/2 +-export([connect/3, + connect/2, + connect/4, + listen/2, + transport_accept/1, + transport_accept/2, + handshake/1, + handshake/2, + handshake/3, + handshake_continue/2, + handshake_continue/3, + handshake_cancel/1, + ssl_accept/1, + ssl_accept/2, + ssl_accept/3, + controlling_process/2, + peername/1, + peercert/1, + sockname/1, + close/1, + close/2, + shutdown/2, + recv/2, + recv/3, + send/2, + getopts/2, + setopts/2, + getstat/1, + getstat/2 ]). %% SSL/TLS protocol handling --export([cipher_suites/0, cipher_suites/1, cipher_suites/2, filter_cipher_suites/2, - prepend_cipher_suites/2, append_cipher_suites/2, - eccs/0, eccs/1, versions/0, - format_error/1, renegotiate/1, prf/5, negotiated_protocol/1, - connection_information/1, connection_information/2]). +-export([cipher_suites/0, + cipher_suites/1, + cipher_suites/2, + cipher_suites/3, + filter_cipher_suites/2, + prepend_cipher_suites/2, + append_cipher_suites/2, + eccs/0, + eccs/1, + versions/0, + groups/0, + groups/1, + format_error/1, + renegotiate/1, + prf/5, + negotiated_protocol/1, + connection_information/1, + connection_information/2]). %% Misc --export([handle_options/2, tls_version/1, new_ssl_options/3, suite_to_str/1]). +-export([handle_options/2, + tls_version/1, + new_ssl_options/3, + suite_to_str/1, + suite_to_openssl_str/1, + str_to_suite/1]). -deprecated({ssl_accept, 1, eventually}). -deprecated({ssl_accept, 2, eventually}). @@ -74,6 +116,7 @@ ciphers/0, cipher/0, hash/0, + key/0, kex_algo/0, prf_random/0, cipher_filters/0, @@ -82,7 +125,11 @@ protocol_extensions/0, session_id/0, error_alert/0, - srp_param_type/0]). + tls_alert/0, + srp_param_type/0, + named_curve/0, + sign_scheme/0, + group/0]). %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -101,16 +148,21 @@ -type host() :: hostname() | ip_address(). % exported -type hostname() :: string(). -type ip_address() :: inet:ip_address(). --type session_id() :: binary(). --type protocol_version() :: tls_version() | dtls_version(). --type tls_version() :: tlsv1 | 'tlsv1.1' | 'tlsv1.2' | 'tlsv1.3' | legacy_version(). --type dtls_version() :: 'dtlsv1' | 'dtlsv1.2'. --type legacy_version() :: sslv3. +-type session_id() :: binary(). % exported +-type protocol_version() :: tls_version() | dtls_version(). % exported +-type tls_version() :: 'tlsv1.2' | 'tlsv1.3' | tls_legacy_version(). +-type dtls_version() :: 'dtlsv1.2' | dtls_legacy_version(). +-type tls_legacy_version() :: tlsv1 | 'tlsv1.1' | sslv3. +-type dtls_legacy_version() :: 'dtlsv1'. -type verify_type() :: verify_none | verify_peer. -type cipher() :: aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm | + aes_128_ccm | + aes_256_ccm | + aes_128_ccm_8 | + aes_256_ccm_8 | chacha20_poly1305 | legacy_cipher(). % exported -type legacy_cipher() :: rc4_128 | @@ -128,14 +180,30 @@ -type legacy_hash() :: md5. --type sign_algo() :: rsa | dsa | ecdsa. +-type sign_algo() :: rsa | dsa | ecdsa. % exported + +-type sign_scheme() :: rsa_pkcs1_sha256 + | rsa_pkcs1_sha384 + | rsa_pkcs1_sha512 + | ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 + | ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 + | ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 + | rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 + | rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 + | rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 + | rsa_pss_pss_sha256 + | rsa_pss_pss_sha384 + | rsa_pss_pss_sha512 + | rsa_pkcs1_sha1 + | ecdsa_sha1. % exported + -type kex_algo() :: rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa | ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa | srp_rsa| srp_dss | psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | - dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon. - + dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon | + any. %% TLS 1.3 , exported -type erl_cipher_suite() :: #{key_exchange := kex_algo(), cipher := cipher(), mac := hash() | aead, @@ -173,7 +241,10 @@ sect163r2 | secp160k1 | secp160r1 | - secp160r2. + secp160r2. % exported + +-type group() :: secp256r1 | secp384r1 | secp521r1 | ffdhe2048 | + ffdhe3072 | ffdhe4096 | ffdhe6144 | ffdhe8192. % exported -type srp_param_type() :: srp_1024 | srp_1536 | @@ -213,7 +284,7 @@ bad_certificate_status_response | bad_certificate_hash_value | unknown_psk_identity | - no_application_protocol. + no_application_protocol. % exported %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -type common_option() :: {protocol, protocol()} | @@ -224,6 +295,9 @@ {keyfile, key_pem()} | {password, key_password()} | {ciphers, cipher_suites()} | + {eccs, [named_curve()]} | + {signature_algs_cert, signature_schemes()} | + {supported_groups, supported_groups()} | {secure_renegotiate, secure_renegotiation()} | {depth, allowed_cert_chain_length()} | {verify_fun, custom_verify()} | @@ -233,6 +307,7 @@ {partial_chain, root_fun()} | {versions, protocol_versions()} | {user_lookup_fun, custom_user_lookup()} | + {log_level, logging_level()} | {log_alert, log_alert()} | {hibernate_after, hibernate_after()} | {padding_check, padding_check()} | @@ -259,20 +334,24 @@ -type algo_filter() :: fun((kex_algo()|cipher()|hash()|aead|default_prf) -> true | false). -type secure_renegotiation() :: boolean(). -type allowed_cert_chain_length() :: integer(). --type custom_verify() :: {Verifyfun :: fun(), InitialUserState :: term()}. --type crl_check() :: boolean() | peer | best_effort. --type crl_cache_opts() :: [term()]. --type handshake_size() :: integer(). --type hibernate_after() :: timeout(). --type root_fun() :: fun(). --type protocol_versions() :: [protocol_version()]. --type signature_algs() :: [{hash(), sign_algo()}]. --type custom_user_lookup() :: {Lookupfun :: fun(), UserState :: term()}. --type padding_check() :: boolean(). --type beast_mitigation() :: one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled. --type srp_identity() :: {Username :: string(), Password :: string()}. --type psk_identity() :: string(). --type log_alert() :: boolean(). + +-type custom_verify() :: {Verifyfun :: fun(), InitialUserState :: any()}. +-type crl_check() :: boolean() | peer | best_effort. +-type crl_cache_opts() :: [any()]. +-type handshake_size() :: integer(). +-type hibernate_after() :: timeout(). +-type root_fun() :: fun(). +-type protocol_versions() :: [protocol_version()]. +-type signature_algs() :: [{hash(), sign_algo()}]. +-type signature_schemes() :: [sign_scheme()]. +-type supported_groups() :: [group()]. +-type custom_user_lookup() :: {Lookupfun :: fun(), UserState :: any()}. +-type padding_check() :: boolean(). +-type beast_mitigation() :: one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled. +-type srp_identity() :: {Username :: string(), Password :: string()}. +-type psk_identity() :: string(). +-type log_alert() :: boolean(). +-type logging_level() :: logger:level(). %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -311,6 +390,7 @@ -type ssl_imp() :: new | old. %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + -type server_option() :: {cacerts, server_cacerts()} | {cacertfile, server_cafile()} | {dh, dh_der()} | @@ -392,6 +472,7 @@ stop() -> %% %% Description: Connect to an ssl server. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + -spec connect(TCPSocket, TLSOptions) -> {ok, sslsocket()} | {error, reason()} | @@ -415,6 +496,7 @@ connect(Socket, SslOptions) when is_port(Socket) -> Host :: host(), Port :: inet:port_number(), TLSOptions :: [tls_client_option()]. + connect(Socket, SslOptions0, Timeout) when is_port(Socket), (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Timeout >= 0) or (Timeout == infinity) -> CbInfo = handle_option(cb_info, SslOptions0, default_cb_info(tls)), @@ -431,6 +513,7 @@ connect(Socket, SslOptions0, Timeout) when is_port(Socket), connect(Host, Port, Options) -> connect(Host, Port, Options, infinity). + -spec connect(Host, Port, TLSOptions, Timeout) -> {ok, sslsocket()} | {ok, sslsocket(),Ext :: protocol_extensions()} | @@ -553,7 +636,6 @@ ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Performs the SSL/TLS/DTLS server-side handshake. - -spec handshake(HsSocket) -> {ok, SslSocket} | {ok, SslSocket, Ext} | {error, Reason} when HsSocket :: sslsocket(), SslSocket :: sslsocket(), @@ -580,6 +662,12 @@ handshake(#sslsocket{} = Socket, Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Tim (Timeout == infinity) -> ssl_connection:handshake(Socket, Timeout); +%% If Socket is a ordinary socket(): upgrades a gen_tcp, or equivalent, socket to +%% an SSL socket, that is, performs the SSL/TLS server-side handshake and returns +%% the SSL socket. +%% +%% If Socket is an sslsocket(): provides extra SSL/TLS/DTLS options to those +%% specified in ssl:listen/2 and then performs the SSL/TLS/DTLS handshake. handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions) when is_port(ListenSocket) -> handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions, infinity). @@ -877,14 +965,14 @@ cipher_suites() -> %% Description: Returns all supported cipher suites. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher_suites(erlang) -> - [ssl_cipher_format:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(default)]; + [ssl_cipher_format:suite_legacy(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(default)]; cipher_suites(openssl) -> - [ssl_cipher_format:openssl_suite_name(Suite) || + [ssl_cipher_format:suite_map_to_openssl_str(ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(Suite)) || Suite <- available_suites(default)]; cipher_suites(all) -> - [ssl_cipher_format:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(all)]. + [ssl_cipher_format:suite_legacy(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(all)]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec cipher_suites(Supported, Version) -> ciphers() when @@ -894,7 +982,8 @@ cipher_suites(all) -> %% Description: Returns all default and all supported cipher suites for a %% TLS/DTLS version %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -cipher_suites(Base, Version) when Version == 'tlsv1.2'; +cipher_suites(Base, Version) when Version == 'tlsv1.3'; + Version == 'tlsv1.2'; Version == 'tlsv1.1'; Version == tlsv1; Version == sslv3 -> @@ -903,7 +992,30 @@ cipher_suites(Base, Version) when Version == 'dtlsv1.2'; Version == 'dtlsv1'-> cipher_suites(Base, dtls_record:protocol_version(Version)); cipher_suites(Base, Version) -> - [ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- supported_suites(Base, Version)]. + [ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(Suite) || Suite <- supported_suites(Base, Version)]. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec cipher_suites(Supported, Version, rfc | openssl) -> [string()] when + Supported :: default | all | anonymous, + Version :: protocol_version(). + +%% Description: Returns all default and all supported cipher suites for a +%% TLS/DTLS version +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +cipher_suites(Base, Version, StringType) when Version == 'tlsv1.2'; + Version == 'tlsv1.1'; + Version == tlsv1; + Version == sslv3 -> + cipher_suites(Base, tls_record:protocol_version(Version), StringType); +cipher_suites(Base, Version, StringType) when Version == 'dtlsv1.2'; + Version == 'dtlsv1'-> + cipher_suites(Base, dtls_record:protocol_version(Version), StringType); +cipher_suites(Base, Version, rfc) -> + [ssl_cipher_format:suite_map_to_str(ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(Suite)) + || Suite <- supported_suites(Base, Version)]; +cipher_suites(Base, Version, openssl) -> + [ssl_cipher_format:suite_map_to_openssl_str(ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(Suite)) + || Suite <- supported_suites(Base, Version)]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec filter_cipher_suites(Suites, Filters) -> Ciphers when @@ -997,6 +1109,20 @@ eccs_filter_supported(Curves) -> Curves). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec groups() -> [group()]. +%% Description: returns all supported groups (TLS 1.3 and later) +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +groups() -> + tls_v1:groups(4). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec groups(default) -> [group()]. +%% Description: returns the default groups (TLS 1.3 and later) +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +groups(default) -> + tls_v1:default_groups(4). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec getopts(SslSocket, OptionNames) -> {ok, [gen_tcp:option()]} | {error, reason()} when SslSocket :: sslsocket(), @@ -1006,7 +1132,7 @@ eccs_filter_supported(Curves) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- getopts(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}, OptionTags) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(OptionTags) -> ssl_connection:get_opts(Pid, OptionTags); -getopts(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}}}} = ListenSocket, OptionTags) when is_list(OptionTags) -> +getopts(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_,_}}}} = ListenSocket, OptionTags) when is_list(OptionTags) -> try dtls_socket:getopts(Transport, ListenSocket, OptionTags) of {ok, _} = Result -> Result; @@ -1065,7 +1191,7 @@ setopts(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]}, Options0) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(Options0) _:_ -> {error, {options, {not_a_proplist, Options0}}} end; -setopts(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_}}}} = ListenSocket, Options) when is_list(Options) -> +setopts(#sslsocket{pid = {dtls, #config{transport_info = {Transport,_,_,_,_}}}} = ListenSocket, Options) when is_list(Options) -> try dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, ListenSocket, Options) of ok -> ok; @@ -1108,7 +1234,7 @@ getstat(Socket) -> %% %% Description: Get one or more statistic options for a socket. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -getstat(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}}}}, Options) when is_port(Listen), is_list(Options) -> +getstat(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen, #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _, _}}}}, Options) when is_port(Listen), is_list(Options) -> tls_socket:getstat(Transport, Listen, Options); getstat(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_], fd = {Transport, Socket, _, _}}, Options) when is_pid(Pid), is_list(Options) -> @@ -1257,7 +1383,6 @@ tls_version({3, _} = Version) -> tls_version({254, _} = Version) -> dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version). - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec suite_to_str(CipherSuite) -> string() when CipherSuite :: erl_cipher_suite(); @@ -1271,12 +1396,41 @@ tls_version({254, _} = Version) -> %% Description: Return the string representation of a cipher suite. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- suite_to_str(Cipher) -> - ssl_cipher_format:suite_to_str(Cipher). + ssl_cipher_format:suite_map_to_str(Cipher). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec suite_to_openssl_str(CipherSuite) -> string() when + CipherSuite :: erl_cipher_suite(). +%% +%% Description: Return the string representation of a cipher suite. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +suite_to_openssl_str(Cipher) -> + ssl_cipher_format:suite_map_to_openssl_str(Cipher). +%% +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec str_to_suite(CipherSuiteName) -> erl_cipher_suite() when + CipherSuiteName :: string() | {error, {not_recognized, CipherSuiteName :: string()}}. +%% +%% Description: Return the map representation of a cipher suite. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +str_to_suite(CipherSuiteName) -> + try + %% Note in TLS-1.3 OpenSSL conforms to RFC names + %% so if CipherSuiteName starts with TLS this + %% function will call ssl_cipher_format:suite_str_to_map + %% so both RFC names and legacy OpenSSL names of supported + %% cipher suites will be handled + ssl_cipher_format:suite_openssl_str_to_map(CipherSuiteName) + catch + _:_ -> + {error, {not_recognized, CipherSuiteName}} + end. + %%%-------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + %% Possible filters out suites not supported by crypto available_suites(default) -> Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]), @@ -1333,9 +1487,10 @@ handle_options(Opts0, #ssl_options{protocol = Protocol, cacerts = CaCerts0, [] -> new_ssl_options(SslOpts1, NewVerifyOpts, RecordCB); Value -> - Versions = [RecordCB:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Value], + Versions0 = [RecordCB:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Value], + Versions1 = lists:sort(fun RecordCB:is_higher/2, Versions0), new_ssl_options(proplists:delete(versions, SslOpts1), - NewVerifyOpts#ssl_options{versions = Versions}, record_cb(Protocol)) + NewVerifyOpts#ssl_options{versions = Versions1}, record_cb(Protocol)) end; %% Handle all options in listen and connect @@ -1351,12 +1506,14 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> CertFile = handle_option(certfile, Opts, <<>>), - Versions = case handle_option(versions, Opts, []) of - [] -> - RecordCb:supported_protocol_versions(); - Vsns -> - [RecordCb:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Vsns] - end, + [HighestVersion|_] = Versions = + case handle_option(versions, Opts, []) of + [] -> + RecordCb:supported_protocol_versions(); + Vsns -> + Versions0 = [RecordCb:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Vsns], + lists:sort(fun RecordCb:is_higher/2, Versions0) + end, Protocol = handle_option(protocol, Opts, tls), @@ -1367,7 +1524,7 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> ok end, - SSLOptions = #ssl_options{ + SSLOptions0 = #ssl_options{ versions = Versions, verify = validate_option(verify, Verify), verify_fun = VerifyFun, @@ -1388,13 +1545,29 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> psk_identity = handle_option(psk_identity, Opts, undefined), srp_identity = handle_option(srp_identity, Opts, undefined), ciphers = handle_cipher_option(proplists:get_value(ciphers, Opts, []), - RecordCb:highest_protocol_version(Versions)), + HighestVersion), eccs = handle_eccs_option(proplists:get_value(eccs, Opts, eccs()), - RecordCb:highest_protocol_version(Versions)), - signature_algs = handle_hashsigns_option(proplists:get_value(signature_algs, Opts, - default_option_role(server, - tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Versions), Role)), - tls_version(RecordCb:highest_protocol_version(Versions))), + HighestVersion), + supported_groups = handle_supported_groups_option( + proplists:get_value(supported_groups, Opts, groups(default)), + HighestVersion), + signature_algs = + handle_hashsigns_option( + proplists:get_value( + signature_algs, + Opts, + default_option_role_sign_algs(server, + tls_v1:default_signature_algs(HighestVersion), + Role, + HighestVersion)), + tls_version(HighestVersion)), + signature_algs_cert = + handle_signature_algorithms_option( + proplists:get_value( + signature_algs_cert, + Opts, + undefined), %% Do not send by default + tls_version(HighestVersion)), reuse_sessions = handle_reuse_sessions_option(reuse_sessions, Opts, Role), reuse_session = handle_reuse_session_option(reuse_session, Opts, Role), secure_renegotiate = handle_option(secure_renegotiate, Opts, true), @@ -1413,7 +1586,6 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> next_protocol_selector = make_next_protocol_selector( handle_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, Opts, undefined)), - log_alert = handle_option(log_alert, Opts, true), server_name_indication = handle_option(server_name_indication, Opts, default_option_role(client, server_name_indication_default(Host), Role)), @@ -1439,6 +1611,10 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> handshake = handle_option(handshake, Opts, full), customize_hostname_check = handle_option(customize_hostname_check, Opts, []) }, + LogLevel = handle_option(log_alert, Opts, true), + SSLOptions = SSLOptions0#ssl_options{ + log_level = handle_option(log_level, Opts, LogLevel) + }, CbInfo = handle_option(cb_info, Opts, default_cb_info(Protocol)), SslOptions = [protocol, versions, verify, verify_fun, partial_chain, @@ -1450,10 +1626,12 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> cb_info, renegotiate_at, secure_renegotiate, hibernate_after, erl_dist, alpn_advertised_protocols, sni_hosts, sni_fun, alpn_preferred_protocols, next_protocols_advertised, - client_preferred_next_protocols, log_alert, + client_preferred_next_protocols, log_alert, log_level, server_name_indication, honor_cipher_order, padding_check, crl_check, crl_cache, - fallback, signature_algs, eccs, honor_ecc_order, - beast_mitigation, max_handshake_size, handshake, customize_hostname_check], + fallback, signature_algs, signature_algs_cert, eccs, honor_ecc_order, + beast_mitigation, max_handshake_size, handshake, customize_hostname_check, + supported_groups], + SockOpts = lists:foldl(fun(Key, PropList) -> proplists:delete(Key, PropList) end, Opts, SslOptions), @@ -1638,7 +1816,20 @@ validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, {Precedence, PreferredProtocols Value; validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, undefined) -> undefined; -validate_option(log_alert, Value) when is_boolean(Value) -> +validate_option(log_alert, true) -> + notice; +validate_option(log_alert, false) -> + warning; +validate_option(log_level, Value) when + is_atom(Value) andalso + (Value =:= emergency orelse + Value =:= alert orelse + Value =:= critical orelse + Value =:= error orelse + Value =:= warning orelse + Value =:= notice orelse + Value =:= info orelse + Value =:= debug) -> Value; validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, Value) when is_list(Value) -> validate_binary_list(next_protocols_advertised, Value), @@ -1726,23 +1917,46 @@ validate_option(Opt, Value) -> throw({error, {options, {Opt, Value}}}). handle_cb_info({V1, V2, V3, V4}, {_,_,_,_,_}) -> - {V1,V2,V3,V4, list_to_atom(atom_to_list(V2) ++ "passive")}; + {V1,V2,V3,V4, list_to_atom(atom_to_list(V2) ++ "_passive")}; handle_cb_info(CbInfo, _) -> CbInfo. +handle_hashsigns_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) + andalso Version >= {3, 4} -> + case tls_v1:signature_schemes(Version, Value) of + [] -> + throw({error, {options, + no_supported_signature_schemes, + {signature_algs, Value}}}); + _ -> + Value + end; handle_hashsigns_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) - andalso Version >= {3, 3} -> + andalso Version =:= {3, 3} -> case tls_v1:signature_algs(Version, Value) of [] -> throw({error, {options, no_supported_algorithms, {signature_algs, Value}}}); _ -> Value end; -handle_hashsigns_option(_, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} -> +handle_hashsigns_option(_, Version) when Version =:= {3, 3} -> handle_hashsigns_option(tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); handle_hashsigns_option(_, _Version) -> undefined. +handle_signature_algorithms_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) + andalso Version >= {3, 4} -> + case tls_v1:signature_schemes(Version, Value) of + [] -> + throw({error, {options, + no_supported_signature_schemes, + {signature_algs_cert, Value}}}); + _ -> + Value + end; +handle_signature_algorithms_option(_, _Version) -> + undefined. + handle_reuse_sessions_option(Key, Opts, client) -> Value = proplists:get_value(Key, Opts, true), validate_option(Key, Value), @@ -1786,7 +2000,8 @@ validate_binary_list(Opt, List) -> end, List). validate_versions([], Versions) -> Versions; -validate_versions([Version | Rest], Versions) when Version == 'tlsv1.2'; +validate_versions([Version | Rest], Versions) when Version == 'tlsv1.3'; + Version == 'tlsv1.2'; Version == 'tlsv1.1'; Version == tlsv1; Version == sslv3 -> @@ -1799,10 +2014,11 @@ validate_versions([Ver| _], Versions) -> tls_validate_versions([], Versions) -> Versions; -tls_validate_versions([Version | Rest], Versions) when Version == 'tlsv1.2'; - Version == 'tlsv1.1'; - Version == tlsv1; - Version == sslv3 -> +tls_validate_versions([Version | Rest], Versions) when Version == 'tlsv1.3'; + Version == 'tlsv1.2'; + Version == 'tlsv1.1'; + Version == tlsv1; + Version == sslv3 -> tls_validate_versions(Rest, Versions); tls_validate_versions([Ver| _], Versions) -> throw({error, {options, {Ver, {versions, Versions}}}}). @@ -1850,10 +2066,10 @@ binary_cipher_suites(Version, []) -> %% not require explicit configuration default_binary_suites(Version); binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Map|_] = Ciphers0) when is_map(Map) -> - Ciphers = [ssl_cipher_format:suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0], + Ciphers = [ssl_cipher_format:suite_map_to_bin(C) || C <- Ciphers0], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers); binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Tuple|_] = Ciphers0) when is_tuple(Tuple) -> - Ciphers = [ssl_cipher_format:suite(tuple_to_map(C)) || C <- Ciphers0], + Ciphers = [ssl_cipher_format:suite_map_to_bin(tuple_to_map(C)) || C <- Ciphers0], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers); binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Cipher0 | _] = Ciphers0) when is_binary(Cipher0) -> All = ssl_cipher:all_suites(Version) ++ @@ -1868,11 +2084,11 @@ binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Cipher0 | _] = Ciphers0) when is_binary(Cipher0) end; binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Head | _] = Ciphers0) when is_list(Head) -> %% Format: ["RC4-SHA","RC4-MD5"] - Ciphers = [ssl_cipher_format:openssl_suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0], + Ciphers = [ssl_cipher_format:suite_openssl_str_to_map(C) || C <- Ciphers0], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers); binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers0) -> %% Format: "RC4-SHA:RC4-MD5" - Ciphers = [ssl_cipher_format:openssl_suite(C) || C <- string:lexemes(Ciphers0, ":")], + Ciphers = [ssl_cipher_format:suite_openssl_str_to_map(C) || C <- string:lexemes(Ciphers0, ":")], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers). default_binary_suites(Version) -> @@ -1908,6 +2124,16 @@ handle_eccs_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) -> error:_ -> throw({error, {options, {eccs, Value}}}) end. +handle_supported_groups_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) -> + {_Major, Minor} = tls_version(Version), + try tls_v1:groups(Minor, Value) of + Groups -> #supported_groups{supported_groups = Groups} + catch + exit:_ -> throw({error, {options, {supported_groups, Value}}}); + error:_ -> throw({error, {options, {supported_groups, Value}}}) + end. + + unexpected_format(Error) -> lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Unexpected error: ~p", [Error])). @@ -2053,8 +2279,10 @@ new_ssl_options([{next_protocols_advertised, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Op new_ssl_options([{client_preferred_next_protocols, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{next_protocol_selector = make_next_protocol_selector(validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, Value))}, RecordCB); -new_ssl_options([{log_alert, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> - new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{log_alert = validate_option(log_alert, Value)}, RecordCB); +new_ssl_options([{log_alert, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> + new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{log_level = validate_option(log_alert, Value)}, RecordCB); +new_ssl_options([{log_level, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> + new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{log_level = validate_option(log_level, Value)}, RecordCB); new_ssl_options([{server_name_indication, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{server_name_indication = validate_option(server_name_indication, Value)}, RecordCB); new_ssl_options([{honor_cipher_order, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> @@ -2067,12 +2295,26 @@ new_ssl_options([{eccs, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> handle_eccs_option(Value, RecordCB:highest_protocol_version()) }, RecordCB); +new_ssl_options([{supported_groups, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> + new_ssl_options(Rest, + Opts#ssl_options{supported_groups = + handle_supported_groups_option(Value, RecordCB:highest_protocol_version()) + }, + RecordCB); new_ssl_options([{signature_algs, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{signature_algs = handle_hashsigns_option(Value, tls_version(RecordCB:highest_protocol_version()))}, RecordCB); +new_ssl_options([{signature_algs_cert, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> + new_ssl_options( + Rest, + Opts#ssl_options{signature_algs_cert = + handle_signature_algorithms_option( + Value, + tls_version(RecordCB:highest_protocol_version()))}, + RecordCB); new_ssl_options([{protocol, dtls = Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, dtls_record = RecordCB) -> new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{protocol = Value}, RecordCB); new_ssl_options([{protocol, tls = Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, tls_record = RecordCB) -> @@ -2134,15 +2376,24 @@ handle_verify_options(Opts, CaCerts) -> throw({error, {options, {verify, Value}}}) end. +%% Added to handle default values for signature_algs in TLS 1.3 +default_option_role_sign_algs(_, Value, _, Version) when Version >= {3,4} -> + Value; +default_option_role_sign_algs(Role, Value, Role, _) -> + Value; +default_option_role_sign_algs(_, _, _, _) -> + undefined. + default_option_role(Role, Value, Role) -> Value; default_option_role(_,_,_) -> undefined. + default_cb_info(tls) -> {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error, tcp_passive}; default_cb_info(dtls) -> - {gen_udp, udp, udp_closed, udp_error}. + {gen_udp, udp, udp_closed, udp_error, udp_passive}. include_security_info([]) -> false; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl index 2a20d13cd5..2d57b72f7b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ -include("ssl_record.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). --export([decode/1, own_alert_txt/1, alert_txt/1, reason_code/2]). +-export([decode/1, + own_alert_txt/1, + alert_txt/1, + alert_txt/4, + reason_code/4]). %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API @@ -48,20 +52,29 @@ decode(Bin) -> decode(Bin, [], 0). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server) -> -%% {tls_alert, unicode:chardata()} | closed. -%-spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server) -> closed | {essl, string()}. +-spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server, ProtocolName::string(), StateName::atom()) -> + {tls_alert, {atom(), unicode:chardata()}} | closed. %% %% Description: Returns the error reason that will be returned to the %% user. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -reason_code(#alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY}, _) -> +reason_code(#alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY}, _, _, _) -> closed; -reason_code(#alert{description = Description, role = Role} = Alert, Role) -> - {tls_alert, {description_atom(Description), own_alert_txt(Alert)}}; -reason_code(#alert{description = Description} = Alert, Role) -> - {tls_alert, {description_atom(Description), alert_txt(Alert#alert{role = Role})}}. +reason_code(#alert{description = Description, role = Role} = Alert, Role, ProtocolName, StateName) -> + Txt = lists:flatten(alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, own_alert_txt(Alert))), + {tls_alert, {description_atom(Description), Txt}}; +reason_code(#alert{description = Description} = Alert, Role, ProtocolName, StateName) -> + Txt = lists:flatten(alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, alert_txt(Alert))), + {tls_alert, {description_atom(Description), Txt}}. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec alert_txt(string(), server | client, StateNam::atom(), string()) -> string(). +%% +%% Description: Generates alert text for log or string part of error return. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt) -> + io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt]). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec own_alert_txt(#alert{}) -> string(). @@ -161,10 +174,14 @@ description_txt(?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY) -> "Insufficient Security"; description_txt(?INTERNAL_ERROR) -> "Internal Error"; +description_txt(?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK) -> + "Inappropriate Fallback"; description_txt(?USER_CANCELED) -> "User Canceled"; description_txt(?NO_RENEGOTIATION) -> "No Renegotiation"; +description_txt(?MISSING_EXTENSION) -> + "Missing extension"; description_txt(?UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION) -> "Unsupported Extension"; description_txt(?CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE) -> @@ -177,8 +194,8 @@ description_txt(?BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE) -> "Bad Certificate Hash Value"; description_txt(?UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) -> "Unknown Psk Identity"; -description_txt(?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK) -> - "Inappropriate Fallback"; +description_txt(?CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED) -> + "Certificate required"; description_txt(?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL) -> "No application protocol"; description_txt(Enum) -> @@ -228,10 +245,14 @@ description_atom(?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY) -> insufficient_security; description_atom(?INTERNAL_ERROR) -> internal_error; +description_atom(?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK) -> + inappropriate_fallback; description_atom(?USER_CANCELED) -> user_canceled; description_atom(?NO_RENEGOTIATION) -> no_renegotiation; +description_atom(?MISSING_EXTENSION) -> + missing_extension; description_atom(?UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION) -> unsupported_extension; description_atom(?CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE) -> @@ -244,9 +265,9 @@ description_atom(?BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE) -> bad_certificate_hash_value; description_atom(?UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) -> unknown_psk_identity; -description_atom(?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK) -> - inappropriate_fallback; +description_atom(?CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED) -> + certificate_required; description_atom(?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL) -> no_application_protocol; description_atom(_) -> - 'unsupported/unkonwn_alert'. + 'unsupported/unknown_alert'. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl index b23123905e..9b2322da17 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%% Alert protocol - RFC 2246 section 7.2 +%%% updated by RFC 8486 with +%%% missing_extension(109), +%%% certificate_required(116), %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %% AlertLevel @@ -100,12 +103,14 @@ -define(INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, 86). -define(USER_CANCELED, 90). -define(NO_RENEGOTIATION, 100). +-define(MISSING_EXTENSION, 109). -define(UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, 110). -define(CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE, 111). -define(UNRECOGNISED_NAME, 112). -define(BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, 113). -define(BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE, 114). -define(UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, 115). +-define(CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, 116). -define(NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, 120). -define(ALERT_REC(Level,Desc), #alert{level=Level,description=Desc,where={?FILE, ?LINE}}). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_app.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_app.erl index 62e8765d4a..9e6d676bef 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_app.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_app.erl @@ -29,9 +29,26 @@ -export([start/2, stop/1]). start(_Type, _StartArgs) -> + start_logger(), ssl_sup:start_link(). stop(_State) -> + stop_logger(), ok. +%% +%% Description: Start SSL logger +start_logger() -> + Config = #{level => debug, + filter_default => stop, + formatter => {ssl_logger, #{}}}, + Filter = {fun logger_filters:domain/2,{log,sub,[otp,ssl]}}, + logger:add_handler(ssl_handler, logger_std_h, Config), + logger:add_handler_filter(ssl_handler, filter_non_ssl, Filter), + logger:set_application_level(ssl, debug). +%% +%% Description: Stop SSL logger +stop_logger() -> + logger:unset_application_level(ssl), + logger:remove_handler(ssl_handler). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl index 549e557beb..9997f5e0c8 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ trusted_cert_and_path(CertChain, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, PartialChainHandler) - case SignedAndIssuerID of {error, issuer_not_found} -> - %% The root CA was not sent and can not be found. + %% The root CA was not sent and cannot be found. handle_incomplete_chain(Path, PartialChainHandler); {self, _} when length(Path) == 1 -> {selfsigned_peer, Path}; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl index fce48d1678..c16e2331ff 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl @@ -31,18 +31,24 @@ -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). -include("ssl_handshake.hrl"). -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). --export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, - cipher_init/3, nonce_seed/2, decipher/6, cipher/5, aead_encrypt/5, aead_decrypt/6, +-export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, security_parameters_1_3/2, + cipher_init/3, nonce_seed/2, decipher/6, cipher/5, aead_encrypt/6, aead_decrypt/6, suites/1, all_suites/1, crypto_support_filters/0, chacha_suites/1, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, psk_suites_anon/1, - srp_suites/0, srp_suites_anon/0, + srp_suites/1, srp_suites_anon/1, rc4_suites/1, des_suites/1, rsa_suites/1, filter/3, filter_suites/1, filter_suites/2, hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1, is_acceptable_hash/2, is_fallback/1, random_bytes/1, calc_mac_hash/4, calc_mac_hash/6, - is_stream_ciphersuite/1]). + is_stream_ciphersuite/1, signature_scheme/1, + scheme_to_components/1, hash_size/1, effective_key_bits/1, + key_material/1, signature_algorithm_to_scheme/1]). + +%% RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 +-export([generate_client_shares/1, generate_server_share/1, add_zero_padding/2]). -compile(inline). @@ -70,7 +76,7 @@ security_parameters(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL = CipherSuite, SecParams) -> %%------------------------------------------------------------------- security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams) -> #{cipher := Cipher, mac := Hash, - prf := PrfHashAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + prf := PrfHashAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(CipherSuite), SecParams#security_parameters{ cipher_suite = CipherSuite, bulk_cipher_algorithm = bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher), @@ -83,6 +89,15 @@ security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams) -> prf_algorithm = prf_algorithm(PrfHashAlg, Version), hash_size = hash_size(Hash)}. +security_parameters_1_3(SecParams, CipherSuite) -> + #{cipher := Cipher, prf := PrfHashAlg} = + ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(CipherSuite), + SecParams#security_parameters{ + cipher_suite = CipherSuite, + bulk_cipher_algorithm = bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher), + prf_algorithm = PrfHashAlg, %% HKDF hash algorithm + cipher_type = ?AEAD}. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec cipher_init(cipher_enum(), binary(), binary()) -> #cipher_state{}. %% @@ -91,9 +106,13 @@ security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams) -> cipher_init(?RC4, IV, Key) -> State = crypto:stream_init(rc4, Key), #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, state = State}; -cipher_init(?AES_GCM, IV, Key) -> +cipher_init(Type, IV, Key) when Type == ?AES_GCM; + Type == ?AES_CCM -> <<Nonce:64>> = random_bytes(8), #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, nonce = Nonce, tag_len = 16}; +cipher_init(?AES_CCM_8, IV, Key) -> + <<Nonce:64>> = random_bytes(8), + #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, nonce = Nonce, tag_len = 8}; cipher_init(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, IV, Key) -> #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, tag_len = 16}; cipher_init(_BCA, IV, Key) -> @@ -133,14 +152,18 @@ cipher(?AES_CBC, CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version) -> crypto:block_encrypt(aes_cbc256, Key, IV, T) end, block_size(aes_128_cbc), CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version). -aead_encrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, Fragment, AdditionalData) -> - crypto:block_encrypt(aead_type(Type), Key, Nonce, {AdditionalData, Fragment}). +aead_encrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, Fragment, AdditionalData, TagLen) -> + crypto:block_encrypt(aead_type(Type), Key, Nonce, {AdditionalData, Fragment, TagLen}). aead_decrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, CipherText, CipherTag, AdditionalData) -> crypto:block_decrypt(aead_type(Type), Key, Nonce, {AdditionalData, CipherText, CipherTag}). aead_type(?AES_GCM) -> aes_gcm; +aead_type(?AES_CCM) -> + aes_ccm; +aead_type(?AES_CCM_8) -> + aes_ccm; aead_type(?CHACHA20_POLY1305) -> chacha20_poly1305. @@ -158,7 +181,7 @@ block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CS0, block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV, state = IV_Cache0} = CS0, Mac, Fragment, {3, N}) - when N == 2; N == 3 -> + when N == 2; N == 3; N == 4 -> IV_Size = byte_size(IV), <<NextIV:IV_Size/binary, IV_Cache/binary>> = case IV_Cache0 of @@ -261,7 +284,7 @@ all_suites({3, _} = Version) -> suites(Version) ++ chacha_suites(Version) ++ psk_suites(Version) - ++ srp_suites() + ++ srp_suites(Version) ++ rc4_suites(Version) ++ des_suites(Version) ++ rsa_suites(Version); @@ -290,12 +313,13 @@ chacha_suites(_) -> %% Description: Returns a list of the anonymous cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user. Intended only for testing. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -anonymous_suites({3, N}) -> - srp_suites_anon() ++ anonymous_suites(N); +anonymous_suites({3, N} = Version) -> + srp_suites_anon(Version) ++ anonymous_suites(N); anonymous_suites({254, _} = Version) -> dtls_v1:anonymous_suites(Version); -anonymous_suites(N) - when N >= 3 -> +anonymous_suites(4) -> + []; %% Raw public key negotiation may be used instead +anonymous_suites( 3 = N) -> psk_suites_anon(N) ++ [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, @@ -328,8 +352,9 @@ anonymous_suites(N) when N == 0; %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- psk_suites({3, N}) -> psk_suites(N); -psk_suites(N) - when N >= 3 -> +psk_suites(4) -> + []; %% TODO Add new PSK, PSK_(EC)DHE suites +psk_suites(3) -> [ ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, @@ -350,22 +375,34 @@ psk_suites(_) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- psk_suites_anon({3, N}) -> psk_suites_anon(N); -psk_suites_anon(N) - when N >= 3 -> +psk_suites_anon(3 = N) -> [ ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + ?TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 - ] ++ psk_suites_anon(0); -psk_suites_anon(_) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + ?TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA + ] ++ psk_suites_anon(N-1); +psk_suites_anon(N) when N > 0 -> [?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, @@ -376,14 +413,18 @@ psk_suites_anon(_) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]. + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]; +psk_suites_anon(0) -> + []. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec srp_suites() -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. +-spec srp_suites(tls_record:tls_version()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the SRP cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -srp_suites() -> +srp_suites({3,0}) -> + []; +srp_suites(_) -> [?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, @@ -392,12 +433,14 @@ srp_suites() -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec srp_suites_anon() -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. +-spec srp_suites_anon(tls_record:tls_version()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the SRP anonymous cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -srp_suites_anon() -> +srp_suites_anon({3,0}) -> + []; +srp_suites_anon(_) -> [?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA]. @@ -418,11 +461,12 @@ rc4_suites({3, Minor}) -> rc4_suites(0) -> [?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5]; -rc4_suites(N) when N =< 3 -> +rc4_suites(N) when N =< 4 -> [?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec des_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% @@ -457,7 +501,7 @@ rsa_suites(0) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ]; -rsa_suites(N) when N =< 3 -> +rsa_suites(N) when N =< 4 -> [ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, @@ -511,7 +555,7 @@ filter_suite(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, all_filters(Hash, HashFilters) andalso all_filters(Prf, PrfFilters); filter_suite(Suite, Filters) -> - filter_suite(ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Suite), Filters). + filter_suite(ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(Suite), Filters). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec filter_suites([ssl:erl_cipher_suite()] | [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]) -> @@ -556,7 +600,8 @@ crypto_support_filters() -> end]}. is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, _Algos) when KeyExchange == psk; - KeyExchange == null -> + KeyExchange == null; + KeyExchange == any -> true; is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == dh_anon; KeyExchange == dhe_psk -> @@ -568,7 +613,7 @@ is_acceptable_keyexchange(dhe_rsa, Algos) -> proplists:get_bool(dh, Algos) andalso proplists:get_bool(rsa, Algos); is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_psk -> + KeyExchange == ecdhe_psk -> proplists:get_bool(ecdh, Algos); is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> @@ -608,6 +653,12 @@ is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, Algos) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm; Cipher == aes_256_gcm -> proplists:get_bool(aes_gcm, Algos); +is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, Algos) + when Cipher == aes_128_ccm; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm; + Cipher == aes_128_ccm_8; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm_8 -> + proplists:get_bool(aes_ccm, Algos); is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, Algos) -> proplists:get_bool(Cipher, Algos). @@ -651,6 +702,28 @@ is_stream_ciphersuite(#{cipher := rc4_128}) -> true; is_stream_ciphersuite(_) -> false. + +-spec hash_size(atom()) -> integer(). +hash_size(null) -> + 0; +%% The AEAD MAC hash size is not used in the context +%% of calculating the master secret. See RFC 5246 Section 6.2.3.3. +hash_size(aead) -> + 0; +hash_size(md5) -> + 16; +hash_size(sha) -> + 20; +%% Uncomment when adding cipher suite that needs it +%hash_size(sha224) -> +% 28; +hash_size(sha256) -> + 32; +hash_size(sha384) -> + 48; +hash_size(sha512) -> + 64. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -660,7 +733,7 @@ mac_hash({_,_}, ?NULL, _MacSecret, _SeqNo, _Type, mac_hash({3, 0}, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) -> ssl_v3:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment); mac_hash({3, N} = Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) - when N =:= 1; N =:= 2; N =:= 3 -> + when N =:= 1; N =:= 2; N =:= 3; N =:= 4 -> tls_v1:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Version, Length, Fragment). @@ -678,6 +751,12 @@ bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc; bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm; Cipher == aes_256_gcm -> ?AES_GCM; +bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_ccm; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm -> + ?AES_CCM; +bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_ccm_8; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm_8 -> + ?AES_CCM_8; bulk_cipher_algorithm(chacha20_poly1305) -> ?CHACHA20_POLY1305. @@ -692,6 +771,10 @@ type(Cipher) when Cipher == des_cbc; ?BLOCK; type(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm; Cipher == aes_256_gcm; + Cipher == aes_128_ccm; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm; + Cipher == aes_128_ccm_8; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm_8; Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 -> ?AEAD. @@ -709,8 +792,16 @@ key_material(aes_256_cbc) -> 32; key_material(aes_128_gcm) -> 16; +key_material(aes_128_ccm) -> + 16; +key_material(aes_128_ccm_8) -> + 16; key_material(aes_256_gcm) -> 32; +key_material(aes_256_ccm_8) -> + 32; +key_material(aes_256_ccm) -> + 32; key_material(chacha20_poly1305) -> 32. @@ -726,6 +817,10 @@ expanded_key_material(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc; Cipher == aes_256_cbc; Cipher == aes_128_gcm; Cipher == aes_256_gcm; + Cipher == aes_128_ccm; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm; + Cipher == aes_128_ccm_8; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm_8; Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 -> unknown. @@ -735,22 +830,31 @@ effective_key_bits(des_cbc) -> 56; effective_key_bits(Cipher) when Cipher == rc4_128; Cipher == aes_128_cbc; - Cipher == aes_128_gcm -> + Cipher == aes_128_gcm; + Cipher == aes_128_ccm; + Cipher == aes_128_ccm_8 -> 128; effective_key_bits('3des_ede_cbc') -> 168; effective_key_bits(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_256_cbc; Cipher == aes_256_gcm; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm_8; Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 -> 256. iv_size(Cipher) when Cipher == null; - Cipher == rc4_128; - Cipher == chacha20_poly1305-> + Cipher == rc4_128 -> 0; iv_size(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm; - Cipher == aes_256_gcm -> + Cipher == aes_256_gcm; + Cipher == aes_128_ccm; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm; + Cipher == aes_128_ccm_8; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm_8 -> 4; +iv_size(chacha20_poly1305) -> + 12; iv_size(Cipher) -> block_size(Cipher). @@ -761,6 +865,10 @@ block_size(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc; Cipher == aes_256_cbc; Cipher == aes_128_gcm; Cipher == aes_256_gcm; + Cipher == aes_128_ccm; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm; + Cipher == aes_128_ccm_8; + Cipher == aes_256_ccm_8; Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 -> 16. @@ -804,26 +912,93 @@ sign_algorithm(?ECDSA) -> ecdsa; sign_algorithm(Other) when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 4) and (Other =< 223)) -> unassigned; sign_algorithm(Other) when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 224) and (Other =< 255)) -> Other. -hash_size(null) -> - 0; -%% The AEAD MAC hash size is not used in the context -%% of calculating the master secret. See RFC 5246 Section 6.2.3.3. -hash_size(aead) -> - 0; -hash_size(md5) -> - 16; -hash_size(sha) -> - 20; -%% Uncomment when adding cipher suite that needs it -%hash_size(sha224) -> -% 28; -hash_size(sha256) -> - 32; -hash_size(sha384) -> - 48. -%% Uncomment when adding cipher suite that needs it -%hash_size(sha512) -> -% 64. + +signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha256) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA256; +signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha384) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA384; +signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha512) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA512; +signature_scheme(ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) -> ?ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256; +signature_scheme(ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) -> ?ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384; +signature_scheme(ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512) -> ?ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512; +signature_scheme(rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) -> ?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256; +signature_scheme(rsa_pss_rsae_sha384) -> ?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384; +signature_scheme(rsa_pss_rsae_sha512) -> ?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512; +signature_scheme(ed25519) -> ?ED25519; +signature_scheme(ed448) -> ?ED448; +signature_scheme(rsa_pss_pss_sha256) -> ?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256; +signature_scheme(rsa_pss_pss_sha384) -> ?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384; +signature_scheme(rsa_pss_pss_sha512) -> ?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512; +signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha1) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA1; +signature_scheme(ecdsa_sha1) -> ?ECDSA_SHA1; +%% Handling legacy signature algorithms +signature_scheme({Hash0, Sign0}) -> + Hash = hash_algorithm(Hash0), + Sign = sign_algorithm(Sign0), + <<?UINT16(SigAlg)>> = <<?BYTE(Hash),?BYTE(Sign)>>, + SigAlg; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA256) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha256; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA384) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha384; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA512) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha512; +signature_scheme(?ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256) -> ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256; +signature_scheme(?ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384) -> ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384; +signature_scheme(?ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512) -> ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256) -> rsa_pss_rsae_sha256; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384) -> rsa_pss_rsae_sha384; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512) -> rsa_pss_rsae_sha512; +signature_scheme(?ED25519) -> ed25519; +signature_scheme(?ED448) -> ed448; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256) -> rsa_pss_pss_sha256; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384) -> rsa_pss_pss_sha384; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512) -> rsa_pss_pss_sha512; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA1) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha1; +signature_scheme(?ECDSA_SHA1) -> ecdsa_sha1; +%% Handling legacy signature algorithms for logging purposes. These algorithms +%% cannot be used in TLS 1.3 handshakes. +signature_scheme(SignAlgo) when is_integer(SignAlgo) -> + <<?BYTE(Hash),?BYTE(Sign)>> = <<?UINT16(SignAlgo)>>, + {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)}; +signature_scheme(_) -> unassigned. +%% TODO: reserved code points? + +scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha256) -> {sha256, rsa_pkcs1, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha384) -> {sha384, rsa_pkcs1, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha512) -> {sha512, rsa_pkcs1, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) -> {sha256, ecdsa, secp256r1}; +scheme_to_components(ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) -> {sha384, ecdsa, secp384r1}; +scheme_to_components(ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512) -> {sha512, ecdsa, secp521r1}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) -> {sha256, rsa_pss_rsae, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_rsae_sha384) -> {sha384, rsa_pss_rsae, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_rsae_sha512) -> {sha512, rsa_pss_rsae, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(ed25519) -> {undefined, undefined, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(ed448) -> {undefined, undefined, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_pss_sha256) -> {sha256, rsa_pss_pss, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_pss_sha384) -> {sha384, rsa_pss_pss, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_pss_sha512) -> {sha512, rsa_pss_pss, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha1) -> {sha1, rsa_pkcs1, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(ecdsa_sha1) -> {sha1, ecdsa, undefined}; +%% Handling legacy signature algorithms +scheme_to_components({Hash,Sign}) -> {Hash, Sign, undefined}. + + +%% TODO: Add support for ed25519, ed448, rsa_pss* +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?sha256WithRSAEncryption}) -> + rsa_pkcs1_sha256; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?sha384WithRSAEncryption}) -> + rsa_pkcs1_sha384; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?sha512WithRSAEncryption}) -> + rsa_pkcs1_sha512; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'ecdsa-with-SHA256'}) -> + ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'ecdsa-with-SHA384'}) -> + ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'ecdsa-with-SHA512'}) -> + ecdsa_secp512r1_sha512; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'sha-1WithRSAEncryption'}) -> + rsa_pkcs1_sha1; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?sha1WithRSAEncryption}) -> + rsa_pkcs1_sha1; +signature_algorithm_to_scheme(#'SignatureAlgorithm'{algorithm = ?'ecdsa-with-SHA1'}) -> + ecdsa_sha1. + %% RFC 5246: 6.2.3.2. CBC Block Cipher %% @@ -861,7 +1036,7 @@ generic_block_cipher_from_bin({3, N}, T, IV, HashSize) next_iv = IV}; generic_block_cipher_from_bin({3, N}, T, IV, HashSize) - when N == 2; N == 3 -> + when N == 2; N == 3; N == 4 -> Sz1 = byte_size(T) - 1, <<_:Sz1/binary, ?BYTE(PadLength)>> = T, IVLength = byte_size(IV), @@ -1159,3 +1334,55 @@ filter_keyuse_suites(Use, KeyUse, CipherSuits, Suites) -> false -> CipherSuits -- Suites end. + +generate_server_share(Group) -> + Key = generate_key_exchange(Group), + #key_share_server_hello{ + server_share = #key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = Key + }}. + +generate_client_shares([]) -> + #key_share_client_hello{client_shares = []}; +generate_client_shares(Groups) -> + generate_client_shares(Groups, []). +%% +generate_client_shares([], Acc) -> + #key_share_client_hello{client_shares = lists:reverse(Acc)}; +generate_client_shares([Group|Groups], Acc) -> + Key = generate_key_exchange(Group), + KeyShareEntry = #key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = Key + }, + generate_client_shares(Groups, [KeyShareEntry|Acc]). + + +generate_key_exchange(secp256r1) -> + public_key:generate_key({namedCurve, secp256r1}); +generate_key_exchange(secp384r1) -> + public_key:generate_key({namedCurve, secp384r1}); +generate_key_exchange(secp521r1) -> + public_key:generate_key({namedCurve, secp521r1}); +generate_key_exchange(x25519) -> + crypto:generate_key(ecdh, x25519); +generate_key_exchange(x448) -> + crypto:generate_key(ecdh, x448); +generate_key_exchange(FFDHE) -> + public_key:generate_key(ssl_dh_groups:dh_params(FFDHE)). + + +%% TODO: Move this functionality to crypto! +%% 7.4.1. Finite Field Diffie-Hellman +%% +%% For finite field groups, a conventional Diffie-Hellman [DH76] +%% computation is performed. The negotiated key (Z) is converted to a +%% byte string by encoding in big-endian form and left-padded with zeros +%% up to the size of the prime. This byte string is used as the shared +%% secret in the key schedule as specified above. +add_zero_padding(Bin, PrimeSize) + when byte_size (Bin) =:= PrimeSize -> + Bin; +add_zero_padding(Bin, PrimeSize) -> + add_zero_padding(<<0, Bin/binary>>, PrimeSize). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl index 2371e8bd32..0fa5f66c49 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ -record(cipher_state, { iv, key, + finished_key, state, nonce, tag_len @@ -600,15 +601,98 @@ %% TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x32}; -define(TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#32)>>). -%%% Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 -%% TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xcc, 0x13} --define(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#13)>>). +%%% ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) RFC7905 -%% TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xcc, 0x14} --define(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#14)>>). +%% TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xCC, 0xA8} +-define(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#A8)>>). -%% TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xcc, 0x15} --define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#15)>>). +%% TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xCC, 0xA9} +-define(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#A9)>>). + +%% TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xCC, 0xAA} +-define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#AA)>>). + +%% TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xCC, 0xAB} +-define(TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#AB)>>). + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xCC, 0xAC} +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#AC)>>). + +%% TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xCC, 0xAD} +-define(TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#AD)>>). + +%% TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xCC, 0xAE} +-define(TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#AE)>>). + + + +%% RFC 6655 - TLS-1.2 cipher suites + +%% TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM = {0xC0,0x9C} +-define(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#9C)>>). + +%% TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM = {0xC0,0x9D} +-define(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#9D)>>). + +%% TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM = {0xC0,0x9E} +-define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#9E)>>). + +%% TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM = {0xC0,0x9F} +-define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#9F)>>). + +%% TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0x9A0} +-define(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#A0)>>). + +%% TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xA1} +-define(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#A1)>>). + +%% TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xA2} +-define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#A2)>>). + +%% TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xA3} +-define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#A3)>>). + +%% TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM = {0xC0,0xA4} +-define(TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#A4)>>). + +%% TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM = {0xC0,0xA5) +-define(TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#A5)>>). + +%% TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM = {0xC0,0xA6} +-define(TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#A6)>>). + +%% TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM = {0xC0,0xA7} +-define(TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#A7)>>). + +%% TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xA8} +-define(TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#A8)>>). + +%% TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xA9) +-define(TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#A9)>>). + +%% TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 = {0xC0,0xAA} +-define(TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#AA)>>). + +%% TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 = << ?BYTE(0xC0,0xAB} +-define(TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, <<?BYTE(16#C0),?BYTE(16#AB)>>). + + +%%% TLS 1.3 cipher suites RFC8446 + +%% TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x13,0x01} +-define(TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#13), ?BYTE(16#01)>>). + +%% TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x13,0x02} +-define(TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#13),?BYTE(16#02)>>). + +%% TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0x13,0x03} +-define(TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#13),?BYTE(16#03)>>). + +%% %% TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0x13,0x04} +-define(TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#13), ?BYTE(16#04)>>). + +%% %% TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0x13,0x05} +-define(TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#13),?BYTE(16#05)>>). -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_cipher). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher_format.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher_format.erl index 1d28e1e3b4..bca1022b5f 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher_format.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher_format.erl @@ -48,42 +48,154 @@ -type openssl_cipher_suite() :: string(). --export([suite_to_str/1, suite_definition/1, suite/1, erl_suite_definition/1, - openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1]). +-export([suite_map_to_bin/1, %% Binary format + suite_bin_to_map/1, %% Erlang API format + suite_map_to_str/1, %% RFC string + suite_str_to_map/1, + suite_map_to_openssl_str/1, %% OpenSSL name + suite_openssl_str_to_map/1, + suite_legacy/1 %% Erlang legacy format + ]). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec suite_to_str(internal_erl_cipher_suite()) -> string(). +-spec suite_map_to_str(internal_erl_cipher_suite()) -> string(). %% %% Description: Return the string representation of a cipher suite. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -suite_to_str(#{key_exchange := null, +suite_map_to_str(#{key_exchange := null, cipher := null, mac := null, prf := null}) -> "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV"; -suite_to_str(#{key_exchange := Kex, +suite_map_to_str(#{key_exchange := any, + cipher := Cipher, + mac := aead, + prf := PRF}) -> + "TLS_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Cipher)) ++ + "_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(PRF)); +suite_map_to_str(#{key_exchange := Kex, cipher := Cipher, mac := aead, prf := PRF}) -> "TLS_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Kex)) ++ "_WITH_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Cipher)) ++ "_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(PRF)); -suite_to_str(#{key_exchange := Kex, +suite_map_to_str(#{key_exchange := Kex, cipher := Cipher, mac := Mac}) -> "TLS_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Kex)) ++ "_WITH_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Cipher)) ++ "_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Mac)). +suite_str_to_map("TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV") -> + #{key_exchange => null, + cipher => null, + mac => null, + prf => null}; +suite_str_to_map(SuiteStr)-> + Str0 = string:prefix(SuiteStr, "TLS_"), + case string:split(Str0, "_WITH_") of + [Rest] -> + tls_1_3_suite_str_to_map(Rest); + [Prefix, Kex | Rest] when Prefix == "SPR"; + Prefix == "PSK"; + Prefix == "DHE"; + Prefix == "ECDHE" + -> + pre_tls_1_3_suite_str_to_map(Prefix ++ "_" ++ Kex, Rest); + [Kex| Rest] -> + pre_tls_1_3_suite_str_to_map(Kex, Rest) + end. + +suite_map_to_openssl_str(#{key_exchange := any, + mac := aead} = Suite) -> + %% TLS 1.3 OpenSSL finally use RFC names + suite_map_to_str(Suite); +suite_map_to_openssl_str(#{key_exchange := null} = Suite) -> + %% TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV + suite_map_to_str(Suite); +suite_map_to_openssl_str(#{key_exchange := rsa = Kex, + cipher := Cipher, + mac := Mac}) when Cipher == "des_cbc"; + Cipher == "3des_ede_cbc" -> + openssl_cipher_name(Kex, string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Cipher))) ++ + "-" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Mac)); +suite_map_to_openssl_str(#{key_exchange := Kex, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305 = Cipher, + mac := aead}) -> + openssl_suite_start(string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Kex))) + ++ openssl_cipher_name(Kex, string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Cipher))); +suite_map_to_openssl_str(#{key_exchange := Kex, + cipher := Cipher, + mac := aead, + prf := PRF}) -> + openssl_suite_start(string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Kex))) + ++ openssl_cipher_name(Kex, string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Cipher))) ++ + "-" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(PRF)); +suite_map_to_openssl_str(#{key_exchange := Kex, + cipher := Cipher, + mac := Mac}) -> + openssl_suite_start(string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Kex))) + ++ openssl_cipher_name(Kex, string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Cipher))) ++ + "-" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Mac)). + + +suite_openssl_str_to_map("TLS_" ++ _ = SuiteStr) -> + suite_str_to_map(SuiteStr); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("DES-CBC-SHA") -> + suite_str_to_map("TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("DES-CBC3-SHA") -> + suite_str_to_map("TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("SRP-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> + suite_str_to_map("TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("DHE-RSA-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("DHE-RSA", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("DHE-DSS-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("DHE-DSS", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("EDH-RSA-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("DHE-RSA", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("EDH-DSS-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("DHE-DSS", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("DES" ++ _ = Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("RSA", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("AES" ++ _ = Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("RSA", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("RC4" ++ _ = Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("RSA", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("ECDH-RSA-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("ECDH-RSA", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("ECDH-ECDSA-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("ECDH-ECDSA", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("ECDHE-RSA-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("ECDHE-RSA", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("ECDHE-ECDSA-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("ECDHE-ECDSA", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("RSA-PSK-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("RSA-PSK", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("RSA-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("RSA", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("DHE-PSK-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("DHE-PSK", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("ECDHE-PSK-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("ECDHE-PSK", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("PSK-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("PSK", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("SRP-RSA-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("SRP-RSA", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("SRP-DSS-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("SRP-DSS", Rest); +suite_openssl_str_to_map("SRP-" ++ Rest) -> + suite_openssl_str_to_map("SRP", Rest). + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> internal_erl_cipher_suite(). +-spec suite_bin_to_map(cipher_suite()) -> internal_erl_cipher_suite(). %% %% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. %% Note: Currently not supported suites are commented away. %% They should be supported or removed in the future. %%------------------------------------------------------------------- %% TLS v1.1 suites -suite_definition(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) -> #{key_exchange => null, cipher => null, mac => null, @@ -91,111 +203,111 @@ suite_definition(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) -> %% RFC 5746 - Not a real cipher suite used to signal empty "renegotiation_info" extension %% to avoid handshake failure from old servers that do not ignore %% hello extension data as they should. -suite_definition(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) -> #{key_exchange => null, cipher => null, mac => null, prf => null}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> #{key_exchange => rsa, cipher => rc4_128, mac => md5, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => rsa, cipher => rc4_128, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => rsa, cipher => des_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => rsa, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, cipher => des_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, cipher => des_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; %%% TSL V1.1 AES suites -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => rsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => rsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; %% TLS v1.2 suites -%% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> +%% suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> %% {rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => rsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => rsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha256, @@ -207,611 +319,683 @@ suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> %% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_256_CBC SHA256 %%% DH-ANON deprecated by TLS spec and not available %%% by default, but good for testing purposes. -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> #{key_exchange => dh_anon, cipher => rc4_128, mac => md5, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dh_anon, cipher => des_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dh_anon, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dh_anon, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dh_anon, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dh_anon, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dh_anon, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; %%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => psk, cipher => rc4_128, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => psk, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => psk, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => psk, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, cipher => rc4_128, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, cipher => rc4_128, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; %%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => psk, cipher => null, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, cipher => null, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, cipher => null, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => psk, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => psk, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => psk, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => psk, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + prf => sha384}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + prf => sha384}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> + prf => sha384}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => psk, cipher => null, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => psk, cipher => null, mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> + prf => sha384}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, cipher => null, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, cipher => null, mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> + prf => sha384}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, cipher => null, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, cipher => null, mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; + prf => sha384}; %%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, cipher => rc4_128, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> + prf => sha384}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, cipher => null, mac => sha256, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, cipher => null, mac => sha384, - prf => default_prf}; + prf => sha384}; %%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => null, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => null, prf => sha384}; -%% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) -> -%% #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, -%% cipher => aes_128_ccm, -%% mac => null, -%% prf =>sha256}; -%% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) -> -%% #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, -%% cipher => aes_256_ccm, -%% mac => null, -%% prf => sha256}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_ccm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_ccm_8, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; %%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => srp_anon, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => srp_dss, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => srp_anon, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => srp_dss, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => srp_anon, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => srp_dss, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; %% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, cipher => null, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, cipher => rc4_128, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher => null, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher => rc4_128, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, cipher => null, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, cipher => rc4_128, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, cipher => null, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, cipher => rc4_128, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, cipher => null, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, cipher => rc4_128, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha, prf => default_prf}; %% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha384, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha384, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha384, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, cipher => aes_128_cbc, mac => sha256, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, cipher => aes_256_cbc, mac => sha384, prf => sha384}; %% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => rsa, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => rsa, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dh_rsa, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => dh_rsa, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dh_dss, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => null, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => dh_dss, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dh_anon, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => dh_anon, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; %% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, cipher => aes_128_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, cipher => aes_256_gcm, mac => aead, prf => sha384}; -%% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_ccm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_ccm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_ccm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_ccm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_ccm_8, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_ccm_8, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_ccm_8, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_ccm_8, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_bin_to_map(#{key_exchange := psk_dhe, + cipher := aes_256_ccm_8, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8; + +% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, cipher => chacha20_poly1305, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher => chacha20_poly1305, mac => aead, prf => sha256}; -suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, cipher => chacha20_poly1305, mac => aead, - prf => sha256}. + prf => sha256}; +%% TLS 1.3 Cipher Suites RFC8446 +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => any, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => any, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => any, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => any, + cipher => aes_128_ccm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}. +%% suite_bin_to_map(?TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) -> +%% #{key_exchange => any, +%% cipher => aes_128_ccm_8, +%% mac => aead, +%% prf => sha256}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec erl_suite_definition(cipher_suite() | internal_erl_cipher_suite()) -> old_erl_cipher_suite(). +-spec suite_legacy(cipher_suite() | internal_erl_cipher_suite()) -> old_erl_cipher_suite(). %% %% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. Filters last value %% for now (compatibility reasons). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -erl_suite_definition(Bin) when is_binary(Bin) -> - erl_suite_definition(suite_definition(Bin)); -erl_suite_definition(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, cipher := Cipher, +suite_legacy(Bin) when is_binary(Bin) -> + suite_legacy(suite_bin_to_map(Bin)); +suite_legacy(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, cipher := Cipher, mac := Hash, prf := Prf}) -> case Prf of default_prf -> @@ -821,943 +1005,915 @@ erl_suite_definition(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, cipher := Cipher, end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec suite(internal_erl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite(). +-spec suite_map_to_bin(internal_erl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite(). %% %% Description: Return TLS cipher suite definition. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% TLS v1.1 suites -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, cipher := rc4_128, mac := md5}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, cipher := rc4_128, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, cipher := des_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, cipher :='3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, cipher:= des_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, cipher:= des_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, cipher:= rc4_128, mac := md5}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, cipher:= des_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; %%% TSL V1.1 AES suites -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; %% TLS v1.2 suites -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; %%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, cipher := rc4_128, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, cipher := rc4_128, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, cipher := rc4_128, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; %%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, cipher := null, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, cipher := null, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, cipher := null, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, cipher := null, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, cipher := null, mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, cipher := null, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, cipher := null, mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, cipher := null, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, cipher := null, mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; %%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, cipher := rc4_128, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, cipher :='3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, cipher := null, mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, cipher := null, mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; %%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := null, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := null, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; - %% suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - %% cipher := aes_128_ccm, - %% mac := null, - %% prf := sha256}) -> - %% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256; - %% suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, - %% cipher := aes_256_ccm, - %% mac := null, - %% prf := sha256}) -> - %% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_ccm_8, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_ccm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256; %%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; %%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, cipher := null, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, cipher := rc4_128, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher := null, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher := rc4_128, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, cipher := null, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, cipher := rc4_128, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, cipher := null, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, cipher := rc4_128, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, cipher := null, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, cipher := rc4_128, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; %%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac:= sha256, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha384, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha256, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha384, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha256, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha384, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, cipher := aes_128_cbc, mac := sha256, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, cipher := aes_256_cbc, mac := sha384, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; %% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; %% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, cipher := aes_128_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, cipher := aes_256_gcm, mac := aead, prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; %% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, cipher := chacha20_poly1305, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, cipher := chacha20_poly1305, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, cipher := chacha20_poly1305, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec openssl_suite(openssl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite(). -%% -%% Description: Return TLS cipher suite definition. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% translate constants <-> openssl-strings -openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("AES256-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("RC4-SHA") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -openssl_suite("RC4-MD5") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; -openssl_suite("EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("DES-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; +%% RFC 6655 - TLS-1.2 cipher suites +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_ccm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_ccm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_ccm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_ccm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_ccm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_ccm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_ccm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_ccm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM; -%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_ccm_8, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_ccm_8, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_ccm_8, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_ccm_8, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_ccm_8, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_ccm_8, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_ccm_8, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_ccm_8, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8; -openssl_suite("SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA") -> - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +%% TLS 1.3 Cipher Suites RFC8446 +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := any, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := any, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := any, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; +suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := any, + cipher := aes_128_ccm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256. +%% suite_map_to_bin(#{key_exchange := any, +%% cipher := aes_128_ccm_8, +%% mac := aead, +%% prf := sha256}) -> +%% ?TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256. -%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +tls_1_3_suite_str_to_map(CipherStr) -> + {Cipher, Mac, Prf} = cipher_str_to_algs(any, CipherStr, ""), + #{key_exchange => any, + mac => Mac, + cipher => Cipher, + prf => Prf + }. -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +pre_tls_1_3_suite_str_to_map(KexStr, Rest) -> + Kex = algo_str_to_atom(KexStr), + [CipherStr, AlgStr] = string:split(Rest, "_", trailing), + {Cipher, Mac, Prf} = cipher_str_to_algs(Kex, CipherStr, AlgStr), + #{key_exchange => Kex, + mac => Mac, + cipher => Cipher, + prf => Prf + }. + +cipher_str_to_algs(_, CipherStr, "CCM"= End) -> %% PRE TLS 1.3 + Cipher = algo_str_to_atom(CipherStr ++ "_" ++ End), + {Cipher, aead, sha256}; +cipher_str_to_algs(_, CipherStr, "8" = End) -> %% PRE TLS 1.3 + Cipher = algo_str_to_atom(CipherStr ++ "_" ++ End), + {Cipher, aead, sha256}; +cipher_str_to_algs(_, CipherStr, "CHACHA20_POLY1305" = End) -> %% PRE TLS 1.3 + Cipher = algo_str_to_atom(CipherStr ++ "_" ++ End), + {Cipher, aead, sha256}; +cipher_str_to_algs(_, CipherStr0, "") -> %% TLS 1.3 + [CipherStr, AlgStr] = string:split(CipherStr0, "_", trailing), + Hash = algo_str_to_atom(AlgStr), + Cipher = algo_str_to_atom(CipherStr), + {Cipher, aead, Hash}; +cipher_str_to_algs(Kex, CipherStr, HashStr) -> %% PRE TLS 1.3 + Hash = algo_str_to_atom(HashStr), + Cipher = algo_str_to_atom(CipherStr), + case is_aead_cipher(CipherStr) of + true -> + {Cipher, aead, Hash}; + false -> + {Cipher, Hash, default_prf(Kex, Hash)} + end. -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +default_prf(_, md5) -> + default_prf; +default_prf(_, sha) -> + default_prf; +default_prf(ecdhe_ecdsa, sha256) -> + sha256; +default_prf(ecdhe_rsa, sha256) -> + sha256; +default_prf(dhe_rsa, sha256) -> + default_prf; +default_prf(dhe_dss, sha256) -> + default_prf; +default_prf(rsa, sha256) -> + default_prf; +default_prf(rsa_psk, sha256) -> + default_prf; +default_prf(_, Hash) -> + Hash. -%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +%% PRE TLS 1.3 +is_aead_cipher("CHACHA20_POLY1305") -> + true; +is_aead_cipher(CipherStr) -> + [_, Rest] = string:split(CipherStr, "_", trailing), + (Rest == "GCM") orelse (Rest == "CCM") orelse (Rest == "8"). -%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites -openssl_suite("AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +openssl_is_aead_cipher("CHACHA20-POLY1305") -> + true; +openssl_is_aead_cipher(CipherStr) -> + case string:split(CipherStr, "-", trailing) of + [_, Rest] -> + (Rest == "GCM") orelse (Rest == "CCM") orelse (Rest == "8"); + [_] -> + false + end. -%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. +algo_str_to_atom("SRP_SHA_DSS") -> + srp_dss; +algo_str_to_atom(AlgoStr) -> + erlang:list_to_existing_atom(string:to_lower(AlgoStr)). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec openssl_suite_name(cipher_suite()) -> openssl_cipher_suite() | internal_erl_cipher_suite(). -%% -%% Description: Return openssl cipher suite name if possible -%%------------------------------------------------------------------- -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "AES256-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name( ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - "RC4-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> - "RC4-MD5"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - "DES-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - "NULL-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - "AES256-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256"; +openssl_cipher_name(_, "3DES_EDE_CBC" ++ _) -> + "DES-CBC3"; +openssl_cipher_name(Kex, "AES_128_CBC" ++ _ = CipherStr) when Kex == rsa; + Kex == dhe_rsa; + Kex == ecdhe_rsa; + Kex == ecdhe_ecdsa -> + openssl_name_concat(CipherStr); +openssl_cipher_name(Kex, "AES_256_CBC" ++ _ = CipherStr) when Kex == rsa; + Kex == dhe_rsa; + Kex == ecdhe_rsa; + Kex == ecdhe_ecdsa -> + openssl_name_concat(CipherStr); +openssl_cipher_name(Kex, "AES_128_CBC" ++ _ = CipherStr) when Kex == srp; + Kex == srp_rsa -> + lists:append(string:replace(CipherStr, "_", "-", all)); +openssl_cipher_name(Kex, "AES_256_CBC" ++ _ = CipherStr) when Kex == srp; + Kex == srp_rsa -> + lists:append(string:replace(CipherStr, "_", "-", all)); +openssl_cipher_name(_, "AES_128_CBC" ++ _ = CipherStr) -> + openssl_name_concat(CipherStr) ++ "-CBC"; +openssl_cipher_name(_, "AES_256_CBC" ++ _ = CipherStr) -> + openssl_name_concat(CipherStr) ++ "-CBC"; +openssl_cipher_name(_, "AES_128_GCM" ++ _ = CipherStr) -> + openssl_name_concat(CipherStr) ++ "-GCM"; +openssl_cipher_name(_, "AES_256_GCM" ++ _ = CipherStr) -> + openssl_name_concat(CipherStr) ++ "-GCM"; +openssl_cipher_name(_, "RC4" ++ _) -> + "RC4"; +openssl_cipher_name(_, CipherStr) -> + lists:append(string:replace(CipherStr, "_", "-", all)). -%%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - "PSK-RC4-SHA"; +openssl_suite_start(Kex) -> + case openssl_kex_name(Kex) of + "" -> + ""; + Name -> + Name ++ "-" + end. -%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 +openssl_kex_name("RSA") -> + ""; +openssl_kex_name(Kex) -> + lists:append(string:replace(Kex, "_", "-", all)). -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA"; +kex_name_from_openssl(Kex) -> + lists:append(string:replace(Kex, "-", "_", all)). -%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"; +cipher_name_from_openssl("AES128") -> + "AES_128_CBC"; +cipher_name_from_openssl("AES256") -> + "AES_256_CBC"; +cipher_name_from_openssl("AES128-CBC") -> + "AES_128_CBC"; +cipher_name_from_openssl("AES256-CBC") -> + "AES_256_CBC"; +cipher_name_from_openssl("AES-128-CBC") -> + "AES_128_CBC"; +cipher_name_from_openssl("AES-256-CBC") -> + "AES_256_CBC"; +cipher_name_from_openssl("AES128-GCM") -> + "AES_128_GCM"; +cipher_name_from_openssl("AES256-GCM") -> + "AES_256_GCM"; +cipher_name_from_openssl("DES-CBC") -> + "DES_CBC"; +cipher_name_from_openssl("DES-CBC3") -> + "3DES_EDE_CBC"; +cipher_name_from_openssl("RC4") -> + "RC4_128"; +cipher_name_from_openssl(Str) -> + Str. -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"; +openssl_name_concat(Str0) -> + [Str, _] = string:split(Str0, "_", trailing), + [Part1, Part2] = string:split(Str, "_", trailing), + Part1 ++ Part2. -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - "ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"; +suite_openssl_str_to_map(Kex0, Rest) -> + Kex = algo_str_to_atom(kex_name_from_openssl(Kex0)), + [CipherStr, AlgStr] = string:split(Rest, "-", trailing), + {Cipher, Mac, Prf} = openssl_cipher_str_to_algs(Kex, CipherStr, AlgStr), + #{key_exchange => Kex, + mac => Mac, + cipher => Cipher, + prf => Prf + }. -%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384"; +%% Does only need own implementation PRE TLS 1.3 +openssl_cipher_str_to_algs(_, CipherStr, "CCM"= End) -> + Cipher = algo_str_to_atom(CipherStr ++ "_" ++ End), + {Cipher, aead, sha256}; +openssl_cipher_str_to_algs(_, CipherStr, "8" = End) -> + Cipher = algo_str_to_atom(CipherStr ++ "_" ++ End), + {Cipher, aead, sha256}; +openssl_cipher_str_to_algs(_, CipherStr, "POLY1305" = End) -> + Cipher = algo_str_to_atom(CipherStr ++ "_" ++ End), + {Cipher, aead, sha256}; +openssl_cipher_str_to_algs(Kex, CipherStr, HashStr) -> + Hash = algo_str_to_atom(HashStr), + Cipher = algo_str_to_atom(cipher_name_from_openssl(CipherStr)), + case openssl_is_aead_cipher(CipherStr) of + true -> + {Cipher, aead, Hash}; + false -> + {Cipher, Hash, default_prf(Kex, Hash)} + end. -%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; -openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; -%% No oppenssl name -openssl_suite_name(Cipher) -> - suite_definition(Cipher). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl index fbbe0a49c8..2483509228 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl @@ -35,10 +35,11 @@ -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_srp.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% Setup --export([connect/8, handshake/7, handshake/2, handshake/3, +-export([connect/8, handshake/7, handshake/2, handshake/3, handle_common_event/5, handshake_continue/3, handshake_cancel/1, socket_control/4, socket_control/5]). @@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ %% Help functions for tls|dtls_connection.erl -export([handle_session/7, ssl_config/3, - prepare_connection/2, hibernate_after/3, map_extensions/1]). + prepare_connection/2, hibernate_after/3]). %% General gen_statem state functions with extra callback argument %% to determine if it is an SSL/TLS or DTLS gen_statem machine @@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ handshake(#sslsocket{pid = [Pid|_]} = Socket, Timeout) -> connected -> {ok, Socket}; {ok, Ext} -> - {ok, Socket, Ext}; + {ok, Socket, no_records(Ext)}; Error -> Error end. @@ -327,32 +328,33 @@ prf(ConnectionPid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> %%==================================================================== %% Alert and close handling %%==================================================================== -handle_own_alert(Alert, _, StateName, +handle_own_alert(Alert0, _, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, protocol_cb = Connection}, ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> try %% Try to tell the other side - send_alert(Alert, StateName, State) + send_alert(Alert0, StateName, State) catch _:_ -> %% Can crash if we are in a uninitialized state ignore end, try %% Try to tell the local user - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = Role}), + Alert = Alert0#alert{role = Role}, + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert,StateName, State) catch _:_ -> ok end, {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}, State}. -handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, _, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - protocol_cb = Connection, - tracker = Tracker}, - handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {false, first}}, - start_or_recv_from = StartFrom} = State) -> +handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + protocol_cb = Connection, + tracker = Tracker}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {false, first}}, + start_or_recv_from = StartFrom} = State) -> Pids = Connection:pids(State), - alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role, Connection); + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection); handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, socket = Socket, @@ -363,9 +365,9 @@ handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = socket_options = Opts, start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State) -> Pids = Connection:pids(State), - alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role, Connection). + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection). -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert0, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, socket = Socket, host = Host, @@ -379,10 +381,11 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, session = Session, socket_options = Opts} = State) -> invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session), - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), - StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + Alert = Alert0#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}, + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), + StateName, Alert), Pids = Connection:pids(State), - alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection), + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection), {stop, {shutdown, normal}, State}; handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, @@ -392,13 +395,14 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, StateName, State) -> handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), {stop,{shutdown, peer_close}, State}; -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert0, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, protocol_cb = Connection}, handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, internal}}, ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + Alert = Alert0#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}, + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), {stop,{shutdown, peer_close}, State}; @@ -408,7 +412,7 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, From}} = HsEnv, ssl_options = SslOpts } = State0) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}), State = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State0), @@ -419,8 +423,8 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, protocol_cb = Connection}, handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {true, From}} = HsEnv, ssl_options = SslOpts - } = State0) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, + } = State0) -> + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}), %% Go back to connection! @@ -432,8 +436,9 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = Role, protocol_cb = Connection}, ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, + Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), Connection:next_event(StateName, no_record, State). %%==================================================================== @@ -442,8 +447,7 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName, passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = {_,BufferSize,_}}, StateName, Connection, StartTimerAction) -> case BufferSize of 0 -> - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0), - Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State, StartTimerAction); + Connection:next_event(StateName, no_record, State0, StartTimerAction); _ -> case read_application_data(<<>>, State0) of {stop, _, _} = ShutdownError -> @@ -610,7 +614,8 @@ read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize, Rear0, Bin0) -> <<SizeA:32, DataA:SizeA/binary, SizeB:32, DataB:SizeB/binary, SizeC:32, DataC:SizeC/binary, - SizeD:32, DataD:SizeD/binary, Rest/binary>> -> + SizeD:32, DataD:SizeD/binary, Rest/binary>> + when 0 < SizeA, 0 < SizeB, 0 < SizeC, 0 < SizeD -> %% We have 4 complete packets in the first binary erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataA), erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataB), @@ -620,7 +625,8 @@ read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize, Rear0, Bin0) -> DHandle, Front0, BufferSize - (4*4+SizeA+SizeB+SizeC+SizeD), Rear0, Rest); <<SizeA:32, DataA:SizeA/binary, SizeB:32, DataB:SizeB/binary, - SizeC:32, DataC:SizeC/binary, Rest/binary>> -> + SizeC:32, DataC:SizeC/binary, Rest/binary>> + when 0 < SizeA, 0 < SizeB, 0 < SizeC -> %% We have 3 complete packets in the first binary erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataA), erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataB), @@ -628,7 +634,8 @@ read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize, Rear0, Bin0) -> read_application_dist_data( DHandle, Front0, BufferSize - (3*4+SizeA+SizeB+SizeC), Rear0, Rest); <<SizeA:32, DataA:SizeA/binary, - SizeB:32, DataB:SizeB/binary, Rest/binary>> -> + SizeB:32, DataB:SizeB/binary, Rest/binary>> + when 0 < SizeA, 0 < SizeB -> %% We have 2 complete packets in the first binary erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataA), erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, DataB), @@ -639,13 +646,13 @@ read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize, Rear0, Bin0) -> %% Basic one packet code path <<Size:32, Data:Size/binary, Rest/binary>> -> %% We have a complete packet in the first binary - erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, Data), + 0 < Size andalso erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, Data), read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize - (4+Size), Rear0, Rest); <<Size:32, FirstData/binary>> when 4+Size =< BufferSize -> %% We have a complete packet in the buffer %% - fetch the missing content from the buffer front {Data,Front,Rear} = iovec_from_front(Size - byte_size(FirstData), Front0, Rear0, [FirstData]), - erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, Data), + 0 < Size andalso erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, Data), read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front, BufferSize - (4+Size), Rear); <<Bin/binary>> -> %% In OTP-21 the match context reuse optimization fails if we use Bin0 in recursion, so here we @@ -661,23 +668,61 @@ read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front0, BufferSize, Rear0, Bin0) -> %% contains enough data to maybe form a packet %% - fetch a tiny binary from the buffer front to complete the length field {LengthField,Front,Rear} = - iovec_from_front(4 - byte_size(IncompleteLengthField), Front0, Rear0, [IncompleteLengthField]), + case IncompleteLengthField of + <<>> -> + iovec_from_front(4, Front0, Rear0, []); + _ -> + iovec_from_front( + 4 - byte_size(IncompleteLengthField), Front0, Rear0, [IncompleteLengthField]) + end, LengthBin = iolist_to_binary(LengthField), read_application_dist_data(DHandle, Front, BufferSize, Rear, LengthBin); <<IncompleteLengthField/binary>> -> %% We do not have enough data in the buffer to even form a length field - await more data - {[IncompleteLengthField|Front0],BufferSize,Rear0} + case IncompleteLengthField of + <<>> -> + {Front0,BufferSize,Rear0}; + _ -> + {[IncompleteLengthField|Front0],BufferSize,Rear0} + end end end. +iovec_from_front(0, Front, Rear, Acc) -> + {lists:reverse(Acc),Front,Rear}; iovec_from_front(Size, [], Rear, Acc) -> - iovec_from_front(Size, lists:reverse(Rear), [], Acc); + case Rear of + %% Avoid lists:reverse/1 for simple cases. + %% Case clause for [] to avoid infinite loop. + [_] -> + iovec_from_front(Size, Rear, [], Acc); + [Bin2,Bin1] -> + iovec_from_front(Size, [Bin1,Bin2], [], Acc); + [Bin3,Bin2,Bin1] -> + iovec_from_front(Size, [Bin1,Bin2,Bin3], [], Acc); + [_,_,_|_] = Rear -> + iovec_from_front(Size, lists:reverse(Rear), [], Acc) + end; +iovec_from_front(Size, [Bin|Front], Rear, []) -> + case Bin of + <<Last:Size/binary>> -> % Just enough + {[Last],Front,Rear}; + <<Last:Size/binary, Rest/binary>> -> % More than enough, split here + {[Last],[Rest|Front],Rear}; + <<>> -> % Not enough, skip empty binaries + iovec_from_front(Size, Front, Rear, []); + <<_/binary>> -> % Not enough + BinSize = byte_size(Bin), + iovec_from_front(Size - BinSize, Front, Rear, [Bin]) + end; iovec_from_front(Size, [Bin|Front], Rear, Acc) -> case Bin of <<Last:Size/binary>> -> % Just enough {lists:reverse(Acc, [Last]),Front,Rear}; <<Last:Size/binary, Rest/binary>> -> % More than enough, split here {lists:reverse(Acc, [Last]),[Rest|Front],Rear}; + <<>> -> % Not enough, skip empty binaries + iovec_from_front(Size, Front, Rear, Acc); <<_/binary>> -> % Not enough BinSize = byte_size(Bin), iovec_from_front(Size - BinSize, Front, Rear, [Bin|Acc]) @@ -699,12 +744,13 @@ handle_session(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, handshake_env = #handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol} = HsEnv, connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = ReqVersion} = CEnv} = State0) -> #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = - ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(CipherSuite), PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion, KeyAlgorithm), {ExpectNPN, Protocol} = case Protocol0 of undefined -> + {false, CurrentProtocol}; _ -> {ProtoExt =:= npn, Protocol0} @@ -1022,7 +1068,8 @@ certify(internal, #certificate_request{} = CertRequest, connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns}} = State, Connection) -> - case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(CertRequest, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, ssl:tls_version(Version)) of + case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(CertRequest, Cert, + SupportedHashSigns, ssl:tls_version(Version)) of #alert {} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); NegotiatedHashSign -> @@ -1188,10 +1235,8 @@ cipher(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, cipher(internal, #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, handshake_env = #handshake_env{expecting_finished = true, - expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = HsEnv} = State0, Connection) -> - {Record, State} = - Connection:next_record(State0), - Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, + expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true} = HsEnv} = State, Connection) -> + Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false}}); cipher(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, #state{handshake_env = HsEnv, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = @@ -1230,10 +1275,17 @@ connection({call, From}, {connection_information, false}, State, _) -> Info = connection_info(State), hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, {ok, Info}}]); connection({call, From}, negotiated_protocol, - #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = undefined}} = State, _) -> + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{alpn = undefined, + negotiated_protocol = undefined}} = State, _) -> hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, {error, protocol_not_negotiated}}]); connection({call, From}, negotiated_protocol, - #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol}} = State, _) -> + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{alpn = undefined, + negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol}} = State, _) -> + hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, + [{reply, From, {ok, SelectedProtocol}}]); +connection({call, From}, negotiated_protocol, + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{alpn = SelectedProtocol, + negotiated_protocol = undefined}} = State, _) -> hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, {ok, SelectedProtocol}}]); connection({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> @@ -1313,10 +1365,10 @@ handle_common_event({timeout, handshake}, close, _StateName, #state{start_or_rec handle_common_event({timeout, recv}, timeout, StateName, #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State, _) -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, bytes_to_read = undefined}, [{reply, RecvFrom, {error, timeout}}]}; -handle_common_event(_Type, Msg, StateName, #state{connection_env = +handle_common_event(Type, Msg, StateName, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State, _) -> - Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, {unexpected_msg, Msg}), + Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, {unexpected_msg, {Type,Msg}}), handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State). handle_call({application_data, _Data}, _, _, _, _) -> @@ -1442,13 +1494,13 @@ handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, econnaborted}, StateName, } = State) when StateName =/= connection -> Pids = Connection:pids(State), alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker,Socket, - StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role, Connection), + StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role, StateName, Connection), {stop, {shutdown, normal}, State}; handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, error_tag = ErrorTag}} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Reason]), - error_logger:error_report(Report), + ?LOG_ERROR(Report), handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), {stop, {shutdown,normal}, State}; @@ -1478,7 +1530,7 @@ handle_info(allow_renegotiate, StateName, #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State) handle_info(Msg, StateName, #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, error_tag = Tag}} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Got unexpected info: ~p ~n", [{Msg, Tag, Socket}]), - error_logger:info_report(Report), + ?LOG_NOTICE(Report), {next_state, StateName, State}. %%==================================================================== @@ -1570,7 +1622,7 @@ connection_info(#state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}, connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = {_,_} = Version}, ssl_options = Opts}) -> RecordCB = record_cb(Connection), - CipherSuiteDef = #{key_exchange := KexAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + CipherSuiteDef = #{key_exchange := KexAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(CipherSuite), IsNamedCurveSuite = lists:member(KexAlg, [ecdh_ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdh_rsa, ecdhe_rsa, ecdh_anon]), CurveInfo = case ECCCurve of @@ -1581,7 +1633,7 @@ connection_info(#state{static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}, end, [{protocol, RecordCB:protocol_version(Version)}, {session_id, SessionId}, - {cipher_suite, ssl_cipher_format:erl_suite_definition(CipherSuiteDef)}, + {cipher_suite, ssl_cipher_format:suite_legacy(CipherSuiteDef)}, {selected_cipher_suite, CipherSuiteDef}, {sni_hostname, SNIHostname} | CurveInfo] ++ ssl_options_list(Opts). @@ -1593,18 +1645,23 @@ security_info(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) -> ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), [{client_random, ClientRand}, {server_random, ServerRand}, {master_secret, MasterSecret}]. -do_server_hello(Type, #hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocols} = +do_server_hello(Type, #{next_protocol_negotiation := NextProtocols} = ServerHelloExt, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, handshake_env = HsEnv, session = #session{session_id = SessId}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{versions = [HighestVersion|_]}} = State0, Connection) when is_atom(Type) -> - + %% TLS 1.3 - Section 4.1.3 + %% Override server random values for TLS 1.3 downgrade protection mechanism. + ConnectionStates1 = update_server_random(ConnectionStates0, Version, HighestVersion), + State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}, ServerHello = - ssl_handshake:server_hello(SessId, ssl:tls_version(Version), ConnectionStates0, ServerHelloExt), + ssl_handshake:server_hello(SessId, ssl:tls_version(Version), + ConnectionStates1, ServerHelloExt), State = server_hello(ServerHello, - State0#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = + State1#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocols =/= undefined}}, Connection), case Type of new -> @@ -1613,6 +1670,60 @@ do_server_hello(Type, #hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocol resumed_server_hello(State, Connection) end. +update_server_random(#{pending_read := #{security_parameters := ReadSecParams0} = + ReadState0, + pending_write := #{security_parameters := WriteSecParams0} = + WriteState0} = ConnectionStates, + Version, HighestVersion) -> + ReadRandom = override_server_random( + ReadSecParams0#security_parameters.server_random, + Version, + HighestVersion), + WriteRandom = override_server_random( + WriteSecParams0#security_parameters.server_random, + Version, + HighestVersion), + ReadSecParams = ReadSecParams0#security_parameters{server_random = ReadRandom}, + WriteSecParams = WriteSecParams0#security_parameters{server_random = WriteRandom}, + ReadState = ReadState0#{security_parameters => ReadSecParams}, + WriteState = WriteState0#{security_parameters => WriteSecParams}, + + ConnectionStates#{pending_read => ReadState, pending_write => WriteState}. + +%% TLS 1.3 - Section 4.1.3 +%% +%% If negotiating TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 servers MUST set the last eight bytes +%% of their Random value to the bytes: +%% +%% 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01 +%% +%% If negotiating TLS 1.1 or below, TLS 1.3 servers MUST and TLS 1.2 +%% servers SHOULD set the last eight bytes of their Random value to the +%% bytes: +%% +%% 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00 +override_server_random(<<Random0:24/binary,_:8/binary>> = Random, {M,N}, {Major,Minor}) + when Major > 3 orelse Major =:= 3 andalso Minor >= 4 -> %% TLS 1.3 or above + if M =:= 3 andalso N =:= 3 -> %% Negotating TLS 1.2 + Down = ?RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS12, + <<Random0/binary,Down/binary>>; + M =:= 3 andalso N < 3 -> %% Negotating TLS 1.1 or prior + Down = ?RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS11, + <<Random0/binary,Down/binary>>; + true -> + Random + end; +override_server_random(<<Random0:24/binary,_:8/binary>> = Random, {M,N}, {Major,Minor}) + when Major =:= 3 andalso Minor =:= 3 -> %% TLS 1.2 + if M =:= 3 andalso N < 3 -> %% Negotating TLS 1.1 or prior + Down = ?RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS11, + <<Random0/binary,Down/binary>>; + true -> + Random + end; +override_server_random(Random, _, _) -> + Random. + new_server_hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression, session_id = SessionId}, @@ -1649,7 +1760,7 @@ resumed_server_hello(#state{session = Session, server_hello(ServerHello, State0, Connection) -> CipherSuite = ServerHello#server_hello.cipher_suite, - #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(CipherSuite), #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State = Connection:queue_handshake(ServerHello, State0), State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm}}. @@ -1664,7 +1775,7 @@ handle_peer_cert(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, State1 = State0#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo}, session = Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert}}, - #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(CipherSuite), State = handle_peer_cert_key(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, KeyAlgorithm, State1), Connection:next_event(certify, no_record, State). @@ -2505,22 +2616,6 @@ hibernate_after(connection = StateName, hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions) -> {next_state, StateName, State, Actions}. -map_extensions(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, - signature_algs = SigAlg, - alpn = Alpn, - next_protocol_negotiation = Next, - srp = SRP, - ec_point_formats = ECPointFmt, - elliptic_curves = ECCCurves, - sni = SNI}) -> - #{renegotiation_info => ssl_handshake:extension_value(RenegotiationInfo), - signature_algs => ssl_handshake:extension_value(SigAlg), - alpn => ssl_handshake:extension_value(Alpn), - srp => ssl_handshake:extension_value(SRP), - next_protocol => ssl_handshake:extension_value(Next), - ec_point_formats => ssl_handshake:extension_value(ECPointFmt), - elliptic_curves => ssl_handshake:extension_value(ECCCurves), - sni => ssl_handshake:extension_value(SNI)}. terminate_alert(normal) -> ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY); @@ -2682,7 +2777,7 @@ ssl_options_list([ciphers = Key | Keys], [Value | Values], Acc) -> ssl_options_list(Keys, Values, [{Key, lists:map( fun(Suite) -> - ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Suite) + ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(Suite) end, Value)} | Acc]); ssl_options_list([Key | Keys], [Value | Values], Acc) -> @@ -2861,22 +2956,22 @@ send_user(Pid, Msg) -> Pid ! Msg, ok. -alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> - alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection); -alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket,_, _, _, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> - alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role, Connection). +alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) -> + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection); +alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket,_, _, _, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) -> + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection). -alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> - alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, false, no_pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection). +alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) -> + alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, false, no_pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection). -alert_user(_, _, _, _, false = Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, _) when From =/= undefined -> +alert_user(_, _, _, _, false = Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) when From =/= undefined -> %% If there is an outstanding ssl_accept | recv %% From will be defined and send_or_reply will %% send the appropriate error message. - ReasonCode = ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role), + ReasonCode = ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName), send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, {error, ReasonCode}); -alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> - case ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role) of +alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, StateName, Connection) -> + case ssl_alert:reason_code(Alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName) of closed -> send_or_reply(Active, Pid, From, {ssl_closed, Connection:socket(Pids, Transport, Socket, Tracker)}); @@ -2885,14 +2980,14 @@ alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Con {ssl_error, Connection:socket(Pids, Transport, Socket, Tracker), ReasonCode}) end. -log_alert(true, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, #alert{role = Role} = Alert) -> +log_alert(Level, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, #alert{role = Role} = Alert) -> Txt = ssl_alert:own_alert_txt(Alert), - error_logger:info_report(io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt])); -log_alert(true, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, Alert) -> + Report = ssl_alert:alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt), + ssl_logger:notice(Level, Report); +log_alert(Level, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, Alert) -> Txt = ssl_alert:alert_txt(Alert), - error_logger:info_report(io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt])); -log_alert(false, _, _, _, _) -> - ok. + Report = ssl_alert:alert_txt(ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt), + ssl_logger:notice(Level, Report). invalidate_session(client, Host, Port, Session) -> ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Host, Port, Session); @@ -2954,3 +3049,8 @@ new_emulated([], EmOpts) -> EmOpts; new_emulated(NewEmOpts, _) -> NewEmOpts. + +no_records(Extensions) -> + maps:map(fun(_, Value) -> + ssl_handshake:extension_value(Value) + end, Extensions). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl index c90fe926b7..844368c761 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ sni_hostname = undefined, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false ::boolean(), next_protocol = undefined :: undefined | binary(), + alpn = undefined, %% Used in TLS 1.3 negotiated_protocol, hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined}, cert_hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined}, @@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ srp_params :: #srp_user{} | secret_printout() | 'undefined', public_key_info :: ssl_handshake:public_key_info() | 'undefined', premaster_secret :: binary() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', - server_psk_identity :: binary() | 'undefined' % server psk identity hint + server_psk_identity :: binary() | 'undefined' % server psk identity hint }). -record(connection_env, { @@ -107,20 +108,77 @@ client_certificate_requested = false :: boolean(), protocol_specific = #{} :: map(), session :: #session{} | secret_printout(), + key_share, %% Data shuffling %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% connection_states :: ssl_record:connection_states() | secret_printout(), protocol_buffers :: term() | secret_printout() , %% #protocol_buffers{} from tls_record.hrl or dtls_recor.hr user_data_buffer :: undefined | {[binary()],non_neg_integer(),[binary()]} | secret_printout(), bytes_to_read :: undefined | integer(), %% bytes to read in passive mode - %% recv and start handling - start_or_recv_from :: term() + start_or_recv_from :: term(), + log_level }). - -define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS, #'DHParameter'{prime = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME, base = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR}). -define(WAIT_TO_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION, 12000). + +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS 1.3 +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +%% TLS 1.3 uses the same state record with the following differences: +%% +%% state :: record() +%% +%% session_cache - not implemented +%% session_cache_cb - not implemented +%% crl_db - not implemented +%% client_hello_version - Bleichenbacher mitigation in TLS 1.2 +%% client_certificate_requested - Built into TLS 1.3 state machine +%% key_algorithm - not used +%% diffie_hellman_params - used in TLS 1.2 ECDH key exchange +%% diffie_hellman_keys - used in TLS 1.2 ECDH key exchange +%% psk_identity - not used +%% srp_params - not used, no srp extension in TLS 1.3 +%% srp_keys - not used, no srp extension in TLS 1.3 +%% premaster_secret - not used +%% renegotiation - TLS 1.3 forbids renegotiation +%% hello - used in user_hello, handshake continue +%% allow_renegotiate - TLS 1.3 forbids renegotiation +%% expecting_next_protocol_negotiation - ALPN replaced NPN, depricated in TLS 1.3 +%% expecting_finished - not implemented, used by abbreviated +%% next_protocol - ALPN replaced NPN, depricated in TLS 1.3 +%% +%% connection_state :: map() +%% +%% compression_state - not used +%% mac_secret - not used +%% sequence_number - not used +%% secure_renegotiation - not used, no renegotiation_info in TLS 1.3 +%% client_verify_data - not used, no renegotiation_info in TLS 1.3 +%% server_verify_data - not used, no renegotiation_info in TLS 1.3 +%% beast_mitigation - not used +%% +%% security_parameters :: map() +%% +%% cipher_type - TLS 1.3 uses only AEAD ciphers +%% iv_size - not used +%% key_size - not used +%% key_material_length - not used +%% expanded_key_material_length - used in SSL 3.0 +%% mac_algorithm - not used +%% prf_algorithm - not used +%% hash_size - not used +%% compression_algorithm - not used +%% master_secret - used for multiple secret types in TLS 1.3 +%% client_random - not used +%% server_random - not used +%% exportable - not used +%% +%% cipher_state :: record() +%% nonce - used for sequence_number + -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_connection). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_hash_dir.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_hash_dir.erl index bb62737232..9478ff9b78 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_hash_dir.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_hash_dir.erl @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ -module(ssl_crl_hash_dir). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). -behaviour(ssl_crl_cache_api). @@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ select(Issuer, {_DbHandle, [{dir, Dir}]}) -> %% is happy with that, but if it's true, this is an error. []; {error, Error} -> - error_logger:error_report( + ?LOG_ERROR( [{cannot_find_crl, Error}, {dir, Dir}, {module, ?MODULE}, @@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ find_crls(Issuer, Hash, Dir, N, Acc) -> error:Error -> %% Something is wrong with the file. Report %% it, and try the next one. - error_logger:error_report( + ?LOG_ERROR( [{crl_parse_error, Error}, {filename, Filename}, {module, ?MODULE}, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dh_groups.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dh_groups.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..20d53de430 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dh_groups.erl @@ -0,0 +1,467 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +-module(ssl_dh_groups). + +-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). + +-export([modp2048_generator/0, modp2048_prime/0, + ffdhe2048_generator/0, ffdhe2048_prime/0, + ffdhe3072_generator/0, ffdhe3072_prime/0, + ffdhe4096_generator/0, ffdhe4096_prime/0, + ffdhe6144_generator/0, ffdhe6144_prime/0, + ffdhe8192_generator/0, ffdhe8192_prime/0, + dh_params/1]). + +%% RFC3526 - 2048-bit MODP Group +%% This group is assigned id 14. +%% +%% This prime is: 2^2048 - 2^1984 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1918 pi] + 124476 } +%% +%% Its hexadecimal value is: +%% +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 +%% 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD +%% EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 +%% E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED +%% EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D +%% C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F +%% 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D +%% 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B +%% E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 +%% DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 +%% 15728E5A 8AACAA68 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF +%% +%% The generator is: 2. +modp2048_generator() -> + 2. + +modp2048_prime() -> + P = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" + "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" + "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" + "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" + "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D" + "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F" + "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D" + "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B" + "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9" + "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510" + "15728E5A" "8AACAA68" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF", + list_to_integer(P, 16). + + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%%% RFC8446 - TLS 1.3 +%%% RFC7919 - Negotiated FFDHE for TLS +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + +%% ffdhe2048 +%% --------- +%% The 2048-bit group has registry value 256 and is calculated from the +%% following formula: +%% +%% The modulus is: +%% +%% p = 2^2048 - 2^1984 + {[2^1918 * e] + 560316 } * 2^64 - 1 +%% +%% The hexadecimal representation of p is: +%% +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF ADF85458 A2BB4A9A AFDC5620 273D3CF1 +%% D8B9C583 CE2D3695 A9E13641 146433FB CC939DCE 249B3EF9 +%% 7D2FE363 630C75D8 F681B202 AEC4617A D3DF1ED5 D5FD6561 +%% 2433F51F 5F066ED0 85636555 3DED1AF3 B557135E 7F57C935 +%% 984F0C70 E0E68B77 E2A689DA F3EFE872 1DF158A1 36ADE735 +%% 30ACCA4F 483A797A BC0AB182 B324FB61 D108A94B B2C8E3FB +%% B96ADAB7 60D7F468 1D4F42A3 DE394DF4 AE56EDE7 6372BB19 +%% 0B07A7C8 EE0A6D70 9E02FCE1 CDF7E2EC C03404CD 28342F61 +%% 9172FE9C E98583FF 8E4F1232 EEF28183 C3FE3B1B 4C6FAD73 +%% 3BB5FCBC 2EC22005 C58EF183 7D1683B2 C6F34A26 C1B2EFFA +%% 886B4238 61285C97 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF +%% +%% The generator is: g = 2 +%% +%% The group size is: q = (p-1)/2 +%% +%% The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 103 +%% bits. +ffdhe2048_generator() -> + 2. + +ffdhe2048_prime() -> + P = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "ADF85458" "A2BB4A9A" "AFDC5620" "273D3CF1" + "D8B9C583" "CE2D3695" "A9E13641" "146433FB" "CC939DCE" "249B3EF9" + "7D2FE363" "630C75D8" "F681B202" "AEC4617A" "D3DF1ED5" "D5FD6561" + "2433F51F" "5F066ED0" "85636555" "3DED1AF3" "B557135E" "7F57C935" + "984F0C70" "E0E68B77" "E2A689DA" "F3EFE872" "1DF158A1" "36ADE735" + "30ACCA4F" "483A797A" "BC0AB182" "B324FB61" "D108A94B" "B2C8E3FB" + "B96ADAB7" "60D7F468" "1D4F42A3" "DE394DF4" "AE56EDE7" "6372BB19" + "0B07A7C8" "EE0A6D70" "9E02FCE1" "CDF7E2EC" "C03404CD" "28342F61" + "9172FE9C" "E98583FF" "8E4F1232" "EEF28183" "C3FE3B1B" "4C6FAD73" + "3BB5FCBC" "2EC22005" "C58EF183" "7D1683B2" "C6F34A26" "C1B2EFFA" + "886B4238" "61285C97" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF", + list_to_integer(P, 16). + + +%% ffdhe3072 +%% --------- +%% The 3072-bit prime has registry value 257 and is calculated from the +%% following formula: +%% +%% The modulus is: +%% +%% p = 2^3072 - 2^3008 + {[2^2942 * e] + 2625351} * 2^64 - 1 +%% +%% The hexadecimal representation of p is: +%% +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF ADF85458 A2BB4A9A AFDC5620 273D3CF1 +%% D8B9C583 CE2D3695 A9E13641 146433FB CC939DCE 249B3EF9 +%% 7D2FE363 630C75D8 F681B202 AEC4617A D3DF1ED5 D5FD6561 +%% 2433F51F 5F066ED0 85636555 3DED1AF3 B557135E 7F57C935 +%% 984F0C70 E0E68B77 E2A689DA F3EFE872 1DF158A1 36ADE735 +%% 30ACCA4F 483A797A BC0AB182 B324FB61 D108A94B B2C8E3FB +%% B96ADAB7 60D7F468 1D4F42A3 DE394DF4 AE56EDE7 6372BB19 +%% 0B07A7C8 EE0A6D70 9E02FCE1 CDF7E2EC C03404CD 28342F61 +%% 9172FE9C E98583FF 8E4F1232 EEF28183 C3FE3B1B 4C6FAD73 +%% 3BB5FCBC 2EC22005 C58EF183 7D1683B2 C6F34A26 C1B2EFFA +%% 886B4238 611FCFDC DE355B3B 6519035B BC34F4DE F99C0238 +%% 61B46FC9 D6E6C907 7AD91D26 91F7F7EE 598CB0FA C186D91C +%% AEFE1309 85139270 B4130C93 BC437944 F4FD4452 E2D74DD3 +%% 64F2E21E 71F54BFF 5CAE82AB 9C9DF69E E86D2BC5 22363A0D +%% ABC52197 9B0DEADA 1DBF9A42 D5C4484E 0ABCD06B FA53DDEF +%% 3C1B20EE 3FD59D7C 25E41D2B 66C62E37 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF +%% +%% The generator is: g = 2 +%% +%% The group size is: q = (p-1)/2 +%% +%% The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 125 +%% bits. +ffdhe3072_generator() -> + 2. + +ffdhe3072_prime() -> + P = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "ADF85458" "A2BB4A9A" "AFDC5620" "273D3CF1" + "D8B9C583" "CE2D3695" "A9E13641" "146433FB" "CC939DCE" "249B3EF9" + "7D2FE363" "630C75D8" "F681B202" "AEC4617A" "D3DF1ED5" "D5FD6561" + "2433F51F" "5F066ED0" "85636555" "3DED1AF3" "B557135E" "7F57C935" + "984F0C70" "E0E68B77" "E2A689DA" "F3EFE872" "1DF158A1" "36ADE735" + "30ACCA4F" "483A797A" "BC0AB182" "B324FB61" "D108A94B" "B2C8E3FB" + "B96ADAB7" "60D7F468" "1D4F42A3" "DE394DF4" "AE56EDE7" "6372BB19" + "0B07A7C8" "EE0A6D70" "9E02FCE1" "CDF7E2EC" "C03404CD" "28342F61" + "9172FE9C" "E98583FF" "8E4F1232" "EEF28183" "C3FE3B1B" "4C6FAD73" + "3BB5FCBC" "2EC22005" "C58EF183" "7D1683B2" "C6F34A26" "C1B2EFFA" + "886B4238" "611FCFDC" "DE355B3B" "6519035B" "BC34F4DE" "F99C0238" + "61B46FC9" "D6E6C907" "7AD91D26" "91F7F7EE" "598CB0FA" "C186D91C" + "AEFE1309" "85139270" "B4130C93" "BC437944" "F4FD4452" "E2D74DD3" + "64F2E21E" "71F54BFF" "5CAE82AB" "9C9DF69E" "E86D2BC5" "22363A0D" + "ABC52197" "9B0DEADA" "1DBF9A42" "D5C4484E" "0ABCD06B" "FA53DDEF" + "3C1B20EE" "3FD59D7C" "25E41D2B" "66C62E37" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF", + list_to_integer(P, 16). + + +%% ffdhe4096 +%% --------- +%% The 4096-bit group has registry value 258 and is calculated from the +%% following formula: +%% +%% The modulus is: +%% +%% p = 2^4096 - 2^4032 + {[2^3966 * e] + 5736041} * 2^64 - 1 +%% +%% The hexadecimal representation of p is: +%% +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF ADF85458 A2BB4A9A AFDC5620 273D3CF1 +%% D8B9C583 CE2D3695 A9E13641 146433FB CC939DCE 249B3EF9 +%% 7D2FE363 630C75D8 F681B202 AEC4617A D3DF1ED5 D5FD6561 +%% 2433F51F 5F066ED0 85636555 3DED1AF3 B557135E 7F57C935 +%% 984F0C70 E0E68B77 E2A689DA F3EFE872 1DF158A1 36ADE735 +%% 30ACCA4F 483A797A BC0AB182 B324FB61 D108A94B B2C8E3FB +%% B96ADAB7 60D7F468 1D4F42A3 DE394DF4 AE56EDE7 6372BB19 +%% 0B07A7C8 EE0A6D70 9E02FCE1 CDF7E2EC C03404CD 28342F61 +%% 9172FE9C E98583FF 8E4F1232 EEF28183 C3FE3B1B 4C6FAD73 +%% 3BB5FCBC 2EC22005 C58EF183 7D1683B2 C6F34A26 C1B2EFFA +%% 886B4238 611FCFDC DE355B3B 6519035B BC34F4DE F99C0238 +%% 61B46FC9 D6E6C907 7AD91D26 91F7F7EE 598CB0FA C186D91C +%% AEFE1309 85139270 B4130C93 BC437944 F4FD4452 E2D74DD3 +%% 64F2E21E 71F54BFF 5CAE82AB 9C9DF69E E86D2BC5 22363A0D +%% ABC52197 9B0DEADA 1DBF9A42 D5C4484E 0ABCD06B FA53DDEF +%% 3C1B20EE 3FD59D7C 25E41D2B 669E1EF1 6E6F52C3 164DF4FB +%% 7930E9E4 E58857B6 AC7D5F42 D69F6D18 7763CF1D 55034004 +%% 87F55BA5 7E31CC7A 7135C886 EFB4318A ED6A1E01 2D9E6832 +%% A907600A 918130C4 6DC778F9 71AD0038 092999A3 33CB8B7A +%% 1A1DB93D 7140003C 2A4ECEA9 F98D0ACC 0A8291CD CEC97DCF +%% 8EC9B55A 7F88A46B 4DB5A851 F44182E1 C68A007E 5E655F6A +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF +%% +%% The generator is: g = 2 +%% +%% The group size is: q = (p-1)/2 +%% +%% The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 150 +%% bits. +ffdhe4096_generator() -> + 2. + +ffdhe4096_prime() -> + P = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "ADF85458" "A2BB4A9A" "AFDC5620" "273D3CF1" + "D8B9C583" "CE2D3695" "A9E13641" "146433FB" "CC939DCE" "249B3EF9" + "7D2FE363" "630C75D8" "F681B202" "AEC4617A" "D3DF1ED5" "D5FD6561" + "2433F51F" "5F066ED0" "85636555" "3DED1AF3" "B557135E" "7F57C935" + "984F0C70" "E0E68B77" "E2A689DA" "F3EFE872" "1DF158A1" "36ADE735" + "30ACCA4F" "483A797A" "BC0AB182" "B324FB61" "D108A94B" "B2C8E3FB" + "B96ADAB7" "60D7F468" "1D4F42A3" "DE394DF4" "AE56EDE7" "6372BB19" + "0B07A7C8" "EE0A6D70" "9E02FCE1" "CDF7E2EC" "C03404CD" "28342F61" + "9172FE9C" "E98583FF" "8E4F1232" "EEF28183" "C3FE3B1B" "4C6FAD73" + "3BB5FCBC" "2EC22005" "C58EF183" "7D1683B2" "C6F34A26" "C1B2EFFA" + "886B4238" "611FCFDC" "DE355B3B" "6519035B" "BC34F4DE" "F99C0238" + "61B46FC9" "D6E6C907" "7AD91D26" "91F7F7EE" "598CB0FA" "C186D91C" + "AEFE1309" "85139270" "B4130C93" "BC437944" "F4FD4452" "E2D74DD3" + "64F2E21E" "71F54BFF" "5CAE82AB" "9C9DF69E" "E86D2BC5" "22363A0D" + "ABC52197" "9B0DEADA" "1DBF9A42" "D5C4484E" "0ABCD06B" "FA53DDEF" + "3C1B20EE" "3FD59D7C" "25E41D2B" "669E1EF1" "6E6F52C3" "164DF4FB" + "7930E9E4" "E58857B6" "AC7D5F42" "D69F6D18" "7763CF1D" "55034004" + "87F55BA5" "7E31CC7A" "7135C886" "EFB4318A" "ED6A1E01" "2D9E6832" + "A907600A" "918130C4" "6DC778F9" "71AD0038" "092999A3" "33CB8B7A" + "1A1DB93D" "7140003C" "2A4ECEA9" "F98D0ACC" "0A8291CD" "CEC97DCF" + "8EC9B55A" "7F88A46B" "4DB5A851" "F44182E1" "C68A007E" "5E655F6A" + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF", + list_to_integer(P, 16). + + +%% ffdhe6144 +%% --------- +%% The 6144-bit group has registry value 259 and is calculated from the +%% following formula: +%% +%% The modulus is: +%% +%% p = 2^6144 - 2^6080 + {[2^6014 * e] + 15705020} * 2^64 - 1 +%% +%% The hexadecimal representation of p is: +%% +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF ADF85458 A2BB4A9A AFDC5620 273D3CF1 +%% D8B9C583 CE2D3695 A9E13641 146433FB CC939DCE 249B3EF9 +%% 7D2FE363 630C75D8 F681B202 AEC4617A D3DF1ED5 D5FD6561 +%% 2433F51F 5F066ED0 85636555 3DED1AF3 B557135E 7F57C935 +%% 984F0C70 E0E68B77 E2A689DA F3EFE872 1DF158A1 36ADE735 +%% 30ACCA4F 483A797A BC0AB182 B324FB61 D108A94B B2C8E3FB +%% B96ADAB7 60D7F468 1D4F42A3 DE394DF4 AE56EDE7 6372BB19 +%% 0B07A7C8 EE0A6D70 9E02FCE1 CDF7E2EC C03404CD 28342F61 +%% 9172FE9C E98583FF 8E4F1232 EEF28183 C3FE3B1B 4C6FAD73 +%% 3BB5FCBC 2EC22005 C58EF183 7D1683B2 C6F34A26 C1B2EFFA +%% 886B4238 611FCFDC DE355B3B 6519035B BC34F4DE F99C0238 +%% 61B46FC9 D6E6C907 7AD91D26 91F7F7EE 598CB0FA C186D91C +%% AEFE1309 85139270 B4130C93 BC437944 F4FD4452 E2D74DD3 +%% 64F2E21E 71F54BFF 5CAE82AB 9C9DF69E E86D2BC5 22363A0D +%% ABC52197 9B0DEADA 1DBF9A42 D5C4484E 0ABCD06B FA53DDEF +%% 3C1B20EE 3FD59D7C 25E41D2B 669E1EF1 6E6F52C3 164DF4FB +%% 7930E9E4 E58857B6 AC7D5F42 D69F6D18 7763CF1D 55034004 +%% 87F55BA5 7E31CC7A 7135C886 EFB4318A ED6A1E01 2D9E6832 +%% A907600A 918130C4 6DC778F9 71AD0038 092999A3 33CB8B7A +%% 1A1DB93D 7140003C 2A4ECEA9 F98D0ACC 0A8291CD CEC97DCF +%% 8EC9B55A 7F88A46B 4DB5A851 F44182E1 C68A007E 5E0DD902 +%% 0BFD64B6 45036C7A 4E677D2C 38532A3A 23BA4442 CAF53EA6 +%% 3BB45432 9B7624C8 917BDD64 B1C0FD4C B38E8C33 4C701C3A +%% CDAD0657 FCCFEC71 9B1F5C3E 4E46041F 388147FB 4CFDB477 +%% A52471F7 A9A96910 B855322E DB6340D8 A00EF092 350511E3 +%% 0ABEC1FF F9E3A26E 7FB29F8C 183023C3 587E38DA 0077D9B4 +%% 763E4E4B 94B2BBC1 94C6651E 77CAF992 EEAAC023 2A281BF6 +%% B3A739C1 22611682 0AE8DB58 47A67CBE F9C9091B 462D538C +%% D72B0374 6AE77F5E 62292C31 1562A846 505DC82D B854338A +%% E49F5235 C95B9117 8CCF2DD5 CACEF403 EC9D1810 C6272B04 +%% 5B3B71F9 DC6B80D6 3FDD4A8E 9ADB1E69 62A69526 D43161C1 +%% A41D570D 7938DAD4 A40E329C D0E40E65 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF +%% +%% The generator is: g = 2 +%% +%% The group size is: q = (p-1)/2 +%% +%% The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 175 +%% bits. +ffdhe6144_generator() -> + 2. + +ffdhe6144_prime() -> + P = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "ADF85458" "A2BB4A9A" "AFDC5620" "273D3CF1" + "D8B9C583" "CE2D3695" "A9E13641" "146433FB" "CC939DCE" "249B3EF9" + "7D2FE363" "630C75D8" "F681B202" "AEC4617A" "D3DF1ED5" "D5FD6561" + "2433F51F" "5F066ED0" "85636555" "3DED1AF3" "B557135E" "7F57C935" + "984F0C70" "E0E68B77" "E2A689DA" "F3EFE872" "1DF158A1" "36ADE735" + "30ACCA4F" "483A797A" "BC0AB182" "B324FB61" "D108A94B" "B2C8E3FB" + "B96ADAB7" "60D7F468" "1D4F42A3" "DE394DF4" "AE56EDE7" "6372BB19" + "0B07A7C8" "EE0A6D70" "9E02FCE1" "CDF7E2EC" "C03404CD" "28342F61" + "9172FE9C" "E98583FF" "8E4F1232" "EEF28183" "C3FE3B1B" "4C6FAD73" + "3BB5FCBC" "2EC22005" "C58EF183" "7D1683B2" "C6F34A26" "C1B2EFFA" + "886B4238" "611FCFDC" "DE355B3B" "6519035B" "BC34F4DE" "F99C0238" + "61B46FC9" "D6E6C907" "7AD91D26" "91F7F7EE" "598CB0FA" "C186D91C" + "AEFE1309" "85139270" "B4130C93" "BC437944" "F4FD4452" "E2D74DD3" + "64F2E21E" "71F54BFF" "5CAE82AB" "9C9DF69E" "E86D2BC5" "22363A0D" + "ABC52197" "9B0DEADA" "1DBF9A42" "D5C4484E" "0ABCD06B" "FA53DDEF" + "3C1B20EE" "3FD59D7C" "25E41D2B" "669E1EF1" "6E6F52C3" "164DF4FB" + "7930E9E4" "E58857B6" "AC7D5F42" "D69F6D18" "7763CF1D" "55034004" + "87F55BA5" "7E31CC7A" "7135C886" "EFB4318A" "ED6A1E01" "2D9E6832" + "A907600A" "918130C4" "6DC778F9" "71AD0038" "092999A3" "33CB8B7A" + "1A1DB93D" "7140003C" "2A4ECEA9" "F98D0ACC" "0A8291CD" "CEC97DCF" + "8EC9B55A" "7F88A46B" "4DB5A851" "F44182E1" "C68A007E" "5E0DD902" + "0BFD64B6" "45036C7A" "4E677D2C" "38532A3A" "23BA4442" "CAF53EA6" + "3BB45432" "9B7624C8" "917BDD64" "B1C0FD4C" "B38E8C33" "4C701C3A" + "CDAD0657" "FCCFEC71" "9B1F5C3E" "4E46041F" "388147FB" "4CFDB477" + "A52471F7" "A9A96910" "B855322E" "DB6340D8" "A00EF092" "350511E3" + "0ABEC1FF" "F9E3A26E" "7FB29F8C" "183023C3" "587E38DA" "0077D9B4" + "763E4E4B" "94B2BBC1" "94C6651E" "77CAF992" "EEAAC023" "2A281BF6" + "B3A739C1" "22611682" "0AE8DB58" "47A67CBE" "F9C9091B" "462D538C" + "D72B0374" "6AE77F5E" "62292C31" "1562A846" "505DC82D" "B854338A" + "E49F5235" "C95B9117" "8CCF2DD5" "CACEF403" "EC9D1810" "C6272B04" + "5B3B71F9" "DC6B80D6" "3FDD4A8E" "9ADB1E69" "62A69526" "D43161C1" + "A41D570D" "7938DAD4" "A40E329C" "D0E40E65" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF", + list_to_integer(P, 16). + + +%% ffdhe8192 +%% --------- +%% The 8192-bit group has registry value 260 and is calculated from the +%% following formula: +%% +%% The modulus is: +%% +%% p = 2^8192 - 2^8128 + {[2^8062 * e] + 10965728} * 2^64 - 1 +%% +%% The hexadecimal representation of p is: +%% +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF ADF85458 A2BB4A9A AFDC5620 273D3CF1 +%% D8B9C583 CE2D3695 A9E13641 146433FB CC939DCE 249B3EF9 +%% 7D2FE363 630C75D8 F681B202 AEC4617A D3DF1ED5 D5FD6561 +%% 2433F51F 5F066ED0 85636555 3DED1AF3 B557135E 7F57C935 +%% 984F0C70 E0E68B77 E2A689DA F3EFE872 1DF158A1 36ADE735 +%% 30ACCA4F 483A797A BC0AB182 B324FB61 D108A94B B2C8E3FB +%% B96ADAB7 60D7F468 1D4F42A3 DE394DF4 AE56EDE7 6372BB19 +%% 0B07A7C8 EE0A6D70 9E02FCE1 CDF7E2EC C03404CD 28342F61 +%% 9172FE9C E98583FF 8E4F1232 EEF28183 C3FE3B1B 4C6FAD73 +%% 3BB5FCBC 2EC22005 C58EF183 7D1683B2 C6F34A26 C1B2EFFA +%% 886B4238 611FCFDC DE355B3B 6519035B BC34F4DE F99C0238 +%% 61B46FC9 D6E6C907 7AD91D26 91F7F7EE 598CB0FA C186D91C +%% AEFE1309 85139270 B4130C93 BC437944 F4FD4452 E2D74DD3 +%% 64F2E21E 71F54BFF 5CAE82AB 9C9DF69E E86D2BC5 22363A0D +%% ABC52197 9B0DEADA 1DBF9A42 D5C4484E 0ABCD06B FA53DDEF +%% 3C1B20EE 3FD59D7C 25E41D2B 669E1EF1 6E6F52C3 164DF4FB +%% 7930E9E4 E58857B6 AC7D5F42 D69F6D18 7763CF1D 55034004 +%% 87F55BA5 7E31CC7A 7135C886 EFB4318A ED6A1E01 2D9E6832 +%% A907600A 918130C4 6DC778F9 71AD0038 092999A3 33CB8B7A +%% 1A1DB93D 7140003C 2A4ECEA9 F98D0ACC 0A8291CD CEC97DCF +%% 8EC9B55A 7F88A46B 4DB5A851 F44182E1 C68A007E 5E0DD902 +%% 0BFD64B6 45036C7A 4E677D2C 38532A3A 23BA4442 CAF53EA6 +%% 3BB45432 9B7624C8 917BDD64 B1C0FD4C B38E8C33 4C701C3A +%% CDAD0657 FCCFEC71 9B1F5C3E 4E46041F 388147FB 4CFDB477 +%% A52471F7 A9A96910 B855322E DB6340D8 A00EF092 350511E3 +%% 0ABEC1FF F9E3A26E 7FB29F8C 183023C3 587E38DA 0077D9B4 +%% 763E4E4B 94B2BBC1 94C6651E 77CAF992 EEAAC023 2A281BF6 +%% B3A739C1 22611682 0AE8DB58 47A67CBE F9C9091B 462D538C +%% D72B0374 6AE77F5E 62292C31 1562A846 505DC82D B854338A +%% E49F5235 C95B9117 8CCF2DD5 CACEF403 EC9D1810 C6272B04 +%% 5B3B71F9 DC6B80D6 3FDD4A8E 9ADB1E69 62A69526 D43161C1 +%% A41D570D 7938DAD4 A40E329C CFF46AAA 36AD004C F600C838 +%% 1E425A31 D951AE64 FDB23FCE C9509D43 687FEB69 EDD1CC5E +%% 0B8CC3BD F64B10EF 86B63142 A3AB8829 555B2F74 7C932665 +%% CB2C0F1C C01BD702 29388839 D2AF05E4 54504AC7 8B758282 +%% 2846C0BA 35C35F5C 59160CC0 46FD8251 541FC68C 9C86B022 +%% BB709987 6A460E74 51A8A931 09703FEE 1C217E6C 3826E52C +%% 51AA691E 0E423CFC 99E9E316 50C1217B 624816CD AD9A95F9 +%% D5B80194 88D9C0A0 A1FE3075 A577E231 83F81D4A 3F2FA457 +%% 1EFC8CE0 BA8A4FE8 B6855DFE 72B0A66E DED2FBAB FBE58A30 +%% FAFABE1C 5D71A87E 2F741EF8 C1FE86FE A6BBFDE5 30677F0D +%% 97D11D49 F7A8443D 0822E506 A9F4614E 011E2A94 838FF88C +%% D68C8BB7 C5C6424C FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF +%% +%% The generator is: g = 2 +%% +%% The group size is: q = (p-1)/2 +%% +%% The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 192 +%% bits. +ffdhe8192_generator() -> + 2. + +ffdhe8192_prime() -> + P = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "ADF85458" "A2BB4A9A" "AFDC5620" "273D3CF1" + "D8B9C583" "CE2D3695" "A9E13641" "146433FB" "CC939DCE" "249B3EF9" + "7D2FE363" "630C75D8" "F681B202" "AEC4617A" "D3DF1ED5" "D5FD6561" + "2433F51F" "5F066ED0" "85636555" "3DED1AF3" "B557135E" "7F57C935" + "984F0C70" "E0E68B77" "E2A689DA" "F3EFE872" "1DF158A1" "36ADE735" + "30ACCA4F" "483A797A" "BC0AB182" "B324FB61" "D108A94B" "B2C8E3FB" + "B96ADAB7" "60D7F468" "1D4F42A3" "DE394DF4" "AE56EDE7" "6372BB19" + "0B07A7C8" "EE0A6D70" "9E02FCE1" "CDF7E2EC" "C03404CD" "28342F61" + "9172FE9C" "E98583FF" "8E4F1232" "EEF28183" "C3FE3B1B" "4C6FAD73" + "3BB5FCBC" "2EC22005" "C58EF183" "7D1683B2" "C6F34A26" "C1B2EFFA" + "886B4238" "611FCFDC" "DE355B3B" "6519035B" "BC34F4DE" "F99C0238" + "61B46FC9" "D6E6C907" "7AD91D26" "91F7F7EE" "598CB0FA" "C186D91C" + "AEFE1309" "85139270" "B4130C93" "BC437944" "F4FD4452" "E2D74DD3" + "64F2E21E" "71F54BFF" "5CAE82AB" "9C9DF69E" "E86D2BC5" "22363A0D" + "ABC52197" "9B0DEADA" "1DBF9A42" "D5C4484E" "0ABCD06B" "FA53DDEF" + "3C1B20EE" "3FD59D7C" "25E41D2B" "669E1EF1" "6E6F52C3" "164DF4FB" + "7930E9E4" "E58857B6" "AC7D5F42" "D69F6D18" "7763CF1D" "55034004" + "87F55BA5" "7E31CC7A" "7135C886" "EFB4318A" "ED6A1E01" "2D9E6832" + "A907600A" "918130C4" "6DC778F9" "71AD0038" "092999A3" "33CB8B7A" + "1A1DB93D" "7140003C" "2A4ECEA9" "F98D0ACC" "0A8291CD" "CEC97DCF" + "8EC9B55A" "7F88A46B" "4DB5A851" "F44182E1" "C68A007E" "5E0DD902" + "0BFD64B6" "45036C7A" "4E677D2C" "38532A3A" "23BA4442" "CAF53EA6" + "3BB45432" "9B7624C8" "917BDD64" "B1C0FD4C" "B38E8C33" "4C701C3A" + "CDAD0657" "FCCFEC71" "9B1F5C3E" "4E46041F" "388147FB" "4CFDB477" + "A52471F7" "A9A96910" "B855322E" "DB6340D8" "A00EF092" "350511E3" + "0ABEC1FF" "F9E3A26E" "7FB29F8C" "183023C3" "587E38DA" "0077D9B4" + "763E4E4B" "94B2BBC1" "94C6651E" "77CAF992" "EEAAC023" "2A281BF6" + "B3A739C1" "22611682" "0AE8DB58" "47A67CBE" "F9C9091B" "462D538C" + "D72B0374" "6AE77F5E" "62292C31" "1562A846" "505DC82D" "B854338A" + "E49F5235" "C95B9117" "8CCF2DD5" "CACEF403" "EC9D1810" "C6272B04" + "5B3B71F9" "DC6B80D6" "3FDD4A8E" "9ADB1E69" "62A69526" "D43161C1" + "A41D570D" "7938DAD4" "A40E329C" "CFF46AAA" "36AD004C" "F600C838" + "1E425A31" "D951AE64" "FDB23FCE" "C9509D43" "687FEB69" "EDD1CC5E" + "0B8CC3BD" "F64B10EF" "86B63142" "A3AB8829" "555B2F74" "7C932665" + "CB2C0F1C" "C01BD702" "29388839" "D2AF05E4" "54504AC7" "8B758282" + "2846C0BA" "35C35F5C" "59160CC0" "46FD8251" "541FC68C" "9C86B022" + "BB709987" "6A460E74" "51A8A931" "09703FEE" "1C217E6C" "3826E52C" + "51AA691E" "0E423CFC" "99E9E316" "50C1217B" "624816CD" "AD9A95F9" + "D5B80194" "88D9C0A0" "A1FE3075" "A577E231" "83F81D4A" "3F2FA457" + "1EFC8CE0" "BA8A4FE8" "B6855DFE" "72B0A66E" "DED2FBAB" "FBE58A30" + "FAFABE1C" "5D71A87E" "2F741EF8" "C1FE86FE" "A6BBFDE5" "30677F0D" + "97D11D49" "F7A8443D" "0822E506" "A9F4614E" "011E2A94" "838FF88C" + "D68C8BB7" "C5C6424C" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF", + list_to_integer(P, 16). + +dh_params(ffdhe2048) -> + #'DHParameter'{ + prime = ffdhe2048_prime(), + base = ffdhe2048_generator()}; +dh_params(ffdhe3072) -> + #'DHParameter'{ + prime = ffdhe3072_prime(), + base = ffdhe3072_generator()}; +dh_params(ffdhe4096) -> + #'DHParameter'{ + prime = ffdhe4096_prime(), + base = ffdhe4096_generator()}; +dh_params(ffdhe6144) -> + #'DHParameter'{ + prime = ffdhe6144_prime(), + base = ffdhe6144_generator()}; +dh_params(ffdhe8192) -> + #'DHParameter'{ + prime = ffdhe8192_prime(), + base = ffdhe8192_generator()}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index 29db1b07c4..bd2efa9fbb 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_srp.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). -export_type([ssl_handshake/0, ssl_handshake_history/0, @@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ -type oid() :: tuple(). -type public_key_params() :: #'Dss-Parms'{} | {namedCurve, oid()} | #'ECParameters'{} | term(). -type public_key_info() :: {oid(), #'RSAPublicKey'{} | integer() | #'ECPoint'{}, public_key_params()}. --type ssl_handshake_history() :: {[binary()], [binary()]}. +-type ssl_handshake_history() :: {iodata(), iodata()}. -type ssl_handshake() :: #server_hello{} | #server_hello_done{} | #certificate{} | #certificate_request{} | #client_key_exchange{} | #finished{} | #certificate_verify{} | @@ -53,14 +54,14 @@ -export([certify/7, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5, master_secret/4, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6, init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/2, verify_server_key/5, - select_version/3, extension_value/1 + select_version/3, select_supported_version/2, extension_value/1 ]). %% Encode --export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/1, +-export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/2, encode_extensions/1, encode_extensions/2, encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1]). %% Decode --export([decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1, +-export([decode_handshake/3, decode_vector/1, decode_hello_extensions/4, decode_extensions/3, decode_server_key/3, decode_client_key/3, decode_suites/2 ]). @@ -71,13 +72,19 @@ premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]). %% Extensions handling --export([client_hello_extensions/5, +-export([client_hello_extensions/6, handle_client_hello_extensions/9, %% Returns server hello extensions handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3, select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5, - select_hashsign_algs/3 + select_hashsign_algs/3, empty_extensions/2, add_server_share/3, + add_alpn/2, add_selected_version/1, decode_alpn/1 ]). +-export([get_cert_params/1, + server_name/3, + validation_fun_and_state/9, + handle_path_validation_error/7]). + %%==================================================================== %% Create handshake messages %%==================================================================== @@ -92,8 +99,8 @@ hello_request() -> #hello_request{}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec server_hello(binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states(), - Extension::map()) -> #server_hello{}. +%%-spec server_hello(binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states(), +%% Extension::map()) -> #server_hello{}. %% %% Description: Creates a server hello message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -176,7 +183,7 @@ client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version, %% Description: Creates a certificate_request message, called by the server. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certificate_request(CipherSuite, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, HashSigns, Version) -> - Types = certificate_types(ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), Version), + Types = certificate_types(ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(CipherSuite), Version), Authorities = certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), #certificate_request{ certificate_types = Types, @@ -357,7 +364,7 @@ certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) end catch - error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> + error:{badmatch,{error, {asn1, Asn1Reason}}} -> %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason}); error:OtherReason -> @@ -504,6 +511,21 @@ verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams, select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) -> do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions). + +%% Called by TLS 1.2/1.3 Server when "supported_versions" is present +%% in ClientHello. +%% Input lists are ordered (highest first) +select_supported_version([], _ServerVersions) -> + undefined; +select_supported_version([ClientVersion|T], ServerVersions) -> + case lists:member(ClientVersion, ServerVersions) of + true -> + ClientVersion; + false -> + select_supported_version(T, ServerVersions) + end. + + %%==================================================================== %% Encode handshake %%==================================================================== @@ -512,14 +534,14 @@ encode_handshake(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, _Version) PaddingLength = 32 - ((byte_size(SelectedProtocol) + 2) rem 32), {?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE((byte_size(SelectedProtocol))), SelectedProtocol/binary, ?BYTE(PaddingLength), 0:(PaddingLength * 8)>>}; -encode_handshake(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, +encode_handshake(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor} = Version, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Comp_method, - extensions = #hello_extensions{} = Extensions}, _Version) -> + extensions = Extensions}, _Version) -> SID_length = byte_size(Session_ID), - ExtensionsBin = encode_hello_extensions(Extensions), + ExtensionsBin = encode_hello_extensions(Extensions, Version), {?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID/binary, CipherSuite/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method), ExtensionsBin/binary>>}; @@ -567,71 +589,146 @@ encode_handshake(#certificate_verify{signature = BinSig, hashsign_algorithm = Ha encode_handshake(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, _Version) -> {?FINISHED, VerifyData}. -encode_hello_extensions(#hello_extensions{} = Extensions) -> - encode_hello_extensions(hello_extensions_list(Extensions), <<>>). -encode_hello_extensions([], <<>>) -> +encode_hello_extensions(_, {3, 0}) -> <<>>; -encode_hello_extensions([], Acc) -> +encode_hello_extensions(Extensions, _) -> + encode_extensions(hello_extensions_list(Extensions), <<>>). + +encode_extensions(Exts) -> + encode_extensions(Exts, <<>>). + +encode_extensions([], <<>>) -> + <<?UINT16(0)>>; +encode_extensions([], Acc) -> Size = byte_size(Acc), <<?UINT16(Size), Acc/binary>>; - -encode_hello_extensions([#alpn{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) -> - Len = byte_size(ExtensionData), +encode_extensions([#alpn{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) -> + Len = byte_size(ExtensionData), ExtLen = Len + 2, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ALPN_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?UINT16(Len), - ExtensionData/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) -> + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ALPN_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtensionData/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) -> Len = byte_size(ExtensionData), - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} | Rest], Acc) -> - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc); -encode_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0) = Info} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} | Rest], Acc) -> + encode_extensions(Rest, Acc); +encode_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0) = Info} | Rest], Acc) -> Len = byte_size(Info), - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>); + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Info} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Info} | Rest], Acc) -> InfoLen = byte_size(Info), Len = InfoLen +1, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(InfoLen), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(InfoLen), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = EllipticCurves} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = EllipticCurves} | Rest], Acc) -> EllipticCurveList = << <<(tls_v1:oid_to_enum(X)):16>> || X <- EllipticCurves>>, ListLen = byte_size(EllipticCurveList), Len = ListLen + 2, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), EllipticCurveList/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = ECPointFormats} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#supported_groups{supported_groups = SupportedGroups} | Rest], Acc) -> + + SupportedGroupList = << <<(tls_v1:group_to_enum(X)):16>> || X <- SupportedGroups>>, + ListLen = byte_size(SupportedGroupList), + Len = ListLen + 2, + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), + SupportedGroupList/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = ECPointFormats} | Rest], Acc) -> ECPointFormatList = list_to_binary(ECPointFormats), ListLen = byte_size(ECPointFormatList), Len = ListLen + 1, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(ListLen), ECPointFormatList/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#srp{username = UserName} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#srp{username = UserName} | Rest], Acc) -> SRPLen = byte_size(UserName), Len = SRPLen + 1, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), UserName/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos} | Rest], Acc) -> SignAlgoList = << <<(ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash)):8, (ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)):8>> || {Hash, Sign} <- HashSignAlgos >>, ListLen = byte_size(SignAlgoList), Len = ListLen + 2, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), SignAlgoList/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#sni{hostname = Hostname} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#signature_algorithms{ + signature_scheme_list = SignatureSchemes} | Rest], Acc) -> + SignSchemeList = << <<(ssl_cipher:signature_scheme(SignatureScheme)):16 >> || + SignatureScheme <- SignatureSchemes >>, + ListLen = byte_size(SignSchemeList), + Len = ListLen + 2, + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), SignSchemeList/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#signature_algorithms_cert{ + signature_scheme_list = SignatureSchemes} | Rest], Acc) -> + SignSchemeList = << <<(ssl_cipher:signature_scheme(SignatureScheme)):16 >> || + SignatureScheme <- SignatureSchemes >>, + ListLen = byte_size(SignSchemeList), + Len = ListLen + 2, + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), SignSchemeList/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#sni{hostname = Hostname} | Rest], Acc) -> HostLen = length(Hostname), HostnameBin = list_to_binary(Hostname), % Hostname type (1 byte) + Hostname length (2 bytes) + Hostname (HostLen bytes) ServerNameLength = 1 + 2 + HostLen, % ServerNameListSize (2 bytes) + ServerNameLength ExtLength = 2 + ServerNameLength, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLength), - ?UINT16(ServerNameLength), - ?BYTE(?SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME), - ?UINT16(HostLen), HostnameBin/binary, - Acc/binary>>). + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLength), + ?UINT16(ServerNameLength), + ?BYTE(?SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME), + ?UINT16(HostLen), HostnameBin/binary, + Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#client_hello_versions{versions = Versions0} | Rest], Acc) -> + Versions = encode_versions(Versions0), + VerLen = byte_size(Versions), + Len = VerLen + 1, + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(VerLen), Versions/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = Version0} | Rest], Acc) -> + Version = encode_versions([Version0]), + Len = byte_size(Version), %% 2 + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), Version/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#key_share_client_hello{client_shares = ClientShares0} | Rest], Acc) -> + ClientShares = encode_client_shares(ClientShares0), + ClientSharesLen = byte_size(ClientShares), + Len = ClientSharesLen + 2, + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ClientSharesLen), + ClientShares/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#key_share_server_hello{server_share = ServerShare0} | Rest], Acc) -> + ServerShare = encode_key_share_entry(ServerShare0), + Len = byte_size(ServerShare), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), ServerShare/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#key_share_hello_retry_request{selected_group = Group0} | Rest], Acc) -> + Group = tls_v1:group_to_enum(Group0), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), + ?UINT16(2), ?UINT16(Group), Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#psk_key_exchange_modes{ke_modes = KEModes0} | Rest], Acc) -> + KEModes = encode_psk_key_exchange_modes(KEModes0), + KEModesLen = byte_size(KEModes), + ExtLen = KEModesLen + 1, + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES_EXT), + ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?BYTE(KEModesLen), KEModes/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#pre_shared_key_client_hello{ + offered_psks = #offered_psks{ + identities = Identities0, + binders = Binders0} = PSKs} | Rest], Acc) -> + Identities = encode_psk_identities(Identities0), + Binders = encode_psk_binders(Binders0), + Len = byte_size(Identities) + byte_size(Binders), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?PRE_SHARED_KEY_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), Identities/binary, Binders/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#pre_shared_key_server_hello{selected_identity = Identity} | Rest], Acc) -> + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?PRE_SHARED_KEY_EXT), + ?UINT16(2), ?UINT16(Identity), Acc/binary>>). + encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) -> undefined; @@ -657,7 +754,7 @@ decode_handshake(_, ?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE(SelectedProtocolLength), ?BYTE(PaddingLength), _Padding:PaddingLength/binary>>) -> #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}; -decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, +decode_handshake(Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method)>>) -> #server_hello{ @@ -666,14 +763,13 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:3 session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, compression_method = Comp_method, - extensions = #hello_extensions{}}; + extensions = empty_extensions(Version, server_hello)}; -decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, +decode_handshake(Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method), ?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>) -> - - HelloExtensions = decode_hello_extensions(Extensions), + HelloExtensions = decode_hello_extensions(Extensions, Version, {Major, Minor}, server_hello), #server_hello{ server_version = {Major,Minor}, @@ -716,17 +812,49 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?FINISHED, VerifyData) -> decode_handshake(_, Message, _) -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_handshake, Message})). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_vector(binary()) -> binary(). +%% +%% Description: Remove length tag from TLS Vector type. Needed +%% for client hello when extensions in older versions may be empty. +%% +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_vector(<<>>) -> + <<>>; +decode_vector(<<?UINT16(Len), Vector:Len/binary>>) -> + Vector. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_hello_extensions(binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), + ssl_record:ssl_version(), atom()) -> map(). +%% +%% Description: Decodes TLS hello extensions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_hello_extensions({client, binary()} | binary()) -> #hello_extensions{}. +decode_hello_extensions(Extensions, LocalVersion, LegacyVersion, MessageType0) -> + %% Convert legacy atoms + MessageType = + case MessageType0 of + client -> client_hello; + server -> server_hello; + T -> T + end, + %% RFC 8446 - 4.2.1 + %% Servers MUST be prepared to receive ClientHellos that include this extension but + %% do not include 0x0304 in the list of versions. + %% Clients MUST check for this extension prior to processing the rest of the + %% ServerHello (although they will have to parse the ServerHello in order to read + %% the extension). + Version = process_supported_versions_extension(Extensions, LocalVersion, LegacyVersion), + decode_extensions(Extensions, Version, MessageType, empty_extensions(Version, MessageType)). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_extensions(binary(),tuple(), atom()) -> map(). %% %% Description: Decodes TLS hello extensions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_hello_extensions({client, <<>>}) -> - #hello_extensions{}; -decode_hello_extensions({client, <<?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>}) -> - decode_hello_extensions(Extensions); -decode_hello_extensions(Extensions) -> - dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, #hello_extensions{}). +decode_extensions(Extensions, Version, MessageType) -> + decode_extensions(Extensions, Version, MessageType, empty_extensions()). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl:kex_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> @@ -776,7 +904,7 @@ available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) -> filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(Curve, Suites); available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, Curve) -> Suites = available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve), - filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, + filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, Version, []). available_signature_algs(undefined, _) -> @@ -936,88 +1064,222 @@ premaster_secret(EncSecret, #{algorithm := rsa} = Engine) -> %%==================================================================== %% Extensions handling %%==================================================================== -client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, - #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, - eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> - {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = - case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of - true -> - client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs); - false -> - {undefined, undefined} - end, +client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation, KeyShare) -> + HelloExtensions0 = add_tls12_extensions(Version, SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), + HelloExtensions1 = add_common_extensions(Version, HelloExtensions0, CipherSuites, SslOpts), + maybe_add_tls13_extensions(Version, HelloExtensions1, SslOpts, KeyShare). + + +add_tls12_extensions(_Version, + SslOpts, + ConnectionStates, + Renegotiation) -> SRP = srp_user(SslOpts), + #{renegotiation_info => renegotiation_info(tls_record, client, + ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), + srp => SRP, + alpn => encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation), + next_protocol_negotiation => + encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, + Renegotiation), + sni => sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication) + }. - #hello_extensions{ - renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client, - ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), - srp = SRP, - signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version), - ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, - elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, - alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation), - next_protocol_negotiation = - encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, - Renegotiation), - sni = sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}. + +add_common_extensions({3,4}, + HelloExtensions, + _CipherSuites, + #ssl_options{eccs = SupportedECCs, + supported_groups = Groups, + signature_algs = SignatureSchemes}) -> + {EcPointFormats, _} = + client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs), + HelloExtensions#{ec_point_formats => EcPointFormats, + elliptic_curves => Groups, + signature_algs => signature_algs_ext(SignatureSchemes)}; + +add_common_extensions(Version, + HelloExtensions, + CipherSuites, + #ssl_options{eccs = SupportedECCs, + signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns}) -> + + {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = + case advertises_ec_ciphers( + lists:map(fun ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map/1, + CipherSuites)) of + true -> + client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs); + false -> + {undefined, undefined} + end, + HelloExtensions#{ec_point_formats => EcPointFormats, + elliptic_curves => EllipticCurves, + signature_algs => available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version)}. + + +maybe_add_tls13_extensions({3,4}, + HelloExtensions0, + #ssl_options{signature_algs_cert = SignatureSchemes, + versions = SupportedVersions}, + KeyShare) -> + HelloExtensions = + HelloExtensions0#{client_hello_versions => + #client_hello_versions{versions = SupportedVersions}, + signature_algs_cert => + signature_algs_cert(SignatureSchemes)}, + maybe_add_key_share(HelloExtensions, KeyShare); +maybe_add_tls13_extensions(_, HelloExtensions, _, _) -> + HelloExtensions. + + +%% TODO: Add support for PSK key establishment + +%% RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) - 4.2.8. Key Share +%% +%% 4.2.8.1. Diffie-Hellman Parameters +%% Diffie-Hellman [DH76] parameters for both clients and servers are +%% encoded in the opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a +%% KeyShare structure. The opaque value contains the Diffie-Hellman +%% public value (Y = g^X mod p) for the specified group (see [RFC7919] +%% for group definitions) encoded as a big-endian integer and padded to +%% the left with zeros to the size of p in bytes. +%% +%% 4.2.8.2. ECDHE Parameters +%% +%% ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the +%% opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure. +%% +%% For secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1, the contents are the +%% serialized value of the following struct: +%% +%% struct { +%% uint8 legacy_form = 4; +%% opaque X[coordinate_length]; +%% opaque Y[coordinate_length]; +%% } UncompressedPointRepresentation; +%% +%% X and Y, respectively, are the binary representations of the x and y +%% values in network byte order. There are no internal length markers, +%% so each number representation occupies as many octets as implied by +%% the curve parameters. For P-256, this means that each of X and Y use +%% 32 octets, padded on the left by zeros if necessary. For P-384, they +%% take 48 octets each. For P-521, they take 66 octets each. +maybe_add_key_share(HelloExtensions, undefined) -> + HelloExtensions; +maybe_add_key_share(HelloExtensions, KeyShare) -> + #key_share_client_hello{client_shares = ClientShares0} = KeyShare, + %% Keep only public keys + ClientShares = lists:map(fun kse_remove_private_key/1, ClientShares0), + HelloExtensions#{key_share => #key_share_client_hello{ + client_shares = ClientShares}}. + +add_server_share(server_hello, Extensions, KeyShare) -> + #key_share_server_hello{server_share = ServerShare0} = KeyShare, + %% Keep only public keys + ServerShare = kse_remove_private_key(ServerShare0), + Extensions#{key_share => #key_share_server_hello{ + server_share = ServerShare}}; +add_server_share(hello_retry_request, Extensions, + #key_share_server_hello{ + server_share = #key_share_entry{group = Group}}) -> + Extensions#{key_share => #key_share_hello_retry_request{ + selected_group = Group}}. + +add_alpn(Extensions, ALPN0) -> + ALPN = encode_alpn([ALPN0], false), + Extensions#{alpn => ALPN}. + +add_selected_version(Extensions) -> + SupportedVersions = #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = {3,4}}, + Extensions#{server_hello_selected_version => SupportedVersions}. + +kse_remove_private_key(#key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = + #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = PublicKey}}) -> + #key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = PublicKey}; +kse_remove_private_key(#key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = + {PublicKey, _}}) -> + #key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = PublicKey}. + +signature_algs_ext(undefined) -> + undefined; +signature_algs_ext(SignatureSchemes0) -> + %% The SSL option signature_algs contains both hash-sign algorithms (tuples) and + %% signature schemes (atoms) if TLS 1.3 is configured. + #signature_algorithms{signature_scheme_list = SignatureSchemes0}. + +signature_algs_cert(undefined) -> + undefined; +signature_algs_cert(SignatureSchemes) -> + #signature_algorithms_cert{signature_scheme_list = SignatureSchemes}. handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, ClientCipherSuites, - #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info, - srp = SRP, - ec_point_formats = ECCFormat, - alpn = ALPN, - next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, Version, + Exts, Version, #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation, alpn_preferred_protocols = ALPNPreferredProtocols} = Opts, #session{cipher_suite = NegotiatedCipherSuite, compression_method = Compression} = Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> - Session = handle_srp_extension(SRP, Session0), - ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(server, RecordCB, Version, Info, - Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, + Session = handle_srp_extension(maps:get(srp, Exts, undefined), Session0), + ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(server, RecordCB, Version, maps:get(renegotiation_info, Exts, undefined), + Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, ClientCipherSuites, Compression, - ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation), - - ServerHelloExtensions = #hello_extensions{ - renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation), + + Empty = empty_extensions(Version, server_hello), + ServerHelloExtensions = Empty#{renegotiation_info => renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), - ec_point_formats = server_ecc_extension(Version, ECCFormat) - }, - + ec_point_formats => server_ecc_extension(Version, + maps:get(ec_point_formats, Exts, undefined)) + }, + %% If we receive an ALPN extension and have ALPN configured for this connection, %% we handle it. Otherwise we check for the NPN extension. + ALPN = maps:get(alpn, Exts, undefined), if ALPN =/= undefined, ALPNPreferredProtocols =/= undefined -> Protocol = handle_alpn_extension(ALPNPreferredProtocols, decode_alpn(ALPN)), {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, - ServerHelloExtensions#hello_extensions{alpn=encode_alpn([Protocol], Renegotiation)}}; + ServerHelloExtensions#{alpn => encode_alpn([Protocol], Renegotiation)}}; true -> - ProtocolsToAdvertise = handle_next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, Opts), + NextProtocolNegotiation = maps:get(next_protocol_negotiation, Exts, undefined), + ProtocolsToAdvertise = handle_next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, Opts), {Session, ConnectionStates, undefined, - ServerHelloExtensions#hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation= - encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(ProtocolsToAdvertise)}} + ServerHelloExtensions#{next_protocol_negotiation => + encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(ProtocolsToAdvertise)}} end. handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, - #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info, - alpn = ALPN, - next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, Version, + Exts, Version, #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation, next_protocol_selector = NextProtoSelector}, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> - ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(client, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, + ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(client, RecordCB, Version, + maps:get(renegotiation_info, Exts, undefined), Random, CipherSuite, undefined, Compression, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation), %% If we receive an ALPN extension then this is the protocol selected, %% otherwise handle the NPN extension. + ALPN = maps:get(alpn, Exts, undefined), case decode_alpn(ALPN) of %% ServerHello contains exactly one protocol: the one selected. %% We also ignore the ALPN extension during renegotiation (see encode_alpn/2). [Protocol] when not Renegotiation -> {ConnectionStates, alpn, Protocol}; + [_] when Renegotiation -> + {ConnectionStates, alpn, undefined}; undefined -> + NextProtocolNegotiation = maps:get(next_protocol_negotiation, Exts, undefined), Protocol = handle_next_protocol(NextProtocolNegotiation, NextProtoSelector, Renegotiation), {ConnectionStates, npn, Protocol}; {error, Reason} -> @@ -1062,26 +1324,50 @@ select_hashsign(_, _, KeyExAlgo, _, _Version) when KeyExAlgo == dh_anon; {null, anon}; %% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have %% negotiated a lower version. -select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, - undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); -select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, - {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = - TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - - SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), - - case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); - (_) -> - false - end, HashSigns) of - [] -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); - [HashSign | _] -> - HashSign +select_hashsign({ClientHashSigns, ClientSignatureSchemes}, + Cert, KeyExAlgo, undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) + when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> + select_hashsign({ClientHashSigns, ClientSignatureSchemes}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, + tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); +select_hashsign({#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, + ClientSignatureSchemes0}, + Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, {Major, Minor}) + when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> + ClientSignatureSchemes = get_signature_scheme(ClientSignatureSchemes0), + {SignAlgo0, Param, PublicKeyAlgo0} = get_cert_params(Cert), + SignAlgo = sign_algo(SignAlgo0), + PublicKeyAlgo = public_key_algo(PublicKeyAlgo0), + + %% RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2) + %% If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all + %% certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a + %% hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension. + %% + %% RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) + %% TLS 1.3 provides two extensions for indicating which signature + %% algorithms may be used in digital signatures. The + %% "signature_algorithms_cert" extension applies to signatures in + %% certificates and the "signature_algorithms" extension, which + %% originally appeared in TLS 1.2, applies to signatures in + %% CertificateVerify messages. + %% + %% If no "signature_algorithms_cert" extension is + %% present, then the "signature_algorithms" extension also applies to + %% signatures appearing in certificates. + case is_supported_sign(SignAlgo, Param, ClientHashSigns, ClientSignatureSchemes) of + true -> + case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == PublicKeyAlgo -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); + (_) -> + false + end, ClientHashSigns) of + [] -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); + [HashSign | _] -> + HashSign + end; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm) end; select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) -> #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), @@ -1095,21 +1381,23 @@ select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) -> %% %% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client) %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, - certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{ + hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{ + hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, + certificate_types = Types}, + Cert, + SupportedHashSigns, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, - signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = - TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - - Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), - SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), - - case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of + {SignAlgo0, Param, PublicKeyAlgo0} = get_cert_params(Cert), + SignAlgo = sign_algo(SignAlgo0), + PublicKeyAlgo = public_key_algo(PublicKeyAlgo0), + + case is_acceptable_cert_type(PublicKeyAlgo, Types) andalso + %% certificate_request has no "signature_algorithms_cert" + %% extension in TLS 1.2. + is_supported_sign(SignAlgo, Param, HashSigns, undefined) of true -> - case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign -> + case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == PublicKeyAlgo -> is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); (_) -> false @@ -1122,8 +1410,38 @@ select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm) end; -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) -> - select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version). +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{certificate_types = Types}, Cert, _, Version) -> + {_, _, PublicKeyAlgo0} = get_cert_params(Cert), + PublicKeyAlgo = public_key_algo(PublicKeyAlgo0), + + %% Check cert even for TLS 1.0/1.1 + case is_acceptable_cert_type(PublicKeyAlgo, Types) of + true -> + select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version); + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm) + end. + + +%% Gets the relevant parameters of a certificate: +%% - signature algorithm +%% - parameters of the signature algorithm +%% - public key algorithm (key type) +get_cert_params(Cert) -> + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, + signatureAlgorithm = + {_,SignAlgo, Param}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, PublicKeyAlgo, _}} = + TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, + {SignAlgo, Param, PublicKeyAlgo}. + + +get_signature_scheme(undefined) -> + undefined; +get_signature_scheme(#signature_algorithms_cert{ + signature_scheme_list = ClientSignatureSchemes}) -> + ClientSignatureSchemes. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> @@ -1172,6 +1490,8 @@ extension_value(#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = List}) -> List; extension_value(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = List}) -> List; +extension_value(#supported_groups{supported_groups = SupportedGroups}) -> + SupportedGroups; extension_value(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = Algos}) -> Algos; extension_value(#alpn{extension_data = Data}) -> @@ -1181,7 +1501,20 @@ extension_value(#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = Data}) -> extension_value(#srp{username = Name}) -> Name; extension_value(#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data}) -> - Data. + Data; +extension_value(#signature_algorithms{signature_scheme_list = Schemes}) -> + Schemes; +extension_value(#signature_algorithms_cert{signature_scheme_list = Schemes}) -> + Schemes; +extension_value(#key_share_client_hello{client_shares = ClientShares}) -> + ClientShares; +extension_value(#key_share_server_hello{server_share = ServerShare}) -> + ServerShare; +extension_value(#client_hello_versions{versions = Versions}) -> + Versions; +extension_value(#server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = SelectedVersion}) -> + SelectedVersion. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions @@ -1192,33 +1525,30 @@ int_to_bin(I) -> L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2, <<I:(L*8)>>. -certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 -> - case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa, - proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of - true -> - <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; - false -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>> - end; - -certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa; - KeyExchange == dh_rsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; - KeyExchange == dhe_dss; - KeyExchange == srp_dss -> - <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> - <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>; +%% TLS 1.0+ +%% The end-entity certificate provided by the client MUST contain a +%% key that is compatible with certificate_types. +certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 1 -> + ECDSA = supported_cert_type_or_empty(ecdsa, ?ECDSA_SIGN), + RSA = supported_cert_type_or_empty(rsa, ?RSA_SIGN), + DSS = supported_cert_type_or_empty(dss, ?DSS_SIGN), + <<ECDSA/binary,RSA/binary,DSS/binary>>; +%% SSL 3.0 certificate_types(_, _) -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>. + RSA = supported_cert_type_or_empty(rsa, ?RSA_SIGN), + DSS = supported_cert_type_or_empty(dss, ?DSS_SIGN), + <<RSA/binary,DSS/binary>>. + +%% Returns encoded certificate_type if algorithm is supported +supported_cert_type_or_empty(Algo, Type) -> + case proplists:get_bool( + Algo, + proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of + true -> + <<?BYTE(Type)>>; + false -> + <<>> + end. certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), @@ -1761,16 +2091,67 @@ encode_alpn(undefined, _) -> encode_alpn(Protocols, _) -> #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}. -hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, - srp = SRP, - signature_algs = HashSigns, - ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, - elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, - alpn = ALPN, - next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation, - sni = Sni}) -> - [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns, - EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined]. + +encode_versions(Versions) -> + encode_versions(lists:reverse(Versions), <<>>). +%% +encode_versions([], Acc) -> + Acc; +encode_versions([{M,N}|T], Acc) -> + encode_versions(T, <<?BYTE(M),?BYTE(N),Acc/binary>>). + +encode_client_shares(ClientShares) -> + encode_client_shares(ClientShares, <<>>). +%% +encode_client_shares([], Acc) -> + Acc; +encode_client_shares([KeyShareEntry0|T], Acc) -> + KeyShareEntry = encode_key_share_entry(KeyShareEntry0), + encode_client_shares(T, <<Acc/binary,KeyShareEntry/binary>>). + +encode_key_share_entry(#key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = KeyExchange}) -> + Len = byte_size(KeyExchange), + <<?UINT16((tls_v1:group_to_enum(Group))),?UINT16(Len),KeyExchange/binary>>. + +encode_psk_key_exchange_modes(KEModes) -> + encode_psk_key_exchange_modes(lists:reverse(KEModes), <<>>). +%% +encode_psk_key_exchange_modes([], Acc) -> + Acc; +encode_psk_key_exchange_modes([psk_ke|T], Acc) -> + encode_psk_key_exchange_modes(T, <<?BYTE(?PSK_KE),Acc/binary>>); +encode_psk_key_exchange_modes([psk_dhe_ke|T], Acc) -> + encode_psk_key_exchange_modes(T, <<?BYTE(?PSK_DHE_KE),Acc/binary>>). + + +encode_psk_identities(Identities) -> + encode_psk_identities(Identities, <<>>). +%% +encode_psk_identities([], Acc) -> + Len = byte_size(Acc), + <<?UINT16(Len), Acc/binary>>; +encode_psk_identities([#psk_identity{ + identity = Identity, + obfuscated_ticket_age = Age}|T], Acc) -> + IdLen = byte_size(Identity), + encode_psk_identities(T, <<Acc/binary,?UINT16(IdLen),Identity/binary,Age/binary>>). + + +encode_psk_binders(Binders) -> + encode_psk_binders(Binders, <<>>). +%% +encode_psk_binders([], Acc) -> + Len = byte_size(Acc), + <<?UINT16(Len), Acc/binary>>; +encode_psk_binders([Binder|T], Acc) -> + Len = byte_size(Binder), + encode_psk_binders(T, <<Acc/binary,?BYTE(Len),Binder/binary>>). + + +hello_extensions_list(HelloExtensions) -> + [Ext || {_, Ext} <- maps:to_list(HelloExtensions), Ext =/= undefined]. %%-------------Decode handshakes--------------------------------- dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, @@ -1910,16 +2291,60 @@ dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, _) -> dec_server_key_signature(_, _, _) -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, failed_to_decrypt_server_key_sign)). -dec_hello_extensions(<<>>, Acc) -> +%% Processes a ClientHello/ServerHello message and returns the version to be used +%% in the decoding functions. The following rules apply: +%% - IF supported_versions extension is absent: +%% RETURN the lowest of (LocalVersion and LegacyVersion) +%% - IF supported_versions estension is present: +%% RETURN the lowest of (LocalVersion and first element of supported versions) +process_supported_versions_extension(<<>>, LocalVersion, LegacyVersion) + when LegacyVersion =< LocalVersion -> + LegacyVersion; +process_supported_versions_extension(<<>>, LocalVersion, _LegacyVersion) -> + LocalVersion; +process_supported_versions_extension(<<?UINT16(?SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, _Rest/binary>>, + LocalVersion, _LegacyVersion) when Len > 2 -> + <<?BYTE(_),Versions0/binary>> = ExtData, + [Highest|_] = decode_versions(Versions0), + if Highest =< LocalVersion -> + Highest; + true -> + LocalVersion + end; +process_supported_versions_extension(<<?UINT16(?SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ?BYTE(Major),?BYTE(Minor), _Rest/binary>>, + LocalVersion, _LegacyVersion) when Len =:= 2 -> + SelectedVersion = {Major, Minor}, + if SelectedVersion =< LocalVersion -> + SelectedVersion; + true -> + LocalVersion + end; +process_supported_versions_extension(<<?UINT16(_), ?UINT16(Len), + _ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, + LocalVersion, LegacyVersion) -> + process_supported_versions_extension(Rest, LocalVersion, LegacyVersion); +%% Tolerate protocol encoding errors and skip parsing the rest of the extension. +process_supported_versions_extension(_, LocalVersion, LegacyVersion) + when LegacyVersion =< LocalVersion -> + LegacyVersion; +process_supported_versions_extension(_, LocalVersion, _) -> + LocalVersion. + +decode_extensions(<<>>, _Version, _MessageType, Acc) -> Acc; -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ALPN_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) - when Len + 2 =:= ExtLen -> +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ALPN_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) + when Len + 2 =:= ExtLen -> ALPN = #alpn{extension_data = ExtensionData}, - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{alpn = ALPN}); -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, Acc#{alpn => ALPN}); +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> NextP = #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData}, - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextP}); -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, Acc#{next_protocol_negotiation => NextP}); +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + Info:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> RenegotiateInfo = case Len of 1 -> % Initial handshake Info; % should be <<0>> will be matched in handle_renegotiation_info @@ -1928,25 +2353,54 @@ dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info:Len/binar <<?BYTE(VerifyLen), VerifyInfo/binary>> = Info, VerifyInfo end, - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = - RenegotiateInfo}}); + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{renegotiation_info => + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = + RenegotiateInfo}}); -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), SRP:SRPLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), + SRP:SRPLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) when Len == SRPLen + 1 -> - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{srp = #srp{username = SRP}}); + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, Acc#{srp => #srp{username = SRP}}); -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), - ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) + when Version < {3,4} -> SignAlgoListLen = Len - 2, <<?UINT16(SignAlgoListLen), SignAlgoList/binary>> = ExtData, HashSignAlgos = [{ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)} || <<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>> <= SignAlgoList], - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{signature_algs = - #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos}}); - -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), - ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{signature_algs => + #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = + HashSignAlgos}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) + when Version =:= {3,4} -> + SignSchemeListLen = Len - 2, + <<?UINT16(SignSchemeListLen), SignSchemeList/binary>> = ExtData, + SignSchemes = [ssl_cipher:signature_scheme(SignScheme) || + <<?UINT16(SignScheme)>> <= SignSchemeList], + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{signature_algs => + #signature_algorithms{ + signature_scheme_list = SignSchemes}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> + SignSchemeListLen = Len - 2, + <<?UINT16(SignSchemeListLen), SignSchemeList/binary>> = ExtData, + SignSchemes = [ssl_cipher:signature_scheme(SignScheme) || + <<?UINT16(SignScheme)>> <= SignSchemeList], + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{signature_algs_cert => + #signature_algorithms_cert{ + signature_scheme_list = SignSchemes}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) + when Version < {3,4} -> <<?UINT16(_), EllipticCurveList/binary>> = ExtData, %% Ignore unknown curves Pick = fun(Enum) -> @@ -1958,31 +2412,130 @@ dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), end end, EllipticCurves = lists:filtermap(Pick, [ECC || <<ECC:16>> <= EllipticCurveList]), - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = - #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = - EllipticCurves}}); -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), - ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{elliptic_curves => + #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = + EllipticCurves}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) + when Version =:= {3,4} -> + <<?UINT16(_), GroupList/binary>> = ExtData, + %% Ignore unknown curves + Pick = fun(Enum) -> + case tls_v1:enum_to_group(Enum) of + undefined -> + false; + Group -> + {true, Group} + end + end, + SupportedGroups = lists:filtermap(Pick, [Group || <<Group:16>> <= GroupList]), + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{elliptic_curves => + #supported_groups{supported_groups = + SupportedGroups}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> <<?BYTE(_), ECPointFormatList/binary>> = ExtData, ECPointFormats = binary_to_list(ECPointFormatList), - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{ec_point_formats = - #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = - ECPointFormats}}); - -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Rest/binary>>, Acc) when Len == 0 -> - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{sni = #sni{hostname = ""}}); %% Server may send an empy SNI - -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), - ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{ec_point_formats => + #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = + ECPointFormats}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) when Len == 0 -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{sni => #sni{hostname = ""}}); %% Server may send an empy SNI + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> <<?UINT16(_), NameList/binary>> = ExtData, - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{sni = dec_sni(NameList)}); + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{sni => dec_sni(NameList)}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) when Len > 2 -> + <<?BYTE(_),Versions/binary>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{client_hello_versions => + #client_hello_versions{ + versions = decode_versions(Versions)}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ?UINT16(SelectedVersion), Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) + when Len =:= 2, SelectedVersion =:= 16#0304 -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{server_hello_selected_version => + #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = + {3,4}}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Version, MessageType = client_hello, Acc) -> + <<?UINT16(_),ClientShares/binary>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{key_share => + #key_share_client_hello{ + client_shares = decode_client_shares(ClientShares)}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Version, MessageType = server_hello, Acc) -> + <<?UINT16(Group),?UINT16(KeyLen),KeyExchange:KeyLen/binary>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{key_share => + #key_share_server_hello{ + server_share = + #key_share_entry{ + group = tls_v1:enum_to_group(Group), + key_exchange = KeyExchange}}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Version, MessageType = hello_retry_request, Acc) -> + <<?UINT16(Group)>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{key_share => + #key_share_hello_retry_request{ + selected_group = tls_v1:enum_to_group(Group)}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> + <<?BYTE(PLen),KEModes:PLen/binary>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{psk_key_exchange_modes => + #psk_key_exchange_modes{ + ke_modes = decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(KEModes)}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?PRE_SHARED_KEY_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Version, MessageType = client_hello, Acc) -> + <<?UINT16(IdLen),Identities:IdLen/binary,?UINT16(BLen),Binders:BLen/binary>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{pre_shared_key => + #pre_shared_key_client_hello{ + offered_psks = #offered_psks{ + identities = decode_psk_identities(Identities), + binders = decode_psk_binders(Binders)}}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?PRE_SHARED_KEY_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Version, MessageType = server_hello, Acc) -> + <<?UINT16(Identity)>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{pre_shared_key => + #pre_shared_key_server_hello{ + selected_identity = Identity}}); + %% Ignore data following the ClientHello (i.e., %% extensions) if not understood. - -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(_), ?UINT16(Len), _Unknown:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc); +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(_), ?UINT16(Len), _Unknown:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, Acc); %% This theoretically should not happen if the protocol is followed, but if it does it is ignored. -dec_hello_extensions(_, Acc) -> +decode_extensions(_, _, _, Acc) -> Acc. dec_hashsign(<<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo)>>) -> @@ -2000,6 +2553,26 @@ decode_alpn(undefined) -> decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) -> decode_protocols(Data, []). +decode_versions(Versions) -> + decode_versions(Versions, []). +%% +decode_versions(<<>>, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +decode_versions(<<?BYTE(M),?BYTE(N),Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_versions(Rest, [{M,N}|Acc]). + + +decode_client_shares(ClientShares) -> + decode_client_shares(ClientShares, []). +%% +decode_client_shares(<<>>, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +decode_client_shares(<<?UINT16(Group),?UINT16(Len),KeyExchange:Len/binary,Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_client_shares(Rest, [#key_share_entry{ + group = tls_v1:enum_to_group(Group), + key_exchange= KeyExchange + }|Acc]). + decode_next_protocols({next_protocol_negotiation, Protocols}) -> decode_protocols(Protocols, []). @@ -2015,6 +2588,38 @@ decode_protocols(<<?BYTE(Len), Protocol:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> decode_protocols(_Bytes, _Acc) -> {error, invalid_protocols}. + +decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(KEModes) -> + decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(KEModes, []). +%% +decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(<<>>, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(<<?BYTE(?PSK_KE), Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(Rest, [psk_ke|Acc]); +decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(<<?BYTE(?PSK_DHE_KE), Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_psk_key_exchange_modes(Rest, [psk_dhe_ke|Acc]). + + +decode_psk_identities(Identities) -> + decode_psk_identities(Identities, []). +%% +decode_psk_identities(<<>>, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +decode_psk_identities(<<?UINT16(Len), Identity:Len/binary, Age:4/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_psk_identities(Rest, [#psk_identity{ + identity = Identity, + obfuscated_ticket_age = Age}|Acc]). + + +decode_psk_binders(Binders) -> + decode_psk_binders(Binders, []). +%% +decode_psk_binders(<<>>, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +decode_psk_binders(<<?BYTE(Len), Binder:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_psk_binders(Rest, [Binder|Acc]). + + %% encode/decode stream of certificate data to/from list of certificate data certs_to_list(ASN1Certs) -> certs_to_list(ASN1Certs, []). @@ -2181,7 +2786,7 @@ filter_unavailable_ecc_suites(_, Suites) -> handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, ClientCipherSuites, Compression, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) -> - {ok, ConnectionStates} = handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0, + {ok, ConnectionStates} = handle_renegotiation_info(Version, RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, ClientCipherSuites), hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role, @@ -2253,17 +2858,6 @@ handle_srp_extension(undefined, Session) -> handle_srp_extension(#srp{username = Username}, Session) -> Session#session{srp_username = Username}. - -sign_algo(?rsaEncryption) -> - rsa; -sign_algo(?'id-ecPublicKey') -> - ecdsa; -sign_algo(?'id-dsa') -> - dsa; -sign_algo(Alg) -> - {_, Sign} =public_key:pkix_sign_types(Alg), - Sign. - is_acceptable_hash_sign( _, KeyExAlgo, _) when KeyExAlgo == psk; KeyExAlgo == dhe_psk; @@ -2279,15 +2873,80 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos,_, SupportedHashSigns) -> is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) -> lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns). -is_acceptable_cert_type(Sign, _HashSigns, Types) -> +is_acceptable_cert_type(Sign, Types) -> lists:member(sign_type(Sign), binary_to_list(Types)). -is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) -> - [] =/= lists:dropwhile(fun({_, S}) when S =/= Sign -> - true; - (_)-> - false - end, HashSigns). +%% signature_algorithms_cert = undefined +is_supported_sign(SignAlgo, _, HashSigns, undefined) -> + lists:member(SignAlgo, HashSigns); + +%% {'SignatureAlgorithm',{1,2,840,113549,1,1,11},'NULL'} +is_supported_sign({Hash, Sign}, 'NULL', _, SignatureSchemes) -> + Fun = fun (Scheme, Acc) -> + {H0, S0, _} = ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(Scheme), + S1 = case S0 of + rsa_pkcs1 -> rsa; + S -> S + end, + H1 = case H0 of + sha1 -> sha; + H -> H + end, + Acc orelse (Sign =:= S1 andalso + Hash =:= H1) + end, + lists:foldl(Fun, false, SignatureSchemes); + +%% TODO: Implement validation for the curve used in the signature +%% RFC 3279 - 2.2.3 ECDSA Signature Algorithm +%% When the ecdsa-with-SHA1 algorithm identifier appears as the +%% algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding MUST omit the +%% parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a +%% SEQUENCE of one component: the OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsa-with-SHA1. +%% +%% The elliptic curve parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of +%% the certificate of the issuer SHALL apply to the verification of the +%% signature. +is_supported_sign({Hash, Sign}, _Param, _, SignatureSchemes) -> + Fun = fun (Scheme, Acc) -> + {H0, S0, _} = ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(Scheme), + S1 = case S0 of + rsa_pkcs1 -> rsa; + S -> S + end, + H1 = case H0 of + sha1 -> sha; + H -> H + end, + Acc orelse (Sign =:= S1 andalso + Hash =:= H1) + end, + lists:foldl(Fun, false, SignatureSchemes). + +%% SupportedPublicKeyAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY-ALGORITHM-CLASS ::= { +%% dsa | rsa-encryption | dh | kea | ec-public-key } +public_key_algo(?rsaEncryption) -> + rsa; +public_key_algo(?'id-ecPublicKey') -> + ecdsa; +public_key_algo(?'id-dsa') -> + dsa. + +%% SupportedSignatureAlgorithms SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM-CLASS ::= { +%% dsa-with-sha1 | dsaWithSHA1 | md2-with-rsa-encryption | +%% md5-with-rsa-encryption | sha1-with-rsa-encryption | sha-1with-rsa-encryption | +%% sha224-with-rsa-encryption | +%% sha256-with-rsa-encryption | +%% sha384-with-rsa-encryption | +%% sha512-with-rsa-encryption | +%% ecdsa-with-sha1 | +%% ecdsa-with-sha224 | +%% ecdsa-with-sha256 | +%% ecdsa-with-sha384 | +%% ecdsa-with-sha512 } +sign_algo(Alg) -> + public_key:pkix_sign_types(Alg). + sign_type(rsa) -> ?RSA_SIGN; sign_type(dsa) -> @@ -2306,6 +2965,11 @@ client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) -> CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of true -> + %% RFC 8422 - 5.1. Client Hello Extensions + %% Clients SHOULD send both the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension and the + %% Supported Point Formats Extension. If the Supported Point Formats + %% Extension is indeed sent, it MUST contain the value 0 (uncompressed) + %% as one of the items in the list of point formats. EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}, EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs, {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves}; @@ -2392,11 +3056,11 @@ renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) -> #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} end. -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, +handle_renegotiation_info(_, _RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> +handle_renegotiation_info(_, _RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; @@ -2404,10 +3068,10 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)} end; -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> +handle_renegotiation_info(_, _RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}; -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, +handle_renegotiation_info(_, _RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, ConnectionStates, true, _, _) -> ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), @@ -2418,7 +3082,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co false -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation)) end; -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, +handle_renegotiation_info(_, _RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of @@ -2434,11 +3098,13 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_co throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation)) end end; +handle_renegotiation_info({3,0}, _RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, _SecureRenegotation, _) -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; -handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) -> +handle_renegotiation_info(_, RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) -> handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation); -handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> +handle_renegotiation_info(_, RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of true -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv})); @@ -2460,7 +3126,7 @@ handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> cert_curve(_, _, no_suite) -> {no_curve, no_suite}; cert_curve(Cert, ECCCurve0, CipherSuite) -> - case ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite) of + case ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(CipherSuite) of #{key_exchange := Kex} when Kex == ecdh_ecdsa; Kex == ecdh_rsa -> OtpCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), @@ -2473,4 +3139,58 @@ cert_curve(Cert, ECCCurve0, CipherSuite) -> {ECCCurve0, CipherSuite} end. - +empty_extensions() -> + #{}. + +empty_extensions({3,4}, client_hello) -> + #{ + sni => undefined, + %% max_fragment_length => undefined, + %% status_request => undefined, + elliptic_curves => undefined, + signature_algs => undefined, + %% use_srtp => undefined, + %% heartbeat => undefined, + alpn => undefined, + %% signed_cert_timestamp => undefined, + %% client_cert_type => undefined, + %% server_cert_type => undefined, + %% padding => undefined, + key_share => undefined, + pre_shared_key => undefined, + psk_key_exchange_modes => undefined, + %% early_data => undefined, + %% cookie => undefined, + client_hello_versions => undefined, + %% cert_authorities => undefined, + %% post_handshake_auth => undefined, + signature_algs_cert => undefined + }; +empty_extensions({3, 3}, client_hello) -> + Ext = empty_extensions({3,2}, client_hello), + Ext#{signature_algs => undefined}; +empty_extensions(_, client_hello) -> + #{renegotiation_info => undefined, + alpn => undefined, + next_protocol_negotiation => undefined, + srp => undefined, + ec_point_formats => undefined, + elliptic_curves => undefined, + sni => undefined}; +empty_extensions({3,4}, server_hello) -> + #{server_hello_selected_version => undefined, + key_share => undefined, + pre_shared_key => undefined + }; +empty_extensions({3,4}, hello_retry_request) -> + #{server_hello_selected_version => undefined, + key_share => undefined, + pre_shared_key => undefined + }; +empty_extensions({3,0}, _) -> + empty_extensions(); +empty_extensions(_, server_hello) -> + #{renegotiation_info => undefined, + alpn => undefined, + next_protocol_negotiation => undefined, + ec_point_formats => undefined}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl index a191fcf766..b248edcaa9 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl @@ -47,14 +47,15 @@ srp_username, is_resumable, time_stamp, - ecc + ecc, %% TLS 1.3 Group + sign_alg, %% TLS 1.3 Signature Algorithm + dh_public_value %% TLS 1.3 DH Public Value from peer }). -define(NUM_OF_SESSION_ID_BYTES, 32). % TSL 1.1 & SSL 3 -define(NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES, 48). --define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR, 2). --define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME, - 16#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). +-define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR, ssl_dh_groups:modp2048_generator()). +-define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME, ssl_dh_groups:modp2048_prime()). %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%% Handsake protocol - RFC 4346 section 7.4 @@ -105,7 +106,11 @@ srp, ec_point_formats, elliptic_curves, - sni + sni, + client_hello_versions, + server_hello_selected_version, + signature_algs_cert, + key_share }). -record(server_hello, { @@ -313,12 +318,12 @@ %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -define(SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT, 13). --record(hash_sign_algos, { - hash_sign_algos - }). +-record(hash_sign_algos, {hash_sign_algos}). +%% RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) +-record(signature_algorithms, {signature_scheme_list}). %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -%% Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation RFC 7301 +%% RFC 7301 Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -define(ALPN_EXT, 16). @@ -338,9 +343,8 @@ -record(next_protocol, {selected_protocol}). %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -%% ECC Extensions RFC 4492 section 4 and 5 +%% ECC Extensions RFC 8422 section 4 and 5 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -define(ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT, 10). -define(EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT, 11). @@ -348,11 +352,18 @@ elliptic_curve_list }). +%% RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) renamed the "elliptic_curve" extension. +-record(supported_groups, { + supported_groups + }). + -record(ec_point_formats, { ec_point_format_list }). -define(ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED, 0). +%% Defined in RFC 4492, deprecated by RFC 8422 +%% RFC 8422 compliant implementations MUST not support the two formats below -define(ECPOINT_ANSIX962_COMPRESSED_PRIME, 1). -define(ECPOINT_ANSIX962_COMPRESSED_CHAR2, 2). @@ -365,10 +376,11 @@ -define(NAMED_CURVE, 3). %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -%% Server name indication RFC 6066 section 3 +%% RFC 6066 Server name indication %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% --define(SNI_EXT, 16#0000). +%% section 3 +-define(SNI_EXT, 0). %% enum { host_name(0), (255) } NameType; -define(SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME, 0). @@ -377,4 +389,56 @@ hostname = undefined }). +%% Other possible values from RFC 6066, not supported +-define(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, 1). +-define(CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_URL, 2). +-define(TRUSTED_CA_KEYS, 3). +-define(TRUNCATED_HMAC, 4). +-define(STATUS_REQUEST, 5). + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% RFC 7250 Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) +%% and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Not supported +-define(CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, 19). +-define(SERVER_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, 20). + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% RFC 6520 Transport Layer Security (TLS) and +%% Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Not supported +-define(HS_HEARTBEAT, 15). + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% RFC 6962 Certificate Transparency +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Not supported +-define(SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMP, 18). + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% RFC 7685 A Transport Layer Security (TLS) ClientHello Padding Extension +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Not supported +-define(PADDING, 21). + + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Supported Versions RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) section 4.2.1 also affects TLS-1.2 +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + +-define(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT, 43). + +-record(client_hello_versions, {versions}). +-record(server_hello_selected_version, {selected_version}). + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Signature Algorithms RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) section 4.2.3 also affects TLS-1.2 +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + +-define(SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT_EXT, 50). + +-record(signature_algorithms_cert, {signature_scheme_list}). + -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_handshake). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl index ddd7a8eb7b..06c3ccae45 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-define(VSN, "8.2.6"). -define(SECRET_PRINTOUT, "***"). -type reason() :: any(). @@ -70,14 +71,40 @@ -define(FALSE, 1). %% sslv3 is considered insecure due to lack of padding check (Poodle attack) -%% Keep as interop with legacy software but do not support as default --define(ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1, sslv3]). +%% Keep as interop with legacy software but do not support as default +%% tlsv1.0 and tlsv1.1 is now also considered legacy +%% tlsv1.3 is under development (experimental). +-define(ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.3', 'tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1, sslv3]). -define(ALL_AVAILABLE_DATAGRAM_VERSIONS, ['dtlsv1.2', dtlsv1]). --define(ALL_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1]). --define(MIN_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.1', tlsv1]). --define(ALL_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['dtlsv1.2', dtlsv1]). +%% Defines the default versions when not specified by an ssl option. +-define(ALL_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2']). +-define(MIN_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.1']). + +%% Versions allowed in TLSCiphertext.version (TLS 1.2 and prior) and +%% TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version (TLS 1.3). +%% TLS 1.3 sets TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version to 0x0303 for all records +%% generated other than an than an initial ClientHello, where it MAY also be 0x0301. +%% Thus, the allowed range is limited to 0x0300 - 0x0303. +-define(ALL_TLS_RECORD_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1, sslv3]). + +-define(ALL_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['dtlsv1.2']). -define(MIN_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, [dtlsv1]). +%% TLS 1.3 - Section 4.1.3 +%% +%% If negotiating TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 servers MUST set the last eight bytes +%% of their Random value to the bytes: +%% +%% 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01 +%% +%% If negotiating TLS 1.1 or below, TLS 1.3 servers MUST and TLS 1.2 +%% servers SHOULD set the last eight bytes of their Random value to the +%% bytes: +%% +%% 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00 +-define(RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS12, <<16#44,16#4F,16#57,16#4E,16#47,16#52,16#44,16#01>>). +-define(RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS11, <<16#44,16#4F,16#57,16#4E,16#47,16#52,16#44,16#00>>). + -define('24H_in_msec', 86400000). -define('24H_in_sec', 86400). @@ -127,7 +154,7 @@ alpn_preferred_protocols = undefined :: [binary()] | undefined, next_protocols_advertised = undefined :: [binary()] | undefined, next_protocol_selector = undefined, %% fun([binary()]) -> binary()) - log_alert :: boolean(), + log_level = notice :: atom(), server_name_indication = undefined, sni_hosts :: [{inet:hostname(), [tuple()]}] | 'undefined', sni_fun :: function() | undefined, @@ -142,9 +169,11 @@ crl_check :: boolean() | peer | best_effort | 'undefined', crl_cache, signature_algs, + signature_algs_cert, eccs, - honor_ecc_order :: boolean(), - max_handshake_size :: integer(), + supported_groups, %% RFC 8422, RFC 8446 + honor_ecc_order :: boolean() | 'undefined', + max_handshake_size :: integer() | 'undefined', handshake, customize_hostname_check %% , @@ -169,17 +198,7 @@ connection_cb }). --type key_map() :: #{algorithm := rsa | dss | ecdsa, - %% engine and key_id ought to - %% be :=, but putting it in - %% the spec gives dialyzer warning - %% of correct code! - engine => crypto:engine_ref(), - key_id => crypto:key_id(), - password => crypto:password() - }. -type state_name() :: hello | abbreviated | certify | cipher | connection. - -type gen_fsm_state_return() :: {next_state, state_name(), any()} | {next_state, state_name(), any(), timeout()} | {stop, any(), any()}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_logger.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_logger.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..514a4464bc --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_logger.erl @@ -0,0 +1,451 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2019. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +-module(ssl_logger). + +-export([debug/4, + format/2, + notice/2]). + +-define(DEC2HEX(X), + if ((X) >= 0) andalso ((X) =< 9) -> (X) + $0; + ((X) >= 10) andalso ((X) =< 15) -> (X) + $a - 10 + end). + +-define(rec_info(T,R),lists:zip(record_info(fields,T),tl(tuple_to_list(R)))). + +-include("tls_record.hrl"). +-include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). +-include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake.hrl"). +-include("dtls_handshake.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). + +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% External API +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +%% SSL log formatter +format(#{level:= _Level, msg:= {report, Msg}, meta:= _Meta}, _Config0) -> + #{direction := Direction, + protocol := Protocol, + message := Content} = Msg, + case Protocol of + 'record' -> + BinMsg = + case Content of + #ssl_tls{} -> + [tls_record:build_tls_record(Content)]; + _ when is_list(Content) -> + lists:flatten(Content) + end, + format_tls_record(Direction, BinMsg); + 'handshake' -> + format_handshake(Direction, Content); + _Other -> + [] + end. + +%% Stateful logging +debug(Level, Direction, Protocol, Message) + when (Direction =:= inbound orelse Direction =:= outbound) andalso + (Protocol =:= 'record' orelse Protocol =:= 'handshake') -> + case logger:compare_levels(Level, debug) of + lt -> + ?LOG_DEBUG(#{direction => Direction, + protocol => Protocol, + message => Message}, + #{domain => [otp,ssl,Protocol]}); + eq -> + ?LOG_DEBUG(#{direction => Direction, + protocol => Protocol, + message => Message}, + #{domain => [otp,ssl,Protocol]}); + _ -> + ok + end. + +%% Stateful logging +notice(Level, Report) -> + case logger:compare_levels(Level, notice) of + lt -> + ?LOG_NOTICE(Report); + eq -> + ?LOG_NOTICE(Report); + _ -> + ok + end. + + +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Handshake Protocol +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +format_handshake(Direction, BinMsg) -> + {Header, Message} = parse_handshake(Direction, BinMsg), + io_lib:format("~s~n~s~n", [Header, Message]). + + +parse_handshake(Direction, #client_hello{ + client_version = Version0, + cipher_suites = CipherSuites0, + extensions = Extensions + } = ClientHello) -> + Version = get_client_version(Version0, Extensions), + Header = io_lib:format("~s ~s Handshake, ClientHello", + [header_prefix(Direction), + version(Version)]), + CipherSuites = parse_cipher_suites(CipherSuites0), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", + [?rec_info(client_hello, + ClientHello#client_hello{cipher_suites = CipherSuites})]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #server_hello{ + server_version = Version0, + cipher_suite = CipherSuite0, + extensions = Extensions + } = ServerHello) -> + Version = get_server_version(Version0, Extensions), + Header = io_lib:format("~s ~s Handshake, ServerHello", + [header_prefix(Direction), + version(Version)]), + CipherSuite = format_cipher(CipherSuite0), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", + [?rec_info(server_hello, + ServerHello#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite})]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #hello_verify_request{} = HelloVerifyRequest) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, HelloVerifyRequest", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(hello_verify_request, HelloVerifyRequest)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #certificate{} = Certificate) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, Certificate", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(certificate, Certificate)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #server_key_exchange{} = ServerKeyExchange) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, ServerKeyExchange", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(server_key_exchange, ServerKeyExchange)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #server_key_params{} = ServerKeyExchange) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, ServerKeyExchange", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(server_key_params, ServerKeyExchange)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #certificate_request{} = CertificateRequest) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, CertificateRequest", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(certificate_request, CertificateRequest)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #server_hello_done{} = ServerHelloDone) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, ServerHelloDone", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(server_hello_done, ServerHelloDone)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #client_key_exchange{} = ClientKeyExchange) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, ClientKeyExchange", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(client_key_exchange, ClientKeyExchange)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #certificate_verify{} = CertificateVerify) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, CertificateVerify", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(certificate_verify, CertificateVerify)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #finished{} = Finished) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, Finished", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(finished, Finished)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #hello_request{} = HelloRequest) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, HelloRequest", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(hello_request, HelloRequest)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #certificate_request_1_3{} = CertificateRequest) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, CertificateRequest", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(certificate_request_1_3, CertificateRequest)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #certificate_1_3{} = Certificate) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, Certificate", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(certificate_1_3, Certificate)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #certificate_verify_1_3{} = CertificateVerify) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, CertificateVerify", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(certificate_verify_1_3, CertificateVerify)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #encrypted_extensions{} = EncryptedExtensions) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, EncryptedExtensions", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(encrypted_extensions, EncryptedExtensions)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #new_session_ticket{} = NewSessionTicket) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Post-Handshake, NewSessionTicket", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(new_session_ticket, NewSessionTicket)]), + {Header, Message}. + + +parse_cipher_suites([_|_] = Ciphers) -> + [format_cipher(C) || C <- Ciphers]. + +format_cipher(C0) -> + try ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(C0) of + Map -> + ssl_cipher_format:suite_map_to_str(Map) + catch + error:function_clause -> + format_uknown_cipher_suite(C0) + end. + +get_client_version(Version, Extensions) -> + CHVersions = maps:get(client_hello_versions, Extensions, undefined), + case CHVersions of + #client_hello_versions{versions = [Highest|_]} -> + Highest; + undefined -> + Version + end. + +get_server_version(Version, Extensions) -> + SHVersion = maps:get(server_hello_selected_version, Extensions, undefined), + case SHVersion of + #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = SelectedVersion} -> + SelectedVersion; + undefined -> + Version + end. + +version({3,4}) -> + "TLS 1.3"; +version({3,3}) -> + "TLS 1.2"; +version({3,2}) -> + "TLS 1.1"; +version({3,1}) -> + "TLS 1.0"; +version({3,0}) -> + "SSL 3.0"; +version({254,253}) -> + "DTLS 1.2"; +version({254,255}) -> + "DTLS 1.0"; +version({M,N}) -> + io_lib:format("TLS/DTLS [0x0~B0~B]", [M,N]). + +header_prefix(inbound) -> + "<<<"; +header_prefix(outbound) -> + ">>>". + + +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS Record Protocol +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +format_tls_record(Direction, BinMsg) -> + {Message, Size} = convert_to_hex('tls_record', BinMsg), + Header = io_lib:format("~s (~B bytes) ~s~n", + [header_prefix_tls_record(Direction), + Size, + tls_record_version(BinMsg)]), + Header ++ Message. + + +header_prefix_tls_record(inbound) -> + "reading"; +header_prefix_tls_record(outbound) -> + "writing". + + +tls_record_version([<<?BYTE(B),?BYTE(3),?BYTE(3),_/binary>>|_]) -> + io_lib:format("TLS 1.2 Record Protocol, ~s", [msg_type(B)]); +tls_record_version([<<?BYTE(B),?BYTE(3),?BYTE(2),_/binary>>|_]) -> + io_lib:format("TLS 1.1 Record Protocol, ~s", [msg_type(B)]); +tls_record_version([<<?BYTE(B),?BYTE(3),?BYTE(1),_/binary>>|_]) -> + io_lib:format("TLS 1.0 Record Protocol, ~s", [msg_type(B)]); +tls_record_version([<<?BYTE(B),?BYTE(3),?BYTE(0),_/binary>>|_]) -> + io_lib:format("SSL 3.0 Record Protocol, ~s", [msg_type(B)]); +tls_record_version([<<?BYTE(B),?BYTE(254),?BYTE(253),_/binary>>|_]) -> + io_lib:format("DTLS 1.2 Record Protocol, ~s", [msg_type(B)]); +tls_record_version([<<?BYTE(B),?BYTE(254),?BYTE(255),_/binary>>|_]) -> + io_lib:format("DTLS 1.0 Record Protocol, ~s", [msg_type(B)]); +tls_record_version([<<?BYTE(B),?BYTE(M),?BYTE(N),_/binary>>|_]) -> + io_lib:format("TLS/DTLS [0x0~B0~B] Record Protocol, ~s", [M, N, msg_type(B)]). + + +msg_type(20) -> "change_cipher_spec"; +msg_type(21) -> "alert"; +msg_type(22) -> "handshake"; +msg_type(23) -> "application_data"; +msg_type(_) -> unknown. + + +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Hex encoding functions +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +convert_to_hex(Protocol, BinMsg) -> + convert_to_hex(Protocol, BinMsg, [], [], 0). +%% +convert_to_hex(P, [], Row0, Acc, C) when C rem 16 =:= 0 -> + Row = lists:reverse(end_row(P, Row0)), + {lists:reverse(Acc) ++ Row ++ io_lib:nl(), C}; +convert_to_hex(P, [], Row0, Acc, C) -> + Row = lists:reverse(end_row(P, Row0)), + Padding = calculate_padding(Row0, Acc), + PaddedRow = string:pad(Row, Padding, leading, $ ), + {lists:reverse(Acc) ++ PaddedRow ++ io_lib:nl(), C}; +convert_to_hex(P, [H|T], Row, Acc, C) when is_list(H) -> + convert_to_hex(P, H ++ T, Row, Acc, C); +convert_to_hex(P, [<<>>|T], Row, Acc, C) -> + convert_to_hex(P, T, Row, Acc, C); + +%% First line +convert_to_hex(P, [<<A:4,B:4,R/binary>>|T], Row, Acc, C) when C =:= 0 -> + convert_to_hex(P, [<<R/binary>>|T], + update_row(<<A:4,B:4>>, Row), + prepend_first_row(P, A, B, Acc, C), + C + 1); +%% New line +convert_to_hex(P, [<<A:4,B:4,R/binary>>|T], Row, Acc, C) when C rem 16 =:= 0 -> + convert_to_hex(P, [<<R/binary>>|T], + update_row(<<A:4,B:4>>, []), + prepend_row(P, A, B, Row, Acc, C), + C + 1); +%% Add 8th hex with extra whitespace +%% 0000 - 16 03 02 00 bd 01 00 00 b9 ... +%% ^^^^ +convert_to_hex(P, [<<A:4,B:4,R/binary>>|T], Row, Acc, C) when C rem 8 =:= 7 -> + convert_to_hex(P, [<<R/binary>>|T], + update_row(<<A:4,B:4>>, Row), + prepend_eighths_hex(A, B, Acc), + C + 1); +convert_to_hex(P, [<<A:4,B:4,R/binary>>|T], Row, Acc, C) -> + convert_to_hex(P, [<<R/binary>>|T], + update_row(<<A:4,B:4>>, Row), + prepend_hex(A, B, Acc), + C + 1); +%% First line +convert_to_hex(P, [H|T], Row, Acc, C) when is_integer(H), C =:= 0 -> + convert_to_hex(P, T, + update_row(H, Row), + prepend_first_row(P, H, Acc, C), + C + 1); +%% New line +convert_to_hex(P, [H|T], Row, Acc, C) when is_integer(H), C rem 16 =:= 0 -> + convert_to_hex(P, T, + update_row(H, []), + prepend_row(P, H, Row, Acc, C), + C + 1); +%% Add 8th hex with extra whitespace +%% 0000 - 16 03 02 00 bd 01 00 00 b9 ... +%% ^^^^ +convert_to_hex(P, [H|T], Row, Acc, C) when is_integer(H), C rem 8 =:= 7 -> + convert_to_hex(P, T, + update_row(H, Row), + prepend_eighths_hex(H, Acc), + C + 1); +convert_to_hex(P, [H|T], Row, Acc, C) when is_integer(H) -> + convert_to_hex(P, T, + update_row(H, Row), + prepend_hex(H, Acc), + C + 1). + + +row_prefix(_ , N) -> + S = string:pad(string:to_lower(erlang:integer_to_list(N, 16)),4,leading,$0), + lists:reverse(lists:flatten(S ++ " - ")). + + +end_row(_, Row) -> + Row ++ " ". + + +%% Calculate padding of the "printable character" lines in order to be +%% visually aligned. +calculate_padding(Row, Acc) -> + %% Number of new line characters + NNL = (length(Acc) div 75) * length(io_lib:nl()), + %% Length of the last printed line + Length = (length(Acc) - NNL) rem 75, + %% Adjusted length of the last printed line + PaddedLength = 75 - (16 - length(Row)), %% Length + %% Padding + PaddedLength - Length. + + +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Functions operating on reversed lists +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +update_row(B, Row) when is_binary(B) -> + case binary_to_list(B) of + [C] when 32 =< C, C =< 126 -> + [C|Row]; + _Else -> + [$.|Row] + end; +update_row(C, Row) when 32 =< C, C =< 126 -> + [C|Row]; +update_row(_, Row) -> + [$.|Row]. + + +prepend_first_row(P, A, B, Acc, C) -> + prepend_hex(A, B,row_prefix(P, C) ++ Acc). +%% +prepend_first_row(P, N, Acc, C) -> + prepend_hex(N,row_prefix(P, C) ++ Acc). + +prepend_row(P, A, B, Row, Acc, C) -> + prepend_hex(A, B,row_prefix(P, C) ++ io_lib:nl() ++ end_row(P, Row) ++ Acc). +%% +prepend_row(P, N, Row, Acc, C) -> + prepend_hex(N,row_prefix(P, C) ++ io_lib:nl() ++ end_row(P, Row) ++ Acc). + + + +prepend_hex(A, B, Acc) -> + [$ ,?DEC2HEX(B),?DEC2HEX(A)|Acc]. +%% +prepend_hex(N, Acc) -> + " " ++ number_to_hex(N) ++ Acc. + + +prepend_eighths_hex(A, B, Acc) -> + [$ ,$ ,?DEC2HEX(B),?DEC2HEX(A)|Acc]. +%% +prepend_eighths_hex(N, Acc) -> + " " ++ number_to_hex(N) ++ Acc. + +number_to_hex(N) -> + case string:to_lower(erlang:integer_to_list(N, 16)) of + H when length(H) < 2 -> + lists:append(H, "0"); + H -> + lists:reverse(H) + end. + +format_uknown_cipher_suite(<<?BYTE(X), ?BYTE(Y)>>) -> + "0x" ++ number_to_hex(X) ++ "0x" ++ number_to_hex(Y). + diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl index c56675b691..456a560bf6 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl @@ -516,10 +516,10 @@ last_delay_timer({{_,_},_}, TRef, {LastServer, _}) -> last_delay_timer({_,_}, TRef, {_, LastClient}) -> {TRef, LastClient}. -%% If we can not generate a not allready in use session ID in +%% If we cannot generate a not allready in use session ID in %% ?GEN_UNIQUE_ID_MAX_TRIES we make the new session uncacheable The %% value of ?GEN_UNIQUE_ID_MAX_TRIES is stolen from open SSL which -%% states : "If we can not find a session id in +%% states : "If we cannot find a session id in %% ?GEN_UNIQUE_ID_MAX_TRIES either the RAND code is broken or someone %% is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL %% sessions to our server" @@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ new_id(Port, Tries, Cache, CacheCb) -> case CacheCb:lookup(Cache, {Port, Id}) of undefined -> Now = erlang:monotonic_time(), - %% New sessions can not be set to resumable + %% New sessions cannot be set to resumable %% until handshake is compleate and the %% other session values are set. CacheCb:update(Cache, {Port, Id}, #session{session_id = Id, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl index f7ddbd060e..dec48fa914 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). -include_lib("kernel/include/file.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). -export([create/1, create_pem_cache/1, add_crls/3, remove_crls/2, remove/1, add_trusted_certs/3, @@ -311,7 +312,7 @@ decode_certs(Ref, Cert) -> error:_ -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL WARNING: Ignoring a CA cert as " "it could not be correctly decoded.~n", []), - error_logger:info_report(Report), + ?LOG_NOTICE(Report), undefined end. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl index 1a36b2dba8..867d2cfc5a 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ -module(ssl_record). -include("ssl_record.hrl"). +-include("ssl_connection.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). @@ -39,7 +40,8 @@ set_renegotiation_flag/2, set_client_verify_data/3, set_server_verify_data/3, - empty_connection_state/2, initial_connection_state/2, record_protocol_role/1]). + empty_connection_state/2, initial_connection_state/2, record_protocol_role/1, + step_encryption_state/1]). %% Compression -export([compress/3, uncompress/3, compressions/0]). @@ -120,6 +122,22 @@ activate_pending_connection_state(#{current_write := Current, }. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec step_encryption_state(#state{}) -> #state{}. +%% +%% Description: Activates the next encyrption state (e.g. handshake +%% encryption). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +step_encryption_state(#state{connection_states = + #{pending_read := PendingRead, + pending_write := PendingWrite} = ConnStates} = State) -> + NewRead = PendingRead#{sequence_number => 0}, + NewWrite = PendingWrite#{sequence_number => 0}, + State#state{connection_states = + ConnStates#{current_read => NewRead, + current_write => NewWrite}}. + + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec set_security_params(#security_parameters{}, #security_parameters{}, connection_states()) -> connection_states(). %% @@ -280,13 +298,12 @@ compress(?NULL, Data, CS) -> {Data, CS}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec compressions() -> [binary()]. +-spec compressions() -> [integer()]. %% %% Description: return a list of compressions supported (currently none) %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- compressions() -> - [?byte(?NULL)]. - + [?NULL]. %%==================================================================== %% Payload encryption/decryption @@ -378,7 +395,7 @@ decipher_aead(Type, #cipher_state{key = Key} = CipherState, AAD0, CipherFragment try Nonce = decrypt_nonce(Type, CipherState, CipherFragment), {AAD, CipherText, CipherTag} = aead_ciphertext_split(Type, CipherState, CipherFragment, AAD0), - case ssl_cipher:aead_decrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, CipherText, CipherTag, AAD) of + case ssl_cipher:aead_decrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, CipherText, CipherTag, AAD) of Content when is_binary(Content) -> Content; _ -> @@ -454,34 +471,43 @@ initial_security_params(ConnectionEnd) -> -define(end_additional_data(AAD, Len), << (begin(AAD)end)/binary, ?UINT16(begin(Len)end) >>). -do_cipher_aead(?CHACHA20_POLY1305 = Type, Fragment, #cipher_state{key=Key} = CipherState, AAD0) -> +do_cipher_aead(?CHACHA20_POLY1305 = Type, Fragment, #cipher_state{key=Key, tag_len = TagLen} = CipherState, AAD0) -> AAD = ?end_additional_data(AAD0, erlang:iolist_size(Fragment)), - Nonce = encrypt_nonce(Type, CipherState), - {Content, CipherTag} = ssl_cipher:aead_encrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, Fragment, AAD), + Nonce = chacha_nonce(CipherState), + {Content, CipherTag} = ssl_cipher:aead_encrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, Fragment, AAD, TagLen), {<<Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>, CipherState}; -do_cipher_aead(Type, Fragment, #cipher_state{key=Key, nonce = ExplicitNonce} = CipherState, AAD0) -> +do_cipher_aead(Type, Fragment, #cipher_state{key=Key, tag_len = TagLen, nonce = ExplicitNonce} = CipherState, AAD0) -> AAD = ?end_additional_data(AAD0, erlang:iolist_size(Fragment)), Nonce = encrypt_nonce(Type, CipherState), - {Content, CipherTag} = ssl_cipher:aead_encrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, Fragment, AAD), + {Content, CipherTag} = ssl_cipher:aead_encrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, Fragment, AAD, TagLen), {<<ExplicitNonce:64/integer, Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>, CipherState#cipher_state{nonce = ExplicitNonce + 1}}. -encrypt_nonce(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, #cipher_state{nonce = Nonce, iv = IV}) -> - crypto:exor(<<?UINT32(0), Nonce/binary>>, IV); -encrypt_nonce(?AES_GCM, #cipher_state{iv = IV, nonce = ExplicitNonce}) -> + +chacha_nonce(#cipher_state{nonce = Nonce, iv = IV}) -> + crypto:exor(<<?UINT32(0), Nonce/binary>>, IV). + +encrypt_nonce(Type, #cipher_state{iv = IV, nonce = ExplicitNonce}) when Type == ?AES_GCM; + Type == ?AES_CCM; + Type == ?AES_CCM_8 -> <<Salt:4/bytes, _/binary>> = IV, <<Salt/binary, ExplicitNonce:64/integer>>. -decrypt_nonce(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, #cipher_state{nonce = Nonce, iv = IV}, _) -> - crypto:exor(<<Nonce:96/unsigned-big-integer>>, IV); -decrypt_nonce(?AES_GCM, #cipher_state{iv = <<Salt:4/bytes, _/binary>>}, <<ExplicitNonce:8/bytes, _/binary>>) -> - <<Salt/binary, ExplicitNonce/binary>>. +decrypt_nonce(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, CipherState, _) -> + chacha_nonce(CipherState); +decrypt_nonce(Type, #cipher_state{iv = <<Salt:4/bytes, _/binary>>}, <<ExplicitNonce:8/bytes, _/binary>>) when + Type == ?AES_GCM; + Type == ?AES_CCM; + Type == ?AES_CCM_8 -> + <<Salt/binary, ExplicitNonce/binary>>. -compile({inline, [aead_ciphertext_split/4]}). aead_ciphertext_split(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, #cipher_state{tag_len = Len}, CipherTextFragment, AAD) -> CipherLen = byte_size(CipherTextFragment) - Len, <<CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:Len/bytes>> = CipherTextFragment, {?end_additional_data(AAD, CipherLen), CipherText, CipherTag}; -aead_ciphertext_split(?AES_GCM, #cipher_state{tag_len = Len}, CipherTextFragment, AAD) -> +aead_ciphertext_split(Type, #cipher_state{tag_len = Len}, CipherTextFragment, AAD) when Type == ?AES_GCM; + Type == ?AES_CCM; + Type == ?AES_CCM_8 -> CipherLen = byte_size(CipherTextFragment) - (Len + 8), %% 8 is length of explicit Nonce << _:8/bytes, CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:Len/bytes>> = CipherTextFragment, {?end_additional_data(AAD, CipherLen), CipherText, CipherTag}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl index a927fba0de..6d4d47cedb 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ -define(INITIAL_BYTES, 5). -define(MAX_SEQENCE_NUMBER, 18446744073709551615). %% (1 bsl 64) - 1 = 18446744073709551615 -%% Sequence numbers can not wrap so when max is about to be reached we should renegotiate. +%% Sequence numbers cannot wrap so when max is about to be reached we should renegotiate. %% We will renegotiate a little before so that there will be sequence numbers left %% for the rehandshake and a little data. Currently we decided to renegotiate a little more %% often as we can have a cheaper test to check if it is time to renegotiate. It will still @@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ -define(AES_CBC, 7). -define(AES_GCM, 8). -define(CHACHA20_POLY1305, 9). +%% Following two are not defined in any RFC but we want to have the +%% same type of handling internaly, all of these "bulk_cipher_algorithm" +%% enums are only used internaly anyway. +-define(AES_CCM, 10). +-define(AES_CCM_8, 11). %% CipherType -define(STREAM, 0). @@ -140,6 +145,7 @@ -define(ALERT, 21). -define(HANDSHAKE, 22). -define(APPLICATION_DATA, 23). +-define(HEARTBEAT, 24). -define(KNOWN_RECORD_TYPE(Type), (is_integer(Type) andalso (20 =< (Type)) andalso ((Type) =< 23))). -define(MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, 16384). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl index 52e5db731a..3998f03519 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl @@ -31,13 +31,15 @@ -include("tls_connection.hrl"). -include("tls_handshake.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("tls_record.hrl"). -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). -include("ssl_api.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_srp.hrl"). --include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% Internal application API @@ -49,7 +51,8 @@ handle_protocol_record/3]). %% Handshake handling --export([renegotiation/2, renegotiate/2, send_handshake/2, +-export([renegotiation/2, renegotiate/2, send_handshake/2, + send_handshake_flight/1, queue_handshake/2, queue_change_cipher/2, reinit/1, reinit_handshake_data/1, select_sni_extension/1, empty_connection_state/2]). @@ -60,15 +63,32 @@ close/5, protocol_name/0]). %% Data handling --export([next_record/1, socket/4, setopts/3, getopts/3]). +-export([socket/4, setopts/3, getopts/3]). %% gen_statem state functions -export([init/3, error/3, downgrade/3, %% Initiation and take down states hello/3, user_hello/3, certify/3, cipher/3, abbreviated/3, %% Handshake states connection/3]). +%% TLS 1.3 state functions (server) +-export([start/3, %% common state with client + negotiated/3, + recvd_ch/3, + wait_cert/3, %% common state with client + wait_cv/3, %% common state with client + wait_eoed/3, + wait_finished/3, %% common state with client + wait_flight2/3, + connected/3 %% common state with client + ]). +%% TLS 1.3 state functions (client) +-export([wait_cert_cr/3, + wait_ee/3, + wait_sh/3 + ]). %% gen_statem callbacks -export([callback_mode/0, terminate/3, code_change/4, format_status/2]). +-export([encode_handshake/4]). -define(DIST_CNTRL_SPAWN_OPTS, [{priority, max}]). @@ -142,87 +162,111 @@ pids(#state{protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}}) -> %%==================================================================== %% State transition handling %%==================================================================== -next_record(#state{handshake_env = +next_record(_, #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = HsEnv} = State) when N > 0 -> {no_record, State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}}; -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = [_|_] = CipherTexts}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) -> +next_record(_, #state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = [_|_] = CipherTexts}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) -> next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Check); -next_record(#state{user_data_buffer = {_,0,_}, - protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = []}, - protocol_specific = #{active_n_toggle := true, - active_n := N} = ProtocolSpec, - static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, - close_tag = CloseTag, - transport_cb = Transport} - } = State) -> +next_record(connection, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = []}, + protocol_specific = #{active_n_toggle := true} + } = State) -> + %% If ssl application user is not reading data wait to activate socket + flow_ctrl(State); + +next_record(_, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = []}, + protocol_specific = #{active_n_toggle := true} + } = State) -> + activate_socket(State); +next_record(_, State) -> + {no_record, State}. + + +flow_ctrl(#state{user_data_buffer = {_,Size,_}, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}, + bytes_to_read = undefined} = State) when Size =/= 0 -> + {no_record, State}; +flow_ctrl(#state{user_data_buffer = {_,Size,_}, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}, + bytes_to_read = 0} = State) when Size =/= 0 -> + {no_record, State}; +flow_ctrl(#state{user_data_buffer = {_,Size,_}, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}, + bytes_to_read = BytesToRead} = State) when (Size >= BytesToRead) andalso + (BytesToRead > 0) -> + {no_record, State}; +flow_ctrl(State) -> + activate_socket(State). + + +activate_socket(#state{protocol_specific = #{active_n_toggle := true, active_n := N} = ProtocolSpec, + static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, + close_tag = CloseTag, + transport_cb = Transport} + } = State) -> case tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, N}]) of - ok -> + ok -> {no_record, State#state{protocol_specific = ProtocolSpec#{active_n_toggle => false}}}; - _ -> + _ -> self() ! {CloseTag, Socket}, {no_record, State} - end; -next_record(State) -> - {no_record, State}. + end. %% Decipher next record and concatenate consecutive ?APPLICATION_DATA records into one %% next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Check) -> next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Check, []). %% -next_record(State, [#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA} = CT|CipherTexts], ConnectionStates0, Check, Acc) -> - case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnectionStates0, Check) of - {#ssl_tls{fragment = Fragment}, ConnectionStates} -> - next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Check, [Fragment|Acc]); - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert - end; -next_record(State, [CT|CipherTexts], ConnectionStates0, Check, []) -> - case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnectionStates0, Check) of - {Record, ConnectionStates} -> +next_record(#state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State, + [CT|CipherTexts], ConnectionStates0, Check, Acc) -> + case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(Version, CT, ConnectionStates0, Check) of + {#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Fragment}, ConnectionStates} -> + case CipherTexts of + [] -> + %% End of cipher texts - build and deliver an ?APPLICATION_DATA record + %% from the accumulated fragments + next_record_done(State, [], ConnectionStates, + #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, + fragment = iolist_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc, [Fragment]))}); + [_|_] -> + next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Check, [Fragment|Acc]) + end; + {Record, ConnectionStates} when Acc =:= [] -> + %% Singelton non-?APPLICATION_DATA record - deliver next_record_done(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Record); + {_Record, _ConnectionStates_to_forget} -> + %% Not ?APPLICATION_DATA but we have accumulated fragments + %% -> build an ?APPLICATION_DATA record with concatenated fragments + %% and forget about decrypting this record - we'll decrypt it again next time + next_record_done(State, [CT|CipherTexts], ConnectionStates0, + #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = iolist_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc))}); #alert{} = Alert -> Alert - end; -next_record(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, _Check, Acc) -> - %% Not ?APPLICATION_DATA but we have a nonempty Acc - %% -> build an ?APPLICATION_DATA record with the accumulated fragments - next_record_done(State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, - #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = iolist_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc))}). + end. next_record_done(#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers} = State, CipherTexts, ConnectionStates, Record) -> {Record, State#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = CipherTexts}, connection_states = ConnectionStates}}. - next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). %% next_event(StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) -> - case next_record(State0) of + case next_record(StateName, State0) of {no_record, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, Actions}; - {#ssl_tls{} = Record, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); + {Record, State} -> + next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions) end; -next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions) -> - case Record of - no_record -> - {next_state, StateName, State, Actions}; - #ssl_tls{} = Record -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} - end. - +next_event(StateName, #ssl_tls{} = Record, State, Actions) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; +next_event(StateName, #alert{} = Alert, State, Actions) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]}. %%% TLS record protocol level application data messages handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, @@ -256,7 +300,8 @@ handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> try - {Packets, Buf} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version,Data,Buf0, Options), + EffectiveVersion = effective_version(Version, Options), + {Packets, Buf} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(EffectiveVersion,Data,Buf0, Options), State = State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf}}, @@ -272,8 +317,7 @@ handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, _ -> HsEnv = State#state.handshake_env, {next_state, StateName, - State#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers, - handshake_env = + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}}, Events} end @@ -293,8 +337,8 @@ handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, [] -> ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, empty_alert), Version, StateName, State); - #alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) catch _:_ -> ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, alert_decode_error), @@ -337,27 +381,36 @@ renegotiate(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = server, send_handshake(Handshake, State) -> send_handshake_flight(queue_handshake(Handshake, State)). + queue_handshake(Handshake, #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist0} = HsEnv, connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, flight_buffer = Flight0, + ssl_options = SslOpts, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> {BinHandshake, ConnectionStates, Hist} = encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hist0), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'handshake', Handshake), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'record', BinHandshake), + State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist}, flight_buffer = Flight0 ++ [BinHandshake]}. + send_handshake_flight(#state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport}, flight_buffer = Flight} = State0) -> tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Flight), {State0#state{flight_buffer = []}, []}. + queue_change_cipher(Msg, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, flight_buffer = Flight0, + ssl_options = SslOpts, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> {BinChangeCipher, ConnectionStates} = encode_change_cipher(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'record', BinChangeCipher), State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, flight_buffer = Flight0 ++ [BinChangeCipher]}. @@ -377,8 +430,8 @@ reinit_handshake_data(#state{handshake_env = HsEnv} =State) -> premaster_secret = undefined} }. -select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = HelloExtensions}) -> - HelloExtensions#hello_extensions.sni; +select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = #{sni := SNI}}) -> + SNI; select_sni_extension(_) -> undefined. @@ -388,6 +441,7 @@ empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> %%==================================================================== %% Alert and close handling %%==================================================================== + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec encode_alert(#alert{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. @@ -400,10 +454,12 @@ encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) -> send_alert(Alert, #state{static_env = #static_env{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport}, connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + ssl_options = SslOpts, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = StateData0) -> {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'record', BinMsg), StateData0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. %% If an ALERT sent in the connection state, should cause the TLS @@ -490,22 +546,27 @@ init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, connection_states = ConnectionStates0 } = State0) -> + KeyShare = maybe_generate_client_shares(SslOpts), Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, - Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), - - Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version, - HelloVersion = tls_record:hello_version(Version, SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), + Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert, KeyShare), + + HelloVersion = tls_record:hello_version(SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), Handshake0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Hello, HelloVersion, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'handshake', Hello), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'record', BinMsg), + State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, %% Requested version + connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = HelloVersion}, %% Requested version session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}, handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Handshake}, - start_or_recv_from = From}, + start_or_recv_from = From, + key_share = KeyShare}, next_event(hello, no_record, State, [{{timeout, handshake}, Timeout, close}]); + init(Type, Event, State) -> gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). @@ -536,14 +597,15 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{hello = Hello}}, - [{reply, From, {ok, ssl_connection:map_extensions(Extensions)}}]}; + [{reply, From, {ok, Extensions}}]}; hello(internal, #server_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, handshake_env = HsEnv, start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{hello = Hello}}, - [{reply, From, {ok, ssl_connection:map_extensions(Extensions)}}]}; + [{reply, From, {ok, Extensions}}]}; + hello(internal, #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, static_env = #static_env{ @@ -556,27 +618,40 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, connection_env = CEnv, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> - case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, - ConnectionStates0, Cert, KeyExAlg}, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, - State#state{connection_env = - CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = ClientVersion}}); - {Version, {Type, Session}, - ConnectionStates, Protocol0, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} -> - Protocol = case Protocol0 of - undefined -> CurrentProtocol; - _ -> Protocol0 - end, - gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, - State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, - handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{ - hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, - client_hello_version = ClientVersion, - negotiated_protocol = Protocol}, - session = Session - }) + + case choose_tls_version(SslOpts, Hello) of + 'tls_v1.3' -> + %% Continue in TLS 1.3 'start' state + {next_state, start, State, [{next_event, internal, Hello}]}; + 'tls_v1.2' -> + case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, + SslOpts, + {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, + ConnectionStates0, Cert, KeyExAlg}, + Renegotiation) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, + State#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version + = ClientVersion}}); + {Version, {Type, Session}, + ConnectionStates, Protocol0, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} -> + Protocol = case Protocol0 of + undefined -> CurrentProtocol; + _ -> Protocol0 + end, + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, + internal, + {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, + State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{ + hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, + client_hello_version = ClientVersion, + negotiated_protocol = Protocol}, + session = Session + }) + end + end; hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, @@ -587,10 +662,16 @@ hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOptions, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of #alert{} = Alert -> %%TODO ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, hello, - State#state{connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = ReqVersion}}); + State#state{connection_env = + CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = ReqVersion}}); + %% Legacy TLS 1.2 and older {Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} -> ssl_connection:handle_session(Hello, - Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol, State) + Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol, State); + %% TLS 1.3 + {next_state, wait_sh} -> + %% Continue in TLS 1.3 'wait_sh' state + {next_state, wait_sh, State, [{next_event, internal, Hello}]} end; hello(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); @@ -681,7 +762,7 @@ connection(internal, #hello_request{}, try tls_sender:peer_renegotiate(Pid) of {ok, Write} -> Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, SslOpts, - Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), + Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert, undefined), {State, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates#{current_write => Write}}), next_event(hello, no_record, State#state{session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}, Actions) @@ -700,7 +781,8 @@ connection(internal, #hello_request{}, ssl_options = SslOpts, connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State0) -> Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, SslOpts, - Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), + Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert, undefined), + {State, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State0), next_event(hello, no_record, State#state{session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}, Actions); @@ -730,6 +812,11 @@ connection(internal, #client_hello{}, State = reinit_handshake_data(State0), next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +connection(internal, #new_session_ticket{}, State) -> + %% TLS 1.3 + %% Drop NewSessionTicket (currently not supported) + next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); + connection(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). @@ -755,7 +842,119 @@ downgrade(info, {CloseTag, Socket}, downgrade(info, Info, State) -> handle_info(Info, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); downgrade(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). + ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS 1.3 state functions +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec start(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +start(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +start(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec negotiated(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +negotiated(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +negotiated(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec recvd_ch(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +recvd_ch(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +recvd_ch(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_cert(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_cert(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_cert(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_cv(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_cv(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_cv(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_eoed(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_eoed(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_eoed(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_finished(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_finished(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_finished(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_flight2(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_flight2(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_flight2(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec connected(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +connected(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +connected(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_cert_cr(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_cert_cr(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_cert_cr(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_ee(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_ee(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_ee(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_sh(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_sh(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_sh(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + %-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% gen_statem callbacks %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -786,7 +985,6 @@ initial_state(Role, Sender, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, Trac #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation, erl_dist = IsErlDist} = SSLOptions, ConnectionStates = tls_record:init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation), - SessionCacheCb = case application:get_env(ssl, session_cb) of {ok, Cb} when is_atom(Cb) -> Cb; @@ -843,8 +1041,9 @@ initialize_tls_sender(#state{static_env = #static_env{ tracker = Tracker }, connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, - socket_options = SockOpts, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}, + socket_options = SockOpts, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt, + log_level = LogLevel}, connection_states = #{current_write := ConnectionWriteState}, protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}}) -> Init = #{current_write => ConnectionWriteState, @@ -854,24 +1053,30 @@ initialize_tls_sender(#state{static_env = #static_env{ tracker => Tracker, transport_cb => Transport, negotiated_version => Version, - renegotiate_at => RenegotiateAt}, + renegotiate_at => RenegotiateAt, + log_level => LogLevel}, tls_sender:initialize(Sender, Init). next_tls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_record_buffer = Buf0, - tls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers} = State0) -> + tls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) -> Versions = + %% TLS 1.3 Client/Server + %% - Ignore TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version + %% - Verify that TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version is set to 0x0303 for all records + %% other than an initial ClientHello, where it MAY also be 0x0301. case StateName of hello -> [tls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS]; _ -> State0#state.connection_env#connection_env.negotiated_version end, - case tls_record:get_tls_records(Data, Versions, Buf0) of + case tls_record:get_tls_records(Data, Versions, Buf0, SslOpts) of {Records, Buf1} -> CT1 = CT0 ++ Records, - next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers = + next_record(StateName, State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_record_buffer = Buf1, tls_cipher_texts = CT1}}); #alert{} = Alert -> @@ -987,12 +1192,26 @@ gen_handshake(StateName, Type, Event, Version, StateName, State) end. + +gen_handshake_1_3(StateName, Type, Event, + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> + try tls_connection_1_3:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + malformed_handshake_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end. + + gen_info(Event, connection = StateName, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of Result -> Result catch - _:_ -> + _:_ -> ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, malformed_data), Version, StateName, State) @@ -1008,6 +1227,29 @@ gen_info(Event, StateName, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_ve malformed_handshake_data), Version, StateName, State) end. + +gen_info_1_3(Event, connected = StateName, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> + try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, + malformed_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end; + +gen_info_1_3(Event, StateName, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> + try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + malformed_handshake_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end. + unprocessed_events(Events) -> %% The first handshake event will be processed immediately @@ -1052,3 +1294,35 @@ ensure_sender_terminate(_, #state{protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}}) -> end end, spawn(Kill). + +maybe_generate_client_shares(#ssl_options{ + versions = [Version|_], + supported_groups = + #supported_groups{ + supported_groups = [Group|_]}}) + when Version =:= {3,4} -> + %% Generate only key_share entry for the most preferred group + ssl_cipher:generate_client_shares([Group]); +maybe_generate_client_shares(_) -> + undefined. + +choose_tls_version(#ssl_options{versions = Versions}, + #client_hello{ + extensions = #{client_hello_versions := + #client_hello_versions{versions = ClientVersions} + } + }) -> + case ssl_handshake:select_supported_version(ClientVersions, Versions) of + {3,4} -> + 'tls_v1.3'; + _Else -> + 'tls_v1.2' + end; +choose_tls_version(_, _) -> + 'tls_v1.2'. + + +effective_version(undefined, #ssl_options{versions = [Version|_]}) -> + Version; +effective_version(Version, _) -> + Version. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_1_3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_1_3.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..117e4f059d --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_1_3.erl @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +%% +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Purpose: TODO +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +%% RFC 8446 +%% A.1. Client +%% +%% START <----+ +%% Send ClientHello | | Recv HelloRetryRequest +%% [K_send = early data] | | +%% v | +%% / WAIT_SH ----+ +%% | | Recv ServerHello +%% | | K_recv = handshake +%% Can | V +%% send | WAIT_EE +%% early | | Recv EncryptedExtensions +%% data | +--------+--------+ +%% | Using | | Using certificate +%% | PSK | v +%% | | WAIT_CERT_CR +%% | | Recv | | Recv CertificateRequest +%% | | Certificate | v +%% | | | WAIT_CERT +%% | | | | Recv Certificate +%% | | v v +%% | | WAIT_CV +%% | | | Recv CertificateVerify +%% | +> WAIT_FINISHED <+ +%% | | Recv Finished +%% \ | [Send EndOfEarlyData] +%% | K_send = handshake +%% | [Send Certificate [+ CertificateVerify]] +%% Can send | Send Finished +%% app data --> | K_send = K_recv = application +%% after here v +%% CONNECTED +%% +%% A.2. Server +%% +%% START <-----+ +%% Recv ClientHello | | Send HelloRetryRequest +%% v | +%% RECVD_CH ----+ +%% | Select parameters +%% v +%% NEGOTIATED +%% | Send ServerHello +%% | K_send = handshake +%% | Send EncryptedExtensions +%% | [Send CertificateRequest] +%% Can send | [Send Certificate + CertificateVerify] +%% app data | Send Finished +%% after --> | K_send = application +%% here +--------+--------+ +%% No 0-RTT | | 0-RTT +%% | | +%% K_recv = handshake | | K_recv = early data +%% [Skip decrypt errors] | +------> WAIT_EOED -+ +%% | | Recv | | Recv EndOfEarlyData +%% | | early data | | K_recv = handshake +%% | +------------+ | +%% | | +%% +> WAIT_FLIGHT2 <--------+ +%% | +%% +--------+--------+ +%% No auth | | Client auth +%% | | +%% | v +%% | WAIT_CERT +%% | Recv | | Recv Certificate +%% | empty | v +%% | Certificate | WAIT_CV +%% | | | Recv +%% | v | CertificateVerify +%% +-> WAIT_FINISHED <---+ +%% | Recv Finished +%% | K_recv = application +%% v +%% CONNECTED + +-module(tls_connection_1_3). + +-include("ssl_alert.hrl"). +-include("ssl_connection.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). + +%% gen_statem helper functions +-export([start/4, + negotiated/4, + wait_cert/4, + wait_cv/4, + wait_finished/4, + wait_sh/4, + wait_ee/4, + wait_cert_cr/4 + ]). + + +start(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +start(internal, #client_hello{} = Hello, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_start(Hello, State0) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, start, State0); + {State, start} -> + {next_state, start, State, []}; + {State, negotiated} -> + {next_state, negotiated, State, [{next_event, internal, start_handshake}]} + end; +start(internal, #server_hello{} = ServerHello, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_start(ServerHello, State0) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, start, State0); + {State, NextState} -> + {next_state, NextState, State, []} + end; +start(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> + ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). + + +negotiated(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +negotiated(internal, Message, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_negotiated(Message, State0) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, negotiated, State0); + {State, NextState} -> + {next_state, NextState, State, []} + end. + + +wait_cert(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +wait_cert(internal, + #certificate_1_3{} = Certificate, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_cert(Certificate, State0) of + {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, wait_cert, State); + {State, NextState} -> + tls_connection:next_event(NextState, no_record, State) + end; +wait_cert(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> + ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). + + +wait_cv(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +wait_cv(internal, + #certificate_verify_1_3{} = CertificateVerify, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_cv(CertificateVerify, State0) of + {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, wait_cv, State); + {State, NextState} -> + tls_connection:next_event(NextState, no_record, State) + end; +wait_cv(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> + ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). + + +wait_finished(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +wait_finished(internal, + #finished{} = Finished, State0, Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_finished(Finished, State0) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, finished, State0); + State1 -> + {Record, State} = ssl_connection:prepare_connection(State1, Module), + tls_connection:next_event(connection, Record, State) + end; +wait_finished(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> + ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). + + +wait_sh(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +wait_sh(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_sh(Hello, State0) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, wait_sh, State0); + {State1, start, ServerHello} -> + %% hello_retry_request: go to start + {next_state, start, State1, [{next_event, internal, ServerHello}]}; + {State1, wait_ee} -> + tls_connection:next_event(wait_ee, no_record, State1) + end; +wait_sh(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> + ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). + + +wait_ee(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +wait_ee(internal, #encrypted_extensions{} = EE, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_ee(EE, State0) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, wait_ee, State0); + {State1, NextState} -> + tls_connection:next_event(NextState, no_record, State1) + end; +wait_ee(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> + ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). + + +wait_cert_cr(internal, #change_cipher_spec{}, State, _Module) -> + tls_connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State); +wait_cert_cr(internal, #certificate_1_3{} = Certificate, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_cert_cr(Certificate, State0) of + {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, wait_cert_cr, State); + {State1, NextState} -> + tls_connection:next_event(NextState, no_record, State1) + end; +wait_cert_cr(internal, #certificate_request_1_3{} = CertificateRequest, State0, _Module) -> + case tls_handshake_1_3:do_wait_cert_cr(CertificateRequest, State0) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, wait_cert_cr, State0); + {State1, NextState} -> + tls_connection:next_event(NextState, no_record, State1) + end; +wait_cert_cr(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> + ssl_connection:handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl index c2b0d8e039..37265e0759 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl @@ -26,15 +26,17 @@ -module(tls_handshake). -include("tls_handshake.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). -include("tls_record.hrl"). -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). -include("ssl_api.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% Handshake handling --export([client_hello/8, hello/4]). +-export([client_hello/9, hello/4]). %% Handshake encoding -export([encode_handshake/2]). @@ -49,7 +51,8 @@ %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec client_hello(ssl:host(), inet:port_number(), ssl_record:connection_states(), - #ssl_options{}, integer(), atom(), boolean(), der_cert()) -> + #ssl_options{}, integer(), atom(), boolean(), der_cert(), + #key_share_client_hello{} | undefined) -> #client_hello{}. %% %% Description: Creates a client hello message. @@ -59,19 +62,32 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, ciphers = UserSuites, fallback = Fallback } = SslOpts, - Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert) -> + Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert, KeyShare) -> Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions), + + %% In TLS 1.3, the client indicates its version preferences in the + %% "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1) and the + %% legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the version + %% number for TLS 1.2. + LegacyVersion = + case tls_record:is_higher(Version, {3,2}) of + true -> + {3,3}; + false -> + Version + end, #{security_parameters := SecParams} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), AvailableCipherSuites = ssl_handshake:available_suites(UserSuites, Version), Extensions = ssl_handshake:client_hello_extensions(Version, AvailableCipherSuites, SslOpts, ConnectionStates, - Renegotiation), + Renegotiation, + KeyShare), CipherSuites = ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(AvailableCipherSuites, Renegotiation, Fallback), Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert), #client_hello{session_id = Id, - client_version = Version, + client_version = LegacyVersion, cipher_suites = CipherSuites, compression_methods = ssl_record:compressions(), random = SecParams#security_parameters.client_random, @@ -88,15 +104,92 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, ssl_record:connection_states(), alpn | npn, binary() | undefined}| {tls_record:tls_version(), {resumed | new, #session{}}, ssl_record:connection_states(), binary() | undefined, - #hello_extensions{}, {ssl:hash(), ssl:sign_algo()} | - undefined} | #alert{}. + HelloExt::map(), {ssl:hash(), ssl:sign_algo()} | + undefined} | {atom(), atom()} |#alert{}. %% %% Description: Handles a received hello message %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, random = Random, + + +%% TLS 1.3 - Section 4.1.3 +%% TLS 1.3 clients receiving a ServerHello indicating TLS 1.2 or below +%% MUST check that the last eight bytes are not equal to either of these +%% values. +hello(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, + random = <<_:24/binary,Down:8/binary>>}, + #ssl_options{versions = [{M,N}|_]}, _, _) + when (M > 3 orelse M =:= 3 andalso N >= 4) andalso %% TLS 1.3 client + (Major =:= 3 andalso Minor =:= 3 andalso %% Negotiating TLS 1.2 + Down =:= ?RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS12) orelse + + (M > 3 orelse M =:= 3 andalso N >= 4) andalso %% TLS 1.3 client + (Major =:= 3 andalso Minor < 3 andalso %% Negotiating TLS 1.1 or prior + Down =:= ?RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS11) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + +%% TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last eight bytes are not +%% equal to the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS 1.1 or below. +hello(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, + random = <<_:24/binary,Down:8/binary>>}, + #ssl_options{versions = [{M,N}|_]}, _, _) + when (M =:= 3 andalso N =:= 3) andalso %% TLS 1.2 client + (Major =:= 3 andalso Minor < 3 andalso %% Negotiating TLS 1.1 or prior + Down =:= ?RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS11) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + + +%% TLS 1.3 - 4.2.1. Supported Versions +%% If the "supported_versions" extension in the ServerHello contains a +%% version not offered by the client or contains a version prior to TLS +%% 1.3, the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" +%% alert. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS 1.2 Client +%% +%% - If "supported_version" is present (ServerHello): +%% - Abort handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert +hello(#server_hello{server_version = LegacyVersion, + random = Random, + cipher_suite = CipherSuite, + compression_method = Compression, + session_id = SessionId, + extensions = #{server_hello_selected_version := + #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = Version} = HelloExt} + }, + #ssl_options{versions = SupportedVersions} = SslOpt, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> + %% In TLS 1.3, the TLS server indicates its version using the "supported_versions" extension + %% (Section 4.2.1), and the legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the version + %% number for TLS 1.2. + %% The "supported_versions" extension is supported from TLS 1.2. + case LegacyVersion > {3,3} orelse + LegacyVersion =:= {3,3} andalso Version < {3,3} of + true -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + false -> + case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, SupportedVersions) of + true -> + case Version of + {3,3} -> + %% TLS 1.2 ServerHello with "supported_versions" (special case) + handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, + Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation); + {3,4} -> + %% TLS 1.3 + {next_state, wait_sh} + end; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) + end + end; + +hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, + random = Random, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression, - session_id = SessionId, extensions = HelloExt}, + session_id = SessionId, + extensions = HelloExt}, #ssl_options{versions = SupportedVersions} = SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, SupportedVersions) of @@ -107,6 +200,36 @@ hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, random = Random, false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION) end; + + +%% TLS 1.2 Server +%% - If "supported_versions" is present (ClientHello): +%% - Select version from "supported_versions" (ignore ClientHello.legacy_version) +%% - If server only supports versions greater than "supported_versions": +%% - Abort handshake with a "protocol_version" alert (*) +%% - If "supported_versions" is absent (ClientHello): +%% - Negotiate the minimum of ClientHello.legacy_version and TLS 1.2 (**) +%% - If server only supports versions greater than ClientHello.legacy_version: +%% - Abort handshake with a "protocol_version" alert +%% +%% (*) Sends alert even if there is a gap in supported versions +%% e.g. Server 1.0,1.2 Client 1.1,1.3 +%% (**) Current implementation can negotiate a version not supported by the client +%% e.g. Server 1.0,1.2 Client 1.1 -> ServerHello 1.0 +hello(#client_hello{client_version = _ClientVersion, + cipher_suites = CipherSuites, + extensions = #{client_hello_versions := + #client_hello_versions{versions = ClientVersions} + }} = Hello, + #ssl_options{versions = Versions} = SslOpts, + Info, Renegotiation) -> + try + Version = ssl_handshake:select_supported_version(ClientVersions, Versions), + do_hello(Version, Versions, CipherSuites, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) + catch + _:_ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, malformed_handshake_data) + end; hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion, cipher_suites = CipherSuites} = Hello, @@ -114,18 +237,7 @@ hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion, Info, Renegotiation) -> try Version = ssl_handshake:select_version(tls_record, ClientVersion, Versions), - case ssl_cipher:is_fallback(CipherSuites) of - true -> - Highest = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions), - case tls_record:is_higher(Highest, Version) of - true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); - false -> - handle_client_hello(Version, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) - end; - false -> - handle_client_hello(Version, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) - end + do_hello(Version, Versions, CipherSuites, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) catch error:{case_clause,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed @@ -140,7 +252,8 @@ hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion, %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec encode_handshake(tls_handshake(), tls_record:tls_version()) -> iolist(). +-spec encode_handshake(tls_handshake() | tls_handshake_1_3:tls_handshake_1_3(), + tls_record:tls_version()) -> iolist(). %% %% Description: Encode a handshake packet %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -176,10 +289,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, cipher_suites = CipherSuites, compression_methods = Compressions, random = Random, - extensions = - #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves, - signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} - = HelloExt}, + extensions = HelloExt}, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, eccs = SupportedECCs, @@ -188,6 +298,9 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, Renegotiation) -> case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of true -> + Curves = maps:get(elliptic_curves, HelloExt, undefined), + ClientHashSigns = maps:get(signature_algs, HelloExt, undefined), + ClientSignatureSchemes = maps:get(signature_algs_cert, HelloExt, undefined), AvailableHashSigns = ssl_handshake:available_signature_algs( ClientHashSigns, SupportedHashSigns, Cert, Version), ECCCurve = ssl_handshake:select_curve(Curves, SupportedECCs, ECCOrder), @@ -200,9 +313,11 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_ciphers); _ -> - #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), - case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, - SupportedHashSigns, Version) of + #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(CipherSuite), + case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign({ClientHashSigns, ClientSignatureSchemes}, + Cert, KeyExAlg, + SupportedHashSigns, + Version) of #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; HashSign -> @@ -243,10 +358,28 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, catch throw:Alert -> Alert end. + + +do_hello(undefined, _Versions, _CipherSuites, _Hello, _SslOpts, _Info, _Renegotiation) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION); +do_hello(Version, Versions, CipherSuites, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) -> + case ssl_cipher:is_fallback(CipherSuites) of + true -> + Highest = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions), + case tls_record:is_higher(Highest, Version) of + true -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + false -> + handle_client_hello(Version, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) + end; + false -> + handle_client_hello(Version, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) + end. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, _Version) -> +enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, {3, N}) when N < 4 -> {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>}; -enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, +enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor} = Version, random = Random, session_id = SessionID, cipher_suites = CipherSuites, @@ -257,13 +390,14 @@ enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods), BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites), CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites), - ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions), + ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions, Version), {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary, ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary, ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>}; - +enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, {3, 4}) -> + tls_handshake_1_3:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg); enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version) -> ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version). @@ -274,6 +408,7 @@ get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), Raw = <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), Body/binary>>, try decode_handshake(Version, Type, Body) of Handshake -> + ssl_logger:debug(Opts#ssl_options.log_level, inbound, 'handshake', Handshake), get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, Rest, Opts, [{Handshake,Raw} | Acc]) catch _:_ -> @@ -282,24 +417,26 @@ get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), get_tls_handshake_aux(_Version, Data, _, Acc) -> {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}. -decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) -> +decode_handshake({3, N}, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) when N < 4 -> #hello_request{}; -decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, +decode_handshake(Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary, ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary, Extensions/binary>>) -> - DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions({client, Extensions}), + Exts = ssl_handshake:decode_vector(Extensions), + DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(Exts, Version, {Major, Minor}, + client_hello), #client_hello{ client_version = {Major,Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suites = ssl_handshake:decode_suites('2_bytes', CipherSuites), - compression_methods = Comp_methods, + compression_methods = erlang:binary_to_list(Comp_methods), extensions = DecodedExtensions }; +decode_handshake({3, 4}, Tag, Msg) -> + tls_handshake_1_3:decode_handshake(Tag, Msg); decode_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg) -> ssl_handshake:decode_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg). - - diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl index f6644f64af..fc67bb61fd 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ client_version, random, session_id, % opaque SessionID<0..32> + cookie, % opaque<2..2^16-1> cipher_suites, % cipher_suites<2..2^16-1> compression_methods, % compression_methods<1..2^8-1>, %% Extensions diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c29366e717 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl @@ -0,0 +1,1898 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Purpose: Help funtions for handling the TLS 1.3 (specific parts of) +%%% TLS handshake protocol +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +-module(tls_handshake_1_3). + +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). +-include("ssl_alert.hrl"). +-include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). +-include("ssl_connection.hrl"). +-include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include("ssl_record.hrl"). +-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). + +%% Encode +-export([encode_handshake/1, decode_handshake/2]). + +%% Create handshake messages +-export([certificate/5, + certificate_verify/4, + encrypted_extensions/1]). + +-export([do_start/2, + do_negotiated/2, + do_wait_cert/2, + do_wait_cv/2, + do_wait_finished/2, + do_wait_sh/2, + do_wait_ee/2, + do_wait_cert_cr/2]). + + +%% crypto:hash(sha256, "HelloRetryRequest"). +-define(HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_RANDOM, <<207,33,173,116,229,154,97,17, + 190,29,140,2,30,101,184,145, + 194,162,17,22,122,187,140,94, + 7,158,9,226,200,168,51,156>>). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Create handshake messages +%%==================================================================== + +server_hello(MsgType, SessionId, KeyShare, ConnectionStates) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParams} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + Extensions = server_hello_extensions(MsgType, KeyShare), + #server_hello{server_version = {3,3}, %% legacy_version + cipher_suite = SecParams#security_parameters.cipher_suite, + compression_method = 0, %% legacy attribute + random = server_hello_random(MsgType, SecParams), + session_id = SessionId, + extensions = Extensions + }. + + +%% The server's extensions MUST contain "supported_versions". +%% Additionally, it SHOULD contain the minimal set of extensions +%% necessary for the client to generate a correct ClientHello pair. As +%% with the ServerHello, a HelloRetryRequest MUST NOT contain any +%% extensions that were not first offered by the client in its +%% ClientHello, with the exception of optionally the "cookie" (see +%% Section 4.2.2) extension. +server_hello_extensions(hello_retry_request = MsgType, KeyShare) -> + SupportedVersions = #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = {3,4}}, + Extensions = #{server_hello_selected_version => SupportedVersions}, + ssl_handshake:add_server_share(MsgType, Extensions, KeyShare); +server_hello_extensions(MsgType, KeyShare) -> + SupportedVersions = #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = {3,4}}, + Extensions = #{server_hello_selected_version => SupportedVersions}, + ssl_handshake:add_server_share(MsgType, Extensions, KeyShare). + + +server_hello_random(server_hello, #security_parameters{server_random = Random}) -> + Random; +%% For reasons of backward compatibility with middleboxes (see +%% Appendix D.4), the HelloRetryRequest message uses the same structure +%% as the ServerHello, but with Random set to the special value of the +%% SHA-256 of "HelloRetryRequest": +%% +%% CF 21 AD 74 E5 9A 61 11 BE 1D 8C 02 1E 65 B8 91 +%% C2 A2 11 16 7A BB 8C 5E 07 9E 09 E2 C8 A8 33 9C +server_hello_random(hello_retry_request, _) -> + ?HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_RANDOM. + + +encrypted_extensions(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{alpn = undefined}}) -> + #encrypted_extensions{ + extensions = #{} + }; +encrypted_extensions(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{alpn = ALPNProtocol}}) -> + Extensions = ssl_handshake:add_alpn(#{}, ALPNProtocol), + #encrypted_extensions{ + extensions = Extensions + }. + + +certificate_request(SignAlgs0, SignAlgsCert0) -> + %% Input arguments contain TLS 1.2 algorithms due to backward compatibility + %% reasons. These {Hash, Algo} tuples must be filtered before creating the + %% the extensions. + SignAlgs = filter_tls13_algs(SignAlgs0), + SignAlgsCert = filter_tls13_algs(SignAlgsCert0), + Extensions0 = add_signature_algorithms(#{}, SignAlgs), + Extensions = add_signature_algorithms_cert(Extensions0, SignAlgsCert), + #certificate_request_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + extensions = Extensions}. + + +add_signature_algorithms(Extensions, SignAlgs) -> + Extensions#{signature_algorithms => + #signature_algorithms{signature_scheme_list = SignAlgs}}. + + +add_signature_algorithms_cert(Extensions, undefined) -> + Extensions; +add_signature_algorithms_cert(Extensions, SignAlgsCert) -> + Extensions#{signature_algorithms_cert => + #signature_algorithms_cert{signature_scheme_list = SignAlgsCert}}. + + +filter_tls13_algs(undefined) -> undefined; +filter_tls13_algs(Algo) -> + lists:filter(fun is_atom/1, Algo). + + +%% enum { +%% X509(0), +%% RawPublicKey(2), +%% (255) +%% } CertificateType; +%% +%% struct { +%% select (certificate_type) { +%% case RawPublicKey: +%% /* From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo */ +%% opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; +%% +%% case X509: +%% opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; +%% }; +%% Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; +%% } CertificateEntry; +%% +%% struct { +%% opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; +%% CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; +%% } Certificate; +certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, _CRContext, Role) -> + case ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) of + {ok, _, Chain} -> + CertList = chain_to_cert_list(Chain), + %% If this message is in response to a CertificateRequest, the value of + %% certificate_request_context in that message. Otherwise (in the case + %%of server authentication), this field SHALL be zero length. + {ok, #certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + certificate_list = CertList}}; + {error, Error} when Role =:= server -> + {error, {no_suitable_certificates, Error}}; + {error, _Error} when Role =:= client -> + %% The client MUST send a Certificate message if and only if the server + %% has requested client authentication via a CertificateRequest message + %% (Section 4.3.2). If the server requests client authentication but no + %% suitable certificate is available, the client MUST send a Certificate + %% message containing no certificates (i.e., with the "certificate_list" + %% field having length 0). + {ok, #certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + certificate_list = []}} + end. + + +certificate_verify(PrivateKey, SignatureScheme, + #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + handshake_env = + #handshake_env{ + tls_handshake_history = {Messages, _}}}, Role) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParamsR} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), + #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = HKDFAlgo} = SecParamsR, + + {HashAlgo, _, _} = + ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(SignatureScheme), + + Context = lists:reverse(Messages), + + %% Transcript-Hash uses the HKDF hash function defined by the cipher suite. + THash = tls_v1:transcript_hash(Context, HKDFAlgo), + ContextString = context_string(Role), + + %% Digital signatures use the hash function defined by the selected signature + %% scheme. + case sign(THash, ContextString, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of + {ok, Signature} -> + {ok, #certificate_verify_1_3{ + algorithm = SignatureScheme, + signature = Signature + }}; + {error, badarg} -> + {error, badarg} + + end. + + +finished(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + handshake_env = + #handshake_env{ + tls_handshake_history = {Messages, _}}}) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParamsR, + cipher_state := #cipher_state{finished_key = FinishedKey}} = + ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), + #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = HKDFAlgo} = SecParamsR, + + VerifyData = tls_v1:finished_verify_data(FinishedKey, HKDFAlgo, Messages), + + #finished{ + verify_data = VerifyData + }. + + +%%==================================================================== +%% Encode handshake +%%==================================================================== + +encode_handshake(#certificate_request_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = Context, + extensions = Exts})-> + EncContext = encode_cert_req_context(Context), + BinExts = encode_extensions(Exts), + {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <<EncContext/binary, BinExts/binary>>}; +encode_handshake(#certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = Context, + certificate_list = Entries}) -> + EncContext = encode_cert_req_context(Context), + EncEntries = encode_cert_entries(Entries), + {?CERTIFICATE, <<EncContext/binary, EncEntries/binary>>}; +encode_handshake(#certificate_verify_1_3{ + algorithm = Algorithm, + signature = Signature}) -> + EncAlgo = encode_algorithm(Algorithm), + EncSign = encode_signature(Signature), + {?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, <<EncAlgo/binary, EncSign/binary>>}; +encode_handshake(#encrypted_extensions{extensions = Exts})-> + {?ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, encode_extensions(Exts)}; +encode_handshake(#new_session_ticket{ + ticket_lifetime = LifeTime, + ticket_age_add = Age, + ticket_nonce = Nonce, + ticket = Ticket, + extensions = Exts}) -> + TicketSize = byte_size(Ticket), + BinExts = encode_extensions(Exts), + {?NEW_SESSION_TICKET, <<?UINT32(LifeTime), ?UINT32(Age), + ?BYTE(Nonce), ?UINT16(TicketSize), Ticket/binary, + BinExts/binary>>}; +encode_handshake(#end_of_early_data{}) -> + {?END_OF_EARLY_DATA, <<>>}; +encode_handshake(#key_update{request_update = Update}) -> + {?KEY_UPDATE, <<?BYTE(Update)>>}; +encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg) -> + ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, {3,4}). + + +%%==================================================================== +%% Decode handshake +%%==================================================================== + + +decode_handshake(?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, + ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, + Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method), + ?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>) + when Random =:= ?HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_RANDOM -> + HelloExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(Extensions, {3,4}, {Major, Minor}, + hello_retry_request), + #server_hello{ + server_version = {Major,Minor}, + random = Random, + session_id = Session_ID, + cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, + compression_method = Comp_method, + extensions = HelloExtensions}; +decode_handshake(?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <<?BYTE(0), ?UINT16(Size), EncExts:Size/binary>>) -> + Exts = decode_extensions(EncExts, certificate_request), + #certificate_request_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + extensions = Exts}; +decode_handshake(?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <<?BYTE(CSize), Context:CSize/binary, + ?UINT16(Size), EncExts:Size/binary>>) -> + Exts = decode_extensions(EncExts, certificate_request), + #certificate_request_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = Context, + extensions = Exts}; +decode_handshake(?CERTIFICATE, <<?BYTE(0), ?UINT24(Size), Certs:Size/binary>>) -> + CertList = decode_cert_entries(Certs), + #certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + certificate_list = CertList + }; +decode_handshake(?CERTIFICATE, <<?BYTE(CSize), Context:CSize/binary, + ?UINT24(Size), Certs:Size/binary>>) -> + CertList = decode_cert_entries(Certs), + #certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = Context, + certificate_list = CertList + }; +decode_handshake(?CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, <<?UINT16(EncAlgo), ?UINT16(Size), Signature:Size/binary>>) -> + Algorithm = ssl_cipher:signature_scheme(EncAlgo), + #certificate_verify_1_3{ + algorithm = Algorithm, + signature = Signature}; +decode_handshake(?ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, <<?UINT16(Size), EncExts:Size/binary>>) -> + #encrypted_extensions{ + extensions = decode_extensions(EncExts, encrypted_extensions) + }; +decode_handshake(?NEW_SESSION_TICKET, <<?UINT32(LifeTime), ?UINT32(Age), + ?BYTE(Nonce), ?UINT16(TicketSize), Ticket:TicketSize/binary, + BinExts/binary>>) -> + Exts = decode_extensions(BinExts, encrypted_extensions), + #new_session_ticket{ticket_lifetime = LifeTime, + ticket_age_add = Age, + ticket_nonce = Nonce, + ticket = Ticket, + extensions = Exts}; +decode_handshake(?END_OF_EARLY_DATA, _) -> + #end_of_early_data{}; +decode_handshake(?KEY_UPDATE, <<?BYTE(Update)>>) -> + #key_update{request_update = Update}; +decode_handshake(Tag, HandshakeMsg) -> + ssl_handshake:decode_handshake({3,4}, Tag, HandshakeMsg). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Internal functions +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_cert_req_context(<<>>) -> + <<?BYTE(0)>>; +encode_cert_req_context(Bin) -> + Size = byte_size(Bin), + <<?BYTE(Size), Bin/binary>>. + +encode_cert_entries(Entries) -> + CertEntryList = encode_cert_entries(Entries, []), + Size = byte_size(CertEntryList), + <<?UINT24(Size), CertEntryList/binary>>. + +encode_cert_entries([], Acc) -> + iolist_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc)); +encode_cert_entries([#certificate_entry{data = Data, + extensions = Exts} | Rest], Acc) -> + DSize = byte_size(Data), + BinExts = encode_extensions(Exts), + encode_cert_entries(Rest, + [<<?UINT24(DSize), Data/binary, BinExts/binary>> | Acc]). + +encode_algorithm(Algo) -> + Scheme = ssl_cipher:signature_scheme(Algo), + <<?UINT16(Scheme)>>. + +encode_signature(Signature) -> + Size = byte_size(Signature), + <<?UINT16(Size), Signature/binary>>. + +decode_cert_entries(Entries) -> + decode_cert_entries(Entries, []). + +decode_cert_entries(<<>>, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +decode_cert_entries(<<?UINT24(DSize), Data:DSize/binary, ?UINT16(Esize), BinExts:Esize/binary, + Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + Exts = decode_extensions(BinExts, certificate_request), + decode_cert_entries(Rest, [#certificate_entry{data = Data, + extensions = Exts} | Acc]). + +encode_extensions(Exts)-> + ssl_handshake:encode_extensions(extensions_list(Exts)). +decode_extensions(Exts, MessageType) -> + ssl_handshake:decode_extensions(Exts, {3,4}, MessageType). + +extensions_list(HelloExtensions) -> + [Ext || {_, Ext} <- maps:to_list(HelloExtensions)]. + + +%% TODO: add extensions! +chain_to_cert_list(L) -> + chain_to_cert_list(L, []). +%% +chain_to_cert_list([], Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +chain_to_cert_list([H|T], Acc) -> + chain_to_cert_list(T, [certificate_entry(H)|Acc]). + + +certificate_entry(DER) -> + #certificate_entry{ + data = DER, + extensions = #{} %% Extensions not supported. + }. + +%% The digital signature is then computed over the concatenation of: +%% - A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times +%% - The context string +%% - A single 0 byte which serves as the separator +%% - The content to be signed +%% +%% For example, if the transcript hash was 32 bytes of 01 (this length +%% would make sense for SHA-256), the content covered by the digital +%% signature for a server CertificateVerify would be: +%% +%% 2020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020 +%% 2020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020 +%% 544c5320312e332c207365727665722043657274696669636174655665726966 +%% 79 +%% 00 +%% 0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 +sign(THash, Context, HashAlgo, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = PrivateKey) -> + Content = build_content(Context, THash), + try public_key:sign(Content, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of + Signature -> + {ok, Signature} + catch + error:badarg -> + {error, badarg} + end; +sign(THash, Context, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) -> + Content = build_content(Context, THash), + + %% The length of the Salt MUST be equal to the length of the output + %% of the digest algorithm: rsa_pss_saltlen = -1 + try public_key:sign(Content, HashAlgo, PrivateKey, + [{rsa_padding, rsa_pkcs1_pss_padding}, + {rsa_pss_saltlen, -1}, + {rsa_mgf1_md, HashAlgo}]) of + Signature -> + {ok, Signature} + catch + error:badarg -> + {error, badarg} + end. + + +verify(THash, Context, HashAlgo, Signature, {?'id-ecPublicKey', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) -> + Content = build_content(Context, THash), + try public_key:verify(Content, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) of + Result -> + {ok, Result} + catch + error:badarg -> + {error, badarg} + end; +verify(THash, Context, HashAlgo, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PublicKey, _PubKeyParams}) -> + Content = build_content(Context, THash), + + %% The length of the Salt MUST be equal to the length of the output + %% of the digest algorithm: rsa_pss_saltlen = -1 + try public_key:verify(Content, HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKey, + [{rsa_padding, rsa_pkcs1_pss_padding}, + {rsa_pss_saltlen, -1}, + {rsa_mgf1_md, HashAlgo}]) of + Result -> + {ok, Result} + catch + error:badarg -> + {error, badarg} + end. + + +build_content(Context, THash) -> + Prefix = binary:copy(<<32>>, 64), + <<Prefix/binary,Context/binary,?BYTE(0),THash/binary>>. + + +%%==================================================================== +%% Handle handshake messages +%%==================================================================== + + +%% TLS Server +do_start(#client_hello{cipher_suites = ClientCiphers, + session_id = SessionId, + extensions = Extensions} = _Hello, + #state{connection_states = _ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{ciphers = ServerCiphers, + signature_algs = ServerSignAlgs, + supported_groups = ServerGroups0, + alpn_preferred_protocols = ALPNPreferredProtocols, + honor_cipher_order = HonorCipherOrder}, + session = #session{own_certificate = Cert}} = State0) -> + ClientGroups0 = maps:get(elliptic_curves, Extensions, undefined), + ClientGroups = get_supported_groups(ClientGroups0), + ServerGroups = get_supported_groups(ServerGroups0), + + ClientShares0 = maps:get(key_share, Extensions, undefined), + ClientShares = get_key_shares(ClientShares0), + + ClientALPN0 = maps:get(alpn, Extensions, undefined), + ClientALPN = ssl_handshake:decode_alpn(ClientALPN0), + + ClientSignAlgs = get_signature_scheme_list( + maps:get(signature_algs, Extensions, undefined)), + ClientSignAlgsCert = get_signature_scheme_list( + maps:get(signature_algs_cert, Extensions, undefined)), + + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + + try + %% Handle ALPN extension if ALPN is configured + ALPNProtocol = Maybe(handle_alpn(ALPNPreferredProtocols, ClientALPN)), + + %% If the server does not select a PSK, then the server independently selects a + %% cipher suite, an (EC)DHE group and key share for key establishment, + %% and a signature algorithm/certificate pair to authenticate itself to + %% the client. + Cipher = Maybe(select_cipher_suite(HonorCipherOrder, ClientCiphers, ServerCiphers)), + Groups = Maybe(select_common_groups(ServerGroups, ClientGroups)), + Maybe(validate_client_key_share(ClientGroups, ClientShares)), + + {PublicKeyAlgo, SignAlgo, SignHash} = get_certificate_params(Cert), + + %% Check if client supports signature algorithm of server certificate + Maybe(check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, SignHash, ClientSignAlgs, ClientSignAlgsCert)), + + %% Select signature algorithm (used in CertificateVerify message). + SelectedSignAlg = Maybe(select_sign_algo(PublicKeyAlgo, ClientSignAlgs, ServerSignAlgs)), + + %% Select client public key. If no public key found in ClientShares or + %% ClientShares is empty, trigger HelloRetryRequest as we were able + %% to find an acceptable set of parameters but the ClientHello does not + %% contain sufficient information. + {Group, ClientPubKey} = get_client_public_key(Groups, ClientShares), + + %% Generate server_share + KeyShare = ssl_cipher:generate_server_share(Group), + + State1 = update_start_state(State0, + #{cipher => Cipher, + key_share => KeyShare, + session_id => SessionId, + group => Group, + sign_alg => SelectedSignAlg, + peer_public_key => ClientPubKey, + alpn => ALPNProtocol}), + + %% 4.1.4. Hello Retry Request + %% + %% The server will send this message in response to a ClientHello + %% message if it is able to find an acceptable set of parameters but the + %% ClientHello does not contain sufficient information to proceed with + %% the handshake. + Maybe(send_hello_retry_request(State1, ClientPubKey, KeyShare, SessionId)) + + %% TODO: session handling + + catch + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_groups}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_groups); + {Ref, illegal_parameter} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + {Ref, no_suitable_cipher} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_cipher); + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_signature_algorithm}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, "No suitable signature algorithm"); + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_public_key}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_public_key); + {Ref, no_application_protocol} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL) + end; +%% TLS Client +do_start(#server_hello{cipher_suite = SelectedCipherSuite, + session_id = SessionId, + extensions = Extensions} = _ServerHello, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client, + host = Host, + port = Port, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb}, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, + tls_handshake_history = _HHistory} = HsEnv, + connection_env = CEnv, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{ciphers = ClientCiphers, + supported_groups = ClientGroups0} = SslOpts, + session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0 + } = State0) -> + ClientGroups = get_supported_groups(ClientGroups0), + + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + ServerKeyShare = maps:get(key_share, Extensions, undefined), + SelectedGroup = get_selected_group(ServerKeyShare), + + %% Upon receipt of this extension in a HelloRetryRequest, the client + %% MUST verify that (1) the selected_group field corresponds to a group + %% which was provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the + %% original ClientHello and (2) the selected_group field does not + %% correspond to a group which was provided in the "key_share" extension + %% in the original ClientHello. If either of these checks fails, then + %% the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" + %% alert. + Maybe(validate_selected_group(SelectedGroup, ClientGroups)), + + Maybe(validate_cipher_suite(SelectedCipherSuite, ClientCiphers)), + + %% Otherwise, when sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST + %% replace the original "key_share" extension with one containing only a + %% new KeyShareEntry for the group indicated in the selected_group field + %% of the triggering HelloRetryRequest. + ClientKeyShare = ssl_cipher:generate_client_shares([SelectedGroup]), + Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, + Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert, ClientKeyShare), + + HelloVersion = tls_record:hello_version(SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), + + %% Update state + State1 = update_start_state(State0, + #{cipher => SelectedCipherSuite, + key_share => ClientKeyShare, + session_id => SessionId, + group => SelectedGroup}), + + %% Replace ClientHello1 with a special synthetic handshake message + State2 = replace_ch1_with_message_hash(State1), + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = HHistory}} = State2, + + {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = + tls_connection:encode_handshake(Hello, HelloVersion, ConnectionStates0, HHistory), + tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'handshake', Hello), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, outbound, 'record', BinMsg), + + State = State2#state{ + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = HelloVersion}, %% Requested version + session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Handshake}, + key_share = ClientKeyShare}, + + {State, wait_sh} + + catch + {Ref, {illegal_parameter, Reason}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, Reason) + end. + + +do_negotiated(start_handshake, + #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + session = #session{session_id = SessionId, + own_certificate = OwnCert, + ecc = SelectedGroup, + sign_alg = SignatureScheme, + dh_public_value = ClientPublicKey}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{} = SslOpts, + key_share = KeyShare, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = _HHistory0}, + connection_env = #connection_env{private_key = CertPrivateKey}, + static_env = #static_env{ + cert_db = CertDbHandle, + cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, + socket = _Socket, + transport_cb = _Transport} + } = State0) -> + ServerPrivateKey = get_server_private_key(KeyShare), + + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + + try + %% Create server_hello + %% Extensions: supported_versions, key_share, (pre_shared_key) + ServerHello = server_hello(server_hello, SessionId, KeyShare, ConnectionStates0), + + {State1, _} = tls_connection:send_handshake(ServerHello, State0), + + State2 = + calculate_handshake_secrets(ClientPublicKey, ServerPrivateKey, SelectedGroup, State1), + + State3 = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State2), + + %% Create EncryptedExtensions + EncryptedExtensions = encrypted_extensions(State2), + + %% Encode EncryptedExtensions + State4 = tls_connection:queue_handshake(EncryptedExtensions, State3), + + %% Create and send CertificateRequest ({verify, verify_peer}) + {State5, NextState} = maybe_send_certificate_request(State4, SslOpts), + + %% Create Certificate + Certificate = Maybe(certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, <<>>, server)), + + %% Encode Certificate + State6 = tls_connection:queue_handshake(Certificate, State5), + + %% Create CertificateVerify + CertificateVerify = Maybe(certificate_verify(CertPrivateKey, SignatureScheme, + State6, server)), + %% Encode CertificateVerify + State7 = tls_connection:queue_handshake(CertificateVerify, State6), + + %% Create Finished + Finished = finished(State7), + + %% Encode Finished + State8 = tls_connection:queue_handshake(Finished, State7), + + %% Send first flight + {State9, _} = tls_connection:send_handshake_flight(State8), + + {State9, NextState} + + catch + {Ref, badarg} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {digitally_sign, badarg}); + {Ref, {no_suitable_certificates, Reason}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {no_suitable_certificates, Reason}) + end. + + +do_wait_cert(#certificate_1_3{} = Certificate, State0) -> + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + Maybe(process_certificate(Certificate, State0)) + catch + {Ref, {certificate_required, State}} -> + {?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, certificate_required), State}; + {Ref, {{certificate_unknown, Reason}, State}} -> + {?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, Reason), State}; + {Ref, {{internal_error, Reason}, State}} -> + {?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, Reason), State}; + {Ref, {{handshake_failure, Reason}, State}} -> + {?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason), State}; + {Ref, {#alert{} = Alert, State}} -> + {Alert, State}; + {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> + {Alert, State} + end. + + +do_wait_cv(#certificate_verify_1_3{} = CertificateVerify, State0) -> + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + State1 = Maybe(verify_signature_algorithm(State0, CertificateVerify)), + Maybe(verify_certificate_verify(State1, CertificateVerify)) + catch + {Ref, {{bad_certificate, Reason}, State}} -> + {?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE, {bad_certificate, Reason}), State}; + {Ref, {badarg, State}} -> + {?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {verify, badarg}), State}; + {Ref, {{handshake_failure, Reason}, State}} -> + {?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {handshake_failure, Reason}), State} + end. + +%% TLS Server +do_wait_finished(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}} = State0) -> + + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + + try + Maybe(validate_client_finished(State0, VerifyData)), + + State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), + + %% Configure traffic keys + ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1) + + + catch + {Ref, decrypt_error} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR, decrypt_error) + end; +%% TLS Client +do_wait_finished(#finished{verify_data = _VerifyData}, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}} = State0) -> + + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + + try + %% Maybe(validate_client_finished(State0, VerifyData)), + + %% Maybe send Certificate + CertificateVerify + State1 = Maybe(maybe_queue_cert_cert_cv(State0)), + + Finished = finished(State1), + + %% Encode Finished + State2 = tls_connection:queue_handshake(Finished, State1), + + %% Send first flight + {State3, _} = tls_connection:send_handshake_flight(State2), + + State4 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State3), + + %% Configure traffic keys + ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State4) + + catch + {Ref, decrypt_error} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR, decrypt_error); + {Ref, badarg} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {digitally_sign, badarg}); + {Ref, {no_suitable_certificates, Reason}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {no_suitable_certificates, Reason}) + end. + + +do_wait_sh(#server_hello{cipher_suite = SelectedCipherSuite, + session_id = SessionId, + extensions = Extensions} = ServerHello, + #state{key_share = ClientKeyShare0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{ciphers = ClientCiphers, + supported_groups = ClientGroups0}} = State0) -> + ClientGroups = get_supported_groups(ClientGroups0), + ServerKeyShare0 = maps:get(key_share, Extensions, undefined), + ClientKeyShare = get_key_shares(ClientKeyShare0), + + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + %% Go to state 'start' if server replies with 'HelloRetryRequest'. + Maybe(maybe_hello_retry_request(ServerHello, State0)), + + ServerKeyShare = get_key_shares(ServerKeyShare0), + + Maybe(validate_cipher_suite(SelectedCipherSuite, ClientCiphers)), + Maybe(validate_server_key_share(ClientGroups, ServerKeyShare)), + + %% Get server public key + {SelectedGroup, ServerPublicKey} = get_server_public_key(ServerKeyShare), + + {_, ClientPrivateKey} = get_client_private_key([SelectedGroup], ClientKeyShare), + + %% Update state + State1 = update_start_state(State0, + #{cipher => SelectedCipherSuite, + key_share => ClientKeyShare0, + session_id => SessionId, + group => SelectedGroup, + peer_public_key => ServerPublicKey}), + + State2 = calculate_handshake_secrets(ServerPublicKey, ClientPrivateKey, SelectedGroup, State1), + + State3 = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State2), + + {State3, wait_ee} + + catch + {Ref, {State, StateName, ServerHello}} -> + {State, StateName, ServerHello}; + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_groups}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_groups); + {Ref, illegal_parameter} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + {Ref, no_suitable_cipher} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_cipher); + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_signature_algorithm}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, "No suitable signature algorithm"); + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_public_key}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_public_key) + end. + + +do_wait_ee(#encrypted_extensions{extensions = Extensions}, State0) -> + + ALPNProtocol0 = maps:get(alpn, Extensions, undefined), + ALPNProtocol = get_alpn(ALPNProtocol0), + + {Ref,_Maybe} = maybe(), + + try + %% Update state + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv} = State0, + State1 = State0#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{alpn = ALPNProtocol}}, + + {State1, wait_cert_cr} + catch + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_groups}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_groups); + {Ref, illegal_parameter} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + {Ref, no_suitable_cipher} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_cipher); + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_signature_algorithm}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, "No suitable signature algorithm"); + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_public_key}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_public_key) + end. + + +do_wait_cert_cr(#certificate_1_3{} = Certificate, State0) -> + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + Maybe(process_certificate(Certificate, State0)) + catch + {Ref, {certificate_required, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, certificate_required); + {Ref, {{certificate_unknown, Reason}, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, Reason); + {Ref, {{internal_error, Reason}, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, Reason); + {Ref, {{handshake_failure, Reason}, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason); + {Ref, {#alert{} = Alert, State}} -> + {Alert, State} + end; +do_wait_cert_cr(#certificate_request_1_3{} = CertificateRequest, State0) -> + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + Maybe(process_certificate_request(CertificateRequest, State0)) + catch + {Ref, {certificate_required, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, certificate_required); + {Ref, {{certificate_unknown, Reason}, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, Reason); + {Ref, {illegal_parameter, Reason}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, Reason); + {Ref, {{internal_error, Reason}, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, Reason); + {Ref, {{handshake_failure, Reason}, _State}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason) + end. + + + +%% TODO: Remove this function! +%% not_implemented(State, Reason) -> +%% {error, {not_implemented, State, Reason}}. + +%% not_implemented(update_secrets, State0, Reason) -> +%% State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), +%% State = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1), +%% {error, {not_implemented, State, Reason}}. + + +%% For reasons of backward compatibility with middleboxes (see +%% Appendix D.4), the HelloRetryRequest message uses the same structure +%% as the ServerHello, but with Random set to the special value of the +%% SHA-256 of "HelloRetryRequest": +%% +%% CF 21 AD 74 E5 9A 61 11 BE 1D 8C 02 1E 65 B8 91 +%% C2 A2 11 16 7A BB 8C 5E 07 9E 09 E2 C8 A8 33 9C +%% +%% Upon receiving a message with type server_hello, implementations MUST +%% first examine the Random value and, if it matches this value, process +%% it as described in Section 4.1.4). +maybe_hello_retry_request(#server_hello{random = ?HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_RANDOM} = ServerHello, State0) -> + {error, {State0, start, ServerHello}}; +maybe_hello_retry_request(_, _) -> + ok. + + +maybe_queue_cert_cert_cv(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State) -> + {ok, State}; +maybe_queue_cert_cert_cv(#state{connection_states = _ConnectionStates0, + session = #session{session_id = _SessionId, + own_certificate = OwnCert}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{} = _SslOpts, + key_share = _KeyShare, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = _HHistory0}, + static_env = #static_env{ + role = client, + cert_db = CertDbHandle, + cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, + socket = _Socket, + transport_cb = _Transport} + } = State0) -> + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + %% Create Certificate + Certificate = Maybe(certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, <<>>, client)), + + %% Encode Certificate + State1 = tls_connection:queue_handshake(Certificate, State0), + + %% Maybe create and queue CertificateVerify + State = Maybe(maybe_queue_cert_verify(Certificate, State1)), + {ok, State} + catch + {Ref, badarg} -> + {error, badarg} + end. + + +%% Clients MUST send this message whenever authenticating via a certificate +%% (i.e., when the Certificate message is non-empty). +maybe_queue_cert_verify(#certificate_1_3{certificate_list = []}, State) -> + {ok, State}; +maybe_queue_cert_verify(_Certificate, + #state{connection_states = _ConnectionStates0, + session = #session{sign_alg = SignatureScheme}, + connection_env = #connection_env{private_key = CertPrivateKey}, + static_env = #static_env{role = client} + } = State) -> + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + try + CertificateVerify = Maybe(certificate_verify(CertPrivateKey, SignatureScheme, State, client)), + {ok, tls_connection:queue_handshake(CertificateVerify, State)} + catch + {Ref, badarg} -> + {error, badarg} + end. + + +%% Recipients of Finished messages MUST verify that the contents are +%% correct and if incorrect MUST terminate the connection with a +%% "decrypt_error" alert. +validate_client_finished(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + handshake_env = + #handshake_env{ + tls_handshake_history = {Messages0, _}}}, VerifyData) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParamsR, + cipher_state := #cipher_state{finished_key = FinishedKey}} = + ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = HKDFAlgo} = SecParamsR, + + %% Drop the client's finished message, it is not part of the handshake context + %% when the client calculates its finished message. + [_|Messages] = Messages0, + + ControlData = tls_v1:finished_verify_data(FinishedKey, HKDFAlgo, Messages), + compare_verify_data(ControlData, VerifyData). + + +compare_verify_data(Data, Data) -> + ok; +compare_verify_data(_, _) -> + {error, decrypt_error}. + + +send_hello_retry_request(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, + no_suitable_key, KeyShare, SessionId) -> + ServerHello = server_hello(hello_retry_request, SessionId, KeyShare, ConnectionStates0), + {State1, _} = tls_connection:send_handshake(ServerHello, State0), + + %% Update handshake history + State2 = replace_ch1_with_message_hash(State1), + + {ok, {State2, start}}; +send_hello_retry_request(State0, _, _, _) -> + %% Suitable key found. + {ok, {State0, negotiated}}. + + +maybe_send_certificate_request(State, #ssl_options{verify = verify_none}) -> + {State, wait_finished}; +maybe_send_certificate_request(State, #ssl_options{ + verify = verify_peer, + signature_algs = SignAlgs, + signature_algs_cert = SignAlgsCert}) -> + CertificateRequest = certificate_request(SignAlgs, SignAlgsCert), + {tls_connection:queue_handshake(CertificateRequest, State), wait_cert}. + + +process_certificate_request(#certificate_request_1_3{}, + #state{session = #session{own_certificate = undefined}} = State) -> + {ok, {State#state{client_certificate_requested = true}, wait_cert}}; + +process_certificate_request(#certificate_request_1_3{ + extensions = Extensions}, + #state{session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session} = State) -> + ServerSignAlgs = get_signature_scheme_list( + maps:get(signature_algs, Extensions, undefined)), + ServerSignAlgsCert = get_signature_scheme_list( + maps:get(signature_algs_cert, Extensions, undefined)), + + {_PublicKeyAlgo, SignAlgo, SignHash} = get_certificate_params(Cert), + + %% Check if server supports signature algorithm of client certificate + case check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, SignHash, ServerSignAlgs, ServerSignAlgsCert) of + ok -> + {ok, {State#state{client_certificate_requested = true}, wait_cert}}; + {error, _} -> + %% Certificate not supported: send empty certificate in state 'wait_finished' + {ok, {State#state{client_certificate_requested = true, + session = Session#session{own_certificate = undefined}}, wait_cert}} + end. + + +process_certificate(#certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + certificate_list = []}, + #state{ssl_options = + #ssl_options{ + fail_if_no_peer_cert = false}} = State) -> + {ok, {State, wait_finished}}; +process_certificate(#certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + certificate_list = []}, + #state{ssl_options = + #ssl_options{ + fail_if_no_peer_cert = true}} = State0) -> + + %% At this point the client believes that the connection is up and starts using + %% its traffic secrets. In order to be able send an proper Alert to the client + %% the server should also change its connection state and use the traffic + %% secrets. + State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), + State = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1), + {error, {certificate_required, State}}; +process_certificate(#certificate_1_3{certificate_list = Certs0}, + #state{ssl_options = + #ssl_options{signature_algs = SignAlgs, + signature_algs_cert = SignAlgsCert} = SslOptions, + static_env = + #static_env{ + role = Role, + host = Host, + cert_db = CertDbHandle, + cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, + crl_db = CRLDbHandle}} = State0) -> + %% TODO: handle extensions! + %% Remove extensions from list of certificates! + Certs = convert_certificate_chain(Certs0), + case is_supported_signature_algorithm(Certs, SignAlgs, SignAlgsCert) of + true -> + case validate_certificate_chain(Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, + SslOptions, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) of + {ok, {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}} -> + State = store_peer_cert(State0, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo), + {ok, {State, wait_cv}}; + {error, Reason} -> + State = update_encryption_state(Role, State0), + {error, {Reason, State}}; + {ok, #alert{} = Alert} -> + State = update_encryption_state(Role, State0), + {error, {Alert, State}} + end; + false -> + State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), + State = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1), + {error, {{handshake_failure, + "Client certificate uses unsupported signature algorithm"}, State}} + end. + + +%% TODO: check whole chain! +is_supported_signature_algorithm(Certs, SignAlgs, undefined) -> + is_supported_signature_algorithm(Certs, SignAlgs); +is_supported_signature_algorithm(Certs, _, SignAlgsCert) -> + is_supported_signature_algorithm(Certs, SignAlgsCert). +%% +is_supported_signature_algorithm([BinCert|_], SignAlgs0) -> + #'OTPCertificate'{signatureAlgorithm = SignAlg} = + public_key:pkix_decode_cert(BinCert, otp), + SignAlgs = filter_tls13_algs(SignAlgs0), + Scheme = ssl_cipher:signature_algorithm_to_scheme(SignAlg), + lists:member(Scheme, SignAlgs). + + +%% Sets correct encryption state when sending Alerts in shared states that use different secrets. +%% - If client: use handshake secrets. +%% - If server: use traffic secrets as by this time the client's state machine +%% already stepped into the 'connection' state. +update_encryption_state(server, State0) -> + State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), + ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1); +update_encryption_state(client, State) -> + State. + + +validate_certificate_chain(Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, SslOptions, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) -> + ServerName = ssl_handshake:server_name(SslOptions#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role), + [PeerCert | ChainCerts ] = Certs, + try + {TrustedCert, CertPath} = + ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, + SslOptions#ssl_options.partial_chain), + ValidationFunAndState = + ssl_handshake:validation_fun_and_state(SslOptions#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role, + CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerName, + SslOptions#ssl_options.customize_hostname_check, + SslOptions#ssl_options.crl_check, CRLDbHandle, CertPath), + Options = [{max_path_length, SslOptions#ssl_options.depth}, + {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}], + %% TODO: Validate if Certificate is using a supported signature algorithm + %% (signature_algs_cert)! + case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, CertPath, Options) of + {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> + {ok, {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}}; + {error, Reason} -> + {ok, ssl_handshake:handle_path_validation_error(Reason, PeerCert, ChainCerts, + SslOptions, Options, + CertDbHandle, CertDbRef)} + end + catch + error:{badmatch,{error, {asn1, Asn1Reason}}} -> + %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed + {error, {certificate_unknown, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason}}}; + error:OtherReason -> + {error, {internal_error, {unexpected_error, OtherReason}}} + end. + + +store_peer_cert(#state{session = Session, + handshake_env = HsEnv} = State, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo) -> + State#state{session = Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert}, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo}}. + + +convert_certificate_chain(Certs) -> + Fun = fun(#certificate_entry{data = Data}) -> + {true, Data}; + (_) -> + false + end, + lists:filtermap(Fun, Certs). + + +%% 4.4.1. The Transcript Hash +%% +%% As an exception to this general rule, when the server responds to a +%% ClientHello with a HelloRetryRequest, the value of ClientHello1 is +%% replaced with a special synthetic handshake message of handshake type +%% "message_hash" containing Hash(ClientHello1). I.e., +%% +%% Transcript-Hash(ClientHello1, HelloRetryRequest, ... Mn) = +%% Hash(message_hash || /* Handshake type */ +%% 00 00 Hash.length || /* Handshake message length (bytes) */ +%% Hash(ClientHello1) || /* Hash of ClientHello1 */ +%% HelloRetryRequest || ... || Mn) +%% +%% NOTE: Hash.length is used in practice (openssl) and not message length! +%% It is most probably a fault in the RFC. +replace_ch1_with_message_hash(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + handshake_env = + #handshake_env{ + tls_handshake_history = + {[HRR,CH1|HHistory], LM}} = HSEnv} = State0) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParamsR} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = HKDFAlgo} = SecParamsR, + MessageHash = message_hash(CH1, HKDFAlgo), + State0#state{handshake_env = + HSEnv#handshake_env{ + tls_handshake_history = + {[HRR,MessageHash|HHistory], LM}}}. + + +message_hash(ClientHello1, HKDFAlgo) -> + [?MESSAGE_HASH, + 0,0,ssl_cipher:hash_size(HKDFAlgo), + crypto:hash(HKDFAlgo, ClientHello1)]. + + +calculate_handshake_secrets(PublicKey, PrivateKey, SelectedGroup, + #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + handshake_env = + #handshake_env{ + tls_handshake_history = HHistory}} = State0) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParamsR} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = HKDFAlgo, + cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = SecParamsR, + + %% Calculate handshake_secret + PSK = binary:copy(<<0>>, ssl_cipher:hash_size(HKDFAlgo)), + EarlySecret = tls_v1:key_schedule(early_secret, HKDFAlgo , {psk, PSK}), + + IKM = calculate_shared_secret(PublicKey, PrivateKey, SelectedGroup), + HandshakeSecret = tls_v1:key_schedule(handshake_secret, HKDFAlgo, IKM, EarlySecret), + + %% Calculate [sender]_handshake_traffic_secret + {Messages, _} = HHistory, + + ClientHSTrafficSecret = + tls_v1:client_handshake_traffic_secret(HKDFAlgo, HandshakeSecret, lists:reverse(Messages)), + ServerHSTrafficSecret = + tls_v1:server_handshake_traffic_secret(HKDFAlgo, HandshakeSecret, lists:reverse(Messages)), + + %% Calculate traffic keys + #{cipher := Cipher} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(CipherSuite), + {ReadKey, ReadIV} = tls_v1:calculate_traffic_keys(HKDFAlgo, Cipher, ClientHSTrafficSecret), + {WriteKey, WriteIV} = tls_v1:calculate_traffic_keys(HKDFAlgo, Cipher, ServerHSTrafficSecret), + + %% Calculate Finished Keys + ReadFinishedKey = tls_v1:finished_key(ClientHSTrafficSecret, HKDFAlgo), + WriteFinishedKey = tls_v1:finished_key(ServerHSTrafficSecret, HKDFAlgo), + + update_pending_connection_states(State0, HandshakeSecret, + ReadKey, ReadIV, ReadFinishedKey, + WriteKey, WriteIV, WriteFinishedKey). + + +calculate_traffic_secrets(#state{ + static_env = #static_env{role = Role}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + handshake_env = + #handshake_env{ + tls_handshake_history = HHistory}} = State0) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParamsR} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = HKDFAlgo, + cipher_suite = CipherSuite, + master_secret = HandshakeSecret} = SecParamsR, + + MasterSecret = + tls_v1:key_schedule(master_secret, HKDFAlgo, HandshakeSecret), + + %% Get the correct list messages for the handshake context. + Messages = get_handshake_context(Role, HHistory), + + %% Calculate [sender]_application_traffic_secret_0 + ClientAppTrafficSecret0 = + tls_v1:client_application_traffic_secret_0(HKDFAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Messages)), + ServerAppTrafficSecret0 = + tls_v1:server_application_traffic_secret_0(HKDFAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Messages)), + + %% Calculate traffic keys + #{cipher := Cipher} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_bin_to_map(CipherSuite), + {ReadKey, ReadIV} = tls_v1:calculate_traffic_keys(HKDFAlgo, Cipher, ClientAppTrafficSecret0), + {WriteKey, WriteIV} = tls_v1:calculate_traffic_keys(HKDFAlgo, Cipher, ServerAppTrafficSecret0), + + update_pending_connection_states(State0, MasterSecret, + ReadKey, ReadIV, undefined, + WriteKey, WriteIV, undefined). + + +get_server_private_key(#key_share_server_hello{server_share = ServerShare}) -> + get_private_key(ServerShare). + +get_private_key(#key_share_entry{ + key_exchange = #'ECPrivateKey'{} = PrivateKey}) -> + PrivateKey; +get_private_key(#key_share_entry{ + key_exchange = + {_, PrivateKey}}) -> + PrivateKey. + +%% X25519, X448 +calculate_shared_secret(OthersKey, MyKey, Group) + when is_binary(OthersKey) andalso is_binary(MyKey) andalso + (Group =:= x25519 orelse Group =:= x448)-> + crypto:compute_key(ecdh, OthersKey, MyKey, Group); +%% FFDHE +calculate_shared_secret(OthersKey, MyKey, Group) + when is_binary(OthersKey) andalso is_binary(MyKey) -> + Params = #'DHParameter'{prime = P} = ssl_dh_groups:dh_params(Group), + S = public_key:compute_key(OthersKey, MyKey, Params), + Size = byte_size(binary:encode_unsigned(P)), + ssl_cipher:add_zero_padding(S, Size); +%% ECDHE +calculate_shared_secret(OthersKey, MyKey = #'ECPrivateKey'{}, _Group) + when is_binary(OthersKey) -> + Point = #'ECPoint'{point = OthersKey}, + public_key:compute_key(Point, MyKey). + + +update_pending_connection_states(#state{ + static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + connection_states = + CS = #{pending_read := PendingRead0, + pending_write := PendingWrite0}} = State, + HandshakeSecret, + ReadKey, ReadIV, ReadFinishedKey, + WriteKey, WriteIV, WriteFinishedKey) -> + PendingRead = update_connection_state(PendingRead0, HandshakeSecret, + ReadKey, ReadIV, ReadFinishedKey), + PendingWrite = update_connection_state(PendingWrite0, HandshakeSecret, + WriteKey, WriteIV, WriteFinishedKey), + State#state{connection_states = CS#{pending_read => PendingRead, + pending_write => PendingWrite}}; +update_pending_connection_states(#state{ + static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + connection_states = + CS = #{pending_read := PendingRead0, + pending_write := PendingWrite0}} = State, + HandshakeSecret, + ReadKey, ReadIV, ReadFinishedKey, + WriteKey, WriteIV, WriteFinishedKey) -> + PendingRead = update_connection_state(PendingRead0, HandshakeSecret, + WriteKey, WriteIV, WriteFinishedKey), + PendingWrite = update_connection_state(PendingWrite0, HandshakeSecret, + ReadKey, ReadIV, ReadFinishedKey), + State#state{connection_states = CS#{pending_read => PendingRead, + pending_write => PendingWrite}}. + + +update_connection_state(ConnectionState = #{security_parameters := SecurityParameters0}, + HandshakeSecret, Key, IV, FinishedKey) -> + %% Store secret + SecurityParameters = SecurityParameters0#security_parameters{ + master_secret = HandshakeSecret}, + ConnectionState#{security_parameters => SecurityParameters, + cipher_state => cipher_init(Key, IV, FinishedKey)}. + + +update_start_state(State, Map) -> + Cipher = maps:get(cipher, Map, undefined), + KeyShare = maps:get(key_share, Map, undefined), + SessionId = maps:get(session_id, Map, undefined), + Group = maps:get(group, Map, undefined), + SelectedSignAlg = maps:get(sign_alg, Map, undefined), + PeerPublicKey = maps:get(peer_public_key, Map, undefined), + ALPNProtocol = maps:get(alpn, Map, undefined), + update_start_state(State, Cipher, KeyShare, SessionId, + Group, SelectedSignAlg, PeerPublicKey, + ALPNProtocol). +%% +update_start_state(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + handshake_env = #handshake_env{} = HsEnv, + connection_env = CEnv, + session = Session} = State, + Cipher, KeyShare, SessionId, + Group, SelectedSignAlg, PeerPublicKey, ALPNProtocol) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParamsR0} = PendingRead = + maps:get(pending_read, ConnectionStates0), + #{security_parameters := SecParamsW0} = PendingWrite = + maps:get(pending_write, ConnectionStates0), + SecParamsR = ssl_cipher:security_parameters_1_3(SecParamsR0, Cipher), + SecParamsW = ssl_cipher:security_parameters_1_3(SecParamsW0, Cipher), + ConnectionStates = + ConnectionStates0#{pending_read => PendingRead#{security_parameters => SecParamsR}, + pending_write => PendingWrite#{security_parameters => SecParamsW}}, + State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{alpn = ALPNProtocol}, + key_share = KeyShare, + session = Session#session{session_id = SessionId, + ecc = Group, + sign_alg = SelectedSignAlg, + dh_public_value = PeerPublicKey, + cipher_suite = Cipher}, + connection_env = CEnv#connection_env{negotiated_version = {3,4}}}. + + +cipher_init(Key, IV, FinishedKey) -> + #cipher_state{key = Key, + iv = IV, + finished_key = FinishedKey, + tag_len = 16}. + + +%% Get handshake context for verification of CertificateVerify. +%% +%% Verify CertificateVerify: +%% ClientHello (client) (1) +%% ServerHello (server) (2) +%% EncryptedExtensions (server) (8) +%% CertificateRequest (server) (13) +%% Certificate (server) (11) +%% CertificateVerify (server) (15) +%% Finished (server) (20) +%% Certificate (client) (11) +%% CertificateVerify (client) (15) - Drop! Not included in calculations! +get_handshake_context_cv({[<<15,_/binary>>|Messages], _}) -> + Messages. + + +%% Get handshake context for traffic key calculation. +%% +%% Client is authenticated with certificate: +%% ClientHello (client) (1) +%% ServerHello (server) (2) +%% EncryptedExtensions (server) (8) +%% CertificateRequest (server) (13) +%% Certificate (server) (11) +%% CertificateVerify (server) (15) +%% Finished (server) (20) +%% Certificate (client) (11) - Drop! Not included in calculations! +%% CertificateVerify (client) (15) - Drop! Not included in calculations! +%% Finished (client) (20) - Drop! Not included in calculations! +%% +%% Client is authenticated but sends empty certificate: +%% ClientHello (client) (1) +%% ServerHello (server) (2) +%% EncryptedExtensions (server) (8) +%% CertificateRequest (server) (13) +%% Certificate (server) (11) +%% CertificateVerify (server) (15) +%% Finished (server) (20) +%% Certificate (client) (11) - Drop! Not included in calculations! +%% Finished (client) (20) - Drop! Not included in calculations! +%% +%% Client is not authenticated: +%% ClientHello (client) (1) +%% ServerHello (server) (2) +%% EncryptedExtensions (server) (8) +%% Certificate (server) (11) +%% CertificateVerify (server) (15) +%% Finished (server) (20) +%% Finished (client) (20) - Drop! Not included in calculations! +%% +%% Drop all client messages from the front of the iolist using the property that +%% incoming messages are binaries. +get_handshake_context(server, {Messages, _}) -> + get_handshake_context_server(Messages); +get_handshake_context(client, {Messages, _}) -> + get_handshake_context_client(Messages). + +get_handshake_context_server([H|T]) when is_binary(H) -> + get_handshake_context_server(T); +get_handshake_context_server(L) -> + L. + + +get_handshake_context_client([H|T]) when is_list(H) -> + get_handshake_context_client(T); +get_handshake_context_client(L) -> + L. + + +%% If the CertificateVerify message is sent by a server, the signature +%% algorithm MUST be one offered in the client's "signature_algorithms" +%% extension unless no valid certificate chain can be produced without +%% unsupported algorithms +%% +%% If sent by a client, the signature algorithm used in the signature +%% MUST be one of those present in the supported_signature_algorithms +%% field of the "signature_algorithms" extension in the +%% CertificateRequest message. +verify_signature_algorithm(#state{ + static_env = #static_env{role = Role}, + ssl_options = + #ssl_options{ + signature_algs = LocalSignAlgs}} = State0, + #certificate_verify_1_3{algorithm = PeerSignAlg}) -> + case lists:member(PeerSignAlg, LocalSignAlgs) of + true -> + {ok, maybe_update_selected_sign_alg(State0, PeerSignAlg, Role)}; + false -> + State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), + State = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1), + {error, {{handshake_failure, + "CertificateVerify uses unsupported signature algorithm"}, State}} + end. + + +maybe_update_selected_sign_alg(#state{session = Session} = State, SignAlg, client) -> + State#state{session = Session#session{sign_alg = SignAlg}}; +maybe_update_selected_sign_alg(State, _, _) -> + State. + + +verify_certificate_verify(#state{ + static_env = #static_env{role = Role}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + handshake_env = + #handshake_env{ + public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, + tls_handshake_history = HHistory}} = State0, + #certificate_verify_1_3{ + algorithm = SignatureScheme, + signature = Signature}) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParamsR} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), + #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = HKDFAlgo} = SecParamsR, + + {HashAlgo, _, _} = + ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(SignatureScheme), + + Messages = get_handshake_context_cv(HHistory), + + Context = lists:reverse(Messages), + + %% Transcript-Hash uses the HKDF hash function defined by the cipher suite. + THash = tls_v1:transcript_hash(Context, HKDFAlgo), + + ContextString = peer_context_string(Role), + + %% Digital signatures use the hash function defined by the selected signature + %% scheme. + case verify(THash, ContextString, HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKeyInfo) of + {ok, true} -> + {ok, {State0, wait_finished}}; + {ok, false} -> + State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), + State = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1), + {error, {{handshake_failure, "Failed to verify CertificateVerify"}, State}}; + {error, badarg} -> + State1 = calculate_traffic_secrets(State0), + State = ssl_record:step_encryption_state(State1), + {error, {badarg, State}} + end. + + +context_string(server) -> + <<"TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify">>; +context_string(client) -> + <<"TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify">>. + + +%% Return context string for verifing peer signature +peer_context_string(server) -> + <<"TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify">>; +peer_context_string(client) -> + <<"TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify">>. + + +%% If there is no overlap between the received +%% "supported_groups" and the groups supported by the server, then the +%% server MUST abort the handshake with a "handshake_failure" or an +%% "insufficient_security" alert. +select_common_groups(_, []) -> + {error, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_groups}}; +select_common_groups(ServerGroups, ClientGroups) -> + Fun = fun(E) -> lists:member(E, ClientGroups) end, + case lists:filter(Fun, ServerGroups) of + [] -> + {error, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_groups}}; + L -> + {ok, L} + end. + + +%% RFC 8446 - 4.2.8. Key Share +%% This vector MAY be empty if the client is requesting a +%% HelloRetryRequest. Each KeyShareEntry value MUST correspond to a +%% group offered in the "supported_groups" extension and MUST appear in +%% the same order. However, the values MAY be a non-contiguous subset +%% of the "supported_groups" extension and MAY omit the most preferred +%% groups. +%% +%% Clients can offer as many KeyShareEntry values as the number of +%% supported groups it is offering, each representing a single set of +%% key exchange parameters. +%% +%% Clients MUST NOT offer multiple KeyShareEntry values +%% for the same group. Clients MUST NOT offer any KeyShareEntry values +%% for groups not listed in the client's "supported_groups" extension. +%% Servers MAY check for violations of these rules and abort the +%% handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert if one is violated. +validate_client_key_share(_ ,[]) -> + ok; +validate_client_key_share([], _) -> + {error, illegal_parameter}; +validate_client_key_share([G|ClientGroups], [{_, G, _}|ClientShares]) -> + validate_client_key_share(ClientGroups, ClientShares); +validate_client_key_share([_|ClientGroups], [_|_] = ClientShares) -> + validate_client_key_share(ClientGroups, ClientShares). + + +%% Verify that selected group is offered by the client. +validate_server_key_share([G|_ClientGroups], {_, G, _}) -> + ok; +validate_server_key_share([_|ClientGroups], {_, _, _} = ServerKeyShare) -> + validate_server_key_share(ClientGroups, ServerKeyShare). + + +validate_selected_group(SelectedGroup, [SelectedGroup|_]) -> + {error, {illegal_parameter, + "Selected group sent by the server shall not correspond to a group" + " which was provided in the key_share extension"}}; +validate_selected_group(SelectedGroup, ClientGroups) -> + case lists:member(SelectedGroup, ClientGroups) of + true -> + ok; + false -> + {error, {illegal_parameter, + "Selected group sent by the server shall correspond to a group" + " which was provided in the supported_groups extension"}} + end. + + +get_client_public_key([Group|_] = Groups, ClientShares) -> + get_client_public_key(Groups, ClientShares, Group). +%% +get_client_public_key(_, [], PreferredGroup) -> + {PreferredGroup, no_suitable_key}; +get_client_public_key([], _, PreferredGroup) -> + {PreferredGroup, no_suitable_key}; +get_client_public_key([Group|Groups], ClientShares, PreferredGroup) -> + case lists:keysearch(Group, 2, ClientShares) of + {value, {_, _, ClientPublicKey}} -> + {Group, ClientPublicKey}; + false -> + get_client_public_key(Groups, ClientShares, PreferredGroup) + end. + +get_client_private_key([Group|_] = Groups, ClientShares) -> + get_client_private_key(Groups, ClientShares, Group). +%% +get_client_private_key(_, [], PreferredGroup) -> + {PreferredGroup, no_suitable_key}; +get_client_private_key([], _, PreferredGroup) -> + {PreferredGroup, no_suitable_key}; +get_client_private_key([Group|Groups], ClientShares, PreferredGroup) -> + case lists:keysearch(Group, 2, ClientShares) of + {value, {_, _, {_, ClientPrivateKey}}} -> + {Group, ClientPrivateKey}; + {value, {_, _, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ClientPrivateKey}} -> + {Group, ClientPrivateKey}; + false -> + get_client_private_key(Groups, ClientShares, PreferredGroup) + end. + + +get_server_public_key({key_share_entry, Group, PublicKey}) -> + {Group, PublicKey}. + + +%% RFC 7301 - Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension +%% It is expected that a server will have a list of protocols that it +%% supports, in preference order, and will only select a protocol if the +%% client supports it. In that case, the server SHOULD select the most +%% highly preferred protocol that it supports and that is also +%% advertised by the client. In the event that the server supports no +%% protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL respond +%% with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert. +handle_alpn(undefined, _) -> + {ok, undefined}; +handle_alpn([], _) -> + {error, no_application_protocol}; +handle_alpn([_|_], undefined) -> + {ok, undefined}; +handle_alpn([ServerProtocol|T], ClientProtocols) -> + case lists:member(ServerProtocol, ClientProtocols) of + true -> + {ok, ServerProtocol}; + false -> + handle_alpn(T, ClientProtocols) + end. + + +select_cipher_suite(_, [], _) -> + {error, no_suitable_cipher}; +%% If honor_cipher_order is set to true, use the server's preference for +%% cipher suite selection. +select_cipher_suite(true, ClientCiphers, ServerCiphers) -> + select_cipher_suite(false, ServerCiphers, ClientCiphers); +select_cipher_suite(false, [Cipher|ClientCiphers], ServerCiphers) -> + case lists:member(Cipher, tls_v1:suites('TLS_v1.3')) andalso + lists:member(Cipher, ServerCiphers) of + true -> + {ok, Cipher}; + false -> + select_cipher_suite(false, ClientCiphers, ServerCiphers) + end. + + +%% RFC 8446 4.1.3 ServerHello +%% A client which receives a cipher suite that was not offered MUST abort the +%% handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. +validate_cipher_suite(Cipher, ClientCiphers) -> + case lists:member(Cipher, ClientCiphers) of + true -> + ok; + false -> + {error, illegal_parameter} + end. + + +%% RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) +%% TLS 1.3 provides two extensions for indicating which signature +%% algorithms may be used in digital signatures. The +%% "signature_algorithms_cert" extension applies to signatures in +%% certificates and the "signature_algorithms" extension, which +%% originally appeared in TLS 1.2, applies to signatures in +%% CertificateVerify messages. +%% +%% If no "signature_algorithms_cert" extension is +%% present, then the "signature_algorithms" extension also applies to +%% signatures appearing in certificates. + +%% Check if the signature algorithm of the server certificate is supported +%% by the client. +check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, SignHash, ClientSignAlgs, undefined) -> + do_check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, SignHash, ClientSignAlgs); +check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, SignHash, _, ClientSignAlgsCert) -> + do_check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, SignHash, ClientSignAlgsCert). + + +%% DSA keys are not supported by TLS 1.3 +select_sign_algo(dsa, _ClientSignAlgs, _ServerSignAlgs) -> + {error, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_public_key}}; +select_sign_algo(_, [], _) -> + {error, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_signature_algorithm}}; +select_sign_algo(PublicKeyAlgo, [C|ClientSignAlgs], ServerSignAlgs) -> + {_, S, _} = ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(C), + %% RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and Legacy algorithms are not defined for use in signed + %% TLS handshake messages: filter sha-1 and rsa_pkcs1. + %% + %% RSASSA-PSS RSAE algorithms: If the public key is carried in an X.509 + %% certificate, it MUST use the rsaEncryption OID. + %% RSASSA-PSS PSS algorithms: If the public key is carried in an X.509 certificate, + %% it MUST use the RSASSA-PSS OID. + case ((PublicKeyAlgo =:= rsa andalso S =:= rsa_pss_rsae) + orelse (PublicKeyAlgo =:= rsa_pss andalso S =:= rsa_pss_pss) + orelse (PublicKeyAlgo =:= ecdsa andalso S =:= ecdsa)) + andalso + lists:member(C, ServerSignAlgs) of + true -> + {ok, C}; + false -> + select_sign_algo(PublicKeyAlgo, ClientSignAlgs, ServerSignAlgs) + end. + + +do_check_cert_sign_algo(_, _, []) -> + {error, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_signature_algorithm}}; +do_check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, SignHash, [Scheme|T]) -> + {Hash, Sign, _Curve} = ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(Scheme), + case compare_sign_algos(SignAlgo, SignHash, Sign, Hash) of + true -> + ok; + _Else -> + do_check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, SignHash, T) + end. + + +%% id-RSASSA-PSS (rsa_pss) indicates that the key may only be used for PSS signatures. +%% TODO: Uncomment when rsa_pss signatures are supported in certificates +%% compare_sign_algos(rsa_pss, Hash, Algo, Hash) +%% when Algo =:= rsa_pss_pss -> +%% true; +%% rsaEncryption (rsa) allows the key to be used for any of the standard encryption or +%% signature schemes. +compare_sign_algos(rsa, Hash, Algo, Hash) + when Algo =:= rsa_pss_rsae orelse + Algo =:= rsa_pkcs1 -> + true; +compare_sign_algos(Algo, Hash, Algo, Hash) -> + true; +compare_sign_algos(_, _, _, _) -> + false. + + +get_certificate_params(Cert) -> + {SignAlgo0, _Param, PublicKeyAlgo0} = ssl_handshake:get_cert_params(Cert), + {SignHash0, SignAlgo} = public_key:pkix_sign_types(SignAlgo0), + %% Convert hash to new format + SignHash = case SignHash0 of + sha -> + sha1; + H -> H + end, + PublicKeyAlgo = public_key_algo(PublicKeyAlgo0), + {PublicKeyAlgo, SignAlgo, SignHash}. + + +%% Note: copied from ssl_handshake +public_key_algo(?'id-RSASSA-PSS') -> + rsa_pss; +public_key_algo(?rsaEncryption) -> + rsa; +public_key_algo(?'id-ecPublicKey') -> + ecdsa; +public_key_algo(?'id-dsa') -> + dsa. + +get_signature_scheme_list(undefined) -> + undefined; +get_signature_scheme_list(#signature_algorithms_cert{ + signature_scheme_list = ClientSignatureSchemes}) -> + ClientSignatureSchemes; +get_signature_scheme_list(#signature_algorithms{ + signature_scheme_list = ClientSignatureSchemes}) -> + %% Filter unassigned and legacy elements + lists:filter(fun (E) -> is_atom(E) andalso E =/= unassigned end, + ClientSignatureSchemes). + +get_supported_groups(#supported_groups{supported_groups = Groups}) -> + Groups. + +get_key_shares(#key_share_client_hello{client_shares = ClientShares}) -> + ClientShares; +get_key_shares(#key_share_server_hello{server_share = ServerShare}) -> + ServerShare. + +get_selected_group(#key_share_hello_retry_request{selected_group = SelectedGroup}) -> + SelectedGroup. + +get_alpn(ALPNProtocol0) -> + case ssl_handshake:decode_alpn(ALPNProtocol0) of + undefined -> + undefined; + [ALPNProtocol] -> + ALPNProtocol + end. + +maybe() -> + Ref = erlang:make_ref(), + Ok = fun(ok) -> ok; + ({ok,R}) -> R; + ({error,Reason}) -> + throw({Ref,Reason}) + end, + {Ref,Ok}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.hrl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eb85f216c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.hrl @@ -0,0 +1,261 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2018-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% +%% +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Purpose: Record and constant defenitions for the TLS-handshake protocol +%% see RFC 8446. Also includes supported hello extensions. +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +-ifndef(tls_handshake_1_3). +-define(tls_handshake_1_3, true). + +%% Common to TLS-1.3 and previous TLS versions +%% Some defenitions may not exist in TLS-1.3 this is +%% handled elsewhere +-include("tls_handshake.hrl"). + +%% New handshake types in TLS-1.3 RFC 8446 B.3 +-define(NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4). +-define(END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 5). +-define(ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 8). +-define(KEY_UPDATE, 24). +%% %% Not really a message but special way to handle handshake hashes +%% %% when a "hello-retry-request" (special server_hello) is sent +-define(MESSAGE_HASH, 254). + +%% %% RFC 8446 B.3.1. +%% %% New extension types in TLS-1.3 +-define(PRE_SHARED_KEY_EXT, 41). +-define(EARLY_DATA_EXT, 42). +%%-define(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT, 43). %% Updates TLS 1.2 so defined in ssl_handshake.hrl +-define(COOKIE_EXT, 44). +-define(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES_EXT, 45). +-define(CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES_EXT, 47). +-define(OID_FILTERS_EXT, 48). +-define(POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_EXT, 49). +%% -define(SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT_EXT, 50). %% Updates TLS 1.2 so defined in ssl_handshake.hrl +-define(KEY_SHARE_EXT, 51). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.1 +-record(key_share_entry, { + group, %NamedGroup + key_exchange %key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + }). +-record(key_share_client_hello, { + client_shares %% KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>; + }). +-record(key_share_hello_retry_request, { + selected_group %% NamedGroup + }). +-record(key_share_server_hello, { + server_share %% KeyShareEntry server_share; + }). + +-record(uncompressed_point_representation, { + legacy_form = 4, % uint8 legacy_form = 4; + x, % opaque X[coordinate_length]; + y % opaque Y[coordinate_length]; + }). + +%% RFC 8446 4.2.9. Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes + +%% enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode; +-define(PSK_KE, 0). +-define(PSK_DHE_KE, 1). + +-record(psk_key_exchange_modes, { + ke_modes % ke_modes<1..255> + }). + +%% RFC 8446 4.2.10. Early Data Indication +-record(empty, { + }). +-record(early_data_indication, { + indication % uint32 max_early_data_size (new_session_ticket) | + %% #empty{} (client_hello, encrypted_extensions) + }). + +%% RFC 8446 4.2.11. Pre-Shared Key Extension +-record(psk_identity, + { + identity, % opaque identity<1..2^16-1> + obfuscated_ticket_age % uint32 + }). + +-record(offered_psks, + { + identities, % PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>; + binders % PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>; opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255> + }). + +%% struct { +%% select (Handshake.msg_type) { +%% case client_hello: OfferedPsks; +%% case server_hello: uint16 selected_identity; +%% }; +%% } PreSharedKeyExtension; +-record(pre_shared_key_client_hello, + { + offered_psks + }). + +-record(pre_shared_key_server_hello, + { + selected_identity + }). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.1.2. +-record(cookie, { + cookie %cookie<1..2^16-1>; + }). + +%%% RFC 8446 B.3.1.3. Signature Algorithm Extension +%% Signature Schemes +%% RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms +-define(RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, 16#0401). +-define(RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, 16#0501). +-define(RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, 16#0601). + +%% ECDSA algorithms +-define(ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, 16#0403). +-define(ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, 16#0503). +-define(ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512, 16#0603). + +%% RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption +-define(RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, 16#0804). +-define(RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384, 16#0805). +-define(RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512, 16#0806). + +%% EdDSA algorithms +-define(ED25519, 16#0807). +-define(ED448, 16#0808). + +%% RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID RSASSA-PSS +-define(RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256, 16#0809). +-define(RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384, 16#080a). +-define(RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512, 16#080b). + +%% Legacy algorithms +-define(RSA_PKCS1_SHA1, 16#201). +-define(ECDSA_SHA1, 16#0203). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.1.4. Supported Groups Extension +%% Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) +-define(SECP256R1, 16#0017). +-define(SECP384R1, 16#0018). +-define(SECP521R1, 16#0019). +-define(X25519, 16#001D). +-define(X448, 16#001E). + +%% RFC 8446 Finite Field Groups (DHE) +-define(FFDHE2048, 16#0100). +-define(FFDHE3072, 16#0101). +-define(FFDHE4096, 16#0102). +-define(FFDHE6144, 16#0103). +-define(FFDHE8192 ,16#0104). + +-record(named_group_list, { + named_group_list %named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; + }). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.2 Server Parameters Messages +%% opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;XS +-record(certificate_authoritie_sextension, { + authorities %DistinguishedName authorities<3..2^16-1>; + }). + +-record(oid_filter, { + certificate_extension_oid, % opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>; + certificate_extension_values % opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>; + }). + +-record(oid_filter_extension, { + filters %OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1>; + }). +-record(post_handshake_auth, { + }). + +-record(encrypted_extensions, { + extensions %extensions<0..2^16-1>; + }). + +-record(certificate_request_1_3, { + certificate_request_context, % opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + extensions %Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; + }). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.3 Authentication Messages + +%% Certificate Type +-define(X509, 0). +-define(OpenPGP_RESERVED, 1). +-define(RawPublicKey, 2). + +-record(certificate_entry, { + data, + %% select (certificate_type) { + %% case RawPublicKey: + %% /* From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo */ + %% opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; + %% + %% case X509: + %% opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; + %% }; + extensions %% Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + }). + +-record(certificate_1_3, { + certificate_request_context, % opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + certificate_list % CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + }). + +-record(certificate_verify_1_3, { + algorithm, % SignatureScheme + signature % signature<0..2^16-1> + }). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.4. Ticket Establishment +-record(new_session_ticket, { + ticket_lifetime, %unit32 + ticket_age_add, %unit32 + ticket_nonce, %opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>; + ticket, %opaque ticket<1..2^16-1> + extensions %extensions<0..2^16-2> + }). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.5. Updating Keys +-record(end_of_early_data, { + }). + +-define(UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED, 0). +-define(UPDATE_REQUESTED, 1). + +-record(key_update, { + request_update + }). + +-type tls_handshake_1_3() :: #encrypted_extensions{} | + #certificate_request_1_3{} | + #certificate_1_3{} | + #certificate_verify_1_3{}. + +-export_type([tls_handshake_1_3/0]). + +-endif. % -ifdef(tls_handshake_1_3). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl index 38022030ee..2aeab98929 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl @@ -30,9 +30,10 @@ -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("tls_handshake.hrl"). -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% Handling of incoming data --export([get_tls_records/3, init_connection_states/2]). +-export([get_tls_records/4, init_connection_states/2]). %% Encoding TLS records -export([encode_handshake/3, encode_alert_record/3, @@ -40,13 +41,16 @@ -export([encode_plain_text/4]). %% Decoding --export([decode_cipher_text/3]). +-export([decode_cipher_text/4]). + +%% Logging helper +-export([build_tls_record/1]). %% Protocol version handling -export([protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/2, highest_protocol_version/1, highest_protocol_version/2, is_higher/2, supported_protocol_versions/0, - is_acceptable_version/1, is_acceptable_version/2, hello_version/2]). + is_acceptable_version/1, is_acceptable_version/2, hello_version/1]). -export_type([tls_version/0, tls_atom_version/0]). @@ -76,8 +80,10 @@ init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec get_tls_records( - binary(), [tls_version()] | tls_version(), - Buffer0 :: binary() | {'undefined' | #ssl_tls{}, {[binary()],non_neg_integer(),[binary()]}}) -> + binary(), + [tls_version()] | tls_version(), + Buffer0 :: binary() | {'undefined' | #ssl_tls{}, {[binary()],non_neg_integer(),[binary()]}}, + #ssl_options{}) -> {Records :: [#ssl_tls{}], Buffer :: {'undefined' | #ssl_tls{}, {[binary()],non_neg_integer(),[binary()]}}} | #alert{}. @@ -86,11 +92,10 @@ init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation) -> %% Description: Given old buffer and new data from TCP, packs up a records %% data %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - -get_tls_records(Data, Versions, Buffer) when is_binary(Buffer) -> - parse_tls_records(Versions, {[Data],byte_size(Data),[]}, undefined); -get_tls_records(Data, Versions, {Hdr, {Front,Size,Rear}}) -> - parse_tls_records(Versions, {Front,Size + byte_size(Data),[Data|Rear]}, Hdr). +get_tls_records(Data, Versions, Buffer, SslOpts) when is_binary(Buffer) -> + parse_tls_records(Versions, {[Data],byte_size(Data),[]}, SslOpts, undefined); +get_tls_records(Data, Versions, {Hdr, {Front,Size,Rear}}, SslOpts) -> + parse_tls_records(Versions, {Front,Size + byte_size(Data),[Data|Rear]}, SslOpts, Hdr). %%==================================================================== %% Encoding @@ -102,6 +107,8 @@ get_tls_records(Data, Versions, {Hdr, {Front,Size,Rear}}) -> % %% Description: Encodes a handshake message to send on the ssl-socket. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_handshake(Frag, {3, 4}, ConnectionStates) -> + tls_record_1_3:encode_handshake(Frag, ConnectionStates); encode_handshake(Frag, Version, #{current_write := #{beast_mitigation := BeastMitigation, @@ -122,6 +129,8 @@ encode_handshake(Frag, Version, %% %% Description: Encodes an alert message to send on the ssl-socket. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_alert_record(Alert, {3, 4}, ConnectionStates) -> + tls_record_1_3:encode_alert_record(Alert, ConnectionStates); encode_alert_record(#alert{level = Level, description = Description}, Version, ConnectionStates) -> encode_plain_text(?ALERT, Version, <<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description)>>, @@ -142,6 +151,8 @@ encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates) -> %% %% Description: Encodes data to send on the ssl-socket. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_data(Data, {3, 4}, ConnectionStates) -> + tls_record_1_3:encode_data(Data, ConnectionStates); encode_data(Data, Version, #{current_write := #{beast_mitigation := BeastMitigation, security_parameters := @@ -155,12 +166,14 @@ encode_data(Data, Version, %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states(), boolean()) -> +-spec decode_cipher_text(tls_version(), #ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states(), boolean()) -> {#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states()}| #alert{}. %% %% Description: Decode cipher text %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_cipher_text(CipherText, +decode_cipher_text({3,4}, CipherTextRecord, ConnectionStates, _) -> + tls_record_1_3:decode_cipher_text(CipherTextRecord, ConnectionStates); +decode_cipher_text(_, CipherTextRecord, #{current_read := #{sequence_number := Seq, security_parameters := @@ -170,7 +183,7 @@ decode_cipher_text(CipherText, } } = ConnectionStates0, _) -> SeqBin = <<?UINT64(Seq)>>, - #ssl_tls{type = Type, version = {MajVer,MinVer} = Version, fragment = Fragment} = CipherText, + #ssl_tls{type = Type, version = {MajVer,MinVer} = Version, fragment = Fragment} = CipherTextRecord, StartAdditionalData = <<SeqBin/binary, ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>, CipherS = ssl_record:nonce_seed(BulkCipherAlgo, SeqBin, CipherS0), case ssl_record:decipher_aead( @@ -187,17 +200,17 @@ decode_cipher_text(CipherText, cipher_state => CipherS, sequence_number => Seq + 1, compression_state => CompressionS}}, - {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnectionStates}; + {CipherTextRecord#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnectionStates}; #alert{} = Alert -> Alert end; -decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{version = Version, - fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, +decode_cipher_text(_, #ssl_tls{version = Version, + fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherTextRecord, #{current_read := ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, PaddingCheck) -> case ssl_record:decipher(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0, PaddingCheck) of {PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} -> - MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(CipherText#ssl_tls.type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState1), + MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(CipherTextRecord#ssl_tls.type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState1), case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of true -> #{sequence_number := Seq, @@ -210,7 +223,7 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{version = Version, ConnnectionStates0#{current_read => ReadState1#{sequence_number => Seq + 1, compression_state => CompressionS1}}, - {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; + {CipherTextRecord#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) end; @@ -229,6 +242,8 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{version = Version, %% Description: Creates a protocol version record from a version atom %% or vice versa. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +protocol_version('tlsv1.3') -> + {3, 4}; protocol_version('tlsv1.2') -> {3, 3}; protocol_version('tlsv1.1') -> @@ -239,6 +254,8 @@ protocol_version(sslv3) -> {3, 0}; protocol_version(sslv2) -> %% Backwards compatibility {2, 0}; +protocol_version({3, 4}) -> + 'tlsv1.3'; protocol_version({3, 3}) -> 'tlsv1.2'; protocol_version({3, 2}) -> @@ -372,10 +389,10 @@ is_acceptable_version({N,_} = Version, Versions) is_acceptable_version(_,_) -> false. --spec hello_version(tls_version(), [tls_version()]) -> tls_version(). -hello_version(Version, _) when Version >= {3, 3} -> - Version; -hello_version(_, Versions) -> +-spec hello_version([tls_version()]) -> tls_version(). +hello_version([Highest|_]) when Highest >= {3,3} -> + Highest; +hello_version(Versions) -> lowest_protocol_version(Versions). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -394,84 +411,91 @@ initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> server_verify_data => undefined }. +%% Used by logging to recreate the received bytes +build_tls_record(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = {MajVer, MinVer}, fragment = Fragment}) -> + Length = byte_size(Fragment), + <<?BYTE(Type),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer),?UINT16(Length), Fragment/binary>>. + -parse_tls_records(Versions, Q, undefined) -> - decode_tls_records(Versions, Q, [], undefined, undefined, undefined); -parse_tls_records(Versions, Q, #ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, fragment = Length}) -> - decode_tls_records(Versions, Q, [], Type, Version, Length). +parse_tls_records(Versions, Q, SslOpts, undefined) -> + decode_tls_records(Versions, Q, SslOpts, [], undefined, undefined, undefined); +parse_tls_records(Versions, Q, SslOpts, #ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, fragment = Length}) -> + decode_tls_records(Versions, Q, SslOpts, [], Type, Version, Length). %% Generic code path -decode_tls_records(Versions, {_,Size,_} = Q0, Acc, undefined, _Version, _Length) -> +decode_tls_records(Versions, {_,Size,_} = Q0, SslOpts, Acc, undefined, _Version, _Length) -> if 5 =< Size -> {<<?BYTE(Type),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Q} = binary_from_front(5, Q0), - validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, {MajVer,MinVer}, Length); + validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, {MajVer,MinVer}, Length); 3 =< Size -> {<<?BYTE(Type),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer)>>, Q} = binary_from_front(3, Q0), - validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, {MajVer,MinVer}, undefined); + validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, {MajVer,MinVer}, undefined); 1 =< Size -> {<<?BYTE(Type)>>, Q} = binary_from_front(1, Q0), - validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, undefined, undefined); + validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, undefined, undefined); true -> - validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q0, Acc, undefined, undefined, undefined) + validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q0, SslOpts, Acc, undefined, undefined, undefined) end; -decode_tls_records(Versions, {_,Size,_} = Q0, Acc, Type, undefined, _Length) -> +decode_tls_records(Versions, {_,Size,_} = Q0, SslOpts, Acc, Type, undefined, _Length) -> if 4 =< Size -> {<<?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Q} = binary_from_front(4, Q0), - validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, {MajVer,MinVer}, Length); + validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, {MajVer,MinVer}, Length); 2 =< Size -> {<<?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer)>>, Q} = binary_from_front(2, Q0), - validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, {MajVer,MinVer}, undefined); + validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, {MajVer,MinVer}, undefined); true -> - validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q0, Acc, Type, undefined, undefined) + validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q0, SslOpts, Acc, Type, undefined, undefined) end; -decode_tls_records(Versions, {_,Size,_} = Q0, Acc, Type, Version, undefined) -> +decode_tls_records(Versions, {_,Size,_} = Q0, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, undefined) -> if 2 =< Size -> {<<?UINT16(Length)>>, Q} = binary_from_front(2, Q0), - validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length); + validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, Length); true -> - validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q0, Acc, Type, Version, undefined) + validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q0, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, undefined) end; -decode_tls_records(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length) -> - validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length). +decode_tls_records(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, Length) -> + validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, Length). -validate_tls_records_type(_Versions, Q, Acc, undefined, _Version, _Length) -> +validate_tls_records_type(_Versions, Q, _SslOpts, Acc, undefined, _Version, _Length) -> {lists:reverse(Acc), {undefined, Q}}; -validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length) -> +validate_tls_records_type(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, Length) -> if ?KNOWN_RECORD_TYPE(Type) -> - validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length); + validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, Length); true -> %% Not ?KNOWN_RECORD_TYPE(Type) ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) end. -validate_tls_record_version(_Versions, Q, Acc, Type, undefined, _Length) -> +validate_tls_record_version(_Versions, Q, _SslOpts, Acc, Type, undefined, _Length) -> {lists:reverse(Acc), {#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = undefined, fragment = undefined}, Q}}; -validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length) -> - if - is_list(Versions) -> +validate_tls_record_version(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, Length) -> + case Versions of + _ when is_list(Versions) -> case is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of true -> - validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length); + validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, Length); false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) end; - Version =:= Versions -> + {3, 4} when Version =:= {3, 3} -> + validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, Length); + Version -> %% Exact version match - validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, Length); - true -> + validate_tls_record_length(Versions, Q, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, Length); + _ -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) end. -validate_tls_record_length(_Versions, Q, Acc, Type, Version, undefined) -> +validate_tls_record_length(_Versions, Q, _SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, undefined) -> {lists:reverse(Acc), {#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, fragment = undefined}, Q}}; -validate_tls_record_length(Versions, {_,Size0,_} = Q0, Acc, Type, Version, Length) -> +validate_tls_record_length(Versions, {_,Size0,_} = Q0, SslOpts, Acc, Type, Version, Length) -> if Length =< ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> if @@ -479,7 +503,8 @@ validate_tls_record_length(Versions, {_,Size0,_} = Q0, Acc, Type, Version, Lengt %% Complete record {Fragment, Q} = binary_from_front(Length, Q0), Record = #ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, fragment = Fragment}, - decode_tls_records(Versions, Q, [Record|Acc], undefined, undefined, undefined); + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, inbound, 'record', Record), + decode_tls_records(Versions, Q, SslOpts, [Record|Acc], undefined, undefined, undefined); true -> {lists:reverse(Acc), {#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, fragment = Length}, Q0}} @@ -489,16 +514,27 @@ validate_tls_record_length(Versions, {_,Size0,_} = Q0, Acc, Type, Version, Lengt end. -binary_from_front(SplitSize, {Front,Size,Rear}) -> +binary_from_front(0, Q) -> + {<<>>, Q}; +binary_from_front(SplitSize, {Front,Size,Rear}) when SplitSize =< Size -> binary_from_front(SplitSize, Front, Size, Rear, []). %% -binary_from_front(SplitSize, [], Size, [_] = Rear, Acc) -> - %% Optimize a simple case - binary_from_front(SplitSize, Rear, Size, [], Acc); +%% SplitSize > 0 and there is at least SplitSize bytes buffered in Front and Rear binary_from_front(SplitSize, [], Size, Rear, Acc) -> - binary_from_front(SplitSize, lists:reverse(Rear), Size, [], Acc); + case Rear of + %% Avoid lists:reverse/1 for simple cases. + %% Case clause for [] to avoid infinite loop. + [_] -> + binary_from_front(SplitSize, Rear, Size, [], Acc); + [Bin2,Bin1] -> + binary_from_front(SplitSize, [Bin1,Bin2], Size, [], Acc); + [Bin3,Bin2,Bin1] -> + binary_from_front(SplitSize, [Bin1,Bin2,Bin3], Size, [], Acc); + [_,_,_|_] -> + binary_from_front(SplitSize, lists:reverse(Rear), Size, [], Acc) + end; binary_from_front(SplitSize, [Bin|Front], Size, Rear, []) -> - %% Optimize a frequent case + %% Optimize the frequent case when the accumulator is empty BinSize = byte_size(Bin), if SplitSize < BinSize -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d713062284 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.erl @@ -0,0 +1,320 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% + +-module(tls_record_1_3). + +-include("tls_record.hrl"). +-include("tls_record_1_3.hrl"). +-include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include("ssl_alert.hrl"). +-include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). + +%% Encoding +-export([encode_handshake/2, encode_alert_record/2, + encode_data/2]). +-export([encode_plain_text/3]). + +%% Decoding +-export([decode_cipher_text/2]). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Encoding +%%==================================================================== + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec encode_handshake(iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> + {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. +% +%% Description: Encodes a handshake message to send on the tls-1.3-socket. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_handshake(Frag, ConnectionStates) -> + case iolist_size(Frag) of + N when N > ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH -> + %% TODO: Consider padding here + Data = split_bin(iolist_to_binary(Frag), ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH), + encode_iolist(?HANDSHAKE, Data, ConnectionStates); + _ -> + encode_plain_text(?HANDSHAKE, Frag, ConnectionStates) + end. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec encode_alert_record(#alert{}, ssl_record:connection_states()) -> + {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. +%% +%% Description: Encodes an alert message to send on the ssl-socket. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_alert_record(#alert{level = Level, description = Description}, + ConnectionStates) -> + encode_plain_text(?ALERT, <<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description)>>, + ConnectionStates). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec encode_data(binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> + {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. +%% +%% Description: Encodes data to send on the ssl-socket. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_data(Frag, ConnectionStates) -> + Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, {3,4}), + encode_iolist(?APPLICATION_DATA, Data, ConnectionStates). + +encode_plain_text(Type, Data0, #{current_write := Write0} = ConnectionStates) -> + PadLen = 0, %% TODO where to specify PadLen? + Data = inner_plaintext(Type, Data0, PadLen), + CipherFragment = encode_plain_text(Data, Write0), + {CipherText, Write} = encode_tls_cipher_text(CipherFragment, Write0), + {CipherText, ConnectionStates#{current_write => Write}}. + +encode_iolist(Type, Data, ConnectionStates0) -> + {ConnectionStates, EncodedMsg} = + lists:foldl(fun(Text, {CS0, Encoded}) -> + {Enc, CS1} = + encode_plain_text(Type, Text, CS0), + {CS1, [Enc | Encoded]} + end, {ConnectionStates0, []}, Data), + {lists:reverse(EncodedMsg), ConnectionStates}. + +%%==================================================================== +%% Decoding +%%==================================================================== + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states()) -> + {#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states()}| #alert{}. +%% +%% Description: Decode cipher text, use legacy type ssl_tls instead of tls_cipher_text +%% in decoding context so that we can reuse the code from erlier versions. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = ?OPAQUE_TYPE, + version = ?LEGACY_VERSION, + fragment = CipherFragment}, + #{current_read := + #{sequence_number := Seq, + cipher_state := #cipher_state{key = Key, + iv = IV, + tag_len = TagLen}, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{ + cipher_type = ?AEAD, + bulk_cipher_algorithm = + BulkCipherAlgo} + } = ReadState0} = ConnectionStates0) -> + case decipher_aead(CipherFragment, BulkCipherAlgo, Key, Seq, IV, TagLen) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + PlainFragment -> + ConnectionStates = + ConnectionStates0#{current_read => + ReadState0#{sequence_number => Seq + 1}}, + {decode_inner_plaintext(PlainFragment), ConnectionStates} + end; + + +%% RFC8446 - TLS 1.3 (OpenSSL compatibility) +%% Handle unencrypted Alerts from openssl s_client when server's +%% connection states are already stepped into traffic encryption. +%% (E.g. openssl s_client receives a CertificateRequest with +%% a signature_algorithms_cert extension that does not contain +%% the signature algorithm of the client's certificate.) +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, + version = ?LEGACY_VERSION, + fragment = <<2,47>>}, + ConnectionStates0) -> + {#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, + version = {3,4}, %% Internally use real version + fragment = <<2,47>>}, ConnectionStates0}; +%% TLS 1.3 server can receive a User Cancelled Alert when handshake is +%% paused and then cancelled on the client side. +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, + version = ?LEGACY_VERSION, + fragment = <<2,90>>}, + ConnectionStates0) -> + {#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, + version = {3,4}, %% Internally use real version + fragment = <<2,90>>}, ConnectionStates0}; +%% RFC8446 - TLS 1.3 +%% D.4. Middlebox Compatibility Mode +%% - If not offering early data, the client sends a dummy +%% change_cipher_spec record (see the third paragraph of Section 5) +%% immediately before its second flight. This may either be before +%% its second ClientHello or before its encrypted handshake flight. +%% If offering early data, the record is placed immediately after the +%% first ClientHello. +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + version = ?LEGACY_VERSION, + fragment = <<1>>}, + ConnectionStates0) -> + {#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + version = {3,4}, %% Internally use real version + fragment = <<1>>}, ConnectionStates0}; +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, + version = ?LEGACY_VERSION, + fragment = CipherFragment}, + #{current_read := + #{security_parameters := + #security_parameters{ + cipher_suite = ?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL} + }} = ConnnectionStates0) -> + {#ssl_tls{type = Type, + version = {3,4}, %% Internally use real version + fragment = CipherFragment}, ConnnectionStates0}; +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type}, _) -> + %% Version mismatch is already asserted + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, {record_type_mismatch, Type}). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Internal functions +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize) -> + split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, []). +split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, _) -> + do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, []). + +do_split_bin(<<>>, _, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Acc) -> + case Bin of + <<Chunk:ChunkSize/binary, Rest/binary>> -> + do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [Chunk | Acc]); + _ -> + lists:reverse(Acc, [Bin]) + end. + +inner_plaintext(Type, Data, Length) -> + #inner_plaintext{ + content = Data, + type = Type, + zeros = zero_padding(Length) + }. +zero_padding(Length)-> + binary:copy(<<?BYTE(0)>>, Length). + +encode_plain_text(#inner_plaintext{ + content = Data, + type = Type, + zeros = Zeros + }, #{cipher_state := #cipher_state{key= Key, + iv = IV, + tag_len = TagLen}, + sequence_number := Seq, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{ + cipher_type = ?AEAD, + bulk_cipher_algorithm = BulkCipherAlgo} + }) -> + PlainText = [Data, Type, Zeros], + Encoded = cipher_aead(PlainText, BulkCipherAlgo, Key, Seq, IV, TagLen), + #tls_cipher_text{opaque_type = 23, %% 23 (application_data) for outward compatibility + legacy_version = {3,3}, + encoded_record = Encoded}; +encode_plain_text(#inner_plaintext{ + content = Data, + type = Type + }, #{security_parameters := + #security_parameters{ + cipher_suite = ?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL} + }) -> + %% RFC8446 - 5.1. Record Layer + %% When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext + %% structures are written directly onto the wire. + #tls_cipher_text{opaque_type = Type, + legacy_version = {3,3}, + encoded_record = Data}; + +encode_plain_text(_, CS) -> + exit({cs, CS}). + +additional_data(Length) -> + <<?BYTE(?OPAQUE_TYPE), ?BYTE(3), ?BYTE(3),?UINT16(Length)>>. + +%% The per-record nonce for the AEAD construction is formed as +%% follows: +%% +%% 1. The 64-bit record sequence number is encoded in network byte +%% order and padded to the left with zeros to iv_length. +%% +%% 2. The padded sequence number is XORed with either the static +%% client_write_iv or server_write_iv (depending on the role). +%% +%% The resulting quantity (of length iv_length) is used as the +%% per-record nonce. +nonce(Seq, IV) -> + Padding = binary:copy(<<0>>, byte_size(IV) - 8), + crypto:exor(<<Padding/binary,?UINT64(Seq)>>, IV). + +cipher_aead(Fragment, BulkCipherAlgo, Key, Seq, IV, TagLen) -> + AAD = additional_data(erlang:iolist_size(Fragment) + TagLen), + Nonce = nonce(Seq, IV), + {Content, CipherTag} = + ssl_cipher:aead_encrypt(BulkCipherAlgo, Key, Nonce, Fragment, AAD, TagLen), + <<Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>. + +encode_tls_cipher_text(#tls_cipher_text{opaque_type = Type, + legacy_version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + encoded_record = Encoded}, #{sequence_number := Seq} = Write) -> + Length = erlang:iolist_size(Encoded), + {[<<?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Encoded], + Write#{sequence_number => Seq +1}}. + +decipher_aead(CipherFragment, BulkCipherAlgo, Key, Seq, IV, TagLen) -> + try + AAD = additional_data(erlang:iolist_size(CipherFragment)), + Nonce = nonce(Seq, IV), + {CipherText, CipherTag} = aead_ciphertext_split(CipherFragment, TagLen), + case ssl_cipher:aead_decrypt(BulkCipherAlgo, Key, Nonce, CipherText, CipherTag, AAD) of + Content when is_binary(Content) -> + Content; + _ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) + end + catch + _:_ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) + end. + + +aead_ciphertext_split(CipherTextFragment, TagLen) + when is_binary(CipherTextFragment) -> + CipherLen = erlang:byte_size(CipherTextFragment) - TagLen, + <<CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:TagLen/bytes>> = CipherTextFragment, + {CipherText, CipherTag}; +aead_ciphertext_split(CipherTextFragment, TagLen) + when is_list(CipherTextFragment) -> + CipherLen = erlang:iolist_size(CipherTextFragment) - TagLen, + <<CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:TagLen/bytes>> = + erlang:iolist_to_binary(CipherTextFragment), + {CipherText, CipherTag}. + +decode_inner_plaintext(PlainText) -> + case binary:last(PlainText) of + 0 -> + decode_inner_plaintext(init_binary(PlainText)); + Type when Type =:= ?APPLICATION_DATA orelse + Type =:= ?HANDSHAKE orelse + Type =:= ?ALERT -> + #ssl_tls{type = Type, + version = {3,4}, %% Internally use real version + fragment = init_binary(PlainText)}; + _Else -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, empty_alert) + end. + +init_binary(B) -> + {Init, _} = + split_binary(B, byte_size(B) - 1), + Init. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.hrl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..273427a34e --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.hrl @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2018-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +%% +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Purpose: Record and constant defenitions for the TLS-1.3-record protocol +%% see RFC 8446 not present in earlier versions +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +-ifndef(tls_record_1_3). +-define(tls_record_1_3, true). + +%% enum { +%% invalid(0), +%% %% defined in ssl_record.hrl +%% change_cipher_spec(20), +%% alert(21), +%% handshake(22), +%% application_data(23), +%% heartbeat(24), /* RFC 6520 */ +%% (255) +%% } ContentType; + +-define(INVALID, 0). +-define(LEGACY_VERSION, {3,3}). +-define(OPAQUE_TYPE, 23). + +-record(inner_plaintext, { + content, %% data + type, %% Contentype + zeros %% padding "uint8 zeros[length_of_padding]" + }). +-record(tls_cipher_text, { %% Equivalent of encrypted version of #ssl_tls from previous versions + %% decrypted version will still use #ssl_tls for code reuse purposes + %% with real values for content type and version + opaque_type = ?OPAQUE_TYPE, + legacy_version = ?LEGACY_VERSION, + encoded_record + }). + +-endif. % -ifdef(tls_record_1_3). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_sender.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_sender.erl index c07b7f49cd..d0604565e3 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_sender.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_sender.erl @@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ negotiated_version, renegotiate_at, connection_monitor, - dist_handle + dist_handle, + log_level }). -record(data, @@ -202,7 +203,8 @@ init({call, From}, {Pid, #{current_write := WriteState, tracker := Tracker, transport_cb := Transport, negotiated_version := Version, - renegotiate_at := RenegotiateAt}}, + renegotiate_at := RenegotiateAt, + log_level := LogLevel}}, #data{connection_states = ConnectionStates, static = Static0} = StateData0) -> Monitor = erlang:monitor(process, Pid), StateData = @@ -215,7 +217,8 @@ init({call, From}, {Pid, #{current_write := WriteState, tracker = Tracker, transport_cb = Transport, negotiated_version = Version, - renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}}, + renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt, + log_level = LogLevel}}, {next_state, handshake, StateData, [{reply, From, ok}]}; init(_, _, _) -> %% Just in case anything else sneeks through @@ -406,11 +409,13 @@ handle_common(Type, Msg, _) -> send_tls_alert(#alert{} = Alert, #data{static = #static{negotiated_version = Version, socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport}, + transport_cb = Transport, + log_level = LogLevel}, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = StateData0) -> {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = tls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, outbound, 'record', BinMsg), StateData0#data{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. send_application_data(Data, From, StateName, @@ -419,7 +424,8 @@ send_application_data(Data, From, StateName, dist_handle = DistHandle, negotiated_version = Version, transport_cb = Transport, - renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}, + renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt, + log_level = LogLevel}, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = StateData0) -> case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of true -> @@ -431,10 +437,12 @@ send_application_data(Data, From, StateName, StateData = StateData0#data{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, case tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Msgs) of ok when DistHandle =/= undefined -> + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, outbound, 'record', Msgs), {next_state, StateName, StateData, []}; Reason when DistHandle =/= undefined -> {next_state, death_row, StateData, [{state_timeout, 5000, Reason}]}; ok -> + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, outbound, 'record', Msgs), {next_state, StateName, StateData, [{reply, From, ok}]}; Result -> {next_state, StateName, StateData, [{reply, From, Result}]} diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl index 1bfd9a8b6d..f7c8c770ae 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl @@ -32,7 +32,19 @@ -export([master_secret/4, finished/5, certificate_verify/3, mac_hash/7, hmac_hash/3, setup_keys/8, suites/1, prf/5, ecc_curves/1, ecc_curves/2, oid_to_enum/1, enum_to_oid/1, - default_signature_algs/1, signature_algs/2]). + default_signature_algs/1, signature_algs/2, + default_signature_schemes/1, signature_schemes/2, + groups/1, groups/2, group_to_enum/1, enum_to_group/1, default_groups/1]). + +-export([derive_secret/4, hkdf_expand_label/5, hkdf_extract/3, hkdf_expand/4, + key_schedule/3, key_schedule/4, create_info/3, + external_binder_key/2, resumption_binder_key/2, + client_early_traffic_secret/3, early_exporter_master_secret/3, + client_handshake_traffic_secret/3, server_handshake_traffic_secret/3, + client_application_traffic_secret_0/3, server_application_traffic_secret_0/3, + exporter_master_secret/3, resumption_master_secret/3, + update_traffic_secret/2, calculate_traffic_keys/3, + transcript_hash/2, finished_key/2, finished_verify_data/3]). -type named_curve() :: sect571r1 | sect571k1 | secp521r1 | brainpoolP512r1 | sect409k1 | sect409r1 | brainpoolP384r1 | secp384r1 | @@ -41,12 +53,68 @@ sect193r1 | sect193r2 | secp192k1 | secp192r1 | sect163k1 | sect163r1 | sect163r2 | secp160k1 | secp160r1 | secp160r2. -type curves() :: [named_curve()]. --export_type([curves/0, named_curve/0]). +-type group() :: secp256r1 | secp384r1 | secp521r1 | ffdhe2048 | + ffdhe3072 | ffdhe4096 | ffdhe6144 | ffdhe8192. +-type supported_groups() :: [group()]. +-export_type([curves/0, named_curve/0, group/0, supported_groups/0]). %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API %%==================================================================== +%% TLS 1.3 --------------------------------------------------- +-spec derive_secret(Secret::binary(), Label::binary(), + Messages::iodata(), Algo::ssl:hash()) -> Key::binary(). +derive_secret(Secret, Label, Messages, Algo) -> + Hash = crypto:hash(mac_algo(Algo), Messages), + hkdf_expand_label(Secret, Label, + Hash, ssl_cipher:hash_size(Algo), Algo). + +-spec hkdf_expand_label(Secret::binary(), Label0::binary(), + Context::binary(), Length::integer(), + Algo::ssl:hash()) -> KeyingMaterial::binary(). +hkdf_expand_label(Secret, Label0, Context, Length, Algo) -> + HkdfLabel = create_info(Label0, Context, Length), + hkdf_expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length, Algo). + +%% Create info parameter for HKDF-Expand: +%% HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM +create_info(Label0, Context0, Length) -> + %% struct { + %% uint16 length = Length; + %% opaque label<7..255> = "tls13 " + Label; + %% opaque context<0..255> = Context; + %% } HkdfLabel; + Label1 = << <<"tls13 ">>/binary, Label0/binary>>, + LabelLen = size(Label1), + Label = <<?BYTE(LabelLen), Label1/binary>>, + ContextLen = size(Context0), + Context = <<?BYTE(ContextLen),Context0/binary>>, + Content = <<Label/binary, Context/binary>>, + <<?UINT16(Length), Content/binary>>. + +-spec hkdf_extract(MacAlg::ssl:hash(), Salt::binary(), + KeyingMaterial::binary()) -> PseudoRandKey::binary(). + +hkdf_extract(MacAlg, Salt, KeyingMaterial) -> + hmac_hash(MacAlg, Salt, KeyingMaterial). + + +-spec hkdf_expand(PseudoRandKey::binary(), ContextInfo::binary(), + Length::integer(), Algo::ssl:hash()) -> KeyingMaterial::binary(). + +hkdf_expand(PseudoRandKey, ContextInfo, Length, Algo) -> + Iterations = erlang:ceil(Length / ssl_cipher:hash_size(Algo)), + hkdf_expand(Algo, PseudoRandKey, ContextInfo, Length, 1, Iterations, <<>>, <<>>). + + +-spec transcript_hash(Messages::iodata(), Algo::ssl:hash()) -> Hash::binary(). + +transcript_hash(Messages, Algo) -> + crypto:hash(mac_algo(Algo), Messages). +%% TLS 1.3 --------------------------------------------------- + +%% TLS 1.0 -1.2 --------------------------------------------------- -spec master_secret(integer(), binary(), binary(), binary()) -> binary(). master_secret(PrfAlgo, PreMasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) -> @@ -56,9 +124,10 @@ master_secret(PrfAlgo, PreMasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) -> prf(PrfAlgo, PreMasterSecret, <<"master secret">>, [ClientRandom, ServerRandom], 48). +%% TLS 1.0 -1.2 --------------------------------------------------- -spec finished(client | server, integer(), integer(), binary(), [binary()]) -> binary(). - +%% TLS 1.0 -1.1 --------------------------------------------------- finished(Role, Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) when Version == 1; Version == 2; PrfAlgo == ?MD5SHA -> %% RFC 2246 & 4346 - 7.4.9. Finished @@ -72,7 +141,9 @@ finished(Role, Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Handshake), SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Handshake), prf(?MD5SHA, MasterSecret, finished_label(Role), [MD5, SHA], 12); +%% TLS 1.0 -1.1 --------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS 1.2 --------------------------------------------------- finished(Role, Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) when Version == 3 -> %% RFC 5246 - 7.4.9. Finished @@ -84,21 +155,28 @@ finished(Role, Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) %% PRF(master_secret, finished_label, Hash(handshake_messages)) [0..11]; Hash = crypto:hash(mac_algo(PrfAlgo), Handshake), prf(PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, finished_label(Role), Hash, 12). +%% TLS 1.2 --------------------------------------------------- + +%% TODO 1.3 finished -spec certificate_verify(md5sha | sha, integer(), [binary()]) -> binary(). +%% TLS 1.0 -1.1 --------------------------------------------------- certificate_verify(md5sha, _Version, Handshake) -> MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Handshake), SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Handshake), <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>; +%% TLS 1.0 -1.1 --------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS 1.2 --------------------------------------------------- certificate_verify(HashAlgo, _Version, Handshake) -> crypto:hash(HashAlgo, Handshake). +%% TLS 1.2 --------------------------------------------------- -spec setup_keys(integer(), integer(), binary(), binary(), binary(), integer(), integer(), integer()) -> {binary(), binary(), binary(), binary(), binary(), binary()}. - +%% TLS v1.0 --------------------------------------------------- setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KeyMatLen, IVSize) when Version == 1 -> @@ -123,8 +201,9 @@ setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock, {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}; +%% TLS v1.0 --------------------------------------------------- -%% TLS v1.1 +%% TLS v1.1 --------------------------------------------------- setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KeyMatLen, IVSize) when Version == 2 -> @@ -150,11 +229,12 @@ setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock, {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}; +%% TLS v1.1 --------------------------------------------------- -%% TLS v1.2 +%% TLS v1.2 --------------------------------------------------- setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KeyMatLen, IVSize) - when Version == 3 -> + when Version == 3; Version == 4 -> %% RFC 5246 - 6.3. Key calculation %% key_block = PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, %% "key expansion", @@ -176,8 +256,177 @@ setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock, {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}. +%% TLS v1.2 --------------------------------------------------- --spec mac_hash(integer(), binary(), integer(), integer(), tls_record:tls_version(), +%% TLS v1.3 --------------------------------------------------- +%% RFC 8446 - 7.1. Key Schedule +%% +%% 0 +%% | +%% v +%% PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret +%% | +%% +-----> Derive-Secret(., "ext binder" | "res binder", "") +%% | = binder_key +%% | +%% +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", ClientHello) +%% | = client_early_traffic_secret +%% | +%% +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", ClientHello) +%% | = early_exporter_master_secret +%% v +%% Derive-Secret(., "derived", "") +%% | +%% v +%% (EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract = Handshake Secret +%% | +%% +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c hs traffic", +%% | ClientHello...ServerHello) +%% | = client_handshake_traffic_secret +%% | +%% +-----> Derive-Secret(., "s hs traffic", +%% | ClientHello...ServerHello) +%% | = server_handshake_traffic_secret +%% v +%% Derive-Secret(., "derived", "") +%% | +%% v +%% 0 -> HKDF-Extract = Master Secret +%% | +%% +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c ap traffic", +%% | ClientHello...server Finished) +%% | = client_application_traffic_secret_0 +%% | +%% +-----> Derive-Secret(., "s ap traffic", +%% | ClientHello...server Finished) +%% | = server_application_traffic_secret_0 +%% | +%% +-----> Derive-Secret(., "exp master", +%% | ClientHello...server Finished) +%% | = exporter_master_secret +%% | +%% +-----> Derive-Secret(., "res master", +%% ClientHello...client Finished) +%% = resumption_master_secret +-spec key_schedule(early_secret | handshake_secret | master_secret, + atom(), {psk | early_secret | handshake_secret, binary()}) -> + {early_secret | handshake_secret | master_secret, binary()}. + +key_schedule(early_secret, Algo, {psk, PSK}) -> + Len = ssl_cipher:hash_size(Algo), + Salt = binary:copy(<<?BYTE(0)>>, Len), + {early_secret, hkdf_extract(Algo, Salt, PSK)}; +key_schedule(master_secret, Algo, {handshake_secret, Secret}) -> + Len = ssl_cipher:hash_size(Algo), + IKM = binary:copy(<<?BYTE(0)>>, Len), + Salt = derive_secret(Secret, <<"derived">>, <<>>, Algo), + {master_secret, hkdf_extract(Algo, Salt, IKM)}. +%% +key_schedule(handshake_secret, Algo, IKM, {early_secret, Secret}) -> + Salt = derive_secret(Secret, <<"derived">>, <<>>, Algo), + {handshake_secret, hkdf_extract(Algo, Salt, IKM)}. + +-spec external_binder_key(atom(), {early_secret, binary()}) -> binary(). +external_binder_key(Algo, {early_secret, Secret}) -> + derive_secret(Secret, <<"ext binder">>, <<>>, Algo). + +-spec resumption_binder_key(atom(), {early_secret, binary()}) -> binary(). +resumption_binder_key(Algo, {early_secret, Secret}) -> + derive_secret(Secret, <<"res binder">>, <<>>, Algo). + +-spec client_early_traffic_secret(atom(), {early_secret, binary()}, iodata()) -> binary(). +%% M = ClientHello +client_early_traffic_secret(Algo, {early_secret, Secret}, M) -> + derive_secret(Secret, <<"c e traffic">>, M, Algo). + +-spec early_exporter_master_secret(atom(), {early_secret, binary()}, iodata()) -> binary(). +%% M = ClientHello +early_exporter_master_secret(Algo, {early_secret, Secret}, M) -> + derive_secret(Secret, <<"e exp master">>, M, Algo). + +-spec client_handshake_traffic_secret(atom(), {handshake_secret, binary()}, iodata()) -> binary(). +%% M = ClientHello...ServerHello +client_handshake_traffic_secret(Algo, {handshake_secret, Secret}, M) -> + derive_secret(Secret, <<"c hs traffic">>, M, Algo). + +-spec server_handshake_traffic_secret(atom(), {handshake_secret, binary()}, iodata()) -> binary(). +%% M = ClientHello...ServerHello +server_handshake_traffic_secret(Algo, {handshake_secret, Secret}, M) -> + derive_secret(Secret, <<"s hs traffic">>, M, Algo). + +-spec client_application_traffic_secret_0(atom(), {master_secret, binary()}, iodata()) -> binary(). +%% M = ClientHello...server Finished +client_application_traffic_secret_0(Algo, {master_secret, Secret}, M) -> + derive_secret(Secret, <<"c ap traffic">>, M, Algo). + +-spec server_application_traffic_secret_0(atom(), {master_secret, binary()}, iodata()) -> binary(). +%% M = ClientHello...server Finished +server_application_traffic_secret_0(Algo, {master_secret, Secret}, M) -> + derive_secret(Secret, <<"s ap traffic">>, M, Algo). + +-spec exporter_master_secret(atom(), {master_secret, binary()}, iodata()) -> binary(). +%% M = ClientHello...server Finished +exporter_master_secret(Algo, {master_secret, Secret}, M) -> + derive_secret(Secret, <<"exp master">>, M, Algo). + +-spec resumption_master_secret(atom(), {master_secret, binary()}, iodata()) -> binary(). +%% M = ClientHello...client Finished +resumption_master_secret(Algo, {master_secret, Secret}, M) -> + derive_secret(Secret, <<"res master">>, M, Algo). + +-spec finished_key(binary(), atom()) -> binary(). +finished_key(BaseKey, Algo) -> + %% finished_key = + %% HKDF-Expand-Label(BaseKey, "finished", "", Hash.length) + ssl_cipher:hash_size(Algo), + hkdf_expand_label(BaseKey, <<"finished">>, <<>>, ssl_cipher:hash_size(Algo), Algo). + +-spec finished_verify_data(binary(), atom(), iodata()) -> binary(). +finished_verify_data(FinishedKey, HKDFAlgo, Messages) -> + %% The verify_data value is computed as follows: + %% + %% verify_data = + %% HMAC(finished_key, + %% Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, + %% Certificate*, CertificateVerify*)) + Context = lists:reverse(Messages), + THash = tls_v1:transcript_hash(Context, HKDFAlgo), + tls_v1:hmac_hash(HKDFAlgo, FinishedKey, THash). + +%% The next-generation application_traffic_secret is computed as: +%% +%% application_traffic_secret_N+1 = +%% HKDF-Expand-Label(application_traffic_secret_N, +%% "traffic upd", "", Hash.length) +-spec update_traffic_secret(atom(), binary()) -> binary(). +update_traffic_secret(Algo, Secret) -> + hkdf_expand_label(Secret, <<"traffic upd">>, <<>>, ssl_cipher:hash_size(Algo), Algo). + +%% The traffic keying material is generated from the following input +%% values: +%% +%% - A secret value +%% +%% - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated +%% +%% - The length of the key being generated +%% +%% The traffic keying material is generated from an input traffic secret +%% value using: +%% +%% [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "key", "", key_length) +%% [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "iv", "", iv_length) +-spec calculate_traffic_keys(atom(), atom(), binary()) -> {binary(), binary()}. +calculate_traffic_keys(HKDFAlgo, Cipher, Secret) -> + Key = hkdf_expand_label(Secret, <<"key">>, <<>>, ssl_cipher:key_material(Cipher), HKDFAlgo), + %% TODO: remove hard coded IV size + IV = hkdf_expand_label(Secret, <<"iv">>, <<>>, 12, HKDFAlgo), + {Key, IV}. + +%% TLS v1.3 --------------------------------------------------- + +%% TLS 1.0 -1.2 --------------------------------------------------- +-spec mac_hash(integer() | atom(), binary(), integer(), integer(), tls_record:tls_version(), integer(), binary()) -> binary(). mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, {Major, Minor}, @@ -191,8 +440,11 @@ mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, {Major, Minor}, ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Fragment]), Mac. +%% TLS 1.0 -1.2 --------------------------------------------------- + +%% TODO 1.3 same as above? --spec suites(1|2|3) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. +-spec suites(1|2|3|4|'TLS_v1.3') -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2 -> [ @@ -244,8 +496,29 @@ suites(3) -> %% ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, %% ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, %% ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ] ++ suites(2). - + ] ++ suites(2); + +suites(4) -> + [?TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + ?TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + ?TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + ?TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 + %% Not supported + %% ?TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 + ] ++ suites(3); + +suites('TLS_v1.3') -> + [?TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + ?TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + ?TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + ?TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 + %% Not supported + %% ?TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 + ]. + + +signature_algs({3, 4}, HashSigns) -> + signature_algs({3, 3}, HashSigns); signature_algs({3, 3}, HashSigns) -> CryptoSupports = crypto:supports(), Hashes = proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupports), @@ -273,6 +546,10 @@ signature_algs({3, 3}, HashSigns) -> end, [], HashSigns), lists:reverse(Supported). +default_signature_algs({3, 4} = Version) -> + %% TLS 1.3 servers shall be prepared to process TLS 1.2 ClientHellos + %% containing legacy hash-sign tuples. + default_signature_schemes(Version) ++ default_signature_algs({3,3}); default_signature_algs({3, 3} = Version) -> Default = [%% SHA2 {sha512, ecdsa}, @@ -291,15 +568,117 @@ default_signature_algs({3, 3} = Version) -> default_signature_algs(_) -> undefined. + +signature_schemes(Version, SignatureSchemes) when is_tuple(Version) + andalso Version >= {3, 3} -> + CryptoSupports = crypto:supports(), + Hashes = proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupports), + PubKeys = proplists:get_value(public_keys, CryptoSupports), + Curves = proplists:get_value(curves, CryptoSupports), + RSAPSSSupported = lists:member(rsa_pkcs1_pss_padding, + proplists:get_value(rsa_opts, CryptoSupports)), + Fun = fun (Scheme, Acc) when is_atom(Scheme) -> + {Hash0, Sign0, Curve} = + ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(Scheme), + Sign = case Sign0 of + rsa_pkcs1 -> + rsa; + rsa_pss_rsae when RSAPSSSupported -> + rsa; + rsa_pss_pss when RSAPSSSupported -> + rsa; + S -> S + end, + Hash = case Hash0 of + sha1 -> + sha; + H -> H + end, + case proplists:get_bool(Sign, PubKeys) + andalso proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashes) + andalso (Curve =:= undefined orelse + proplists:get_bool(Curve, Curves)) + andalso is_pair(Hash, Sign, Hashes) + of + true -> + [Scheme | Acc]; + false -> + Acc + end; + %% Special clause for filtering out the legacy hash-sign tuples. + ({Hash, dsa = Sign} = Alg, Acc) -> + case proplists:get_bool(dss, PubKeys) + andalso proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashes) + andalso is_pair(Hash, Sign, Hashes) + of + true -> + [Alg | Acc]; + false -> + Acc + end; + ({Hash, Sign} = Alg, Acc) -> + case proplists:get_bool(Sign, PubKeys) + andalso proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashes) + andalso is_pair(Hash, Sign, Hashes) + of + true -> + [Alg | Acc]; + false -> + Acc + end + end, + Supported = lists:foldl(Fun, [], SignatureSchemes), + lists:reverse(Supported); +signature_schemes(_, _) -> + []. + +default_signature_schemes(Version) -> + Default = [ + ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, + ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, + ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, + rsa_pss_pss_sha512, + rsa_pss_pss_sha384, + rsa_pss_pss_sha256, + rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, + rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, + rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, + %% ed25519, + %% ed448, + + %% These values refer solely to signatures + %% which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2) and are not + %% defined for use in signed TLS handshake messages, although they + %% MAY appear in "signature_algorithms" and + %% "signature_algorithms_cert" for backward compatibility with + %% TLS 1.2. + rsa_pkcs1_sha512, + rsa_pkcs1_sha384, + rsa_pkcs1_sha256, + ecdsa_sha1, + rsa_pkcs1_sha1 + ], + signature_schemes(Version, Default). + + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +hkdf_expand(Algo, PseudoRandKey, ContextInfo, Length, N, N, Prev, Acc) -> + Keyingmaterial = hmac_hash(Algo, PseudoRandKey, <<Prev/binary, ContextInfo/binary, ?BYTE(N)>>), + binary:part(<<Acc/binary, Keyingmaterial/binary>>, {0, Length}); +hkdf_expand(Algo, PseudoRandKey, ContextInfo, Length, M, N, Prev, Acc) -> + Keyingmaterial = hmac_hash(Algo, PseudoRandKey, <<Prev/binary, ContextInfo/binary, ?BYTE(M)>>), + hkdf_expand(Algo, PseudoRandKey, ContextInfo, Length, M + 1, N, Keyingmaterial, <<Acc/binary, Keyingmaterial/binary>>). + %%%% HMAC and the Pseudorandom Functions RFC 2246 & 4346 - 5.%%%% hmac_hash(?NULL, _, _) -> <<>>; hmac_hash(Alg, Key, Value) -> crypto:hmac(mac_algo(Alg), Key, Value). +mac_algo(Alg) when is_atom(Alg) -> + Alg; mac_algo(?MD5) -> md5; mac_algo(?SHA) -> sha; mac_algo(?SHA256) -> sha256; @@ -395,6 +774,7 @@ ecc_curves(all) -> sect239k1,sect233k1,sect233r1,secp224k1,secp224r1, sect193r1,sect193r2,secp192k1,secp192r1,sect163k1, sect163r1,sect163r2,secp160k1,secp160r1,secp160r2]; + ecc_curves(Minor) -> TLSCurves = ecc_curves(all), ecc_curves(Minor, TLSCurves). @@ -409,6 +789,63 @@ ecc_curves(_Minor, TLSCurves) -> end end, [], TLSCurves). +-spec groups(4 | all | default) -> [group()]. +groups(all) -> + [x25519, + x448, + secp256r1, + secp384r1, + secp521r1, + ffdhe2048, + ffdhe3072, + ffdhe4096, + ffdhe6144, + ffdhe8192]; +groups(default) -> + [x25519, + x448, + secp256r1, + secp384r1]; +groups(Minor) -> + TLSGroups = groups(all), + groups(Minor, TLSGroups). +%% +-spec groups(4, [group()]) -> [group()]. +groups(_Minor, TLSGroups) -> + CryptoGroups = supported_groups(), + lists:filter(fun(Group) -> proplists:get_bool(Group, CryptoGroups) end, TLSGroups). + +default_groups(Minor) -> + TLSGroups = groups(default), + groups(Minor, TLSGroups). + +supported_groups() -> + %% TODO: Add new function to crypto? + proplists:get_value(curves, crypto:supports()) ++ + [ffdhe2048,ffdhe3072,ffdhe4096,ffdhe6144,ffdhe8192]. + +group_to_enum(secp256r1) -> 23; +group_to_enum(secp384r1) -> 24; +group_to_enum(secp521r1) -> 25; +group_to_enum(x25519) -> 29; +group_to_enum(x448) -> 30; +group_to_enum(ffdhe2048) -> 256; +group_to_enum(ffdhe3072) -> 257; +group_to_enum(ffdhe4096) -> 258; +group_to_enum(ffdhe6144) -> 259; +group_to_enum(ffdhe8192) -> 260. + +enum_to_group(23) -> secp256r1; +enum_to_group(24) -> secp384r1; +enum_to_group(25) -> secp521r1; +enum_to_group(29) -> x25519; +enum_to_group(30) -> x448; +enum_to_group(256) -> ffdhe2048; +enum_to_group(257) -> ffdhe3072; +enum_to_group(258) -> ffdhe4096; +enum_to_group(259) -> ffdhe6144; +enum_to_group(260) -> ffdhe8192; +enum_to_group(_) -> undefined. %% ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) oid_to_enum(?sect163k1) -> 1; |